ML102980125
| ML102980125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/2010 |
| From: | Mcneil D Operations Branch III |
| To: | Exelon Nuclear |
| Shared Package | |
| ML102510205 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373/10-301, 50-374/10-301 50-373/10-301, 50-374/10-301 | |
| Download: ML102980125 (4) | |
Text
LaSalle Operating Test Comments There were no NRC comments on the outline submitted by the facility.
Item Comment Action Admin JPM a RO Step 2 has actions to notify two separate Revised per recommendation.
people. Separate the step into 2 steps.
Step 3 standard does not specify level Added Field Supervisor or WEC SRO.
of individual to be notified.
Terminating cue needs to be more Revised terminating cue to when the specific. Nursing Supervisor at the hospital is notified.
Admin JPM a SRO Steps #2 and #3 are not critical steps. Changed steps #2 and #3 to non-critical.
Changed step #4 to critical.
The JPM doesnt require the applicant to The applicant is required to find the document anything in order to pass the discrepancy and reject the form. The JPM. The applicant notes the hours applicants verbal response that the time is discrepancy, determines that 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> incomplete is enough for acceptance. If are not met, and then does not sign the the applicant signs the document, this form. There is no requirement or place documents an unsatisfactory performance.
for the applicant to document any No change made to the JPM.
discrepancies.
Admin JPM b RO It doesnt appear the JPM requires the The applicants identification of the work applicant to document anything in order to hours is the critical task. No change pass the JPM. The critical steps involve made.
only determining and nothing must be written down.
Admin JPM b SRO It doesnt appear to require the applicant The applicants identification of the work to document anything in order to pass the hours is the critical task. The applicants JPM. The critical steps involve only verbal response identifying the work hour determining and so nothing is rules is adequate to verify correct documented. knowledge. No change made.
Admin JPM c SRO Two valves are not critical for Revised JPM to omit unnecessary valves.
identification.
If the applicant finds the need for any Identification of additional valves beyond isolation valves in addition to those the isolation valves identified in the JPM is provided, would that be considered failure evidence of unsatisfactory knowledge.
criteria?
Why is securing the Diesel Fire Pump Securing the pump is a tech spec action required here and NOT in the RO and is the portion of the JPM that makes version? this JPM SRO knowledge level.
Admin JPM d Initiating cue has redundant statements. Revised initiating cue to eliminate RO/SRO redundancy.
There is nothing in this JPM that A good operator must recognize the discriminates a good operator from a bad requirements to enter a locked high operator because these are RP radiation area and know which map can be responsibilities, not on-shift licensed used and which RP brief to expect when operator responsibilities as the task entering a locked high rad area. No referenced at the beginning of the JPM change to the JPM.
states.
Admin JPM e SRO Revise to evaluate knowledge of time Revised as requested.
completion and notification during an
LaSalle Operating Test Comments Item Comment Action upgrade classification.
CR JPM a Initial condition procedure step needs Initial condition revised to current revised. procedure revision.
Step 23 no specific enough for minimum Revised to state approximately 20%.
position.
CR JPM c Questioned overlap with scenario event. Scenario had an RWCU leak with unsuccessful isolation leading to a depressurization. This JPM will allow the applicant to successfully isolate the leak.
JPM left as is.
CR JPM d Initial condition should identify the JPM as Revised initial condition to state the JPM is time critical time critical.
CR JPM f The JPM is not alternate path. Left as is. the JPM required action via the response not obtained portion of the procedure.
Step 4 of the JPM should mention the Added not to warn examiner.
examinee may try to initiate SBGT via the Arm and Depress push button.
CR JPM h Setup of JPM had a required piece of Revised JPM setup initial conditions.
equipment out of service due to modified setup since validation.
CR JPM g No cue to state examinee has obtained Added cue to state examinee has obtained proper safety equipment and screwdriver. proper safety equipment and screwdriver.
LFP-100-1, Att. D states to install an Placed cue in the JPM stating someone Equipment Status Tag on 1H13-P603 else will follow through with the placement panel apron W/D (withdraw block light. of the tag and procedure deviation. Wrote This light no longer exists. PCR for procedure change. Release after exam completion.
IP JPM k EPN for C vacuum brkr not listed in step Added EPN to step 3.
3.
Step 3 standard does not state correct Added counter-clockwise direction to the direction to close the vacuum breaker. standard.
Climbing a ladder required for accessing Added a step that when identified, cue the an isolation valve. examinee with the EPN of the identified valve.
Scenario 1 Event 4, A IRM INOP is labeled as a TS Removed as a TS call.
call when no required actions are entered.
Actions for event 1 included action to Removed actions to attempt to re-couple 4 attempt re-coupling 4 times. Not required times.
when below LPSP.
During event 2 annunciator 1PM06J-B407 Overwrote the alarm so it will not energize (PRI CONT 1B EXP TANK LVL HI/LO) during the exam.
energized.
Event 3 WRGM Lo range trip referred to Removed reference to TRM 3.3.d.
TRM 3.3.d.
LaSalle Operating Test Comments Item Comment Action Event 6 - Feedwater break needs more Added additional actions taken and valves response actions listed. that will be closed.
Event 7 - Loss of Coolant, requested to Added additional steps that may be add possible actions based on conditions. performed by applicants.
Event 5 - TBCCW pressure low, the crew Wrote simulator work request. Will issue stated the PPC display did not indicate upon completion of the exam.
the SAC running.
Scenario 2 Turbine lube oil was 93°F at the SWR written to fix TLO temperature in the beginning of the scenario. IC.
On initial run, did not receive Event 2 due Removed the typo, ran event to ensure to typo in cae. actuation and proper response.
Scenario 3 Validation crew stated leaving the Main Added role play and ation to isolate the Turbine bypass valve failed open failed open bypass valve prior to the following the scram masked the MS leak, scram.
causing depressurization.
Preventing HPCS, LPCS and LPCI Added ECCS prevention during an ATWS injection during an ATWS was not a as a critical task.
critical tsk.
Critical task requires initiation of SBLC at Added and/or insert control rods to
>3% but does not mention control rod critical task.
insertion.
Event 5 had only one manual action. Changed event to include additional manual actions.
Event 3 had only one manual action. Changed event to include additional manual actions.
Per the level leg of LGA-010, applicants Added comment in the guide that this are to rapidly lower ractor level to -60 action is met if feedwater injection is inches. Based on power level, -60 may minimized.
not be reached rapidly.
Scenario 4 Erratic pump amps on LPCS pump start. Written simulator work request to be released after exam concludes.
Forced trip of A TDRFP trip before alarm Revised role play to report lube oil leak for TDRFP low bearing oil pressure came after alarm (TDRFP low bearing oil in. pressure) energizes.
Scenario guide does not list many actions Provided copy of LOP-RT-02 for examiner of LOP-RT-02 (RWCU start up). reference.
Scenario guide listed to report indication The statement was removed.
of a RR line break during event 9 and 10.
A RR line break was not included in the scenario.
The crew had difficulty realizing why they Added statement to role play that if the had alarm 1H13-P603-A402 energized applicants ask for guidance from after the MDRFP started. engineering that the alarm is part of the expected response during startup.
The crew manually isolated the Off Gas The A Off Gas Post Treatment Hi outlet valve after receiving A Off Gas malfunction was replaced with an A Off Post Treatment Rad High. The auto Gas Post Treatment downscale isolation requires both A and B post malfunction and will alarm a different treatment signals (hi/downscale or Inop). annunciator (1N62-B208 Off Gas Post
LaSalle Operating Test Comments Item Comment Action The LOR 1N62-P600-B207 states the Treatment or Panel 0PL99J Rad Trouble).
Auto Actions are the 1N62-F057 will This LOR states that both A and B Off as isolate and to verify the auto actions. The Post Treatment malfunctions are required wording lead the crew to believe the for automatic action. Wrote PCR to 2N62-F057 should have auto isolated. address clarification that both monitors needed for auto action.
Some RO tasks were performed by the During evaluation examiner may need to BOP. inject a cue to allow the other operator to take the required actions.
Scenario 5 Event 3 only had one action. Reduce the ramp rate of the failure. This will not allow time to have the RO place the feed pump min flow controller in manual before it opens, requiring the applicant to place the controller in manual and open the valve.
Event 5 has only one action. Leave as-is - spare scenario.
Event 6 has a slow decrease in vacuum. Leave as is, a rapidly decreasing vacuum may drive the applicants to scram the reactor before desired.