ML111741385
| ML111741385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/2011 |
| From: | Hay M Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Olson E Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-11-006 | |
| Download: ML111741385 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000458/2011006
Text
Mr. Eric W. Olson
Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61
St Francisville, LA 70775
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REG!ON IV
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125
June 23, 2011
SUBJECT:
RiVER BEND STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTiFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2011006
Dear Mr. Olson,
On May 12, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team
inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings,
as discussed on May 12, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification
and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations
and with the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected procedures and
records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The team also interviewed a
representative sample of personnel regarding the condition of your safety conscious work
environment.
This report documents one self-revealing violation of very low safety significance (Green). This
finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, one licensee-
identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this
report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was
entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a noncited
violation consistent with Section VI. A. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this
noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document
Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington,
Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend
Station. In additionf jf you disagree 'va,/jth the chaiacterization of any finding in this report, you
should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for
your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector
at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with
Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.
Mr. Eric W. Olson
Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61
St Francisville, LA 70775
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REG!ON IV
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125
June 23, 2011
SUBJECT:
RiVER BEND STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTiFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2011006
Dear Mr. Olson,
On May 12, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team
inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings,
as discussed on May 12, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification
and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations
and with the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected procedures and
records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The team also interviewed a
representative sample of personnel regarding the condition of your safety conscious work
environment.
This report documents one self-revealing violation of very low safety significance (Green). This
finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, one licensee-
identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this
report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was
entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a noncited
violation consistent with Section VI. A. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this
noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document
Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington,
Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend
Station. In additionf jf you disagree 'va,/jth the chaiacterization of any finding in this report, you
should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for
your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector
at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with
Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 2 -
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Sincerely,
Michael Hay, Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000458/20110006
w/Attachments:
Attachment A, Supplemental Information
Attachment 8, Information Request - February 16, 2011
cc: w/Enclosure:
Distribution via Ustserv
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 2 -
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Sincerely,
Michael Hay, Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000458/20110006
w/Attachments:
Attachment A, Supplemental Information
Attachment 8, Information Request - February 16, 2011
cc: w/Enclosure:
Distribution via Ustserv
Docket:
License:
Report:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Team Leader:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
05000458
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
24 miles NNW of Baton Rouge, Louisiana
April 25 through May 12, 2011
Robert C. Hagar, Senior Project Engineer
Jeremy Groom, Resident Inspector
Andy J. Barrett, Resident Inspector
Gabriel W. Apger, Operations Examiner
Michael Hay, Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
- 1 -
Enclosure
Docket:
License:
Report:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Team Leader:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
05000458
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
24 miles NNW of Baton Rouge, Louisiana
April 25 through May 12, 2011
Robert C. Hagar, Senior Project Engineer
Jeremy Groom, Resident Inspector
Andy J. Barrett, Resident Inspector
Gabriel W. Apger, Operations Examiner
Michael Hay, Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
- 1 -
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2011006; April 25 through May 12, 2011; River Bend Station, Biennial Baseline
Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems, Problem Identification and
Resolution
The inspection was performed by a regional senior project engineer, a regional operator
examiner, and two resident inspectors. One noncited violation of very !o\\N significance was
identified during this inspection. Additionally, one licensee-identified finding of very low safety
significance is documented in this report. The significance of most findings is indicated by their
color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance
Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the
significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level
after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The team reviewed approximately 500 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations,
root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if
problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action
program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports,
self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the
corrective action program. Overall, the team determined that the licensee's program for
identifying, prioritizing, and correcting conditions adverse to quality was effective. With few
exceptions, the licensee identified conditions adverse to quality at a low threshold, properly
classified and evaluated those conditions, and developed appropriate corrective actions.
The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility
and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry
operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. In addition,
the licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as
demonstrated by self-identification of poor corrective action program performance and
identification of ineffective corrective actions.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's
failure to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould
J-series relays. In response, the licensee initiated condition report
CR-RBS-20 10-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive
maintenance are performed on high-critical components.
- 2-
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2011006; April 25 through May 12, 2011; River Bend Station, Biennial Baseline
Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems, Problem Identification and
Resolution
The inspection was performed by a regional senior project engineer, a regional operator
examiner, and two resident inspectors. One noncited violation of very !o\\N significance was
identified during this inspection. Additionally, one licensee-identified finding of very low safety
significance is documented in this report. The significance of most findings is indicated by their
color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance
Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the
significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level
after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The team reviewed approximately 500 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations,
root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if
problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action
program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports,
self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the
corrective action program. Overall, the team determined that the licensee's program for
identifying, prioritizing, and correcting conditions adverse to quality was effective. With few
exceptions, the licensee identified conditions adverse to quality at a low threshold, properly
classified and evaluated those conditions, and developed appropriate corrective actions.
The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility
and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry
operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. In addition,
the licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as
demonstrated by self-identification of poor corrective action program performance and
identification of ineffective corrective actions.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's
failure to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould
J-series relays. In response, the licensee initiated condition report
CR-RBS-20 10-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive
maintenance are performed on high-critical components.
- 2-
Enclosure
The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate
corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, high-
duty-cycle Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1. This
performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and was
therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding had very iow
safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification
deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability, did not represent a loss
of system safety function, did not represent a loss of safety function for a single
train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not
screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather
initiating event. Because the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's
misclassification of the failed relay within the preventive maintenance
optimization program in 2008, and because the licensee's performance in that
program was not reflective of current licensee performance, no cross-cutting
aspect was assigned to this finding (Section 40A2.5).
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and
corrective action tracking number (condition report number) are listed in Section 40A7.
- 3 -
Enclosure
The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate
corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, high-
duty-cycle Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1. This
performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and was
therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding had very iow
safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification
deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability, did not represent a loss
of system safety function, did not represent a loss of safety function for a single
train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not
screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather
initiating event. Because the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's
misclassification of the failed relay within the preventive maintenance
optimization program in 2008, and because the licensee's performance in that
program was not reflective of current licensee performance, no cross-cutting
aspect was assigned to this finding (Section 40A2.5).
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and
corrective action tracking number (condition report number) are listed in Section 40A7.
- 3 -
Enclosure
REPORT DETAilS
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents
that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from July 10, 2009, to the end
of the on-site portion of this inspection on May 12, 2011 .
. 1
Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed approximately 500 root and apparent cause evaluations, work
orders, engineering evaluations, and other supporting documentation, from
approximately 15,000 that had been issued between July 10, 2009, to May 12, 2011, to
determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the
corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team also reviewed a
sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending
reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action
program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of
problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment reports, audit
reports, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and
preventive maintenance tasks. A team member reviewed work requests and attended
the licensee's periodic Condition Review Group and the management review committee
meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance
determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability
assessment and work control processes when applicable. The team's review included
verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for
problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous
occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions,
completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems. The team
conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist
where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program.
The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified
violations to verify that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the
inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to
other corrective action documents to verify that corrective actions were still appropriate
and timely.
The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and River Bend Station's risk
assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems
and components. The team selected their samples from issues that involved the
following risk-significant systems:
-4-
Enclosure
REPORT DETAilS
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents
that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from July 10, 2009, to the end
of the on-site portion of this inspection on May 12, 2011 .
. 1
Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed approximately 500 root and apparent cause evaluations, work
orders, engineering evaluations, and other supporting documentation, from
approximately 15,000 that had been issued between July 10, 2009, to May 12, 2011, to
determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the
corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team also reviewed a
sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending
reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action
program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of
problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment reports, audit
reports, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and
preventive maintenance tasks. A team member reviewed work requests and attended
the licensee's periodic Condition Review Group and the management review committee
meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance
determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability
assessment and work control processes when applicable. The team's review included
verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for
problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous
occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions,
completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems. The team
conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist
where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program.
The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified
violations to verify that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the
inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to
other corrective action documents to verify that corrective actions were still appropriate
and timely.
The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and River Bend Station's risk
assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems
and components. The team selected their samples from issues that involved the
following risk-significant systems:
-4-
Enclosure
Standby Service Water
Emergency 480 Volts AC
Normal Service Water
Division 1 and Division 2 Diesel Generators
125 Volts DC
Turbine Plant Component Cooling
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Normal 128 kVolts AC
120 VAC
Instrument Air
Diesel Room Ventilation
Division 3 Diesel
Division 1 and Division 2 4160 Volts AC
Auxiliary Building Ventilation
Service Water Cooling
Fire Protection Water
230 KV Power
Division 3 4160 Volts AC
Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Instrumentation
To assess whether selected problems had been effectively addressed, the team also
expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving Gould J1 0 electrical
relays and recirculation pump seal leakage.
To assess whether problems had been identified and entered into the corrective action
program, the team conducted a walkdown of Station Service Water and Emergency
Diesel Generator systems.
b.
Assessments
1.
Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification
The team concluded that, generally, the licensee had correctly identified deficiencies that
were conditions adverse to quality and had entered those conditions into their corrective
action program in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance
and NRC requirements. The team determined that the licensee had identified problems
at a low threshold. Also, the team found no indication of processes where problems may
be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. However, the team
made the following observations about the effectiveness of licensee problem
identification:
II
For the existence of water inside vaults associated with cables within the scope
of 10 CFR 50.65, the licensee had not initiated a condition report. This issue was
entered into the corrective action program as CR-HQN-2011-0491.
- 5 -
Enclosure
Standby Service Water
Emergency 480 Volts AC
Normal Service Water
Division 1 and Division 2 Diesel Generators
125 Volts DC
Turbine Plant Component Cooling
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Normal 128 kVolts AC
120 VAC
Instrument Air
Diesel Room Ventilation
Division 3 Diesel
Division 1 and Division 2 4160 Volts AC
Auxiliary Building Ventilation
Service Water Cooling
Fire Protection Water
230 KV Power
Division 3 4160 Volts AC
Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Instrumentation
To assess whether selected problems had been effectively addressed, the team also
expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving Gould J1 0 electrical
relays and recirculation pump seal leakage.
To assess whether problems had been identified and entered into the corrective action
program, the team conducted a walkdown of Station Service Water and Emergency
Diesel Generator systems.
b.
Assessments
1.
Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification
The team concluded that, generally, the licensee had correctly identified deficiencies that
were conditions adverse to quality and had entered those conditions into their corrective
action program in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance
and NRC requirements. The team determined that the licensee had identified problems
at a low threshold. Also, the team found no indication of processes where problems may
be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. However, the team
made the following observations about the effectiveness of licensee problem
identification:
II
For the existence of water inside vaults associated with cables within the scope
of 10 CFR 50.65, the licensee had not initiated a condition report. This issue was
entered into the corrective action program as CR-HQN-2011-0491.
- 5 -
Enclosure
When the licensee conducts "tabletop" training sessions before they conduct
emergency drills, and then addresses performance-related weaknesses or issues
through coaching and mentoring without initiating corresponding condition
reports, they miss opportunities to use their corrective action program to identify
possible trends in those weaknesses and issues, and to develop possible
improvements in associated training programs to address those trends. This
issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-040S1.
e
In the same sample of ten measuring and test equipment nonconformance
reports, the inspectors found five reports for which the licensee had not
completed an independent review, even though those reports involved
circumstances that, according to licensee procedures, warranted an independent
review. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as
"
Prior to this inspection, the licensee had not identified that instructions in
Procedure ADM-0029, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) and
the Tool Room Process," Step 10.2.1, for dispositioning measuring and test
equipment nonconformance reports were not consistent with similar instructions
in Step 5.7.4 [4] of fleet Procedure EN-MA-105, "Control of Measuring and Test
Equipment (M&TE)." This issue was entered into the corrective action program
as CR-RBS-2011-4055.
"
For six status items in the radiation protection logs that warranted initiation of a
condition report according to licensee procedures, the licensee had not initiated
corresponding condition reports. This issue was entered into the corrective
action program as CR-RBS-2011-03961.
2.
Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
The licensee generally had performed adequate assessments of conditions adverse to
quality during this assessment period. The team noted that the immediate and prompt
operability assessments reviewed had been completed in a timely manner, except as
noted below. For this assessment, the team made the following related observations:
"
Although the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-04526 warranted
classification as a Category A condition for which a root cause evaluation would
be performed, the licensee classified that condition in Category B and completed
an apparent-cause evaluation. This condition report did not include the
licensee's basis for claSSifying that condition in Category B rather than
Category A. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as
"
For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05224, the leak rate determined by
the licensee's apparent cause evaluation (a "pencil-sized stream") vilas not
consistent with the leak rate that had been used in the jicensee's reportability
evaluation (30 drops/minute). According to the licensee's procedures, the
licensee should have initiated a new condition report to document that new
- 6 -
Enclosure
When the licensee conducts "tabletop" training sessions before they conduct
emergency drills, and then addresses performance-related weaknesses or issues
through coaching and mentoring without initiating corresponding condition
reports, they miss opportunities to use their corrective action program to identify
possible trends in those weaknesses and issues, and to develop possible
improvements in associated training programs to address those trends. This
issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-040S1.
e
In the same sample of ten measuring and test equipment nonconformance
reports, the inspectors found five reports for which the licensee had not
completed an independent review, even though those reports involved
circumstances that, according to licensee procedures, warranted an independent
review. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as
"
Prior to this inspection, the licensee had not identified that instructions in
Procedure ADM-0029, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) and
the Tool Room Process," Step 10.2.1, for dispositioning measuring and test
equipment nonconformance reports were not consistent with similar instructions
in Step 5.7.4 [4] of fleet Procedure EN-MA-105, "Control of Measuring and Test
Equipment (M&TE)." This issue was entered into the corrective action program
as CR-RBS-2011-4055.
"
For six status items in the radiation protection logs that warranted initiation of a
condition report according to licensee procedures, the licensee had not initiated
corresponding condition reports. This issue was entered into the corrective
action program as CR-RBS-2011-03961.
2.
Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
The licensee generally had performed adequate assessments of conditions adverse to
quality during this assessment period. The team noted that the immediate and prompt
operability assessments reviewed had been completed in a timely manner, except as
noted below. For this assessment, the team made the following related observations:
"
Although the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-04526 warranted
classification as a Category A condition for which a root cause evaluation would
be performed, the licensee classified that condition in Category B and completed
an apparent-cause evaluation. This condition report did not include the
licensee's basis for claSSifying that condition in Category B rather than
Category A. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as
"
For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05224, the leak rate determined by
the licensee's apparent cause evaluation (a "pencil-sized stream") vilas not
consistent with the leak rate that had been used in the jicensee's reportability
evaluation (30 drops/minute). According to the licensee's procedures, the
licensee should have initiated a new condition report to document that new
- 6 -
Enclosure
information had made the reportability evaluation questionable. However, the
licensee did not initiate that condition report. This issue was entered into the
corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03834.
..
For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05088 (a heater in a ventilation
system not delivering an adequate amount of power), the licensee's reportability
evaluation was incomplete, in that the evaluation had concluded that oscillations
in heater power were normal, but had failed to consider the low-power condition
of the heater. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that the low-power condition
had not been reportable. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective
action program as CR-RBS-2011-03786.
..
The operability evaluation in CR-RBS-201 0-01717 was incomplete, in that the
licensee had addressed a small oil leak in the reactor core isolation cooling pump
by determining that the leak rate with the pump not running was low enough that
pump operability would not have been affected, but had not evaluated the leak
rate with the pump operating. A subsequent evaluation determined that the leak
rate with the pump operating did not affect operability of the pump. This issue
was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as
CR-RBS-20 11-3854.
..
According to licensee procedures, the condition in CR-RBS-2009-03080
(repetitive maintenance items and adverse trends in nuisance alarms from the
fire protection computer) warranted classification as a Category C condition,
which would have required action to correct the condition. However, the licensee
classified the condition as Category 0, which required only trending the condition
with no action to correct it. This condition report did not include the licensee's
basis for classifying that condition in Category 0 rather than Category C. This
issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-201104131.
For the condition described in CR-RBS-2008-04711 (inadvertent distribution of
radioactive materials foilowing automatic initiation of the standby-gas treatment
system), the licensee's evaluation had been incomplete, in that the licensee had
failed to consider a previous evaluation that had determined that installing sock
filters on certain drain lines would not be acceptable during surveillance testing.
As a result, the corrective actions developed in CR-RBS-2008-04711 had
included installing sock filters on those drain lines to prevent further
contamination, and those sock filters had remained on the drain lines during two
recent surveillance tests. The licensee's subsequent evaluation determined that
installation of the sock filters had not invalidated the surveillance test results.
This issue was entered into the corrective action program as
3.
Assessment -- Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program
Overall. the team concluded that the licensee had generally deve!oped appropriate
corrective actions to address piOblems. However, the team identified the following two
examples of conditions adverse to quality where the licensee had failed to identify or
take appropriate corrective action:
- 7 -
Enclosure
information had made the reportability evaluation questionable. However, the
licensee did not initiate that condition report. This issue was entered into the
corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03834.
..
For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05088 (a heater in a ventilation
system not delivering an adequate amount of power), the licensee's reportability
evaluation was incomplete, in that the evaluation had concluded that oscillations
in heater power were normal, but had failed to consider the low-power condition
of the heater. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that the low-power condition
had not been reportable. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective
action program as CR-RBS-2011-03786.
..
The operability evaluation in CR-RBS-201 0-01717 was incomplete, in that the
licensee had addressed a small oil leak in the reactor core isolation cooling pump
by determining that the leak rate with the pump not running was low enough that
pump operability would not have been affected, but had not evaluated the leak
rate with the pump operating. A subsequent evaluation determined that the leak
rate with the pump operating did not affect operability of the pump. This issue
was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as
CR-RBS-20 11-3854.
..
According to licensee procedures, the condition in CR-RBS-2009-03080
(repetitive maintenance items and adverse trends in nuisance alarms from the
fire protection computer) warranted classification as a Category C condition,
which would have required action to correct the condition. However, the licensee
classified the condition as Category 0, which required only trending the condition
with no action to correct it. This condition report did not include the licensee's
basis for classifying that condition in Category 0 rather than Category C. This
issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-201104131.
For the condition described in CR-RBS-2008-04711 (inadvertent distribution of
radioactive materials foilowing automatic initiation of the standby-gas treatment
system), the licensee's evaluation had been incomplete, in that the licensee had
failed to consider a previous evaluation that had determined that installing sock
filters on certain drain lines would not be acceptable during surveillance testing.
As a result, the corrective actions developed in CR-RBS-2008-04711 had
included installing sock filters on those drain lines to prevent further
contamination, and those sock filters had remained on the drain lines during two
recent surveillance tests. The licensee's subsequent evaluation determined that
installation of the sock filters had not invalidated the surveillance test results.
This issue was entered into the corrective action program as
3.
Assessment -- Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program
Overall. the team concluded that the licensee had generally deve!oped appropriate
corrective actions to address piOblems. However, the team identified the following two
examples of conditions adverse to quality where the licensee had failed to identify or
take appropriate corrective action:
- 7 -
Enclosure
Condition report CR-RBS-2010-02476 identified that corrective actions
associated with CR-RBS-201 0-01587 had been delayed because they had
incorrectly been closed to a global preventive maintenance task that was later
closed. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as
to
The licensee developed CR-RBS-2010-02362 corrective action #14 to implement
a vendor recommendation to install capacitors to reduce "chattering" of certain
relays in circuits associated with oil heaters of the control building chillers, and
thereby improve the reliability of those relays. However, the licensee
inappropriately closed that corrective action to a system health report, and, as a
result, did not implement that recommendation. This issue was entered into the
corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04208 .
. 2
Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a.
Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience,
including reviewing the governing procedure and self assessments. The team reviewed
a sample operating experience notifications that had been issued during the assessment
period to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notifications for
relevance to the facility. The team then examined whether the licensee had entered
those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to address the
issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action
documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating
experience.
b.
Assessment
Overall, the team determined that the iicensee was adequately evaluating industry
operating experience for relevance to the facility, based on reviewing a sample size of
17 industry operating experience notifications. The team concluded that the licensee
was evaluating industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent
cause evaluations. Both internal and external operating experience were being
incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs .
. 3
Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample size of 83 licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and
audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and
effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the
effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self- and
third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the
performance improvement group related to licensee performance. The specific self-
assessment documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- 8 -
Enclosure
Condition report CR-RBS-2010-02476 identified that corrective actions
associated with CR-RBS-201 0-01587 had been delayed because they had
incorrectly been closed to a global preventive maintenance task that was later
closed. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as
to
The licensee developed CR-RBS-2010-02362 corrective action #14 to implement
a vendor recommendation to install capacitors to reduce "chattering" of certain
relays in circuits associated with oil heaters of the control building chillers, and
thereby improve the reliability of those relays. However, the licensee
inappropriately closed that corrective action to a system health report, and, as a
result, did not implement that recommendation. This issue was entered into the
corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04208 .
. 2
Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a.
Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience,
including reviewing the governing procedure and self assessments. The team reviewed
a sample operating experience notifications that had been issued during the assessment
period to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notifications for
relevance to the facility. The team then examined whether the licensee had entered
those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to address the
issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action
documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating
experience.
b.
Assessment
Overall, the team determined that the iicensee was adequately evaluating industry
operating experience for relevance to the facility, based on reviewing a sample size of
17 industry operating experience notifications. The team concluded that the licensee
was evaluating industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent
cause evaluations. Both internal and external operating experience were being
incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs .
. 3
Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample size of 83 licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and
audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and
effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the
effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self- and
third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the
performance improvement group related to licensee performance. The specific self-
assessment documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- 8 -
Enclosure
b.
Assessment
The team concluded that the licensee had an adequate self-assessment process .
. 4
Assessment of Safety~Conscious Work Environment
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspection team conducted informal individual interviews with 23 individuals. The
interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor,
staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether
conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscious work
environment at the River Bend Station.
b.
Assessment
Because the team encountered no indication of an issue related to the safety conscious
work environment during their interviews with site personnel, the team concluded that
the licensee had maintained a safety conscious work environment.
.5
Specific Issues identified During this Inspection
Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays
Introduction. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure
to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould J-series relays.
Description. On October 9,2008, River Bend Station personnel initiated
CR-RBS-2008-05915 to document that valve SWP-MOV4B, standby service water to
drywell unit coolers, had failed in the open position. That valve supplies service water to
the drywell unit coolers and has a safety function to close during a loss-of-coolant
accident. A lower-tier apparent-cause evaluation performed by the licensee had
determined that the valve had failed due to a coil failure for relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X.
The licensee had also determined that the relay had failed because it had been in
service beyond its expected lifetime. The River Bend preventive maintenance template
for Gould J10 control relays had established a replacement interval based on not
exceeding the expect service life for the given service conditions. (For relays the
licensee had classified as high-critical, high-duty-cycle, they had established a 21-year
replacement period.) To address extent-of-condition concerns, the licensee had
implemented a replacement project for Gould relays deSignated as high-duty-cycle, high-
critical. Corrective Action 7 to CR-RBS-2008-05915 had established work orders for
127 relays classified as high-duty-cycle, high-critical. Based on work orders that had
been generated, the licensee closed CR-RBS-2008-05915 on November 26, 2008. By
July 2009, the licensee had completed work to replace the relays they had classified as
high-duty-cyc1e, high-cf!t!caL
- 9 -
Enclosure
b.
Assessment
The team concluded that the licensee had an adequate self-assessment process .
. 4
Assessment of Safety~Conscious Work Environment
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspection team conducted informal individual interviews with 23 individuals. The
interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor,
staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether
conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscious work
environment at the River Bend Station.
b.
Assessment
Because the team encountered no indication of an issue related to the safety conscious
work environment during their interviews with site personnel, the team concluded that
the licensee had maintained a safety conscious work environment.
.5
Specific Issues identified During this Inspection
Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays
Introduction. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure
to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould J-series relays.
Description. On October 9,2008, River Bend Station personnel initiated
CR-RBS-2008-05915 to document that valve SWP-MOV4B, standby service water to
drywell unit coolers, had failed in the open position. That valve supplies service water to
the drywell unit coolers and has a safety function to close during a loss-of-coolant
accident. A lower-tier apparent-cause evaluation performed by the licensee had
determined that the valve had failed due to a coil failure for relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X.
The licensee had also determined that the relay had failed because it had been in
service beyond its expected lifetime. The River Bend preventive maintenance template
for Gould J10 control relays had established a replacement interval based on not
exceeding the expect service life for the given service conditions. (For relays the
licensee had classified as high-critical, high-duty-cycle, they had established a 21-year
replacement period.) To address extent-of-condition concerns, the licensee had
implemented a replacement project for Gould relays deSignated as high-duty-cycle, high-
critical. Corrective Action 7 to CR-RBS-2008-05915 had established work orders for
127 relays classified as high-duty-cycle, high-critical. Based on work orders that had
been generated, the licensee closed CR-RBS-2008-05915 on November 26, 2008. By
July 2009, the licensee had completed work to replace the relays they had classified as
high-duty-cyc1e, high-cf!t!caL
- 9 -
Enclosure
On January 16, 2011, valve SWP-MOV55B failed closed. That valve is the Division 2
standby service water return valve to the cooling tower inlet The licensee initiated
CR-RBS-2011-00393 to document this issue, During troubleshooting, the licensee
found that the valve's control power fuses had failed because the Gould J10 control
relay identified as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1 had shorted out. During an equipment
performance evaluation, the licensee discovered that during a preventive maintenance
optimization program in 2008, SWP-MOV55B had been misclassified as a non-critical
component instead of a high-critical component. (According to licensee
Procedure EN-DC 153, "Preventive Maintenance Component Classification," the relay
should have been classified as high-critical and high-duty-cycie,) Consequently.
because the relay had been classified as non-critical, the licensee had not established a
recurring preventive maintenance task to periodically replace the relay, The inspectors
discovered that the subject relay had been in service for 26 years, well beyond its
expected lifetime of 21 years, The inspectors also determined that because this relay
had been misclassified, it had not been identified in the scope of the corrective actions
identified in CR-RBS-2008-05915. Consequently, no corrective actions had been
implemented to address service beyond its expected life, and the component had been
allowed to run to failure.
As corrective action to address the misclassification of components within the preventive
maintenance optimization system, the licensee initiated condition
report CR-RBS-201 0-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive maintenance
are performed on high-critical components.
Analysis, The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate
corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, high-duty-cycle
Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X. This performance deficiency
was determined to be more than minor and was therefore a finding because it impacted
the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that this
performance deficiency allowed a coil failure that rendered valve SWP-MOV4B
inoperable. The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609,04, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening
and Characterization of Findings," to determine that this finding has very-low safety
significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed
not to result in a loss of operability. does not represent a loss of system safety function,
does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical
specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk significant due
to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event The inspectors determined that
the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's misclassification of the failed relay
within the preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008. The inspectors
considered that the licensee's performance in that program was not reflective of current
licensee performance. so no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding.
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions,"
requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to
quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, on November 26,
2008, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality, in that the plant
configuration that allowed relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X to run to failure was a condition
- 10 -
Enclosure
On January 16, 2011, valve SWP-MOV55B failed closed. That valve is the Division 2
standby service water return valve to the cooling tower inlet The licensee initiated
CR-RBS-2011-00393 to document this issue, During troubleshooting, the licensee
found that the valve's control power fuses had failed because the Gould J10 control
relay identified as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1 had shorted out. During an equipment
performance evaluation, the licensee discovered that during a preventive maintenance
optimization program in 2008, SWP-MOV55B had been misclassified as a non-critical
component instead of a high-critical component. (According to licensee
Procedure EN-DC 153, "Preventive Maintenance Component Classification," the relay
should have been classified as high-critical and high-duty-cycie,) Consequently.
because the relay had been classified as non-critical, the licensee had not established a
recurring preventive maintenance task to periodically replace the relay, The inspectors
discovered that the subject relay had been in service for 26 years, well beyond its
expected lifetime of 21 years, The inspectors also determined that because this relay
had been misclassified, it had not been identified in the scope of the corrective actions
identified in CR-RBS-2008-05915. Consequently, no corrective actions had been
implemented to address service beyond its expected life, and the component had been
allowed to run to failure.
As corrective action to address the misclassification of components within the preventive
maintenance optimization system, the licensee initiated condition
report CR-RBS-201 0-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive maintenance
are performed on high-critical components.
Analysis, The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate
corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, high-duty-cycle
Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X. This performance deficiency
was determined to be more than minor and was therefore a finding because it impacted
the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that this
performance deficiency allowed a coil failure that rendered valve SWP-MOV4B
inoperable. The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609,04, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening
and Characterization of Findings," to determine that this finding has very-low safety
significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed
not to result in a loss of operability. does not represent a loss of system safety function,
does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical
specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk significant due
to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event The inspectors determined that
the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's misclassification of the failed relay
within the preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008. The inspectors
considered that the licensee's performance in that program was not reflective of current
licensee performance. so no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding.
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions,"
requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to
quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, on November 26,
2008, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality, in that the plant
configuration that allowed relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X to run to failure was a condition
- 10 -
Enclosure
adverse to quality, and the licensee failed to identify and correct that condition.
Consequently, on January 16, 2011, the subject relay failed in service and rendered
valve SWP-MOV4B inoperable. Because this finding had very low safety significance,
and because the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as
CR-RBS-2011-04064, this finding is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance
with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2011006-01, "Failure to
Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays."
40A6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On May 12, 2011, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric Olson (the site Vice
President) and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and
is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a noncited violation.
Failure to Incorporate Key Assumptions into an Abnormal Operating Procedure
The licensee identified a non cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1,
"Procedures," for their failure to incorporate into Procedure AOP-50, "Station Blackout,"
instructions to open Division I and II equipment room doors within 30 minutes of a station
blackout event. The corresponding assumption is used in calculations that determine
the licensee's coping during a station blackout. This violation has Green risk
significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed
not to result in a loss of operability, does not represent a loss of system safety function,
does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical
specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk-significant due
to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. In CR-2009-05598 the licensee
documented the change in AOP-50 that requires the doors to be opened within
30 minutes.
- 11 -
Enclosure
adverse to quality, and the licensee failed to identify and correct that condition.
Consequently, on January 16, 2011, the subject relay failed in service and rendered
valve SWP-MOV4B inoperable. Because this finding had very low safety significance,
and because the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as
CR-RBS-2011-04064, this finding is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance
with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2011006-01, "Failure to
Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays."
40A6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On May 12, 2011, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric Olson (the site Vice
President) and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and
is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a noncited violation.
Failure to Incorporate Key Assumptions into an Abnormal Operating Procedure
The licensee identified a non cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1,
"Procedures," for their failure to incorporate into Procedure AOP-50, "Station Blackout,"
instructions to open Division I and II equipment room doors within 30 minutes of a station
blackout event. The corresponding assumption is used in calculations that determine
the licensee's coping during a station blackout. This violation has Green risk
significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed
not to result in a loss of operability, does not represent a loss of system safety function,
does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical
specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk-significant due
to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. In CR-2009-05598 the licensee
documented the change in AOP-50 that requires the doors to be opened within
30 minutes.
- 11 -
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
T Bordelon, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments
F. Hurst, Emergency Plan Instructor
K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist
M. Jurey, Quality Assurance Auditor
D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
M. Mitchell, Engineer
S. Phillips, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety & Assurance
J. Schlesinger, Engineer
D. Vines, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments
D. Wells, Employee Concerns Program Coordinator
NRC Personnel
P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Planning Inspector
V. Gaddy, Branch Chief
G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector
H. Walker, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed 05000458/2011006-01 NCV
Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of
Gould J-series Relays (Section 40A2.5)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
CALCULATIONS
NUMBER
E-143
E-144
TITLE
Standby Battery "ENB-SAT01A" Duty Cycle, Current
Profile and Size Verification
1=t-.11:l I:l A T('\\11:l n ** t" ("", ... 1", (" ** ~~~~+ Cl~",,"';J~ ~~,.J C':_~
....... .. '-'-.....,.1 "t \\J t...., L...o"Yf.Y
......, , ..... 1\\,;;) ,"",ut J ~lll ,
I Ville; Cit fU ufLC
Verification
- 1 -
REVISION
10
'"
u
Attachment A
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
T Bordelon, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments
F. Hurst, Emergency Plan Instructor
K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist
M. Jurey, Quality Assurance Auditor
D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
M. Mitchell, Engineer
S. Phillips, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety & Assurance
J. Schlesinger, Engineer
D. Vines, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments
D. Wells, Employee Concerns Program Coordinator
NRC Personnel
P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Planning Inspector
V. Gaddy, Branch Chief
G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector
H. Walker, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed 05000458/2011006-01 NCV
Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of
Gould J-series Relays (Section 40A2.5)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
CALCULATIONS
NUMBER
E-143
E-144
TITLE
Standby Battery "ENB-SAT01A" Duty Cycle, Current
Profile and Size Verification
1=t-.11:l I:l A T('\\11:l n ** t" ("", ... 1", (" ** ~~~~+ Cl~",,"';J~ ~~,.J C':_~
....... .. '-'-.....,.1 "t \\J t...., L...o"Yf.Y
......, , ..... 1\\,;;) ,"",ut J ~lll ,
I Ville; Cit fU ufLC
Verification
- 1 -
REVISION
10
'"
u
Attachment A
G13.18.3.6*009
Division III 125 VDC Battery Sizing, Load
Circuit
3
Voltage Drop, Short Circuit, Charger Verification and
Cable Verification
G13.18.3.6*021
DC System Analysis, Methodology & Scenario
1
Development
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISIONS
ADM-0099
Performance Improvement Using Fundamentals
5
Control of Engineering Documents
5
preventive maintenance component classification
5
Cable Reliability Program
1
EN-FAP-U-003
Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process
2
EN-FAP-OP-OO6
Operator Aggregate Impact lndex Performance
0
Indicator
Executive Review Board Process
2
EN-Ll-102
Corrective Action Process
1,2,&16
EN-Ll-108
Event Notification And Reporting
4
EN-U-118
Root Cause Analysis Process
13
EN-U-118-06
Common Cause Analysis (CCA)
1
EN-L1-119
Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process
11
EN-Ll-119-0 1
Equipment Failure Evaluation
0
Control of Supplemental Personnel
12
New to Nuclear Workforce Orientation
0&2
Operability Determination Process
5
Conduct of Operations
10
Site Executive Protocol Group
ENS-TQ-110
Emergency Preparedness Training Program
15
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
5
no.~l"'ri,...+i,...n
'--'.,,:H..IlltJI.IVf t
-2-
Attachment A
G13.18.3.6*009
Division III 125 VDC Battery Sizing, Load
Circuit
3
Voltage Drop, Short Circuit, Charger Verification and
Cable Verification
G13.18.3.6*021
DC System Analysis, Methodology & Scenario
1
Development
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISIONS
ADM-0099
Performance Improvement Using Fundamentals
5
Control of Engineering Documents
5
preventive maintenance component classification
5
Cable Reliability Program
1
EN-FAP-U-003
Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process
2
EN-FAP-OP-OO6
Operator Aggregate Impact lndex Performance
0
Indicator
Executive Review Board Process
2
EN-Ll-102
Corrective Action Process
1,2,&16
EN-Ll-108
Event Notification And Reporting
4
EN-U-118
Root Cause Analysis Process
13
EN-U-118-06
Common Cause Analysis (CCA)
1
EN-L1-119
Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process
11
EN-Ll-119-0 1
Equipment Failure Evaluation
0
Control of Supplemental Personnel
12
New to Nuclear Workforce Orientation
0&2
Operability Determination Process
5
Conduct of Operations
10
Site Executive Protocol Group
ENS-TQ-110
Emergency Preparedness Training Program
15
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
5
no.~l"'ri,...+i,...n
'--'.,,:H..IlltJI.IVf t
-2-
Attachment A
Post Maintenance Testing
3
Log Report - Auxiliary, Reactor and Fuel Buildings
46
RLEC-EP-115
Emergency Response Organization Tabletop Training
13
STP-309-0601
Division I ECCS Test
36
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-HON-2009-00738
CR-HON-2009-01184
CR-HON-2010-00013
CR-HON-2010-00067
CR-HON-2010-00386
CR-RBS-2005-0 1141
CR-RBS-2007 -01706
CR-RBS-2007 -02102
CR-RBS-2007 -03092
CR-RBS-2007 -03243
CR-RBS-2007 -04505
CR-RBS-2007 -04669
CR-RBS-2007 -04698
CR-RBS-2007 -05548
C R-RBS-2008-03634
CR -RBS-2009-03233
CR-RBS-2009-037 4 7
C R -RBS-2009-04059
- 3 -
Attachment A
Post Maintenance Testing
3
Log Report - Auxiliary, Reactor and Fuel Buildings
46
RLEC-EP-115
Emergency Response Organization Tabletop Training
13
STP-309-0601
Division I ECCS Test
36
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-HON-2009-00738
CR-HON-2009-01184
CR-HON-2010-00013
CR-HON-2010-00067
CR-HON-2010-00386
CR-RBS-2005-0 1141
CR-RBS-2007 -01706
CR-RBS-2007 -02102
CR-RBS-2007 -03092
CR-RBS-2007 -03243
CR-RBS-2007 -04505
CR-RBS-2007 -04669
CR-RBS-2007 -04698
CR-RBS-2007 -05548
C R-RBS-2008-03634
CR -RBS-2009-03233
CR-RBS-2009-037 4 7
C R -RBS-2009-04059
- 3 -
Attachment A
CR -RBS-2009-06031
CR-RBS-201 0-001 01
CR-RBS-20i 0-0"1 i 48
CR-RBS-20iO-01193
- 4-
Attachment A
CR -RBS-2009-06031
CR-RBS-201 0-001 01
CR-RBS-20i 0-0"1 i 48
CR-RBS-20iO-01193
- 4-
Attachment A
CR-RBS-20i 0-01846
CR-RBS-20 10-01850
CR-RBS-20 10-02362
CR-RBS-201 0-02475
CR-RBS-201 0-02747
CR-RBS-201 0-03104
CR-RBS-201 0-03744
CR-RBS-201 0-04174
CR-RBS-201 0-04274
CR-RBS-201 0-04974
CR-RBS-201 0-051 05
CR-RBS-20 1 0-05895
CR-RBS-20i 1-00147
- 5-
Attachment A
CR-RBS-20i 0-01846
CR-RBS-20 10-01850
CR-RBS-20 10-02362
CR-RBS-201 0-02475
CR-RBS-201 0-02747
CR-RBS-201 0-03104
CR-RBS-201 0-03744
CR-RBS-201 0-04174
CR-RBS-201 0-04274
CR-RBS-201 0-04974
CR-RBS-201 0-051 05
CR-RBS-20 1 0-05895
CR-RBS-20i 1-00147
- 5-
Attachment A
CR-RBS-2011-02S25
ASSESSMENTS
LO-RLO-2008-00116
LO-RLO-2009-00041
LO-RLO-2009-00042
LO-RLO-2009-00060
LO-RLO-2009-00082
LO-RLO-2009-00102
LO-RLO-2009-00112
LO-RLO-2009-0 103
LO-RLO-2009-0124
LO-RLO-2009-0174
LO-RLO-2010-00020
LO-RLO-2010-00021
LO-RLO-2010-00035
LO-RLO-2010-0014
LO-RLO-2010-0016
LO-RLO-2010-0035
LO-RLO-2010-0041
LO-RLO-RBS-2009-139
LO-RLO-RBS-2009-140
WORK ORDERS
071809
164528
164529
166223
179835
181114
192284
194016
198181
200986
201677
209393
209974
209975
211306
211412
213965
218725
221072
226485
223065
229594
229595
234052
234056
234057
234610
235805
235807
235808
238291
244247
249847
254023
258980
263705
266777
267260
267260
267262
267262
267341
268782
270028
271559
272015
- 6 -
Attachment A
CR-RBS-2011-02S25
ASSESSMENTS
LO-RLO-2008-00116
LO-RLO-2009-00041
LO-RLO-2009-00042
LO-RLO-2009-00060
LO-RLO-2009-00082
LO-RLO-2009-00102
LO-RLO-2009-00112
LO-RLO-2009-0 103
LO-RLO-2009-0124
LO-RLO-2009-0174
LO-RLO-2010-00020
LO-RLO-2010-00021
LO-RLO-2010-00035
LO-RLO-2010-0014
LO-RLO-2010-0016
LO-RLO-2010-0035
LO-RLO-2010-0041
LO-RLO-RBS-2009-139
LO-RLO-RBS-2009-140
WORK ORDERS
071809
164528
164529
166223
179835
181114
192284
194016
198181
200986
201677
209393
209974
209975
211306
211412
213965
218725
221072
226485
223065
229594
229595
234052
234056
234057
234610
235805
235807
235808
238291
244247
249847
254023
258980
263705
266777
267260
267260
267262
267262
267341
268782
270028
271559
272015
- 6 -
Attachment A
WORK REQUESTS
019324
193739
225078
229253
243412
172738
193741
226399
230256
187156
223193
227375
232119
191107
225041
227381
232343
EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PLANS
07-0493
07-1606
07-4922
08-0130QA
TRENDINGfTRACKING REPORTS
ON-SITE REVIEW COMMITTEE TRACKING DOCUMENTS
AUDIT REPORTS
NUMBER
QA-19-2010-RBS-1
QA-01-2009-RBS-1
QA-01-2010-RBS-1
QA-1 0-201 O-RBS-1
QA-14/15-2009-RBS-1
QA-12/18-2009-RBS-1
QA-07-2010-RBS-1
QA-3-2009-RBS-1
QS-2009-RBS-018
TITLE
DATES
Training
March 31,2010
Fitness for Duty/Personnel Access Data
August 7,2009
System
Fitness for Duty/Access Authorization
August 20,2010
Maintenance
August 20,2010
Combined Radiation Protection and
December 17,2009
Radwaste
Combined Operations and Technical
August 3,2009
Specifications
April 12 - May 24,2010
Corrective Action Program
June 26,2009
Follow-Up Surveillance of the Yellow
August 18-21, 2009
Problem Identification and Resolution
(PI&R) Rating in the First Quarter 2009
Oversight Report
- 7 -
Attachment A
WORK REQUESTS
019324
193739
225078
229253
243412
172738
193741
226399
230256
187156
223193
227375
232119
191107
225041
227381
232343
EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PLANS
07-0493
07-1606
07-4922
08-0130QA
TRENDINGfTRACKING REPORTS
ON-SITE REVIEW COMMITTEE TRACKING DOCUMENTS
AUDIT REPORTS
NUMBER
QA-19-2010-RBS-1
QA-01-2009-RBS-1
QA-01-2010-RBS-1
QA-1 0-201 O-RBS-1
QA-14/15-2009-RBS-1
QA-12/18-2009-RBS-1
QA-07-2010-RBS-1
QA-3-2009-RBS-1
QS-2009-RBS-018
TITLE
DATES
Training
March 31,2010
Fitness for Duty/Personnel Access Data
August 7,2009
System
Fitness for Duty/Access Authorization
August 20,2010
Maintenance
August 20,2010
Combined Radiation Protection and
December 17,2009
Radwaste
Combined Operations and Technical
August 3,2009
Specifications
April 12 - May 24,2010
Corrective Action Program
June 26,2009
Follow-Up Surveillance of the Yellow
August 18-21, 2009
Problem Identification and Resolution
(PI&R) Rating in the First Quarter 2009
Oversight Report
- 7 -
Attachment A
QS-2009-RBS-022
Followup Surveillance of the 2009
Corrective Action Program Audit
October 21-29,2009
ENGINEERING CHANGES
NUMBER
SIMULATOR DISCREPANCY REPORTS
09-0011
09-0020
10-0094
SYSTEM HEALTH REPORTS
10-0114
Residual Heat Removal System, 4th Quarter 2010
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 4th Quarter 2010
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 1st Quarter 2011
High Pressure Core Spray, 151 Quarter 2011
Standby Liquid Control, 4th Quarter 2010
230KV Electrical Distribution, 4th Quarter 2010
Standby Service Water, 4th Quarter 2010
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
TITLE
ER-RB-2005-0342-000, Functional Impairment of Auxiliary Building
Floor Drains
File No. RBF-07-0070, Response to Generic Letter 2007-01 River Bend
Station - Unit 1 Docket Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47
File No. G.1.495, G9.5, G9.33.4, River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket
Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47 Updated Response to Generic
Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related
Equipment"
Preventative Maintenance Basis Temp!ate, EN-Relay - Control
- 8 -
REVISION
o
o
o
o
09-0013
REVISION/DATE
o
May 3,2007
October 21, 1998
3
Attachment A
QS-2009-RBS-022
Followup Surveillance of the 2009
Corrective Action Program Audit
October 21-29,2009
ENGINEERING CHANGES
NUMBER
SIMULATOR DISCREPANCY REPORTS
09-0011
09-0020
10-0094
SYSTEM HEALTH REPORTS
10-0114
Residual Heat Removal System, 4th Quarter 2010
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 4th Quarter 2010
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 1st Quarter 2011
High Pressure Core Spray, 151 Quarter 2011
Standby Liquid Control, 4th Quarter 2010
230KV Electrical Distribution, 4th Quarter 2010
Standby Service Water, 4th Quarter 2010
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
TITLE
ER-RB-2005-0342-000, Functional Impairment of Auxiliary Building
Floor Drains
File No. RBF-07-0070, Response to Generic Letter 2007-01 River Bend
Station - Unit 1 Docket Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47
File No. G.1.495, G9.5, G9.33.4, River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket
Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47 Updated Response to Generic
Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related
Equipment"
Preventative Maintenance Basis Temp!ate, EN-Relay - Control
- 8 -
REVISION
o
o
o
o
09-0013
REVISION/DATE
o
May 3,2007
October 21, 1998
3
Attachment A
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN- Relay - Protective
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN- Relay - Timing
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, RBS Protective Relay - Lock
Out Relay
Series
3
3
o
4
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, Control Relay - Gould "J"
2
Series
River Bend Station Quarterly Trend Report
3rd Quarter 2010
MAI-366755, E12-PC002B
December 15, 2002
Position Paper, Fleet Position Paper for Battery Cell Surveillance
September 29, 2009
Requirements for Specific Gravity
RCP-NLOI-COURSE PLAN, initial Non-Licensed Operator Course Pian
2
RCTB-HZM-Notify, Hazardous Material Shipping Emergency Notification
0
TEAR-RBS-2009-0797, Evaluate CR-RBS-2009-03233 and CR-RBS-
April 20, 2011
2009-03208 for Training Implications
TEAR-RBS-2009-0804, Add CR-RBS-2009-03292 to Fuel Handler
April 20, 2011
Training
TEAR-RBS-2009-0940, Add CR-RBS-2009-03218 (Accidental Start of
SWC-P1 B) to Applicable Training Material as OE
TEAR-RBS-2009-1230, Develop Initial and Reoccurring Training for the
Operations Shift Managers and Control Room Supervisors for
Responsibilities As Defined in 49CFR Subpart I for 24 Hour Emergency
Contact Information Associated With Radioactive Material Shipping
Response
April 20, 2011
April 28, 2011
MEASURING & TEST EQUIPMENT (M&TE) NON-CONFORMANCE NOTIFICATIONS
M&TE ID No. AVC-001A1
M&TE ID No. BMT-015A
M&TE ID No. DIM-388A
M&TE ID No. HPM-110A
M&TE ID No. KTC-088A
M&TE ID No. LRM-011A
M&TE !D No. MOV-191A
M&TE ID No. ROA-034A
TITLE
- 9 -
REVISION/DATE
January 20, 2011
February 6, 2011
January 26, 2011
March 7, 2011
November 22, 2010
April 11, 2011
February 10, 2011
December 2,2010
Attachment A
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN- Relay - Protective
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN- Relay - Timing
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, RBS Protective Relay - Lock
Out Relay
Series
3
3
o
4
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, Control Relay - Gould "J"
2
Series
River Bend Station Quarterly Trend Report
3rd Quarter 2010
MAI-366755, E12-PC002B
December 15, 2002
Position Paper, Fleet Position Paper for Battery Cell Surveillance
September 29, 2009
Requirements for Specific Gravity
RCP-NLOI-COURSE PLAN, initial Non-Licensed Operator Course Pian
2
RCTB-HZM-Notify, Hazardous Material Shipping Emergency Notification
0
TEAR-RBS-2009-0797, Evaluate CR-RBS-2009-03233 and CR-RBS-
April 20, 2011
2009-03208 for Training Implications
TEAR-RBS-2009-0804, Add CR-RBS-2009-03292 to Fuel Handler
April 20, 2011
Training
TEAR-RBS-2009-0940, Add CR-RBS-2009-03218 (Accidental Start of
SWC-P1 B) to Applicable Training Material as OE
TEAR-RBS-2009-1230, Develop Initial and Reoccurring Training for the
Operations Shift Managers and Control Room Supervisors for
Responsibilities As Defined in 49CFR Subpart I for 24 Hour Emergency
Contact Information Associated With Radioactive Material Shipping
Response
April 20, 2011
April 28, 2011
MEASURING & TEST EQUIPMENT (M&TE) NON-CONFORMANCE NOTIFICATIONS
M&TE ID No. AVC-001A1
M&TE ID No. BMT-015A
M&TE ID No. DIM-388A
M&TE ID No. HPM-110A
M&TE ID No. KTC-088A
M&TE ID No. LRM-011A
M&TE !D No. MOV-191A
M&TE ID No. ROA-034A
TITLE
- 9 -
REVISION/DATE
January 20, 2011
February 6, 2011
January 26, 2011
March 7, 2011
November 22, 2010
April 11, 2011
February 10, 2011
December 2,2010
Attachment A
M& TE
No. TQW-330A
M&TE ID No. WLS-519A
DRAWINGS
NUMBER
0222.111-000-017
0222. 111-000-043
February 14, 2011
April 11, 2011
Engineering Change Markup EC 27430 -
Reactor Recirculation Pump Assembly
Engineering Change Markup EC 19651 -
Assembly Drawing N-7500 Seal Cartridge 833-
PC001A and 833-PC-001 B
- 10-
REVISION
300
301
Attachment A
M& TE
No. TQW-330A
M&TE ID No. WLS-519A
DRAWINGS
NUMBER
0222.111-000-017
0222. 111-000-043
February 14, 2011
April 11, 2011
Engineering Change Markup EC 27430 -
Reactor Recirculation Pump Assembly
Engineering Change Markup EC 19651 -
Assembly Drawing N-7500 Seal Cartridge 833-
PC001A and 833-PC-001 B
- 10-
REVISION
300
301
Attachment A
Information Request - February 16, 2011
Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - River Bend Station
Inspection Report 2011-006
This inspection will cover the period from July 10, 2009, to May 13, 2011. All requested
information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. To the extent possible,
the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office
2007 format, and placed on a compact disc or a DVD. In addition, please load the documents
into IMS Certrec. Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel (2007) or a similar
sortable format.
A supplemental information request will likely be sent prior to April 25, 2011.
Please provide the following no later than March 21, 2011. These documents should cover the
time period from July 10, 2009, to March 1, 2011.
1.
Document Lists
Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the
document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status.
a.
Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions
adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
b.
Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to
quality that were opened or closed during the period
c.
Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or
downgraded in priority/significance during the period
d.
Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or
more smaller issues for the period
e.
Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or
operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety
system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
f.
Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee
Concerns Program (or equivalent)
g.
Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period
h.
Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not
complete at the end of the period
- 1 -
Attachment B
Information Request - February 16, 2011
Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - River Bend Station
Inspection Report 2011-006
This inspection will cover the period from July 10, 2009, to May 13, 2011. All requested
information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. To the extent possible,
the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office
2007 format, and placed on a compact disc or a DVD. In addition, please load the documents
into IMS Certrec. Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel (2007) or a similar
sortable format.
A supplemental information request will likely be sent prior to April 25, 2011.
Please provide the following no later than March 21, 2011. These documents should cover the
time period from July 10, 2009, to March 1, 2011.
1.
Document Lists
Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the
document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status.
a.
Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions
adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
b.
Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to
quality that were opened or closed during the period
c.
Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or
downgraded in priority/significance during the period
d.
Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or
more smaller issues for the period
e.
Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or
operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety
system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
f.
Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee
Concerns Program (or equivalent)
g.
Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period
h.
Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not
complete at the end of the period
- 1 -
Attachment B
2.
Full Documents, with Attachments
a.
Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period
b.
Quality assurance audits performed during the period
c.
AI! audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action
Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations
d.
Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-
NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO
assessments)
e.
Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:
1.
NCV's and Violations issued to RBS
ii.
LER's issued by RBS
f.
Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined
to be applicable to RBS (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be
applicable, provide a summary list):
i.
NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or
evaluated during the period
ii.
Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period
iii.
Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated
during the period
iv.
Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for
applicability during the period
g.
Corrective action documents generated for the following:
i.
Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were
evaluated during the period
ii.
Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which
were evaluated during the period
iii.
Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees
during the period
iv.
Problems related to Emergency Diesel Generators since July 2009.
- 2 -
Attachment B
2.
Full Documents, with Attachments
a.
Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period
b.
Quality assurance audits performed during the period
c.
AI! audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action
Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations
d.
Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-
NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO
assessments)
e.
Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:
1.
NCV's and Violations issued to RBS
ii.
LER's issued by RBS
f.
Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined
to be applicable to RBS (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be
applicable, provide a summary list):
i.
NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or
evaluated during the period
ii.
Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period
iii.
Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated
during the period
iv.
Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for
applicability during the period
g.
Corrective action documents generated for the following:
i.
Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were
evaluated during the period
ii.
Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which
were evaluated during the period
iii.
Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees
during the period
iv.
Problems related to Emergency Diesel Generators since July 2009.
- 2 -
Attachment B
3.
Logs and Reports
a.
Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the
period and broken down by functional organization
b.
Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
c.
Current system health reports or similar information
d.
Radiation protection event logs during the period
e.
Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information
can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)
f.
Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be
provided by hard copy during first week on site)
g,
List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator
deficiencies for the period
4.
Procedures
5.
a.
Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation
procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause
evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement
the corrective action program at RBS.
b.
Quality Assurance program procedures
c.
Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures
d.
Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety Conscious Work Environment
Other
a.
List of risk significant components and systems
b,
Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors
Note: "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests,
cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to RBS.
As it becomes available, but no later than March 21, 2011, this information should be uploaded
on the Certrec IMS website and inform Mr. Michael Vasquez by email at
MichaeLVasquez@nrc.gov. Paper documents or electronic documents on CD I DVD may be
sent via overnight carrier to:
-3-
Attachment B
3.
Logs and Reports
a.
Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the
period and broken down by functional organization
b.
Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
c.
Current system health reports or similar information
d.
Radiation protection event logs during the period
e.
Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information
can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)
f.
Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be
provided by hard copy during first week on site)
g,
List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator
deficiencies for the period
4.
Procedures
5.
a.
Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation
procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause
evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement
the corrective action program at RBS.
b.
Quality Assurance program procedures
c.
Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures
d.
Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety Conscious Work Environment
Other
a.
List of risk significant components and systems
b,
Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors
Note: "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests,
cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to RBS.
As it becomes available, but no later than March 21, 2011, this information should be uploaded
on the Certrec IMS website and inform Mr. Michael Vasquez by email at
MichaeLVasquez@nrc.gov. Paper documents or electronic documents on CD I DVD may be
sent via overnight carrier to:
-3-
Attachment B
U.S. NRC Region IV
612 E. Lamar Blvd.
Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011
Please note that the NRC is not currently able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives
or other similar digital media.
Note: After the request above was sent to RBS, Robert Hagar replaced Michael Vasquez as
the team lead.
- 4 -
Attachment B
U.S. NRC Region IV
612 E. Lamar Blvd.
Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011
Please note that the NRC is not currently able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives
or other similar digital media.
Note: After the request above was sent to RBS, Robert Hagar replaced Michael Vasquez as
the team lead.
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Attachment B