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Category:- No Document Type Applies
MONTHYEARML22112A0062022-04-20020 April 2022
(Public Version) Oconee SLRA - Final RCI 3.5.2.2.2.6-L
ML21323A1152021-11-23023 November 2021
Subsequent License Renewal Environmental Review Requests for Additional and Subsequent Information - Enclosure
ML18060A0282018-02-28028 February 2018
Noncurrence Process - Alternative to Codes and Standards
ML16055A1882016-01-15015 January 2016
FOIA/PA-2016-0071 - Resp 3 - Interim, Continuing to Process Request. Part 2 of 2
ML16055A1872016-01-15015 January 2016
FOIA/PA-2016-0071 - Resp 3 - Interim, Continuing to Process Request. Part 1 of 2
ML15224A7792015-08-0707 August 2015
FOIA/PA-2015-0393 - Resp 2 - Final, Part 1 of 1
ML15162A0842015-06-11011 June 2015
GTCC Disposals at the Barnwell Low-Level Radioactive Waste Facility from 1998 to Present
ML14135A4082014-05-0707 May 2014
FOIA/PA-2013-0213 - Resp 3 - Final, Group Letter D. Part 1 of 1
ML14058A0822014-02-0404 February 2014
Questions and Answers Related to the Oconee External Flooding Issue
ML14058A0522014-02-0404 February 2014
Use of FERC Inundation Calculation Parameters
ML14058A0502014-02-0404 February 2014
Questions and Answers Related to Oconee Flood Barrier
ML14058A0492014-02-0404 February 2014
Site Adequate Protection Backfit Documented Evaluation
ML14058A0212014-02-0404 February 2014
Request for Opinion on the Safe Shutdown Facility Added to the License Basis for the Oconee Units in an SER
ML14058A0202014-02-0404 February 2014
Nancy Ssf Flooding URI Number 1
ML14058A0192014-02-0404 February 2014
TIA, Answers to Questions in Relation to Licensing Basis for Flooding for the Safe Shutdown Facility at Oconee Station
ML14058A0152014-02-0404 February 2014
Site Adequate Protection Backfit Documented Evaluation
ML14049A2872013-08-28028 August 2013
Meeting Feedback Form Meeting No. 20140354
ML16070A2882013-04-24024 April 2013
Jocassee and Keowee Dams, Breach Parameter Review, Dated April 24, 2013 (Redacted)
ML13240A0162013-03-0606 March 2013
Report, Enclosure Oconee Nuclear Station Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report
ML13052A7852013-02-26026 February 2013
Flood Licensing Basis Evaluation Open Items
ML13056A1052013-02-0606 February 2013
Comparison of Approaches for Calculating a Jocassee Dam Failure Frequency
ML13052A7802013-02-0606 February 2013
Options for Revising Oconee Flood CAL Due Dates
ML13052A7812013-02-0606 February 2013
Timeline - Summary of Events
ML13052A7832013-02-0606 February 2013
Draft NRC Information Notice on Dam Failure Frequency in Probabilistic Risk Assessments
ML13052A7872013-02-0606 February 2013
Justification for Continued Operation of Oconee Nuclear Station
ML13056A1002013-02-0606 February 2013
Resolution of Oconee Flooding Issue
ML13052A7862013-02-0606 February 2013
Jocassee Dame Failure Frequency Components
ML12121A6382012-04-30030 April 2012
Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Steam Generator Questions for Oconee Unit 3
ML12056A0522012-03-12012 March 2012
Enclosure 6 - List of Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status
ML12003A0632011-12-16016 December 2011
Tornado and High Energy Line Break (HELB) Mitigation License Amendment Requests (Lars) - Responses to Request for Additional Information, Part 2 of 6
ML12003A0672011-12-16016 December 2011
Tornado and High Energy Line Break (HELB) Mitigation License Amendment Requests (Lars) - Responses to Request for Additional Information, Part 4 of 6
ML12003A0682011-12-16016 December 2011
Tornado and High Energy Line Break (HELB) Mitigation License Amendment Requests (Lars) - Responses to Request for Additional Information, Part 5 of 6
ML12003A0692011-12-16016 December 2011
Tornado and High Energy Line Break (HELB) Mitigation License Amendment Requests (Lars) - Responses to Request for Additional Information, Part 6 of 6
ML1131406132011-11-0101 November 2011
Enclosure 3 - Regulatory Enforcement Conference - Resubmittal of Supplement
ML11279A2532011-10-0606 October 2011
NRC Pre-submittal Meeting - Proposed Tornado Mitigation Flowchart Revision 6 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML11279A2522011-10-0606 October 2011
NRC Pre-submittal Meeting- Proposed Turbine Building HELB Mitigation Flow Chart Revision 5 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML1101907492011-01-18018 January 2011
Enclosure 3 - List of Attendees
ML1035103792010-12-17017 December 2010
NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 08-0054, Revision 1
ML1026404582010-09-13013 September 2010
Enclosure 2 - Redacted Version of Request for Additional Information Re the License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)
ML1035100122010-08-19019 August 2010
NRC Staff Response to NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 08-0054, Revision 0 (Updated)
ML1023705812010-08-19019 August 2010
NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 08-0054
ML1019301982010-06-0909 June 2010
Onsite Ground/Surface Water Monitoring Questionnaire for Oconee Nuclear Station
ML14058A0612010-04-13013 April 2010
Draft Oconee Nuclear Site Adequate Protection Backfit Documented Evaluation
ML1019304602010-03-25025 March 2010
List of Historical Leaks and Spills at Us Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
ML1019305442010-02-0808 February 2010
Ground Water Communication Supplemental Information Questions and Answers
ML1100606662009-10-0909 October 2009
Photographs of Ssf Asw Leak and Piping Replacement Project Taken Between August 20, 2009 and October 9, 2009, by Oconee Resident Inspectors. Part 2 of 14
ML0927103442009-09-25025 September 2009
Site Visit Observation on 09/25/2009 by Joel Munday for Oconee
ML1100404352009-09-15015 September 2009
Plant Issue Tracking Application; Plant Status Daily - Oconee Information for 09/15/2009
ML1100309332009-07-13013 July 2009
Congressional Staff Briefing: Monday July 13, 2009, 3:30 Pm, Room 2108 Rayburn Bldg; Topic: Follow-Up Questions Regarding Chairman'S June 17, 2009 Response Regarding a IP2 Buried Pipe Leak
ML0909004332009-04-0606 April 2009
Enclosure 2 - Oconee Nuclear Station Regulatory Audit - Documents Reviewed
2022-04-20
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JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION OF OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Issue: The Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) at Oconee Nuclear Station may be flooded and rendered inoperable due to a breach of the Jocassee dam located upstream of the site.
Assessment: A review of the current condition of the Jocassee Dam indicates that it is structurally sound and unlikely to suffer a catastrophic failure during the required period of the next two years for the following reasons:
" Construction and Monitoring
- No seepage of water in the main dam and only minor seepage at the east and west abutments were identified in the FERC Inspection Report, "Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA)". Duke is performing biweekly inspection and monitoring of the condition of the dam, as required by FERC.
" The present level of the Jocassee Lake is about 23 feet below the lake's full pond level of 1110 ft due to the drought conditions. This reduces the loading that is imposed on the dam. Furthermore, a review of data showed that failure of the dam resulting from failure of spillways and gates is not likely.
" Seismic
- Due to robustness of its construction in 1973, the probability of an earthquake causing the catastrophic failure of the dam is considered to be low. Data on the potential for soil liquefaction is still being evaluated by NRC staff.
" Accident Mitigation
" Accident sequence progression timelines are on the order of days to containment breach and/or fuel pool boil-off which would allow time to implement mitigating actions. It is assumed that recovery of flooded roadways after floodwater recession will allow for providing a source of water for containment and spent fuel pool cooling.
" Duke has initiated a diverse program of constant surveillance of the performance of the dam by means of on-site cameras and also offsite monitoring of the observed data from its headquarters office. Duke has committed to augmenting their Severe Accident Mitigation Guidance (SAMG) procedures to include potential loss of the SSF due to external flood.
" Near Term Enhancements: Duke had proposed to increase the height of the entrance walls from 5.0 ft to 7.5 ft. Duke has also discussed the procurement of water-tight doors for these entrances with NRC staff which, along with associated engineering, provides the best defense against external flooding at the SSF.
