L-MT-12-095, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Fo
| ML12305A381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/2012 |
| From: | Grubb J Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| L-MT-12-095 | |
| Download: ML12305A381 (24) | |
Text
October 29, 2012 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 L-MT-12-095 10 CFR 50.54(f)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 201 2
References:
- 1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. MLI 2056A046.
- 2. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12135A396.
- 3. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12164A435.
This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk L-MT-I 2-095 Page 2 (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference 1. Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2). This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).
The MNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:
/
1 1 4.1.I Communications from I Communications will be maintained post event 1
Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities the Control Room, TSC and EOF with Offsite Response Facilities Action through the use of satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.
2 Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Control Room OROs) within the Control Room.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 3 EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 201 6, whichever comes first.
Until the enhancements to EP communications at MNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference 3.
Action Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.
Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system.
The Key Site functions with offsite officials (Management links, Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs.
Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
3 4
5 6
7 If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms.
Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 61 2-330-5788.
Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Technical Support Center 4.1.2 NRC Communications via the HPN Network 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications (Site ERFs) 4.1.3 ERF Communications with Offsite Response Organizations 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Summary of Commitments Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure 1 of Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment:
NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on October 29, 2012
' Plant Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc:
Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, MNGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, MNGP, USNRC
ENCLOSURE Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 19 Pages, Follow
Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 0:
September 28, 201 2 Revision 1 :
October 17, 201 2 Revision 2:
October 23, 2012 Page 1 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Index Purpose References
Background
Planned Actions Schedule ATTACHMENT 1: Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration 7
ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources 12 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements 16 Page 2 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued.
Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 1 I, 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments. By October 31, 2012:
Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3.
Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment.
This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for lnformation pertaining to insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear event. Attachments I and 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.
References
- 1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 2012, ADAMs Accession No. ML12056A046
- 2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-MT-12-044),
60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012
- 3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)
- 4. MNGP letter dated June I I, 2012 (L-MT-12-057), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012 Backaround Pursuant to the USNRC Request for lnformation (~eference 1) Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3).
Page 3 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER L1-11-4 (Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All Power in Response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Event).
The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within a 25 mile radius of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions, The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Off-site impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g. phone lines, radio towers) out to a radius of 25 miles. The assumed off-site issues stem from the assumption that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.
Assessment of Existina Communication Equipment Public Address Svstem The public address (PA) system and the evacuation siren are supplied from off-site power which is backed up by on-site essential batteries and emergency diesel generators.
Telephone Svstem The on-site telephone system for the plant and the technical support center are supplied from non-essential station batteries which are backed up by the non-essential diesel generator. The equipment is not located in safety related buildings.
The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered off-site and within the 25 mile radius of the plant.
Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is located at the neighboring Sherco Power Plant (a coal plant owned and operated by Xcel Energy Inc., Northern States Power - Minnesota) and is supplied by normal off-site power and backed up by a dedicated liquid propane generator. MNGP also has local repeaters for the radio system which are supplied by the security batteries and security diesel generator.
Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phone jacks are located in the reactor building and the control room and provide alternates to the radios.
Page 4 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Assessment of Existinq Communications Equipment to Meet the Guidance in NEI 12-01. provides details of the specific functions supported by the communications enhancements.
Off-site Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions, all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Off-site Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within1 5-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations.
For MNGP, the EOF for the assumed event is expected to be the approved back-up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF.
Field Teams are dispatched from the site and use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication.
Planned actions:
The MNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of off-site power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the plant telephone system will only be available for approximately 90 minutes, based on battery capacity. Procedural guidance will be developed to supply critical plant telephone system components from portable diesel generators. Existing satellite capabilities may be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call off-site during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.
Page 5 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Off-site Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2b12 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e.,
Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) is planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key off-site response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
A summary of actions under development include:
Schedule The actions addressed above will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Action Communications will be maintained post event through the use of satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.
Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.
Communications with the NRCvia the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.
Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system.
The Key Site functions with off-site officials (Management links, Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phones capabilities in the site ERFs.
Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 Page 6 of 19 Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4.1.1 Communications from the Control Room, TSC and EOF with Off-site Response Facilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Control Room 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Technical Support Center 4.1.2 NRC Communications via the HPN Network 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications (Site ERFs) 4.1.3 ERF Communications with Off-site Response Organizations 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 7 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment Plant Public Address System (PA)
Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX)
Telephone System Local Commercial Telephone System TSC - OSC Emergency Work Status Primary System Component Location Distributed, the handsets, amplifiers and speakers are located in various areas of the plant Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Distributed Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Protected from Seismic a s defined in this document Yes The essential part of the system resides in seismic structures No The communications room has not been seismically analyzed No No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed Equipment protected Protected from Flooding a s defined in this document Yes The essential part of the system is housed in flood protected buildings Yes The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone No No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone from the below Protected from Wind a s defined in this document Yes The essential part of the system is inside of reinforced solid concrete structures No The communications room is located in an interior room of the building but has not been analyzed for wind No No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The Plant Engineering Building has not been analyzed for wind hazards Comments The plant evacuation siren is located on top of the reactor building and is therefore protected from flooding but has not been analyzed for seismic or wind.
None The connection to the local commercial telephone is in an unprotected building and the rest of the commercial network is outside of the plant's control None
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 8 of 19 ATTACHMENT I:
Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Revision 2 SystemlEquipment CR - TSC OGL (Ops Group Leader)
TSC EGL (Engineering Group Leader) - EOF TSS (Technical Support Supervisor)
Primary System Component Location Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Communications Room in the Monticello Training Center Protected from Seismic a s defined in this document No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed MTC Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed from the below Protected from Wind a s defined in this document No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The Plant Engineering Building has not been analyzed for wind No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The PEB has not been analyzed for wind The MTC has not been analyzed for wind Equipment protected Protected from Flooding a s defined in this document No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone The Training Center is outside the flood protection zone hazards Comments None None
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 9 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT I:
Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment TSC ED - EOF ED -
SM - JIC Voice Over Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)
On-site Portable Telephones (Spectralink)
(Not currently in EP Plan)
N/A if not applicable Primary System Component Location Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Communications Room in the Monticello Training Center N A N A hazards Comments None None Protected from Seismic a s defined in this document No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed MTC Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed N A Equipment protected Protected from Flooding a s defined in this document No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone The Training Center is outside the flood protection zone N A from the below Protected from Wind a s defined in this document No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The PEB has not been analyzed for wind The MTC has not been analyzed for wind N A
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 10 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment NRC Communications (ENS & HPN) Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular Telephones Satellite Telephones 450/800/900 MHz Radio System Primary System Component Location Phones are in the Technical Support Center in the Plant Engineering Buildihg The phone lines are routed through the Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building The lines are routed through the Microwave House where they connect to the commercial telephone system Distributed Distributed Sherburne County Generating Station Security Building (Trunking) and Monticello Security Building (Repeaters)
Protected from Seismic a s defined in this document No No No No Neither of these buildings have been seismically analyzed Equipment protected Protected from Flooding a s defined in this document No No No No The buildings are outside the flood protection zone from the below Protected from Wind a s defined in this document No No No No Neither of these buildings have been analyzed for wind hazards Comments Much of the communication circuits are not housed in protected structures and the commercial portion of the system is unprotected and outside of the site's control The off-site cellular system is unprotected and is outside of the site's control None The trunking controls for the system are housed in the security building at the neighboring coal generating plant and the repeaters at the site are housed in the security building
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 11 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT I:
Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment Sound Powered Telephone System Field Monitoring Team Communications Diesel Fuel Oil Storage used for fueling portable equipment used for communications Technical Support Center (TSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Primary System Component Location Distributed within the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, and Control RoomICable Spreading Room 800 MHz Radio System and Off-site Cellular Telephones Emergency Diesel Day Tank Rooms in the Emergency Diesel Generator Building Plant Engineering Building Monticello Training Center hazards Comments None See the 800 MHz Radio System and Off-site Cellular Telephones Above None The TSC is in an interior location of the Plant Engineering Building but has not been analyzed for any of these criteria The EOF is in an interior location of the Training Center but has not been analyzed for any of these criteria Protected from Seismic a s defined in this document Yes This system resides in seismic structures No Yes This system resides in a seismic structure No The Plant Engineering Building has not been seismically analyzed No The Training Center has not been seismically analyzed Equipment protected Protected from Flooding a s defined in this document Yes This system is located in structures within the flood protection zone No Yes This system is located in structures within the flood protection zone No The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone No The Training Center is outside the flood protection zone from the below Protected from Wind as defined in this document Yes This system resides in re-enforced solid concrete structures No Yes This system resides in a re-enforced solid concrete structure No The Plant Engineering Building has not been analyzed for wind No The Training Center has not been analyzed for wind
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 12 of 19 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources Revision 2 SystemlEquipment Plant Public Address System (PA)
Primary (Plant Admin Building)
Private Branch Exchange (PBX)
Telephone System TSC (Plant Engineering Building)
Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System EOF (Monticello Training Center)
Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System Primary Power Supply (List the power source)
Most of the local speakers and amplifiers are normally supplied from L-34 (Plant Off-site Power)
Y-90 Non-Essential Uninterruptable AC Power Panel is normally supplied from LC-1 08 (Plant Off-site Power)
Y-94 Non-Essential Uninterruptable AC Power Panel (Plant Off-site Power)
Off-site Power (this power source is different from the normal off-site source for the plant and is fed from the local community distribution grid)
Alternate Power Supply (List the power source)
The PA system can alternatively be supplied by Y-10.
L-34 and Y-10 are backed up by Emergency Diesel Generators.
Y-90 can also be supplied from # I 3 Non-Essential Diesel Generator 12.5 KV Commercial (Non-Plant) Off-site Power 0 r
- I 3 Non-Essential Diesel Generator 13.8 KV Plant Power via sub-yard breaker 1 N3 Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g.,
batteries, portable generators, etc.)
YeslNo Y-10 is also backed up by the #I 3 Essential Battery Y-90 is backed up by
- I7 Non-essential Batteries Y-94 is also supplied by #I 7 Non-essential Batteries None Source(s)
Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?
No A communications portable diesel has been purchased and will be available as an alternate supply to the PBX No No
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 13 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources SystemlEquipment Local Commercial Telephone System Voice Over Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)
On-site Portable Telephones (Spectralink)
(Not currently in EP Plan)
NIA if not applicable NRC Communications (ENS & HPN)
Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular Telephones Satellite Telephones 45018001900 MHz Radio System Source(s)
Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?
The local commercial telephone system is not owned or operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control The NRC phone lines and circuits rely on commercial equipment which is not owned or operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control Off-site cellular telephones rely on commercial equipment which is not owned or operated by the site-and is therefore outside of the site's control No No Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g.,
batteries, portable generators, etc.)
YeslNo Unknown NIA NIA Unknown Unknown Spare batteries are located in each facility which has these devices The Trunking system is backed by a dedicated liquid propane generator Primary Power Supply (List the power source)
Unknown NIA NIA Unknown Unknown Local Battery (attached to the unit)
Trunking relies on off-site power (local community distribution grid)
Local backup repeater relies on plant power Alternate Power Supply (List the power source)
Unknown NIA NIA Unknown Unknown None Local Repeater is backed by security UPS which is supplied by the security diesel generator (backup repeater only provides a single channel if off-site power is lost)
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 14 of 19 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources Revision 2 SystemlEquipment Sound Powered Telephone System Field Monitoring Team Communications Technical support Center (TSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Primary Power Supply (List the power source)
NIA (This system does not require any external power)
See 800 MHz Radio and Off-site Cellular Telephone System Y-94 Non-Essential Uninterruptable AC Power Panel (Plant Off-site Power) 1 N3 or Off-site Power Alternate Power Supply (List the power source)
NIA See 800 MHz Radio and Off-site Cellular Telephone System 12.5 KV Commercial (Non-Plant) Off-site Power or #I 3 Non-Essential Diesel Generator None Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g.,
batteries, portable generators, etc.)
YeslNo NIA See 800 MHz Radio and Off-site Cellular Telephone System Y-94 is also supplied by #I 7 Non-essential Batteries None Source(s)
Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?
No No No No
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 15 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Minimum Communications Links 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, w s
[per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.a]
Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 e Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC)
- Emergency Communicators Emergency Communicators 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Requlatow Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d]
Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line 1 Fax Line Direct Phone Line I Fax Line Direct Phone Line/ Fax Line Control Room Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios
- Emergency Notification System (ENS)
Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Federal Telephone System Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Satellite Telephone Satellite Telephone Satellite Telephone Satellite Telephone Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System for Primary EOF Back-up EOF Satellite Telephone Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Satellite Telephone Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Note 1
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 16 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Technical Support Center (TSC)
Minimum Communications Links Emergency Notification System (ENS) a Health Physics Network (HPN) 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emerqencv response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.
Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Federal Telephone System Control Room Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Satellite Telephone 1 per unit Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan Satellite Telephone Direct Phone Line Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Satellite Telephone No Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
l ntegrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Portable Cell Plant Page system Plant Radio System Sound Powered CR to TSC Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 No Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Note 1 Monticello ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.
ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 17 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Technical Support Center (TSC)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
Minimum Communications Links I each for:
SeniorILead TSC Manager Operations Coordination Maintenance Coordination
- Engineering Coordination
- Radiological Support 1 each for:
SeniorILead OSC Manager Radiological Support Additional response coordination links for multi-unit sites:
1 for each position providing Unit In-Plant Team Coordination.
Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line Direct Phone Line Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Limited Satellite Telephone Plant Page system No Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan Satellite Telephone Cell Phone Plant Page system 800 MHz Radio System Plant Page system Plant Radio System Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Satellite Telephone Plant Page system No Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
Integrate multiple Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 Note 1 Monticello ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.
ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 18 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Back-up Emergency Operations Facility Joint Information Center (JIC).
Minimum Communications Links 1 each for:
SeniorILead Manager Key Protective Measures Operations or Technical Support (as needed to support performance of dose projections, formulation of PARS and plant status updates to OR0 authorities).
There are no enhanced functional requirements for the Back-up Facility (Greater than 25 miles from the site) 1 for Senior Manager Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line Normal Means are Available The Joint Information Center is located outside the 25 miles zone and is protected by back-up power.
Direct Phone Line Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No Yes NIA Backup Method@)
Described in site E-Plan Portable Cell Plant Page system Plant Radio System Any normally available means Portable Cell or other direct dial lines Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No Yes NIA Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
Integrate multiple Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Install additional Satellite capability in Back-up EOF Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System (this commitment provides a line from on-site ERFs to support information,flow to the JIC Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 Monticello ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.
ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
NIA Note 1
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant NOTE 1: Proposed satellite system provides satellite telephone access while PBX is on backup power. If the PBX has loss of power a direct satellite telephone line is routed to specific areas. The satellite telephone docking station will have backup power to maintain this secondary function. If the direct line between the satellite telephone dock and the specific areas is lost, the satellite telephone can be removed from the docking station and used outside on built-in battery source.
ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Page 19 of 19 Emergency Response Facility Revision 2 Minimum Communications Links 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloff-site monitorinq teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]
Primary Method Described in site E-Plan a
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Field Team 1 Field Team 2 Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 e TSC Field Team Communicator e TSC Field Team Communicator Field Team I Field Team 2 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal aqencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]
Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan 800 MHz Radio 800 MHz Radio Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Cell Phone Cell Phone EOF Off-site Communicator Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
No backup for cell phone No backup for cell phone There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies.
Refer to Following Section for Additional Information No backup for cell phone No backup for cell phone There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies.
Portable satellite phones Portable satellite phones There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies.
There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies.
Proposed satellite phone system would provide communication as required.
Note 1