Text

Request for Amendment to Penn State Breazeale Reactor R-2 License
	ML12040A166
Person / Time
Site:	Pennsylvania State University
Issue date:	02/07/2012
From:	Foley H; Pennsylvania State Univ
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML12040A166 (74)
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PENNSTATE Henry C. Foley The Pennsylvania State University 814-865-6332 Vice President for Research 304 Old Main Fax: 814-863-9659 Dean of the Graduate School University Park, PA 16802 hcf2@psu.edu www.research.psu.edu February 7, 2012 Document control desk License Amendment Request R-2 Docket 50-005

Dear Sir/Madame:

Attached please find a request for amendment of the Penn State Breazeale Reactor R-2 license. Extensive modernization and upgrades are being conducted to the Radiation Science and Engineering Center with Penn State funds. One of these upgrades includes a reactor bay ventilation system improvement that impacts the Technical Specifications. In addition to the changes requested to, support the modification, other changes are requested to eliminate specifications that duplicate specific regulation, correct inconsistencies, and modify specifications that are not consistent with ANS/ANSI 15.1 and are not required to protect the accident assumptions or analysis in the Safety Analyses Report (SAR).

Along with the justification for the specific changes, a description of the modification and an updated Chapter 6 of the SAR are included for information.

Please exempt this request from fees per IOCFRI 70.11 .a.(4)

If there are any questions regarding the information submitted, please contact Mr. Mark A. Trump, Associate Director for Operations.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executedon 02.07/2--

Sincerely, Henry C. Foley Vice President for Research Dean of the Graduate School Attachments:

Ventilation Modification Description Technical Specification Change Detail and Justification Updated Technical Specifications Updated PSBR SAR Chapter 6 CC - electronic R.A. Nelson - NRC Xiaosong Yin - NRC Greg Schoenebeck - NRC NRC correspondence File Ao xD

REACTOR BAY HEATING AIR CONDITIONING, VENTILATION AND EXHAUST MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION As described in the Safety Analysis Report Chapter 6, the reactor bay (confinement) is serviced by operation of one of two roof mounted exhaust fans (Facility Exhaust System - FES). Upon evacuation alarm activation, the FES fans shutdown and the Emergency Exhaust System (EES) starts. The normal heating and air condition systems for the reactor bay (described in SAR Chapter 9) are antiquated and in need of replacement. The information below is on the planned modification and is provided to assist in the review process. Some minor aspects of the modification may change during the installation process.

A new system has been designed and is being installed to provide the heating and ventilation needs of the reactor bay as well as an energy efficient air makeup and exhaust system. The existing rooftop FES fans are being incorporated into this system and the existing EES system is unchanged. The new energy-efficient heating, cooling and exhaust system (designated reactor bay heating, ventilation, air conditioning and exhaust system - RBHVES) will interface with the evacuation alarm system in a similar manner as the existing FES (shutdown and isolate on evacuation alarm) and consists of the following components and design features:

Two existing powered roof fans (operate during economizer conditions and provide backup exhaust)

Heat Recovery Unit (HRU-02 Variable speed exhaust and makeup fans with enthalpy wheel)

Exhaust discharge stack to above the reactor bay roof height

" Modulating control dampers (determines makeup, recirculation, and exhaust flow)

Recirculating air cooling and heating unit (RAHU filtration, heating coils, cooling coils, recirculation fan)

" Makeup air and overpressure relief dampers

" Two new confinement penetrations for supply and exhaust of conditioned air to the reactor bay

" Two fast-closure confinement isolation dampers

" Break away ducting connections (maintains confinement if roof mounted components are damaged by exterior forces)

Non-visible security features

" Heavy gauge materials through confinement isolation dampers to a break-away feature (ensures integrity of confinement if external ductwork is compromised)

Monitoring and control (damper and fan status, occupancy/operation programming, temperature sensors, differential pressure sensors, reactor bay negative pressure sensors and indication)

" Reactor bay supply and exhaust header duct work

Split HVAC unit for control room heating and air conditioning The new system has four basic modes of operation Secured, Occupied, Unoccupied, and Emergency.

Secured/Shutdown (also loss of power) mode - fast acting confinement isolation dampers shut (monitored and indicted via position switches) at confinement penetrations; fans shutdown, modulating flow control dampers fail as is or move to programmed position.

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REACTOR BAY HEATING AIR CONDITIONING, VENTILATION AND EXHAUST MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Occupied mode - as programmed, whenever the reactor is in operation, or whenever the operators demand occupied, the exhaust/makeup/recirculation fan operate to provide 6000 cfm of reactor bay return/exhaust flow. Flow is in through a new return/exhaust screen and ductwork (above the control room), a new penetration in the waffle structure, new security barrier, and a new (open) confinement isolation damper. At this point, flow is split into return air (recycled for temperature control) and exhaust air. The amount of flow is control by the balanced modulating action of the exhaust and return air dampers in conjunction with the variable speed drive fans. Approximately 3500 cfm of exhaust air goes through the exhaust fan and the enthalpy wheel located in heat recovery unit 2 (HRU-2). HRU-2 recovers usable energy in the exhaust air for use in treatment of makeup air. Exhaust air leaves HRU-2 and is directed to a new exhaust stack on the southwest corner of the reactor bay. The air exhausts the stack at roof level (greater than 34 ft. above ground level) to maintain the original FES exhaust elevation as described in the SAR.

Filtered fresh makeup air is drawn through HRU-2 (where exhaust air heat is recovered) past the modulating makeup air damper to mix with return air. The exhaust, return, and makeup air dampers work with the variable speed fans to maintain a negative pressure in the reactor bay (more exhaust than makeup).

The combined fresh makeup and return air is drawn into the recirculating air handling unit (RAHU-2) where the air is filtered and temperature is adjusted (heated or cooled) as necessary to follow the temperature program. The supply air is now returned to the reactor bay distribution header through a confinement isolation damper, security barrier, and a new confinement penetration.

During some weather conditions, the control system will secure cooling and operate the existing roof fans with maximum fresh air makeup air (economizer operation) to save energy. Negative pressure in the reactor bay will still be maintained and indicated.

Unoccupied mode - The system operates as described in occupied mode above, except that the amount of exhaust and makeup air is reduced to conserve energy and temperature profile adjusted according to program.

Emergency mode - When the building evacuation alarm is activated, the fast-acting confinement isolation dampers will close, and exhaust, makeup, recirculation, and any operating roof fans will shutdown. The filtered emergency exhaust system will operate to provide negative reactor bay pressure.

Emergency operation on loss of normal AC power is the same if the diesel operates as designed (and provides electrical power to the EES system). With no power available all fans shutdown and confinement isolation dampers close.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DETAIL AND JUSTIFICATION A review of the modification to the ventilation systems was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

The results indicated that NRC pre-approval of the modification installation was not required. However, Technical Specification changes are required to support the operation of the system. As noted in the cover letter, other changes are requested to eliminate specifications that duplicate specific regulation, correct inconsistencies, and to modify specifications that are not consistent with ANS/ANSI 15.1-2007 and are not required to protect the accident assumptions or analysis in the Safety Analyses Report (SAR).

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS (LCO)

TS 3.3.1 Non-Pulse Mode Operation - Basis b. Corrected SAR Chapter 13 reference.

TS 3.3.3 Fission Product Activity - removed the requirement that air particulate monitor activate the building evacuation alarm.

Justification: This change removes a TS inconsistency and aligns this specification with TS 3.6.2 Evacuation Alarm which allows for automatic or manual actuation. The automatic actuation is not required for protection of the public, and local or remote alarm is sufficient to protect workers.

TS 3.4 Confinement was completely re-written to more closely align with ANS/ANSI 15.1- 2007, TS 1.1.8 (definition of confinement), and provide clear guidance for control of penetrations.

Justification: Confinement is defined as the "an enclosure on the overallfacility which controls the movement of air into it and out through a controlledpath." For this to be satisfied the enclosure must be intact with no large opening that could significantly redirect the flow of air. The Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) analysis in Chapter 13 of the SAR assumes that a confinement exists. The minimum size of the confinement is a M-A assumption and is specified in TS 5.5.a Reactor Bay Confinement and Ventilation Systems. The MHA also conservatively assumes an exhaust system controls the flow rate of the hypothetical release. Filtration of the exhaust is not assumed to function in the MHA.

The rewritten TS 3.4 protects the MHA assumptions by defining the boundary limitations and controlling penetrations. Ventilation is specified in TS 3.5 Ventilation Systems. Temporary openings in the confinement (doors and penetrations) are acceptable. Penetrations of any reasonable size only affect the source location of inflow air when ventilation is running. Requirements in TS 3.4 ensure the existing enclosure is intact or low pressure boundaries established or provisions and personnel in place to restore the enclosure. Refer to TS 3.4 and TS 3.5 basis for more information.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DETAIL AND JUSTIFICATION TS 3.5 Ventilation Systems was partially rewritten to support the reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system modification. Additionally, time clocks for restoration of exhaust flow and completion of in-progress fuel movement are provided to prevent instantaneous LCO violation and a reportable event for momentary flow interruption. A longer time interval for repair or maintenance of the emergency exhaust is provided to allow continued operations while repairs are conducted.

Justification: The operation of any of the reactor bay exhaust fans (reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system or the emergency exhaust system) will ensure that there is no buildup of airborne radioactive material. If all exhaust to the reactor bay is temporarily lost, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months time limit to restore exhaust allows operators to investigate and respond. Reactor bay area radiation and/or air radiation monitors will continue to alert personnel before a hazardous condition develops.

Since the probability of a fission product release is higher during movement of fuel or fueled experiments, TS 3.5 requires operation of ventilation and requires that the emergency exhaust system be operable.

There is no change in this requirement. TS 3.7 Limitations of Experiments limits fueled experiments to a fraction of the MHA assumptions. A new remedial action is added to TS 3.5 to allow completion of any in progress fuel or experiment movements and prevent instantaneous LCO violation should an exhaust fan fail. Refer to the TS 3.5 basis for more information.

TS 3.6.1 and 4.6.1 Radiation Monitoring The term Beam Hole laboratory was replaced with Neutron Beam Laboratory throughout technical specifications and the basis.

TS 3.6.2 Evacuation Alarm specification was changed to allow a time clock or substitute mechanism for notifying personnel of the need for evacuation. The basis was changed to support the specification and allow for future system improvements.

Justification: The evacuation alarm is a facility-wide alarm used to alert the building occupants of a hazardous condition. Like the fire alarm, personnel are trained to evacuate the building and proceed to a muster area for accountability. The specification change anticipates incorporation of the existing obsolete evacuation alarm system into the facility's life safety alarm system (fire alarm). The building code required life safety system is hardened and includes strobes to alert possible hearing impaired personnel.

To accommodate routine maintenance and testing by outside personnel, a time clock is needed. Since the likelihood of an evacuation is low, a one hour clock is reasonable. Within one hour, operations personnel will return the system to operation or ensure another means of notifying personnel to evacuate is available and verified functional.

TS 3.6.3 Argon-41 Discharge Limits was deleted in its entirety.

Justification: The specification is redundant to the requirements of 10CFR20 and is evaluated and annually reported per TS 6.6.1 .e Operating Reports. Experience has shown that even if all operations are performed at the fixture which generates the most Argon-4 1, the facility releases only a small fraction of the annual limit and is less than the 20% reporting limits.

Section 3.6.4 ALARA was deleted in its entirety.

Justification: ALARA has been codified and the specification is now redundant to the requirements of 10CFR20.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DETAIL AND JUSTIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4 Confinement

The specification is completely rewritten to support and surveil the requirements of TS 3.4 Confinement.

Justification: The revised surveillance specifies daily (during operation) verification of the operability of doors and penetrations to support operations in accordance with TS 3.4. The requirements of the Physical Security Plan are not changed. Refer to the TS 4.4 basis for more information.

TS 4.5 Ventilation Systems is changed to rename the affected components and is technically the same.

Justification: The Facility Exhaust System has been renamed to the reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system. See Chapter 6 of the Updated SAR (provided for information only)

TS 4.6 Radiation Monitoring System and Evacuation Alarm: is renamed from Radiation Monitoring System and Effluents. The evacuation alarm requirements have been moved from TS 4.6.1 to TS 4.6.2 and the previous redundant section (TS 4.6.2 Effluents) has been replaced in its entirety. TS 4.6.1 has been reformatted for clarity. TS 4.6.3 ALARA is removed.

Justification: Evacuation alarm requirements were removed from 4.6.1 for clarity. The requirements to channel check the radiation monitors has been changed to align the wording with other daily TS required checks. All checks have been aligned to support operation of the reactor and are not required if operations are not conducted or scheduled. The previous TS 4.6.2 Effluents (now deleted) was nonspecific, redundant to the requirements of 10CFR20, and is evaluated and annually reported per TS 6.6.1 .e Operating Reports. TS 4.6.3 ALARA has been codified and is now redundant to the requirements of IOCFR20. Therefore removal'of TS 4.6.2 and TS 4.6.3 has no impact on the health and safety of the public and do not reduce the regulatory requirements on the facility.

I DESIGN FEATURES TS 5.5 Reactor Bay Confinement and Ventilation Systems is revised to rename the affected components and correct the building height. It remains technically the same.

Justification: The Facility Exhaust System has been renamed to the reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system. See Chapter 6 of the Updated SAR (provided for information only).

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TS 6.1.1 Structure corrected Vice President Title in the text for the reporting chain of the Radiation Protection Manager.

TS 6.7.3 Records to be Retained for the Life of the Reactor Facility (item a) is reworded to eliminate the reference to visitors.

Justification: the wording and requirements were revised to be consistent with ANSI/ANS 15.1-2007 and 10CFR20 and refer directly to the applicable section of I OCFR20 to ensure correct implementation.

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FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE R-2 APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY BREAZEALE REACTOR DOCKET NO.50-005

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 1.1 Definitions I 2.0 SAFETY LIMIT AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING 8 2.1 Safety Limit - Fuel Element Temperature 8 2.2 Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) 9 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 10 3.1 Reactor Core Parameters 10 3.1.1 Non-Pulse Mode Operation 10 3.1.2 Reactivity Limitation 11 3.1.3 Shutdown Margin 12 3.1.4 Pulse Mode Operation 13 3.1.5 Core Configuration Limitation 14 3.1.6 TRIGA Fuel Elements 15 3.2 Reactor Control and Reactor Safety System 16 3.2.1 Reactor Control Rods 16 3.2.2 Manual Control and Automatic Control 17 3.2.3 Reactor Control System 18 3.2.4 Reactor Safety System and Reactor Interlocks 19 3.2.5 Core Loading and Unloading Operation 21 3.2.6 SCRAM Time 21 3.3 Coolant System 22 3.3.1 Coolant Level Limits 22 3.3.2 Detection of Leak or Loss of Coolant 23 3.3.3 Fission Product Activity 23 3.3.4 Pool Water Supply for Leak Protection 24 3.3.5 Coolant Conductivity Limits 24 3.3.6 Coolant Temperature Limits 25 3.4 Confinement 26 3.5 Ventilation Systems 27 3.6 Radiation Monitoring System and Evacuation Alarm 29 3.6.1 Radiation Monitoring 29 3.6.2 Evacuation Alarm 30 3.7 Limitations of Experiments 31 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 34 4.1 Reactor Core Parameters 34 4.1.1 Reactor Power Calibration 34 4.1.2 Reactor Excess Reactivity 34 4.1.3 TRIGA Fuel Elements 35

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.2 Reactor Control and Reactor Safety System 36 4.2.1 Reactivity Worth 36 4.2.2 Reactivity Insertion Rate 36 4.2.3 Reactor Safety System 37 4.2.4 Reactor Interlocks 38 4.2.5 Overpower SCRAM 39 4.2.6 Transient Rod Test 39 4.3 Coolant System 40 4.3.1 Fire Hose Inspection 40 4.3.2 Pool Water Temperature 41 4.3.3 Pool Water Conductivity 41 4.3.4 Pool Water Level Alarm 42 4.4 Confinement 42 4.5 Ventilation Systems 43 4.6 Radiation Monitoring System and Evacuation Alarm 44 4.6.1 Radiation Monitoring System 44 4.6.2 Evacuation Alarm 44 4.7 Experiments 45 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES 46 5.1 Reactor Fuel 46 5.2 Reactor Core 46 5.3 Control Rods 47 5.4 Fuel Storage 47 5.5 Reactor Bay Confinement and Ventilation Systems 48 5.6 Reactor Pool Water Systems 48 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 49 6.1 Organization 49 6.1.1 Structure 49 6.1.2 Responsibility 49 6.1.3 Staffing 51 6.1.4 Selection and Training of Personnel 51 6.2 Review and Audit 52 6.2.1 Safeguards Committee Composition 52 6.2.2 Charter and Rules 52 6.2.3 Review Function 53 6.2.4 Audit 53 6.3 Operating Procedures 54 6.4 Review and Approval of Experiments 55

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.5 Required Action 55 6.5.1 Action to be Taken in the Event the Safety Limit is Exceeded 55 6.5.2 Action to be Taken in the Event of a Reportable Occurrence 56 6.6 Reports 56 6.6.1 Operating Reports 56 6.6.2 Special Reports 57 6.7 Records 58 6.7.1 Records to be Retained for at Least Five Years 58 6.7.2 Records to be Retained for at Least One Training Cycle 58 6.7.3 Records to be Retained for the Life of the Reactor Facility 58

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Included in this document are the Technical Specifications (TS) and the Bases for the Technical Specifications. These Bases, which provide the technical support for the individual technical specifications, are included for information purposes only. They are not part of the Technical Specifications and they do not constitute limitations or requirements to which the licensee must adhere.

1.1 Definitions 1.1.1 ALARA The ALARA (As Low As Reasona'ly cievable) program is a program for maintaining occupational expos:r es'to radiation. and release of radioactive effluents to the environs as low as reasonably achievable.

1.1.2 Automatic Control Automatic control mode operation is when normal reactoffoperations, including start up; *power level change power regulation, 'anitprotective power reductionsarea performed bythe -reactor control system without, or with minimal, operator inteýrention.

1.1.3 Channel A .cannels.the combinatiionbof ýnsr, fine, amplifier, and output devices which are connected for the pUrpose of measuring the value of a parameter.

1.1.4 Channel Calibration A-,-

-channel,:ca'ldlibratio6n-isan adjstijtient of the channel such that its output responds, withacceptable 'range, and accuracy, to known values of the parameter whih the channehiieasures. Calibration SHALL encompass the entire c'annel, ihncuding equipment actuation, alarm, or trip, and SHALL be deemed toinclude a -Channel Test.

1.1. 5 -Channel Ch"gk Achannel **'eck is a qualitative verification of acceptable performance by obserxio4of channel behavior. This verification, where possible, SHALL includeýcrniparison of the channel with other independent channels or systems measuring the same variable.

1.1.6 Channel Test A channel test is the introduction of a signal into the channel to verify that it is operable.

1.1.7 Cold Critical Cold critical is the condition of the reactor when it is critical with the fuel and bulk water temperatures both below 100'F (37.8°C).

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 1.1.8 Confinement Confinement means an enclosure on the overall facility which controls the movement of air into it and out through a controlled path.

1.1.9 Excess Reactivity Excess reactivity is that amount of reactivity that would exist if all control rods (safety, regulating, etc.) were moved to the maximum reactive condition from the point where the reactor is exactly,,critical (keff=1 (one)) in the reference core condition.

1.1.10 Experiment -,,A ,

Experiment SHALL mean (a) any apparatus';,deyice, or material which is not a normal part of the core or.experimental faciitiei1s, but which is inserted in these facilities or is in line:",ittiAa beam of radiaiiýonoriginating from the reactor core; or (b) any 6peration designed to measUr-'reactor parameters or characteristics.

1.1.11 Experimental Farility Experimental fadIIihtySH'AALL mean beam port, including extension tube with shields, thermal column withi shields v*e*rtal tube, central thimble, in-core irradiation holder, pneuimatic-transfer systerm,;and in-pool irradiation facility.

1.1.12 Instrumenited Element '"h-An instrument6dt element is a TRIGA fuel element in which sheathed chrome"l alumel o*r.equivalent- thermocouples are embedded in the fuel.

1 31 Liiting ConditionsýTfo Oeraio Limritin&g conditions for operation of the reactor are those constraints included in the Technical'Specifications that are required for safe operation of the facility. T-h*lese limiting, conditions are applicable only when the reactor is operating uniess otherwise specified.

1.1*14 Limiting Saety System Setting A limiting5safety system setting (LSSS) is a setting for an automatic protective device related to a variable having a significant safety function.

1.1.15 Manual Control Manual control mode is operation of the reactor with the power level controlled by the operator adjusting the control rod positions.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 1.1.16 Maximum Elemental Power Density The maximum elemental power density (MEPD) is the power density of the element in the core producing more power than any other element in that loading. The power density of an element is the total power of the core divided by the number of fuel elements in the core multiplied by the normalized power of that element. This definition is only applicable for non-pulse operation.

1.1.17 Maximum Power Level Maximum Power Level is the maximutm easured value of reactor power for non-pulse operation.

1.1.18 Measured Value The measured value is thlevalue of a parameter as it appears on the output of a channel.

1.1.19 Movable Experiment A movable experimentis:one where it Is intended that the entire experiment may be moved in orinear'h&t ecore or inIto ad out of the reactor while the reactor is operating.,

1.1.20 Normalized RPower T. .. noralized power, N is the ratio of the power of a fuel element to the average* power p~erfuel element.

Operabe meansIa component or system is capable of performing its intended functiulon

. 1I 22 Operating-02perating means a component or system is performing its intended function.

1.1.23 PulseWo&e Pulse mode operation SHALL mean operation of the reactor allowing the operator to insert preselected reactivity by the ejection of the transient rod.

1.1.24 Reactivity Limits The reactivity limits are those limits imposed on reactor core reactivity.

Quantities are referenced to a reference core condition.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 1.1.25 Reactivity Worth of an Experiment The reactivity worth of an experiment is the maximum absolute value of the reactivity change that would occur as a result of intended or anticipated changes or credible malfunctions that alter experiment position or configuration.

1.1.26 Reactor Control System The reactor control system is composed of*ontrol and operational interlocks, reactivity adjustment controls, flow and temperature controls, and display systems which permit the operator to o perate the reactor reliably in its allowed modes. -

1.1.27 Reactor Interlock C -

A reactor interlock is a dv ice which prevents soniý action, associated with reactor operation, until certain reactor operation conditions are satisfied.

1.1.28 Reactor O.eratii., ,

The reactor is operating whenever it is not secured or shutdown.

1.1.29 Reactor Secured -

The reactoris s.,ecured wAheni:

a insufficientwiSsille IItcontains material or moderator present in the reactor, adjacent experiments, orIcontrol rods, to attain criticality under optimum 1available conditions of moderation, and reflection, OR b, *combinatlon of the following" S

1) The minihim number of neutron absorbing control rods are fully iWnseted orthe,7r safety devices are in shutdown positions, as required by'technical specifications, 2Thc console key switch is in the off position and the key is removed 1f#om the lock, AND

3) No work is in progress involving core fuel, core structure, installed control rods, or control rod drives unless they are physically decoupled from the control rods, AND

4) No experiments in or near the reactor are being moved or serviced that have, on movement, a reactivity worth exceeding the maximum value allowed for a single experiment or one dollar whichever is smaller.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 1.1.30 Reactor Shutdown The reactor is shutdown if it is subcritical by at least one dollar in the reference core condition and the reactivity worth of all experiments is included.

1.1.31 Reactor Safety System Reactor safety systems are those systems, including their associated input channels, which are designed to initiate automiatic reactor protection or to provide information for initiation of mainual protective action.

1.1.32 Reference Core Condition - .

The condition of the core whei *at is at ambient :temperature (cold) and the reactivity worth of xenon iiisjlgigible (<0.2 1% AO/k(-$0.30)).

1.1.33 Research Reactor A research reactoris defined as ai device designed to suppol;ia self-sustaining neutron chain reacti*o*nfor researchý *dev'elopment, educational, training, or experimental puroses-,nd which may have provisions for the production of radioisotopes.

1.1.34 ~a61Repo le Occurrence .

A 4reportable o*ccurrence is'sanyof the folding which occurs during reactor operation:

,;**- a. Operationwhthe safety sy setting less conservative than specified in TS§-'2Limlting:Safety System Setting.

b. O0eration in.violation of ahlimiting condition for operation.

c. Failure of a required reactor safety system component which could render the system incapable of performing its intended safety function.

d':ý.Any unanticipated or uncontrolled change in reactivity greater than one

e. Aii observed inadequacy in the implementation of either administrative or procedural controls which could result in operation of the reactor outside the limiting conditions for operation.

f. Release of fission products from a fuel element.

g. Abnormal and significant degradation in reactor fuel, cladding, coolant boundary or confinement boundary that could result in exceeding 10 CFR Part 20 exposure criteria.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 1.1.35 Rod-Transient The transient rod is a control rod with SCRAM capabilities that is capable of providing rapid reactivity insertion for use in either pulse or square wave mode of operation.

1.1.36 Safety Limit Safety limits are limits on important process variables which are found to be necessary to reasonably protect the integrit of certain physical barriers which guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The principal physical barrier is the fuel element cladding'..

1.1.37 SCRAM Time SCRAM time is the elaps&d.iie between reachingmalimiting safety system set point and a specified control rod movement.

1.1.38 Secured Experiment A secured experiment is any experlnint, experimental facility, or component of an experiment thatvisheld in a stationary position relative to the reactor by mechanical means .The restraining forces must be substantially greater than those to which the experiment might be subjected to by hydraulic, pneumatic, buoyati, 'o other forces which are-normal to theIoperating environment of the experiment 'orby forces.which can arise as a result of credible malfunctions.

1.1.39 Secured Experiment with Movable Parts A secureied experiement with movable parts is one that contains parts that are intended to6be moved while the reactor is operating.

1.1.40 Shall Should and May The word shall is used to denote a requirement; the word "should" to denote a recommendation; and the word "may" to denote permission, neither a requirement-nor a recommendation.

1.1.41 Shii- Reuating, and Safety Rods A shimiregulating, or safety rod is a control rod having an electric motor drive and SCRAM capabilities. It has a fueled follower section.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 1.1.42 Shutdown Margin Shutdown margin SHALL mean the minimum shutdown reactivity necessary to provide confidence that the reactor can be made subcritical by means of the control and safety systems starting from any permissible operating condition although the most reactive rod is in its most reactive position, and that the reactor will remain subcritical without further operator action.

1.1.43 Square Wave Mode Square wave (SW) mode operation SHIALE~mean operation of the reactor allowing the operator to insert presel'e*te~d reactivity by the ejection of the transient rod, and which results in).#nmixinUm power within the license limit.

1.1.44 Steady State Power Level Steady state power level is the nominal measured value of reactor power to which reactor power is being. controlled whether by ntfhnubal or automatic actions. Minor variations aboutf.this level.ffay occur dued-t.fnoise, normal signal variationjano reactivity adjustm.ents. During manual~ automatic, or square wave mbdes-do operation, some initial, momentary overshoot may occur.

1.1.45 TRIGA Fuel Element

A-TRIGA ::.fueýlelement is a single TRIGA fuel rod of standard type, either 8.5 wt / U-ZrHIi*nstainless steel cladding oir-12: wt% U-ZrH in stainless steel cladding enriched to less th'an 20% uranium-235.

,Awa*tchdog:circuit is a circuitconsisting of a timer and a relay. The timer energizes the"rly as long as it is reset prior to the expiration of the timing intervafif it is nOt -resetwithin the timing interval, the relay will de-energize thereby causing a SCRAM.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 2.0 SAFETY LIMIT AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING 2.1 Safety Limit - Fuel Element Temperature Applicability The safety limit specification applies to the maximum temperature in the reactor fuel.

Objective The objective is to define the maximum fuel element temperature that can be permitted with confidence that no damage to the fuel element and/or cladding will result.

Specification The temperature in a water-cooled. TRIGA fuel element SHALL NOT exceed 1150'C under any operating condition. 3/4 -

Basis The important parameter -ý-for a TRIGA reactor isthie fuel element temperature. This parameter is well suited as,a: single; specificati6onespecially since it can be measured at a point within the fuel element anfd:th6 relationsh.ip b*etween the measured and actual temperature is well characterized analytically. A loss in.the integrity of the fuel element claddiiig-ould arise from a build-ppý -5'.excessivq.epressure between the fuel-moderator: dA6ih& :cladding if thý&iiraximiijh fiiýf temperaiture exceeds 11 50°C. The pressure iscaised by t& 1apresence"ofair,>siogases, and hydrogen from the dissociatioinof--the hydrogen and zirconium in the fuel-moderator. The magnitude of this pressure i, deitermiined, by the fuel-moderator temperature, the ratio of hydrogen to zirconium in th -al.oy, ahd the7rate chandg in the pressure.

.2The safety:limit for the tandard TRIGA fuel is based on data, including the large mass of experimentaevidence ob tained during high performance reactor tests on this fuel.

These data indiicat that the0stress in the cladding due to the increase in the hydrogen pressure from the :disociatiionf zirconium hydride will remain below the ultimate stress pr'vided thdifthe temperature of the fuel does not exceed 1150'C and thýe fuel claddingjisbelow 500*C. See Safety Analysis Report, Ref. 13 and 30 in Section.13and Simnad,. M.T., F.C. Foushee, and G.B. West, "Fuel Elements for Pulsed Reactors, Nucl. Technology, Vol. 28, p. 31-56 (January 1976).

Page 8 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 2.2 Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS)

Applicability The LSSS specification applies to the SCRAM setting which prevents the safety limit from being reached.

Obiective The objective is to prevent the safety limit (1150°C) from being reached.

Specification The limiting safety system setting SHALLE be a maxintim of 650'C as measured with an instrumented fuel element if it is loc Q' in a core p6soiion representative of the maximum elemental power densityE", _PD) in that loadiiig If it is not practical to locate the instrumented fuel in suchi aposition, the LSSS SHALL be reduced. The reduction of the LSSS SHALL be by' a ratio based on the calculated linear relationship between the normalized power at the monfitored, poition as compared to normalized power at the core position'representative of the MEPD in that loadiing-Basis The limiting safety system setting is a*temtperature wihich, if reached, SHALL cause a reactor SCRAM to be initiatedpreventingýtle'safety limiitfrom being exceeded.

Experiments and analyses described in thel*SaefivtAnalysis Report, Section 13 -

Accident.Ahalysis, sho that the mesured fuel tiemperature at steady state power has a simple linerelationshir t i to the normalized power of a fuel element in the core.

Maximum fuel temperature occurs when an instrumented element is in a core position of MEPD. The al loc6atiofi.of the ihstfhmented element and the associated LSSS

'-SHALL be chosen by calculatioiinnd/oi 4 3periment prior to going to maximum reactor operational power level The me si}r'del temperature during steady state operation is close to the maximul fuel temperature in that element. Thus, 500'C of safety margin exists b**fje the ,C.1150 safety limit is reached. This safety margin provides adequate compensation for variations in the temperature profile of depleted and diffe&ently loaded fuel. elements(i.e. 8.5 wt% vs. 12 wt% fuel elements). See Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

If it is not practicalto place an instrumented element in the position representative of MEPD the LSssSHAýLL be reduced to maintain the 500'C safety margin between the 1 150'C safety limif and the highest fuel temperature in the core if it was being measured. The reduction ratio SHALL be determined by calculation using the accepted techniques used in Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

In the pulse mode of operation, the same LSSS SHALL apply. However, the temperature channel will have no effect on limiting the peak power or fuel temperature, generated, because of its relatively long time constant (seconds), compared with the width of the pulse (milliseconds).

Page 9 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION The limiting conditions for operation as set forth in this section are applicable only when the reactor is operating. They need not be met when the reactor is shutdown unless specified otherwise.

3.1 Reactor Core Parameters 3.1.1 Non-Pulse Mode Operation Applicability These specifications apply to the poWer*5generýated during manual control mode, automatic control mode, and square wave mod operations.

Obj ective..... .. : ? *.

The objective is to limit the sourfe term an&energy production to that used in the Safety Analysis Report.

Specifications

a. The reactor maybe opdeidt~d at steady sýtate power levels of 1 MW (thermal) or less.

b zThemaximum powerle-vel sHALL henogreater than 1.1 MW (thermal).

c. Thesteady state fuel temperature SHALL be a maximum of 650'C as me*sured withlan instrumented fuel element if it is located in a core position representati*e*of MEPD in thattloading. If it is not practical to locate the

-.instrumented fuel in suh a position, the steady state fuel temperature

'SHALL 5e calculated by.aratio based on the calculated linear relationship betwefen the'normalized power at the monitored position as compared to norQizked p8wer at the core position representative of the MEPD in that loading.. In this ;aethe measured steady state fuel temperature SHALL be limited such that tlfe-calculated steady state fuel temperature at the core position representative of the MEPD in that loading SHALL NOT exceed Basisý

a. Thermal and hydraulic calculations and operational experience indicate that a compact TRIGA reactor core can be safely operated up to power levels of at least 1.15 MW (thermal) with natural convective cooling.

b. Operation at 1.1 MW (thermal) is within the bounds established by the SAR for steady state operations. See Chapter 13, Section C of the SAR.

c. Limiting the maximum steady state measured fuel temperature of any position to 650'C places an upper bound on the fission product release fraction to that used in the analysis of a Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA). See Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

Page 10 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.1.2 Reactivity Limitation Applicability This specification applies to the reactivity condition of the reactor and the reactivity worth of control rods, experiments, and experimental facilities. It applies to all modes of operation.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the reactolr isoperated within the limits analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report and to ensure that the safety limit will not be exceeded..K Specification .

a. The maximum excess reactivity above cold, clean,- ciriical plus samarium poison of the core configuration with experiments and experimental facilities in p0iaceSHALL be 4i9% Ak/k (-$7.00).

b. During initial mieasureents of maximum excess reactivity for a new core/experimental ,configýuration this specification is suspended provided the *actor is operated at power levels no gr&ater than 1 kW. If the power leVe ev xceeds 1 kW, p0wer-SHAL-Lb-e.reduc&d to less than 1 kW within

.01one minute,..This exemptioni does not apply for the annual confirmatory nicm,ýasuremenit of excess reactivity required by TS 4.1.2.

Limiting the exces*s reactivity of the core to 4.9% Ak/k (-$7.00) prevents the fuel temp*eature linthe core from exceeding 11 50'C under any assumed accident condition agcde'scribed in the Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13. The

exemption allows the initial physics measurement of maximum excess reactivity for a new core/experimental configuration to be measured without creating a reportable occurrence. Maintaining the power level less that 1 kW durinthisexemption assures there is no challenge to the safety limit on fuel temperattire.

Page 11 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.1.3 Shutdown Margin Applicability This specification applies to the reactivity condition of the reactor and the reactivity worth of control rods, experiments, and experimental facilities. It applies to all modes of operation.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the reactor'.' canbe shut down at all times and to ensure that the safety limit will not be exceeded:

Specification The reactor SHALL NOT be -operated unless the shutdown margin provided by control rods is greater than 0.175%IAk/k (025) with: ...

a. All movable expe.imients, experimenrits with movable parts and experimental facilities in theirhmost reazctiye state, aind--,

b. ThehJ!ighest reactivitW`worth cdntrol rod ful* withdrawn.

Basis" shutdo n maigi('-f, $0.25) ensures that the reactor can be

.. a subtCal. fiomafanyom operafitg condition even if the highest worth control r-odshould remain in the' fly withdrawn position. The shutdown margin requirement may be more restrictive than TS 3.1.2.

Page 12 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.1.4 Pulse Mode Operation Applicability These specifications apply to the energy generated in the reactor as a result of a pulse insertion of reactivity.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the safety lirmi~tywill not be exceeded during pulse mode operation.

Specifications . "

a. The stepped reactivity insertion for pulse opeiation SHALL NOT exceed 2.45% Ak/k (43.50) and the maximum worth of the poison section of the transient rod SHALL bel*imited to 2.45% Ak/k (>5$3.50).

b. Pulses SHALL NOT be initiated fromp6ower levels abo*v*- kW.

Basis

a. Experiments and fihalykeg' described itlnie Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13, show that the pe6k pulse~teeperatur s can be predicted for new 12 wt%

fuel' 1aced in any cor&positior.:T 'these experiments and analyses show that e.m-iaxmimum allowecd.;ulseyrea-c..iyof2.45% Ak/k ($3.50), prevents the imaximumftue-1 temperti&"'f6bm reacliingýthe safety limit (1150'C) for any "cpfe~configuration that meets the requirements of TS 3.1.5.

The *faximuiii:ofthrf the-PUSe rod is limited to 2.45% Ak/k (4$3.50) to

,.prevent-exceedinglh f, imit (1 150'C) with an accidental ejection of the. transient-rod

b. If a pulse is initiated from power levels below 1 kW, the maximum allowed full worth of the pulse rod can be used without exceeding the safety limit.

Page 13 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.1.5 Core Configuration Limitation Applicability These specifications apply to all core configurations except as noted.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the safety limit (1150'C) will not be exceeded due to power peaking effects in the various core configurations.

Specifications

a. The critical core SHALL be an assenibly ofeither 8.5 wt% U-ZrH stainless steel clad or a mixture of 8.5 wtand 12 wt% U-ZrH stainless steel clad TRIGA fuel-moderator elements placed in water with a 1.7-inch center line grid spacing.

b. The maximum calculated MEPD SHALL be less tatiit24.7 kW per fuel element for non-pulse operaition).

c. The NP of any core loading withla maximum allowed pulse worth of 2.45%

Ak/k (-$3.50) SHNLL be limited to 2,2 IF the maximum allowed pulse worth is less than 2 45'/ k/k ($-3.50)r-foany given core loading (i.e. the pulse can be limite'd-, by thet6Kal worth of tlfietransient rod, by the core exd 4or~administrlvely), TH ENthe miJix1mum NP may be increased

]aslong as the calculatedmaximun fuel temperature does not exceed the safety limdiwith hiat maximumi allowed pulse worth and NP.

d. IF the maximum NP is increased above 2.2 as described in TS 3.1.5.c above, THEN the lnsertion of Excess, Reactivity analysis in the Safety Analysis SReport SHLL be evaluated to ensure that the safety limit is not exceeded withthe new conditions Sýee Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.1.2.).

e. The corceSHALLENOT be configured such that a 12 wt% U-ZrH stainless steel clad TRIGhfiiel-moderator element with a burnup less than a nominal 8000 MWO/Metric"Ton of Uranium is located adjacent to a vacant (water-filled) interial core position during pulse mode operation.

Basis-,~

a. The safety analysis is based on an assembly of either 8.5 wt% U-ZrH stainless steel clad or a mixture of 8.5 wt% and 12 wt% U-ZrH stainless steel clad TRIGA fuel-moderator elements placed in water with a 1.7-inch center line grid spacing.

b. Limiting the MEPD to 24.7 kW per element for non-pulse operation places an upper bound on the elemental heat production and the source term of the PSBR to that used in the analysis of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) respectively. See Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

c. The maximum NP for a given core loading determines the peak pulse temperature with the maximum allowed pulse worth. If the maximum Page 14 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 allowed pulse worth is reduced the maximum NP may be increased without exceeding the safety limit (1 150'C). The amount of increase in the maximum NP allowed SHALL be calculated by an accepted method documented by an administratively approved procedure.

d. If the core loading deviates from the limits set in TS 3.1.5.c then revalidation of the Insertion of Excess Reactivity analysis in the Safety Analysis Report will ensure that the new loading does not inadvertently exceed the safety limit (See Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.1.2.).

e. Radial peaking effects in unirradiated 12-wiP/o U-ZrH stainless steel clad TRIGA fuel-moderator elements located-4djacent to water-filled internal core position may cause a reductioiii the safety margin during pulse mode operation with the maximum alltowdpuls b*worth of 2.45% Ak/k (-$3.50) and the maximum allowed NP,.-f 2'2. Locating an 8.5 wt% or moderately-irradiated (-8000 Megawatt Days per MetribcTon of Uranium) 12 wt% U-ZrH stainless steel clad TRIGA fuel-moderator1 element adjacent to vacant water-filled internal cofre positions provides additional safety margin. 12 wt% elements in the periphery of the core are not subj.et to this concern as the NP is too low to make thesei.elem~its'limiting.

3.1.6 TRIGA Fuel Elements' Applicability Thes~e eif.cations apply~ito the mnechanical condition of the fuel.

The objective is to-ensure thatthfe reactor is not operated with damaged fuel that

_:might allow..releaseof 'fission pr6ducts.

Specifications- '.ý:-

" The reactor SHALL NOT be operated with damaged fuel except to detect and identify the.fuel element for removal. A TRIGA fuel element SHALL be

'-considered damaged and SHALL be removed from the core if:

a Ir-:;Jn measuring the transverse bend, the bend exceeds the limit of 0.125 inch

-bver the length of the cladding.

b. In nieas§uring the elongation, its length exceeds its original length by 0.125 inch.

c. A clad defect exists as indicated by release of fission products.

Page 15 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis

a. The limit of transverse bend has been shown to result in no difficulty in disassembling the core. Analysis of the removal of heat from touching fuel elements shows that there will be no hot spots which cause damage to the fuel.

b. Experience with TRIGA reactors has shown that fuel element bending that could result in touching has occurred without deleterious effects. This is because (1) during steady state operatiodif the maximum fuel temperatures are at least 500'C below the safety liriit (.1 150'C), and (2) during a pulse, the cladding temperatures remain*wellbelow their stress limit. The elongation limit has been specifi&d6i 6nii~f re that the cladding material will not be subjected to strains that-:coiid caus6.aloss of fuel integrity and to ensure adequate coolant flodw`.:-"-' ...

3.2 Reactor Control and Reactor Safely System 3.2.1 Reactor Control Rods Applicability This specification applAies to"th*e.reactor control rods.

Obiectiv~eýK?

The

,isto objective ensure that sufficient c ,n6ol rods are operable to maintain the reactor subcritical.

tz-. Specification.-

There SHALL be -a minimum of three operable control rods in the reactor core.

Basis The shutdown"margin and excess reactivity specifications require that the

reactor can be made subcritical with the most reactive control rod fully withdrawn. This specification helps ensure it.

Page 16 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.2.2 Manual Control and Automatic Control Applicability This specification applies to the maximum reactivity insertion rate associated with movement of a standard control rod out of the core.

Objective The objective is to ensure that adequate contril of the reactor can be maintained during manual and 1, 2, or 3 rod automatic(ciontrol.

Specification ,pj*

The rate of reactivity insertion, ass-6 ciated with 'Movementof either the regulating, shim, or safety cofitr6l'rod SHALL be NT greater than 0.63% Ak/k

(-$0.90) per second when aveiaged over full rod tra-el." If the automatic control uses a combination ofýmore than one rod, the siu`1m. the reactivity of those rods SHALL be not greater, than 0.63°1 Ak/k (-$0.90)- er second when averaged over full travel.

Basis The ramp accident analysis (refer tSafety A ysis Report, Chapter 13) indicates that the safety limit (1 50.-C) iil not b1ý exceeded if the reactivity addiion*rate is less than 17 (2J*;D..50) pei second, when averaged over fulllhravel. This**specification6of 0"63% Aýýk -ýe$0.90) per second, when averaged over full travel is well within that analysis.

accident analysis (refer to Safiety Analysis Report, Chapter 13) indicates that

-- .the safety limiit (11*0C) will n6ot-be exceeded if the reactivity addition rate is

>" 4ess than 175%:/Ak/k (-$2i.50) per second, when averaged over full travel. This specification of 0:63 % A"k(-$0 .90) per second, when averaged over full travelisIell withinthat anal*yis.

Page 17 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.2.3 Reactor Control System Applicability This specification applies to the information which must be available to the reactor operator during reactor operation.

Objective The objective is to require that sufficient infg9iation is available to the operator to ensure safe operation of the reactor. ,

Specification The reactor SHALL NOT be operafed unless the .'easuring channels listed in Table 1 are operable. (Notewhfiat:"MN, AU, and SWar*e abbreviations for manual control mode, automatic c6ntrol mode, and square wave-mode, respectively).

_Measuring

- Channels Min. No.'-.: Effective Mode Measuring Channel'. " Operable MN, AU & SW Pulse Fuel Eleiefit Teimperature 1 X X Wide Ranige Instrumfent LineartPower 1 X Log Powr 6 61 1 X RatrPeriod/S tartup-Rate1X Poe ange Instrumient Linea-ýr-- Power 1 X Pulse PeadkPowe'- 1 X Basis Fuel tempeirture displayed at the control console gives continuous information on this Patfiheter which has a specified safety limit. The power level monitors ensure that the reactor power level is adequately monitored for the manual control, automatic control, square wave, and pulsing modes of operation. The specifications on reactor power level and reactor period indications are included in this section to provide assurance that the reactor is operated at all times within the limits allowed by these Technical Specifications.

Page 18 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.2.4 Reactor Safety System and Reactor Interlocks Applicability This specification applies to the reactor safety system channels, the reactor interlocks, and the watchdog circuit.

Objective The objective is to specify the minimum number of reactor safety system channels and reactor interlocks that must be operable for safe operation.

Specification .

The reactor SHALL NOT be operated unlessall of the channels and interlocks described in Table 2a and Table 2,b -are operable. -.

Basis

a. A temperature SCRAM and-twopower 2level SCRAM esure the reactor is shutdown before:,the safety limit o6n -thetifuel element tenip"Edrture is reached.

The actual setting- !,of the fuel temera`ture SCRAM depends on the LSSS for that core loadin`g: and tfhe location of the instrumented fuel element (see TS 2.2).

Table 2 MinimumReactor SafetyystemniChannels ffective Mode 7Chaifliel. O&all-. Functibn MN, I*U Pulse SW Fuel Temperature,,- 1 ,SCRAMt..65 0 C X X X Higi Power ýq ý'2 'SCRAM < 110% of X X maximum reactor

-.'

operafional power not to exceed 1.1 MW Detector Power I SCRAM on failure of X X Supply supply voltage SCRAM Bar on 1 Manual SCRAM X X X Console Preset Timer Transient Rod SCRAM X 15 seconds or less after pulse Watchdog Circuit 1 SCRAM on software or X X X self-check failure

The limit of 650'C SHALL be reduced as required by TS 2.2.

Page 19 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Table 2b Minimum Reactor Interlocks Nu mber Effe ctive Mode Channel Opeerable Function MN, AU Pulse SW Source Level 1 Prevent rod withdrawal X without a neutron-induced signal on the log power channel Pulse Mode Inhibit 1 Prevent pulsing fromr--." X levels above 1.kW,.Li Transient Rod 1 Prevent applications of -,"."X air unless cwlinder is fully inserted Shim, Safety, and 1 Prevent movement ofz-T nx Regulating Rod any rod excepitthe :

trfansient rod Simultaneous Rod 1 Praevent simultaneousf X X Withdrawal manual wthdrawal of tiA 6rods b The maximumreactor operational powefrmay be administratively limited to less than 1 MW depending"on TS 3.1.5.b. The high power SCRAMs SHA11EbEbe'se!.tto no more than 110% of the administratively limited

.maxiuni tactor operational;pbwer if it is less than 1 MW.

- c. Operation o.the. reactor ispifevented by SCRAM if there is a failure of the detictor powerisupply for the reactor safety system channels.

d The manIal SCRAMallows the operator to shut down the reactor in any mode of operation if an unsafe or abnormal condition occurs.

e . {The preset timer ensures that the transient rod will be inserted and the rdactor will remain at low power after pulsing.

f. The watchdog circuit will SCRAM the reactor if the software or the self-checks fail (see Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 7).

g. The interlock to prevent startup of the reactor without a neutron-induced signal ensures that sufficient neutrons are available for proper startup in all allowable modes of operation.

h. The interlock to prevent the initiation of a pulse above 1 kW is to ensure that fuel temperature is approximately pool temperature when a pulse is performed. This is to ensure that the safety limit is not reached.

Page 20 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

i. The interlock to prevent application of air to the transient rod unless the cylinder is fully inserted is to prevent pulsing the reactor in the manual control or automatic control mode.

j. In the pulse mode, movement of any rod except the transient rod is prevented by an interlock. This interlock action prevents the addition of reactivity other than with the transient rod.

k. Simultaneous manual withdrawal of two rods is prevented to ensure the reactivity rate of insertion is not exceeded.

3.2.5 Core Loading and Unloading Operation Applicability This specification applies to th* source level interlock.

Objective The objective of this specification is to allow bypass of thebsource level interlock during operations with a sucitic"ail core. -

Specification During core loading and- tunloadling .7operations- Vhen the reactor is subcritical, the sourelevel interlockmay benmomentarily 'ýfeated using a spring loaded switch in aceordance withthe fuello-ading procedure.

Basis','--

..6-ý;*-,,During cor&loadinga*n-d unloading, the reactor is subcritical. Thus,

- -mfentarilyl

- - defeating the source lvel interlock is a safe operation. Should the core ,become inadvertently supercritical, the accidental insertion Of reactivity will riot allow mfultemperatur& to exceed the 11 50 C safety limit because no

' -. j* single TRIGA fuel element is worth more than 1% Ak/k (-$1.43) in the most reactive c6re.position.?*.

3.2 6 SCRAM Time Ap2Ipiicabilit-Vy..

This specification applies to the time required to fully insert any control rod to a full down position from a full up position.

Objective The objective is to achieve rapid shutdown of the reactor to prevent fuel damage.

Specification The time from SCRAM initiation to the full insertion of any control rod from a full up position SHALL be less than 1 second.

Page 21 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis This specification ensures that the reactor will be promptly shut down when a SCRAM signal is initiated. Experience and analysis, Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13, have indicated that for the range of transients anticipated for a TRIGA reactor, the specified SCRAM time is adequate to ensure the safety of the reactor. If the SCRAM signal is initiated at 1.1 MW, while the control rod is being withdrawn, and the negative reactivity is not inserted until the end of the one second rod drop time, the maximum fuel temperature does not reach the safety limit.

3.3 Coolant System 3.3.1 Coolant Level Limits Applicability This specification applies to-operation of the reactor with respect to a required depth of water above the top of the bottom grid plate.

Objective -

The objective is to'ensurethat water is'present to provide adequate personnel shielding and core c6oling When-the reactijs. operated, and during a LOCA.

Specificatik. : -

The.reactor SHAeLL NOT.be oprated . wfh l& s than 18 ft. of water above the top of the bottom grid plate W"hienthe wat&eris more tihi:anapproximately 18 ft. above the top of the bottom grid Plat -the water provides sufficient shielding to protect personnel during operationh water through'at1 MW-, re:.:

ad i , core cooling is achieved with natural circulation of the Swater throughthe cor8 Should the water level drop below approximately 18.25 a-.>ft. above the top of the bottom grid plate while operating at 1 MW, a low pool Yievel alarm (se'eTS 3.3.2) will alert the operator who is required by

&ditinistrative. ly' approved procedure to shut down the reactor. Once this alarm occS rs it will take longer than 1300 seconds before the core is completely uncover.d b c&ause of a break in the 6" pipe connected to the bottom of the pool.

Tests and-:c'alculations show that, during a LOCA, 680 seconds is sufficient decay time after shutdown (see Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13) to prevent the fuel temperature from reaching 950°C. To prevent cladding rupture, the fuel and the cladding temperature must not exceed 950°C (it is assumed that the fuel and the cladding are the same temperature during air cooling).

Page 22 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.3.2 Detection of Leak or Loss of Coolant Applicability This specification applies to detecting a pool water loss.

Objective The objective is to detect the loss of a significant amount of pool water.

Specification A pool level alarm SHALL be activated and *orrective action taken when the pool level drops 26 cm from a leveli were the pool is full.

Basis The alarm occurs when the wate'rlevel is approximately -J'8,.25 ft. above the top of the bottom grid plate. The point at whichthe pool is foil1i-iapproximately 19.1 ft. above the o6p of the bottom gridplaMe* The reactor staff SHALL take action to keep the core covered witlhwater according to existing procedures.

The alarm is also transmittedNto the Police Services annunciator panel which is monitored 24 hrs. a day. The a"larm provides a signal that occurs at all times.

Thus, the alarm provides time to initiate corrective action before the radiation from thec core.,poses a serious hazard.

3.3.3 Fission ProductActivity ApplicLabiIi ty

-Th-.-s spec i tIs6n

[ipisapplies tIthe detection of fission product activity.

Objective The objective is to ensure that fission products from a leaking fuel element are

detected to provide opportunity to take protective action.

Sp*cification.

An air pýariculate monitor SHALL be operating in the reactor bay whenever the reactor islperating. An alarm actuated by this unit SHALL alert personnel.

Basis This unit will be sensitive to airborne radioactive particulate matter containing fission products and fission gases and will alert personnel to evaluate the situation and take appropriate protective action.

Page 23 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.3.4 Pool Water Supply for Leak Protection Applicability This specification applies to pool water supplies for the reactor pool for leak protection.

Objective The objective is to ensure that a supply of water is available to replenish reactor pool water in the event of pool water leakage;.

Specification A source of water of at least 100 GPM SHALL be available either from the University water supply or byýdvrting the heat exchanger secondary flow to the pool.

Basis Provisions for both of-these supplies are.in place and will sui'ppy more than the specified flow rate: This flow rate will be more than sufficient to handle leak rates that have occurred in the past or ani anticipated leak that might occur in the future.

3.3.5 CoolanLCCdductivity Limfits '"

App"licabilit This srpc&ification applies to the conductivity of the water in the pool.

The olbjetives are.,

a. To prevent. activated&contaminants from becoming a radiological hazard,

.: and b To help pireclude corrosion of fuel cladding and other primary system

.omnponentts.

Specification The reactor SHALL NOT be operated if the conductivity of the bulk pool water is greater than 5 microsiemens/cm (5 micromhos/cm).

Basis Experience indicates that 5 microsiemens/cm is an acceptable level of water contaminants in an aluminum/stainless steel system such as that at the PSBR.

Based on experience, activation at this level does not pose a significant radiological hazard, and significant corrosion of the stainless steel fuel cladding will not occur when the conductivity is below 5 microsiemens/cm.

Page 24 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.3.6 Coolant Temperature Limits Applicability This specification applies to the pool water temperature.

Objective The objective is to maintain the pool water temperature at a level that will not cause damage to the demineralizer resins.

Specification An alarm SHALL annunciate and correctiv* action SHALL be taken if during operation the bulk pool water temperature reacdhes, 140F (60'C).

Basis This specification is primarily, topreserve demineraliz~r!resins. Information available indicates that temperatu-redamage Will be miniiai up to this temperature.

-a 41 Page 25 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.4 Confinement Applicability This specification applies to the boundary walls and doors that make up the confinement.

Objective The objective is to define the components and conditions requiring confinement.

Specification Whenever the reactor is operating or irradiatdfuei. or a fueled experiment with significant fission product inventory is being moved-outside containers, systems or storage areas:

a. Reactor bay doors SHALL be closed or operable, excepti*tat the door is continuously attended AND provisions in place to immedieiey close the door OR establish a low pressure confinement 1bound ar AND

b. Large penetrations SHALL.NOT xist in the'confinement boundary except that the penetration s continuously attende*d iid provisi6ns in place to immediately close the penetratiofnornestablishW low pressirei'confinement boundary Basis During react6r 'operation-.or a of movement of irradiated fuel or fueled experiments, the probability of fisslio prdugfctelease infc'reases. This specification ensures that the Sreactorbayboundary is intact tod ensure that a controlled air flow passage can exist to

...meet the definition oftonfinementidurngthese times. Controlled air flow is maintained by one or rerexhaust s nemfans and ensures controlled release of any a;.irborne radioactiiyty (see -TS&3.5 Ventilation). For the purpose of this specification, the confinement in-cludes the reactor bay, low bay and control room (if the control room doisksýblocked ope"

a. Largeýop'en penetrations can disrupt the flow of ventilation. Except for the attended passage of p"ople.oDrireuipment, doors shall remain closed. A door is operable when it is closed or c.pIbl"':f a closing via an automatic closure mechanism. To be operable, a blocked door ormah'nual door must be attended to ensure that in an event that requires closure, it can and will be closed. If a door is inoperable or under maintenance, a temporary low pressure confinement or alternative boundary can be established.

Temporary or alternative boundaries should be verified acceptable by the Senior Reactor Operator. An established low pressure boundary that satisfies this specification may or may not meet the requirement of the Physical Security Plan. The existing doors include the reactor bay personnel doors, reactor bay rollup or exterior weather door, low bay equipment doors, and the pipe tunnel boundary partition/door.

The low bay equipment doors include the Hot Cell Access plugs.

Page 26 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

b. Temporary penetrations may be established in the confinement for ongoing maintenance and modifications. Whenever such penetrations exist, a low pressure confinement boundary should be established or a designated individual assigned with all necessary provisions in place to close the penetration. Provisions and preparations for low pressure boundaries should be verified acceptable by the Senior Reactor Operator. The high flow rate of the exhaust systems will maintain air flow into the confinement even with relatively large penetrations. A large penetration is defined as any penetration greater than approximately 100 square inches and is limited by security, not air flow considerations.

3.5 [entilation Systems Applicability This specification applies to the operatiofiyof the reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system andh'eh*mergency exhaustýsystem.

Objective '

The objective is to mitigafe .the consequences'dof therelease of airborn~eradioactive materials resulting from reac4dorperation.

Specification

a. Whenever the.reactor is operating, at leastfone react6rbay exhaust fan SHALL be operatinfg AND" ecept for periods of tinelless than 30 play'MAT21 during maintenance or repatir, the emergýfexhaust siys-tem SHALL be operable.

Wiith nooperdting .exhaust fansn, restore an exhaust fan to operation within 1

- hour or shutdown h thie reactor.,,;

b Whenfeverirradiatedlfuel or a fielýedexperiment with significant fission product inventoryis being moved outside c3ntainers, systems or storage areas, at least one

reactor bay exhaust fan SHALL be operating AND the emergency exhaust system

'NS.HALL be operable.

With no operating exhaust fans or discovery of an inoperable emergency exhaust system, complete the movement in progress then cease all further o"vemen*u*ntil compliance with 3.5.b is restored.

Page 27 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis

a. During normal operation, the concentration of airborne radioactivity in unrestricted areas is below effluent release limits as described in the Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

The operation of any of the reactor bay exhaust fans (reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system or the emergency exhaust system) will maintain this condition and provide confinement per TS 1.1.8. If all exhaust to the reactor bay is temporarily lost, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months time limit to restore exhaust allows operators to investigate and respond. Reactor bay area radiation and/or air radiation monitors will continue to assure an unrecognized hazardous condition does not develop.

In the event of a substantial release of airborne radioactiWt, an air radiation monitor and/or an area radiation monitor will alert personnel and leadtd inritiation of the building evacuation alarm which will automatically cause the reactor bay, hbeting ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system to shutdown.. The emergency exhliist S-tem will start and the exhausted air will be passed through the emergency exhaustuýsystem filtes:s"before release. This reduces the radiation within the building. The filters w.iflfiieiove 90/*/alftof the particulate fission products that escape to the atmosphere.,

The emergency exhaust system activates during an evacuation whereupop all personnel are required to evacuate the building (TS 3.6.2) --Ifthere is :a evacuation *hile the emergency exhaust system is out of servic& for.maintenance-rrrepair, personnel evacuaiion is not prevented.

In the unlikely event an accident `durs cduring emergency.,exhaust system maintenance or repair, the public dose will be equivalent to0or less than that alculated in the Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13a*s thisanalyses does not takelcredit for the filtration provided by emergency exhaut'sy's Tem Therefore the systenf filtration anid operation is not required to meet the accidentgnalysis4and a 30 day repair.period isimnidated or operations will cease.

b. During irrad ated fuel orfueled expenrment movement, the likelihood of event releasing:;fission products-.6 tote bayis.increase9d. Therefore operation of the exhaust system and, Tilabi ityf an operable filtered exhaust"fisprudent. If the system fails or is discovered ipnePbrable durinigio.v.em~fit activities, the: movement in progress must be completed to store th-ijel or experiment-in an a-pproved location. This is prudent and remains within the requirement of the liaitilng condition for operation remedial action. No further movements may b6iconducted until the.limiting condition for operation is satisfied.

Page 28 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.6 Radiation Monitorine System and Evacuation Alarm 3.6.1 Radiation Monitoring Applicability This specification applies to the radiation monitoring information which must be available to the reactor operator during reactor operation.

Objective The objective is to ensure that sufficient radiation monitoring information is available to the operator to ensure perslonne641diation safety during reactor operation.

Specification The reactor SHALL NOT be'0 perated unless the radiation monitoring channels listed in Table 3 are operating.

-Table 3 Radiation Monitoring Channels 4:Radiation Monitoring h annels Function Number Area Radiation Monitor Monitor radiation lev els in 1 the reactor bay.

Continuous Air Monitor radioactive (Radiatio-n)Monitor" particulates in the rea ctor bay air.

Nethioni Beanm-Laboratory Monitor radiation in t1he Monijbi". Neutron Beam Labor atory (required only when t he

, *laboratory is in use.)

Basis".-

a. The radiation monitors provide information to operating personnel of any impending or existing danger from radiation so that there will be sufficient time to evacuate the facility and to take the necessary steps to control the spread of radioactivity to the surroundings.

b. The area radiation monitor in the Neutron Beam Laboratory provides information to the user and to the reactor operator when this laboratory is in use.

Page 29 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.6.2 Evacuation Alarm Applicability This specification applies to the evacuation alarm.

Objective The objective is to ensure that all personnel are alerted to evacuate the PSBR building when a potential radiation hazard e6xists within this building.

Specification The reactor SHALL NOT be opetat6ed'unless the evacuation alarm is operable and audible to personnel within thePSBR buildiig'when activated by the radiation monitoring channel* in ,Table 3 or a manuiil!switch.

With no operable evacuatiion, alarm system, withinri hour return the evacuation alarm to operatiionhor verify that an evacuiaticn can be initiated using the faciity announcement system or other audibleaiarm.

Basis The evacuation alarm system produces a audibllealarm throughout the PSBR buildind when activated The alarnifndtifies all- personnel within the PSBR builýding--toe-,*acuate the uilding:as'ýresribed b the PSBR emergency procedure.

Since he !probabi:ity of a validneed for a full facility evacuation is very low areasof the 7building -that have significant sources of radiation have local Alms it isrAa*snabf-thavthe evacuation system may be removed from service for maintenance and testing-without ceasing reactor operations. The one hour time liit allows fo6r routine maintenance and testing. Verification of a suitable substitutelalarm or a functioning facility announcement system will ensure the facility caný be evacuated in accordance with emergency procedures and allow for longer maintenance intervals if required.

-';Th*4--"*

Page 30 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 3.7 Limitations of Experiments Applicability These specifications apply to experiments installed in the reactor and its experimental facilities.

Obiective The objective is to prevent damage to the reactor and to minimize release of radioactive materials in the event of an experiment-failure.

Specifications The reactor SHALL NOT be operated unless-the foll6wing conditions governing experiments exist:

a. The reactivity of a movable experiment and/or movable portions of a secured experiment plus the maximum allowed pulse reactivity SHALL.be less than 2.45%

Ak/k (-$3.50). However, the reactivity of ar6moable experime-fif and/or movable portions of a secured&kperiment SHAMLL ha've a reactivity worth.tlss than 1.4% Ak/k

(-$2.00). During measurements made to determine specific worth, this specification is suspended providedt-hetj16dactor is operadtd apower levels no greater than 1 kW.

When a movable experiment is usedd, the maximum allowed pulse SHALL be reduced below the allowed pulse ieaitivifný sertion of 2ý.453 Ak/k (-$3.50) to ensure that the sum is lessi;2..45%. Ak/k (41$:50)

b. A sing*6 secured experiment SHAtLLbe limifed to a maximum of 2.45% Ak/k

(-$3.50) The sum of the reactivi*t worth of all experiments SHALL be less than 2.45% Ak/k ( $3.50j) *During measurements made to determine experimental

.-,xworth, this Sp1eificaifion issuspenddprovided the reactor is operated at power

, 1&Vetsi-o-.greateita 1k

c. When the keff of the :c6re is less than 1 (one) with all control rods at their upper limit and no e*xperiments,4in or near the core, secured negative reactivity

-*experiments may-be added' ithout limit.

d. Awnqxperiment may be irradiated or an experimental facility may be used in conjunction with tfihe reactor provided its use does not require a license amendment, as desc"ibNed inTO 'CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests and Experiments." The failure mechaniih tha't..SHALL be analyzed include, but are not limited to corrosion, overheating,"-impact from projectiles, chemical, and mechanical explosions.

Explosive material SHALL NOT be stored or used in the facility without proper safeguards to prevent release of fission products or loss of reactor shutdown capability.

If an experimental failure occurs which could lead to the release of fission products or the loss of reactor shutdown capability, physical inspection SHALL be performed to determine the consequences and the need for corrective action. The results of the inspection and any corrective action taken SHALL be reviewed by the Director or a designated alternate and determined to be satisfactory before operation of the reactor is resumed.

Page 31 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

e. Experiment materials, except fuel materials, which could off-gas, sublime, volatilize, or produce aerosols under (1) normal operating conditions of the experiment and reactor, (2) credible accident conditions in the reactor, or (3) possible accident conditions in the experiment, SHALL be limited in activity such that the airborne concentration of radioactivity averaged over a year SHALL NOT exceed the limit of Appendix B Table 2 of 10 CFR Part 20.

When calculating activity limits, the following assumptions SHALL be used:

1) If an experiment fails and releases radioactiV-,gases or aerosols to the reactor bay or atmosphere, 100% of the gases or aerqiS61ls escape.

2) If the effluent from an experimental facility- exhausts through a holdup tank which closes automatically on high r-adiatioi level, at least 10% of the gaseous activity or aerosols produced wifllescape.

3) If the effluent from an experi* ntal facility exhauts -through a filter installation designed for greater than 99/officiency for 0.3 micron particles, at least 10%

of these vapors can escape.

4) For materials who'e§oboiling point i"s'ab6vovV 30°F and wherevpors formed by boiling this material.caescape onlythroiiugh an undisturbed column of water above the core, at %at10%

of these vapors can escape.

f. Each fueled experiment SHALL beconitrolled siefi that the total inventory of iodine isotopes131 t--hrough 135 in the experiment-is no gi}&ter than 1.5 curies. In addition, anyfueldexperint which would~generae an inventory of more than 5 millihcuris (mCi) off1 131 through ý1*35 SHAULU-be reviewed to ensure that in the case of anaccident the total relea-*eof iodine will not exceed that postulated for the MHA (see' Safety Analysis Report--Chapter 13).

Page 32 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis

a. This specification limits the sum of the reactivities of a maximum allowed pulse and a movable experiment to the specified maximum reactivity of the transient rod.

This limits the effects of a pulse simultaneous with the failure of the movable experiment to the effects analyzed for a 2.45% Ak/k (-$3.50) pulse. In addition, the maximum power attainable with the ramp insertion of 1.4% Ak/k (4$2.00) is less than 500 kW starting from critical.

b. The maximum worth of all experiments is limited~to 2.45% Ak/k (-$3.50) so that their inadvertent sudden removal from the coldtcritical reactor will not result in the reactor achieving a power level high enough1to0xxceed the temperature safety limit (1 150°C). The worth of a single secured .&Dfriment is limited to the allowed pulse reactivity insertion as an increased measuref6f safety. Should the 2.45% Ak/k,

(-$3.50) reactivity be inserted by arampincrease*i the maximum power attainable is less than 1 MW.

c. Since the initial core is subcritical; adding and then inadverently removing all negative reactivity experiments leaves the core-in its initialfsubcritical condition.

d. The design basis accident is the MHA (SbeelSafety Analysis Re6W,Chapter 13). A chemical explosion (*cic s,.detonated TNT) or a mechanical explosion (such as a steam explosion or a higihifresure gas containper explosion) may release enough energy to cause release ofifissd6iiproducts or lossof reactor shutdown capability.

A projectile with a large aimount of kinetic energy I9uld cause release of fission productsor los°s of reactor shu'tdown capability. Accelerated corrosion of the fuel cladding due to material relead by a failed lexperirie'nt could also lead to release of fissl ioproductts._- .:

If an exprifiment failue occurs a special investigation is required to ensure that all

.-;effects from thef:ailure- areknown before operation proceeds.

-j6. This specificati6onW s intended to reduce the likelihood that airborne activities in excess of thelimits Afppendix B-Table 2 of 10 CFR Part 20 will be released to n-, the atmosplhere outsidýehefacility boundary.

f. `,The 5 mCi limitation on I-31 through 1-135 ensures that in the event of failure of a fuied experimeni, the exposure dose at the exclusion area boundary will be less thanWthtpostulat&eJd for the MHA (See Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13) even if the iodine is releas ed in the air.

Page 33 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS IF a Surveillance Requirement(s) is not accomplished in the specified interval that prohibits reactor operation; THEN the reactor SHALL NOT be operated until the Surveillance Requirement(s) is satisfied EXCEPT as required to accomplish the required Surveillance(s).

4.1 Reactor Core Parameters 4.1.1 Reactor Power Calibration Applicability This specification applies to the surveilldan'ceýof.the reactor power calibration.

Objective The objective is to verify the performance and operabilitý.y of the power measuring channel. -

Specification A thermal power chaznrnelalibration SHALL be made on the linear power level monitoring channel'bienni'ally- not to exc ee6d.3 months.

The thermal powr level chaa necalibration will ensure that the reactor is operated at the authorized power levels.

,4.;2 ,-ýReactorEx esgs Reactivity Applicabilihty-This spification applies to surveillance of core excess reactivity.

Ojective ,

Tll&objective 'ito ensure that the reactor excess reactivity does not exceed the Te6hnical Sp-ecifications and the limit analyzed in Safety Analysis Report, Chapte'r'13 Specification The excess reactivity of the core SHALL be measured annually, not to exceed 15 months, and following core or control rod changes equal to or greater than 0.7% Ak/k (-$1.00).

Page 34 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis Excess reactivity measurements on this schedule ensure that no unexpected changes have occurred in the core and the core configuration does not exceed excess reactivity limits established in the TS 3.1.2.

4.1.3 TRIGA Fuel Elements Applicability This specification applies to the surveilla icerequirements for the TRIGA fuel elements.

Objective The objective is to verify theOntinuing integrity'of the fuel element cladding.

Specification Fuel elements and-control rods wtfi fue6lf6llowers SHALL beinspected visually for damag-e o0r 7?deterioration and measured for length and bend in accordance with theefollowing:

a. Before being placed ýin the _corefor the first-.time or before return to service.

b.-Everytwo6years, not to exceed 30mon6ths, or-at intervals not to exceed the sum of $3,500. i pulsereativi'ty, whidlieyer comes first, for elements with a

`'NP greater th ii 1 (one) andifdor control rods with fueled followers.

c Every four yeqar-s notto exceed.54 months, for elements with a NP of

.1(one),z ls Upnbeing pd. removed from service. Those removed from service are then exempt:from fuirther inspection.

Basis Tljecfrequency. 6f inspection and measurement schedule is based on the paramheters. 5 osýt likely to affect the fuel cladding of a pulsing reactor operated at modet e-piiulsing levels and utilizing fuel elements whose characteristics are well knlo."ft?

Page 35 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.2 Reactor Control and Reactor Safety System 4.2.1 Reactivity Worth Applicability This specification applies to the reactivity worth of the control rods.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the controlfrods are capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical.

Specification The reactivity worth of each'control rod and the shutdown margin for the core loading in use SHALL be determined annually, not toiexceed 15 months, or following core or control rod changes equalJo or greatei -,than 0.7% Ak/k

(-$l .00).

Basis The reactivity worthf 6ofthe *c6trol rod is measured to ensure that the required shutdown margin is a&vilable andt,ý provide*an*accurate means for determining the cot&&cess reactivit;-,imaximum reactivity'.*eactivity insertion rates, and the!,eactivity*worth of experiments*ins erdtin thW core.

4.2.2 Re'activity Insertion Rate This specification applies to control rod movement speed.

Objiective_

q,,The objective is to ensure that the reactivity addition rate specification is not vliolated and that the control rod drives are functioning.

Specificatidh The roddr'ive speed both up and down and the time from SCRAM initiation to the full insertion of any control rod from the full up position SHALL be measured annually, not to exceed 15 months, or when any significant work is done on the rod drive or the rod.

Basis This specification ensures that the reactor will be promptly shut down when a SCRAM signal is initiated. Experience and analysis have indicated that for the range of transients anticipated for a TRIGA reactor, the specified SCRAM time is adequate to ensure the safety of the reactor. It also ensures that the maximum reactivity addition rate specification will not be exceeded.

Page 36 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.2.3 Reactor Safely System Applicability The specifications apply to the surveillance requirements for measurements, channel tests, and channel checks of the reactor safety systems and watchdog circuit.

Objective The objective is to verify the performance and operability of the systems and components that are directly related to~rpdctor safety.

Specifications - . - .

a. A channel test of the SCRAM function of the Mdb range linear, power range linear, fuel temperature, manual, and preset 1timer safety channels SHALL be made on each-day -that the reactor is to beý perated, or prior to each operation that extendsrmhore than, oe day.

b. A channel test. ofthe* detector power supply SCRAM functions for both the wide range andthezower range and the watchdog circuit SHALL be performed annual y, noi to6exceed 15'months.

c. Chann*elchecks for`6operability SHALL be performed daily on fuel element

ý..temperaturewide range linear powereWide rraige log power, wide range reactor periiSUR and power rangelifiqar power when the reactor is to be operated, orýprior to each- operation that extends more than one day.

d The power range channel SHALL be compared with other independent

-..channe6l'forf proper channel ifidication, when appropriate, each time the

- reactor is oper-ated.

e. The pulse peak-power channel SHALL be compared to the fuel temperature each time the reacrtoris pulsed, to ensure proper peak power channel operatio.

Basis System components have proven operational reliability.

a. Daily channel tests ensure accurate SCRAM functions and ensure the detection of possible channel drift or other possible deterioration of operating characteristics.

b. An annual channel test of the detector power supply SCRAM will ensure that this system works, based on past experience as recorded in the operation log book. An annual channel test of the watchdog circuit is sufficient to ensure operability.

c. The channel checks will make information available to the operator to ensure safe operation on a daily basis or prior to an extended run.

Page 37 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

d. Comparison of the percent power channel with other independent power channels will ensure the detection of channel drift or other possible deterioration of its operational characteristics.

e. Comparison of the peak pulse power to the fuel temperature for each pulse will ensure the detection of possible channel drift or deterioration of its operational characteristics.

4.2.4 Reactor Interlocks Applicabili-y These specifications apply to the surveillance requirements for the reactor control system interlocks.

Objective The objective is to ensure pe formance and operabilityWfthe reactor control system interlocks.

Specifications

a. A channel checkof-the "source interlock,.SHALL be performed each day that the reactor is operated o6r'iprior to each operation that extends more than one day except when the neutrobn ignal is greater than the setpoint when the source is,-removed from. the core.-

b:.A*channe tsst. SHALL-be performed semi-annually, not to exceed 7 1/2 months, on th'e.pulse m6de' i"ihibit interlock which prevents pulsing from pow4erlevels hgher than one ,kilowatt.

c, *A channel check SHALL be performed semi-annually, not to exceed 7 1/2 moi** snths onthe transienf frd interlock which prevents application of air to the6 transienti*aunless the'cylinder is fully inserted.

d. ,monthsonthe" A channie*check'SHALL be performed semi-annually, not to exceed 7 1/2 rod dive interlock which prevents movement of any rod except the tiansient rod in pulse mode.

e. 'ALchannblicheck SHALL be performed semi-annually, not to exceed 7 1/2 mo'nrthz the rod drive interlock which prevents simultaneous manual withdrawal of more than one rod.

Page 38 of 58 I'

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis The channel test and checks will verify operation of the reactor interlock system. Experience at the PSBR indicates that the prescribed frequency is adequate to ensure operability.

After extended operation, the photo neutron source strength may be high enough that removing the source may not drop the neutron signal below the setpoint of the source interlock. With a largeintrinsic source there is no practical way to channel check the sourceintferlock. In this case there is no need for a source interlock.

4.2.5 Overpower SCRAM Applicability This specification applies tothehigh power and fuel'tempterature SCRAM channels.

Objective i The objective is to-veroiy that-high power and fuel temperature SCRAM channels perform the SCRAM functions."' :-*

S ecific-iin--

The high power and fuel te-nmp-erfature SCRAMs SHALL be tested annually, not to 6exeed 15 m6fiths. - -

o-*,-. 'Basis - q Experience wi*ht the PSBR for more than a decade, as recorded in the operation log bo*.k indicas, that this interval is adequate to ensure operability.

4..2.6. Transient Rod.Test "

>*Applicabilit ,

T*se*s'pecifications apply to surveillance of the transient rod mechanism.

ObjectiVe**

The objective is to ensure that the transient rod drive mechanism is maintained in an operable condition.

Page 39 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Specifications

a. The transient rod system SHALL be verified operable on each day that the reactor is pulsed.

b. The transient rod drive cylinder and the associated air supply system SHALL be inspected, cleaned, and lubricated as necessary, and at least annually, not to exceed 15 months.

c. The reactor SHALL be pulsed annually; ýnoft to exceed 15 months, to compare fuel temperature measuremnenisand peak power levels with those of previous pulses of the same readcti'i 'value or the reactor SHALL NOT be pulsed until such comparativepulse measurements are performed.

Basis Functional checks along with*periodic maintenance ensgure repeatable performance. The reactor is pulsed at suitable interval S'atndt a comparison made with previous similar pulsesitgodeterimie if change idtransient rod drive mechanism, fuel, oircre charactefisticS have taken place.

4.3 Coolan t System 4.3.1 Fire Hose Inspection This sp-ecification-applies to ,thee dedicated fire hoses used to supply water to the pool ina;n-emergency.

O.bjective The objective is tzensure that these hoses are operable.

,-i.-.Specificat'ion ., }

,The two (2) dedicated fire hoses that provide supply water to the pool in an e iiargency SHALL be visually inspected for damage and wear annually, not to exceed 15 rmIonths.

Basis This frequency is adequate to ensure that significant degradation has not occurred since the previous inspection.

Page 40 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.3.2 Pool Water Temperature Applicability This specification applies to pool water temperature.

Objective The objective is to limit pool water temperatre.

Specification 5-The pool temperature alarm SHALL e cali*rated annually, not to exceed 15 months.

Basis Experience has shown this instrument to be..drift-free ant that this interval is adequate to ensure operability.

4.3.3 Pool Water Conductivti Applicability A:

This. specification appliesto surveillance-of poo-water conductivity.

Objective The ojectv isthat p9ol water mineral content is maintained at

-:-an acceptabledelevelI Specificationi Pool watert- onductivity SHALL be measured and recorded daily when the reactor is tobe operatedior at monthly intervals when the reactor is shut down

'.for this timedperiod.

asis Based*opnexprience, observation at these intervals provides acceptable surveillf'ce- of limits that ensure that fuel clad corrosion and neutron activation of dissolved materials will not occur.

Page 41 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.3.4 Pool Water Level Alarm Applicability This specification applies to the surveillance requirements for the pool level alarm.

Objective The objective is to verify the operability qf*-}e.pool water level alarm.

Specification The pool water level alarm SHALL bechannel checked monthly, not to exceed 6 weeks, to ensure its operability Basis Experience, as exhibited by pas -periodic checks, has shown'that monthly checks of the poo!w.ater level alarimesur=es' operability of the gystem during the montlh.,

4.4 Confinement Applicabilit This spe6jf"ic'ation applies to reacto.r bay dors andppenetrations.

Objective The: obj e6-tive is towensure that reactor bay.'doors and penetrations are maintained

'>:operabe per TS.34

>l5pecification A Verification that ieActor conffinement doors and temporary penetrations comply with TS 3 4 SHALL be made on each day that the reactor is to be operated, or prior to each operation- that extends more than one day..

Basis The operability status of reactor bay doors is commonly observed by the users of the door throughout each day. The existence of temporary penetration is an unusual maintenance event. The failure of a door to properly close will not result in an increase in the likelihood or severity of a release. Therefore a daily check of the door and penetration status is more than adequate to assure confinement function.

Page 42 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.5 Ventilation Systems Applicability These specifications apply to the reactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system and emergency exhaust system.

Obiective The objective is to ensure the proper operation of the eactor bay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system and emergency e-exhaust system in controlling releases of radioactive material to the uncontrolled eniin6hfnent.

Specifications

a. It SHALL be verified monthly, not to exceed 6 weeks whenever operation is scheduled, that the emergency'e xhust system is operab 1&*vith correct pressure drops across the filters (as specifiedtin procedures).

b. It SHALL be verified.honthly, not toexiedeM6 wveeks, whenevedr-operation is scheduled, that the ra'cctd-8rbbay heating ventilation air conditioning and exhaust system is isolated whenithe emergency exhaust system activates during an evacuation alarm (See TS 3.6.2 and-TS 5.5).

Basis Experience, based onpe)riodic checks performed 6:ei years of operation, has demonstrated that a test-of the exhaust systems on a monthly basis, not to exceed 6 weeks, is sufficilent to ensure the proper operation of the systems. This provides

,rasoinable assurnce On. teztdcntrol of the ,release of radioactive material.

-L: !-i* .-

Page 43 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 4.6 Radiation Monitoring System and Evacuation Alarm 4.6.1 Radiation Monitoring System Applicability This specification applies to surveillance requirements for the reactor bay area radiation monitor, the neutron beam laboratory area radiation monitor, and the reactor bay continuous air radiation monitor.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the radiai6n monitors are operable and to verify the appropriate alarm settings -

Specification The area radiation monitorthe neutron beam laboratory- radiation monitor, and the continuous air (radiation) monitor SHALL be

a. Verified operable (wien*ýver the;mnitor is requihd$to be in service per T.S.3.6.1) by a channe'cljchc ach day that tlh -reactor is operated or prior"*t*oeh operation that extends more than one day;

b. Channel festeda monthly, not to exceed 6 weeks, whenever operations are scheduled

c. Calibrated annally, n6tto.exceed15 :months, whenever operations are Basls' A daily ctanneltheck when thefm-onitor is required to be in service is prudent anddadequate toiensureýpeiSonnei-Fjriotection. Additionally, experience has shown .this frequency of verficaton of the radiation monitor set points and operailitis adtqiae to correct for any variation in the system due to a change of operating characteristics. Annual channel calibration ensures that units are

"*-6 within the-secificatioiisdefined by procedures. If no operations are scheduled, tý',Ihen calibration and testihg intervals are not applicable.

4.6.2 Evaduation Alafm A pplicabift This specification applies to the emergency evacuation alarm.

Objective The objective is to ensure that the emergency alarm is audible when actuated automatically or via a manual switch.

Specification The evacuation alarm SHALL be verified audible annually not to exceed 15 months.

Page 44 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 Basis During an abnormal radiation event an evacuation alarm is transmitted through the building via the public address system or the life safety fire panel. The public address system is frequently used for information paging and malfunction is readily apparent. The life safety fire alarm system is maintained in accordance with building codes and is highly reliable with backup power and automated trouble identification. This specification works in conjunction with specification 4.6.1 to comprehensively test the alarm system with this specification only testing the enunciators. Therefore annual testing of the audible enunciator is adequate to verify thejlrnm function..

4.7 Experiments Applicability.

This specification applies to surveill i*cý'requirements foio experiments.

Objective <

The objective is to ensure that the conditios afindrestrictions of TS'3.`-77are met.

Specification Those conditions and restricticins listed iniTiS 3 7 SHAL'L be considered by the PSBR authorized reviewertbefore sigfing the irradition authorization for each experiment.

Authorized revieers ar fappointed by the facility director.

.Ni-Page 45 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Reactor Fuel Specifications The individual unirradiated TRIGA fuel elements shall have the following characteristics:

a. The total uranium content SHALL be either 8.5AN t% or 12.0 wt% nominal and enriched to less than 20% uranium-235.

b. The hydrogen-to-zirconium atom ratio (in the ZrH-x) SHALL be a nominal 1.65 H atoms to 1.0 Zr atom.

c. The cladding SHALL be 304 stainle*ss steel with a nominal 0.020 inch thickness.

Basis Nominal values of uranium *loading, U-23-5 nrichnient, hydrogen loadihng and cladding thickness are taken to mend those values specified by the manufacturer as standard values for TRIGA fuel. Minor deviations aboutthese levels may occur due to variations in manufacturing and are n6o-considerdto be violations of this specification.

5.2 Reactor Core,*. - :

Syecificdtiuhons

a. The core SHALL be ij arrangement of TRIGA uranium-zirconium hydride fuel-romoderator elements positio65ned in tie reactor grid plates.

1bý.*. The reftoi r excludin..g expefi-ie5ts and experimental facilities, SHALL bewater,

-,.g or D20, or graphite, or any combihation of the three moderator materials.

Basis, The arraingement of TR'IGA fuel elements positioned in the reactor grid plates ensures that adequate space is maintained for effective cooling. The Mark III TRIGA reactor is an open deignwitthouit provision for reflector except in the form of natural water used for cooling Andigfa*tiie elements which may be placed in the grid array. Restrictions on the reflector-in this specification ensure any changes are analyzed against the criteria for experiments consistent with TS 3.7.

Page 46 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 5.3 Control Rods Specifications

a. The shim, safety, and regulating control rods SHALL have SCRAM capability and contain borated graphite, B4C powder, or boron and its compounds in solid form as a poison in stainless steel or aluminum cladding. These rods may incorporate fueled followers which have the same characteristics as the fuel region in which they are used.

b. The transient control rod SHALL have SCRAM capability and contain borated graphite, B4C powder, or boron and its co m5Unds in a solid form as a poison in an aluminum or stainless steel clad. When iusd as'*atransient rod, it SHALL have an adjustable upper limit to allow a variationiof reactiv4y insertions. This rod may incorporate a voided or a solid aluminum follower.

Basis The poison requirements for the control rods are s'atisfied by using neutron-absorbing borated graphite, B4C pQ0 leyr, or boron and its compounds. These m- terials must be contained in a suitable claddi gkmaterial, suc_ as aluminum or stainless steel, to ensure mechanical stability during, movement and to isolate the poison from the pool water environment. SCRAM capabilities areprovided by the rapid insertion of the control rods, which is the primary ope}rationalsa-fty, feature: ofthe reactor. The transient control rod is designed for use inapulsIng TRIGA reactor and does not by design have a fuel followe r.

5.4 Fuel Storage*,

Specificaltions

t. All ftulielements SHVALL be stored in a geometrical array where the keff is less than 0.8 forall condifions of modeation.

b. Irradiated fuel elements SHALL be stored in an array which SHALL permit si fflicient natural convection cooling by water such that the fuel element tempýerature SHALL NOT reach the safety limit as defined in TS 2.1.

Basis The limits imposed by this specification are conservative and ensure safe storage and handling of nuclear fuel. GA-5402 "Criticality Safety Guide" places a general limitation on well-moderated U-235 to 300 grams per square foot. A rack of new 12 wt% elements would have no more than 288 grams per square foot. Additional work by General Atomics in 1966 showed that a 2x10 array of 12 wt% elements with no separation would have a keff= 0.7967. Because the fuel racks used for storage have an actual spacing of 2.0 inches and 2.5 inches and vertically offset by 20 inches, the calculations are conservative.

Page 47 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 5.5 Reactor Bay Confinement and Ventilation Systems Specifications

a. The reactor SHALL be housed in a room (reactor bay) designed to restrict leakage.

The minimum free volume (total bay volume minus occupied volume) in the reactor bay SHALL be 1900 in3.

b. The reactor bay SHALL be equipped with two exhaust systems. Under normal operating conditions, the reactor bay heating yvntilation air conditioning and exhaust system exhausts unfiltered reactor bay adif to the environment releasing it at a point at least 34feet (10.5 m) above the # tbr bay floor. Upon initiation of a building evacuation alarm, the previously nfentibned system is automatically isolated and an emergency exhaust system automatically starts. The emergency exhaust system is also designed to dis charge reactor-biy air at a point at least 34 feet above reactor bay floor.

Basis ,-

The value of 1900 m forfreactor bay free:v"lume:'is assumed in the SAR 13.1.1 Maximum Hypothetical Accident and is used ifi the calculation of the radionuclide concentrations for the analyi*s-.-*!-":..

The SAR analysis 13. 1.1 Maxiiffium Hypothetical Accident does not take credit for any filtration present in:the emergency exhauSt;system. TlhehIieight above the reactor bay floor level..f the rleaise helps to-ei'sure hdequ`aiemixing prior to possible public exposure. ,-

5.6 Reactor Pool Water Systems -

Slp&cifiCaxtion -

'.Thereactor co6re 'SHALL be cooled by natural convective water flow.

Thernalizand hydraulic 'calculations and operational experience indicate that a compact TRIGA*gctor core cana be safely operated up to power levels of at least 1.15 MW (thermal) wifth'nattural convective cooling.

,ý:-

z°3 Page 48 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.1 Organization 6.1.1 Structure The University Vice President for Research Dean of the Graduate School (level

1) has the responsibility for the reactor facility license. The management of the facility is the responsibility of the Director (level 2), who reports to the Vice President for Research, Dean of the Graduate chool through the office of the Dean of the College of Engineering. Administrative and fiscal responsibility is within the office of the Dean.

The minimum qualifications for the position of D-hrector of the PSBR are an advanced degree in science orlengineering, and"2years experience in reactor operation. Five years of exp'iienece directing reactob 'operations may be substituted for an advancedidegree.

The Manager of Radiation Protection reportsthrough the Director of Environmental Health and Safety, lthassistant Vice Preside~n for Physical Plant, and to the enhkw-Vice Presidehtffor Finance and Business/Treasurer.

The qualifications 7f4iithe-Manager of R~idation Protection position are the equivalent of a graduate degreefin radiation. protection, 3 to 5 years experience with a broad byproducL naterialliýense, and c'tification by The American Board ofHea-lth Physics or eligibility*forgcertifiktion.

6.1.2 Responibisih1t%

Responsibility fd'orhe safe operation of the reactor facility SHALL be within the

,.- chain of commanid-showý1,n in the'organization chart. Individuals at the various niimaagemenitle*ivels . .in.. to'*aving responsibility for the policies and operantio of the reactor facIhfliSHALL be responsible for safeguarding the public .and facIlItNy*personnel from undue radiation exposures and for adhering

" to all requiremeni i of the operating license and technical specifications.

\ In all instances,ý responsibilities of one level may be assumed by designated alternates M o 1higher levels, conditional upon appropriate qualifications.

Page 49 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 ORGANIZATION CHART Senior Vice President for Finance Vice President for Research and Business/Treasurer Dean of the Graduate School (Level 1)

I Vice President for I

Dean, College Physical Plant of Engineering I

[ I Director of Environmental Health and Safety Manager of Rd i Penn State R-eactor Safeguards Committee RaditionProtctio *:*; *:;*I I Director LiI enn State Breazeale Reactor

" Level 2)

Associate Director for Operations (Level 2)

Operating Staff Senior Reactor Operators (Level 3)

Reactor Operators (Level 4)

Page 50 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.1.3 Staffing

a. The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured SHALL be:

1) A licensed operator present in the control room, in accordance with applicable regulations.

2) A second person present at the facility able to carry out prescribed written instructions.

3) If a senior reactor operator is ndt.i rfsent at the facility, one SHALL be available by telephone and able* to be at the facility within 30 minutes.

b. A list of reactor facility personnel by namebad telephone number SHALL be readily avaiIable in the control roo or use by the operator.

The list SHALL include--".'

1) Management personnel.`*:.

2) Radiation saety personnel'

3) Other operaions pfeýonnel.

c. ýEV'Otts-requiring the direction`of a SeniorkR'actor Operator SHALL

1) All ful, or control rod relocations within the reactor core region.

2) Reloc*aion6of any in-core, experiment with a reactivity worth greater than, oe Idolr

3) R.ecovery*from unplanned or unscheduled shutdown (in this

":-'iinitance,do0umented verbal concurrence from a Senior Reactor O erator is'fruired).

6.14 Selection and Training of Personnel Thei ýselection- training, and requalification of operations personnel SHALL meet:or exýcedke the requirements of all applicable regulations and the Ameri*canNational Standard for Selection and Training of Personnel for Research Reactors, ANSI/ANS-15.4-1988, Sections 4-6.

Page 51 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.2 Review and Audit 6.2.1 Safeguards Committee Composition A Penn State Reactor Safeguards Committee (PSRSC) SHALL exist to provide an independent review and audit of the safety aspects of reactor facility operations. The committee SHALL have a minimum of 5 members and SHALL collectively represent a broad spectrum of expertise in reactor technology and other science and engineering fields. The committee SHALL have at least one member with health, physics expertise. The committee SHALL be appointed by and tep-brt to the Dean of the College of Engineering. The PSBR Director SHALL.be an ex-officio member of the PSRSC.

6.2.2 Charter and Rules The operations of the PSRSC'SHALL be in accordancewith a written charter, including provisions for:

a. Meeting frequtency -not less tn:a:nonce per calendar year-not to exceed 15 months.';-

b. Quorums - at least one*!*haf of the voting membership SHALL be present (the Director who-iS ex-officio SHALL NOT vote) and no more

,than ne~half of thelýv oting m beers preg-eh~iSHALL be members of the rdttr staff.'

c .%,Use of Sub~gtoups - thecdfi*nmittee chairman can appoint ad-Hoc coi.mmittees asodeemed necessary.

d --Minute-s of the meetings -SHALL be recorded, disseminated, reviewed, and approved in a tilyjmaimer.

Page 52 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.2.3 Review Function The following items SHALL be reviewed:

a. 10 CFR Part 50.59 reviews of:

1) Proposed changes in equipment, systems, tests, or experiments.

2) All new procedures and major revisions thereto having a significant effect upon safety.

3) All new experiments or classeis of experiments that could have a significant effect upon reactivity orlupon the release of radioactivity.

b. Proposed changes in technical specifications, license, or charter.

c. Violations of technical specifications, license or charter. Violations of internal procedures or i.....ctions having safety si.gificance.

d. Operating abfiormalities havilng sAety significance.

e. Special reports lise*i.dm.TS 6.6.2. ,,

f. Audit reports.

6.2.4 Audit The audit function SHALL be performed annually, not to exceed 15 months, prefrcably by a non-member (f the reactor staff. The audit function SHALL perfored tbe by a person notddirectly involved with the function being S -audited Tlfaudit fuuicintSHAL L include selective (but comprehensive) examinatioiiýsý foperatinig&ords, logs, and other documents. Discussions with ,pe-ra-i*gepirsonnel andiu bservation of operations should also be used as appropri ate Dficiencies uncovered that affect reactor safety SHALL promptly be repor&ed-to the office of the Dean of the College of

, Engineering. 'The folilwing items SHALL be audited:

a.:,Facility operations for conformance to Technical Specifications, license, and procedures (at least once per calendar year with interval not to exceed 15 months).

b. The requalification program for the operating staff (at least once every other calendar year with the interval not to exceed 30 months).

c. The results of action taken to correct deficiencies that may occur in the reactor facility equipment, systems, structures, or methods of operations that affect reactor safety (at least once per calendar year with the interval not to exceed 15 months).

d. The reactor facility emergency plan and implementing procedures (at least once every other calendar year with the interval not to exceed 30 months).

Page 53 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.3 Operating Procedures Written procedures SHALL be reviewed and approved prior to the initiation of activities covered by them in accordance with TS 6.2.3. Written procedures SHALL be adequate to ensure the safe operation of the reactor, but SHALL NOT preclude the use of independent judgment and action should the situation require such. Operating procedures SHALL be in effect and SHALL be followed for at least the following items:

a. Startup, operation, and shutdown of the reactdrf

b. Core loading, unloading, and fuel movement within the reactor.

c. Routine maintenance of major comnt ents ofsy'stems that could have an effect on reactor safety.

d. Surveillance tests and calibriations required by the technical specifications (including daily checkout pr6oedure).

e. Radiation, evacuation and alarm checks

f. Release of irradiated samples.

g. Evacuation.

h. Fire or -ex-ploosio~n

i. Gaseous release'

%*j: :Medical emierg~nci~e s'iU..` 0"

k. Civil..disorderi:,.', u ,:4

1.. Bomb threat '

M-.,' ->Threat of thft of specaf nuclear material.

n. Thefft of special nuclear material.

o. Industrial sabotage.

p. Experiment evaluation and authorization.

q. Reactor operation using a beam port.

Page 54 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

r. D20 handling.

s. Health physics orientation requirements.

t. Hot cell entry procedure.

u. Implementation of emergency and security plans.

v. Radiation instrument calibration

w. Loss of pool water.

6.4 Review and Approval of Experiments j

a. All new experiments SHALL be reviewed for Technical Specifications compliance, 10 CFR Part 50.59 analysis, and approved in writing by level 2 management or designated altermate prior to initiation.:,.,

b. Substantive changes to experiffents preio6uSly reviewed bry-the PSRSC SHALL be made.only after reviewk andapproval in writing W5y level 2 management or deignated alternate.

6.5 Required Action 6.5.1 Actionto be. Taken in the Event the Safetv Limit is Exceeded

'In the event tth safety lmit (1150 C) is exceeded:

a. The reactor'SHALL be ght.down and reactor operation SHALL NOT be resumed until authorized by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

-Commission.

b. Tesafety imit violation'SHALL be promptly reported to level 2 or degnated aliernates.

c. An immediate report of the occurrence SHALL be made to the Chairrrý PSRSC and reports SHALL be made to the USNRC in "Aýe,,accordanceq with TS 6.6.

d. Arport 'SHALL be prepared which SHALL include an analysis of the causes and extent of possible resultant damage, efficacy of corrective action, and recommendations for measures to prevent or reduce the probability of recurrence. This report SHALL be submitted to the PSRSC for review.

Page 55 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.5.2 Action to be Taken in the Event of a Reportable Occurrence In the event of a reportable occurrence, (Definition 1.1.34) the following action SHALL be taken:

a. The reactor SHALL be returned to normal or shutdown. If it is necessary to shutdown the reactor to correct the occurrence, operations SHALL NOT be resumed unless authorized by level 2 or designated alternates.

b. The Director or a designated alternate SHfALL be notified and corrective action taken with respect to thepoetdations involved.

c. The Director or a designated alternate SHA*LL notify the office of the Dean of the College of Engineering and the office of the Vice President for Research, Dean oflthe Graduate School.

d. The Director or a designated alternate :SHALL notifyhe Chairman of the PSRSC.

e. A report SHALL be. made to thie PSRSC which SHALL include an analysis of the-cause of the occurrence, efficacy of corrective action, and recommendations.fornmeasures to prevent or reduce the probability of recurrence. This report SHALL be reviewed by the PSRSC at their next reeting.~

A report'SHALL be made tothe Doi'nint Control Desk, USNRC Washingt*n, DC 20555i 6.6 -- Repogrts -.-

S6.61 Operating Reports An aninal report -SHALL be submitted within 6 months of the end of The a;* Pennsylvania State:Uniyersity fiscal year to the Document Control Desk, USNRC, Wshington DC 20555, including at least the following items:

a A narraltiv summary of reactor operating experience including the einergyproduced by the reactor, and the number of pulses > $2.00 but "less*dhan or equal to $2.50 and the number greater than $2.50.

b. The unscheduled shutdowns and reasons for them including, where applicable, corrective action taken to preclude recurrence.

c. Tabulation of major preventive and corrective maintenance operations having safety significance.

Page 56 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2

d. Tabulation of major changes in the reactor facility and procedures, and tabulation of new tests and experiments, that are significantly different from those performed previously and are not described in the Safety Analysis Report, including a summary of the analyses leading to the conclusions that no license amendment, as described in 10 CFR 50.59, was required.

e. A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to environs beyond the effective control of the owner-operator as determined at or before the point of such release or discharge. The summary SHALL, ihcJiucde to the extent practicable an estimate of individual radionuclidtb:prlesent in the effluent. If the estimated average release after diluiki6`6r, diffusion is less than 20 percent of the concentrationwallowved orfi'e*6mmended, only a statement to this effect need be preseifte.d.

f. A summarized result"of environmental surveys'performed outside the facility.

6.6.2 Special Reports.".-,

Special reports are- used toreport unplanned events as well as planned major facility and adminisitative-changes. These:special reports SHALL contain and SHALL be communicated as follows:`"

a'. Tie&reSHALL be a report no later..than,.the following working day by

-telephoneto ,the OpertioýnS.Center, U-SNRC, Washington, DC 20555, to be followedlby a written report to the Document Control Desk, USNRC, WashingtonD--DC 20555,that describes the circumstances of the event within 14* -d6y f any of the following:

-:1.)- . Violation

'4 of safetyalimits (See TS 6.5.1)

2) Releasef'2fiadioactivity from the site above allowed limits (See TS-6 5.2)

3) A rep rtable occurrence (Definition 1.1.34) b*A,,writtehnreport SHALL be made within 30 days to the USNRC, and to the.offices given in TS 6.6.1 for the following:

1) Permanent changes in the facility organization involving level 1-2 personnel.

2) Significant changes in the transient or accident analysis as described in the Safety Analysis Report.

Page 57 of 58

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PENN STATE BREAZEALE REACTOR (PSBR)

FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-2 6.7 Records To fulfill the requirements of applicable regulations, records and logs SHALL be prepared, and retained for the following items:

6.7.1 Records to be Retained for at Least Five Years

a. Log of reactor operation and summary of energy produced or hours the reactor was critical.

b. Checks and calibrations procedure file.%

c. Preventive and corrective electronic aiintenance log.

d. Major changes in the reactoi facility and proc'edures.

e. Experiment authorization' file including conclusions that new tests or experiments did not requirbea IIcense amendment, 4as described in 10 CFR50.59.

f. Event evalu t1 foForms (includnll- uscheduled shutdowns) and reportable ociirreiic* reports.

g. Preventive and correctIvecmaintenance'records of associated reactor

,,equpmbent.

,:Faility r-adiatlon and.con a~mmnation surveys.

i. Fue* invenrithes and traff~ers.

7, SurvllanC11e actvities as rtqtired by the Technical Specifications.

k. Records of PSRSC reviews and audits.

ý6.7.2 Records to be Retained for at Least One Training Cycle 21*}. Requalifi ation records for licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators*.

6.7.3 Recofds to be Retained for the Life of the Reactor Facility

a. Radiation exposure records for all personnel monitored in accordance with 10CFR20.2106.

b. Environmental surveys performed outside the facility.

c. Radioactive effluents released to the environs.

d. Drawings of the reactor facility including changes.

e. Records of the results of each review of exceeding the safety limit, the automatic safety system not functioning as required by TS 2.2, or any limiting condition for operation not being met.

Page 58 of 58

6.0 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.1 Summary Description The building is constructed of concrete blocks, bricks, insulated steel and aluminum panels, structural steel, and re-enforced concrete and is in general, fireproof in nature. The reactor bay serves as a confinement designed to limit the exchange of effluents with the external environment through controlled or defined pathways. During normal operations, the reactor bay is kept at a negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere by the operation of one or more of four separate exhaust fans and associated confinement penetrations. Three fans are associated with the Reactor Bay Heating Ventilation air conditioning and Exhaust System (RBHVES) and the other is the Emergency Exhaust System (EES) fan. When the evacuation alarm is actuated, the EES fan starts (if not previously running) and all other fans are shutdown and the their penetrations are closed (via dampers), whereby a negative pressure is maintained on the reactor bay and the effluent is exhausted through filters to a stack that exhausts approximately 34 feet

(-10 m) above reactor bay floor level. The reactor bay meets the TS definition 1.1.8, "Confinement means an enclosure on the overall facility which controls the movement of air into and out through a controlled path".

6.2 Detailed Descriptions 6.2.1 Confinement The -70,000 feet 3 (1900 nm 3 ) minimum volume reactor bay is maintained at a negative pressure with respect to the remainder of the building by one or more of four separate exhaust fans (see Figure 6-1). Depending on operational configuration, fresh air to the reactor bay is supplied by leaks around doors and penetrations and by the supply air fan. Normal heating, cooling, ventilation, and negative pressure of the reactor bay is maintained by the RBHVES. A filtered emergency exhaust system (EES) is also available.

The RBHVES functions are to supply fresh tempered makeup air and to control air flow through the reactor bay to minimize worker radiation exposure and to release the reactor bay air in a controlled manner (-3500 feet 3/min or 9.9 x 104 /min) where dilution and diffusion of the effluent occurs before it comes into contact with the public. Argon-41 is the only radioactive gas of significance released during the normal operation of the reactor, and is the result of the action of thermal neutrons on air in the reactor pool water and in experimental apparatus. See section 11.1.1.1 for typical Argon-41 annual releases and section 11.1.5 for a discussion of personnel exposures.

The RBHVES contains an exhaust fan and stack that exhausts at reactor bay roof level, a makeup fan with enthalpy wheel, a recirculation fan and associated control dampers. Confinement penetration dampers close to isolate the system on system shutdown or power failure. During normal operation the balance of fresh makeup air and exhaust air maintains a slight negative pressure in the reactor bay. Two additional roof fans with gravity back-draft dampers are available as backup and to improve heating and cooling efficiency during certain weather conditions. The RBHVES serves no safety function during an airborne release.

VI- 1 PSBR Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 2/6/12

When the evacuation alarm system is activated, any operating RBHVES fans are shutdown, associated confinement isolation dampers shut, and the EES system starts. The EES creates sufficient negative pressure in the reactor bay so that any movement of radioactive material from the bay would be through the system filters. Air enters the EES through a screened opening in the east wall of the reactor bay about -14 feet (-4 m) above the bay floor (see Figure 6-2 EES System). The air then passes through a pre-filter, absolute filter, and carbon filter that are mounted in 3a housing on the roof of the east extension of the reactor bay. The exhaust fan

(-3 100 feet/min or -9.1 x 104 C/min with system dampers completely open) is also mounted there. Flow can be reduced through the system by adjusting the manual dampers. Filtered air exhausts into an 18 inch (46 cm) diameter PVC pipe and stack. The stack travels up the east outside wall of the reactor building and exhausts at a point above the reactor bay roof (-34 feet above reactor bay floor level).

The EES control panel in the Cobalt-60 facility entrance lobby shows the operational status of the EES system. The control panel consists of four differential pressure gauges, three of which show pressure drops across each of the filters. The fourth pressure gauge shows the velocity pressure in the stack. Also located on the control panel are two pilot lights; one indicates that the system is energized, the other indicates flow in the system (by means of a flow switch). A switch that allows the system to be manually activated is also on the panel. Manual start of the EES does not affect the RBHVES system operation.

The EES three stage filter system is housed in a dust-tight containment. The purpose of the low-cost pre-filter is to filter atmospheric dust that would be deposited in the more expensive absolute filter. Thus, the lifetime of the absolute filter is extended. The high-efficiency absolute filter is needed to remove particulate radiation and has a removal efficiency of 99.9% for .3 micron-sized particles and 99.99% for one micron-sized particles. The carbon filter has a high efficiency for removing fission gases, most importantly the radioiodine.

VI-2 PSBR Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 2/6/12

Economizer Makeup Gravity Backdraft Air Damper Dampers

~d3000 - 3000 CFM CFM 0 Roof Fans 7 N.O.I 1 3 . 5 "x lO. N . C*

-- e+24"x 14" ExastT FI 3000 Filtr I -

I CFM ii Z) Reactor Bay

,,II Confinement Isolation BayI'" 18I dia.

IIFilter II3S 0a e I RU-2 _ Dampers -

L. c CFM

-* ;* " " _* Pre-Filter---

6___.___ ___ Absolute Filter Emergency Exhaust Makeup N.O. cr) Charcoal Filter System Air Damper Exhaust To Above Outside Reactor Bay Air Roofline.

Intake Figure 6-1 Reactor Bay HVAC and Emergency Exhaust Systems

1 & #2

3 14 5 #61 be Pre Absolute Carbon stack flow Flowr Air Flow H

II JIIo Tb

't` s k) HAND AUTO StatiIckP o~er Pre- Absolute Carbon Pressure filter Filter Filter -Tips Pr on O\ Flow West

_Fan East Fan* F]

II \ --COBALT-60

. .. LOBBY CONTROL

. PANEL Facility Exhaust System Qircuit Boxes V_ _Emergency Exhaust System Circuit Box and Pilot Lights PVC Stack (18")

,(To Pt. Above Bay Roof)

Metal Stacks

-PVC Duct (18")

-Motorized Damper Screenedd Exhaust Opening -Fan low7 CL6o iter i [" Power Absolute Filter I Monitor Figure 6-2 Emergency Exhaust System VI-4 PSBR Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 2/6/12

Static tips are located upstream of the pre-filter, between the pre-filter and the absolute filter, between the absolute filter and the carbon filter, and downstream of the carbon filter. These static tips are connected to three of the differential pressure gauges by copper tubing. A stainless pitot tube mounted in the stack is connected to the fourth differential pressure gauge. As the EES is operated, both the efficiency and the pressure drop across the filters increase due to loading. The filters should be changed when the initial pressure drop (normal operating range for clean filters) has approximately doubled (removal range for spent filters), which is well before the maximum design pressure drop (flag setting) across the filter is exceeded (see Table 6-1). Periodic checks of the filter criteria are provided by a PSBR standard operating procedure.

Table 6-1 EES Filter Criteria Normal Operating Range Removal Range Flag Setting (inches H 20) (inches H 2 0) (inches H 20)

Pre-filter .07 .14 - .24 0.42 Absolute Filter .7 1.4-1.5 1.65 Carbon Filter .6 1.0-1.1 1.15 Stack .2 1 0.52 The switch on the control panel has two operational modes, auto and hand. It is not possible to disable the system with this switch. Operating the system using the hand mode has no effect on the reactor's operation or any other system.

A Power Monitor box (reactor bay east wall) has three red neon lights that are lit when there is three-phase AC power available to the system. In the auto mode, when an evacuation is initiated, an indicator on the emergency exhaust system fan control box (reactor bay east wall) is lit when the emergency exhaust fan is energized.

Once the EES is energized, it takes ten to fifteen seconds for the EES flow to increase enough to activate the stack flow switch that turns on the red power-on light on the Cobalt-60 lobby control panel. Shortly thereafter, the air flow will stabilize at its normal rate (and the pressure drop gauges will stabilize). A console message "Emerg Ventilation Flow On" (also actuated by the flow switch in the stack) is the positive indication to the reactor operator that the emergency exhaust system is energized and has flow. DCC-X (reactor console digital control computer discussed in Chapter 7) also disables the RBHVES if the EES was activated by DCC-X; manually activating the EES does not disable the RBHVES.

VI-5 PSBR Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 2/6/12

The TS describe the requirements for the confinement and for RBHVES and EES system operability and periodic surveillance during reactor operation and fuel movement:

" TS 3.4 describes the ventilation and air passages requirements to meet the definition of confinement operability

" TS 3.5 describes requirements for exhaust fan and EES operability when the reactor is operating or irradiated fuel or fueled experiments are being moved

" TS 4.4 describes the surveillance requirements for verification of confinement status (reactor doors and penetrations)

" TS 4.5 indicates the surveillance frequencies to ensure the proper operation of the RBHVES and the EES in controlling the releases of radioactive material to the uncontrolled environment.

TS 5.5a describes the confinement as designed to restrict leakage and describes the minimum volume

TS 5.5b describes the RBHVES and EES systems, and operability during normal and alarm conditions Section 13.1, Accident Analysis, gives a summary of projected radiological exposures from the MHA. This information indicates that even if the EES fails to operate during the MHA, doses to the public are still within 10 CFR 20 limits.

6.2.2 Containment Not applicable for PSBR.

6.2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System Not applicable for PSBR.

VI-6 PSBR Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 2/6/12

ML12040A166

Contents

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Dear Sir/Madame:

4.4 Confinement

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

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ML12040A166

Text

Dear Sir/Madame:

4.4 Confinement

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Navigation menu

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