ML110280015
| ML110280015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/2011 |
| From: | Burgess G Duke Energy Corp |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 46568 | |
| Download: ML110280015 (5) | |
Text
01121201 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page I Part 21 (PAR) Event# 46568 Rep Org: CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE Notification Date / Time: 01/24/2011 18:11 (EST)
Supplier: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS Event Date / Time: 06/05/2010 (EST)
Last Modification: 01/24/2011 Region: 1 Docket #:
City: YORK Agreement State: Yes County: License #:
State: SC NRC Notified by: GARY BURGESS Notifications: MARVIN SYKES R2DO HQ Ops Officer: VINCE KLCO Part 21 GRP by email Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:
21,21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH POTENTIAL PART 21 - BUS DISCONNECT STAB ASSEMBLY - 600V ESSENTIAL MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS "During 2004, 2006 and 2010, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) ordered spare parts for the 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System (EPE) motor control center, installed at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations. The spare parts were ordered under Purchase Orders 15488,38585, 132512 and 134626 from Electrical Power Systems, Inc. (EPSI). The specific part is a NEMA Size 1 stab (disconnect) assembly for connecting motor control center feeder circuits to the motor control center main bus. The McGuire and Catawba motor control centers were manufactured by Nelson Electric in Tulsa, OK. Spare stab assemblies were needed for QA-1 applications but they were no longer available to purchase from an approved vendor. The parts were evaluated and approved for Commercial Grade procurement.
"When the stab assemblies were received they were dedicated on site at Duke for Commercial Grade application at McGuire and also at Catawba. Inspection of the parts and application of the commercial grade process did not identify that the parts were not manufactured to the specifications used in the commercial grade evaluation process. The manufacturer, who was different from the original parts manufacturer, had revised the detail drawing of the stab assembly. The revised drawing allowed a different method for soldering the lead wire to the stab. During parts dedication, the new stab assemblies passed basic electrical checks, but there was no visual inspection of the soldering because the connections had been inserted into the stab assembly molding.
"Catawba Unit 1 experienced a failure of the Jacket Water Keep Warm Pump Motor circuit for Diesel Generator (D/G) 1B on June 05, 2010 due to failure of the soldered connection on a stab assembly that had just been installed. The pump motor is QA Condition 1 and it is powered from a QA Condition 1 motor control center. The failure of the Catawba Unit 1 D/G Keep Warm Pump Motor was not significant from a plant risk standpoint.
01/24/2011 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Paze 2 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 46568 "Of the 21 spare stab assemblies purchased and dedicated for use at Catawba and McGuire, only one was placed in service. That stab assembly was installed at Catawba on 6/3/2010 and failed on 6/5/2010. The remaining suspect stab assemblies at Catawba and McGuire were put on HOLD shortly after this failure. Other than the failed Catawba stab assembly, no other suspect stab assemblies were placed in service in the past or currently at McGuire or Catawba Nuclear Stations. None of these dedicated stab assemblies were sold or transferred to another nuclear utility. Following the failure of the stab assembly at Catawba, stab assemblies were tested, a failure investigation was performed, design information was requested from the vendor and the commercial grade program implications were investigated. It was not until January 2011 that the issue was determined to be reportable per 10 CFR Part 21."
The licensee provided courtesy notifications to the North Carolina and South Carolina Warning Points and York, Gaston and Mecklenburg County agencies.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
01/24/2011 17:29 FAX 8038313185 CNS CONTROL ROOM Z1001 Enclosure 4.11 RPl/0/B/5000/013 Event Notification Report Page 1 of 2 STATE: "'THIS IS THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE INNRC REGION 2 MAKING AN EVENT NOTIFICATION REPORT" EN #
NOTIFICATON UNIT CALLER'S NAME CALLBACK TELEPHONE#: NRC C'PERATIONS OFFICER TR+'?.- I ",A P.'?
i*-I* , 0f ENS 1-803-831-2674(TSC) 1-8031831-3920 (C/R) ICONTACTED NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER, PRIMARY 301-816-5100 or -800-532-3469; BACKUPS - list] 1-301-951-0550 or 1-800-449-3694;
[2ndl 1-301-415-0550; and [3rd) 1-301.415-0153 EVENT TU &ZONE EVENT F(A-I POWER/MODEBEFOREC4.- (A-# POWER/MODEAFrSR sA.tý
-4LQ E Rggion 0 D lto /0 rp 44m Ida Io l(time) (zone) I IIl,-,0,- ( M oEr I m~oorf A a-t.,.L IMMIEDIATE 4-HR NON-EMERGENCY IoCFR72,75(b)ISFSI S-HR NON-EMERGENCY 10CFR7Z.75(c)
EVENT CLASSIFICATION (GE, SAP, ALERT, (1) TS Deviation for ISFSI _ (1) Defect in ISFSI SSC NOIE) 50.72 or 72.75 (ISF51) (2) Offsite Notification for [SFS1 (2) (SFS1 Confinement System PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANT OR _(3) Offshe medical (ISFS1 MATERIALS - .HR NON-EMERGENCY 10 CFR 50,72(bX2)
TRANSPORTATION (10 CFR 20) (ii)(A) Dcgtudod Condition 24-IKOUR NON-EMERGENCY ISFSI MATERIALIEXPOSURE (10 CFR 20) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition Radiological Exposure I0CFR20,2202 (iv)(A) Valid System Actuation Fitness For Duty 10CFR26.73 1.14R NON-EMERGENCY IOCFRS0,72(b)(1) , (v)(A) Sefe S/D Capability Operating License Deviation TS Deviation pursuant to IOCFRS0.54(x) (v)(B) RHR Capability Accidenta Criticality or Loss/Theft of Material (v)(C) Control of Radiological 24-HOUR NON-EMERGENCY ISTSI (v)(D) Accident Mitigation ISFSI Lost Safety Function 72.75(d)(1) 1 4-HR NON-EMERGENCY 1QCFRSO.72(b)(2) (xii) Offsite Medical (i) TS Required S/D (xiii) Lost ENS 30 DAY NON EMERGENCY (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS (xiii) Lost Emergency Assessment - 10CFR20.2201 CivAB) RPS Actuation when Rx is critical (xill) Lo t Ot'sice Communications Thet;, Lt of Missing Materal (xi) Offsitc Notification (xiii) Emergency Siren Inopri-able Lst of Missng Materia
__Theft,
_______________________ ______________________ - - 60-D)AY OPTONAL lOCfl0.730sX)(j vCoT'lrerue*qAmi 0t ? "-reNT IALL PA.T 7-1 ISI34ACt.- Invalid Specified System Actwatlon OTHER UNSPECIFIED
, .E IREMENT (IDENTIFY)
Ret*action EVENT DESCRIPTION (Include: Systerms ffected. actuations & their initiating ign'als causesflect of event on pltt, actions taken or planned. PARs etc.)
CATEGORY INITIATION SIGNAL N REACTOR TRIP SEE &t'rACACt, SNEETS MJAPESF ACTUATION _ ____
4 _ ECCS ACTUATION 51 FLOW LCO SYSTEM &- Io-&eL P sANqTVAL,. pd*rn c.cj*iro( ce.TErt COMPONENr~T~sIC 1 rt17SA.ASM CAUSE: VMECHANICAL ELECTRICAL PERSONNEL ERROR OTHER Continue on Enclosure 4,11 page 2 of 2 if necessary.
NOT7PICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANY'inNG UNUSUAL OR NOT UNDERSTOOD? 0 YES IWSO NRC RESIDENT (Explain above)
STATE(s) NC DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION 13 YES SC 10V AS REQUIRED? (Explain above)
LOCAL York County MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL ESTIMATEDI Gaston County CORRECTED: RESTART DATE Mecklenburg County OTHER GOV AGENCIES J 1 MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE . - 7 ; -
01/24/2011 17:30 FAX 8038313185 CNS CONTROL ROOM zo02 Enclosure 4.11 RPYO/B/5000/013 Event Notification Report Page 2 of 2 RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES: CIHECK OR FILL IN APPLICAB3LE ITEMS (specific dctailsýexplnatalonas Should be covered in even-; description)
-"ONUIIREM*k
- I 1 USNMDNIREDAS I "F iERLA*EUASE I' - N ((EMIAT 1 :1 l[EMANUATE.D FERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED PFSrfE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED i;w-te release path in description NOTE: Contact Radiation Protection Shift to obtain the following relcase information, IF the notification is due and the information is not available, mark "Not Available and complete the notification, Relenses Rate (Cl/eec) % TIS. LIMIT -00 GUIDE Total Activity (C) -- b T.S. LIMIT OOUlF Noblo Gas 0.1Cilse" 1000 C, Iodine 10 u-Isce ' ,01CI Panicuiate lUc/sc- I MCI i'iuid (excluding tritiium & 10 uClmin, lissolved noble gsees Liquid itium) 0.2 C/in 5 C1 fatal-Act~iji cMCL.; R.AD MONJ I-RS 7"PANTSTCk oNEsl; I MAIN 5i:'rAM LINE*- Sri 13LO'UWOWN -- OTH-EK IN ALARM M 6 AIR EJECTOR NIT 1-.Fsp!26,27,28.29 (EMF 34)
IEMT33) UI 2-MrI 10 1,2,13)______
UADMOMN IT R=9 ADNGS
%-T.S, LIMITI Ulf applicable) =NOT APPO'CABLE NO APlgB.* T APPLICASG~b NOT AP}:U*CABLB.*
RCS OR Sri TUBE EAM: CHECK OR PILL IN APPEICABE* ITEMS (specific detals*lexplantions should be covae.,d in event cscri'ptian)
ILOCA'I ION 01' HWE LEAK (e,g, S#valve, pipt, etc,);
LEAK RAVl:gpm/gpd =,S. 13MITS EXCEEDED: JSUPDIDN OR LONG IERM DEVELOPMrIVN1 LEAK START 1AlE: Timb *OODLANT ACTIVITY(Last Sample): PIMARYM ECONDARY-L19or OF-MENREL*ATED EQUIPMoT NToPRATInorMtt EVENT DE.SCRIPTION (Continued from Enclosure 4.11 Page 1 of 2)
...--.. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MAY BE ATrACýIED.
APPROVED B enTIME/ATE;nt(*7 _y Operations "i M ager/Emergenq' Coordinator (eastern) f EM dd yy
01/24/2011 17:30 FAX 8038313185 CNS CONTROL ROOM [J003 Reportability Determination Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 Bus Disconnect Stab Assembly - 600V Essential Motor Control Centers Problem Investigation Report PIP G-10-1 494 During 2004, 2006 and 2010, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) ordered spare parts for the 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System (EPE) motor control centers installed at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations. The spare parts were ordered under Purchase Orders 15488, 38585, 132512 and 134626 from Electrical Power Systems, Inc.
(EPSI). The specific part is a NEMA Size I stab (disconnect) assembly for connecting motor control center feeder circuits to the motor control center main bus. The McGuire and Catawba motor control centers were manufactured by Nelson Electric in Tulsa, OK. Spare stab assemblies were needed for QA- 1 applications but they were no longer available to purchase from an approved vendor, The parts were evaluated and approved for Commercial Grade procurement.
When the stab assemblies were received they were dedicated on site at Duke for Commercial Grade application at McGuire and also at Catawba. Inspection of the parts and application of the commercial grade process did not identify that the parts were not manufactured to the specifications used in the commercial grade cvaluation process.
The manufacturer, who was different from the original parts manufacturer, had revised the detail drawing of the stab assembly. The revised drawing allowed a different method for soldering the lead wire to the stab. During parts dedication, the new stab assemblies passed basic electrical checks, but there was no visual inspection of the soldering because the connections had been inserted into the stab assembly molding.
Catawba Unit I experienced a failure of the Jacket Water Keep Warm Pump Motor circuit for Diesel Generator (D/G) IB on June 05, 2010 due to failure of the soldered connection on a stab assembly that had just been installed.
The pump motor is QA Condition 1 and it is powered from a QA Condition 1motor control center. The failure of the Catawba Unit I DIG Keep Warm Pump Motor was not significant from a plant risk standpoint.
Of the 21 spare stab assemblies purchased and dedicated for use at Catawba and McGuire, only one was placed in service. That stab assembly was installed at Catawba on 6/3/2010 and failed on 6/5/2010. The remaining suspect stab assemblies at Catawba and McGuire were put on HOLD shortly after this failure. Other than the failed Catawba stab assembly, no other suspect stab assemblies were placed in service in the past or currently at McGuire or Catawba Nuclear Stations, None of these dedicated stab assemblies were sold or transferred 1.o another nuclear utility. Following the failure of the stab assembly at Catawba, stab assemblies were tested, a failure investigation was performed, design information was requested from the vendor and the commercial grade program implications were investigated. It was not until January 2011 that the issue was determined to be reportable per 10 CPR Part 21.