ML13008A597

Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Related to Dairyland Power Cooperative, La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Exemption

ML13008A597
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse  File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	07/31/2013
From:	NRC/FSME/DWMEP
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Download: ML13008A597 (29)

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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE RELATED TO DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE, LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR EXEMPTION DOCKET Nos. 50-409 and 72-046

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On November 23, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final rule amending certain emergency planning (EP) requirements in the regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities (76 Federal Register (FR) 72560; November 23, 2011) (EP Final Rule). The EP Final Rule was effective on December 23, 2011, with various implementation dates for each of the rule changes.

Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC) is holder of Possession-Only License DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) facility. The license, issued pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), allows DPC to possess and store spent nuclear fuel at the permanently shutdown and decommissioned facility under the provision of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K, General License for Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites. All of the spent nuclear fuel has been transferred to an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) under the general license provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K.

On June 18, 2012, DPC submitted a letter, Request for Exemption to Revised Emergency Planning Regulations (Reference 1), requesting exemption from specific EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for the LACBWR facility and ISFSI.

DPC states that this exemption request and its impact on the corresponding emergency plan:

(1) is authorized by law; (2) will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety; and (3) is consistent with the common defense and security in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12. DPC states that its intent in submitting this exemption request is to maintain the regulatory structure in place prior to the issuance of the EP Final Rule and, therefore, does not propose any changes to the Emergency Plan or implementing procedures other than simple regulatory reference changes that can be implemented under 10 CFR 50.54(q).

Enclosure 2

2 2.0 DISCUSSION The LACBWR facility was a 50 megawatt Atomic Energy Commission Demonstration Reactor, which went critical in July 1967, and commenced commercial operation in November 1969.

DPC purchased the LACBWR facility in July 1973. The reactor was permanently shutdown in April 1987 and placed in SAFSTOR1 condition in August 1991. The LACBWR facility is in decommissioning status, and DPC filed its decommissioning plan (Reference 2) on December 21, 1987, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82, Termination of License. The NRC approved the decommissioning of the facility and specifically, the LACBWR Decommissioning Plan on August 7, 1991 (Reference 3). The Decommissioning Plan includes a safety review of the facility and was used by staff to assist in evaluating the currently-requested exemptions.

By letter dated September 23, 1987, (Reference 4) the NRC granted an exemption from the requirement to produce and distribute an annual information brochure to the public as required in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2, based on the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the LACBWR facility, the licensees intent to issue a final letter describing the status of the LACBWR facility, and the fact that no further public protective actions were required.

DPC revised the Emergency Plan for LACBWR to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the LACBWR facility in Revision 10, dated September 29, 1987 (Reference 5), and submitted the Emergency Plan to the NRC for approval. The revision contained a technical report which provided the radiological consequences for the maximum credible accident scenario associated with the spent fuel pool. Based on the technical evaluation, DPC revised the Emergency Plan for LACBWR to eliminate all aspects of offsite emergency preparedness.

The NRC approved Revision 10 of the Emergency Plan for LACBWR in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated July 8, 1988 (Reference 6). The NRC staff (staff) concluded that the licensee's emergency plan was acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the decommissioning plant status. The staff found that the postulated dose to the general public from any reasonably conceivable accident would not exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs), and for the bounding accident, the length of time available to respond to a loss of spent fuel cooling or reduction in water level in the spent fuel pool gave confidence that offsite measures for the public could be taken without preparation.

Although DPC did not specifically request an exemption from the emergency planning requirements when it submitted the LACBWR Emergency Plan (Revision 10) for approval, the staffs approval of the Emergency Plan and DPRs proposals to eliminate compliance with offsite EP requirements granted a de facto exemption from offsite emergency preparedness requirements. Since the approval for Revision 10 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, DPC had not requested nor received any exemptions from emergency planning requirements prior to the request dated June 18, 2012. The basis for the current exemptions from offsite emergency 1 SAFSTOR is a method of decommissioning in which a nuclear facility is placed and maintained in a condition that allows the facility to be safely stored and subsequently decontaminated (i.e., deferred decontamination) to levels that permit release for unrestricted use.

3 preparedness requirements has not changed since the NRC approved Revision 10 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan. Therefore, DPC continues to be exempt from these EP requirements.

On June 20, 2011, DPC submitted to the NRC Revision 31 to the LACBWR Emergency Plan (Reference 7), which contained changes to establish ISFSI emergency planning requirements.

This revision included a description of the LACBWR ISFSI site and NAC-Multipurpose Canister (NAC-MPC) dry cask storage system it was using, the basis for emergency planning associated with the NAC-MPC system accident analyses, and requirements for emergency response to ISFSI conditions. This revision provided emergency planning for the period of time during the transfer of the spent nuclear fuel from the spent fuel pool into the storage cask.

By letter dated October 19, 2012 (Reference 8), DPC notified the NRC that all of the spent nuclear fuel from the LACBWR facility had been transferred to dry cask storage at the on-site ISFSI on September 19, 2012. Additionally, by letter dated October 24, 2012 (Reference 9)

DPC further committed to the NRC that there would be no spent fuel placed in the LACBWR spent fuel pool from that date forward.

With the EP Final Rule, several requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 were modified or added, including changes in Section 50.47, Section 50.54, and Appendix E. Specific implementation dates were provided for each EP rule change. The EP Final Rule codified certain voluntary protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events, and generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed by NRC Order EA-02-026, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures, dated February 25, 2002.

In addition, the EP Final Rule amended other licensee emergency plan requirements to: (1) enhance the ability of licensees in preparing for and in taking certain protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency; (2) address, in part, security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; (3) clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan implementation among licensees; and (4) modify certain EP requirements to be more effective and efficient. However, the EP Final Rule was only an enhancement to the NRCs regulations and was not necessary for adequate protection. On page 72563 of the Federal Register notice for the EP Final Rule, the Commission determined that the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.

3.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In the Final Rule for Storage of Spent Fuel in NRC-Approved Storage Casks at Power Reactor Sites (55 FR 29181; July 18, 1990), the NRC amended its regulations to provide for the storage of spent nuclear fuel under a general license on the site of any nuclear power reactor. In its Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the Final Rule (55 FR 29185), the Commission responded to comments related to emergency preparedness for spent fuel dry storage, stating, The new 10 CFR 72.32(c) states that, For an ISFSI that is located on the site of a nuclear power reactor licensed for operation by the Commission, the emergency plan required by 10 CFR 50.47 shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this section. One condition of the general license is that the reactor licensee must review the reactor emergency plan and modify it as necessary to cover dry cask storage and related activities. If the emergency plan is in

4 compliance with 10 CFR 50.47, then it is in compliance with the Commission's regulations with respect to dry cask storage.

In the SOC for the Final Rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and Monitored Retrievable Storage Installation (MRS) (60 FR 32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission stated, in part, that current reactor emergency plans cover all at-or near reactor ISFSI's. An ISFSI that is to be licensed for a stand-alone operation will need an emergency plan established in accordance with the requirements in this rulemaking (60 FR 32431). The Commission responded to comments (60 FR 32435) concerning offsite emergency planning for ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded that the offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones.

As part of the review for DPCs current exemption request, the staff also used the EP regulations in 10 CFR 72.32 and Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) - 16, Emergency Planning, (Reference 10) as references to ensure consistency between specific-licensed and general-licensed ISFSIs.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when special circumstances are present. The staff reviewed this request to determine whether the specific exemptions should be granted.

4.1 Current Exemptions for 10 CFR 50.47 The NRC previously approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan (Revision 10), which eliminated offsite emergency planning for the LACBWR facility, based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. The approval relieved DPC from certain sections (as indicated below by strike through) of 10 CFR 50.47 for the LACBWR facility.

(4.1.1) 10 CFR 50.47(b)

(b) The onsite and, except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standards:

(4.1.2) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1)

(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

5 (4.1.3) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)

(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.

(4.1.4) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)

(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

(4.1.5) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)

(5) Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

(4.1.6) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)

(6) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

(4.1.7) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7)

(7) Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.

(4.1.8) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)

(9) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

(4.1.9) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)

(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates

6 have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

DPC continues to be exempt from the requirements in Section 50.47 as shown above because the basis for the exemptions has not changed since 1988.

4.2 Specific Exemptions for 10 CFR 50.47 DPCs application dated June 18, 2012, requested an exemption from certain sections (as indicated below by strike through) of 10 CFR 50.47 for the LACBWR facility and ISFSI.

(4.2.1) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)

(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made,

[arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, [1988 exemption)) arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan which identified the emergency facilities. This approval exempted DPC from the requirement in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees near site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) have been made. The NRC concluded that the licensees proposal to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning was acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor. Additionally, the staff concluded that the LACBWR EP provided for an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at the LACBWR facility in its shutdown and defueled condition, and also provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the LACBWR facility.

The 2011 EP Final Rule changed the regulation by removing the term near site from 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). The fact that an EOF need not be near the site does not change the licensees current exemption from the underlying requirement to have an EOF because the basis for the exemption has not changed. Therefore, the staff concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from the requirement that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees Emergency Operations Facility have been made, of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

(4.2.2) (10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)

(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. [1988 exemption]

Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees.

Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines

7 for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed. [1988 exemption]

In 1995, the Commission provided its view on evacuation planning for an ISFSI not at a reactor site in its Statement of Considerations for the Final Rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and MRSs: The Commission does not agree that as a general matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning (60 FR 32439).

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from 50.47(b)(10) in its entirety and concluded that the licensees proposal to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning was acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor. The NRC determined that no credible events would result in doses to the public beyond the owner controlled area boundary that would exceed the EPA PAGs.

Therefore, EP zones beyond the owner controlled area and the associated protective actions developed from evacuation time estimates (ETE) were no longer required. Additionally, the staff concluded that the LACBWR Emergency Plan provided for an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at the LACBWR facility in its shutdown and defueled condition, and also provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the LACBWR facility.

The 2011 EP Final Rule changed the regulation by adding the requirements, Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis, to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). These requirements to develop and update an ETE are offsite activities. The NRC granted DPC an exemption from offsite emergency planning activities in 1988. Because the basis for the 1988 exemption has not changed and is the same basis for DPCs current exemption request, the staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the new requirements, Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis, of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

4.3 Specific Exemptions for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV DPCs application dated June 18, 2012 requested an exemption from certain sections of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 (as indicated by strike through) for the LACBWR facility and ISFSI.

(4.3.1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e.,

organization for coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions during hostile action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this Part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR Part 52, shall contain

8 information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in

§ 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards.

In the EP Final Rule, the Commission defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. The NRC excluded non-power reactors (NPR) from the definition of "hostile action" at that time because an NPR is not a nuclear power plant and a regulatory basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of non-power reactors in that definition. Further analysis and stakeholder interactions would be needed prior to including non-power reactors in the definition of "hostile action."

Likewise, an ISFSI is not a nuclear power plant. The staff also considered the similarities between the LACBWR facility and a non-power reactor to determine whether the LACBWR facility should be included within the definition of hostile action. NPRs pose lower radiological risks to the public from accidents than do power reactors because: (1) the core radionuclide inventories are lower as a result of their lower power levels and often shorter operating cycle lengths; and (2) NPRs have lower decay heat associated with a lower risk of core melt and fission product release in a loss-of-coolant accident. The LACBWR facility also has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. This fact formed part of the basis for DPCs 1988 exemptions from offsite EP requirements. For all of these reasons, the staff concludes that the LACBWR ISFSI is excluded from the definition of hostile action.

Because the LACBWR ISFSI is not a facility that falls within the definition of hostile action in Appendix E of Part 50, the NRC staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 to have an emergency plan that contains onsite protective actions during hostile action. The remaining requirements of Appendix E,Section IV.1 apply to DPC.

(4.3.2) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2

2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the following requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations on the same grounds as discussed in section 4.2.2 above.

The 2011 EP Final Rule changed 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, in part, by dividing the former first paragraph of Section IV into 7 smaller paragraphs and, in new paragraph 2, removing the language and for taking other protective actions and including the requirement, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC. DPCs request for an exemption from the new part of paragraph 2 is granted because DPC was previously granted an exemption from offsite emergency planning activities, including activities regarding ETEs. Because DPC does not have to prepare ETEs, it

9 does not need to comply with the requirement that the ETEs be based on the most recent U.S.

Census Bureau data.

Based on these reasons and the analysis in section 4.2.2 above, the staff concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from the requirement, The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, and is exempt from the requirement, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC, in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.

(4.3.3) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.3

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.3, for the reasons provided in section 4.3.2 above.

(4.3.4) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under

§ 50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4, for the reasons provided in section 4.3.2 above.

(4.3.5) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.5

5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.5, for the reasons provided in section 4.3.2 above.

10 (4.3.6) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6

6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6, for the reasons provided in section 4.3.2 above.

(4.3.7) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.7

7. After an applicant for a combined license under Part 52 of this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC for review under § 50.4 of this chapter no later than 365 days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.

The regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.7 do not apply to DPC because the LACBWR facility is licensed under 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the requested exemption is not necessary.

(4.3.8) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.1

1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.

DPC does not operate a nuclear power plant, and the NRC-approved LACBWR Emergency Plan provides a description of the normal operating organization for the LACBWR ISFSI.

Because the LACBWR ISFSI is not a nuclear power plant and DPC satisfies the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.1 for its ISFSI, the NRC staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.1 to have an emergency plan that describes the normal operating organization for a nuclear power plant.

11 (4.3.9) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.2.b

b. Plant staff emergency assignments; DPC does not operate a nuclear power plant, and the NRC-approved LACBWR Emergency Plan provides a description of the onsite ERO for the LACBWR ISFSI, including the staff emergency assignments. Because the LACBWR ISFSI is not a nuclear power plant and DPC satisfies the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.2.b for its ISFSI, the NRC staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.2.b to have an emergency plan that describes the onsite ERO staff emergency assignments for a nuclear power plant.

(4.3.10) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.3

3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which identified the onsite emergency response organization and offsite organizations that would assist in emergency mitigation and recovery efforts. This approval exempted DPC from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.3 to have an emergency plan that includes, A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from this requirement because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.11) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.4

4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for making offsite dose projections and a description of how these projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which exempted DPC from the requirement in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) to have adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.4 for offsite dose projections. In granting this exemption, the NRC relied on the factors and conclusions discussed in section 4.2.2 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from only the requirement to make offsite dose projections. The remaining requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.4, apply to DPC.

(4.3.12) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.5

5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions that may arise.

Other persons with special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees of

12 the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of these persons shall be described. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which identified the onsite emergency response organization and offsite organizations that would assist in emergency mitigation and recovery efforts. This approval exempted DPC from the requirement to identify the individuals described in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.5, for the reasons provided in section 4.3.10 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from this requirement because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.13) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7

7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix, hostile action is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to amend its emergency plan by June 23, 2014, to: (1) include a description of the assistance expected from appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, beyond the information already contained in the LACBWR Emergency Plan to meet the requirement of Appendix E,Section IV.A.7 as of December 22, 2011; and (2) identify and describe the assistance expected from appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with hostile action at the site, as hostile action is defined in Appendix E,Section IV.A.7. The NRC grants the first exemption because requiring DPC to provide a description of the assistance expected from appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, in light of the low risk of an emergency necessitating offsite assistance and the information already provided by DPC in its emergency plan, is an unnecessary burden on the licensee. The NRC grants the second exemption because, as explained in section 4.3.1 above, DPC is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a hostile action.

(4.3.14) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.8

8. Identification of the State and/or local officials responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations when necessary.

The NRC concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.8, for the reasons provided in section 4.2.2 above.

(4.3.15) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9

13

9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.

In the EP proposed rule (74 FR 23254; May 18, 2009), the NRC asked for public comment on whether the NRC should add a requirement for non-power reactor licensees to perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel can perform all assigned emergency plan implementation functions in a timely manner without having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. The NRC received several comments that opposed a regulation imposing this requirement. In the EP Final Rule, the NRC agreed that this requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees. Staffing at non-power reactors is generally small, which is commensurate with operating the facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. Therefore, the NRC did not include this requirement in the EP Final Rule.

The staff considered the similarity between the staffing levels at ISFSIs like the LACBWR facility and staffing levels at NPRs. The design of the ISFSI provides radiation shielding and contains internal airflow paths that allow decay heat from the spent fuel contents to be removed by natural air circulation around the canister wall. This passive design requires monitoring by minimal staff which is commensurate with operating the ISFSI in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. In the EP Final Rule, the NRC agreed that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees due to the small staffing levels required to operate the facility. For the same reason, the staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9.

(4.3.16) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1

1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside

[1988 exemption] the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite [1988 exemption] monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and State and local governmental authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1 that By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels

14 must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant because, as explained in section 4.3.1 above, DPC is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a hostile action.

(4.3.17) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.1

1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total emergency organization shall be described.

The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite [1988 exemption] radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System)

[1988 exemption]for notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall include: (1) notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency [1988 exemption]of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C.1. These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements and the general emergency and site area emergency classification levels. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements: and offsite and (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C.1. The approval of the LACBWR Emergency Plan also exempted DPC from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C.1 to have emergency action levels based on potential emergencies involving the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System because the LACBWR reactor was permanently shut down and defueled. Given these reasons and the analysis in section 4.2.2 above, the NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from these requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C.1.

(4.3.18) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2

2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.

15 Because ISFSIs have a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures, and based on the NRC staffs reviews of previous versions of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, the staff concludes that the LACBWR Emergency Plan, as of June 20, 2011, provided: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness: and (2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the LACBWR facility. Thus, granting the requested exemption from the requirement in Appendix E,Section IV.C.2, to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes and promptly declare an emergency condition, which was not a requirement as of December 22, 2011, would not change these conclusions.

The staff concludes that DPC is only exempt from the requirements, By June 20, 2012, within 15 minutes, and to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2, based upon the analysis in this section and the licensee commitment in Revision 31 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan to notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency. The remaining requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.C.2 apply to DPC.

(4.3.19) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1

1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, [1988 exemption]shall be described. This description shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements, for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, and within the EPZs, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1, based upon the analysis in section 4.2.2 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from these requirements because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.20) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3

3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes [1988 exemption] after declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first reactor at the site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public with the plume

16 exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and notification system. [1988 exemption] The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15 minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner.

The responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from notifying responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency by increasing the notification time to 60 minutes after declaring an emergency. Additionally, the NRC granted DPC an exemption for all other remaining requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. The staff concluded that the licensees proposal to discontinue offsite response measures, such as offsite notification of the general public; State and local response; and a means to provide early notification and clear instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, was acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the defueled and decommissioning status of the plant. See section 4.2.2 above for further discussion of the basis for the 1988 exemption from offsite EP requirements.

The 2011 EP Final Rule changed 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 by adding the following: The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15 minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. DPC was previously exempted from offsite emergency planning requirements, including alerting and notification capability requirements. Because DPC does not have to meet alerting and notification capability requirements, the NRC determines that DPC does not have to meet the backup alerting and notification capability requirements. The requirement to have a backup alerting and notification capability is an offsite emergency planning requirement. Because the basis for granting DPC an exemption from offsite emergency planning requirements has not changed, and that basis is the same basis for DPCs current exemption request, the NRC staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the new requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.D.3 based on the analysis in this section and

17 section 4.2.2.

DPC continues to commit to notify offsite agencies of the existence of an emergency situation within one hour as originally approved by the NRC in the SER for the LACBWR Emergency Plan. The current LACBWR Emergency Plan requires notification to the Vernon County Sheriffs Office Communication Center and the NRC within one hour of the declaration of an emergency at the LACBWR facility.

(4.3.21) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.4

4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power reactor site's alert and notification design report, including the backup alert and notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3 must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and notification design report does not include a backup alert and notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification means must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval. However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.

Because the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.4 concern a backup alert and notification capability, and DPC is exempt from the backup alert and notification capability requirement, the NRC concludes that DPC is exempt from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.4. The justification is provided in section 4.3.20.

(4.3.22) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) 8.a.(i) A licensee onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations [1998 exemption] facility from which effective direction can be exercised during an emergency; In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which identified the control room and adjacent training room as the facilities that were intended to be used as emergency response centers. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations facility for the reasons provided in section 4.2.1 above. The licensees application provides that the ISFSI Administrative Building is designated as the Emergency Response Facility for ISFSI emergency conditions.

The 2011 EP Final Rule removed the term near site from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements, and a licensee emergency operations facility, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) based on the analysis in this section and section 4.2.1.

(4.3.23) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(ii)

(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite operational support center;

18 The 2011 EP Final Rule changed the provision by adding the requirement, For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite operational support center, to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.

NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, (Reference 11) provides that the operational support center is an onsite area separate from the control room and the Technical Support Center where licensee operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. The operational support center should provide a location where plant logistic support can be coordinated during an emergency and restrict control room access to those support personnel specifically requested by the shift supervisor.

With the current decommissioning status of the LACBWR site and the storage of the spent nuclear fuel in the ISFSI, an operational support center is no longer required to meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical support during an emergency. Therefore, the NRC concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(ii).

(4.3.24) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E.8.b.

b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license.

For an emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the emergency operations facility must include the following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, and local responders; (2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency response personnel; (3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency response facilities; (4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and (5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies; The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.b. because, as explained in section 4.3.22 above, DPC is exempt from the requirement to have an EOF.

19 (4.3.25) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.c.

c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; (2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; and (3) The capability to support response to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.c. because, as explained in section 4.3.22 above, DPC is exempt from the requirement to have an EOF.

(4.3.26) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d.

d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20, 2012.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d. because, as explained in section 4.3.1 above, DPC is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a hostile action.

(4.3.27) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.e.

e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations facility approved as of December 23, 2011;

20 The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.e. because, as explained in section 4.3.22 above, DPC is exempt from the requirement to have an EOF.

(4.3.28) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9

9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each system shall have a backup power source. All communication plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include:

DPC requested an exemption for the requirements to have a backup power source for an offsite communications system. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) states in part, the notification and coordination must be planned so that un-availability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and coordination.

Section 3.6.3 of ISG - 16 provides in part that the emergency plan should describe the primary and alternate onsite and offsite communication systems that would be used to transmit and receive information throughout the emergency. Additionally, a backup means of offsite communication to commercial telephone should be provided for notification of emergencies and requests for assistance.

Although the regulations in 10 CFR Part 72.32(a)(8) and guidance in ISG - 16 are for Specific Part 72 licensed facilitates, the NRC staff used these to inform its conclusions related to the request from DPC to ensure consistency between the Specific and General licensed ISFSIs.

Additionally, the staff reviewed prior precedence of exemptions granted to Zion, Haddam Neck, Maine Yankee and Yankee Rowe, and found this specific exemption was not requested nor was it previously approved by the NRC. Therefore, the staff denies the requested exemption to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.

(4.3.29) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.a.

a. Provisions for communications with contiguous [1988 exemption] State/local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. [1988 exemption] Such communication shall be tested monthly.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.a, contiguous and within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for the reasons provided in section 4.2.2 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from these requirements because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.30) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.c.

21

c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near site emergency operations [1988 exemption] facility; and among the nuclear facility, [1988 exemption] the principal State and local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams. [1988 exemption] Such communications systems shall be tested annually.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.c, nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near site emergency operations, among the nuclear facility and the field assessment teams for the reasons provided in section 4.2.1 above.

The 2011 EP Final Rule removed the term near site from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.c. The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements, and the emergency operations, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.c based on the analysis in sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.22 above.

(4.3.31) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.d.

d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations [1988 exemption] facility. Such communications shall be tested monthly.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.d, nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations for the reasons provided in section 4.2.1 above.

The 2011 EP Final Rule removed the term near site from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.d. The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements, and the emergency operations, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.d based on the analysis in sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.22 above.

(4.3.32) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1.(a).

1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency shall be described. This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency organization; ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control room shift personnel;

22 iii. Radiological monitoring teams; iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);

v. Repair and damage control teams; vi. First aid and rescue teams; vii. Medical support personnel; viii. Licensees headquarters support personnel; [1988 exemption]

ix. Security personnel.

In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local emergency services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news media persons. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1.a, viii. Licensees headquarters support personnel and local news media persons for the reasons provided in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.10 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from these requirements because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.33) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.

2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test the public notification system, [1988 exemption] test the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.

The 2011 EP Final Rule changed Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.F.2 by replacing the term test the public notification system with test the public alert and notification system. In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirement to test the public notification system. The staff concluded that the licensees proposal to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning was acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the current state of the plant. See section 4.2.2 above for further discussion of the basis for the 1988 exemption from offsite EP requirements. The fact that the EP Final Rule changed the description of the public notification system to be the public alert and notification system does not change the licensees exemption from the requirement to test a notification system because the rule change was not a substantive change to the requirements of the notification system. The staff concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from the requirement, test the public alert and notification system, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.

23 (4.3.34) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.

a. A full participation exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise required by this paragraph 2.a.

The 2011 EP Final Rule revised Section IV.F.2.a to require nuclear power reactor licensees to submit scenarios for their onsite biennial exercises under 10 CFR 50.4. This requirement was revised to enable the NRC to verify that licensees would implement in their exercise scenarios the requirements of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j, including hostile action and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of responders.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a to conduct full participation exercises. In granting this exemption, the NRC relied on the factors and conclusions discussed in section 4.2.2 above.

Because DPC does not have to conduct full participation exercises, it does not need to comply with the requirement that the exercise scenarios for those full participation exercises need to be submitted to the NRC. Based on these reasons and the analysis in section 4.2.2, the staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement, Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise required by this paragraph 2.a, in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.

(4.3.35) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.b.

b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this section. [1988 exemption] In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained[.] during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, event classification, notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC),

Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise

24 training objectives. [1988 exemption]

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement, Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV. F.2.b based on the staffs analysis in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.34 above.

(4.3.36) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.c.

(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency plan in each exercise cycle; and (5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise cycles.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the entirety of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.c. The NRC issued a Final Rule (70 FR 3591; January 26, 2005) that revised 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.c to include additional requirements related to co-located licensees. The 2011 EP Final Rule further changed the provision by reorganizing the section and adding the requirements for hostile action exercises. DPC is not a co-located licensee; therefore, the requirements in Section IV.F.2.c. that apply to co-located licensees do not apply to DPC and DPC does not need an exemption from these requirements.

(4.3.37) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d.

d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this participation from site to site.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d, A State should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion of exercise at least once every two years. In States with more than one site, the State should rotate this participation from site to site.

The 2011 EP Final Rule changed the provision to, Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to site.

Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more than one nuclear power

25 reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this participation from site to site.

DPC requested an exemption from the requirements to perform hostile action exercises. The staff concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from the ingestion pathway portion of an exercise because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988, and is exempt from the hostile action exercise requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d because, as explained in section 4.3.1 above, DPC is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a hostile action.

(4.3.38) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.e.

e. Licensees shall enable any State or local Government located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ [1988 exemption] to participate in the licensees drills when requested by such State or local Government.

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.E, located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for the reasons provided in section 4.2.2 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from these requirements because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.39) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.f.

f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that NRC, in consultation with FEMA, [1988 exemption] cannot (1) find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to emergency response. The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises. [1988 exemption]

In 1988, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan, which eliminated offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted DPC from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.f, in consultation with FEMA and The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises. for the reasons provided in section 4.2.2 above. The NRC concludes that DPC continues to be exempt from these requirements because the basis for the exemption has not changed since 1988.

(4.3.40) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.i.

i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action. Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response

26 organizations.

In the SOC for the EP Final Rule (76 FR 72589), the NRC discussed the addition of a new Section IV.F.2.i to Appendix E to require all nuclear power reactor licensees to include hostile action in biennial evaluated exercises. The final rule also ensures that scenarios will be sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events to properly train responders to respond to events more realistic than those currently used in training, and to avoid preconditioning the responders to success with inappropriate anticipatory responses.

In the EP Final Rule, the NRC identified this requirement as specific for power reactor licensees.

The staff considered the similarity between the LACBWR facility and a non-power reactor for the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. The results of analyses of design basis and hypothetical accident conditions evaluated for the LACBWR ISFSI show that there is substantial design margin for safety to the public and on-site personnel. Unlike nuclear power plants, ISFSIs have a low risk of a radiological release or a wide spectrum of events at an ISFSI.

Although DPC did not request exemption from this requirement, as explained in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.1, the NRC staff concludes that DPC is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to offsite emergency planning activities and a hostile action, respectively. Therefore, the staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement, Such scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.i.

(4.3.41) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section F.2.j.

j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to implement the principal functional areas of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.

27 In the SOC for the EP Final Rule (76 FR 72589), the NRC discussed the addition of a new Section IV.F.2.j to Appendix E to require all nuclear power reactor licensees to provide an opportunity for the emergency response organization (ERO) to demonstrate proficiency in response to a wide spectrum of scenarios, including a hostile action and a loss of large areas of the plant due to fire or explosion. It further provides that the ERO must demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), EOF and joint information center.

In the EP Final Rule, the NRC identified this requirement as specific for nuclear power reactor licensees. As explained in section 4.3.41 above, the NRC staff concludes that DPC is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a wide spectrum of events, offsite emergency planning activities and a hostile action. Additionally, with the current conditions of the site, where only the ISFSI and its related support systems, structures, and components remain, there are no other facilities in which ERO personnel could demonstrate proficiency. Based on these reasons, the staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.j.

(4.3.42) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.I.

By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions of the licensees emergency plan.

The staff concludes that DPC is exempt from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.I. because, as explained in section 4.3.1 above, LACBWR is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a hostile action.

4.4 Exemption Conclusions The NRC has found that DPC meets the criteria for an exemption in § 50.12. The NRC has determined that granting the exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commissions regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

As noted in Section 2.0, Discussion, above, DPCs compliance with the EP requirements in effect before the effective date of the EP Final Rule demonstrated reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense and security. In this SE, the NRC staff explains that DPCs implementation of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, with the exemptions, will continue to provide this reasonable assurance of adequate protection.

Thus, granting the exemptions will not present an undue risk to public health or safety and is not inconsistent with the common defense and security.

For the Commission to grant an exemption, special circumstances must exist. Under

§ 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present when [a]pplication of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. These special circumstances exist here. The NRC has determined that DPCs compliance with the regulations described in this SE is not

28 necessary for the licensee to demonstrate that, under its emergency plan, there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Consequently, special circumstances are present because requiring DPC to comply with the regulations that the staff describes in this SE is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the EP regulations.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC concludes that the licensees request for an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV as specified in the Staff Evaluation is acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the ISFSI.

The exemption request has been reviewed against the acceptance criteria included in 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 72.32 and Interim Staff Guidance - 16. The review considered the ISFSI and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. These evaluations were supported by the previously documented licensee and staff accident analyses. The staff concludes that:

the LACBWR Emergency Plan provides: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness; and (2) the Emergency Plan, in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the LACBWR facility.

The NRC has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the exemptions described in the SE are authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest, and special circumstances are present.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from Dairyland Power Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Request for Exemption from Emergency Planning Requirements, dated June 18, 2012, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A462).

2. Letter from Dairyland Power Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 Decommissioning Plan, Preliminary DECON Plan, and Supplement to Environmental Report, dated December 21, 1987, (ADAMS Legacy No.

8801150072).

3. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Dairyland Power Company, Order Authorizing Decommissioning of Facility, dated August 7, 1991, (ADAMS Legacy No.

9108160073).

4. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Dairyland Power Company, Issuance of Exemption to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV.F.2 and 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(7) for the LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor, dated December 23, 1987, (ADAMS Legacy No. 8712310290).

29

5. Letter from Dairyland Power Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 Emergency Plan Revision, dated September 29, 1987, (ADAMS Legacy No. 8710070789).

6. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Dairyland Power Company, Approval of Emergency Plan, dated July 8, 1988, (ADAMS Legacy No. 8807140110).

7. Letter from Dairyland Power Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Possession-Only License No. DPR-45 LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31, dated June 20, 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. ML11179A047).

8. Letter from Dairyland Power Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 Decommissioning Plan, Request for Rescission of NRC Orders EA-02-077 and EA-03-099, dated September 19, 2012, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12264A575).

9. Letter from Dairyland Power Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 DPC Commitment to Place No Spent Fuel in the LACBWR Spent Fuel Storage Pool, dated October 24, 2012, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12299A474).

10. Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance - 16, Emergency Planning, dated June 14, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003724570).

11. NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, dated February 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051390358).

Principal Contributors: Michael Norris Michael E. Rodriguez