Text

Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis Results
	ML13045A124
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	02/26/2013
From:	V Sreenivas; Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	Heacock D; Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
	Sreenivas V
References
	TAC ME9802, TAC ME9803
	Download: ML13045A124 (46)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 26, 2013 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - FINAL ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR ANALYSIS RESULTS (TAC NOS. ME9802 AND ME9803)

Dear Mr. Heacock:

The enclosure provides the final results of an Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) analysis of a seismic operational events that occurred at North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 on August 23, 2011, as documented in the licensee's event reports 338/11-003, 339/11-001 and inspection reports 50-338/11-11, 50-339/12-10.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the ASP Program in 1979 in response to the Risk Assessment Review Group Report (see NUREG/CR-0400, dated September 1978). The ASP Program systematically evaluates U.S. nuclear power plant operating experience to identify, document, and rank the operating events most likely to lead to inadequate core cooling and severe core damage (precursors). As described in the NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-24, "Revised Review and Transmittal Process for Accident Sequence Precursor Analyses," the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research implemented several process changes to the ASP Program. In accordance with the RIS, this event has a conditional core damage probability greater than or equal to 1 x 10-4; therefore, a formal licensee review was requested. The final analysis was prepared based on the NRC staff's review and evaluation of your comments on the preliminary analysis.

D. Heacock -2 The enclosure containing the final analysis report is being provided for your information. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2597.

Sincerely,

. Sreenivas, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339

Enclosure:

Final Precursor Analysis Summary cc wI encl: Distribution via Listserv

ASP Analysis Accident Sequence Precursor Program - Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research North Anna, Earthquake Causes Reactor Trip with a Loss of Offsite Power and Units 1 & 2 Subsequent Failure of a Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator LERs: 338/11-003, 339/11-001 Unit 1 CCDP = 2x10-4 Event Date: 08/23/2011 IRs: 50-338/11-11, 50-339/12-10 Unit 2 CCDP = 4x10-5 EVENT

SUMMARY

Brief Event Description. On August 23, 2011, at 1:51 p.m., the site experienced a Magnitude 5.8 earthquake on the Richter scale with an epicenter approximately 11 miles southwest of the plant.1 Both reactor trip breakers opened on negative flux rate approximately 11 seconds after the event. Sudden pressure relay actuations were experienced on the reserve station service transformers (RSSTs) approximately 12 seconds after the event, leading to a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event. Approximately 20 seconds after the event, all four emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the station blackout (SBO) diesel generator started automatically. The four EDGs automatically aligned to their respective safety bus. At 2:40 p.m.,

EDG 2H was tripped in the control room due to a coolant leak. Approximately 38 minutes later, the SBO diesel generator was aligned to Bus 2H. At 10:58 p.m., offsite power was restored to the four safety buses. Both units were safely shutdown and stabilized under hot shutdown conditions.

Additional information is provided in References 1-5.

Key Event Details. The following event details are significant to the modeling of this event analysis:

The earthquake led to a reactor trip and LOOP event.

Approximately 49 minutes after the LOOP occurred, EDG 2H was tripped due to coolant leak. The SBO diesel generator was manually aligned to Safety Bus 2H. The gasket was replaced, the leak repaired, and EDG 2H was declared operable following post maintenance testing at 2311 hours96.292 days 13.756 weeks 3.166 months on August 25, 2011.

Offsite power was restored to all four safety buses approximately 9 hours0.375 days 0.0536 weeks 0.0123 months after the LOOP occurred.

The Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump was undergoing surveillance testing when the Unit 1 reactor trip occurred. Approximately 33 minutes later, the TDAFW pump was manually realigned and capable of injecting water into Steam Generator (SG) A.

1 The earthquake exceeded (on average) the North Anna Design Bases Earthquake (DBE) spectral accelerations in the more damaging frequency range of 2-10 hertz by about 12% in one horizontal orientation and 21% in the vertical orientation. The North Anna DBE ground spectra for rock and soil founded structures are anchored to 0.12g and 0.18g peak ground accelerations (PGA) respectively in the horizontal direction (Reference 1).

1

LER 338/11-003

The earthquake did not damage any of structures, systems, and/or components (SSCs).

However, there was an increased failure potential of SSCs due to the earthquake occurrence.

ANALYSIS RESULTS Conditional Core Damage Probability. The calculated conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for Units 1 and 2 are 2.1x10-4 and 4.1x10-5, respectively.

The Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program acceptance threshold is a CCDP of 1x10-6 or the CCDP equivalent of an uncomplicated reactor trip with a non-recoverable loss of secondary plant systems (e.g., feedwater and condensate), whichever is greater. This CCDP equivalent for North Anna Units 1 and 2 is 7x10-7.

Dominant Sequence. The dominant accident sequence, Loss of Offsite Power Switchyard Related (LOOPSC) Sequence 17-69 contributes 85% (Unit 1) and 65% (Unit 2) of the total seismic induced LOOP event CCDP. Additional sequences that contribute greater than 1% of the total internal events CCDP are provided in Appendix A.

The dominant sequence is shown graphically in Figures B-1 and B-2 in Appendix B. The events and important component failures in LOOPSC Sequence 17-69 are:

Switchyard-related LOOP occurs,

Reactor scram succeeds,

Emergency power fails,

SBO diesel generator was connected to Bus 2H,

Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) fails,

Operators fail to restore offsite power within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and

Operators fail to recover an EDG within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Analysis Results. Appendix A includes tables that provide the following:

Summary of conditional event changes, including base and change case probabilities/

frequencies.

Event tree dominant results.

Dominant sequences (including CCDPs).

Sequence logic for all dominant sequences.

Referenced fault trees (including definitions).

Cutset report for each dominant sequence.

MODELING ASSUMPTIONS Analysis Type. The Revision 8.17 of the North Anna SPAR model was used for the analysis of this initiating event.

Analysis Rules. The ASP program uses Significance Determination Process (SDP) results for degraded conditions when available. A licensee performance deficiency (PD) was identified in connection with coolant leak of EDG 2H. The PD involves the licensee failure to establish and maintain adequate maintenance procedures for the EDGs. Specifically, the procedure for installation of the jacket water cooling inlet jumper gasket did not provide adequate guidance, 2

LER 338/11-003 which resulted in the failure of the EDG 2H to perform its safety function on August 23, 2011.

The SDP assessment of risk of this PD was finalized on May 11, 2012 (Reference 5); resulting in a WHITE finding (i.e., low-to-moderate safety significance). However, the ASP Program performs independent analysis for events involving reactor trips. In addition, any SSC that was determined to be degraded, failed, or unavailable due to test/maintenance during the event is factored into the ASP initiating event analysis (regardless of whether the failures or degradations are due to licensee PD).

Modeling Assumptions. The following key modeling assumptions and parameter estimations were made for this initiating event analysis:

Unit 1

The event was modeled as a dual-unit, switchyard-related LOOP.

- The probability of IE-LOOPSC (Loss of Offsite Power Switchyard-Related Initiating Event) was set to 1.0; all other initiating event frequencies were set to zero.

- Basic Events DUAL-UNIT-LOOP (Probability that a LOOP is a Dual Unit LOOP) and OEP-VCF-LP-SITESC (Site LOOP- Switchyard-Related) were set to TRUE.

The offsite power could not be recovered within three hours.2

- Basic Events OEP-XHE-XL-NR01HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 1 Hour), OEP-XHE-XL-NR02HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 2 Hours),

and OEP-XHE-XL-NR03HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 3 Hours) were set to TRUE.

Sequence-specific HRA calculations were performed (see Appendix C):

- Basic event OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 4 Hours) was set to 5x10-3.

- Basic event DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP (Operators Fail to Strip DC Loads in 1 Hour) was set to 1x10-2.

- Basic event EPS-XHE-XM-AAC (Operators Fail to Start and Align SBO Diesel Generator to Bus 2H) was set to 2.0x10-2.

- Basic event AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL (Operators Fail to Control TDAFW pump) was set to 5.0x10-1.

If operators fail to strip dc loads within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the station batteries will deplete in 2 hours0.0833 days 0.0119 weeks 0.00274 months .

Since, offsite power was not restored to the switchyard until approximately 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months ; no credit for offsite power recovery prior to battery depletion was given. However, the TDAFW pump was capable of providing flow to the SGs if the batteries had depleted (if the operators successful realigned the pump to the SGs after testing). Therefore, additional time to SG dry-out and core uncovery allows for additional time for offsite power recovery to the safety busses.3 2

On August 23rd at 5:23 p.m., a RSST was returned to service, operators subsequently realigned offsite power to Safety Bus 2J (17 minutes later) and Safety Bus1H (25 minutes later).

3 The time to SG dry-out and core damage was estimated to be approximately 10 hours0.417 days 0.0595 weeks 0.0137 months regardless if operators successfully control TDAFW pump flow until the emergency condensate storage tank is empty or the operators fail to control the flow and overfill the SGs.

3

LER 338/11-003

- Basic event OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H2SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 6 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours), OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H2SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 7 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours), OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H2SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 9 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours), and OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H2SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 10 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours) were set to 5x10-3. See Appendix C for additional details.

Since offsite power recovery was credited prior to battery depletion for sequences that operators successfully stripped dc loads within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and thereby extending the battery depletion time to 4 hours0.167 days 0.0238 weeks 0.00548 months . No additional credit was given for later recovery of offsite power for these sequences.

- Basic event OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H4SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 6 Hours, Given Failure at 4 Hours), OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H4SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 7 Hours, Given Failure at 4 Hours), OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H4SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 9 Hours, Given Failure at 4 Hours), and OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H4SC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 10 Hours, Given Failure at 4 Hours) were set to TRUE.

The Unit 1 TDAFW pump was undergoing surveillance testing and was not immediately available when the event occurred. However, operators could stop the test and restart the system, and align TDAFW pump flow to a SG.

- The definition for basic event AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2 (AFW Turbine Pump Unavailable due to Test and Maintenance) was modified for this analysis. The event was modified to include both (1) the probability that the TDAFW pump was undergoing surveillance testing upon initiation of the LOOP and (2) non-recovery probability of operators to reset the pump and align it to feed a steam generator. The probability of (1) is 1.0 because the TDAFW pump was undergoing surveillance testing at the onset of the event. The probability of (2) was determined to be 2x10-2 (see Appendix C); therefore, the basic event AFW-TDP-TM-TDP was set to 2x10-2.

Operators tripped EDG 2H due to a coolant leak. EDG 2H was recovered approximately 6 hours0.25 days 0.0357 weeks 0.00822 months after it was secured due to the coolant leak; therefore, no recovery credit for its recovery was credited prior to battery depletion. However, recovery credit for the EDG is provided in applicable sequences that the TDAFW pump provides feed to the SGs after battery depletion.

- Basic Event EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H (EDG 2H Fails to Run) was set to TRUE.

The offsite power was recovered to all four safety buses approximately nine hours after the reactor trip and LOOP occurred; therefore, the default EDG and turbine-driven AFW pump mission times were changed to reflect the actual time offsite power was restored to the safety buses. Since the overall fail-to-run is made up of two separate factors, the mission times for these factors were set to the following: ZT-DGN-FR-E = 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and ZT-TDP-FR-E

= 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (base case values) and ZT-DGN-FR-L = 8 hours0.333 days 0.0476 weeks 0.011 months and ZT-TDP-FR-L= 8 hours0.333 days 0.0476 weeks 0.011 months .

Operators manually aligned the SBO diesel generator to Bus 2H when EDG 2H was tripped due to a coolant leak.

4

LER 338/11-003

- Basic Event EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT1 (Probability SBO Diesel Generator Used to Save Unit 1) was set to FALSE and Basic Event EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT2 (Probability SBO Diesel Generator Used to Save Unit 2) was set to TRUE.

Unit 24

The event was modeled as a dual-unit, switchyard-related LOOP.

- The probability of IE-LOOPSC (Loss of Offsite Power Switchyard-Related Initiating Event) was set to 1.0; all other initiating event probabilities were set to zero.

- DUAL-UNIT-LOOP (Probability that a LOOP is a Dual Unit LOOP) and OEP-VCF-LP-SITESC (Site LOOP- Switchyard-Related) were set to TRUE.

The offsite power could not be recovered within three hours.

- Basic Events OEP-XHE-XL-NR01HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 1 Hour), OEP-XHE-XL-NR02HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 2 Hours),

and OEP-XHE-XL-NR03HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 3 Hours) were set to TRUE.

Sequence-specific HRA calculations were performed (see Appendix C):

- Basic event OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 4 Hours) was set to 5x10-3.

- Basic event DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP (Operators Fail to Strip DC Loads in 1 Hour) is set to 1x10-2.

- Basic event EPS-XHE-XM-AAC (Operators Fail to Start and Align SBO Diesel Generator to Bus 2H) was set to 2x10-2.

- Basic event AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL (Operators Fail to Control TDAFW pump) was set to 5.0x10-1.

If operators fail to strip dc loads within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the station batteries will deplete in 2 hours0.0833 days 0.0119 weeks 0.00274 months .

Since, offsite power was not restored to the switchyard until approximately 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months ; no credit for offsite power recovery prior to battery depletion was given. However, the TDAFW pump was capable of providing flow to the SGs if the batteries had depleted. Therefore, additional time to SG dry-out and core uncovery allows for additional time for offsite power recovery to the safety busses.

- Basic event OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H2SC, OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H2SC, OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H2SC, and OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H2SC were set to 5x10-3. See Appendix C for additional details.

Since offsite power recovery was credited prior to battery depletion for sequences that operators successfully stripped dc loads within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and thereby extending the battery depletion time to 4 hours0.167 days 0.0238 weeks 0.00548 months . No additional credit was given for later recovery of offsite power for these sequences.

4 The Unit 1 SPAR model was used to analyze the Unit 2 risk; therefore, in some cases, Unit 1 basic events are used to represent Unit 2 components.

5

LER 338/11-003

- Basic event OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H4SC, OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H4SC, OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H4SC, and OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H4SC were set to TRUE.

Operators tripped EDG 2H due to a coolant leak. EDG 2H was recovered approximately 6 hours0.25 days 0.0357 weeks 0.00822 months after it was secured due to the coolant leak; therefore, no recovery credit for its recovery was credited prior to battery depletion. However, recovery credit for the EDG is provided in applicable sequences that the TDAFW pump provides feed to the SGs after battery depletion.

- Basic Event EPS-DGN-FR-DG1H (EDG 1H Fails to Run) was set to TRUE.

The offsite power was recovered to all four safety buses approximately nine hours after the reactor trip and LOOP occurred; therefore, the default EDG and turbine-driven AFW pump mission times were changed to reflect the actual time offsite power was restored to the safety buses. Since the overall fail-to-run is made up of two separate factors, the mission times for these factors were set to the following: ZT-DGN-FR-E = 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and ZT-TDP-FR-E

= 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (base case values) and ZT-DGN-FR-L = 8 hours0.333 days 0.0476 weeks 0.011 months and ZT-TDP-FR-L= 8 hours0.333 days 0.0476 weeks 0.011 months .

Operator manually aligned the SBO diesel generator to Bus 2H when EDG 2H was tripped due to a coolant leak.

- Basic Event EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT1 (Probability SBO Diesel Generator Used to Save Unit 1) was set to TRUE and Basic Event EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT2 (Probability SBO Diesel Generator Used to Save Unit 2) was set to FALSE.

Seismic Impact on Risk. Based on U.S. Geological Survey data, the best estimate of the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) for the August 23, 2010 earthquake at the North Anna site is 0.2g (Reference 1). The range for Seismic Initiator Bin 1 is 0.05g-0.28g (References 6 and 7);

therefore, Seismic Initiator Bin-1 component fragilities and failure probabilities were selected for this analysis. Since the earthquake caused a LOOP initiating event, no other seismically-induced initiating events (e.g., loss-of-coolant accidents) were evaluated in this analysis. In addition, only the seismic failure probabilities for key components to mitigate a seismically-induced LOOP initiating event were included.

Based on generic component fragilities (References 6 and 7), the following seismic failure probabilities were calculated given the earthquake that occurred at the North Anna site on August 23rd.5 Probability of Basic Event Component Description Failure for a Bin-1 Earthquake EQ-SWS-FA Intake Structure 9.2E-7 EQ-AC1H1-FA 480V 1H1 Emergency Bus 2.5E-5 EQ-AC1J1-FA 480V 1J1 Emergency Bus 2.5E-5 EQ-EDG1H-FA EDG 1H 1.5E-7 EQ-EDG1J-FA EDG 1J 1.5E-7 EQ-EDG2H-FA EDG 2H 1.5E-7 EQ-EDG2J-FA EDG 2J 1.5E-7 5

These seismic failure probabilities were added to their applicable fault trees as basic events (the revised fault trees are provided in Appendix B):

6

LER 338/11-003 Probability of Basic Event Component Description Failure for a Bin-1 Earthquake EQ-AFW-TDP-FA Turbine-Driven AFW Pump 2.6E-5 EQ-ECST-FA Emergency Condensate Storage Tank 3.5E-7 EQ-BDC-1-I DC Bus 1-I Failed due to Earthquake 2.5E-6 EQ-BDC-1-II DC Bus 1-II Failed due to Earthquake 2.5E-6 EQ-BDC-1-III DC Bus 1-III Failed due to Earthquake 2.5E-6 EQ-BDC-2-I DC Bus 2-I Failed due to Earthquake 2.5E-6 EQ-BDC-2-III DC Bus 2-III Failed due to Earthquake 2.5E-6 EQ-BCH-CHR-I Battery Charger I Failed due to Earthquake 8.1E-4 EQ-BCH-CHR-II Battery Charger II Failed due to Earthquake 8.1E-4 EQ-BCH-CHR-III Battery Charger III Failed due to Earthquake 8.1E-4 Without the seismic fragility considerations, the event CCDPs are 2.1x10-4 and 4.1x10-5 for Units 1 and 2, respectively, which is about 1% lower than the risk calculated considering these fragilities. While this is not a complete seismic analysis using plant-specific fragilities, it is reasonable to conclude the earthquake at North Anna did not significantly reduce the ability of the plant to respond to and mitigate the initiating event.

Sensitivity Studies. The modeling of the SBO diesel generator is an important assumption on the CCDPs for both units in the analysis of this dual unit LOOP event. During the event, EDG 2H failed and the SBO diesel generator was aligned to supply power to Bus 2H. This analysis models the SBO diesel generator being modeled as aligned to only Unit 2.

The following table shows the sensitivity analysis of changing the probabilities of the alignment of the SBO diesel generator between the two units. The individual unit CCDPs increased when the probability of the SBO diesel generator alignment decreased (i.e., the unit event risk increases as the likelihood of that unit having the SBO diesel generator available decreases).6 Probability of SBO Diesel CCDP CCDP CCDP Generator Alignment (Unit 1) (Unit 2) (Both Units)

Unit 1, P = 0.0, Unit 2, P = 1.0 2.1E-04 4.1E-05 2.5E-04 Unit 1, P = 0.2, Unit 2, P = 0.8 1.8E-04 6.5E-05 2.4E-04 Unit 1, P = 0.4, Unit 2, P = 0.6 1.4E-04 9.0E-05 2.3E-04 Unit 1, P = 0.6, Unit 2, P = 0.4 9.7E-05 1.1E-04 2.1E-04 Unit 1, P = 0.8, Unit 2, P = 0.2 5.7E-05 1.4E-04 2.0E-04 Unit 1, P = 1.0, Unit 2, P = 0.0 1.7E-05 1.6E-04 1.8E-04 REFERENCES

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Management Directive 8.3 11-012, Decision Documentation for Reactive Inspection, August 24, 2011 (ML112410546).

2. Virginia Electric and Power Company, LER 338/11-003, Dual Unit Reactor Trip and ESF Actuations during Seismic Event with a Loss of Offsite Power, October 20, 2011 (ML11299A018).

6 The Unit 1 CCDP is more sensitive to alignment probability of the SBO due to the Unit 1 TDAFW pump being in surveillance testing at the time of the LOOP (and therefore a higher than nominal unavailability due to operator recovery).

7

LER 338/11-003

3. Virginia Electric and Power Company, LER 339/11-001, Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Coolant Leak, November 23, 2011 (ML11340A034).

4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Augmented Inspection Report 50-338/11-11, North Anna Power Station-NRC Integrated Inspection, October 31, 2011 (ML113040031).

5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inspection Report 50-338/12-10, North Anna Final Significance Determination of a WHITE Finding, Notice of Violation, and Assessment Follow-Up Letter, May 11, 2012 (ML12136A115).

6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Seismic Fragility Tables, October 2011 (ML071220070).

7. S. Khericha, et al, Development of Simplified Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for Seismic Initiating Event, Eleventh International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management and European Safety and Reliability Association Conference, Helsinki, Finland, will be published on June 25-29, 2012 (ML12018A034).

8. Idaho National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-6883, The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method, August 2005 (ML051950061).

9. Idaho National Laboratory, INL/EXT-10-18533, SPAR-H Step-by-Step Guidance, May 2011 (ML112060305).

8

LER 338/11-003 Appendix A: Analysis Results Unit 1 Summary of Conditional Event Changes Event Description Cond. Nominal Value Value AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2 AFW TURBINE PUMP UNAVAILALBLE DUE TO T/M 2.00E-2 5.39E-3 AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL OPERATOR FAILS TO CONTROL AFW TDP 5.00E-1 3.00E-1 DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP OPERATORS STRIPS DC LOADS WITHIN 1 HOUR 1.00E-2 2.20E-1 DUAL-UNIT-LOOP PROBABILITY THAT A LOOP IS A DUAL UNIT LOOP TRUE 5.82E-1 EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H DIESEL GENERATOR 2H FAILS TO RUN TRUE 2.84E-2 EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT1 PROBABILITY AAC DIESEL USED TO SAVE UNIT 1 FALSE 5.00E-1 EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT2 PROBABILITY AAC DIESEL USED TO SAVE UNIT 2 TRUE 5.00E-1 EPS-XHE-XM-AAC FAILURE TO START AND ALIGN THE AAC (SBO) DIESEL 2.00E-2 1.00E-1 GENERATOR IE-LOOPSCa LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATOR (SWITCHYARD- 1.00E+0 1.04E-2 CENTERED)

OEP-VCF-LP-SITESC SITE LOOP (SWITCHYARD-RELATED) TRUE 2.11E-1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR01HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 TRUE 4.02E-1 HOUR OEP-XHE-XL-NR02HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 TRUE 2.24E-1 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR03HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 3 TRUE 1.45E-1 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 4 5.00E-3 1.02E-1 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 6 5.00E-3 2.62E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 6 TRUE 5.73E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 7 5.00E-3 2.08E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 7 TRUE 4.55E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 9 5.00E-3 1.39E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 9 TRUE 3.04E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 10 5.00E-3 1.17E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 10 TRUE 2.55E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS ZT-DGN-FR-Lb DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO RUN 8.73E-3 2.47E-2 ZT-TDP-FR-Lb TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN 5.60E-4 3.52E-2 EPS-DGN-FR-DGAACb ALTERNATE AC DIESEL FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12b CCF OF UNIT 1 & 2 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN 6.01E-3 2.22E-4 EPS-DGN-FR-DG1Hb DIESEL GENERATOR 1H FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2 EPS-DGN-FR-DG1Jb DIESEL GENERATOR 1J FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2 AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2b AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN 4.97E-3 3.95E-2 EPS-DGN-FR-DG2Jb DIESEL GENERATOR 2J FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2

a. All other initiating event probabilities were set to zero.

b. The conditional probability values for these events were automatically calculated in SAPHIRE due to other basic event probability modifications.

A-1

LER 338/11-003 Implied Event Changes as per RASP Guidance Event Description Cond. Nominal Value Value EPS-DGN-FS-DG2H DIESEL GENERATOR 2H FAILS TO START FALSE 2.89E-3 EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H UNIT 2 EDG 2H UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T& M TRUE 1.43E-2 EPS-DGN-CF-FSU12 CCF OF UNIT 1 & 2 DIESELGENERATORS TO START 1.75E-5 1.77E-5 Dominant Sequence Results Only items contributing at least 1.0% to the total CCDP are displayed.

Event Tree Sequence CCDP % Contribution Description LOOPSC 17-69 1.75E-4 85.0% /RPS-L, EPS, AFW-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H LOOPSC 17-21 1.22E-5 5.9% /RPS-L, EPS, /AFW-B, /PORV-B, /RSD, BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, DGR-02H LOOPSC 17-66 3.71E-6 1.8% /RPS-L, EPS, /AFW-B, PORV-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H Total 2.06E-4 100%

Referenced Fault Trees Fault Tree Description AFW-B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BP1 RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING)

BP2 RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY DGR-01H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR DGR-02H DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY IN 2 HRS EPS EMERGENCY POWER OPR-01H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR OPR-02H OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 2 HRS PORV-B NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 PWR A1 PORVS/SRVS DURING SBO Cutset Report - LOOPSC 17-69

CCDP Total % Cutset 1.75E-4 100 Displaying 1414 of 1414 Cut Sets.

1 1.05E-4 59.8 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 2 3.40E-5 19.4 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 3 2.61E-5 14.9 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 4 5.24E-6 2.99 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XR-FW543,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 5 2.62E-6 1.5 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H Cutset Report - LOOPSC 17-21

CCDP Total % Cutset 1.22E-5 100 Displaying 241 of 241 Cutsets.

1 1.20E-5 98.6 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 Cutset Report - LOOPSC 17-66

CCDP Total % Cutset 3.71E-6 100 Displaying 335 of 335 Cutsets.

1 1.83E-6 49.3 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 2 1.83E-6 49.3 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C Referenced Events Name Description Probability A-2

LER 338/11-003 Name Description Probability AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2 AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN 5.0E-03 AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2 AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO START 6.5E-03 AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2 AFW TURBINE PUMP UNAVAILALBLE DUE TO TM 2.0E-02 AFW-XHE-XR-FW543 1-FW-543 RECIRCULATION VALVE TO ECST LEFT OPEN 1.0E-03 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12 CCF OF UNIT 1 & 2 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN 5.8E-03 EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EDG IN 1 HOUR 8.7E-01 EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EDG IN 2 HOURS 8.0E-01 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATOR (SWITCHYARD-IE-LOOPSC 1.0E+00 RELATED)

PPR-MOV-FC-1535 PORV 1 (AOV-1455C) BLOCK VALVE (1535) FAILS TO CLOSE 9.6E-04 PPR-MOV-FC-1536 PORV 2 (AOV-1456) BLOCK VALVE (1536) FAILS TO CLOSE 9.6E-04 PPR-SRV-CO-SBO PORVS/SRVS OPEN DURING SBO 3.7E-01 RCS-MDP-LK-BP1 RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING) FAILS 1.25E-02 RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING) FAILS 2.0E-01 A-3

LER 338/11-003 Unit 2 Summary of Conditional Event Changes Event Description Cond. Nominal Value Value AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL OPERATOR FAILS TO CONTROL AFW TDP 5.00E-1 3.00E-1 DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP OPERATORS STRIPS DC LOADS WITHIN 1 HOUR 1.00E-2 2.20E-1 DUAL-UNIT-LOOP PROBABILITY THAT A LOOP IS A DUAL UNIT LOOP TRUE 5.82E-1 EPS-DGN-FR-DG1H DIESEL GENERATOR 1H FAILS TO RUN TRUE 2.84E-2 EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT1 PROBABILITY AAC DIESEL USED TO SAVE UNIT 1 FALSE 5.00E-1 EPS-PROB-AAC-UNIT2 PROBABILITY AAC DIESEL USED TO SAVE UNIT 2 TRUE 5.00E-1 EPS-XHE-XM-AAC FAILURE TO START AND ALIGN THE AAC (SBO) DIESEL 2.00E-2 1.00E-1 GENERATOR IE-LOOPSCa LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATOR (SWITCHYARD- 1.00E+0 1.04E-2 CENTERED)

OEP-VCF-LP-SITESC SITE LOOP (SWITCHYARD-RELATED) TRUE 2.11E-1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR01HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 TRUE 4.02E-1 HOUR OEP-XHE-XL-NR02HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 TRUE 2.24E-1 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR03HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 3 TRUE 1.45E-1 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 4 5.00E-3 1.02E-1 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 6 5.00E-3 2.62E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 6 TRUE 5.73E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 7 5.00E-3 2.08E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 7 TRUE 4.55E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 9 5.00E-3 1.39E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 9 TRUE 3.04E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H2SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 10 5.00E-3 1.17E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 2 HOURS OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H4SC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 10 TRUE 2.55E-1 HOURS GIVEN FAILURE IN 4 HOURS ZT-DGN-FR-Lb DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO RUN 8.73E-3 2.47E-2 ZT-TDP-FR-Lb TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN 5.60E-4 3.52E-2 EPS-DGN-FR-DGAACb ALTERNATE AC DIESEL FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12b CCF OF UNIT 1 & 2 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN 6.01E-3 2.22E-4 EPS-DGN-FR-DG1Hb DIESEL GENERATOR 1H FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2 EPS-DGN-FR-DG1Jb DIESEL GENERATOR 1J FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2 AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2b AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN 4.97E-3 3.95E-2 b

EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J DIESEL GENERATOR 2J FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-2 2.84E-2

a. All other initiating event frequencies were set to zero.

b. The conditional probability values for these events were automatically calculated in SAPHIRE due to other basic event probability modifications.

A-4

LER 338/11-003 Implied Event Changes as per RASP Guidance Event Description Cond. Nominal Value Value EPS-DGN-FS-DG2H DIESEL GENERATOR 2H FAILS TO START FALSE 2.89E-3 EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H UNIT 2 EDG 2H UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T& M TRUE 1.43E-2 EPS-DGN-CF-FSU12 CCF OF UNIT 1 & 2 DIESELGENERATORS TO START 1.75E-5 1.77E-5 Dominant Sequence Results Only items contributing at least 1.0% to the total CCDP are displayed.

Event Tree Sequence CCDP % Contribution Description LOOPSC 17-69 2.64E-5 64.5% /RPS-L, EPS, AFW-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H LOOPSC 17-21 3.59E-6 8.8% /RPS-L, EPS, /AFW-B, /PORV-B, /RSD, BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, DGR-02H LOOPSC 16 1.84E-6 4.5% /RPS-L, /EPS, AFW-L, FAB-L LOOPSC 02-06 1.61E-6 3.9% /RPS-L, /EPS, /AFW, /PORV, LOSC-L, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, HPI-SIL LOOPSC 02-05 1.56E-6 3.8% /RPS-L, /EPS, /AFW, /PORV, LOSC-L, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, /HPI-SIL, RSS-SIL LOOPSC 17-66 1.09E-6 2.7% /RPS-L, EPS, /AFW-B, PORV-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H LOOPSC 17-03-08 7.03E-7 1.7% /RPS-L, EPS, /AFW-B, /PORV-B, /RSD, /BP1, /BP2,

/DC-STRIP, OPR-04H, DGR-04H, /AFW-MAN, CST-REFILL-LT1, SG-DEP-LT, PWR-REC-10H4 LOOPSC 17-03-12 7.03E-7 1.7% /RPS-L, EPS, /AFW-B, /PORV-B, /RSD, /BP1, /BP2,

/DC-STRIP, OPR-04H, DGR-04H, AFW-MAN, SG-DEP-LT1, PWR-REC-10H4 LOOPSC 02-04 6.72E-7 1.6% /RPS-L, /EPS, /AFW, /PORV, LOSC-L, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, /HPI-SIL, /RSS-SIL, HPR-SIL Total 4.10E-5 100%

Referenced Fault Trees Fault Tree Description AFW-B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFW-L AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DURING LOOP AFW-MAN MANUAL CONTROL AFW BP1 RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING)

BP2 RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY CST-REFILL-LT1 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK REFILL LONG-TERM DGR-01H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR DGR-02H DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY IN 2 HRS DGR-04H DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)

EPS EMERGENCY POWER FAB-L FEED AND BLEED DURING LOOP HPI-SIL HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION HPR-SIL HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC LOSC-L RCP SEALS SURVIVE LOOP OPR-01H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR OPR-02H OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 2 HRS OPR-04H OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)

PORV-B NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 PWR A1 PORVS/SRVS DURING SBO PWR-REC-10H4 LATE POWER RECOVERY (10 HR)

RSS-SIL RECIRC SPRAY SG-DEP-LT DEPRESSURIZE SGS SG-DEP-LT1 DEPRESSURIZE SGS (DEPENDENT)

A-5

LER 338/11-003 Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 17-69

CCDP Total % Cut Set 2.64E-5 100 Displaying 1047 of 1047 Cut Sets.

1 1.62E-6 6.14 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 2 1.41E-6 5.34 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 3 1.24E-6 4.71 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 4 1.17E-6 4.43 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 5 1.08E-6 4.09 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 6 1.01E-6 3.83 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 7 1.01E-6 3.83 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 8 8.80E-7 3.33 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 9 8.40E-7 3.18 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 10 7.75E-7 2.93 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 11 7.75E-7 2.93 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 12 7.30E-7 2.76 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 13 6.80E-7 2.57 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 14 6.74E-7 2.55 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 15 5.65E-7 2.14 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 16 5.21E-7 1.97 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 17 4.88E-7 1.85 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 18 4.24E-7 1.61 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 19 4.05E-7 1.53 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 20 3.74E-7 1.42 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 21 3.52E-7 1.33 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 22 3.27E-7 1.24 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 23 3.25E-7 1.23 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H 24 2.72E-7 1.03 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC 25 2.71E-7 1.02 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 17-21

CCDP Total % Cut Set 3.59E-6 100 Displaying 185 of 185 Cut Sets.

1 5.74E-7 16 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 A-6

LER 338/11-003 2 4.99E-7 13.9 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 3 3.58E-7 9.98 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 4 3.58E-7 9.98 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 5 3.11E-7 8.67 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 6 2.41E-7 6.71 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 7 1.73E-7 4.81 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 8 1.50E-7 4.18 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 9 1.16E-7 3.22 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 10 9.57E-8 2.67 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 11 8.30E-8 2.31 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 12 8.30E-8 2.31 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 13 7.21E-8 2.01 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 14 7.21E-8 2.01 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 15 7.05E-8 1.96 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 16 6.87E-8 1.91 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 17 5.97E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 18 5.05E-8 1.41 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 19 4.39E-8 1.22 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 16

CCDP Total % Cut Set 1.84E-6 100 Displaying 2246 of 2246 Cut Sets.

1 2.00E-7 10.9 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-CKV-CO-LEAKAGE,HPI-XHE-XM-BLEED2 2 2.00E-7 10.9 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-CKV-CO-LEAKAGE,HPI-XHE-XM-FB 3 1.49E-7 8.12 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-PMP-CF-ALL,HPI-XHE-XM-BLEED2 4 1.49E-7 8.12 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-PMP-CF-ALL,HPI-XHE-XM-FB 5 1.07E-7 5.81 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,PPR-SRV-CF-PRVS 6 1.00E-7 5.44 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,HPI-XHE-XM-FB,HPI-XHE-XM-RECBLEED 7 1.00E-7 5.44 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,HPI-XHE-XM-BLEED2,HPI-XHE-XM-RECBLEED 8 3.54E-8 1.92 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,PPR-SRV-CC-1456 9 2.54E-8 1.38 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,PPR-SRV-CC-1456 10 2.21E-8 1.2 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,PPR-SRV-CC-1456 11 1.94E-8 1.05 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN 12 1.88E-8 1.02 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 02-06 A-7

LER 338/11-003

CCDP Total % Cut Set 1.61E-6 100 Displaying 2679 of 2679 Cut Sets.

1 1.07E-7 6.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 2 9.34E-8 5.79 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 3 6.70E-8 4.15 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 4 6.70E-8 4.15 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 5 5.82E-8 3.61 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 6 3.89E-8 2.41 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,HPI-MDP-FS-1B,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 7 3.38E-8 2.1 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,HPI-MDP-FS-1B,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 8 2.43E-8 1.5 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H,HPI-MDP-FS-1B,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 9 2.43E-8 1.5 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,HPI-MDP-FS-1B,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 10 2.24E-8 1.39 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-MOV-CF-1115BD,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 11 2.17E-8 1.34 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-MDP-TM-ABC,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 12 2.11E-8 1.31 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,HPI-MDP-FS-1B,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 13 2.10E-8 1.3 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,HVC-PND-OC-103-12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 14 1.88E-8 1.17 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H,HPI-MDP-CF-STRTABC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 15 1.83E-8 1.13 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,HVC-PND-OC-103-12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 16 1.64E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H,HPI-MDP-CF-STRTABC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 02-05

CCDP Total % Cut Set 1.56E-6 100 Displaying 968 of 968 Cut Sets.

1 1.56E-7 10 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 2 1.36E-7 8.72 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 3 9.73E-8 6.26 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 4 9.73E-8 6.26 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 5 9.16E-8 5.89 IE-LOOPSC,EQ-SWS-FA,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 6 8.46E-8 5.44 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 7 8.45E-8 5.43 IE-LOOPSC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-MDP-CF-ALLFS 8 6.01E-8 3.87 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-SMP-PG-NL,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 9 3.14E-8 2.02 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG2J,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 10 2.26E-8 1.45 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG2J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 11 2.26E-8 1.45 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 12 2.25E-8 1.44 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B72 A-8

LER 338/11-003 13 1.96E-8 1.26 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 14 1.96E-8 1.26 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 15 1.95E-8 1.26 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B72 16 1.91E-8 1.23 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-SEQ-FO-2J,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 17 1.87E-8 1.2 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M2,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 18 1.87E-8 1.2 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-15F5,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 19 1.87E-8 1.2 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15F1,EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 20 1.62E-8 1.04 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-15F5,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 21 1.62E-8 1.04 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M2,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 22 1.62E-8 1.04 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15F1,EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J,/HPI-MDP-TM-1B,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 23 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05L3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-A168 24 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05L2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-A168 25 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D1,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-A168 26 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CO-05L3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-A168 27 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15F1,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 28 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-A168 29 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-15F5,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 30 1.57E-8 1.01 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-HDR-TM-B168 Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 17-66

CCDP Total % Cut Set 1.09E-6 100 Displaying 273 of 273 Cut Sets.

1 8.71E-8 8 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 2 8.71E-8 8 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 3 7.57E-8 6.95 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 4 7.57E-8 6.95 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 5 5.43E-8 4.99 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 6 5.43E-8 4.99 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 7 5.43E-8 4.99 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 8 5.43E-8 4.99 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 9 4.72E-8 4.33 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 10 4.72E-8 4.33 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C A-9

LER 338/11-003 11 3.65E-8 3.35 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 12 3.65E-8 3.35 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 13 2.62E-8 2.41 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 14 2.62E-8 2.41 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 15 2.28E-8 2.09 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 16 2.28E-8 2.09 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 17 1.76E-8 1.61 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 18 1.76E-8 1.61 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 19 1.45E-8 1.33 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 20 1.45E-8 1.33 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 21 1.26E-8 1.16 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 22 1.26E-8 1.16 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 23 1.26E-8 1.16 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 24 1.26E-8 1.16 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 25 1.09E-8 1 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 26 1.09E-8 1 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1536,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1456 27 1.09E-8 1 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C 28 1.09E-8 1 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,/PPR-MOV-FC-1535,PPR-SRV-CO-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-1455C Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 17-03-08

CCDP Total % Cut Set 7.03E-7 100 Displaying 173 of 173 Cut Sets.

1 7.64E-8 10.9 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 2 6.64E-8 9.45 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 3 5.83E-8 8.29 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 4 4.82E-8 6.86 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 5 4.76E-8 6.78 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 6 4.14E-8 5.89 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 7 3.63E-8 5.17 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 A-10

LER 338/11-003 8 3.55E-8 5.05 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 9 3.20E-8 4.56 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 10 3.12E-8 4.44 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 11 3.01E-8 4.28 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 12 2.30E-8 3.27 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 13 2.24E-8 3.19 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 14 2.21E-8 3.15 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 15 2.00E-8 2.84 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 16 1.95E-8 2.77 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 17 1.10E-8 1.57 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 18 1.10E-8 1.57 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 19 9.60E-9 1.37 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 20 9.14E-9 1.3 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 21 8.42E-9 1.2 IE-LOOPSC,/AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 17-03-12

CCDP Total % Cut Set 7.03E-7 100 Displaying 173 of 173 Cut Sets.

1 7.64E-8 10.9 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 2 6.64E-8 9.45 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 3 5.83E-8 8.29 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 4 4.82E-8 6.86 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 5 4.76E-8 6.78 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 A-11

LER 338/11-003 6 4.14E-8 5.89 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 7 3.63E-8 5.17 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 8 3.55E-8 5.05 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 9 3.20E-8 4.56 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 10 3.12E-8 4.44 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,EPS-XHE-XM-AAC,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 11 3.01E-8 4.28 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 12 2.30E-8 3.27 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 13 2.24E-8 3.19 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 14 2.21E-8 3.15 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-SEQ-FO-1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 15 2.00E-8 2.84 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 16 1.95E-8 2.77 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 17 1.10E-8 1.57 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 18 1.10E-8 1.57 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 19 9.60E-9 1.37 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 20 9.14E-9 1.3 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D3,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 21 8.42E-9 1.2 IE-LOOPSC,AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL,/DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP,EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J,EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC,EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H,EPS-XHE-XL-NR10H4,OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 Cut Set Report - LOOPSC 02-04

CCDP Total % Cut Set 6.72E-7 100 Displaying 2174 of 2174 Cut Sets.

1 1.42E-8 2.12 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-CF-FSAB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 2 1.42E-8 2.12 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-CF-FSAB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 3 1.12E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MOV-CF-1860AB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 4 1.12E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MOV-CF-1863AB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 A-12

LER 338/11-003 5 1.12E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MOV-CF-1860AB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 6 1.12E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MOV-CF-1863AB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 7 1.12E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-MOV-CF-1863AB,HPI-TRNA-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 8 1.12E-8 1.66 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-MOV-CF-1863AB,HPI-TRNB-RUN,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 9 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 10 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05L2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 11 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CO-05L3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 12 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-15F5,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 13 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 14 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 15 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05L2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 16 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CO-05L3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 17 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-15F5,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 18 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05M2,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 19 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05L3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 20 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15F1,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 21 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D1,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 22 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-OO-05L3,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 23 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15F1,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 24 1.02E-8 1.52 IE-LOOPSC,ACP-CRB-CC-15D1,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-TM-1A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 25 7.61E-9 1.13 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNB-RUN,LPI-MDP-CF-FRAB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 26 7.61E-9 1.13 IE-LOOPSC,EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12,HPI-TRNA-RUN,LPI-MDP-CF-FRAB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 Referenced Events Name Description Probability ACP-CRB-CC-15D3 BREAKER 15D3 FAILS TO OPEN 2.39E-03 ACP-CRB-CC-15F1 1-EP-BKR-15F1 ON 4160 V BUS 1F FAILS TO OPEN 2.39E-03 ACP-CRB-OO-05L1 0-AAC-BKR-05L1 ON 4160 V BUS 0L FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-03 ACP-CRB-OO-05L2 0-AAC-BKR-05L2 ON 4160 V BUS 0L FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-03 ACP-CRB-OO-05L3 0-AAC-BKR-05L3 ON 4160 V BUS 0L FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-03 ACP-CRB-OO-05M2 0-AAC-BKR-05M2 ON 4160 V BUS 0M FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-03 ACP-CRB-OO-05M3 0-AAC-BKR-05M3 ON 4160 V BUS 0M FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-03 ACP-CRB-OO-15F5 0-AAC-BKR-15F5 ON 4160 V BUS 0M FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-03 AFW-CKV-CO-LEAKAGE SG CKVS 1-FW-68, 100, & 132 LEAK CAUSE STEAM BINDING 1.0E-05 AFW-TDP-FR-TDP2 AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN 5.0E-03 AFW-TDP-FS-TDP2 AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO START 6.5E-03 A-13

LER 338/11-003 Name Description Probability AFW-TDP-TM-TDP2 AFW TURBINE PUMP UNAVAILALBLE DUE TO TM 5.4E-03 AFW-XHE-XM-CNTRL OPERATOR FAILS TO CONTROL AFW TDP 5.0E-01 AFW-XHE-XM-REC1ED8 1-AP-22 5 LOSS OF EMERGENCY CST 5.0E-04 DCP-XHE-XA-STRIP OPERATORS STRIPS DC LOADS WITHIN 1 HOUR 2.0E-02 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU12 CCF OF UNIT 1 & 2 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN 5.8E-03 EPS-DGN-FR-DG1J DIESEL GENERATOR 1J FAILS TO RUN 1.3E-02 EPS-DGN-FR-DG2H DIESEL GENERATOR 2H FAILS TO RUN 1.3E-02 EPS-DGN-FR-DG2J DIESEL GENERATOR 2J FAILS TO RUN 1.3E-02 EPS-DGN-FR-DGAAC SBO DIESEL FAILS TO RUN 1.3E-02 EPS-DGN-FS-DG1J DIESEL GENERATOR 1J FAILS TO START 2.9E-03 EPS-DGN-FS-DG2H DIESEL GENERATOR 2H FAILS TO START 2.9E-03 EPS-DGN-FS-DG2J DIESEL GENERATOR 2J FAILS TO START 2.9E-03 EPS-DGN-FS-DGAAC SBO DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO START 2.9E-03 EPS-DGN-TM-DG1J DIESEL GENERATOR 1J UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 1.4E-02 EPS-DGN-TM-DG2H UNIT 2 EDG 2H UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 1.4E-02 EPS-DGN-TM-DG2J DIESEL GENERATOR 2J UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 1.4E-02 EPS-DGN-TM-DGAAC SBO DIESEL UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 1.4E-02 EPS-SEQ-CF-ALL CCF OF BUS 1H , 1J, 2H & 2J LOAD SEQUENCERS 5.9E-06 EPS-SEQ-FO-1J BUS 1J LOAD SEQUENCER FAILS 1.7E-03 EPS-SEQ-FO-2J BUS 2J LOAD SEQUENCER FAILS 1.7E-03 EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EDG IN 1 HOUR 8.7E-01 EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EDG IN 2 HOURS 8.0E-01 EPS-XHE-XL-NR03H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EDG IN 3 HOURS 7.5E-01 EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EDG IN 4 HOURS 7.0E-01 EPS-XHE-XM-AAC FAILURE TO START AND ALIGN THE SBO DIESEL 5.0E-03 EPS-XHE-XM-REC1HF7 FAILURE TO X-TIE ALT POWER SOURCE FROM 1B BUS 2.0E-02 EQ-SWS-FA SW INTAKE STRUCTURE FAILED DUE TO EARTHQUAKE 9.2E-07 HPI-CKV-OO-SI47 HPI/RWST CHECK VALVE SI-47 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.4E-04 HPI-MDP-CF-STRTABC CCF OF HPI PUMPS A, B & CTO START 1.3E-05 HPI-MDP-FS-1B HPI MDP TRAIN 1B FAILURE TO START 1.4E-03 HPI-MDP-TM-1B HPI MDP 1B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 3.9E-03 HPI-MDP-TM-ABC HPI MDPs 1A, 1B, OR 1C (2-OF-3) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 3.8E-03 HPI-MOV-CF-1115BD CCF OF SUCTION MOVS 1.9E-05 HPI-MOV-CF-1863AB CCF OF LPI/HPI MOV 1-CH-MOV-1863A&B TO OPEN 1.9E-05 HPI-SMP-PG-NL CONTAINMENT RECIRC SUMP PLUGS - NON LOCA 5.0E-05 HPI-TRNA-RUN HPI TRAIN A OPERATING 5.0E-01 HPI-TRNB-RUN HPI TRAIN B OPERATING 5.0E-01 HPI-XHE-XM-BLEED2 1-FR-H 1 LOSS OF HEAT SINK STEP 15 OPEN TWO PORVS 2.0E-02 HPI-XHE-XM-FB OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING 2.0E-02 HPI-XHE-XM-RECBLEED FAIL TO RECOVER BLEED LATE 1.0E-02 HVC-PND-OC-103-12 1-HV-AOD-103-1/2 SPURIOUSLY CLOSED DURING MISSION 3.7E-04 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATOR (SWITCHYARD-IE-LOOPSC 1.0E+00 RELATED)

LPI-MDP-CF-FRAB 1-SI-P-1A & B FAILS TO RUN COMMON CAUSE FAULTS 1.2E-05 LPI-MDP-CF-FSAB 1-SI-P-1A & B FAILS TO START COMMON CAUSE FAULTS 2.6E-05 LPI-MDP-TM-1A LPI MDP TRAIN 1A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 7.1E-03 LPI-MDP-TM-1B LPI MDP TRAIN 1B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM 7.1E-03 LPI-MOV-CF-1860AB COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SUMP ISOL VALVES 1.9E-05 LPI-MOV-CF-1863AB COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF X-TIE MOVs 1863A/B TO HPR 1.85E-05 A-14

LER 338/11-003 Name Description Probability OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 4 OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC 1.0E-01 HOURS (SWITCHYARD)

OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC0 CONVOLUTION FACTOR FOR CCF-OPR (4HR-SC AVAIL) 2.6E-01 OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC1 CONVOLUTION FACTOR FOR 1FTR-OPR (4HR-SC AVAIL) 2.6E-01 OEP-XHE-XX-NR04HSC2 CONVOLUTION FACTOR FOR 2FTR-OPR (4HR-SC AVAIL) 1.2E-01 PPR-MOV-FC-1535 PORV 1 (AOV-1455C) BLOCK VALVE (1535) FAILS TO CLOSE 9.6E-04 PPR-MOV-FC-1536 PORV 2 (AOV-1456) BLOCK VALVE (1536) FAILS TO CLOSE 9.6E-04 PPR-SRV-OO-1455C PORV 1 (AOV-1455C) FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND 3.5E-03 PPR-SRV-CC-1456 PORV 2 (AOV-1456) FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND 3.5E-03 PPR-SRV-CF-PRVS CCF OF PORVS (1456 & 1455C) TO OPEN 2.1E-04 PPR-SRV-CO-L PORVS/SRVS OPEN DURING LOOP 1.5E-01 PPR-SRV-CO-SBO PORVS/SRVS OPEN DURING SBO 3.7E-01 RCS-MDP-LK-BP1 RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING) FAILS 1.3E-02 RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING) FAILS 2.0E-01 SWS-HDR-TM-A168 SW HDR A IN MAINTENANCE 168 HR ACTION (IN PSA) 5.5E-03 SWS-HDR-TM-B168 SW HDR B IN MAINTENANCE 168 HR ACTION (IN PSA) 5.5E-03 SWS-HDR-TM-B72 SW HDR B IN MAINTENANCE 72 HR ACTION (IN PSA) 7.9E-04 SWS-MDP-CF-ALLFS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SWS MPDs TO START 8.5E-07 A-15

LER 338/11-003 Appendix B: Key Event Trees and Modified Fault Trees Figure B-1. North Anna, Units 1 and 2 LOOP (Switchyard-Centered) Event Tree.

B-1

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-2. North Anna, Units 1 and 2 SBO Event Tree.

B-2

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-3. North Anna, Unit 1 AFW-CST-WATER Fault Tree.

Figure B-4. North Anna, Unit 1 ACP-1H1 Fault Tree.

B-3

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-5. North Anna, Unit 1 ACP-1J1 Fault Tree.

Figure B-6. North Anna, Unit 1 AFW-TDP Fault Tree.

B-4

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-7. North Anna, Unit 1 EPS-DGN-1H Fault Tree.

Figure B-8. North Anna, Unit 1 EPS-DGN-1J Fault Tree.

B-5

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-9. North Anna, Unit 1 EPS-DGN-2H Fault Tree.

Figure B-10. North Anna, Unit 1 EPS-DGN-2J Fault Tree.

B-6

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-11. North Anna, Unit 1 SWS-HDRA Fault Tree.

Figure B-12. North Anna, Unit 1 SWS-HDRB Fault Tree.

B-7

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-13. North Anna, Unit 1 DCP-1-I-LATE Fault Tree.

B-8

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-14. North Anna, Unit 1 DCP-1-I Fault Tree.

B-9

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-15. North Anna, Unit 1 DCP-1-II-LATE Fault Tree.

B-10

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-16. North Anna, Unit 1 DCP-1-III Fault Tree.

B-11

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-17. North Anna, Unit 1 DCP-1-III-LATE Fault Tree.

B-12

LER 338/11-003 Figure B-18. North Anna, Unit 1 EPS-DGN-2J Fault Tree.

Figure B-19. North Anna, Unit 1 EPS-DGN-2H Fault Tree.

B-13

LER 338/11-003 Appendix C: Human Failure Event Quantification In this analysis, the failure probabilities of six human failure events (HFEs) were evaluated using SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method (Reference 8). These HFEs were quantified in the context of the event that occurred (i.e., the LOOP caused by the earthquake), additional event details such as degradation or unavailability of SSCs (e.g., EDG 2H failure due to coolant leak, Unit 1 TDAFW pump undergoing surveillance testing), operator performance during the event (e.g., successful recovery of offsite power), and the postulated accident sequences. Details of their evaluation, along with a brief background of the SPAR-H method are provided below.

SPAR-H Background. The SPAR-H Method considers the following three factors:

Probability of failure to diagnose the need for action,

Probability of failure to successfully perform the desired action, and

Dependency on other operator actions involved in the specific sequence of interest.

The probability of failure to perform the diagnosis or action component of a HFE is the product of a nominal failure probability (1x10-2 for diagnosis or 1x10-3 for action) and the following eight performance shaping factors (PSFs):

Available Time

Stress

Complexity

Experience/Training

Procedures

Ergonomics

Fitness for Duty

Work Processes Dependency. Dependency between HFEs was evaluated by reviewing the cutsets. Based on clarified SPAR-H guidance (Reference 9), having multiple HFEs within the same cutset does not automatically constitute dependency and intervening successes are not necessary to break dependency. Unless two HFEs are strongly related (often sequential steps in a procedure),

there is probably no dependence (due to the boundaries between HFEs and not sharing subtasks between HFEs). Additionally, dependency is implicitly accounted for by adjusting the PSFs for same deficiency (e.g., stress, complexity) in multiple HFEs. No dependency was identified for any HFE for this analysis.

Analysis HFEs. The following operator actions were evaluated for this analysis; including the calculation of the human error probability (HEP) for each HFE.

1. OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HSC (Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 4 Hours)

HFE Definition- Operators fail to restore offsite power to a safety bus within 4 hours0.167 days 0.0238 weeks 0.00548 months (i.e.,

prior to battery depletion) during a postulated SBO.

Description and Event Context- The earthquake caused multiple transformers to lock out due to activation of the sudden pressure relays resulting in the loss of offsite power. The recovery of offsite power was not possible until after 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months . During a postulated loss of all ac (alternate-current) power, and if operators were successful in stripping unnecessary dc loads within one hour, operators could recover offsite power to a safety bus within 4 hours0.167 days 0.0238 weeks 0.00548 months .

C-1

LER 338/11-003 Operator Action Success Criteria- Stop DC Turbine Oil Pump and DC Air Side Seal Oil Pump within one hour and restore offsite power to a safety bus within 4 hours0.167 days 0.0238 weeks 0.00548 months .

Cues- No unit safety busses are energized.

Procedural Guidance- Step 35, AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power.

Diagnosis/Action- This HFE contains sufficient diagnosis activities. The nominal action component of the HEP is 0.001. No event information is available to warrant a change in the action PSFs for this HEP.

PSF Multiplier Notes The available time for this action from the beginning of LOOP is four hours (i.e., the battery depletion time given successful stripping of dc loads within one hour). The recovery of offsite power was not possible until approximately 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months after the LOOP occurred; therefore, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months was available for operators to recover power to a Time Available 0.1 safety bus during a postulated SBO. Since the action time required to recover power to a safety bus is minimal (< 5 minutes), the available time for diagnosis is approximately 55 minutes. Therefore, available time for this HFE is assigned as Extra Time (i.e., x0.1; time available is 1 to 2 times nominal and > 30 minute).

The PSF for diagnosis stress is assigned a value of High Stress Stress 2 (i.e., x2) due to the postulated SBO.

The PSF for diagnosis complexity is assigned a value of Moderately Complex (i.e., x2) because operators would have to deal with Complexity 2 multiple equipment unavailabilities and the concurrent actions/multiple procedures.

No event information available to warrant a change from nominal for Procedures 1 this HFE.

No event information available to warrant a change from nominal for Experience/Training 1 this HFE.

No event information available to warrant a change from nominal for Ergonomics/HMI 1 this HFE.

No event information available to warrant a change from nominal for Fitness for Duty 1 this HFE.

No event information available to warrant a change from nominal for Work Processes 1 this HFE.

PSF Composite 0.40 Diagnosis HEP 4E-3 Action HEP 1.E-3 Adjusted Total HEP 5E-3

2. OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H2SC (Operators Fail to Recover Offsite Power in 6 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours), OEP-XHE-XL-NR07H2SC (Operators Fail to Recover Offsite Power in 7 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours), OEP-XHE-XL-NR09H2SC (Operators Fail to Recover Offsite Power in 9 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours), and OEP-XHE-XL-NR10H2SC (Operators Fail to Recover Offsite Power in 10 Hours, Given Failure at 2 Hours)

HFE Definition- Operators fail to restore offsite power to a safety bus, given TDAFW pump flow to a SG after battery depletion, prior to SG dry-out and core uncovery during a postulated SBO.

C-2

LER 338/11-003 Description and Event Context- The earthquake caused multiple transformers to lock out due to activation of the sudden pressure relays resulting in the loss of offsite power. The recovery of offsite power was not possible until after 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months . During a postulated loss of all ac (alternate-current) power, and if operators fail to strip unnecessary dc loads within one hour, the batteries would deplete in 2 hours0.0833 days 0.0119 weeks 0.00274 months . However, operators could recover offsite power later given TDAFW pump flow to a SG after battery depletion.

Operator Action Success Criteria- Restore offsite power to a safety bus prior to SG dry-out and core uncovery.

Cues- No unit safety busses are energized.

Procedural Guidance- Step 35, AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power.

Diagnosis/Action- This HFE contains sufficient diagnosis activities. The nominal action component of the HEP is 0.001. No event information is available to warrant a change in the action PSFs for this HEP.

PSF Multiplier Notes The available time for this action from the beginning of LOOP is a minimum of 6 hours0.25 days 0.0357 weeks 0.00822 months . The recovery of offsite power was not possible until approximately 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months after the LOOP occurred; therefore, a minimum of 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months was available for operators to recover power to a safety bus during a postulated SBO. Since the action time Time Available 0.1 required to recover power to a safety bus is minimal (< 5 minutes),

the available time for diagnosis is would be a minimum of almost 3 hours0.125 days 0.0179 weeks 0.00411 months . Therefore, available time for this HFE is assigned as Extra Time (i.e., x0.1; time available is 1 to 2 times nominal and > 30 minute).