ML102950563
| ML102950563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/2010 |
| From: | NRC Region 1 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0334 | |
| Download: ML102950563 (5) | |
Text
Outside of Scope BRANCH 3 DAILY 4/22/10 STATUS Highlighted items were discussed at DRPIDRS Coordination meeting Outside of Scope VV SALEM'ONE Weekend Coverage: Dan AL1=(9X)>0.07 AL2.(2o3)>O 1-AL3=(!X)>0.13 Outside of Scope AFW Pipingi Degiradation V:
Bia c~kgrno und:
E V
- PSEG identified significant piping and coating degradation for the buried AFW supply piping for 2 of the 4 steam 2
~generators. The pipe was schedule 80, 4" inside diameter, carbon steel piping with a protective coating., Based on preliminary UT measurements of the piping, engineering determined AFVV system operability could not b e assured through next operating. cycle. Additional UIT examinations were performed to evaluate the Structural, integrity of the pieand to identify the sections of pipe that. needed repl~acement. Based.oh these measurements, PSEG will repace ajtl l dep a d salopeithe t1e2 and 14 header's'. Following replacement of abouat 8 f of shallow piping PSEG removed the supportsfor the piping that was not replaced and identified a section unde-ra pipe support clamp
that was well below minimum wall (.077). Subsequent UTs determined that the thickness measurement was the result of a localized pit. To fully evaluate the impact of the identified pipe degradation on the AFW system PSEG hired Structural Integrity Associates, Inc to complete a finite element analysis.
Extent of Condition:
0 Unit Zhas greater margin - it is a newer plant and is presumably in better condition; documentation exists that proves the piping Was opened and inspected -16 years ago and found to be in pristine condition; ISI code gives more allowance to an operating unit (they can take credit for up to 90% of the yield stress). DRS reviewed photographs and has no immediate safety concerns. There were no similar inspections of Unit 1 AFW piping.
On each unit there are three safety-related systems with buried piping (ASW, SW and control air) o Control air coating in tact, PSEG will document the inspection.
o Control air small leak. PSEG cut out and replaced. Will evaluate the failure mechanism (believe it was repeatedly stepped on).
o No previous UT inspections for service water piping, previously focused on seals for bell and spigot joints (as of end of outage all will have been replaced). Based on SW piping OE the current concern would be groundwater corrosion of the metal bands between concrete layers.
Unit -P2i-PSEG can' not locateif(rmationiihat proves thiat they completed ASME code required pressure drop test for the buried sections of the 22 and '24 headers. UnIVt2 entered a 24-hr shutdown action statement at 1132 on 4/21 for this cotnhdition. It will expire at 1 132 on 4122. Options are: perform the missed surveillance, cormplete a risk analysis that determines that it is ok to extend the periodicity of the surveillance up to one Interval, or s~hutdpwn Unit 2.
Questions and Concerns:
Design change to support 1275 psig (may not perform analysis since all piping to be replaced)
Unit 2 EOC (operability based on differences between Unit 1 & 2))
Replacement plan and schedule Information Needs - discussed during 4/19, 1315, status call - answers highlighted Finite element analysis (have not received yet - expect this morning)
Past operability review for Unit 1 (should be available shortly after the FEA received)
Operability determination for Unit 2 (expect 4122)
Design records for as installed piping on Unit 1 & 2 (not found as,,of yet, still looking)
Previous ASME r"nuired flow or Dressure dron tests for Units 1 & 2 (will fol6lw-ut'i uutside oT Scope
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A Outside of Sdope Additional Items Status Board Items:
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