Text

Salem/Operations, SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q), Rev. 0, Earthquake
	ML110070221
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	12/30/2004
From:	; Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	LR-N10-0355 SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q), Rev 0
	Download: ML110070221 (74)
	v • d • e

PSEG Internal Use Only Page 1 of 1 PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.

SALEM/OPERATIONS SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q) - REV. 0 EARTHQUAKE A.

BieIUlial Review Performed: Yes No NAL B.

Change Packages and affected document numbers incorporated into this revision: None C.

OTSC incorporated into this revision: None REVISION

SUMMARY

This is a new Earthquake Abnormal Operating Procedure that incorporates guidance contained within the following documents:

EPRI NP-6695, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake Regulatory Guide 1.12 - Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes Regulatory Guide 1.166 - Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions Regulatory Guide 1.167 - Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown by a Seismic Event The absence of clear, detailed and rational procedures for nuclear plant response to an earthquake may result in unnecessary shutdown of an operating nuclear power plant and a prolonged delay in plant startup. The guidelines contained within this procedure are intended to minimize costs related to t3 a shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Units following an earthquake, while assuring safety in operation.

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IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS Effective Date ~joi.

None Date APPROVED:

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EARTHQUAKE ENTRY CONDITIONS DATE: ____ TIME: __

1.1 Vibratory ground motion is felt on site and recognized as such by a consensus of the Control Room Operating Crew 1.2 Annunciation of Unit 1 OHA A-37, SElS RCDR SYS ACT 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 None 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS NOTE It is expected that the Operating Crew responds to all alarms and immediate effects of the seismic event lAW the applicable ABs, EOPs and OPs. Operator response to maintain the plant in a safe stable condition takes precedence over this procedure.

If vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the Operating Basis Earthquake

(> O. 1 g) occurs, shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Power Plants will be required lAW Appendix A to 1 OCFR1 00. Prior to resuming operations, the licensee will be required to demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The guidance contained within this procedure implements the requirements of Appendix A to 1 OCFR 100.

If vibratory ground motion does NOT exceed that of the Operating Basis Earthquake << 0.1 g), and no significant damage is found during Operator Walkdown inspections, then shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plants is NOT considered necessary.

A vibratory ground motion of :::;0.2g is within the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) limitation for Systems, Structures and Components (S8Cs) important to safety at the Salem Nuclear Plant.

3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.

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NOTE Indication of either of the following conditions constitutes declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT in accordance with the ECG:

A seismic event is felt by personnel within the Protected Area.

Valid Actuation of the Seismic Trigger (> 0.01 g) has occurred as verified by the SMA~3 Event Indicator (flag) being WHITE as indicated on the Salem Seismic Recorder.

Indication of either of the above specified conditions in conjunction with a Valid Actuation of the Hope Creek Seismic Switch (> 0.1 g), constitutes declaration of an ALERT in accordance with the ECG.

If the OSC is activated (optional for UNUSUAL EVENT and required for ALERT),

then all in-plant repairs, evaluation activities, and damage assessments should be coordinated through the Operations Support Center (OSC). The Shift Manager (SM) should ensure that the OSC Coordinator and/or OSC Operations Supervisor implement appropriate portions of this procedure, as required.

3.2 IF a seismic event is felt by personnel within the Protected Area, THEN NOTIFY the Shift Manager (SM) to refer to the Event Classification Guide.

NOTE The EVENT ALARM is illuminated when there is a seismic event (> 0.01 g),

and the system is recording.

The EVENT INDICATOR indicates an seismic event has been recorded.

The indicator is normally BLACK, however, indicates WHITE after an event has been recorded.

The setpoint for the Seismic Monitoring System starter unit is 0.01 g.

The Seismic Event Recorder will record a seismic event anytime the event is greater than 0.01 g, and will continue to record for an additional 10 seconds.

The Seismic Monitoring System can record a maximum of 30 minutes of data.

3.3 MONITOR the Seismic Recorder to determine if a valid seismic event has occurred.

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3.4 IF a valid seismic event has NOT occurred, THEN PERFORM the following:

SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)

A.

INITIATE a notification for Maintenance Controls to investigate the cause of alann and initiate corrective action.

B.

GO TO Section 4.0, Completion and Review.

NOTE Indication of either of the following conditions constitutes declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT in accordance with the ECG:

A seismic event is felt by personnel within the Protected Area.

Valid Actuation of the Seismic Trigger (> 0.01 g) has occurred as verified by the SMA-3 Event Indicator (flag) being WHITE as indicated on the Salem Seismic Recorder.

Indication of either of the above specified conditions in conjunction with a Valid Actuation of the Hope Creek Seismic Switch (> O. 1 g) I constitutes declaration of an ALERT in accordance with the ECG.

If the ase is activated {optional for UNUSUAL EVENT and required for ALERT)I then all in~plant repairs, evaluation activities, and damage assessments should be coordinated through the Operations Support Center (OSC). The Shift Manager (SM) should ensure that the OSC Coordinator andlor OSC Operations Supervisor implement appropriate portions of this procedure, as required.

3.5 If NOT already perfonned, NOTIFY the Shift Manager (8M) to refer to the Event Classification Guide.

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NOTE Performing a quick overall diagnosis of plant operation will assist in determining if conditions exist that require urgent attention.

Steps 3,6 through 3.10 may be performed simultaneously, or in any order.

3,6 PERFORM the following to provide a quick overall diagnosis of plant operation, as applicable:

MONITOR BEACON for any indicated changes in Reactor Core Operating Parameters (e.g., AFD, Reactor Power, etc.).

MONITOR Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Critical Function Status Trees (CFSTs).

CHECK Radiation Monitors associated with the Reactor Coolant System for indication of changes.

CHECK Reactor Coolant System for indication of changes in with regard to flow,-

temperature and pressure.

CHECK the Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) for any indication of metallic sounds on the system audio speaker.

NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the Reactor Coolant System and Secondary System '

for activity and chemistry, and to compare sample results to sample results obtained prior to the seismic event.

MONITOR for ANY indications of pipe ruptures or flooding on site (e,g., fire mains, circulating water, condensate, etc.)

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J sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q) 3.7 IF Unit 1 or 2 is currently in a Refueling Outage or Outage condition, THEN PERFORM the following:

A.

NOTIFY the Refueling SRO to suspend Core Alterations pending further evaluation of the seismic event, as applicable.

B.

EVALUATE the following conditions, as applicable:

Steam Generator Nozzle Dams - Failure of the Steam Generator Nozzle Dams may result in significant leakage from the Reactor Cavity. Refer to Sl(2).OP-AB.FUEL-0002(Q). Loss of Refueling Cavity or Spent Fuel Pool Level, for loss of Refueling Cavity level.

Reactor Cavity Seal - Failure of the Reactor Cavity Seal may result in significant leakage from the Reactor Cavity. Refer to Sl(2).OP-AB.FUEL-0002(Q), Loss of Refueling Cavity or Spent Fuel Pool Level, for loss of Refueling Cavity level.

Partial Loaded Reactor Core - Fuel assemblies may topple, and at worst case may cause damage to irradiated fuel. Refer to Sl(2).OP-AB.FUEL~OOOl(Q),

Fuel Handling Incident, in the event damage occurs to irradiated fuel.

CAUTION Maintenance Controls Technicians should not attempt to readjust or recalibrate the Seismic Monitoring System until seismic data is downloaded, as this would defeat attempts to obtain post-event calibration data. Additionally, extreme caution should be utilized by Maintenance Controls during data collection and subsequent handling of data to prevent inadvertent loss of the recorded seismic data.

NOTE Each of the Seismic Monitoring Instruments actuated during a seismic event shall be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and a channel calibration performed within 5 days following the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12.

Seismic Monitoring System channel calibration may require reducing reactor power and/or shutdown of Unit 1 in order for personnel to access Seismic Monitoring equipment located within the inner bioshield (ALARA).

3.8 CONTACT Maintenance Controls to have qualified persOlmel perform Attachment 7, Seismic Monitoring System Data Retrieval and Calibration (Maintenance Controls).

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sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q) 3.9 IF it is desired to obtain updated information regarding the seismic event, THEN CONTACT the National Earthquake Center in Denver, Colorado utilizing one of the following contact methods:

phone @ 303-273-8500 e-mail @ http://earthquake.usgs.gov e-mail @ http://www.neic.cr.usgs.gov/

e-mail @ http://www.mgs.md.gov/esic/seisnet/

NOTE Several relays in the Cardox System may be inadvertently tripped during a seismic event. These relays provide interlocks, but will not initiate a CO2 discharge. There are nine relays per Unit (one for each DG FOST Room, one for*

each DG Room, one for both DFO Pump Rooms, one for each Switchgear Room, and one for the Electrical Penetration Room).

Of immediate concern are the relays for the Diesel Generator Room. If one of these relays trip, the respective DG Area and Control Area Exhaust Fans will be tripped. These relays must be either reset or bypassed to restart the respective fans.

The relays for each Diesel Generator Room are located in the panel below the Cardox Actuation Light.

3.10 IF ANY Unit 1 or Unit 2 DO Room or Control Area Exhaust Fan has tripped, THEN RESTORE ventilation as follows:

A.

IF it is desired to restore Diesel Generator Area Ventilation immediately, THEN START the affected fans lAW the following procedures, as applicable:

S1.0P~SO.DGV-OOOl(Q), Diesel Generator Area Ventilation Operation.

S2.0P-SO.DGV-OOOl(Q), Diesel Generator Area Ventilation Operation.

B.

NOTIFY Fire Department personnel to reset the affected Cardox System Relays, '

C.

When affected Cardox System Relays are reset, RETURN the Diesel Generator Area Ventilation to normal operation lAW the fonowing procedures, as applicable:

S1.0P-SO.DGV-0001(Q), Diesel Generator Area Ventilation Operation.

S2.0P-SO.DGV*OOOl(Q), Diesel Generator Area Ventilation Operation.

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NOTE Plant walkdowns are to be completed in a timely manner following indication of an earthquake. Regulatory Guide 1.166 requires the decision to shut down the plant be made within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event. EPRI recommends Operator Walkdowns be completed within 4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event.

3.11 COMMENCE Operator Walkdowns lAW Attachment 2, Operator Walkdowns.

NOTE Conditions may exist following a seismic event which exceeds the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) such that a discontinuance of power generation could result in loss of critical lifeline functions and potential loss of life. If the System Operator requests that the Salem Stations remain on line, and shutdown of the plants is required as a result of exceeding the aBE limitation, then Licensing and the NRC should be immediately consulted with to propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plants lAW Regulatory Guide 1.166. The need for power generation does NOT take precedence over plant Operating Procedures, or requirements of the Operating License.

Load reduction rates of ~5%/minute are NOT recommended in Step 3.12.

For the purpose of Step 3.12, "significant damage" is considered to be damage which has the potential to adversely affect the operability, functionality, or reliability of systems, structures or components (S8Cs) required for the safe operation, including shutdown to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), of the nuclear power plant.

3.12 IF vibratory ground motion exceeded that of the Operating Basis Earthquake (> O.lg)

OR significant damage was identified during performance of the Operator Walkdowns, THEN:

A.

IF the Reactor is in Mode 1 or 2, THEN:

1.

PERFORM Pre-Shutdown Inspections lAW Attachment 3, Pre-Shutdown Inspections.

2.

COMMENCE a normal plant shutdown lAW Sl(2).OP-IO.ZZ-0004(Q),

Power Operation or SI(2).OP-IO.ZZ-0005(Q), Minimum Load to Hot Standby, as applicable.

B.

PERFORM Post-Shutdown Inspections and Tests lAW Attachment 4, Post-Shutdown Inspections and Tests.

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NOTE For the purpose of Step 3.13, "significant damage" is considered to be damage which has the potential to adversely affect the operability, functionality, or reliability of systems, structures or components (SSCs) required for the safe operation, including shutdown to Mode* 5 (Cold Shutdown), of the nuclear power plant.

3.13 IF vibratory ground motion did NOT exceed that of the Operating Basis Earthquake

( <O.lg)

AND no significant damage was identified during performance of the Operator Walkdowns, THEN:

A.

IF the Reactor is in Mode 1 or 2, THEN CONTINUE plant operation.

B.

IF the Reactor Tripped as a result of the seismic event, THEN:

1.

PERFORM a Post-Trip Review lAW SC.OP-DG.ZZ-OIOl, Salem Post-Trip Data Collection Guidelines.

2.

COMMENCE a Unit Startup lAW applicable lOPs.

3.14 GO TO Section 4.0, Completion and Review.

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J SC,OP-AB,ZZ"0004(Q) 4.0 COMPLETION AND REVIEW 4.1 CIRCLE Entry Condition number in Section 1.0, OR EXPLAIN Entry Condition in Comments Section of Attachment 8, Completion Sign-Off Sheet.

4.2 COMPLETE Attachment 8, Sections I,D and 2.0.

AND FORWARD this procedure to SM/CRS for review and approval.

4.3 SM/CRS PERFORM the following:

A, REVIEW this procedure with Attachments 1 through 8 for completeness and accuracy.

B.

COMPLETE Attachment 8, Section 3.0.

C.

FORWARD completed procedure to Operations Staff.

END OF PROCEDURE Salem Common Page 9 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 1 of 1)

CONTINUOUS ACTION

SUMMARY

1.0 IF AT ANY TIME the Reactor trips, THEN PERFORM the following:

GO TO 1(2)-EOP-TRIP-l, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, as applicable.

When conditions permit. CONTINUE with this procedure.

2.0 IF AT ANY TIME damage has occurred to any Structure, System or Component (SSe) that is required to safely shutdown the plant following an OBE or seismic event, CONTACT Licensing to communicate a plan for the timely repair andlor shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plant(s) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

3.0 REFER TO Appendix C, Additional Considerations Following a Seismic Event, for additional considerations following a seismic event.

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 3)

OPERATOR WALKDOWNS NOTE s C. OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)

The purpose of Operator Walkdowns is to determine the effect of the Earthquake or seismic event on plant structures, and to provide additional guidance with regard to additional required inspections.

As Plant Operators are the most knowledgeable with regard to their duty stations l they should take the lead in monitoring of their assigned areas. Additionally, Plant Operators may be assisted by available on~site personnel (e.g., Engineering, Maintenance, Quality Assurance l etc.) in performance of the Operator Walkdowns.

High radiation areas, the containment building, and other areas with limited access need not be included in the initial walkdown inspections unless plant personnel have reason to suspect that there may be damage in these areas.

If the OSC is activated (optional for UNUSUAL EVENT and required for ALERT),

then all in-plant repairs, evaluation activities, and damage assessments should be coordinated through the Operations Support Center (OSC). The Shift Manager (8M) should ensure that the OSC Coordinator and/or OSC Operations Supervisor implement appropriate portions of this procedure, as required.

Plant walkdowns are to be completed in a timely manner following indication of an earthquake. Regulatory Guide 1.166 requires the decision to shut down the plant be made within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event. EPRI recommends Operator Walkdowns be completed within 4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event.

The plant itself, not damage from nearby communities, or data from remote locations, is the best indicator of the severity of the seismic event at the plant site.

1.0 The Operator Walkdown Teams should be briefed on the following:

Who to report the results of the Operator Walkdown. If the OSC is activated, the recommended point of contact would be the OSC Coordinator who will ensure the Shift Manager (SM) is briefed.

When the Operator Walkdown teams are to report results. Based on the severity of the identified issue, consider a phone call or page when issues are discovered, followed by a face to face turnover. If the OSC is activated report results as directed in the OSC Team briefing obtained prior to team dispatch.

(continued on next page)

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 2 of 3)

OPERATOR WALKDOWNS SC.OPNAB.ZZ-0004(Q)

Results of Operator Walkdowns are to be documented on Attachment 2, Section 3.0. Ensure adequate copies of Inspection Results/Comments page for each Walkdown Team.

Use extreme caution when investigating potentially damaged equipment.

2.0 In addition to the General Tour Criteria, the following additional inspection criteria shOUld be considered during performance of the Operator Walkdowns:

Check for leaks in piping systems, especially at flanged or threaded cOlU1ections,.

and branch lines.

Check for damage to low pressure tanks (Le., tanks vented to atmosphere),

particularly ground or floor mounted vertical storage tanks (e.g., RWST, PWST, AFWST).

Check fluid levels in tanks. Level switches may have activated due to sloshing of the respective fluid.

Check for high vibration, high bearing temperatures, and unusual noise in rotating equipment (e.g., pumps and fans)

Check the condition of equipment anchorage. Check for deformation or loosening of anchor bolts, pullout or shear of anchor bolts, rocking, sliding, or misalignment of equipment.

Check for major cracks or spalling in reinforced concrete structures. It should be noted that hair line cracks in reinforced concrete structures, even if caused by the earthquake or seismic event, are NOT considered significant unless they are large enough to result in the yielding of rebar.

Check for distortion of electrical and control cabinets including a brief visual check of internally mounted components such as relays and circuit breakers.

Check for portable equipment which may have shifted, jeopardizing equipment that may be required for safe shutdown of the plant.

Consider the use a digital camera to document identified issues.

Consider utilizing the detailed inspection Plant Equipment Checks identified in Appendix A for additional guidance.

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 3 of 3)

OPERATOR WALKDOWNS S C.OP~AB.ZZ-0004(Q) 3.0 INSPECTION RESULTS/COMMENTS:

I Responsible Area:

I Walkdown Team Members:

Date/Time:

Inspection Results/Comments:

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ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of 1)

PRE-SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS NOTE In order to ascertain possible fuel and reactor internal damage, the 'following checks should be prior to the plant shutdown being initiated.

Conditions may exist following a seismic event which exceeds the OBE such that a discontinuance of power generation could result in loss of critical lifeline functions and potential loss of life. If the System Operator requests that the Salem Stations remain on line, and shutdown of the plants is required as a result of exceeding the OBE limitation, then Licensing and the NRC should be immediately consulted with to propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plants lAW Regulatory Guide 1.166. The need for power generation does NOT take precedence over plant Operating Procedures, or requirements of the Operating License.

1.0 CONTACT the Electric System Operator (ESO) to determine the availability of off-site power, and the impact of removing the Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Plants from operation, as applicable.

2.0 PERFORM Sl(2).OP*ST.RCS-0001(Q), Reactivity Control System Rod Control:

Assemblies, to demonstrate operability of the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms.

3.0 MONITOR BEACON for any indicated changes in Reactor Core Operating Parameters' (e.g., AFD, Reactor Power, etc.).

4.0 MONITOR Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Critical Function Status Trees (CFSTs).

5.0 CHECK Radiation Monitors associated with the Reactor Coolant System for indication of changes.

6.0 CHECK Reactor Coolant System for indication of changes in with regard to flow, temperature and pressure.

7.0 CHECK the Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) for any indication of changes in the noise signature.

8.0 NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the Reactor Coolant System and Secondary System for activity and chemistry, and to compare sample results to sample results obtained prior to the seismic event.

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ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 1 of 4)

POST-SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS AND TESTS NOTE Post-shutdown inspections and tests are those needed to determine the physical condition of the nuclear plant and its readiness to resume operation after being shutdown due to a seismic event. These inspections and tests are designed to provide a graded response commensurate with the type and severity of damage found. The recommended post-shutdown actions consist of the following:

a)

Focused inspections by experienced engineers of a pre-selected sample of representative structures and equipment. The purpose of these inspections is to determine the need for expanded inspections and tests, and to provide data to establish the severity of the earthquake.

b)

Determination of EPRI damage intensity as delineated in Appendix B. Using the information collected during focused inspections, and other observations, a group of experienced engineers will establish the EPRI damage intensity utilizing the established guidelines. Identification of the EPRI damage intensity will determine the course of actions to restart the plant.

c) d)

If damage to the pre-selected sample of safety-related equipment and structures is found, or the EPRI damage intensity is determined to exceed a specific level, then*

expanded inspections are to be performed. These expanded inspections by qualified engineers are undertaken to further define evaluate potential damage to all components, systems, and structures required for operation. This information is used to (1) establish corrective actions and repairs that may be required to return the plant to a state of operational readiness, and (2) identify the need and timing for additional analytical and other engineering evaluations which may be prudent to assure the long term integrity and reliability of the plant.

Surveillance tests as required by Technical Specifications to verify the operability of equipment needed for plant operation.

1.0 COMMENCE detailed visual inspections lAW with Attachment 6, Visual Inspection of Equipment and Structures Following a Earthquake.

2.0 IF damage to Safety Related Equipment has occurred, THEN GO TO Step 9.0 of this attachment.

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SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)

ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 2 of 4)

POST-SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS AND TESTS 3.0 IF damage to Seismic Monitoring Equipment has occurred, THEN GO TO Step 8.0 of this attachment.

4.0 PERFORM required surveillance testing to support Reactor Startup.

5.0 PERFORM Unit Startup lAW applicable lOPs.

NOTE For EPRI Damage Intensities of two (2) or less, Long-Term Evaluations lAW are NOT required to be completed prior to performing the Unit Startup, as delineated in Section 3.3 of EPRI NP-6695. If the EPRI Damage Intensity exceeds two (2), plant restart will depend on successful completion of the Long-Term Evaluations.

6.0 REQUEST Engineering to perform Attachment 5, Long Term Evaluations.

7.0 PERFORM the following:

RETURN TO procedure step in effect.

GO TO Section 4.0, Completion and Review.

NOTE Appendix B should be referred to for a description of EPRI Damage Levels.

8.0 IF damage is less than an EPRI Damage Intensity level of one (1),

THEN RETURN TO Step 4.0 of this attachment.

9.0 COMMENCE performance of Expanded Plant Inspections (i.e., expand the scope of the Appendix A inspections, for example perform valve strokes on a larger population of valves than was checked initially).

Salem Common Page 16 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 3 of 4)

POST*SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS AND TESTS 10.0 IF damage is equal to or greater than an EPRI Damage Intensity level of three (3),

THEN GO TO Step 20.0 of this attachment.

11.0 IF damage is equal to an EPRI Damage Intensity level of two (2),

THEN GO TO Step 16.0 of this attachment.

12.0 IF damage is equal to an EPRI Damage Intensity level of one (1),

THEN GO TO Step 13.0 of this attachment.

NOTE Steps 13.0 and 14.0 are utilized when damage is determined to be equal to an EPRI Damage Intensity level of one (1).

13.0 INITIATE corrective action to repair damage sustained as a result of the seismic event.

14.0 PERFORM surveillance testing to demonstrate operability of repaired equipment, as required.

15.0 RETURN TO Step 4.0 of this attachment.

NOTE Steps 16.0 through 18.0 are utilized when damage is determined to be equal to an EPRI Damage Intensity level of two (2).

16.0 INITIATE corrective action to repair damage sustained as a result of the seismic event.

17.0 PERFORM surveillance testing of repaired equipment to demonstrate operability.

18.0 PERFORM Containment Leak Rate Testing as directed by Engineering Programs.

19.0 RETURN TO Step 4.0 of this attachment.

Salem Common Page 17 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 4 of 4)

POST-SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS AND TESTS NOTE Steps 20.0 through 29.0 are utilized when damage is determined to be equal to, or greater than an EPRI Damage Intensity level of three (3).

20.0 PLACE the Reactor in the Defueled Mode lAW applicable lOPs.

21.0 PERFORM inspection of Nuclear Fuel and Reactor Internals.

22.0 INITIATE corrective action to repair damage sustained as a result of the seismic event.

23.0 PERFORM surveillance testing to demonstrate operability of repaired equipment, as required.

24.0 PERFORM Containment Leak Rate Testing as directed by Engineering Programs.

25.0 REQUEST Engineering to perform Attachment 5, Long Term Evaluations.

26.0 PERFORM surveillance testing to demonstrate operability of repaired equipment, as required.

27.0 PERFORM required surveillance testing to support Reactor Startup.

28.0 PERFORM Unit Startup lAW applicable lOPs.

29.0 PERFORM the following:

RETURN TO procedure step in effect.

GO TO Section 4.0, Completion and Review.

Salem Common Page 18 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 5 (Page 1 of 1)

LONG-TERM EVALUATIONS NOTE Long-term evaluations are those engineering activities needed to assess the potential for hidden damage that may have occurred to safety-related equipment and structured which might degrade their long-term reliability. Long-term evaluations are not required if plant shutdown is not warranted (e.g., the aBE criteria is not exceeded).

For EPRI Damage Intensities of 2 or less, these evaluations may be performed after the plant is restarted. If the EPRI Damage Intensity exceeds 2, plant restart will depend on successful completion of this attachment.

1.0 PERFORM calculation of seismic loads (Le., floor response spectra based on actual ground motion records from the seismic event.

2.0 COMPARE calculated seismic loads with design loads at locations of interest.

3.0 PERFORM seismic re-evaluation of equipment and structures where calculated loads may have exceeded design loads.

4.0 REFER TO EPRI NP-6695, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake regarding additional guidance for Long-Term Evaluation.

Salem Common Page 19 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 1 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE NOTE

provides a pre-selected sample of representative structures and equipment required to be visually inspected. The purpose of these inspections is to determine the need for expanded inspections and tests, and to provide required data to establish the EPRI Damage Intensity.

The Operations Support Center (OSC) with support of the Technical Support Center (TSC) will generally be responsible for coordinating performance of, Sections 4.0 through 9.0, and maintaining the inspection records.

1.0 ENSURE the assigned Walkdown Teams are briefed on the following:

Clear expectation of the plant areas the team is expected to walkdown.

A brief description of what equipment is expected to be walked down (Le.,

walkdown all Safety Related Equipment in the assigned area).

A brief discussion concerning the extent of the walkdown (Le., included with the valve checks in Appendix A is a requirement to stroke valves in both directions.

A possible exception to this would be to only perfonn valve strokes if there appears to be damage to the valve actuator.

Proper turnover of infonnation is critical to ensure that issues are communicated to station management. and that all areas of the plant are adequately walked down.

Refer to Appendix A for a list of equipment to be checked.

Refer to Appendix B for a definition of the EPRI Seismic Damage Scale.

Results of the Walkdown/lnspections are to be documented on Section 3.0 of this attachment.

Salem Common Page 20 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 2 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 2.0 Sections 4.0 through 9.0 of this attachment are intended to be utilized by the Operations SUppOlt Center (OSC) to provide a tracking mechanism for perfonnance of the detailed walkdowns. Additional guidance for the individual responsible maintaining inspection records is as follows:

In the "Instructions II column list scope of walkdown (Le., what parts of Appendix A you want the team to accomplish). Based on the skill of the team, additional teams may be required.

If a follow up walkdown is required, state the reason why, and any specific personnel that might be required for the follow-up assessment (e.g., Seismic Engineer required for seismic evaluation).

If an Inspection Team is not being sent to a specific area, list the reason why.

For example, no inspection team sent to eves HUT due to area being High Radiation Area (HRA) and no indicated damage to eves HUT.

This should be additionally noted in the Comments Section.

As available staffing resources increase, consider appointing a specific person to track each duty station area (Le., Unit 1 Primary Area, Unit 2 Primary Area, etc.)

similar to how Implementation Teams are structured during an Outage. It should be anticipated that these inspections will take several days to complete.

Salem Common Page 21 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 3 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 3.0 INSPECTION RESULTS/COMMENTS:

I Responsible Area:

I Walkdown Team Members:

Date/Time:

Inspection Results/Comments:

Salem Common Page 22 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 4 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 4.0 UNIT 1 PRIMARY AREA Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 100'Aux Halon Bldg Hallway Chemistry Lab Main Hallway Primary Sample Room BA Evap Room Demin Valve Alley BAT Pump Area Hallway to Hot Shop Hot Shop Area Hot Shop Mezzanine Waste Evap Room 100' & 122' lA DO Room EDG Area 18 DG Room IC DGRoom DG Common Control Area Salem Common Page 23 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 5 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 4.0 UNIT 1 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions Mechanical 100' Area Penetration Area 100' Stairway to 130' 78' Area SW Valve Rooms BIT Room Containment APD Area FHB Area 130'Area 100' Area 84' Area 122' Aux BAST Area Bldg VCT Area ABV Area CRHVAC Area Salem Common Page 24 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 6 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 4.0 UNIT 1 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 84' Aux Spray Add Bldg Tank Area 11-13 Chg Pump Area Chg Valve Platform CS Pump Area DG FOST Area FO Transfer Pump Area AFW Pump Area Seal Water HX Room Letdown HX Room 84' Hallway 12/13 CC Pump Area 11 CC Pump Area SI Pump Area SFPHx Area Salem Common Page 25 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 4.0 UNIT 1 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team FollOW-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 64' Aux Laundry Tank Bldg Area eves MT Area WHUT Area WG eamp Area Gas Decay Tank Area eves HUT Area RAP Tank Pump Area General 55' Aux Area Bldg Aux Sump Tank Area 45' Aux 11 RHR Bldg Pump Area 12RHR Pump Area 64' 4160 V Bus Switchgear Area le 125 VDe Batt ASDS Inverter Salem Common Page 26 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 8 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 4.0 UNIT 1 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 84' 84' Switchgear Hallway 460 V Bus Area DeBus Area 100' Relay Relay Room Room Area 11112 Ess Cont Inverter lA VIB Inverter IB VIB Inverter IC VIB Inverter 10 VIB Inverter lA 125 VDC Batt 1B 125 VDC Batt lA 28 VDC Batt IB 28 VDC Batt Penetration Chiller Area Area Inner Pen Area 78' Electrical Area Salem Common Page 27 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 9 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 5.0 UNIT 1 SECONDARY AREA Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched.

Instructions 88' Turbine Raw Water Bldg Storage Basin DeminPlant Area Circ Water Outlet Area Cire Water Inlet Area LO Storage Tank Area Hot Water Tank Area Heater Drain Pump Area Condensate Pump Area 100' Turbine TAC Hx and Bldg Pump Area Demin Plant Area Generator Duet Work Cond Pump Area Heater Drain Pump Area Cire Water Outlet Area Cire Water Inlet Area Salem Common Page 28 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 5.0 UNIT 1 SECONDARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 100' Turbine HD Tank and Bldg Mezz Area (continued)

Chern Add Tanks/Pumps 4160 V Bus Area 230 V MCC Area Stm Gen Feed Pump Area SAC and Dryer Area 120' Turbine NH3 Tank Bldg Area Main Turb LO Area Stator Cooling Skid BF13119/40 Area West Side Dump Valves West Side of Condenser East Side Dump Valves Low Press FW Htr Area Salem Common Page 29 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 11 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 5.0 UNIT 1 SECONDARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions Turbine Deck Turbine Crane High Press FW Htr Area East MSR Area West MSR Area HP Turbine Area 11/12/13 LP Turb Area Generator Area AUK Bldg Roof Area Salem Common Page 30 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 12 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 6.0 UNIT 2 PRIMARY AREA Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 10O'Aux Halon Bldg Hallway Main Hallway.

PASS Room Count Room BA Evap Room Demin Valve Alley BAT Pump Area Solid Rad Waste Area 100' & 122' 2A DGRoom EDG Area 2B DO Room 2C DO Room DO Common Control Area Salem Common Page 31 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 13 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 6.0 UNIT 2 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions Mechanical 100' Area Penetration Area 100' Stairway to 130' 78' Area SW Valve Rooms BIT Room Containment APD Area FHB Area 130' Area 100' Area 84' Area 122' AUK BAST Area Bldg VCT Area ABV Area CRHVAC Area Salem Common Page 32 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 14 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 6.0 UNIT 2 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 84' Aux Spray Add Bldg Tank Area 21-23 Chg Pump Area Chg Valve Platform CS Pump Area DO FOST Area FO Transfer Pump Area AFW Pump Area Seal Water HX Room Letdown HX Room 84' Hallway 22/23 CC Pump Area 21 CC Pump Area SI Pump Area SFP Hx Area Salem Common Page 33 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 15 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 6.0 UNIT 2 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions CVCS MT Area WHUT Area WG Comp Area Gas Decay Tank Area evcs HUT Area RAP Tank Pump Area General 55' Aux Area Bldg Aux Sump Tank Area 45' Aux 21 RHR Bldg Pump Area 22RHR Pump Area 64' 4160 V Bus Switchgear Area 2C 125 VDe Batt ASDS Inverter Salem Common Page 34 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 16 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 6.0 UNIT 2 PRIMARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 84' 84' Switchgear Hallway 460 V Bus Area DC Bus Area 100' Relay Relay Room Room Area 21/22 Ess Cont Inverter 2A VIB Inverter 2B VIB Inverter 2C VIB Inverter 2DVlB Inverter 2A 125 VDC Batt 2B 125 VDC Batt 2A 28VDC Batt 2B 28 VDC Batt Penetration Chiller Area Area Inner Pen Area 78' Electrical Area Salem Common Page 35 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 17 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 7.0

!]NIT 2 SECONDARY AREA Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 88' Turbine Cire Water Bldg Outlet Area Circ Water Inlet Area LO Storage Tank Area Heater Drain Pump Area Condensate Pump Area 100' Turbine TAC Hx and Bldg Pump Area Generator Duct Work Cond Pump Area Heater Drain Pump Area Cire Water Outlet Area Cire Water Inlet Area Salem Common Page 36 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 18 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 7.0 UNIT 2 SECONDARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions 100' Turbine HD Tank. and Bldg Mezz Area (continued)

Chern Add Tanks/Pumps 4160 V Bus Area 230 V MCC Area Stm Gen Feed Pump Area CA Dryer Area Stator Cooling Skid 120' Turbine NH3 Tank Hall Area Main Turh LO Area BF13/19/40 Area West Side Dump Valves West Side of Condenser East Side Dump Valves Low Press FW Htr Area Salem Common Page 37 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 19 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 7.0 UNIT 2 SECONDARY AREA (continued)

Location Initial Team Follow"Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions Turbine Deck Turbine Crane High Press FW Htr Area East MSR Area WestMSR Area HP Turbine Area 21/22/23 LP Turb Area Generator Area Heating Water Cony Aux Bldg Roof Area Salem Common Page 38 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 20 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 8.0 CmCULATING WATER AND SERVICE WATER AREA Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions Service

1 SW Bay Water Area Structure

1 SW Bay Ctrl House

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2 SW Bay Area

2 SW Bay Ctrl House

2 SW Bay Screen Area

3 SW Bay Area

3 SW Bay Ctri House

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4 SW Bay Area

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4 SW Bay Screen Area Circulating Unit 1 Circ Water Water Area Structure Unit 2 Cire Water Area Circ Water Swgr Salem Common Page 39 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 21 of 21)

VISUAL INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES FOLLOWING A EARTHQUAKE 9.0 YARD LOCATIONS Location Initial Team Follow-Up Team Description Area Dispatched Instructions Findings Dispatched Instructions Yard Area Gas Turbine SBO Compressor RAP Tanks Area FOST Area Switchyard Area Fresh Water Storage Tanks Well Water Pump House Containment Exteriors Mixing Bottle Areas HH Boiler Area Salem Common Page 40 of 61 Findings Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 1 of 2)

SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM DATA RETRIEVAL AND CALmRATION (Maintenance Controls)

CAUTION sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)

Maintenance Controls Technicians should not attempt to readjust or recalibrate the Seismic Monitoring System until seismic data is downloaded, as this would defeat attempts to obtain postwevent calibration data. Additionally, extreme caution should be utilized by Maintenance Controls during data collection and subsequent handling of data to prevent inadvertent loss of the recorded seismic data.

NOTE Each of the Seismic Monitoring Instruments actuated during a seismic event shall '

be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and a channel calibration performed within 5 days following the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12.

Seismic Monitoring System channel calibration may require reducing reactor power and/or shutdown of Unit 1 in order for personnel to access Seismic Monitoring equipment located within the inner bioshield (ALARA).

Magnitude results from the Seismic Monitoring System should be conveyed to the Shift Manager (SM), as soon as possible following data acquisition.

1.0 PERFORM the following lAW SC.IC-PT.INS-0005(Q), Seismic Strong Motion Instrumentation Retrieving and Loading Cassettes:

A.

RETRIEVE and PRODUCE a graphic seismic record of the Seismic Monitoring System data.

B.

ENSURE the Seismic Monitoring System is returned to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12 (Triaxial Time~History Accelographs).

Salem Connnon Page 41 of 61 Rev. 0

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ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 2 of 2)

SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM DATA RETRmVAL AND CALIBRATION (Maintenance Controls) 2.0 PERFORM the following lAW SC.IC-PT.INS-0001(Q), Peak Recording Accelograph:.

A.

RETRIEVE and DEVELOP accelograph plates from the Peak Recording Accelographs.

. B.

ENSURE the Peak Recording Accelographs are returned to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12 (Triaxial Peak Accelographs).

3.0 PERFORM channel calibration of the Seismic Monitoring System within 5 days of the seismic event lAW one of the following channel calibration procedures:

SC.IC-PT.INS-0002(Q), Seismic Strong Motion Instrumentation Channel Calibration (18 Month Full Channel Calibration Procedure)

Salem Common VSC.IC-CC.INS-OOOI(Q), Strong Motion Time-History Acceleration Recorder (Vendor Full Channel Calibration Procedure)

Page 42 of 61 Rev. 0

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COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET

1.0 COMMENTS

(Include procedure deficiencies and corrective actions. Attach additional pages as necessary.)

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COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET

2.0 SIGNATURES

Print Initials Signature Date 3.0 SM/eRS FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL:

This procedure with Attachments 1-8 is reviewed for completeness and accuracy.

Entry conditions and all deficiencies, including corrective actions, are clearly recorded in the COMMENTS Section of this attaclunent.

Signature:

Date: -----

SM/CRS Salem Common Page 44 of 61 Rev. 0

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APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 13)

PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS BATTERY RACKS Recommended Equipment Checks Check battery rack anchorage for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; evidence of rocking or sliding of battery racks.

Check for distortion of battery fack structure.

Check for evidence of rocking or sliding of batteries on the racks, buckling Of distortion of the bus bars. condition of the spacers between the batteries.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check buses/cables/ground straps for damage, distortion or chafing.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

SC.OPMAB.ZZ-0004(Q)

Verified By STATIC INVERTERS AND BATTERY CHARGERS Recommended Equipment Checks Verified By Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Check for distortion of cabinet structure.

Open cabinet and verifY that internally mounted components are secure and undamaged.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

Salem Common Page 45 of 61 Rev. 0

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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS TRANSFORMERS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts 01' nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Check oil reservoir level.

Check associated fire suppression systems for damage; e.g., nitrogen blanketing system, fire deluge system.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Check for distortion of cabinet structure.

Open cabinet and verify that internally mounted components, including relays and breakers, are secure and undamaged.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

Salem Common Page 46 of 61 Verified By Verified By Rev. 0

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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Check for distortion of cabinet structure.

Open cabinet and verify that internally mounted components, including relays and breakers, are secure and undamaged.

Reset any trips. Any additional trips after initial reset should be investigated.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

MEDIUM VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Check for distortion of cabinet structure.

Open cabinet and verify that internally mounted components, including relays and breakers, are secure and undamaged.

Reset any trips. Any additional trips after initial reset should be investigated.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms. breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

Salem Common Page 47 of 61 S C. OP~AB.ZZ-0004(Q)

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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS DISTRIBUTION PANELS Recommended Equipment Checks Cbeck equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached couduit and ground straps.

Check for distortion of cabinet structure.

Open cabinet and verify that internally mounted components, including relays and breakers, are secure and undamaged.

Reset any trips. Any additional trips after initial reset should be investigated.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

MOTOR GENERATORS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to pump due to seismic loads imposed by attached piping.

Check pump and motor bearings for indications of overheating, and lubrication.

Check for evidence of excessive motor-generator vibration andlor noise. Evidence of excessive vibration andlor noise may be an indication of misalignment between the motor and generator shafts.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

Salem Common Page 48 of 61 Verified By I

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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS ENGINES AND GENERATORS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Open cabinet and verify that internally mounted components, including relays and breakers, are secure and undamaged.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

FANS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.

Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.

Check for damage or distortion to fan housing or tearing of fabric noise eliminators due to seismic loads imposed by attached ducts.

Check for evidence of excessive fan vibration andlor noise. Evidence of excessive fan vibration andlor noise may be an indication of misalignment between the motor and fan shafts.

Check for clearance between the fan wheel and housing.

Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.

Check for belt tightness and/or slippage; e.g., belt smoking or odor.

Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.

Salem Common Page 49 of 61 sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)

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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS AIR HANDLERS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocklng or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for damage to air handler due to seismic loads imposed by attached ducts or tearing of fabric noise eliminators.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check for belt tightness andlor slippage; e.g., belt smoking or odor.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
AIR HANDLING DUCTS Recommended Equipment Checks Check for deformation of dead weight supports and sway bracing.
Check for damage to ducts at building joints and interfaces between buildings.
Check for damage to ducts at joints.
Check that instruments mounted to the rack are secure and undamaged.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check for tearing of fabric transitions/noise eliminators.
Check for damage to internal filters and racks.
Salem Common Page 50 of 61 SC.OP"AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS CHILLERS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for refrigerant leakage.
Check for damage to chiller due to seismic loads imposed by attached ducts or piping.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check for belt tightness and/or slippage; e.g., belt smoking or odor.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
AIR COMPRESSORS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damagej e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for air leaks if compressor is running continuously rather than cycling on and off.
Check for evidence of excessive air compressor vibration and/or noise. Evidence of excessive vibration and/or noise may be an indication of misalignment between the motor and air compressor shafts.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check for belt tightness andlor slippage; e.g., belt smoking or odor.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
Salem Common Page 51 of 61 S C.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS VERTICAL PUMPS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check casing below base plate for damage due to ground settlement/movement.
Check for damage to pump due to seismic loads imposed by attached piping.
Check for damage to shaft housing.
Check pump and motor bearings for indications of overheating, and lubrication.
Check for evidence of excessive pump vibration and/or noise. Evidence of excessive vibration and/or noise may be an indication of misalignment between the motor and pump shafts.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
HORIZONTAL PUMPS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e,g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for damage to pump housing due to seismic loads imposed by attached piping.
Check pump and motor bearings for indications of overheating, and lubrication.
Check for evidence of excessive pump vibration and/or noise. Evidence of excessive vibration and/or noise may be an indication of misalignment between the motor and pump shafts.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
Salem Common Page 52 of 61 SC.OP~AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS LOW PRESSURE STORAGE TANKS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached piping and ground straps.
Check for buckling of tank walls; e.g., "elephant foot" buckling.
Check for cracking or leakage at the base plate to cylindrical shell connection.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
Verified By HIGH PRESSURE TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS Recommended Equipment Checks Verified By Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached piping and ground straps.
AIR AND MOTOR OPERATED VALVES Recommended Equipment Checks Verified By Check for damage or distortion at attachment of valve operator to valve body.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Stroke valve in both directions to check operation.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check local alarms, breakers and pmtective devices for actuations or trips.
Salem Common Page 53 of 61 Rev. 0
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS INSTRUMENT RACKS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor boIts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for distortion of cabinet structure.
Check that instruments mounted to the rack are secure and undamaged.
Reset any trips. Any additional trips after initial reset should be investigated.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
SENSORS Recommended Equipment Checks Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g.* stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Verify sensor operation utilizing readout check at local/control room indicators.
Salem Common Page 54 of 61 sC.OP"AB.ZZ*0004(Q)
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION CABINETS Recommended Equipment Checks Verified By Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of equipment.
Check for damage to attached conduit and ground straps.
Check for distortion of cabinet strucmre.
Check cabinet to verify instrument gauges, controls, and other equipment mounted to cabinets are secure and undamaged.
Reset any trips. Any additional trips after initial reset should be investigated.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Check local alarms, breakers and protective devices for actuations or trips.
PIPING Recommended Equipment Checks Verified By Check for snubber damage; e.g., snubbers pulled loose from foundation boits, evidence of excessive travel, jam up of inertia mechanism/leakage of hydraulic fluid and bent piston rods.
Check for damage at rigid supports; e.g., deformation of support structure, deformation of pipe due to impact with support structure.
Check for damage or leakage of pipe at rigid connections; e.g., anchor points with other equipment and structures.
Check for damage to pipe at building joints and interfaces between buildings.
Check for damage or leakage of piping and branch lines.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
Salem Common Page 55 of 61 Rev. 0
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS ELECTRICAL RACEWAYS Recommended Equipment Checks Check for deformation of dead weight supports and sway bracing.
Check for damage to cables at building joints and interfaces between buildings.
Check for damage to ground straps of electrical raceways.
Check for damage due to impact or earthquake induced flooding or spraying.
STEEL FRAMED STRUCTURES Recommended Equipment Checks Check for damage at bolted or welded connections.
Check equipment anchorage/isolation mounts for damage; e.g., stretching or loosening-of anchor bolts or nuts; rocking or sliding of base plates on concrete.
Check for distortion or buckling of braces and other compression members.
REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES Recommended Equipment Checks Check for new open (> 0.06 inches) cracks, spal1ing of concrete. It should be noted that minor cracks, even if caused by the earthquake. are not considered significant unless large enough to result in yielding of rebar.
Check for evidence of ground settlement.
Check for evidence of differential horizontal and vertical movement between adjacent and/or interconnecting buildings and structured.
Salem Common Page 56 of 61 SC.OP~AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
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PLANT EQUIPMENT CHECKS PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Recommended Equipment Checks Check for Reactor Coolant System leakage at flanged joints; e.g., CRD Mechanism.
Check for condition of supports and snubbers for large components; e.g., reactor coolant pumps, steam generators, pressurizer.
Check for condition of the CRDM support structure.
BURIED PIPE Recommended Equipment Checks Check for damage or leakage at pipe interface with buildings and tanks, Check for indication of fire main leakage as evidenced by excavation and/or actuation of fire pumps.
Fire mains, service and circulating water piping, especially dead legs, are susceptible to buildups of corrosion and growths which are knocked loose by earthquake motion.
These loosened accumulations can clog screens and small diameter pipes such as fire hydrants. Check for clogging and flush pipe mains, as necessary.
Salem Common Page 57 of 61 sC.OP*AB.ZZ~0004(Q)
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3 APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)
EPRI SEISMIC DAMAGE SCALE SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FACILITIES Maximum Damage Description No damage to seismically designed structures and equipment. Some displacement of panels in wire hung suspended ceiling. Some tipping, displacement, and spilling of contents of book cases and storage racks without lateral bracing or positive anchorage. Some cracking of windows, plaster, and un-reinforced masonry walls in non-seismically designed structures designed and built to commercial standards, such as administration buildings, warehouses, and shops. Tripping of some non-seismically designed vibration monitoring instrumentation and vibration sensitive instruments.
No damage to seismically designed structures and equipment. Some falling of panels in wire hung suspended ceilings. General tipping and some overturning of book cases, file cabinets, and storage racks without lateral bracing or positive anchorage. Widespread cracking of windows. plaster, masonry, and concrete in structures built to commercial standards such as the turbine hall; some such cracking in industrial structures (1). Some rubbing or displacement of insulation on non-seismic piping. Tripping of non-seismically designated vibration monitoring and vibration sensitive instrumentation. Slight damage to low pressure storage tanks.
Widespread breaking of windows. Depending on design basis and available seismic margins, widespread cracking of walls in seismical1y designated structures can be expected. Some leakage of flanged and threaded joints in non-seismically designed and seismically designed piping may be expected. Some permanent deformation of non-seismically designed and seismically designed distribution systems (raceways, pipe, and ducts). Many instances of damaged insulation on piping. General failure of wire hung suspended ceilings and light fixtures. General overturning of unrestrained book cases, storage racks, filing cabinets, and furniture. Un-reinforced brick, tile, and block walls thrown out of line. Partial collapse of commercial construction. Trips and vibration alarms for non-seismically designed vibration monitoring and vibration sensitive instruments requiring significant resetting. Some shifting of unanchored equipment on their foundations and some permanent deformation of walls and leakage of contents of non-seismically designed and seismically designed tanks. Possible leakage of contents of non-seismically designed tanks.
Some spalling of concrete walls and permanent deformations of structural steel joints in both non-seismically and seismically designed industrial buildings. Un-reinforced masonry and block walls generally thrown out of plumb in seismically designed structures. Significant leakage and occasional rupture of non-seismically designed piping with bolted flanges and threaded joints, and breaking of cables in non-seismically designed raceway, particularly at or near construction joints. Some failure of non-seismically designed piping, duct, and raceway supports. Permanent deformation and yielding of seismically designed piping, raceway and duct supports, and impacts with adjacent structure and equipment. Permanent deformation and yielding of seismically designed mechanical and electrical equipment. Some anchorage failures. Severe damage and collapse of commercial construction. Moderate damage to industrial construction. Slight damage to seismic Category 1 construction. Widespread damage of ceramic isolators. Debris and rubble may limit access.
General failure of non-seismically designed and seismically designed tanks and non-seismically designed underground nonwelded steel piping.
(1)
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Salem Conunon Page 58 of 61 Rev. 0
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APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 2)
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT NOTE The following may require additional consideration following a seismic event.
Provisions for the delivery of fuel oil from outside suppliers may need to be factored into the recovery plan. Refer to NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0201(Q), TSC - Integrated Engineering Response, for additional guidance.
The System Operator should be contacted to understand the effects on the grid, and grid stability.
Availability of water for secondary system cooling may be limited which would require a more rapid cooldown than is desired. Availability of secondary water system water sources must be carefully monitored to ensure adequate cooling water is available to support attaining Cold Shutdown.
The plant is designed such that equipment required to take the plant to Hot Shutdown (Mode 3) is seismically qualified. An assessment of equipment availability/operability should be performed prior to commencing RCS cooldown and depressurization.
Should a loss of offsite power occur, the potential exists for RCS void formation if a rapid RCS cooldown is required.
Operations personnel should be alert for a loss of Station and Instrument Air. If a loss of Instrument Air occurs, refer to Sl(2).OP-AB.CA-OOOl(Q), Loss of Control Air, as applicable.
Impaired lighting conditions may exist in the plant. Compensatory actions should be discussed, as required.
DE has demonstrated that impaired communications may exist in the plant, and from the plant to the outside. Compensatory actions should be discussed, as required.
Communications with the NJ, DE and the Coast Guard will be necessary to determine if any other accidents on the river could affect Salem Nuclear Power Plants (e.g., a refinery is discharging a large amount of oil into the river.
(continued on next page)
Salem Common Page 59 of 61 Rev. 0
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S C.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT The status of the BOF and ENC should be evaluated Possible damage to roads and bridges in the surrounding area may limit the availability of outside assistance for an extended period of time (e.g., site access road).
If transportation systems are damaged, consider the ability of NJ and DE to perform protective actions (evaluations), if required. The ability of PSEG personnel to respond to an emergency callout should be considered. The TSC or EOF should contact state and local Emergency Management personnel for status of roads, and infrastructure concerns.
The ability to effectively implement the provisions of the PSEG, NJ, and DE Emergency Plans should be assessed as part of the unit startup preparations.
As a minimum the following should be reviewed/assessed:
~ Ingress and Egress capabilities within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ),
in NJ and DE.
NJ and DE Emergency Preparedness capabilities and facilities status.
Status of the Alert Notification System (ANS), also referred to as the offsite Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) sirens, and status of Backup Public Notification options in place in areas of failed sirens.
Salem Common Page 60 of 61 Rev. 0
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EXHIBIT 1 (Page 1 of 1)
BRIEFING SHEET NOTE SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q)
The following items are a list of potential topics which should be covered during the briefing at SM/CRS discretion.
1)
SAFETY Use extreme caution when investigating potentially damaged equipment.
2)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION and ECGs
3)
4) 3.8.1.1, AC Sources Operating 3.8.1.2, AC Sources Shutdown Event Classification Guide, Attachment 9.5, Seismic Event PARAMETERS TO BE MONITORED BEACON for any indicated changes in Reactor Core Operating Parameters (e.g., AFD, Reactor Power, etc.).
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Critical Function Status Trees (CFSTs).
Radiation Monitors associated with the Reactor Coolant System for indication of changes.
Reactor Coolant System for indication of changes in with regard to flow, temperature and pressure.
Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) for any indication of metallic sounds on the system audio speaker.
Changes in Reactor Coolant System and Secondary System activity and chemistry.
Indications of pipe ruptures or flooding on site (e.g., fire mains, circulating water, condensate, etc.)
CONTINGENCIES IF OBE was exceeded (>O.lg)
OR damage is identified, THEN CONSIDER briefing the Operating Crew on the Reactor Shutdown.
The Operating Crew should RESPOND to all alanns and immediate effects of the seismic event lAW the applicable ABs, EOPs and OPs. Operator response to maintain the plant in a safe stable condition takes precedence over this procedure.
REFER TO Appendix C, Additional Considerations Following a Seismic Event, for additional considerations.
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1.0 REFERENCES
EARTHQUAKE TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT 1.1 Technical Documents:
A.
Salem Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report:
1.
Section 2.5, Geology and Seismology
2.
Section 7.7.2.12, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation
3.
Section 8.3.1.5, Standby Power Supplies
4.
Section 9.4.5, Diesel Generator Area Ventilation
5.
Table 7.7-3, Seismic Monitoring Instruments
6.
Table 7.7-4, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements B.
Technical Specifications:
1.
3.8.1.1, AC Sources Operating
2.
3.8.1.2, AC Sources Shutdown C.
Event Classification Guide, Attachment 9.5, Seismic Event
1.2 Procedures
A.
NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0201(Q), TSC - Integrated Engineering Response B.
NC.NA-AP.ZZ-OOll(Q), Records Management Program C.
S1.0P-AB.CA-0001(Q), Loss of Control Air D.
S2.0P-AB.CA-OOOl(Q), Loss of Control Air E.
S1.0P-AB.FUEL-0001(Q), Fuel Handling Incident F.
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-0001(Q), Fuel Handling Incident G.
S1.0P-AB.FUEL-0002(Q), Loss of Refueling Cavity or Spent Fuel Pool Level H.
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-0002(Q), Loss of Refueling Cavity or Spent Fuel Pool Level I.
S1.0P-AR.ZZ-0001(Q), Overhead Annunciators Window A J.
S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0001(Q), Overhead Annunciators Window A K.
S1.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(Q), Power Operation L.
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004(Q), Power Operation M.
Sl.0P-IO.ZZ-0005(Q), Minimum Load to Hot Standby N.
S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0005(Q), Minimum Load to Hot Standby O.
S1.0P-SO.DGV-0001(Q). Diesel Generator Area Ventilation Operation P.
S2.0P-SO.DGV-0001(Q), Diesel Generator Area Ventilation Operation Q.
Sl.0PwST.RCS-OOOl(Q), Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies R.
S2.0P-ST.RCS-0001(Q), Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies (continued on next page)
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(continued)
S.
SC,IC-FT.INS-0003(Q), Seismic Strong Motion Instrumentation (6 Month. Functional Test of Seismic Monitoring System)
T.
SC.lC-PT.lNS-0001(Q), Peak Recording Accelograph (Mechanical Accelograph Instructions)
U.
SC,IC-PT.1NS-0002(Q), Seismic Strong Motion Instrumentation Channel Calibration (18 Month Full Channel Calibration Procedure)
V.
SC.IC-PT.lNS-0004(Q), Seismic Strong Motion Instrumentation Channel Check (31 Day Channel Check Procedure)
W.
SC.IC-PT.INS-0005(Q), Seismic Strong Motion Instrumentation Retrieving and Loading Cassettes X.
SC.IC-PT.INS-0006(Q), Seismic System Field Device Calibration Triaxial Time -
History Accelerometers ITMTR-14240, lTMTR-14241 and ITMTR-14242 (Calibration Procedure for the Triaxial Accelerometers)
Y.
VSC.lC-CC.lNS-0001(Q), Strong Motion Time-History Acceleration Recorder (Vendor Full Channel Calibration Procedure)
Z.
VSC.IC-PT.INS-OOOl(Q), Strong Motion Time-History Acceleration Recorder (Vendor Functional Test Procedure)
AA, SC. OP-DG. ZZ-01 01, Salem Post-Trip Data Collection Guidelines
1. 3 Drawinas:
A.
219398, No. 1 & 2 Units Seismic Sensing & Recording System B.
231926, No.1 & 2 Units - Fire Protection System Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Rooms &
Tank: Rooms C.
304854, Kinemetrics Operating Instructions for SMP-l Magnetic Tape Playback System
1.4 Commitments
None 1.5 Industry Concerns:
None 1.6 Seismic Monitorina-System Vendor Information:
Kinemetrics Incorporated 222 Vista Avenue Pasadena, CA 91107 Telephone: (626)795-2220 E-mai1: www.kinemetrics.com Salem Common Page 2 of 12 Rev. 0
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1.7 Other
A.
EPRI NP-6695. Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake B.
Regulatory Guide 1.12 - Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes C.
Regulatory Guide 1.166 - Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions D.
Regulatory Guide 1.167 - Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown by a Seismic Event E.
L.P. No. 0300-000.00S-SEISMIC-00, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation F.
NDTF 20184342, Salem Response to an DB Earthquake G.
Order 70026223, Salem Procedure/Actions After Earthquake H.
Order 70026209, Emergency Response to Earthquake I.
10CFR50, Appendix A to Part 50 -- General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants J.
10CFRlOO, Appendix A to Part 100 -- Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants 2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 This procedure is not intended to combat the consequences of an earthquake; however the appropriate Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) serve that function. Instead, the intent of this procedure is to provide the necessary guidance to Control Room Operating personnel to:
Assess the consequences of an earthquake to determine if a shutdown is required, or continued operation is acceptable.
Provide the direction necessary for the Salem Operations Department personnel to respond to the consequences of an earthquake.
Assist the Salem Operations Department in identifying the extent of testing required following a earthquake induced forced shutdown.
2.2 It is expected that the Operating Crew responds to all alarms and immediate effects of the seismic event lAW the applicable ABs, BOPs and OPs. Operator response to maintain the plant in a safe stable condition takes precedence over this procedure.
2.3 This discussion provides the reasoning behind the logic and flowpath of the procedure.
It is not intended to provide additional direction to the procedure.
2.4 This Earthquake Abnormal Operating Procedure incorporates guidance contained within EPRI NP-6695 and Regulatory Guides 1.12, 1.166 and 1.167. The absence of clear, detailed and rational procedures for nuclear plant response to an earthquake may result in unnecessary shutdown of an operating nuclear power plant(s) and a prolonged delay in plant startup. The guidelines contained within this procedure are intended to minimize costs related to a shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Units following an earthquake, while assuring safety in operation.
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J sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q) 2.5 Entry conditions This procedure is initiated when any of the following conditions are recognized:
Vibratory ground motion is felt on site and recognized as such by a consensus of the Control Room Operating crew Annunciation of OHA A-37, SElS RCDR SYS ACT 2.6 Immediate Actions There are no immediate actions associated with this procedure.
2.7 Subsequent Actions Step 3.1 NOTE ~ Indicates if vibratory ground motion exceeds that of the Operating Basis Earthquake (>O.1g) occurs, shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Power Plants will be required lAW Appendix A to 10CFRlOO. Prior to resuming operations, the licensee will be required to demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. This guidance is consistent with guidance provided in EPRI NP-6695 and Reg Guide 1.166.
Stcp 3.1 NOTE - Indicates if vibratory ground motion does NOT exceed that of the Operating Basis Earthquake ( < 0.1 g), and no significant damage is found during Operator Walkdown inspections, then shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plants is NOT considered necessary. This guidance is consistent with guidance provided in EPRI NP-6695 and Regulatory Guide 1.166.
Step 3.1 initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.
Step 3.2 NOTB identifies the conditions requiring BCG Notification. Indication of either of the following conditions constitutes declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT in accordance with the BCG: (1) A seismic event is felt by personnel within the Protected Area, or (2) Valid Actuation of the Seismic Trigger (>O.01g) has occurred as verified by the SMA-3 Event Indicator (flag) being WHITE as indicated on the Salem Seismic Recorder. Additionally, indication of either of the above specified conditions in conjunction with a Valid Actuation of the Hope Creek Seismic Switch (>O.lg),
constitutes declaration of an ALERT in accordance with the ECG.
Step 3.2 indicates if a seismic event is felt by personnel within the Protected Area, then the Shift Manager (SM) is to be notified to refer to the Event Classification Guide.
lAW the ECG, classification of the event is required to be performed within 15 minutes.
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Step 3.3 NOTE - Contains specific information regarding operation of the Seismic Monitoring System.
Step 3.3 directs the Operator to monitor the Seismic Recorder to determine if a valid seismic event has occurred. This information will be utilized in determining if continued performance of this procedure is warranted.
Step 3.4 provides specific guidance if it is determined that a valid seismic event has NOT occurred.
Step 3.5 NOTE identifies the conditions requiring ECG Notification. Indication of either of the following conditions constitutes declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT in accordance with the ECG: (1) A seismic event is felt by personnel within the Protected Area, or (2) Valid Actuation of the Seismic Trigger (>O.Olg) has occurred as verified by the SMA-3 Event Indicator (flag) being WHITE as indicated on the Salem Seismic Recorder. Additionally, indication of either of the above specified conditions in corijunction with a Valid Actuation of the Hope Creek Seismic Switch (> O.lg)t constitutes declaration of an ALERT in accordance with the BCG.
Step 3.5 indicates if not already performed, then the Shift Manager (SM) is to be notified to refer to the Event Classification Guide. lAW the ECG, classification of the event is required to be performed within 15 minutes.
Step 3.6 perfol1ns a quick overall diagnosis of plant operation will assist in determining if other conditions exist that may require urgent attention. It is expected that the Operating Crew will respond to all alarms and immediate effects of the seismic event lAW the applicable ABs, BOPs and OPs. Operator response to maintain the plant in a safe stable condition takes precedence over performance of this procedure.
Step 3.7 evaluates if Unit 1 or 2 is currently in a Refueling Outage or Outage condition.
Special consideration should be given to Steam Generator Nozzle Dam(s),
Reactor Cavity Seal(s), and Partial Loaded Reactor Core(s) in the event a seismic event occurs. The applicable ABs are identified should the indicated condition exist.
Step 3.8 CAUTION - Indicates Maintenance Controls Technicians should NOT attempt to readjust or recalibrate the Seismic Monitoring System until seismic data is downloaded, as this would defeat attempts to obtain post~event calibration data. Also, caution indicates extreme caution should be utilized during data collection and subsequent handling of data to prevent inadvertent loss of the data. This caution was incorporated to highlight the need to exercise extreme care during data collection.
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Step 3.8 NOTE - UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12 is referenced indicating that each of the Seismic Monitoring Instruments actuated during a seismic event shall be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and a channel calibration performed within 5 days following the seismic event. Additionally, with regard to Unit 1. Seismic Monitoring System channel calibration may require reducing reactor power and/or shutdown (Unit 1 only) in order for personnel to access Seismic Monitoring equipment located within the inner bioshield due to ALARA concerns.
Step 3.8 contacts Maintenance Controls to have qualified personnel perform, Seismic Monitoring System Data Retrieval and Calibration. Performance of Attachment 7 will provide data for determining subsequent procedural actions, and ensures compliance with UFSAR 7.7.2.12.
Step 3.9 identifies contact numbers for the National Earthquake Center, for obtaining updated information regarding the seismic event, if desired.
Step 3.10 and NOTE - Indicates that several relays in the Cardox System may be inadvertently tripped during a seismic event. These relays provide interlocks, but will not initiate a CO2 discharge. There are nine relays per Unit (one for each DO FOST Room, one for each DO Room, one for both DFO Pump Rooms, one for each Switchgear Room, and one for the Electrical Penetration Room). Of immediate concern are the relays for the Diesel Generator Room. If one of these relays trip,the respective DO Area and Control Area Exhaust Fans will be tripped. These relays must be either reset or bypassed to restart the respective fans. Specific guidance is provided to start the diesel room exhaust fans, should this condition exist. This incorporates guidance that was previously contained in Sl(2).OP-AR.ZZ-0001(Q).
Step 3.11 and NOTE - Step commences Operator Walkdowns lAW Attachment 2.
None indicates Plant walkdowns are to be completed in a timely manner following indication of an earthquake. Regulatory Guide 1.166 requires the decision to shut down the plant be made within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event. EPRI recommends Operator Walkdowns be completed within 4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event. The plant itself, not damage from nearby communities, or data from remote locations, is the best indicator of the severity of the seismic event at the plant site. This guidance is consistent with guidance provided in EPRI NP-6695 and Regulatory Guide 1.166.
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Step 3.12 NOTE - Indicates conditions may exist following a seismic event which exceeds the aBE such that a discontinuance of power generation could result in loss of critical lifeline functions and potential loss of life. If the System Operator requests that the Salem Stations remain on line, and shutdown of the plants is required as a result of exceeding the OBE limitation, then Licensing and the NRC should be immediately consulted with to propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plants lAW Regulatory Guide 1.166. It should be noted. the need for power generation does NOT take precedence over plant Operating Procedures, or the requirements of the Operating License. Additionally, Load reduction rates of 2:= 5 % Iminute are NOT recommended during performance of Step 3.12, and Itsignificant damage" is defined.
Step 3.12 - Step indicates that if vibratory ground motion exceeded that of the Operating Basis Earthquake (> 0.1 g), or damage was identified during performance of the Operator Walkdowns, then if not already shutdown, shutdown the Reactor following performance of pre-shutdown inspections lAW Attachment 3. Following shutdown Post-Shutdown Inspections and Tests are performed IA W Attachment 4. This guidance is consistent with guidance provided in EPRI NP-6695 and Regulatory Guide 1.166.
Step 3.13 and NOTE - Step indicates that if vibratory ground motion did NOT exceed that of the Operating Basis Earthquake <<O.lg), or damage was NOT identified during performance of the Operator Walkdowns, then operation may continue, or the unit started up if shutdown. This guidance is consistent with guidance provided in EPRI NP-6695 and Regulatory Guide 1.166, and "significant damage" is defined. - Continuous Action Summary Step 1.0 provides guidance to the Operator to transition to 1(2)-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, in the event of a Reactor Trip as a result of the seismic event. The Operator is then directed to continue with Step 3.3 of this procedure, when conditions permit.
Step 2.0 indicates if damage has OCCUlTed to any Structure, System or Component (SSC) that is required to safely shutdown the plant following an OBE or seismic event, then Licensing should be contacted to communicate a plan for the timely repair and/or shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plant(s) to the Commission.
Step 3.0 references Appendix C, Additional Consideration Following a Seismic Event, for additional post-seismic event concerns.
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J sC.OP-AB.ZZ-0004(Q) - Operator Walkdowns When the plant is stable and personnel are available, operators should perform walkdowns of the plant similar to those performed during their normal daily rounds.
The purpose of Operator Walkdowns is to determine the effect of the earthquake or seismic event on plant structures, and to provide additional guidance with regard to additional required inspections.
As Plant Operators are the most knowledgeable with regard to their duty stations, they should take the lead in monitoring of their assigned areas. Additionally. Plant Operators may be assisted by available on-site personnel (e.g., Engineering, Maintenance, Quality Assurance, etc.) in performance of the Operator Walkdowns.
High radiation areas, the containment building, and other areas with limited access need not be included in the initial walkdown inspections unless plant personnel have reason to suspect that there may be damage in these areas.
Plant walkdowns are to be completed in a timely manner following indication of an earthquake. Regulatory Guide 1.166 requires the decision to shut down the plant be made within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event. EPRI recommends Operator Walkdowns be completed within 4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of the event.
The plant itself, not damage from nearby communities, or data from remote locations, is the best indicator of the severity of the seismic event at the plant site. - PreHShutdown Inspections Following the decision to shutdown the plant, but prior to initiating the shutdown, visual inspections of essential safe shutdown equipment should be performed to determine its readiness. Other factors outside of the of the plant that could affect the timing of the shutdown (e.g., availability/reliability of off~site power), should also be evaluated at this time.
In order to ascertain possible fuel and reactor internal damage, the indicated checks should be prior to the plant shutdown being initiated.
When plant capability to safely shutdown has been verified, nOlmal shutdown should proceed.
The need for power generation does NOT take precedence over plant Operating Procedures.
or the requirements of the Operating License. Conditions may exist following a seismic event which exceeds the aBE such that a discontinuance of power generation could result in loss of critical lifeline functions and potential loss of life. If the System Operator requests that the Salem Stations remain on line, and shutdown of the plants is required as a result of exceeding the OBE limitation, then Licensing and the NRC should be immediately consulted with to propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the Salem Nuclear Plants lAW Regulatory Guide 1.166. It should be noted, the need for power generation does NOT take precedence over plant Operating Procedures, or the requirements of the Operating License.
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W U1 SC,OP-AB,ZZ-0004(Q) - Post-Shutdown Inspections and Tests Post-shutdown inspections and tests are those needed to determine the physical condition of the nuclear plant and its readiness to resume operation after being shutdown due to a seismic event. These inspections and tests are designed to provide a graded response commensurate with the type and severity of damage found. The recommended post-shutdown actions* consist of the following:
a)
Focused inspections by experienced engineers of a pre-selected sample of representative structures and equipment. The purpose of these inspections is to determine the need for expanded inspections and tests, and to provide data to establish the severity of the earthquake.
b)
Detennination of EPRI damage intensity. Using the infonnation collected during focused inspections, and other observations, a group of experienced engineers will establish the EPRI damage intensity utilizing the established guidelines. Identification of the EPRI damage intensity will determine the course of actions to restart the plant.
c)
If damage to the pre-selected sample of safety-related equipment and structures is found,.
or the EPRI damage intensity is determined to exceed a specific level, then expanded inspections are to be performed. These expanded inspections by qualified engineers are undertaken to further define evaluate potential damage to all components, systems, and structures required for operation. This information is used to (1) establish corrective actions and repairs that may be required to return the plant to a state of operational readiness, and (2) identify the need and timing for additional analytical and other engineering evaluations which may be prudent to assure the long term integrity and reliability of the plant.
d)
Surveillance tests as required by Technical Specifications to verify the operability of equipment needed for plant operation.
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W IJ) s C.OP*AB.ZZM0004(Q) ~ Long~ Term Evaluations Long-term evaluations are those engineering activities needed to assess the potential for hidden damage that may have occurred to safety-related equipment and structured which might degrade their long-term reliability. Long-term evaluations are not required if plant shutdown is not warranted (e.g., the OBE criteria is not exceeded).
For EPRI Damage Intensities of 2 or less, these evaluations may be performed after the plant is restarted. If the EPRl Damage Intensity exceeds 2, plant restart will depend on successful completion of the long-term evaluations.
The recommended long-term evaluations consist of the following:
Determine of Actual Seismic Loads - This includes the calculation of floor response spectra using the actual earthquake ground motion records. For those plants with design floor spectra, a comparison of the calculated and design spectra would be made.
Measured spectral accelerations may be used in place of calculated floor response spectra where such information is available from seismic instruments installed in the plant.
Seismic Re-evaluation-Where the original design spectra may have been exceeded by a seismic event, selected equipment and structures should be further evaluated to establish the nature of any exceedance and its potential to cause damage. The seismic re-evaluations make use of original design information, modern analytical techniques, seismic capacity data and, where necessary, special nondestructive examinations and functional tests. - Visual Inspection of Equipment and Structures Following a Earthquake provides a pre-selected sample of representative structures and equipment required to be visually inspected. The purpose of these inspections is to determine the need for expanded inspections and tests, and to provide required data to establish the EPRI Damage Intensity.
Refer to Appendix A for a list of equipment to be checked.
Refer to Appendix B for a definition of the EPRl Seismic Damage Scale.
The Technical Support Center (TSC) will generally be responsible for coordinating performance of Attachment 6, and maintaining the inspection records.
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J SC.OP~AB.ZZ~0004(Q) H Seismic Monitoring System Data Retrieval and Calibration (Maintenance Controls)
CAUTION H Maintenance Controls Technicians should not attempt to readjust or recalibrate the Seismic Monitoring System until seismic data is downloaded, as this would defeat attempts to obtain postHevent calibration data. Additionally. extreme caution should be utilized by Maintenance Controls during data collection and subsequent handling of data to prevent inadvertent loss of the recorded seismic data.
NOTE M Each of the Seismic Monitoring Instruments actuated during a seismic event shall be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and a channel calibration performed within 5 days following the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12.
NOTE H Seismic Monitoring System channel calibration may require reducing reactor power and/or shutdown of Unit 1 in order for personnel to access Seismic Monitoring equipment located within the inner bioshield due to ALARA concerns.
NOTE - Magnitude results from the Seismic Monitoring System should be conveyed to the Shift Manager (SM), as soon as possible following data acquisition.
Step 1.1 retrieves. produces a graphic image of the Triaxial TimeHHistory Accelograph, then ensures the Seismic Monitoring System is returned to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12.
Step 1.2 retrieves and develops accelographs plates from the Triaxial Peak Accelographs, then ensures the Peak Recording Accelographs are returned to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12.
Step 1.3 ensures a channel calibration of the Seismic Monitoring System is performed within 5 days of the seismic event lAW UFSAR Section 7.7.2.12. H Completion Sign~off Sheet Salem Common Page 11 of 12 Rev. 0
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Appendix A - Plant Equipment Checks The equipment identified in Appendix A should is required to be included in the focused post-earthquake inspection lAW Section 5.3.2.1 of EPRI NP-6695.
Appendix B - EPRI Seismic Damage Scale for Nuclear Power Plant Facilities The EPR! Seismic Damage Intensity Scale is delineated (EPRI-I, EPRI-2 and EPRI-3) as identified in EPRI NP-6695.
Appendix C - Additional Considerations Following A Seismic Event Exhibit 1 - Briefing Sheet Items that could be potentially discussed at a Shift Briefing are identified.
END OF DOCUMENT Salem Common Page 12 of 12 Rev. 0

ML110070221

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SUMMARY

SUMMARY

1.0 COMMENTS

2.0 SIGNATURES

1.0 REFERENCES

1.2 Procedures

1.4 Commitments

1.7 Other

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ML110070221

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

1.0 COMMENTS

2.0 SIGNATURES

1.0 REFERENCES

1.2 Procedures

1.4 Commitments

1.7 Other

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