ML11258A122

Email from P. Bode, Entergy, Subj: FW: Part 21 - Kasi MOV and AOV Software, (3 Pgs)

ML11258A122
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	06/20/2011
From:	Halter M Reactor Projects Branch 2
To:	Bode P Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0272, EN 46955
Download: ML11258A122 (3)

Text

-I From: Halter, Mandy Sent: Monday, June 20, 2011 1:33 PM To: 'pbode@entergy.com'

Subject:

Part 21 - KASI MOV and AOV Software Attachments: EN46955.pdf; KVAP-Software-for-AOV-&-MOV-design-basis-margin-calculations-for-JOG-Progra m-lmplementation-G L-96-05-Periodic-Verification-margin-improvement.pdf

Paul, Attached is the Part 21 that came out of Oconee.(attached above EN 46955). The defect is related to errors in the Kalsi Engineering Valve and Actuator Program (KVAP) software that provide default flow and torque coefficients for ball and plug valves which can affect margin predictions.

Please confirm whether or not Indian Point has reviewed this issue for applicability.

Thanks and kind regards, Mandy Mandy Halter U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center - Unit 3 (914) 739-8565

Attachment B OMP 1-14 NRC Event Notification Worksheet Page 1 of 2 NRC Event Notification Worksheet Notification Time Facility or Organization Unit Caller's Name Call Back # 7 Oconee Nuclear Station 1,2, 3 Sandra Severance ENS 256-9931 p864) 873-3466 NRC Operations Officer Contacted: INRC Event Number:

Event Time/Zone Event Date Power/Mode Before Power/Mode After 1152 EST 6/7/2011 Unit 1: Mode 6 Unit 1: 100%

Unit 2: 100% Unit 2: 100%

Unit3: 100% Unit3: 100%

El

. Event Classifications LI General Emergency Li LI 8-Hour Non-Emergency 10iCFR 50.72 (hb)(3)7 (ii) (A) Degraded Condition 1

El Site Area Emergency

[] U (ii) (B) Unanalyzed Condition Alert [E] (xiii) Loss of emergency assessment capability/offsite communications 1: Unusual Event 0 (iv) (A) System Actuation El 50.72 Non-emergency (see other columns) [E RIs 72.75 Spent Fuel (ISFSI) El Containment isolation 73.71 Physical Security LIECCS El Transportation UZ202202 Material/Exposure U Containment spray/coolers 26.73 Fitness for Duty [E Emergency AC (Keowee Hydro)

Other: 21.21 (d)(3)(i) El (v) (A) Safe Shutdown Capability

[2 (v) (B) Residual Heat Removal Capability 1-Hour Non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1) El (v) (C) Control of radiological material E] Deviation from TS per 50.54(x) [E (v) (D) Accident Mitigation El (xii) Transport contaminated person to offsite medical facility 4-Hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)

F] (i) TS Required Shutdown U (iv) (A) ECCS Discharge into RCS E] (iv) (B) RPIS Actuation (while critical)

[] (xi) News release/notification to other government agencies

Attachment B OMP 1-14 NRC Event Notification Worksheet Page 2 of 2 Event Description (Include systems affcotcd, actuations and their initialing signals, causes, cffect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc.)

Event: In KVAP Error Report 2011-02, Kalsi Engineering identified an error in the Kalsi

-Engineering Valve and Actuator Program (KVAP) software that provides default flow and torque coefficients for ball and plug valves which can affect margin predictions. Communication between Kalsi and Duke Energy personnel confirmed that non-conservative torque values were calculated for select ball valves used at Oconee for containment isolation. As a result of the Kalsi error, the non-conservatively calculated torque values resulted in negative actuator margins, calling into question the actuators' capability to close the valves under all design conditions. Therefore, it has been determined that the KVAP software program error constitutes a defect, reportable under IOCFR21.

Initial Safety Significance: Four safety-related contairnent isolation valves in the High Pressure Injection system were impacted, requiring entry into TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, on two Oconee units.

Corrective Action(s):

1. Upon further calculation, two of the containment isolation valves were determined to have adequate margin and were declared operable.

2. Two other containment isolation valves required modifications to restore operability.

Anything unusual or not understood? El Yes (Explain above) [ No Did all systems function as required?j] Yes ]E No (Explain above)

Mode of operatious until corrected: Estimated restart date:

Jflocs event result in a radiological release, RCS leak, or steam generator tue E e cmplete page 3) No Does the event result in any of the units experiencing a 7 transient? l Yes (complete Oconee Plant Status sheet) No R

Notifications

,RC Resident: /will be ]lant Manager [Y/N/will be

!otiffedBy:

State(s): I') ll*

ire , DIotified By: rime:

• viii1, beOperations Superintenden:" /N/will be Notified By: _Tme: _otified By: Timne:

Local: A , 11,,-bel* O.ther Goverument Agencies: Y be otified By: _Time: *Notifed By: ,Tmc:

Media/Press Release: A)*A- "f ,Qý"il b Goth ta . viHbe WotIfed By: rtme Not*fied By $ I. Time I Z 0 ra!Pns Shi n ger/Emergenc, Coordinator Approval: Date/Time:

NRC Notification Complete by Caller/NRC Communicator: , Date/Time: _