ML120970351

NRDC Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

ML120970351
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	10/31/2011
From:	Natural Resources Defense Council
To:	NRC/SECY
SECY/RAS
References
74FR38117, PR 51
Download: ML120970351 (9)

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ENERGY FACTS

© gilesashford.com Nuclear Accident at Indian Point:

Consequences and Costs The catastrophic accident at Japans Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011 has resulted in a global re-examination of the safety of nuclear power and teaches us a lot about the risks of continued operation at the Indian Point reactor in New York. Just in the spring and summer of 2011, five nuclear power plants in the United States were damaged and underwent emergency shutdown due to flooding, earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes. A review of the potential radiological consequences of a nuclear accident at Indian Point, the seismic hazards in its location, and cost estimates of a hypothetical accident shows just how dangerous the situation is.

Among the 104 operating U.S. nuclear reactors, the two would be at risk for receiving a whole-body radiation units at Indian Point, 34 miles north of Central Park, pose dose greater than 1 rem, which for an average individual heightened risks. Very large populations could be exposed results in a 0.3 percent increase in risk of premature to radiation in a major accident, the reactors are located in death from cancer. An accident of this scale would a seismically active area, and their owner currently seeks require the administration of stable iodine to more than to extend the reactors lives beyond their engineered 40- six million people (where people would be at risk for year lifespan. receiving a thyroid radiation dose greater than 10 rad).

n An accident at Indian Point Unit 3 on the scale of n An accident at Indian Point Unit 3 involving a full reactor Fukushima Daiichi could require the sheltering or core melt approaching the scale of Chernobyl could put evacuation of as many as 5.6 million people due to people in New York City at risk for receiving a whole-a fallout plume blown south to the New York City body radiation dose greater than 25 rem, resulting in a 7 metropolitan area. People in the path of the plume percent increase in risk of premature death from cancer For more Matthew McKinzie Christopher Paine www.nrdc.org/policy information, mmkinzie@nrdc.org cpaine@nrdc.org www.facebook.com/nrdc.org please 202) 289-2363 (202) 289-2370 www.twitter.com/nrdc contact: switchboard.nrdc.org/ switchboard.nrdc.org/

blogs/mmkinzie blogs/cpaine

Image Source: National Agriculture Imagery Program Figure 1: Regional map of the Indian Point Energy Center. Figure 2: The Indian Point Energy Center reactor containment buildings and other structures.

for an average individual. An accident of this scale would Indian Point. Figure 1 shows a regional map of Indian Point require the administration of stable iodine throughout the with 10, 20, and 50 mile rings around the plant drawn. Figure New York City metropolitan area, and put thousands at 2 shows an aerial photograph of Indian Point with labels for risk for radiation sickness in and near the Hudson Valley. the containment building3 for Unit 1, which was shut down n An accident at one of Indian Points reactors on the in October 1974, and containment buildings for Unit 2, which scale of the recent catastrophe in Japan could cause a began commercial operation in August 1974, and Unit 3, swath of land down to the George Washington Bridge which began commercial operation two years later.

to be uninhabitable for generations due to radiation In Entergys 2010 Indian Point Energy Center Emergency contamination. A release of radiation on the scale of Plan, the highest category of emergency is termed a General Chernobyls would make Manhattan too radioactively Emergency and is described as: actual or imminent contaminated to live in if the city fell within the plume. substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity with the potential for a large The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) approach release of radioactive material.4 In 1981, Sandia National to calculating seismic risk used to oversee Indian Point is Laboratory conducted a study for the NRC that predicted outdated, and underestimates the danger of a damaging a maximum of 50,000 immediate fatalities as far as 17.5 earthquake that could lead to a radiological release. miles downwind and another 14,000 fatal cancers due to NRDC estimates that, if the plume of radiation headed radiological releases from a damaged reactor at Indian Point.5 south from Indian Point to New York City, the cost of a severe The 9-11 attacks have caused additional concern that accident at the plant would be 10 to 100 times higher than for Indian Point could be the target of a terrorist attack. In 2004, the Fukushima Daiichi accident, where the cost for cleanup a study by the Union of Concerned Scientists estimated and compensation is projected to exceed $60 billion. as many as 44,000 near-term deaths from acute radiation syndrome and as many as 518,000 long-term cancer deaths Radiological Releases in a Severe Accident could occur in people within 50 miles of Indian Point in the The Indian Point Energy Center is located in the village of event of a severe accident.6 Buchanan, New York, on the east bank of the Hudson River In order to fully appreciate the implications of a major in Westchester County, 34 miles directly north of the center accident at Indian Point, NRDC used the U.S. Department of of Manhattan Island.1 Entergy Nuclear Northeast (with Defense (DoD) computer model HPAC (Hazard Prediction headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi), a subsidiary of Entergy and Assessment Capability)7 to calculate resulting fallout Corporation (with headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana), plumes. The DoD software contains specific data on the owns and operates 12 nuclear plants at 10 sites2, including reactors at Indian Point (as well as at Fukushima Daiichi).

the two operating Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) units at Importantly, HPAC computes an inventory of radioactive PAGE 1 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

elements that accumulate in the nuclear fuel rods of these reactors during normal operation. The DoD model captures Table 1: Radiological source terms for DoD HPAC computer many other important aspects of the release of radiation due models of accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 and Indian to an accident at a nuclear power plant as well, including the Point Unit 3.

radiological source term, the ambient weather, and data on nearby populations; these terms are defined below. Dry Well Leakage/Failure Boiling Water The source term for an accident at a nuclear plant is the HPAC Fukushima Reactor Containment type and quantity of radioactive materials (fission products Daiichi Unit 2 and transuranic elements) released from the core of a reactor, Source Term In-Vessel Vessel Gap first into the containment atmosphere and then from within Severe Core Melt Release the containment into the surrounding environment. This Damage Through depends on the design of a reactor, its operating power at Operating Power: 2,280 MWt the time of the accident, the type of fuel, and the degree of damage to fuel, to containment, and to other reactor Total Curies 2.80E+07 3.50E+08 5.10E+08 components in the accident. The DoD code models three Iodine-131 Curies 2.00E+06 1.20E+07 2.40E+07 degrees or types of nuclear facility accidents for PWR large and dry containment leakage and failure. In progressing Iodine-131 Percent Core 3.8% 23.0% 45.0%

severity these are: gap release; in-vessel severe core damage; and vessel melt-through. Percent of Estimated 49.4% 296.3% 592.6%

The PWR accident progression8 begins with loss of reactor Fukushima Release coolant and failure of emergency core cooling, as occurred at Cesium-137 Curies 2.10E+05 1.00E+06 2.50E+06 Fukushima Daiichi due to Station Blackout and earthquake and tsunami damage. As the core heats up, fuel cladding Cesium-137 4.1% 53.0% 67.0%

(the metal sheath surrounding the uranium fuel) warps and Percent Core cracks, resulting in release of the radioactivity located in the Percent of Estimated gap between nuclear fuel pellets and the cladding: the gap 64.8% 308.6% 771.6%

Fukushima Release release. If cooling cant be re-established, the core gradually melts and slumps to the bottom of the reactor pressure Large, Dry, or Subatmospheric Leakage/

vessel (the cores sealed steel container), called the in-vessel Failure Pressurized Water Reactor severe core damage. Finally, if the bottom head of the reactor HPAC Indian Point Containment pressure vessel fails, molten core debris can be ejected from Unit 3 Source Term the reactor pressure vessel and will react with the concrete In-Vessel Vessel Gap floor below: the vessel melt-through. Severe Core Melt-Release Preliminary estimates of the amount of radioactive Damage Through Iodine-131 and Cesium-137 discharged from the Fukushima Operating Power: 3,025 MWt Daiichi nuclear power plant in the first intense weeks of its 2011 accident are 4.05E+06 Curies (Ci) and 3.24E+05 Total Curies 2.6E+07 3.6+08 5.0E+08 Ci, respectively. 9 These values are about one-tenth of the Iodine-131 Curies 2.7E+06 2.20E+07 3.5E+07 quantities of radioactive material released in the 1987 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine.10 Similarly, both the land area Iodine-131 Percent Core 3.8% 30.0% 49.0%

highly contamination with Cesium-137 and cancer deaths from radiation exposure are estimated to be on the order of Percent of Estimated 66.7% 543.2% 864.2%

10 times less for Fukushima Daiichi than for Chernobyl.11 Fukushima Release Much of the radiation emitted from Fukushima Daiichi Cesium-137 Curies 2.20E+05 1.30E+06 2.90E+06 occurred on March 15, 2011, in a plume traveling northwest from the reactors, likely originating from Unit 2. Table 1 Cesium-137 3.8% 55.0% 69.0%

below shows the DoD HPAC computer models source terms Percent Core for progressively more severe accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Percent of Estimated Unit 2 and at Indian Point Unit 3. 67.9% 401.2% 895.1%

Fukushima Release It is important to note that the thermal power of Indian DoD=Department of Defense Point Unit 3 is greater than for Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2, HPAC=Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability so there is a larger quantity of fuel and radioactive material in the Indian Point reactor. Once the larger power of Indian Point Unit 3 is taken into account, (as shown in Table 1) that Fukushima, which was a multi-unit accident with damage to the amount of radioactivity calculated by HPAC in the source spent nuclear fuel storage.

terms for Fukushima Daiichi and Indian Point are in fact Given estimates of the amount of radiation actually similar. Also note that these calculations were performed emitted at Fukushima Daiichi, the severity of this accident for a hypothetical accident at only one of Indian Points would fall in between HPACs gap release and HPACs in-two operating reactors, and the accident scenarios did not vessel severe core damage source termsa release of about 8 involve radiation release from the spent fuel pools, unlike for percent of the core inventory calculated by the DoDs HPAC PAGE 2 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

code. The three Indian Point source terms calculated in examined wind rose data for the nearby Poughkeepsie/

HPAC bracket the Fukushima Daiichi accident: Dutchess County Airport, shown in Figure 3.13 The length of n Gap release: About two-thirds of Fukushima Daiichi the petals in the wind rose shows the frequency with which the wind blows from a given direction averaged over a 10 n In-vessel severe core damage: Four to five times higher year period, and the relative size of the colored bands in a than Fukushima Daiichi petal shows with what probability the wind blows at different n Vessel melt-through: nine times higher than speeds. Northerly and westerly winds are predominant at Fukushima Daiichi. Indian Point.Winds in the Hudson Valley are most often channeled by the terrain into a north-south axis.14 In other The size of an accidents source term also depends on words, the predominant northerly winds at Indian Point the time and duration of a radiation release. For these blow south down the Hudson Valley to New York City. NRDC calculations, it was conservatively assumed that the release used the HPAC database of historical weather from a world-of radiation from the Indian Point reactor begins eight wide network of weather stations for the year 1990 as well hours after an emergency shut-down, or scram. It is as terrain data to calculate the likely fallout plumes from an within this eight-hour period in the hypothetical accident Indian Point reactor accident in October.

that the reactor core loses cooling; damage to the fuel The population within portions of the fallout plume is occurs as it is uncovered and overheats and containment given in Table 2, for progressively severe accident scenarios is severely damaged. Importantly, during this eight-hour and for different ambient weather.

period between scram and the start of the fallout plume, the The first three columns show the number of people intensity of radioactivity in the fuel will decrease as shorter-expected to receive a given radiation dose from exposure lived radionuclides produced in the fuel during normal to the plume over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the start of the accident, operation of the reactor decay. We conservatively modeled the including the radiation given off by inhaled material retained plume resulting from gap release as emitted over one hour, the in the human body for a long time after the accident. Here plume resulting from in-vessel severe core damage as emitted the dose specified is the total effective dose equivalent over two hours, and the plume resulting from vessel melt (TEDE) to the whole body, which is the sum of the inhaled

-through as emitted over ten hours.12 dose, the ground shine dose, and the cloud shine dose. The Ambient weather determines in what direction, how far, U.S. EPA publishes protective action guides (PAGs)15 for and how fast radioactive fallout would travel from Indian public exposure to radiation following a nuclear accident, Point following a major accident. In NRDCs analysis, we and for doses 1-5 rem or greater recommends evacuation or sheltering. The EPA PAG for exposure between 5 and 25 rem allows for emergency worker exposure for performing lifesaving actions. The EPA PAG for exposure greater than 25 rem is cautious and voluntary for emergency workers, given the increased risk for cancer from such an exposure.16 The Fukushima accident earlier this year increased public familiarity with stable iodine, which inhibits the uptake of radioactive iodine to the thyroid. According to federal guidelines, stable iodine tablets should be taken for adults 18 to 40 years of age receiving a dose greater than 10 rad to the thyroid. The threshold is much higher for older people and lower for children and infants. As can be seen from Table 2 and from Figures 4 through 6, the extent of 10 rad Thryoid dose is greater than for 1 rem whole body dose.

The last column is a calculation of shorter-term (acute) exposure to radiation, where an exposure of 75 rad is the threshold for radiation sickness. For all of these calculations, no sheltering of people downwind of the accident is taken into account in order to estimate an at-risk population.

The particular circumstances of an individual following an accident at Indian Point would be uncertain.

NRDCs calculations show that the most widespread effects of a severe accident at Indian Point would be the Figure 3: Wind rose for Poughkeepsie/Dutchess County Airport risk of radiation exposure for people downwind that would for measurements during the 10-year period 1997-2007. The increase their risk of cancer, but not be severe enough to numbers indicate the direction the wind is blowing from (0 = cause radiation sickness. We calculated the numbers of North, 90 = East, 180 = South, and 270 = West), and the colored people exposed to the plumes that would receive at least 1 bars indicate the percentage of time that the winds blow at rem, 5 rem and 25 rem of radiation exposure within the first a given speed. Northerly and westerly winds dominate in the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after an accident began. By comparison, over the winter and spring, while slower southerly winds dominate in the summer months.24 course of a year, medical procedures and natural background PAGE 3 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

Table 2: Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability calculations of the number of people at risk of receiving radiation doses for exposure during the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the given nuclear accident at Indian Point Unit 3, for different weather conditions and assuming no sheltering.

EPA PAG Threshold Federal Guidelines EPA PAG EPA PAG Threshold for Voluntary for Administration of Radiation Threshold for for Emergency Emergency Worker Stable Iodine Sickness Public Evacuation Lifesaving Worker Exposure Due to for Adults 18 to 40 (>75 rad or Sheltering Exposure High Risk years of age acute dose)

(> 1 rem TEDE) (>5 rem TEDE)

(> 25 rem TEDE) (> 10 rad thyroid dose)

Number of people at risk Scenario: Gap Release (two-thirds of Fukushima Daiichi)

Historical Winds - October Morning (6 a.m.) 102,000 23,000 6,000 162,000 < 10 Historical Winds - October Afternoon (noon) 35,000 4,000 1,000 181,000 < 10 Historical Winds - October Evening (6 p.m.) 101,000 43,000 14,000 115,000 < 10 Historical Winds - October Night (midnight) 86,000 25,000 8,000 105,000 < 10 Westerly Winds (12.5 mph) 87,000 9,000 1,000 293,000 < 10 Northerly Winds (7.5 mph) 2.8 million 24,000 1,000 4.9 million < 10 Scenario: In-Vessel Severe Core Damage (scaled to Fukushima Daiichi)

Historical Winds - October Morning (6 a.m.) 216,000 41,000 13,000 314,000 <100 Historical Winds - October Afternoon (noon) 229,000 6,000 1,000 311,000 <100 Historical Winds - October Evening (6 p.m.) 150,000 66,000 20,000 258,000 <100 Historical Winds - October Night (midnight) 118,000 28,000 9,000 228,000 <100 Westerly Winds (12.5 mph) 371,000 20,000 2,000 478,000 <100 Northerly Winds (7.5 mph) 5.6 million 58,000 2,000 6.3 million <100 Scenario: In-Vessel Severe Core Damage (about four times Fukushima Daiichi)

Historical Winds - October Morning (6 a.m.) 909,000 147,000 33,000 1.0 million <100 Historical Winds - October Afternoon (noon) 691,000 219,000 26,000 761,000 400 Historical Winds - October Evening (6 p.m.) 973,000 128,000 55,000 1.4 million 1,300 Historical Winds - October Night (midnight) 1.1 million 128,000 39,000 2.0 million 3,000 Westerly Winds (12.5 mph) 984,000 339,000 17,000 1.1 million 100 Northerly Winds (7.5 mph) 8.5 million 5.1 million 50,000 8.8 million 200 Scenario: Vessel Melt-Through (about nine times Fukushima Daiichi)

Historical Winds - October Morning (6 a.m.) 1.8 million 616,000 100,000 1.9 million 500 Historical Winds - October Afternoon (noon) 1.9 million 1.1million 300,000 1.9 million 2,500 Historical Winds - October Evening (6 p.m.) 3.5 million 367,000 115,000 3.7 million 1,000 Historical Winds - October Night (midnight) 3.0 million 287,000 73,000 3.1 millioin 500 Westerly Winds (12.5 mph) 1.2 million 796,000 149,000 1.2 million 700 Northerly Winds (7.5 mph) 9.9 million 8.5 million 6.0 million 9.9 million 900 Doses shown with respect to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys Protective Action Guides (EPA PAG) are Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE), which is the sum of the inhalation Committed Effective Dose Equivalent, the ground shine dose, and the cloud shine dose for radiation exposures absent sheltering. The fourth column shows calculations of people at risk for greater than 10 rad thyroid dose, and acute doses shown in the last column with respect to radiation sickness are the total acute bone marrow dose.

EPA=Environmental Protection Agency, PAG=Protective action guide, TED=Total effective dose equivalent, MPH=miles per hour PAGE 4 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

radiation result in an average radiation exposure of about severe accidents at Indian Point occurring at different times 0.6 rem. The added risk of exposure to 1 rem to an average of the day, using historical weather data for the month of individual would increase a persons chances of getting October. Figure 7 shows a plume of radiation impacting New cancer or dying by about 0.3 percent, 5 rem, by about 1.4 York City for the vessel melt-through accident scenario carried percent, and 25 rem by about 7 percent. by light northerly winds. As can be seen from these figures, the As shown in Table 2, the most extreme accident ambient weather plays a large role in the direction and extent, consequences are for northerly winds carrying the plume to and therefore the consequences, of fallout from an accident.

the New York metropolitan area. In the first stage of accident progression, the Gap Release scenario, about three million Seismic Risk people would be advised to shelter or evacuate, to reduce The NRC staff recently recognized that the current state the radiation dose and increased risk of cancer and genetic of knowledge related to earthquake threats and accident damage. For the next most severe scenario of in-vessel modeling is not reflected in the regulations at many sites.16 severe core damage, the computer model predicts over five In general, past attempts by the NRC to reconcile disparities million people could receive the radiation dose allowed for between seismic science and nuclear regulations have not emergency lifesaving workers, which results in elevated 1.4% been comprehensive, imposing few or no requirements on increased cancer risk for an average individual. Finally, for a previously-licensed reactors. In 1996, the NRC set forth two vessel melt-through, the model predicts six million people new seismic regulations, but only applied these new criteria could receive a radiation dose greater than 25 rem, 10 million to applications submitted after January 10, 1997.

people could need stable iodine, and potentially thousands The NRCs attempts to revise seismic risks at U.S.

would be at risk for radiation sickness in the areas near to reactors have suffered from two key flaws: either the the reactor. Figure 4 through Figure 6 illustrate the fallout scope or methods of the review were limited by scarce plumes from the DoD HPAC calculations for progressively Figure 5: In-vessel severe core damage calculations using Figure 4: Gap Release calculations using historical weather historical weather data for the month of October: four separate data for the month of October: Four separate HPAC model runs Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability showing the different plumes resulting from an accident at Indian model runs showing the different plumes resulting from an Point Unit 3 occurring at different times of the day. An accident accident at Indian Point Unit 3 occurring at different times of the of this scale would result in approximately two-thirds of the day. An accident of this scale would result in approximately four radiation released at the Fukushima Daiichi accident. times the radiation released at the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

PAGE 5 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

Figure 6: Vessel melt-through calculations using historical Figure 7: Vessel melt-through calculations for light (7.5 miles weather data for the month of October: Four separate HPAC per hour) northerly winds blowing radiation south from Indian model runs showing the different plumes resulting from an Point to the New York City metropolitan area. An accident of accident at Indian Point Unit 3 occurring at different times of the this scale would result in approximately nine times the radiation day. An accident of this scale would result in approximately nine released at the Fukushima Daiichi accident, approaching the times the radiation released at the Fukushima Daiichi accident, scale of the Chernobyl accident.

approaching the scale of the Chernobyl accident.

data, or the NRC showed deference to voluntary nuclear In April 2011, the NRC conducted an inspection at Indian industry initiatives. When licensees volunteered to reassess Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 and reported that the earthquake risk, the NRC did not validate the results or even licensee identified a number of potential vulnerabilities require licensees to report whether or not the studies were regarding firefighting following a Safe Shutdown Earthquake actually completed.17 (SSE). The potential vulnerabilities stem from the fact that In a 2008 article by seismologists at Columbia Universitys the fire protection system in non-safety related buildings, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,18 the authors catalogued buried/underground fire headers, fire pumps, and the city 383 earthquakes in the New York region and found concrete water makeup supply are not seismically designed which evidence for a previously unknown active seismic zone could result in a loss of portions of the fire protection that runs from Stamford, Connecticut, to Peekskill, New system following a SSE.19 A SSE is the maximum earthquake York, passing less than a mile north of the Indian Point potential for which certain structures, systems and plant (Figure 8). Due to the zones proximity to other known components important to safety are designed to remain seismic structures, the authors pointed out the possibility functional.

of an earthquake of magnitude 6 or higher along the zone. Currently, the NRC is conducting a process begun in The authors go as far as to say that the Indian Point site in 2005 to evaluate seismic hazards based on new data for the particular is clearly one of the least favorable sites in our Central and Eastern United States; this process is called area study from an earthquake hazard and risk perspective. GI-199. A determination of the site-specific seismic hazards This study illustrates that new forms of sophisticated and associated plant risk are planned for the next phase of analysis, decades of new data on tremors, and improved GI-199. However, the overall process appears to be falling models together provide valuable insight into the extent to short of implementing the already-known seismic criteria which current NRC regulations may be lacking. established in 1996.On the surface, the results of GI-199 only PAGE 6 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

seem to establish how these new seismic evaluations are n $680 million operating loss due to suspended operations considered through a cost-benefit analysis. But if the finding at nuclear plants and replacement with thermal within GI-199 emerges that Indian Point is indeed lacking generating capacity in its ability protect against earthquakes (an August 2010 n $1.37 billion cost for resources to bring the crisis at the NRC report revealed that Indian Point Unit 3 had the highest plant under control probability of core damage of any plant in the country)20 then the implications are compounded by the power plants n $1.15 billion compensation for mental distress caused by proximity to large populations. the accident n $1.32 billion compensation to companies that became Fukushima and the Potential Economic inoperable due to the evacuation orders and other Costs of an Accident at Indian Point reasons The cost of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi is n $1.84 billion compensation to people who could not enormous. In August of 2011 Tokyo Electric Power Company work because of the accident (TEPCO), the utility which owns the Fukushima Daiichi reactors and other plants impacted by the Great East Japan n $870 million compensation for losses caused by Earthquake and tsunami, posted a $7.39 billion loss for its shipment restrictions on agriculture and marine April to June quarter.21 This loss includes a projection of costs products due to radiation contamination.

through the final phase of TEPCOs roadmap to achieve cold On September 9, 2011, the Japanese government announced shutdown of the Fukushima reactors between October 2011 that it planned to spend $2.9 billion on cleaning up and January 2012. residential areas contaminated by the Fukushima accident.

TEPCO's estimated losses, detailed in the assessment, Japans Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura described included: the governments plan to build a facility to store radioactive material in Fukushima Prefecture before it is removed to Figure 8: Earthquake locations as measured by seismic instruments between 1974 and 2007. Arrows denote the Figure 9: Cesium-137 long-term ground contamination boundaries of the Ramapo Seismic Zone (map data from Sykes, calculated for two accident scenarios at Indian Point Unit 3 and Armbruster, Kim and Seeber). for light (7.5 mph) northerly winds.

PAGE 7 l Nuclear Accident at Indian Point

a final disposal site.22 These costs are in addition to multi- of land. Second, the Fukushima Daiichi accident was billion capital losses from destruction of the reactors located in a predominantly non-urban area. Neither of these themselves and loss of the value of their future generating considerations would hold for Indian Point.

capacity. And more recently, a Japanese government panel One factor affecting the cost of an accident at Indian reviewing TEPCOs finances projected that the utility company Point would be the extent of the ground concentration of would eventually face damages of at least $59 billion.23 radioactive materials downwind from the reactor. Following Real estate and economic activity within the New York the Chernobyl accident, cesium-137, a radionuclide with a area is among the most valuable in the world. The damage half-life of about 30 years, contaminated over 1,000 square claims from radioactive contamination of this region would kilometers to a level greater than 40 Curies per square be vast. In the 2004 Union of Concerned Scientists study, the kilometer, a level of contamination at which the population economic damages within 100 miles of Indian Point were was encouraged to leave permanently. The accident at calculated to exceed $1.1 trillion for the worst cases evaluated, Fukushima Daiichi produced a zone of similar levels of using NRC methodologies. Estimating the full cost of a severe contamination of cesium-137 to the northwest of the plant accident at Indian Point is difficult, but it can be inferred from over about 175 square kilometers. NRDCs calculations two factors that the cost of an accident at the power plant for a Fukushima-scale accident and for a Chernobyl-scale would indeed be one to two orders of magnitude higher than accident at Indian Point, on a day with typical, northerly the eventual total cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. winds, are shown in Figure 9. As can be seen from this figure, First, it is likely that winds blew some of the fallout from an accident at one of Indian Points reactors on the scale Fukushima Daiichi eastward out to sea, reducing the radiation of Chernobyls would make Manhattan too radioactively dose to nearby populations and diminishing contamination contaminated to live in if the city fell within the plume.

Endnotes 10 L. Devell, S. Guntay, and D. A. Powers, The Chernobyl Reactor Accident Source Term: Development of 1 The Indian Point site measures 239 acres and is centered at 41° 16 11 latitude, 73° 57 8 longitude a Consensus View, (Issy-les-Moulineaux, France: Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, (41.269722 N, 73.952222 W). OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, November 1995).

2 In addition to the two units at Indian Point, Entergy Nuclear owns and operates: Arkansas Nuclear 11 Frank N. von Hippel, The radiological and psychological consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi (Units 1 and 2) near Russellville, Arkansas; Cooper Nuclear Station near Brownville, Nebraska; accident, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no.5, pp 27-36.

FitzPatrick in Oswego, New York; Grand Gulf Nuclear Station near Port Gibson, Mississippi; Pilgrim 12 NUREG-1465, pg. 9.

Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts; Palisades Power Plant in Covert, Michigan; River 13 Ricardo K. Sakai, David R. Fitzjarrald, Chris Walcek, Matt J. Czikowsky, and Jeffrey M. Freedman, Bend Station near St. Francisville, Louisiana; Vermont Yankee in Vernon, Vermont; and Waterford 3 in Wind Channeling in the Hudson Valley, NY, (2006), p. 1.

Taft, Louisiana. 14 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, (Washington, D.C.:

3 Of the three types of containment structures for PWRs - Large Dry, Subatmospheric, and Ice Office of Radiation Programs, United States Environmental Protection Agency).

Condenser - Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3 have steel-lined reinforced concrete Large Dry 15 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, pg. 2-12.

containment structures with hemispherical domes and flat bases.

16 Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century - The Near-Term Task Force 4 Frank Phillips and Brian Sullivan Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan, (Revision 10, Entergy Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Corporation, December 2010), pp. D-5, D-17. Commission, July 12, 2011), pp. 25-30.

5 Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House 17 Supplement 4 to GL 88-20, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe of Representatives, Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC2) For U.S. Nuclear Power Accident Vulnerabilities, 10 CFR 50.54(f) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 29, 1989.

Plants Conditional on an SST1 Release, November 1, 1982. In July, 2011 the Union of Concerned Scientists analyzed documents it obtained under the Freedom of Information Act from the NRC, 18 LR Sykes, JG Armbruster, W Kim, L Seeber, Observations and Tectonic Setting of Historic and and found that an updated analysis of severe nuclear accidents - NRCs State of the Art Reactor Instrumentally Located Earthquakes in the Greater New York City-Philadelphia Area, Bulletin of the Consequence Analysis or SOARCA - did not differ substantially from the 1982 study. See: http:// Seismological Society of America 98, no.4 (August 2008), pp. 1696-1719.

allthingsnuclear.org/post/8243137367/nrc-study-shows-the-serious-consequences-of-a. 19 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 - NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/183 Inspection Report 6 Edwin S. Lyman, Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at 05000247 1201 1009, Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, the Indian Point Nuclear Plant, (Washington, D.C.: Union of Concerned Scientists, Commissioned by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 13, 2011.

Riverkeeper, September 2004) p. 4. 20 Generic Issue 199 (GI-199), Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central 7 Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability, version 4.0.4 ( Washington, D.C.: Defense Threat and Eastern United States on Existing Plants, Safety/Risk Assessment, August 2010.

Reduction Agency , April 2004). The HPAC documentation describes the code as: a counter 21 Kazumasa Takenaka, TEPCO Posts 571 Billion Yen Net Loss in Quarter, The Asahi Shimbun, August proliferation, counterforce tool that predicts the effects of hazardous material releases into the 10, 2011 atmosphere and its collateral effects on civilian and military populations. HPAC assists warfighters 22 Decon Plan May Cost ¥220 Billion, The Japan Times, Saturday, September 10, 2011.

in destroying targets containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and responding to hazardous 23 Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, Tepco Faces Zombie Future as Fukushima Claims Set to Surpass agent releases. It employs integrated source terms, high-resolution weather forecasts and particulate $59 Billion, Bloomberg, September 30, 2011.

transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard areas and human collateral effects.

24 Jase Bernhardt, Victoria Kelly, Allison Chatrchyan, and Art DeGaetano, The Natural Resource 8 L Soffer, S. B. Burson, C. M. Ferrell, R. Y. Lee, J. N. Ridgely, Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Inventory of Dutchess County NY: Chapter 2 Climate and Air Quality, Revised October 2010, pp. 13-14.

Nuclear Power Plants: Final Report (NUREG-1465), (Washington, D.C.: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1995), pp. 2-3.

9 Masamichi Chino, Hiromasa Nakayama, Haruyasu Nagai, Hiroaki Terada, Genki Katata And Hiromi Yamazawa, Preliminary Estimation of Release Amounts of 131I and 137Cs Accidentally Discharged from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the Atmosphere, Journal of Nuclear Science And Technology, 48, no. 7, p. 1129-1134, 2011.

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