SBK-L-12101, NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application, Structures Monitoring Program Supplement-Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML12142A323)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application, Structures Monitoring Program Supplement-Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring
ML12142A323
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/2012
From: Freeman P
NextEra Energy Seabrook
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SBK-L-12101
Download: ML12142A323 (75)


Text

NExTera ENERGY f SEABROOK May 16, 2012 SBK-L-12101 Docket No. 50-443 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Seabrook Station NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application Structures Monitoring Program Supplement-Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring

References:

1. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC letter SBK-L-10077, "Seabrook Station Application for Renewed Operating License," May 25, 2010. (Accession Number ML101590099)
2. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC letter SBK-L-12061, "Seabrook Station Response to Request for Additional Information, NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application - Supplemental Response - Alkali Silica Reaction (ASR)", March 30, 2012 (Accession Number ML12094A364).
3. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC letter SBK-L-12088, "Supplemental Response- (RAI)

Follow-up B.2.1.31-1, Item 1, NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application,"

April 18, 2012. (Accession Number ML12110A407)

In Reference 1, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra) submitted an application for a renewed facility operating license for Seabrook Station Unit 1 in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Parts 50, 51, and 54.

In References 2 and 3, NextEra provided supplemental information related to staff RAIs regarding the ongoing analysis of Alkali-Silica Reaction.

In this Supplement are changes to the License Renewal Application (LRA) associated with management of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in concrete structures.

The existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been augmented by a plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.3 IA. Enclosure 1 contains changes to LRA Chapter 3 tables associated with the aging management review. Enclosure 2 contains changes to LRA Appendix A - Updated UFSAR Supplement, and Appendix B - Aging Management Programs.

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, P.O. Box 300, Lafayette Road, Seabrook, NH 03874

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission SBK-L-12010 1/Page 2 The changes are explained, and where appropriate to facilitate understanding, portions of the LRA are repeated with the change highlighted by strikethroughs for deleted text and bolded italics for inserted text. In some instances the entire text of a section has been replaced or added.

In these cases a note is included in the introduction indicating the replacement of the entire text of the section.

Commitment number 71 has been added. There are no other new or revised regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Enclosure 3 provides a revised LRA Appendix A - Final Safety Report Supplement Table A.3, License Renewal Commitment List, updated to reflect the license renewal commitment changes made in NextEra Energy Seabrook correspondence to date.

If there are any questions or additional information is needed, please contact Mr. Richard R.

Cliche, License Renewal Project Manager, at (603) 773-7003.

If you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please contact Mr. Michael O'Keefe, Licensing Manager, at (603) 773-7745.

Sincerely, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC.

Paul 0. Freeman Site Vice President

Enclosures:

- Changes to the Seabrook Station License Renewal Application Associated with Chapter 3 - Aging Management Review Results - Changes to the Seabrook Station License Renewal Application Associated with Appendix A - Updated UFSAR Supplement, and Appendix B - Aging Management Programs - LRA Appendix A - Final Safety Report Supplement Table A.3, License Renewal Commitment List

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission SBK-L-12101/Page 3 cc:

W.M. Dean, NRC Region I Administrator J. G. Lamb, NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate 1-2 W. J. Raymond, NRC Resident Inspector A.D. Cunanan, NRC Project Manager, License Renewal M. Wentzel, NRC Project Manager, License Renewal Mr. Christopher M. Pope Director Homeland Security and Emergency Management New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Bureau of Emergency Management 33 Hazen Drive Concord, NH 03305 John Giarrusso, Jr., Nuclear Preparedness Manager The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency 400 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01702-5399

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission SBK-L-12101/ Page 4 N ExTera1M SEABROOK I, Paul 0. Freeman, Site Vice President of NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC hereby affirm that the information and statements contained within are based on facts and circumstances which are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sworn and Subscribed Before me this day of May, 2012 Paul 0. Freeman

] Site Vice President Notary

Enclosure 1 to SBK-L-12101 Changes to the Seabrook Station License Renewal Application Associated with Chapter 3 - Aging Management Review Results

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 2 of 40 Introduction contains an update to the information provided in the NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application (LRA), Section 3.5. The LRA is being updated as a result of recent operating experience and additional information regarding the managing of aging effects associated with Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR).

Description of Changes CHANGES TO LRA CHAPTER 3 The following changes have been made to Section 3.5 of the Seabrook License Renewal Application (LRA). For clarity, entire sentences or paragraphs from the LRA are provided with deleted text highlighted by strikethroughs and inserted text highlighted by bolded italics:

1. In sections 3.5.2.1.1 (on page 3.5-3), 3.5.2.1.2 (on page 3.5-4), 3.5.2.1.4 (on page 3.5-6),

3.5.2.1.5 (on page 3.5-8), 3.5.2.1.7 (on page 3.5-10), and 3.5.2.1.8 (on page 3.5-11) the following program is added to the list of aging management programs listed under the heading "Aging Management Programs."

  • Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) MonitoringProgram(B.2.1.31A)
2. In section 3.5.2.2.1.10, on page 3.5-17, the 3rd and the 4th paragraphs are revised as follows:

Concrete aggregates used in Seabrook Station concrete structures were selected per ASTM C33, which uses ASTM C295 "PetrographicExamination of Aggregates for Concrete." Aggregates identified as potentially reactive were not used at Seabrook Station. Seabrook Station Operating Experience has indicated that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the Periodof Extended Operation (PEO).

Hawevef, Seabrook Station ee-seovatively-manages cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL Program, B.2.1.28, and--the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, and Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) MonitoringProgram,B.2.1.31A.

3. In section 3.5.2.2.2.1, on page 3.5-19, Item 5 is revised as follows:

Concrete in inaccessible areas is evaluated for expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregate. Tests and petrographic examinations performed according to ASTM C227-50 or ASTM C295-54 had initially verified that aggregates used are not reactive.

H.2..3 , Seabrook Station Opnser'atively managecs Eackingduc to xanin and r-eaction with aggrcgatcs thfough the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Proegrami,

.2413-h. Seabrook Station Operating Experience (OE) has indicated that Alkali-Silica

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 3 of 40 Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the Periodof Extended Operation (PEO).

Seabrook Station manages cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31 and the Seabrook StationAlkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) MonitoringProgram,B.2.1.31A.

4. In section 3.5.2.2.2.2, on page 3.5-21, the 3 rd and the &h 4 paragraphs of Item 2 are revised as follows:

Concrete aggregates used in Seabrook Station concrete structures were selected per ASTM C33, which uses ASTM C295 "Petrographic Examination of Aggregates for Concrete." Aggregates identified as potentially reactive were not used at Seabrook Station. Seabrook Station OperatingExperience (OE) has indicatedthat Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the Periodof Extended Operation (PEO).

Nevcrtheless, Scabrook Station uses the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring to expansion and r.eation .gg.egate.

with . Seabrook Station manages cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station Structures MonitoringProgram, B.2.1.31 and the Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

MonitoringProgram,B.2.1.31A.

5. In section 3.5.2.2.2.4, on page 3.5-24, the 2nd paragraph of Item 3 is revised as follows:

Concrete in inaccessible areas is evaluated for expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregate. Tests and petrographic examinations performed according to ASTM C227-50 or ASTM C295-54 had initially verified that aggregates used are not reactive.

Neveffheless, Seabrook Station manages beth cracking due tex anin and reacto with aggregates and Inres fieprsity, and pefmeability, and loss of material duet leaching of ealciutm hydroxide with the Seabrook Station Structurfes Moenitoring Pro)grami, B.2.14.3 . Seabrook Station OperatingExperience (OE) has indicatedthat Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures and will require monitoring through the Period of Extended Operation (PEO). Seabrook Station manages cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates through the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Program,B.2.1.31 and the Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A. Increase in porosity and permeability, and loss of strength due to leaching of calcium hydroxide is managed by the Seabrook Station Structures MonitoringProgram,B.2.1.31.

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 4 of 40

6. In Table 3.5.1, on page 3.5-32, line item 3.5.1-15 is revised as follows:

Agin Further Compnen Agiing:EffeetfDssso Component Management Ev.aluation Discussion Number ..... Program Recommended.

3.5.1-15 Concrete Increase in ISI (lWL) for Yes, if concrete The Seabreek MANR r-esuilts elements: walls, porosity accessible areas. was not conclude that crackingdu dome, basemat, permeability due None for constructed as to expansien and reactio ring girder, to leaching of inaccessible stated for with aggregate is not an buttresses, calcium areas if concrete inaccessible areas aging mechanimrquin containment, hydroxide; was constructed management for the concrete fill-in cracking due to in accordance contaunment stfucieatw annulus (as expansion and with the Seabf-oele applicable) reaction with recommendation Concrete was constructed aggregate s of ACI 201.2R equivalent to recommendations in ACI 201.2R. SeabrookStation OperatingExperience has indicatedthat Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structuresand will requiremonitoring through the Periodof Extended Operation (PEO).

Seabrook manages loss of material due to leaching of calcium hydroxide with the ASME Section XI, Subsection 1WL Program, B.2.1.28.

Cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates is managedthrough the ASME Section X1, Subsection IWL Program, B.2.1.28 andAlkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A.

Further evaluation is provided in LRA Subsection 3.5.2.2.1.10.

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 5 of 40

7. In Table 3.5.1, on page 3.5-36, line item 3.5.1-27 is revised as follows:

Item Aging Further Numer Cxiponent.Aigfet Management .Evalation Discussion Mecbnis, IProgram Re~ommnded-____________

3.5.1-27 All Groups Cracking due to Structures Yes, if not within This item is not applieable except Group 6: expansion due to Monitoring the scope of the to Seabroek.

accessible and reaction with Program None applicant's The Seabrooek AAMR results inaccessible aggregates for inaccessible Structures eenclude that r-eaction wit interior / areas if concrete Monitoring aggregates is not exterior was constructed Program or signifieant and The concrete in accordance concrete was not concrete was constructed with the constructed as consistent with the recommendation stated for recommendations of ACI s in ACI 201.2R- inaccessible areas 201.2R. SeabrookStation 77 OperatingExperience has indicatedthat Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structuresand will requiremonitoring through the Periodof Extended Operation (PEO).

Nonetheless, all Seabroo

-stfutural components applicable to-this itemwil be moenitor-ed by the Cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates will be monitored by the Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31 and Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program,B.2.1.31A.

Further evaluation is provided in LRA Subsection 3.5.2.2.2.1, Item 5.

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 6 of 40

8. In Table 3.5.1, on page 3.5-42, line item 3.5.1-36 is revised as follows:

ItmAig tet/Aging Further Component: M h, - Managenient Evaluation " , isjcussion Numbier 3.5.1-36 Group 6: all Cracking due to Accessible areas: Yes, if concrete Consistent with NUEC accessible / expansion / Inspection of was not .

inaccessible reaction with Water Control constructed as The concrete was reinforced aggregates Structures stated for constructedconsistent concrete Associated with inaccessible areas with the recommendations Nuclear Power ofACI 201.2R. Seabrook Plants. None for Station Operating inaccessible Experience has indicated areas if concrete that Alkali-Silica Reaction was constructed (ASR) is present in site in accordance structures and will require with the monitoring through the recommendation Periodof Extended s in ACI Operation (PEO).

201.2R77 The Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31 and Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program,B.2.1.31A, will manage degradation of accessible and inaccessible concrete components for cracking due to expansion /

reaction with aggregates.

Further evaluation is provided in LRA Subsection 3.5.2.2.2.4, Item 3.

9. In Table 3.5.2-1, starting on page 3.5-53, line items associated with 3.5.1 -27 and 3.5.1-36 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

I ntnddAgin'g'Effect Aging Table, 1component Type i qiig Mnamn .I Nt.

Funcion Material, Environment'; -Reurn aagm t3.l No BSAS Concrete Monitoring A NONESSENTIAL Program SWITCHGEAR Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.A-2 3.5.1-27 BUILDING Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Air (ASR)

Outdoor Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 7 of 40 Structures Monitoring A BSAS Concrete Program (Sump) FIRE Structural Raw Water Expansion III.A3-PUMPHOUSE SucwaRaWae Exflon Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE Support Concrete (External) and Cracking Akl-iia 23512 Exposed to Raw Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures BSAS Concrete Monitoring A (Sump) STEAM GENERATOR Program BLOWDOWN Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion . Alkali-Silica 23.5.1-27 3.5.A-2 RECOVERY Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

BUILDING Exposed to Raw (ASR)

Water Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures BSAS Concrete Monitoring DISCHARGE Program E, 511 TRANSITION Air Indoor III.A6-STRUCTURE Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36 Exposed to Air Support (External) Reaction (T-17)

Indoor (ASR) E, 517 Uncontrolled Monitoring Program Structures-Monitoring BSAS Concrete Program E, 511 DISCHARGE TRANSITION Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 2III.A51 3.5.1-3 6 STRUCTURE Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-17)

Exposed to Air (AcSR) E, 517 Outdoor Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring BSAS Concrete Program E, 511 DISCHARGE TRANSITION Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Aa-iA.3 Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-3 6 STRUCTURE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-17)

Exposed to Air (AcSR) E, 517 Outdoor Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 8 of 40 Structures Monitoring BSAS Concrete Program E, 511 DISCHARGE TRANSITION SRCUE Structural Spot Concrete Raw Water

~ Expansion rcig Aa-i Alkali-Silica 22.3 3.5.1-36 STRUCTURE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

Exposed to Raw (ASR) E, 517 Water Monitoring Program Structures BSAS Concrete FIRE Monitoring Program A FIRE Air Indoor III.A3-PUMPHOUSE Structural Concrete Expansion Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Indoor (A SR)

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A BSAS Concrete Program FIRE III.A3-PUMPHOUSE Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27 ExposedCo(External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures BSAS Concrete Monitoring INTAKE Program E, 511 TRANSITION Air Indoor III.A6-Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36 Exposed to Air Support (External) Reaction (T-17)

Indoor (ASR) E, 517 Uncontrolled Monitoring Program Structures BSAS Concrete Monitoring INTAKE Program INTAKEIII.A6- E, 511 TRANSITION Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Aa-i Alkali-Silica 22.3 3.5.1-36 STRUCTURE Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

Exposed to Air (ASR) E, 517 Outdoor Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 9 of 40 Structures Monitoring BSAS Concrete E, 511 INTAKE Program TRANSITION Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Aa-i Alkali-Silica 22. 3 3.5.1-36 STRUCTURE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

Exposed to Air (ASR) E, 517 Outdoor (S)E 1 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring BSAS Concrete Program E, 511 INTAKE TRANSITION Structural Raw Water Expansion Aa-i 2. 3 STRUCTURE Support Concrete (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica 2(T- 17) 3.5.1-36 Exoedt RwReaction Exposed to Raw (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures BSAS Concrete Monitoring A NONESSENTIAL Program SWITCHGEAR Air Indoor III.A3-BUILDING Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Support (External) Reaction (T-03)

Indoor (ASR) E, 517 Uncontrolled Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring Program E, 511 BSAS Concrete III.A6-REVETMENT Flood Concrete Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36 BelowBarrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T- 17)

(ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring Program E, 511 BSAS Concrete Soil Expansion III.A6-REVETMENT Support Concrete Soil ansin Alkali-Silica 2 3.5.1-36 Below Grade (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-17)

(ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 10 of 40 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 11 of 40

10. In Table 3.5.2-2, starting on page 3.5-68, line items associated with 3.5.1-15, and 3.5.1-27 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

Inede ,Aginig Effect NUREg Table Intend(G-1801.

!Component Type Ft Material Environment Requiring. Management I3.X-1 Note

~Managernent PreiiiH ~Item Structures Monitoring A Program CNT-CE-Reinforced Shelter, Concrete Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A1-2 3.5.1-27 Concrete Below Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A Program CNT-CE-Reinforced Structural Concrete Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A1-2 3.5.1-27 Concrete Below Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A CNT-CE- Program Reinforced Shelter, Air Indoor Expansion III.A 1-2 Concrete Exposed Protection Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica 3 5.1-27 to Air Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction 3 .

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A CNT-CE- Program Reinforced Structural Air Indoor Expansion III.A 1-2 Concrete Exposed Pressure Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica 3 5.1-27 to Air Indoor Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction 3 .

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring CNT-CE- Program A Reinforced Structural Air Indoor Ucnrl Ed Expansion xAlkali-Silica ILA1-2 511-2 Concrete Exposed Strt Concrete Uncontrolled (T-03) to Air Indoor Support (External) and Cracking Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 12 of 40 CNT-CE-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CE-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CE-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CE-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CE-Reinforced to Air Outdoor

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 13 of 40 CNT-CEVA-Reinforced Concrete Below Grade CNT-CEVA-Reinforced Concrete Below Grade CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Indoor Uncontrolled CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Indoor Uncontrolled CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Indoor Uncontrolled

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 14 of 40 CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Indoor Uncontrolled CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Outdoor CNT-CEVA-Reinforced to Air Outdoor

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 15 of 40 Structures Monitoring A CNT-CI- Program Reinforced Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A4-2 Concrete Exposed Fir Concrete Uncontrolled. Alkali-Silica 3.5.1-27 to Air Indoor Barrier (External) and Cracking Reactio(T-03)

Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A CNT-CI- Program Reinforced Flood Air Indoor Expansion JII.A4-2 Concrete Exposed BarrierBarrieral)

Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Aai-liaeton(Y-03) 3 51-27

.Alkali-Silica to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring £, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A CNT-CI- Program Reinforced Air Indoor Expansion III.A4-2 Concrete Exposed Barrie Concrete Uncontrolled ansin Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 to Air Indoor Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A CNT-CL-Reinforced Program Air Indoor Corc ed Structural Expansion III.A4-2 Concrete Exposed Support Concrete Uncontrolled 3 51-27

.Alkali-Silica to Air Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E,517 Program ASME Section XI, Subsection A CNT-CS-Reinforced Fire Air Indoor Expansion IWL Program Concrete Exposed tAiinor Fir Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled (Etra) and Cracking Alkali-Silica IalA(3.5.1-15 (C-04) to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 16 of 40 ASME Section XI, Subsection A CNT-CS-Reinforced Flood Air Indoor Expansion IWL Program Concrete ExposedtoArInor Barrier Bare Concrete Uncontrolled

( t) Epan Cracking and ing- Alkali-Silica (C-04) 3.51-15 3511 to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program ASME Section XI, A CNT-CS- Subsection CoceeEpsd ReinforcedExposede HIELB Concreteg Cnrt Air Indoor Uncontrolled Expansion IWL Program I1.AI-3 3511 tonireeIn oo d Shielding (e nterol)d and Cracking Alkali-Silica (C-04) 3.5.1-15 to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program ASME Section XI, Subsection A CNT-CS-Reinforced Missile Air Indoor Expansion IWL Program Concrete Exposed tAiInor Barrie Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled (Etra) aand Cracking clA(3.5.1-15 Alkali-Silica (C-04) to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program ASME Section XI, Subsection A CNT-CS-Reinforced Shelter Air Indoor Expansion I Program A-3 Concrete Exposed Concrete Uncontrolled ansin AI-Aa-0 3.5.1-15 to Air Indoor Protection (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (C-04)

Unoto ole Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program ASME Section XI, Subsection A CNT-CS-Reinforced Air Indoor IWL Program Concrete Exposed Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-SiliAa (C-04) 3.5.1-15 to Air Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 17 of 40 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

Enclosure I SBK-L-12101 Page 18 of 40

11. In Table 3.5.2-4, starting on page 3.5-128, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

StruceTable Copnn Tje> Intended.AigEfc gn G101 Componet TNop Material E~nvironment Ruing jMan~agement-' l 3.X-1 Note Mýanagemeint KProgram Ie

-~ '~tent, Structures MYS - Concrete Monitoring A CONTROL ROOM Air IndoorProgram MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE Air (ASR)

Indoor Uncontrolled (ntr)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures MYS - Concrete Monitoring A Ground Program CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE Below (ASR)

Grade (A tr)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures MYS - Concrete Monitoring A Program CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AIR Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 INTAKE Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE (ASR)

Exposed to Weather rE, Monitoring E 517 1

Program Structures MYS - Concrete Monitoring A CONTROL ROOM Program MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE Ra (ASR)

Exposed to Weather Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 19 of 40 Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 CONDENSATE Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled nd Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 STORAGE TANK Air (External) Reaction Indoor Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR Structural Air Indoor Expansion JJI.A3-2 CONDENSATE StSupporl Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 STORAGE TANK Air (External) Reaction Indoor Uncontrolled (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR Stctal Ground Expansion III.A3-2 CONDENSATE Strt Concrete Water/Soil ansin Alkali-Silica (TI.3) 3.5.1-27 STORAGE TANK Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T03)

Below Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR MsieArOtor EpninIIA-CONDENSATE Brie Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica 1I.A3-2 3.5.1-27 STORAGE TANK Barrier Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Weather (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program ENCLOSURE FOR StutrlArOtor EpninI.3-CONDENSATE Strt Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica II.A3-2 3.5.1-27 STORAGE TANK Support Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Weather (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring I___ _ 1__ 1_Program I _I _I

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 20 of 40 Structures MYS - Concrete NON Monitoring A SAFETY RELATED Air IndoorProgram ELECTRICAL DUCT Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 BANKS/MANHOLES Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor (taRe Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete NON Program SAFETY RELATED Ground ELECTRICAL DUCT Strt Concrete Water/Soil xpansion Alkali-Silica (T0A32 3.5.1-27 BANKS/MANHOLES (External) Reaction Below Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A Program MYS - Concrete NON SAFETY RELATED Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 MANHOLES Exposed Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03) to Weather (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures MYS - Concrete Monitoring A SAFETY RELATED Air IndoorProgram ELECTRICAL DUCT Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 BANKS/MANHOLES Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor ( a Re Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring MYS - Concrete Program A SAFETY RELATED Structural Ground Expansion III.A3-2 ELECTRICAL DUCT Strt Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-0 3.5.1-27 BANKS/MANHOLES (External) Reaction Below Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 21 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program MYS - Concrete SAFETY RELATED Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 MANHOLES Exposed Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03) to Weather (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A Program MYS - Concrete SAFETY RELATED Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 MANHOLES Exposed Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03) to Weather (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Air IndoorProgram SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 ACCESS VAULT Air Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Indoor Uncontrolled (AESR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A Program MYS - Concrete Ground Eaogr31 SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 ACCESS VAULT Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Below Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring Program A MYS - Concrete SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 ACCESS VAULT Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Raw Water (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 22 of 40 Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program STATION Ground BLACKOUT Structural GrudExpansion III.A3-2 3512 BLACKOUT .tSupport Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T.A03) 3.5.1-27 STRUCTURES Below (External) Reaction Grade (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Program STATION BLACKOUT Structural Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion AlkaiSii II.A3-2 3.5.1-27 STRUCTURES Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Weather (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program Structures MYS - Concrete Sump Monitoring A Program CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AIR Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 INTAKE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

STRUCTURE (ASR)eac Exposed to Raw Water Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures MYS - Concrete Sump Monitoring A NON SAFETY Program RELATED ELECTRICAL DUCT Strt Conc Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica (T.A32 3.5.1-27 BANKS/MANHOLES Reaction (T-03)

Exposed to Raw (ASR) E, 517 Water Monitoring Program Structures Monitoring A MYS - Concrete Sump Program SAFETY RELATED Raw Water Expansion IIIA3-2 ELECTRICAL DUCT Structural Concrete (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 BANKS/MANHOLES Reaction Exposed to Raw Water (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 23 of 40

12. In Table 3.5.2-5, starting on page 3.5-15 1, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

AgYing Effect AigTbe NýConipobenit Type Inedd Material Environment R~equiring Management, G11 3.-1 Note".

FunctionManagem.ent P.o*oran]i I tei Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Flood Ground EII.A1-2 Concrete -CDG- BFloo Concrete Barierand Water/Soil Expansion Cracking Alkali-Silica Reactio (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion . ILI-2 Concrete -CDG- Structural Concrete Water/Soil ansin Alkali-Silica (T-2 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -CDG- Fire Air Indoor Expansion' III.A1-2 Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -CDG- Air Indoor Exposed to Air Supt Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica (T-A3) 3.5.1-27 Indoor Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -CDG- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A1-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 24 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -CDG- Shelter, Air Outdoor Expansion III.A 1-2 Concrete Alkali-Silica 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking (T-03)-

Reaction Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A, 512 PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -CDG- Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A 1-27 Exposed to Raw Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program PS-T - ~~~~~~GroundExasoIIA32 3517 Concrete - Structural Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 CEHMS- Below Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Grade (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete - Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 CEHMS- Exposed Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03) to Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP- F o dGroundConcrete Flood Water/Soil E p ni nIIA Alkali-Silica Expansion III.A3 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) and Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 25 of 40 PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP-Below Grade PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP-Exposed to Air Indoor Uncontrolled PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP-Exposed to Air Indoor Uncontrolled PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP-Exposed to Air Outdoor PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP-Exposed to Air Outdoor

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 26 of 40 Structures Monitoring A, 512 Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -EFP- Structural Raw Water Expansion Alki-Sii III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Support Cte(External) and Cracking Realn (T-03)

Exposed to Raw Water Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion 1.A5-2 Concrete -FSB- Flood Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion III.A5-2 Concrete -FSB- Structural Concrete Water/Soil ansin Alkali-Silica (T-2 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -FSB- Fire Air Indoor Expasion III.A5-2 Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -FSB- Air Indoor Expansion III.A5-2 Exposed to Air Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 27 of 40 Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -FSB- Structal Air Indoor Expansion III.A5-2 Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -FSB- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A5-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -FSB- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A5-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A, 512 Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -FSB- Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A5-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Raw Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced F o dGround E p ni nIIA -

Concrete -PAB- Flood Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica II.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure I SBK-L-12101 Page 28 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced St u t rlGround Eansin p ni nII A -

Concrete -PAB- Structural Concrete Water/Soil Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Support (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -PAB- Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed to Air BFir Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -PAB- Structural Air Indoor Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion AlkaliSii (TI03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -PAB- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -PAB- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure I SBK-L-12101 Page 29 of 40 PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW-Below Grade PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW-Below Grade PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW-Exposed to Air Indoor Uncontrolled PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW-Exposed to Air Indoor Uncontrolled PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW-Exposed to Air Indoor Uncontrolled

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 30 of 40 Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -PCEW- Structural Air Indoor Expansion Expnsin IlI.A3-2 Ii. 3 51-2 Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-0 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A, 512 Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -PCEW- Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Raw Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced F o dGround E p ni nIIA -

Concrete -PHA- Flood Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica (TI.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 31 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Structural Ground Expansion III.A3-2 Concrete -PHA- Spot Concrete Water/Soil an rcig Alkali-silica (T0) 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Suctura (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -PHA- Fire Air Indoor Expansion I11.A3-2 Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled Alkali-Silica (T03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -PHA- Structural Air Indoor Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (TI03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -PHA- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Ground Concrete -TFA- Flood Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica (T.A32 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 32 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -TFA- St u t rlG Concrete Structural round Water/Soil Eansin p ni nII Alkali-Silica (IT.A3-2 A - 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Support (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -TFA- Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed to Air Barrier Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -TFA- Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed to Air Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled (T-03) 51-27 Indoor (External) and Cracking Reaction 3 .

Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -TFA- Structural Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -TFA- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 33 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -TFA- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (AcSR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Ground Expansion I1I.A3-2 Concrete -WPB- Flood Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Below Grade (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Structural GroundConcreteoWate Concrete -WPB- SGrt Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica (TI.3) 3.5.1-27 Below Grade Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -WPB- Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed orir to Air Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) .5.1-27 Indoor Barrier (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -WPB- Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed to Air Shielding Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 34 of 40 Structures Monitoring A PST - Reinforced Program Concrete -WPB- Structural Air Indoor Expansion . J.A3-2 Exposed to Air Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03)

Indoor (External) Reaction Uncontrolled (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -WPB- Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (3-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program PST - Reinforced Concrete -WPB- Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 Exposed to Air Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

13. In Table 3.5.2-7, starting on page 3.5-242, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

Intndd Agin- Effect Aging G-1 80 Componeent Type Material Environment Requirini r g Manahgement VI,, 3.X-l Note Function HManagement.l Irgamitem Structures Monitoring A Program TUR - Concrete Structural Raw Water Expansion III.A3-2 (Sump) - Exposed Support Concrete (External) and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 to Raw WaterReaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 35 of 40 Structures Monitoring A Program TUR - Concrete - Structural Air Outdoor Expansion III.A3-2 Exposed to Air Concrete xrn and in Alkali-Silica 3.5.1-27 Outdoor Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

(ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A Program TUR - Concrete - Structural Air Indoor Expansion . J.A3-2 in Air Indoor Support Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Uncontrolled (External) Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

14. In Table 3.5.2-8, starting on page 3.5-247, line items associated with 3.5.1-27 are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

LheddUAginigEffect AgingTal Co*mponent Type Material Environment Re'iiii)ng Management I 3X- Not0 Function, Management Prga Volr.n Vj2-w y31I tem Nt Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program CIRCULATING Structural GroundConcreteoWate WATER Srtr Concrete Water/Soil Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Below Grade (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A CIRCULATING Program WATER Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor Uncontrolled ( r eato (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 36 of 40 Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program CIRCULATING Shelter, Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 51-27 PUMPHOUSE Protection Concrete (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program CIRCULATING WATER Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Raw Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A SERVICE Program WATER Ground COOLING Structural Groil Expansion III.A3-2 3.5 1-27 COLIGSupport Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3512 TOWER Including (External) Reaction Switchgear Rooms (ASR)

Below Grade Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A SERVICE Program WATER COOLING Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.51-27 TOLING Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER Including Reaction Switchgear Rooms (ASR) in Air Outdoor Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A SERVICE Program WATER IIA-COOLING Shelter, Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica IIIA32 51-27 TOLING Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER Including Reaction Switchgear Rooms (ASR) in Air Outdoor Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 37 of 40 Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete -

Program SERVICE WATER Structural Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 COOLING - Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER in Raw (ASR)

Water Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete -

Program SERVICE WATER Ultimate Concrete Raw Water Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 COOLING Heat Sink (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

TOWER in Raw (ASR)

Water Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A SERVICE Program WATER Fire Air Indoor Expansion III.A3-2 COOLING TWR Fir Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Including Swgr (External) Reaction Rms in Air Indoor (ASR)

Uncontrolled -M11onitoring E, 517 Program Structures WCS - Concrete - Monitoring A SERVICE Program WATER Stctal Air Indoor Expansion JII.A3-2 COOLING TWR Strt Concrete Uncontrolled and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 Including Swgr S (External) Reaction Rms in Air Indoor (ASR)

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program SERVICE Stctal Ground Expansion III.A3-2 WATER Support Concrete Water/Soil and Cracking Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE (External) Reaction Below Grade (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12101 Page 38 of 40 Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete -

Program SERVICE WATER Fire Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE in Barrier (External) and-Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor Uncontrolled (xra Re (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete -

SERVICE Air IndoorProgram WATER Structural Concrete Uncontrolled Expansion Alkali-Silica III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Air Indoor (ASR)

Uncontrolled Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program SERVICE III.A3-2 WATER Missile Concrete Air Outdoor Expansion Alkali-Silica (T-03) 3.5.1-27 PUMPHOUSE in Barrier (External) and Cracking Reaction Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program SERVICE Shelter, Air Outdoor Expansion AlkliSili III.A 3.5.1-27 WATERVICE Concrete (Exter IA(T-03)-

PUMPHOUSE in Protection (External) and Cracking Reaction Air Outdoor (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program Structures Monitoring A WCS - Concrete - Program WATER Structural Raw Water Expansion AlkliSii III.A3-2 3.5.1-27 SAERVIESrcua Concrete (External)ic and5Cackin PUMPHOUSE in Support (External) and Cracking Reaction (T-03)

Raw Water (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

Enclosure I SBK-L-12101 Page 39 of 40

15. The following four line items which were added under SBK-L- 11063 dated April 14, 2011 (Ref. Page 6 of 7 of Enclosure 2) are revised and a new plant specific note 517 is added as follows:

giAin aUR Tabl ComponentdType Material Environment Requiring. Management G- iX- Note

~CmoetTpucin-Management jTyi..ogram Vol.I Iteem ASME Section XI, Subsection A CNT-CS- Cracking due JWL Program Reinforced Missile Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ I1.A1-3 3.5.1-15 Concrete Exposed Barrier (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04) to Raw Water aggregates Reaction (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program ASME Section XI, A Subsection CNT-CS- Cracking due IWL Program Reinforced Shelter, Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ IL.A1-3 3.5.1-15 Concrete Exposed Protection (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04) to Raw Water aggregates Reaction (ASR) E, 517 Monitoring Program ASME Section XI, A Subsection CNT-CS- Structural Cracking due IWL Program ReinforcedPressure Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ IL.AI-3 3.5.1-15 Concrete Exposed Prre (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04) to Raw Water aggregates Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program ASME Section XI, A Subsection CNT-CS- Cracking due IWL Program Reinforced Structural Concrete Raw Water to expansion/ II.A 1-3 3.5.1-15 Support (External) reaction with Alkali-Silica (C-04)

Concrete Exposed to Raw Water aggregates Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring E, 517 Program 517 Seabrook Station Operating Experience indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in site structures. Cracking due to reaction with aggregate will

Enclosure 1 SBK-L-12 101 Page 40 of 40 be monitored by the plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

16. The concrete fire barriers that are included in section 3.3 of the LRA have .credited the Fire Protection Program as the aging management program in section 3.3. Because all of the concrete fire barriers are also structural concrete covered in section 3.5, they will also be inspected by the Structures Monitoring Program as specified in section 3.5. All of the AMR line items with structural concrete that are subject to Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in section 3.3 are also listed in section 3.5, where the new Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Monitoring Program is being added to the Structures Monitoring Program. This will ensure that the concrete fire barriers will also be inspected for ASR and no changes are needed to section 3.3 to address ASR.

Enclosure 2 to SBK-L-12101 Changes to the Seabrook Station License Renewal Application Associated with Appendix A - Updated UFSAR Supplement and Appendix B - Aging Management Programs

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 2 of 18 Introduction contains an update to the information provided in the NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application (LRA), Appendix A and Appendix B. Included in this update are changes which augment the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, by addition of a plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.3 IA. The ASR Monitoring Program will be used to augment the existing Structures Monitoring Program to identify plant structures affected by ASR, monitor its progression and take corrective action such that intended functions are maintained.

CHANGES TO LRA APPENDIX A The following changes have been made to Appendix A of the Seabrook License Renewal Application (LRA). For clarity, entire sentences or paragraphs from the LRA are provided with deleted text highlighted by strikethroughs and inserted text highlighted by bolded italics:

Add line A.2.1.3 1A to APPENDIX A - Table of Contents, page A-I17, as follows:

A .2.1.31 Structures M onitoring Program ....................................................................................... A- 16 A.2.1.31A Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring................................................. A-17 a) Add Item #31A to Section A.1.1, on page A-5, as follows:

31. Structures Monitoring Program (A.2.1.31) 31A. Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring (A.2.1.31A) b) Add new section A.2.1.31A to page A-17, as follows:

A.2.1.31A ALKALI-SILICA REACTION (ASR) MONITORING The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) MonitoringProgram manages cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregatesof concrete structures within the scope of license renewal. The program is consistent with the ten elements of an acceptable aging management program as described in NUREG-1800Appendix A.1, Section A.1.2.3 and TableA.1-1.

The StructuralMonitoring Program performs visual inspections of the concrete structures at Seabrook for indications of the presence of alkali-silica reaction (ASR). ASR is detected by visual observation of cracking on the surface of the concrete. The cracking is typically accompanied by the presence of moisture and efflorescence. Concrete affected by expansive ASR is typically characterizedby a network or "pattern" of cracks. ASR involves the formation of an alkali-silica gel which expands when exposed to water. Microcracking due to ASR is generated through forces applied by the expanding aggregateparticles and/or swelling of the alkali-silicagel within and around the boundaries of reacting aggregateparticles. The ASR gel may exude from the crackforming white secondary deposits at the concrete surface. The gel also

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12 101 Page 3 of 18 often causes a dark discoloration of the cement paste surrounding the crack at the concrete surface. If pattern or map cracking typical of concrete affected by ASR is identified, an evaluation will be performed to determinefurther actions.

To manage the aging effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in concrete structures, the existing Structures MonitoringProgram,B.2.1.31, has been augmented by this plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31A. The ASR Monitoring Program is structured according to the guidelines in ACI 349.3R, "Structural ConditionAssessment of Buildings."

ASR is detected by visual observation of crackingon the surface of the concrete. The cracking is typically accompanied by the presence of moisture and efflorescence. Monitoring of crack growth is used to assess the long term implicationsof ASR and specify monitoringintervals.

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) and Individual Crack Width criteria are established as thresholds at which structuralevaluation is necessary. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. A CCI of less than the 1.0 mm/i and Individual Crack Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed acceptable with deficiencies. Deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence offurther degradation.A CCI of 1.0 mm/im or greater,or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0 mm or greaterrequires structuralevaluation.

The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program will monitor at least 20 locations that represent the highest CCI values recorded during the baseline inspections. Follow-up inspection of these locations will be performed at six month intervals.

c) Add Commitment #71 to Table A.3, "License Renewal Commitment List", page A-43 as follows:

A.3 LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENT LIST UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCAT LOCATION SCHEDULE Alkali-Silica Reaction Implement the Alkali-Silica Reaction Priorto entering the 71 (ASR) Monitoring (ASR) Monitoring Program B.2.1.31A periodof extended Program operation.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 4 of 18 CHANGES TO LRA APPENDIX B The following changes have been made to Appendix B of the Seabrook License Renewal Application (LRA). For clarity, revised sections include entire sentences or paragraphs from the LRA and are shown with deleted text highlighted by strikethroughs and inserted text highlighted by bolded italics:

a) Revise Appendix B - Table of Contents, page B-2 to add line B.2.1.31A to as follows:

B.2.1.31 Structures M onitoring Program ................................................ B-164 B.2.1.31A Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) MonitoringProgram..................... B-1 74 b) Revise B.1.5, "NUREG-1801 CHAPTER XI AGING MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS" on page B-9 to add line 31A to as follows:

31 Structures Monitoring Program (B.2.1.31) [Existing]

31A. Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) MonitoringProgram(B.2.1.31A) [New]

c) Revised B.2.0, "Aging Management Correlation Chart- NUREG-1801 To Seabrook Station Programs", on page B-14 as follows:

~NU~RiG-m81 NumerNUJREG 1801 Program 1/4 SeabrdOk Stationi Program Seabrook Station PlantSpecific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR)

Program Monitoring d) Add to B.2.0, "NUREG-1801 Chapter XI Aging Management Programs", new Section B.2.1.31A, Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program in its entirety, to page B-174, as follows:

B.2.1.31A ALKALI-SILICA REACTION MONITORING PROGRAM Program Description NextEra Energy Seabrook Operating Experience (OE) indicates that Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is present in concrete structures and will require monitoring through the Period of Extended Operation.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 5 of 18 Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) is a reaction that occurs over time in concrete between alkaline cement paste and reactive, non-crystalline silica in aggregates. An expansive gel is formed within aggregates resulting in micro cracks in aggregates and in the adjacent cement paste. Because the ASR mechanism requires the presence of water, ASR has been predominantly detected in groundwater impacted portions of below grade structures, with limited impact to exterior surfaces of above grade structures.

The ASR developed at Seabrook because the concrete mix designs utilized an aggregate that was susceptible to Alkali-Silica Reaction, which was not known at the time.

Although the testing was conducted in accordance with the ASTM C289 standard, this standard was subsequently identified as limited in its ability to predict long term ASR.

To manage the aging effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in concrete structures, the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been augmented by this plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.3 IA. The ASR Monitoring Program will be structured according to the guidelines in ACI 349.3R, "StructuralCondition Assessment of Buildings. "

Evaluations of a structure's condition are completed according to the guidelines set forth in the Structural Monitoring Program (the Seabrook Station Maintenance Rule program that implements the Structures Monitoring Program). The acceptance guidelines in the Structural Monitoring Program are a three-tier hierarchy similar to that described in ACI 349.3R-96, which provides quantitative degradation limits. Under this system, structures are evaluated for ASR as detailed in the following Table. ASR affected areas classified to be Unacceptable (requires further evaluation) or Acceptable with Deficiencies are monitored in accordance with the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program.

Recommendation for Combined Cracking PructgralMonategoring Individual Concrete lndex Individual Crack Width tComponents CCI Unacceptable (requires Structural Evaluation 1.0 m/m or greater 1.0 mm or greater further evaluation)

Quantitative Monitoring 0.5 mm/m or greater 0.2 mm or greater Acceptable with and Trending Deficiencies QAny area with indications of pattern cracking or sQualitative Monitoring water ingress Routine inspection as Area has no indications of pattern cracking or water Acceptable prescribed by Structures Monitoring Program ingress - No visual presence of ASR

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12 101 Page 6 of 18 Industry Expert Engagement Alkali-Silica Reaction is a newly identified aging mechanism to Seabrook and little or no experience exists in management of its aging effects in the US nuclear industry. NextEra has engaged several subject matter experts with knowledge of ASR and its impact on concrete structures. Based on this expertise, NextEra has concluded that the mechanical properties of the in-situ structures, that are highly reinforced with rebar steel, are expected to be higher than the results from core bore testing (4" concrete bore with no rebar).

Principle references used in development of this aging management program consist of the following input of subject matter experts and both nuclear and non-nuclear sources:

- "Report on the Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction in Transportation Structures," U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, January 2010, Report Number FHWA-HIF-09-004.

- "Structural Effects of Alkali-Silica Reaction: Technical Guidance on the Appraisal of Existing Structures," Institution of Structural Engineers, July 1992.

- ORNL/NRC/LTR-95/14, "In-Service Inspection Guidelines for Concrete Structures in Nuclear Power Plants," December 1995."

- "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments", MPR-3727, Revision 0, April 2012.

Monitoring Monitoring of ASR associated cracks is an effective method for determining ASR progression. Monitoring of ASR associated cracks at Seabrook is implemented with two measurements. One is Cracking Index (CI) and the other is Individual Crack Width.

The CI is a quantitative assessment of cracking present in the cover concrete of affected structures. A CI measurement is taken on accessible surfaces exhibiting ASR pattern cracking. The process for determining the Cracking Index (CI) is described in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) document FHWA-HIF-09-004, "Report on the Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in Transportation Structures." The Cracking Index is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal or vertical sides of a 20-inch by 20-inch square on the ASR-affected concrete surface.

Since each side of the square is 0.5 m, the Cracking Index in a given direction is reported in units of min/m.

The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking Index (CCI) for each area of interest. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. Criteria used in assessment of expansion is expressed in terms of CCI and based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 7 of 18 and Attachments. The CCI and individual crack width are compared to ASR screening criteria and categorized for Qualitative or Quantitative Monitoring and Trending and Structural Evaluation.

The progression of ASR degradation of the concrete is an important consideration for assessing the long term implications of ASR and specifying monitoring intervals. The most reliable means for establishing the progression of ASR degradation is to monitor expansion of the concrete in situ.

Individual Crack Width measurement is also an effective method for assessment of ASR affected areas. Screening criteria used in the assessment of Individual Crack Width, expressed in terms of mm, are based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments.

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments. Monitoring of Cracking Index and Individual Crack Width of at least 20 areas identified in the baseline inspection as having the largest CCI will be performed at six month intervals. Trend data from these follow-up inspections will be used in determining the progression of ASR degradation and a basis for any change to the frequency of the inspection of ASR affected areas. Documentation and trend data will be maintained in accordance with the Structures Monitoring Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of Buildings."

Acceptance Criteria Several published studies describe screening methods to determine when structural evaluations of ASR affected concrete are appropriate and how to prioritize such evaluations. In MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments, these studies were reviewed for applicability. The report concludes: "while these screening methods are based on lightly or unreinforced concrete structures, they are useful in the absence of criteria directly relevant to the highly-reinforced concrete structures used in nuclear generating facilities," and, "Confinement provided by reinforcing steel and other restraints is a key factor regardingthe impact ofASR on reinforced concrete structures. Confinement limits ASR expansion of the in situ structure, which reduces the extent of deleterious cracking and the resultant reduction in concrete properties."

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 8 of 18 NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments. This report provides recommendations and the basis for thresholds used in the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program. The ASR Monitoring Program establishes the screening criteria for ASR affected areas. ASR affected areas are screened and categorized for Qualitative or Quantitative Monitoring and Trending and Structural Evaluation.

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) of less than the 1.0 mm/m and Individual Crack Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed Acceptable with Deficiencies. Areas with deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of further degradation. Documentation and trend data will be maintained in accordance with the Structures Monitoring Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "StructuralCondition Assessment of Buildings. "

Areas with a CCI of 1.0 mm/m or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0 mm or greater are deemed Unacceptable and require a structural evaluation. This evaluation is performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the Current Licensing Basis and is documented in the Corrective Action Program. The engineering evaluation will be typical to those structural evaluations that have already been performed for Alkali-Silica Reaction. The Engineering Evaluation will consider the need to perform a detailed appraisal to determine potential capacity reductions, or the need to perform special studies, testing, and monitoring. Additionally, Corrective Actions requiring repair are entered in the Work Control Program for implementation.

Evaluation Evaluations are performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the Current Licensing Basis. These evaluations are documented in the Corrective Action Program. Additionally, Corrective Actions requiring repair are entered in the Work Control Program for implementation. Deficiencies determined to be acceptable by engineering review are trended for evidence of further degradation.

Conclusion To manage the aging effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates in concrete structures, the existing Structures Monitoring Program, B.2.1.31, has been augmented by this plant specific Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program, B.2.1.3 IA. The ASR Monitoring Program will be structured according to the guidelines in ACI 349.3R, "StructuralCondition Assessment of Buildings. "

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12 101 Page 9 of 18 A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) of less than the 1.0 mm/m and Individual Crack Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed Acceptable with Deficiencies. Areas with deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of further degradation. A CCI of 1.0 mmn/m or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0 mm or greater are deemed Unacceptable and require further evaluation.

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. Monitoring of CI and Individual Crack Width of at least 20 areas identified in the baseline inspection as having the CCI will be performed at six month intervals. Measurement of Cracking Index and Individual Crack Width will be performed in the same areas as the baseline. Trend data from these follow-up inspections will be used in determining the progression of ASR and a basis for any change to the frequency of the inspection.

Program Elements ELEMENT 1 - SCOPE OF PROGRAM The Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program provides for management of aging effects due to the presence of ASR. Program scope includes concrete structures within the scope of the License Renewal Structures Monitoring Program. License Renewal structures within the-scope of this program include:

  • Containment Building (including equipment hatch missile shield)
  • Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area
  • Control Building
  • Control Building Make-up Air Intake Structures
  • Diesel Generator Building
  • Piping (RCA) Tunnels
  • Main Steam and Feed Water East and West Pipe Chase
  • Waste Processing Building
  • Tank Farm
  • Condensate Storage Tank Enclosure
  • Emergency Feed Water Pump House Building, including Electrical Cable Tunnels and Penetration Areas (Control Building to Containment)
  • Fuel Storage Building

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 10 of 18

  • Primary Auxiliary Building including RHR Vaults
  • Circulating Water Pump house Building (below elevation 21'-0)
  • Safety Related Electrical Manholes and Duct Banks
  • Pre-Action Valve Building
  • Miscellaneous Non-Category I Yard Structures o SBO Structure - Transformers and Switch Yard foundations o Non-Safety-Related Electrical Cable Manhole, Duct Bank Yard Structures foundations o Switchyard and 345 KV Power Transmission foundations
  • Non-Category I Structures o Turbine Generator Building o Fire Pump House o Aboveground exterior tanks 1-FP-TK-35-A, 1-FP-TK-3 5-B, 1-FP-TK-36-A, 1-FP-TK-36-B and 1-FP-TK-29 foundations.

o Fire Pump House Boiler Building o Non Essential Switchgear Building o Steam Generator Blowdown Recovery Building o Intake & discharge Transition Structures The Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program manages the effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates.

ELEMENT 2 - PREVENTIVE ACTIONS There are no preventive actions specified in the Seabrook Station Structures Monitoring Program, which includes implementation of NUREG-1801 XI.S5, XI.S6, and XI.S7.

These are monitoring programs only. Similarly, the ASR Monitoring Program does not rely on preventive actions.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12 101 Page 11 of 18 ELEMENT 3 - PARAMETERS MONITORED/INSPECTED The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program manages the effects of cracking due to expansion and reaction with aggregates.

The program focuses on identifying evidence of ASR, either past or present, which could lead to expansion due to reaction with aggregates. The program is consistent with published guidance for condition assessment of structures affected by ASR.

ASR is detected by visual observation of cracking on the surface of the concrete. The cracking is typically accompanied by the presence of moisture and efflorescence.

Concrete affected by expansive ASR is typically characterized by a network or "pattern" of cracks. ASR involves the formation of an alkali-silica gel which expands when exposed to water. Microcracking due to ASR is generated through forces applied by the expanding aggregate particles and/or swelling of the alkali-silica gel within and around the boundaries of reacting aggregate particles. The ASR gel may exude from the crack forming white secondary deposits at the concrete surface. The gel also often causes a dark discoloration of the cement paste surrounding the crack at the concrete surface.

Visual observation of the conditions described above is used to identify the presence of ASR.

Cracking Index A Cracking Index is determined for accessible surfaces exhibiting ASR pattern cracking.

The process for determining the Cracking Index (CI) is described in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) document FHWA-HIF-09-004, "Report on the Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in TransportationStructures."

The Cracking Index is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal or vertical sides of a 20-inch by 20-inch square on the ASR-affected concrete surface. Since each side of the square is 0.5 m, the Cracking Index in a given direction is reported in units of min/m.

The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking Index (CCI) for each area of interest. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. Screening criteria used in the assessment of expansion is expressed in terms of CCI and based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures andAttachments.

The progression of ASR degradation of the concrete is an important consideration for assessing the long term implications of ASR and specifying monitoring intervals. The most reliable means for establishing the progression of ASR is to monitor expansion of the concrete in situ.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 12 of 18 Crack Width Crack Width is a measurement of an individual crack width and is reported in units of mm. Progression of ASR is monitored by periodically measuring the individual crack width. Screening criteria used in the assessment of individual crack width are based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station. Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures andAttachments.

ELEMENT 4 - DETECTION OF AGING EFFECTS ASR is detected by visual inspections performed by qualified individuals. These individuals must either be a licensed Professional Engineer experienced in this area, or will work under the direction of a licensed Professional Engineer.

The Seabrook Station Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program provides for management of aging effects due to the presence of ASR. Program scope includes concrete structures within the scope of License Renewal.

ASR is a reaction that occurs within the structure of the concrete due to the reaction between silica from the aggregate and alkali constituents in the cement. The reaction produces a gel that expands as it absorbs moisture. Expansion of the gel exerts tensile stress on the concrete resulting in cracking. The cracking propagates on the surface of the concrete where it is visually identifiable. Typical cracking resulting from ASR is described as "pattern" or "map" cracking and is usually accompanied by a dark staining adjacent to the cracks at the surface of the structure. The ASR gel may exude from the crack forming white secondary deposits at the concrete surface. Visual indications of pattern cracking, which are often accompanied by staining or residual gel deposits, are documented and evaluated as deficiencies. To identify and verify the presence of ASR, the maximum crack width, a cracking index, and a description of the cracking including any visible surface discoloration are documented. Documentation and trend data will be maintained in accordance with the Structural Monitoring Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "StructuralCondition Assessment of Buildings."

ELEMENT 5 - MONITORING AND TRENDING Monitoring of ASR associated cracks is an effective method for determining ASR progression. Monitoring of ASR associated cracks at Seabrook is implemented with two measurements. One is Cracking Index (CI) and the other is Individual Crack Width.

The CI is a quantitative assessment of cracking present in the cover concrete of affected structures. A CI measurement is taken on accessible surfaces exhibiting ASR pattern cracking. The process for determining the Cracking Index (CI) is described in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) document FHWA-HIF-09-004, "Report on the Diagnosis, Prognosis,and Mitigation of Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) in Transportation Structures." The Cracking Index is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal or vertical sides of a 20-inch by 20-inch square on the ASR-affected concrete surface.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12 101 Page 13 of 18 Since each side of the square is 0.5 m, the Cracking Index in a given direction is reported in units of mm/m.

The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking Index (CCI) for each area of interest. The CCI represents the expansion along the entire perimeter of the 20-inch by 20-inch square. Screening criteria used in the assessment of expansion is expressed in terms of CCI and based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments. The CCI is compared to screening criteria and trended to establish the progression of ASR degradation.

The progression of ASR degradation of the concrete is an important consideration for assessing the long term implications of ASR and specifying monitoring intervals. The most reliable means for establishing the progression of degradation is to monitor expansion of the concrete in situ.

Individual Crack Width measurement is also an effective method for assessment of ASR affected areas. Screening criteria used in the assessment of Individual Crack Width, expressed in terms of mm, are based on recommendations provided in MPR-3727, Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures andAttachments."

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, "SeabrookStation: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments." Monitoring of Cracking Index and Individual Crack Width of at least 20 areas identified in the baseline inspection as having the largest CCI will be performed at six month intervals. Measurement of Cracking Index and Individual Crack Width will be performed in the same areas as the baseline. Trend data from these follow-up inspections will be used in determining the progression of expansion and a basis for any change to the frequency of the inspection. Documentation and trend data will be maintained in accordance with the Structural Monitoring Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "Structural Condition Assessment of Buildings."

Deficiencies being repaired or trended are subject to follow-up inspections of increased frequency. Newly discovered areas exhibiting visual signs of ASR are identified during routinely performed Structural Monitoring Program inspections and documented as deficiencies. Deficiencies are reviewed in accordance with the Structural Monitoring Program and established guidelines of ACI 349.3R, "StructuralCondition Assessment of Buildings."

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 14 of 18 ELEMENT 6 - ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Several published studies describe screening methods to determine when structural evaluations of ASR affected concrete are appropriate and how to prioritize such evaluations. In MPR-3727, Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments," these studies were reviewed for applicability. The report concludes: "while these screening methods are based on lightly or unreinforced concrete structures, they are useful in the absence of criteria directly relevant to the highly-reinforced concrete structures used in nuclear generating facilities," and, "Confinement provided by reinforcing steel and other restraints is a key factor regardingthe impact ofASR on reinforced concrete structures. Confinement limits ASR expansion of the in situ structure, which reduces the extent of deleterious cracking and the resultantreduction in concrete properties."

NextEra has performed a baseline inspection and ASR associated cracks have been evaluated and categorized. NextEra has assessed 131 accessible areas to date in this manner. The areas affected by ASR have been identified and assessed for apparent degradation from ASR, including estimation of in situ expansion. The results are presented in MPR-3727, Revision 0, "Seabrook Station: Impact of Alkali-Silica Reaction on Concrete Structures and Attachments." Based on site specific assessment and review of industry source documentation this report provides recommendations for screening thresholds used in the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program. Using these thresholds, ASR affected areas are screened and categorized for Qualitative or Quantitative Monitoring and Trending and Structural Evaluation.

A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) of less than the 1.0 mmn!m and Individual Crack Width of less than 1.0 mm can be deemed Acceptable with Deficiencies. Areas with deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of further degradation.

A CCI of 1.0 nmm/m or greater, or an Individual Crack Width of 1.0 mm or greater are deemed Unacceptable and require a structural evaluation. Structural evaluations are performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the Current Licensing Basis are documented in the Corrective Action Program. The engineering evaluation will be typical to those structural evaluations that have already been performed for Alkali-Silica Reaction. The Engineering Evaluation will consider the need to perform a detailed appraisal to determine potential capacity reductions, or the need to perform special studies, testing, and monitoring. Additionally, Corrective Actions requiring repair are entered in the Work Control Program for implementation.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12 101 Page 15 of 18 ELEMENT 7 - CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Structural evaluations are performed to ensure impacted structures are in compliance with the Current Licensing Basis are documented in the Corrective Action Program. The NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Program and Nuclear Fleet procedures will be utilized to meet Element 7 Corrective Actions. (Ref: LRA A. 1.5 and B. 1.3.)

ELEMENT 8 - CONFIRMATION PROCESS NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Program and Nuclear Fleet procedures will be utilized to meet Element 8 Confirmation Process. (Ref: LRA A. 1.5 and B. 1.3.)

ELEMENT 9 - ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Program and Nuclear Fleet procedures will be utilized to meet Element 9 Administrative Controls. (Ref: LRA A. 1.5 and B. 1.3.)

ELEMENT 10 - OPERATING EXPERIENCE The primary source of OE, both industry and plant specific, was the Seabrook Station Corrective Action Program documentation. The Seabrook Station Corrective Action Program is used to document review of relevant external OE including INPO documents, NRC communications and Westinghouse documents, and plant specific OE including corrective actions, maintenance work orders generated in response to a structure, system or component deficiencies, system and program health reports, self-assessment reports and NRC and INPO inspection reports.

The Seabrook Station Corrective Action Program is used to track, trend and evaluate plant issues and events. Those issues and events, whether external or plant specific, that are potentially significant to the ASR Monitoring Program are evaluated. The ASR Monitoring Program is revised, as appropriate, if these evaluations show that program changes will enhance program effectiveness.

Historically, NextEra Energy Seabrook (NextEra) has experienced groundwater infiltration through cracks, capillaries, pore spaces, seismic isolation joints, and construction joints in the below grade walls of concrete structures. Some of these areas have shown signs of leaching, cracking, and efflorescence on the concrete due to the infiltration. During the early 1990's an evaluation was conducted to assess the effect of the groundwater infiltration on the serviceability of the concrete walls. That evaluation concluded that there would be no deleterious effect, based on the design and placement of the concrete and on the non-aggressive nature of the groundwater.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 16 of 18 In 2009, NextEra tested seasonal groundwater samples to support the development of a License Renewal Application. The results showed that the groundwater had become aggressive and NextEra initiated a comprehensive review of possible effects to in-scope structures.

A qualitative walkdown of plant structures was performed and the "B" Electrical Tunnel was identified as showing the most severe indications of groundwater infiltration.

Concrete core samples from this area were removed, tested for strength and elasticity values, and subjected to petrographic examinations. While the results showed that both strength and elasticity values had declined, they remained within the design margin. The results of the petrographic examinations also showed that the samples had experienced Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR).

NextEra initiated an extent of condition evaluation and concrete core samples were taken from five additional areas of the plant - areas that showed characteristics with the greatest similarity to the "B" Electrical Tunnel. Additional concrete core samples were also taken from an expanded area around the original concrete core samples in the "B" Electrical Tunnel.

Tests on these core samples confirmed that the original "B" Electrical Tunnel core samples show the most significant ASR. For the five additional areas under investigation, final results of compressive strength and modulus testing indicate that the compressive strength in all areas is greater than the strength required by the design of the structures.

Modulus of elasticity was in the range of the expected value except for the Diesel Generator, Containment Enclosure Buildings, Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse, and the Equipment Vaults which were less than the expected value in localized areas.

Evaluation of the test results shows that the affected structures to be fully capable of performing their safety function but margin had been reduced. The areas are potentially subject to further degradation of material properties due to the effects of ASR.

A review of industry related operating experience related to ASR was performed. The review includes NRC generic communications issued such as Generic Letters, Bulletins, and Information Notices. Industry operating experience is discussed below:

1. In 1994, ASTM Standard C289 was clarified to caution that the tests described may not accurately predict aggregate reactivity when dealing with late- or slow-expanding aggregates containing strained quartz or microcrystalline quartz.
2. On August 4, 2010, NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 2010-14 "Containment Concrete Surface Condition Examination Frequency and Acceptance Criteria."

Seabrook's assessment resulted in updating the IWL program with inspection guidelines typical to ACI 349.3R.

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 17 of 18

3. OE 34348 Operating Experience report submitted by NextEra: Preliminary -

Reduction in Concrete Properties Due to Distress from Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) was issued September 30, 2011.

4. On November 11, 2011, NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 2011-20, "Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction" to notify the industry based on the Seabrook issue.

The Seabrook Station plant specific operating experience identified the following:

1. As part of the Seabrook License Renewal process, the aggressiveness of the groundwater chemistry on concrete structures in contact with groundwater/soil must be determined. The first two samples collected in June 2009 from well locations indicate Chloride levels >500 PPM. Since the chloride levels exceed the acceptable limits, the groundwater was considered aggressive. Groundwater chemistry is now being performed every five years via the Structures Monitoring Program and awareness of the aggressive water chemistry is considered in the inspection of concrete.
2. Concrete core samples were removed from the Control Building B-Electrical Tunnel in April 2010 and Penetration Resistance Tests (PRT) performed. The results of the PRT indicated an average concrete compressive strength of 5340 psi and the concrete core testing indicated an average compressive strength of 4790 psi. An engineering evaluation was performed to review the results of core samples. The results show the structure to be fully capable of performing its safety function but margin had been reduced.
3. In September 2010, Testing was completed on concrete core samples removed from the walls at elevation (-) 20' in the Control Building B-Electrical Tunnel. The results of the modulus testing indicate that the average measured elastic modulus to be less than the expected elastic modulus. An engineering evaluation was performed to review the results of core samples. The results showed the structure to be fully capable of performing its safety function but margin had been reduced. Results of the petrographic examination completed in September 2010 showed that the samples had experienced Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR).
4. Inspection performed April 2011 on elevation (-) 30' in the Containment CEVA identified a craze cracking pattern on a localized area of the Containment concrete shell. The observed craze cracks are tight, less than 40 mils width and contain fine dry white deposits. There were no other indications of degradation or distress in the concrete in this area. Craze cracking with white deposits suggests the presence of alkali-silica reaction. Additional inspections of the exterior face of the Containment Structure were performed in September 2011. These two locations have been included in the second-tier evaluation criteria of the program due to the past groundwater in-leakage and follow-up inspections will be performed. Any identified crack growth will require additional evaluation. NextEra has previously committed

Enclosure 2 SBK-L-12101 Page 18 of 18 to maintaining the exterior surface of the Containment Structure in a dewatered state (LRA Commitment #52).

5. In June 2011, as an extent of condition evaluation, five (5) building structures were investigated to determine if the building concrete was affected by alkali-silica reaction (ASR). The five (5) building structures were selected based on visual indications on the inside concrete surfaces and exposure to groundwater infiltration.

An engineering evaluation was performed to review the results of concrete core samples. The results show these structures to be fully capable of performing their safety function but margin had been reduced. A root cause evaluation was performed to determine how the ASR developed and why its presence was not identified until 2010. The following root causes were identified:

- The ASR developed because the concrete mix designs utilized an aggregate that was susceptible to Alkali-Silica Reaction, which was not known at the time.

Although the testing was conducted in accordance with ASTM standards, those testing standards were subsequently identified as limited in their ability to predict long term ASR.

- The health monitoring program for systems and structures does not contain a process for periodic reassessment of failure modes that were excluded from the monitoring criteria to ensure that the monitoring/mitigating strategies remain applicable and effective.

Exceptions to NUREG-1800 None Enhancements None Conclusion The Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Program provides reasonable assurance that those structures managed by this program will continue to perform their intended functions consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation.

Enclosure 3 to SBK-L-12101 LRA Appendix A - Final Safety Report Supplement Table A.3 License Renewal Commitment List

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 A.3 LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENT LIST UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Program to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

Inspection plan to be submitted to NRC not later

1. PWR Vessel Internals An inspection plan for Reactor Vessel Internals will be A.2.1.7 than 2 years after receipt of submitted for NRC review and approval, the renewed license or not less than 24 months prior to the period of extended operation, whichever comes first.

Closed-Cycle Cooling Enhance cracking, the program lossopened to include of material visualwhen and fouling inspection for the in-scope A.2.1.12 Prior to theoperation extended period of 2.

Water systems are for maintenance.

Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Enhance the program to monitor general corrosion on the Prior to the period of

3. Load (Related to crane and trolley structural components and the effects of A.2.1.13 extended operation Refueling) Handling wear on the rails in the rail system.

Systems Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Enhance the program to list additional cranes for Prior to the period of

4. Load (Related to A.2.1.13 Refueling) Handling monitoring. extended operation Systems Compressed Air Enhance the program to include an annual air quality test Prior to the period of
5. Monitoring requirement for the Diesel Generator compressed air sub A.2.1.14 extended operation system.

Enhance the program to perform visual inspection of Prior to the period of penetration seals by a fire protection qualified inspector. extended operation.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Enhance the program to add inspection requirements such

7. Fire Protection as spalling, and loss of material caused by freeze-thaw, A.2.1.15 Prior to the period of chemical attack, and reaction with aggregates by qualified extended operation.

inspector.

Enhance the program to include the performance of visual Prior to the period of

8. Fire Protection inspection of fire-rated doors by a fire protection qualified A.2.1.15 extended operation.

inspector.

Enhance the program to include NFPA 25 guidance for "where sprinklers have been in place for 50 years, they Prior to the period of

9. Fire Water System shall be replaced or representative samples from one or A.2.1.16 extended operation.

more sample areas shall be submitted to a recognized testing laboratory for field service testing".

Enhance the program to include the performance of Prior to the period of

10. Fire Water System periodic flow testing of the fire water system in accordance A.2.1.16 extended operation.

with the guidance of NFPA 25.

Enhance the program to include the performance of periodic visual or volumetric inspection of the internal surface of the fire protection system upon each entry to the system for routine or corrective maintenance. These inspections will be documented and trended to determine if

11. Fire Water System a representative number of inspections have been A.2.1.16 Within ten years prior to the performed prior to the period of extended operation. If a period of extended operation.

representative number of inspections have not been performed prior to the period of extended operation, focused inspections will be conducted. These inspections will be performed within ten years prior to the period of extended operation.

Enhance the program to include components and aging effects Prior to the period of

12. 1. Aboveground TanksexeddoeainSteel required by the Aboveground Steel Tanks. A.2.1.17 extended operation.

Aboveground Steel Enhance the program to include an ultrasonic inspection Within ten years prior to the

13. Tanks and evaluation of the internal bottom surface of the two Fire A.2.1.17 Witin tenyea pritoth Tanks Protection Water Storage Tanks. period of extended operation.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3

. UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Enhance program to add requirements to 1) sample and analyze

14. Fuel Oil Chemistry new fuel deliveries for biodiesel prior to offloading to the A.2.1.18 Prior to the period of Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil storage tank and 2) periodically sample extended operation.

stored fuel in the Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil storage tank.

Enhance the program to add requirements to check for the Prior to the period of

15. Fuel Oil Chemistry presence of water in the Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil storage tank at A.2.1.18 extended operation.

least once per quarter and to remove water as necessary.

Enhance the program to require draining, cleaning and Prior to the period of

16. Fuel Oil Chemistry inspection of the diesel fire pump fuel oil day tanks on a A.2.1.18 extended operation.

frequency of at least once every ten years.

Enhance the program to require ultrasonic thickness measurement of the tank bottom during the 10-year

17. Fuel Oil Chemistry draining, cleaning and inspection of the Diesel Generator A.2.1.18 Prior to the period of fuel oil storage tanks, Diesel Generator fuel oil day tanks, extended operation.

diesel fire pump fuel oil day tanks and auxiliary boiler fuel oil storage tank.

Reactor Vessel Enhance the program to specify that all pulled and tested Prior to the period of

18. Surveillance capsules, unless discarded before August 31, 2000, are placed in A.2.1.19 extended operation.

storage.

Enhance the program to specify that if plant operations exceed the limitations or bounds defined by the Reactor Vessel

19. Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program, such as operating at a lower cold leg A.2.1.19 Prior to the period of Surveillance temperature or higher fluence, the impact of plant operation extended operation.

changes on the extent of Reactor Vessel embrittlement will be evaluated and the NRC will be notified.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 5 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Enhance the program as necessary to ensure the appropriate withdrawal schedule for capsules remaining in the vessel such that one capsule will be withdrawn at an Reactor Vessel outage in which the capsule receives a neutron fluence that Prior to the period of

20. Surveillance meets the schedule requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.2.1.19 extended operation.

H and ASTM El 85-82 and that bounds the 60-year fluence, and the remaining capsule(s) will be removed from the vessel unless determined to provide meaningful metallurgical data.

Enhance the program to ensure that any capsule removed,

21. Reactor Vessel without the intent to test it, is stored in a manner which A.2.1.19 Prior to the period of Surveillance maintains it in a condition which would permit its future use, extended operation.

including during the period of extended operation.

22. One-Time Inspection Implement the One Time Inspection Program. A.2.1.20 Within ten years prior to the period of extended operation.

Implement the Selective Leaching of Materials Program.

23.

Selective Leaching of The program will include a one-time inspection of selected Within five years prior to the

23. SelMaterials components where selective leaching has not been A.2.1.21 Witin fiexyea priort identified and periodic inspections of selected components period of extended operation.

where selective leaching has been identified.

Buried Piping And Tanks Implement the Buried Piping And Tanks Inspection Within ten years prior to

24. Inspection Program. A.2.1.22 entering the period of extended operation One-Time Inspection of Implement the One-Time Inspection of ASME Code Class Within ten years prior to the
25. ASME Code Class 1 A.2.1.23 Small Bore-Piping 1 Small Bore-Piping Program. period of extended operation.

Enhance the program to specifically address the scope of the program, relevant degradation mechanisms and effects of

26. External Surfaces interest, the refueling outage inspection frequency, the A.2.1.24 Prior to the period of Monitoring inspections of opportunity for possible corrosion under extended operation.

insulation, the training requirements for inspectors and the required periodic reviews to determine program effectiveness.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 6 of 13 SBK-L- 12101 / Enclosure 3 U FSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Inspection Surfaces inof Internal

27. Miscellaneous Piping Implement the Inspection of Internal Surfaces in Prior to the period of and Ducting Miscellaneous Piping and Ducting Components Program. A.2.1.25 extended operation.

Components Enhance the program to add required equipment, lube oil Prior to the period of

28. Lubricating Oil Analysis analysis required, sampling frequency, and periodic oil A.2.1.26 extended operation.

changes.

29. Lubricating Oil Analysis Enhance the program to sample the oil for the Reactor Prior to the period of Coolant pump oil collection tanks. A.2.1.26 extended operation.

Enhance the program to require the performance of a one-

30. Lubricating Oil Analysis time ultrasonic thickness measurement of the lower portion A.2.1.26 Prior to the period of of the Reactor Coolant pump oil collection tanks prior to the extended operation.

period of extended operation.

31. ASME Section XI, Enhance procedure to include the definition of A.2.1.28 Prior to the period of Subsection IWL "Responsible Engineer". extended operation.

Structures Monitoring Enhance procedure to add the aging effects, additional Prior to the period of

32. Program locations, inspection frequency and ultrasonic test A.2.1.31 extended operation.

Program________________ requirements.

Structures Monitoring Enhance procedure to include inspection of opportunity Prior to the period of Program when planning excavation work that would expose A.2.1.31 extended operation.

inaccessible concrete.

Electrical Cables and Connections Not Subject Implement the Electrical Cables and Connections Not Prior to the period of

34. to 10 CFR 50.49 Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification A.2.1.32 exte e perion.

Environmental Requirementsextended operation.

Qualification Requirements Electrical Cables and Connections Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Implement the Electrical Cables and Connections Not Prior to the period of

35. Environmental Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification A.2.1.33 extended operation.

Qualification Requirements Used in Instrumentation Circuits program.

Requirements Used in Instrumentation Circuits

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 7 of 13 SBK-L-12 101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Inaccessible Power Cables Not Subject to Implement the Inaccessible Power Cables Not Subject to Prior to the period of Environmental 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements A.2.1.34 extended perio n.

ex te e operation.

36. 3. E10 CFR 50.49 Qualification program.

Requirements Prior to the period of Implement the Metal Enclosed Bus program. A.2.1.35 ex te e perio n.

37. Metal Enclosed Bus extended operation.

Prior to the period of Fuse Holders Implement the Fuse Holders program. A.2.1.36 exte e perion.

38. I I I Iextended operation.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 8 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE LOCATION Electrical Cable Connections Not Subject Implement the Electrical Cable Connections Not Subject to Prior to the period of

39. to 10 CFR 50.49 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements A.2.1.37 exte e perion.

Environmental extended operation.

Qualification program.

Requirements Prior to the period of 345 KV SF 6 Bus Implement the 345 KV SF 6 Bus program. A.2.2.1 exte e perion.

40. extended operation.

Metal Fatigue of Reactor Enhance the program to include additional transients Prior to the period of

41. Coolant Pressure beyond those defined in the Technical Specifications and A.2.3.1 extended operation.

Boundary UFSAR.

Metal Fatigue of Reactor Enhance the program to implement a software program, to Prior to the period of

42. Coolant Pressure count transients to monitor cumulative usage on selected A.2.3.1 extended operation.

Boundary components.

Pressure -Temperature The updated analyses will be Limits, including Low Seabrook Station will submit updates to the P-T curves and submitted at the appropriate

43. Temperature LTOP limits to the NRC at the appropriate time to comply A.2.4.1.4 time to comply with 10 CFR Overpressure Protection with 10 CFR 50 Appendix G. 50 Appendix G, Fracture Limits Toughness Requirements.

Environmentally- NextEra Seabrook will perform a review of design basis At least two years prior to

44. Assisted Fatigue ASME Class 1 component fatigue evaluations to determine A.2.4.2.3 entering the period of Analyses (TLAA) whether the NUREG/CR-6260-based components that extended operation.

have been evaluated for the effects of the reactor coolant

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 9 of 13 SBK-L-12 101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCATION SCHEDULE environment on fatigue usage are the limiting components for the Seabrook plant configuration. If more limiting components are identified, the most limiting component will be evaluated for the effects of the reactor coolant environment on fatigue usage. If the limiting location identified consists of nickel alloy, the environmentally-assisted fatigue calculation for nickel alloy will be performed using the rules of NUREG/CR-6909.

(1) Consistent with the Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Program Seabrook Station will update the fatigue usage calculations using refined fatigue analyses, if necessary, to determine acceptable CUFs (i.e.,

less than 1.0) when accounting for the effects of the reactor water environment. This includes applying. the appropriate Fen factors to valid CUFs determined from an existing fatigue analysis valid for the period of extended operation or from an analysis using an NRC-approved version of the ASME code or NRC-approved alternative (e.g., NRC-approved code case).

(2) If acceptable CUFs cannot be demonstrated for all the selected locations, then additional plant-specific locations will be evaluated. For the additional plant-specific locations, if CUF, including environmental effects is greater than 1.0, then Corrective Actions will be initiated, in accordance with the Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Program, B.2.3.1. Corrective Actions will include inspection, repair, or replacement of the affected locations before exceeding a CUF of 1.0 or the effects of fatigue will be managed by an inspection program that has been reviewed and approved by the NRC (e.g.,

periodic non-destructive examination of the affected locations at inspection intervals to be determined by a method accepted by the NRC).

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 10 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCATI ON SCHEDULE

45. Number Not Used Protective Coating Enhance the program by designating and qualifying an Prior to the period of
46. Monitoring and Inspector Coordinator and an Inspection Results Evaluator. A.2.1.38 extended operation Maintenance-Enhance the program by including, "Instruments and Protective Coating Equipment needed for inspection may include, but not be Pronitecie Can g limited to, flashlight, spotlights, marker pen, mirror, A.2.1.38 Prior to the period of Montenand measuring tape, magnifier, binoculars, camera with or extended operation without wide angle lens, and self sealing polyethylene sample bags."

Protective Coating Enhance the program to include a review of the previous Prior to the period of

48. Monitoring and two monitoring reports. A.2.1.38 extended operation Maintenance Protoring Coating Enhance is the program to be evaluated to require by the that the responsible inspection evaluation report personnel, A.2.1.38 Prior to the period of Monitoring and who is to prepare a summary of findings and extended operation recommendations for future surveillance or repair.

Within the next two refueling outages, OR15 or OR16, and

50. ASME Section XI, Perform UT testing of the containment liner plate in the A.2.1.27 repeated at intervals of no Subsection IWE vicinity of the moisture barrier for loss of material, more than five refueling outages
51. Number Not Used

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 11 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCATION SCHEDULE ASME Section XI, Implement measures to maintain the exterior surface of the

52. Subsection I, Containment Structure, from elevation -30 feet to +20 feet, A.2.1.28 By December 31, 2012 in a dewatered state.

Reactor Head Closure Replace the spare reactor head closure stud(s) Prior to the period of Studs manufactured from the bar that has a yield strength > 150 A.2.1.3 extended operation.

ksi with ones that do not exceed 150 ksi.

Unless an alternate repair criteria changing the ASME code boundary is permanently approved by the NRC, or the Seabrook Station steam generators are changed to Program to be submitted to

54. Steam Generator Tube eliminate PWSCC-susceptible tube-to-tubesheet welds, A.2. 1.10 NRC at least 24 months prior Integrity submit a plant-specific aging management program to to the period of extended manage the potential aging effect of cracking due to operation.

PWSCC at least twenty-four months prior to entering the Period of Extended Operation.

Steam Generator Tube Seabrook will perform an inspection of each steam Prior to entering the period of Integrity generator to assess the condition of the divider plate A.2. 1.10 extended operation assembly.

Closed-Cycle Cooling Revise the station program documents to reflect the EPRI Prior to entering the period of

56. Water System Guideline operating ranges and Action Level values for A.2.1.12 extended operation.
  • hydrazine and sulfates.

Closed-Cycle Cooling Revise the station program documents to reflect the EPRI Prior to entering the period of

57. Water System Guideline operating ranges and Action Level values for A.2.1.12 extended operation.

Diesel Generator Cooling Water Jacket pH.

Update Technical Requirement Program 5.1, (Diesel Fuel Prior to the period of

58. Fuel Oil Chemistry Oil Testing Program) ASTM standards to ASTM D2709-96 A.2.1.18 extended operation.

and ASTM D4057-95 required by the GALL XI.M30 Rev 1 Nickel Alloy Nozzles and The Nickel Alloy Aging Nozzles and Penetrations program Prior to the period of

59. Penetrations will implement applicable Bulletins, Generic Letters, and A.2.2.3 extended operation.

staff accepted industry guidelines.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 12 of 13 SBK-L-12101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCATION SCHEDULE Buried Piping and Tanks Implement the design change replacing the buried Auxiliary Prior to entering the period of

60. Inspection Boiler supply piping with a pipe-within-pipe configuration A.2.1.22 extended operation.

with leak detection capability.

Replace the flexible hoses associated with the Diesel Within ten years prior to

61. Compressed Air Generator air compressors on a frequency of every 10 A.2.1.14 entering the period of Monitoring Program years. extended operation.

Enhance the program to include a statement that sampling Prior to the period of

62. Water Chemistry frequencies are increased when chemistry action levels are A.2.1.2 extended operation.

exceeded.

Ensure that the quarterly CVCS Charging Pump testing is continued during the PEO. Additionally, add a precaution to

63. Flow Induced Erosion the test procedure to state that an increase in the CVCS N/A Prior to the period of Charging Pump mini flow above the acceptance criteria extended operation may be indicative of erosion of the mini flow orifice as described in LER 50-275/94-023.

Soil analysis shall be performed prior to entering the period of extended operation to determine the corrosivity of the

64. Buried Piping and Tanks soil in the vicinity of non-cathodically protected steel pipe A.2.1.22 Prior to entering the period of within the scope of this program. If the initial analysis extended operation.

Inspection shows the soil to be non-corrosive, this analysis will be re-performed every ten years thereafter.

Implement measures to ensure that the movable incore

65. Flux Thimble Tube detectors are not returned to service during the period of N/A Priordto enerin extended operation. extended operation
66. Number Not Used Perform one shallow core bore in an area that was
67. Structures Monitoring continuously wetted from borated water to be examined for A.2.1.31 No later than December 31, Program concrete degradation and also expose rebar to detect any 2015 degradation such as loss of material.

Structures Monitoring Perform sampling at the leakoff collection points for

68. Program chlorides, sulfates, pH and iron once every three months. A.2.1.31 Starting January 2014

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 13 of 13 SBK-L-12 101 / Enclosure 3 UFSAR No. PROGRAM or TOPIC COMMITMENT LOCATION SCHEDULE Open-Cycle Cooling Replace the Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Plastisol Prior to the period of

69. Water System PVC lined Service Water piping with piping fabricated A.2.1.11 extended operation.

from AL6XN material.

Inspect the piping downstream of CC-V-444 and CC-V-Closed-Cycle Cooling 446 to determine whether the loss of material due to Within ten years prior to the

70. Cloed-Cylem Ccavitation induced erosion has been eliminated or A.2.1.12 period of extended Water System whether this remains an issue in the primary component operation.

cooling water system.

Alkali-Silica Reaction Implement the Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Monitoring Priorto entering the

71. (ASR) Monitoring Program period of extended Program operation.