ML102530133

Exercise - March 9, 2010 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

ML102530133
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	06/09/2010
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	NRC/RGN-II
References
Download: ML102530133 (82)

Text

Catawba Nuclear Station Exercise - March 9, 2010 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program June 9, 2010 I ~~*N FEMA FEMA Region IV

FE Final Exercise Report Catawba Nuclear Station Licensee:

Duke Energy Exercise Date:

March 9, 2010 Report Date:

June 9, 2010 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341-4122 Cover photograph accreditation: Catawba Nuclear Station, 2005, courtesy of Duke Energy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S..............................................................................................................

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1.

EX ECU TTV E SU M M A R Y.................................................................................................

1 II.

IN TR O D U C T IO N.......................................................................................................

3 III.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW...............................................................................................

6 A.

Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description....................................................

6 B.

E xercise Participants...........................................................................................

6 C.

E xercise T im eline...............................................................................................

8 IV.

EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS............................................................

10 A.

Table 2: Summary of Results of Exercise Evaluation......................................

10 B.

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated......................................................................

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1.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA........................................................

13 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center..........................................

13 1.2 D ose A ssessm ent........................................................................

13 1.3 State Traffic Control Points......................................................

14 1.4 Waterway Warning....................................................................

15

2.

JOINT OPERATIONS..........................................................................

15 2.1 Emergency Operations Facility.................................................

15 2.2 Joint Information Center...........................................................

16 2.3 National Weather Service, Greenville-Spartanburg Airport......... 17

3.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA........................................................

17 3.1 State Emergency Operations Center..........................................

17 3.2 D ose A ssessm ent........................................................................

19 3.3 Western Branch Office/Regional Coordination Center............ 20 iii

4.

RISK JU RISD ICTION S......................................................................

20 4.1 YORK COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA................................

20 4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center......................................

20 4.1.2 Back-up RouteAlerting...............................................

21 4.1.3 Protective Actions for Schools.....................................

22 4.1.4 EW & Equipment Monitoring & Decontamination........... 22 4.2 CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NORTH C A R O L IN A.............................................................................

23 4.2.1 Emergency Operations Center......................................

23 4.2.2 Traffi c.Control Points.........................................................

23 4.2.3 Backup Route Alerting.................................................

24 4.2.4 Protective Actions for Schools...................

24 4.2.5 EW & Equipment Monitoring & Decontamination........... 25 4.3 GASTON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA............................

26 4.3.1 Emergency Operations Center......................................

26 4.3.2 Protective Actions for Schools......................................

26

5.

SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS...............................................................

27 5.1 CHEROKEE COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA.......................

27 5.1.1 Reception and Congregate Care...................................

27 5.2 CHESTER COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA...........................

28 5.2.1 Reception and Congregate Care...................................

28 5.3 LANCASTER COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA.....................

28 5.3.1 Reception and Congregate Care...................................

28 5.4 UNION COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA...............................

29 5.4.1 Reception and Congregate Care...................................

29 5.5 CLEVELAND COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA................... 29 5.5.1 Traffi c Control Points....................................................

29 5.6 UNION COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA...............................

30 5.6.1 Emergency Operations Center......................................

30 5.6.2 Traffic Control Points....................................................

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6.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION......... 32 6.1 2008 ARCA RESOLVED........................................................

32 6.1.1 008-08-2.a. 1-A-01 State of NC/Dose Assessment.....

32 6.2 2008 ARCA UNRESOLVED...................................................

33 6.2.1 012-08-5.:a.1-A-02 State of North Carolina SEOC.....

33 List of Appendices APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS...........................................

35 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE TEAM LEADERS AND EVALUATORS.....................

38 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENTS..............................................

42 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO..................................................................

72 List of Tables T able 1 -

E xercise T im eline..............................................................................................

9 Table 2 -

Summary of Results of Exercise Evaluation.........................................................

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I.

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On March 9, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Program staff evaluated a plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the Catawba Nuclear Station. The evaluation of out of sequence activities during the week of March 1-4, 2010 is included in this report. The activities included:

traffic control points; protective actions for schools; reception and congregate care centers; emergency worker and equipment monitoring and decontamination; and waterway warning.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. FEMA used the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology to evaluate the exercise. The requirements of the REP Program effective on the date of the exercise were used in this capability based assessment to analyze the implementation of State and local government plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on July 29-30, 2008. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted February 15-16, 1984.

Officials and representatives from the States of South Carolina and North Carolina; the risk counties of York, South Carolina and Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Gaston, North Carolina; the host counties of Cherokee, Chester, Lancaster and Union, South Carolina and Cleveland and Union North Carolina and Duke Energy as well as numerous volunteers participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the exceptional efforts of the many individuals who planned, prepared for, and participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control, Bureau of Land Waste Management and Health Services should also be recognized for their ability to work around real-world problems and still be able to satisfactorily complete their mission.

Several problems resulted in team members having to use alternate means of communication to send messages and results among their different locations. Despite these problems they were able to send and receive the information they needed to complete their tasks and provide recommendations on protective actions.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. During this exercise FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective 1

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Action (ARCA). An ARCA identified during the 2008 Catawba exercise that concerned the inaccurate content of an Emergency Alert System Message issued by the State of North Carolina was not successfully-re-demonstrated during this exercise. FEMA will continue to monitor and assist the State of North Carolina in resolving this ARCA.

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II.

INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA became a part of the Department of Homeland Security with its creation in 2002. The Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program conducts its activities pursuant to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352.

These regulations are a key element in the REP Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for the REP Program's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities (FNF) include the following:

Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the REPP pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993).

Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce Department of Energy Department of Health and Human Services Department of Homeland Security Department of the Interior Department of Transportation Environmental Protection Agency Food and Drug Administration, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Field representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

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I Formal submission of the RERPs for the Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) to FEMA by the State of South Carolina and involved local jurisdictions occurred on August 31, 1984, and by the State of North Carolina and involved local jurisdictions on September 5, 1984.

l Formal approval of the South Carolina and North Carolina RERPs was granted by FEMA on October 8, 1985, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was evaluated on March 9, 2010, and included evaluations of the following out of sequence activities held from March 1 through March 4, 2010, consisting of the following:

0 York County, South Carolina: Protective actions for schools at the Central Child Development, Dutchman Creek School, Ebinport Elementary School, Northside Elementary School, Old Pointe Elementary School, Richmond Drive School, Sullivan Middle School, Sunset Park Elementary School, Gold Hill Elementary School, Riverview Elementary School, Springfield Middle School, Sugar Creek Elementary School, Pleasant Knoll Elementary School, Harold C. Johnson Middle School; Larne Elementary School, Oakridge Middle School, and Clover Junior High School on March 2, 2010; and emergency worker and equipment monitoring and decontamination at Bethesda Fire Department, Rock Hill, SC and Sharon Fire Department, Sharon, SC on March 2, 2010.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina: Protective actions for schools at SouthwestMiddle School, Lake Wylie Elementary School, and Steele Creek Elementary School on March 2, 2010; traffic control points at Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office, Charlotte, NC on March 2, 2010; and emergency worker and equipment monitoring and decontamination at Charlotte Fire Department Station #20, Charlotte, NC on March 3, 2010.

" Gaston County, North Carolina: Protective actions for schools at W.A. Bess Elementary School, Gastonia, NC on March 2, 2010.

• Cherokee County, South Carolina: Reception and congregate care center operations at Blacksburg High School, Blacksburg, SC on March 1, 2010.

Chester County, South Carolina: Reception and congregate care center operations at Great Falls Middle/High School Complex, Great Falls, SC on March 2, 2010.

Lancaster County, South Carolina: Reception and congregate care center i

operations at Lancaster High School, Lancaster, SC on March 3, 2010.

Union County, South Carolina: Reception and congregate care center operations i

at Union High School, Union, SC on March 4, 2010.

Cleveland County, North Carolina: Kings Mountain Police Department traffic i

control point on March 3, 2010.

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FEMA assessed the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations to implement their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the CNS. This report presents the results of the exercise and findings on the performance by offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations being made by the RAC Chair and final approval by the FEMA Region IV Regional Administrator.

The criteria utilized in the evaluation process are contained in:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; FEMA "Interim Radiological Emergency Preparedness Manual," dated August 2002.

Section III, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section contains a description of the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a table presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results,". presents summary information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a results only format.

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III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW This section contains data and basic information relevant to the March 9, 2010, exercise and out-of-sequence activities that occurred during the week of March 1-8, 2010. The purpose of the exercise was to test Federal, State and local response capabilities in the area surrounding the Catawba Nuclear Station.

A.

Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The Catawba Nuclear Station is located on the western shore of Lake Wylie, approximately six miles north of the City of Rock Hill in York County, South Carolina. The station consists of two Westinghouse Corporation pressurized water reactors. Duke Energy, North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, Saluda River Electric Cooperative, Inc, South Carolina, North Carolina Municipal Power Agency No. 1 and Piedmont Municipal Power Agency share ownership of the facility. Duke Energy operates and manages the facility.

The Catawba EPZ is divided into eleven Emergency Response Planning Areas in South Carolina and four in North Carolina. Major population centers include Rock Hill, Fort Mill, and Tega Cay, South Carolina. The eastern edge of York County in South Carolina and a portion of Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties in North Carolina are also heavily populated. The EPZ also includes the Carowinds Amusement Park. The population for the 10-mile EPZ is 231,682.

B.

Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Catawba Nuclear Station exercise March 9, 2010.

FEDERAL Department of Commerce National Weather Service STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Office of the Adjutant General, Emergency Management Division State Law Enforcement Division Department of Health & Environmental Control Bureau of Land Waste Management and Health Services Department of Mental Health Department of Natural Resources, Law Enforcement Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol, and Bureau of Public Safety Department of Social Services 6

I STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA Governor's Office Public Information Office of Citizen's Affairs Department of Crime Control and Public Safety i

Division of Emergency Management State Highway Patrol National Guard' I

Public Affairs Office Department of Environment and Natural Resources Division of Environmental Health I

Radiation Protection Section Division of Parks and Recreation Wildlife Resources Commission I

Department of Health and Human Services Division of Public Health Office of PublicHealth and Response I

Division of Facility Services Department of Transportation Department of Agriculture RISK JURISDICTIONS i

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina Charlotte Fire Department Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Pineville Police Department Gaston County, North Carolina York County, South Carolina Bethesda Fire Department Sharon Fire Department 3

SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS Cherokee County, South Carolina i

Blacksburg Volunteer Fire Department Buffalo Volunteer Fire Department Cherokee County Sheriff's Department Chester County, South Carolina Fort Lawn Fire Department Great Falls Fire Department Great Falls Police Department LANDO Volunteer Fire Department Richburg Volunteer Fire Department 3

Rossville Fire Department 7I

Lancaster County, South Carolina Lancaster City Fire Department Lancaster Fire Services Lancaster Volunteer Fire Fighters Union County, South Carolina Union City Fire Department Union County Public Services Cleveland County, North Carolina Kings Mountain Police Department Union County, North Carolina Union County Sheriff's Office PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)

American Red Cross (ARC)

Piedmont Chapter Upper Palmetto Chapter Salvation Army C.

Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Catawba Nuclear Station exercise on March 9, 2010. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

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mmm m

mmmmmmmmm m

m m

m m

Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: March 9, 2010 - Catawba Nuclear Station Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken Emergency Time Classification Utility SC-EC S DOSE 11C YORK NC-SEOC/

WESTERN GASTON MECKLENBERG UNIO Level or Event Declared ASSESSMENT COUNTY DOSE BRANCH COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY I

I ASSESSMENT OFFICE Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert 0808 0822 0832 0814 0815 0817 0828 0826 0825 0825 Site Area Emergency 0954 101 1020 0958 1006 1008 1011 1013 1000 1018 General Emergency 1102 1116 1120 1105 1114 1116 1119 1111 1115 1108 Simulated Rad. Release Started 0808 0858 1116 0958 0907/1127 0849/1125 0828 0903 0822 0825 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Facility Declared Operational 0852 0825 0835 0901 0833 0833 0854 0906 0825 1009 Declaration of State of Emergency 1015 1016 1015 1031 1022 South Carolina S _ North C

-a r

-o-lina 1010 1002 1002 1043 1020 J

1002 Local 0939 1000 North Carolina Direction and Control 1109 1120 1115 1120 1120 1120 Exercise Terminated 1320 1313 1320 1320 1325 1319 1319 1325 1325 1335 Early Precautionary Actions: Waterway Warning (WW)ý WW 0901 WW 0923 WW0900 WW 0919 WW 0920 WW 0927 WW 0825 Relocate General Public (RGP): North Carolina Parks (NCP):

RCI108 Reception Center Activated (RC): Agriculture Advisory (AG):

RC 0958 RGP 0939 and Schools (SC)

AG 1052 AG 1100 SC 1012 SC 0934 SC 0927 SC 0825 1I" Protective Action Decision: Stay Tuned: South Carolina 1052 1046 1050 1050 1048 1047 1100 Stored Feed and Hunting Restriction 1" Siren Activation 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1112 I` EAS Message 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1V' National Weather Service Activation 1105 1105 1109 1114 2nd Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate: AO. AI, A2. B1. FI. F2, F3 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 Shelter: A3. B2. Cl. C2. Dl. D2. El. E2 2 d Siren Activation 1200 1205 1200 1200 1200 1200 1155 2"d EAS Message 1205 1205 1205 1205 1205 1205 1205 2"d National Weather Service Activation 1205 1205 1205 1205 1205 1205 3yd Protective Action Decision: KI for General Public and 1210 1211 1145 1156 1156 1135 Emergency Workers 3"d Siren Activation 1200 3rd EAS Message 1230 1205 3' National Weather Service Activation 1_1 KI Decision:

1210 1210 1211 1

South Carolina - Ingest KI for General Public in AO

.12..

2..

North Carolina - General Public 1205 1145 9

IV.

EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS This section contains the results and preliminary findings of the evaluation for all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the exercise on March 9, 2010, and out of sequence activities during the week of March 1-4, 2010. The exercise tested the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ around the Catawba Nuclear Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on their demonstration of criteria as delineated in REP Program Exercise Evaluation Methodology, dated August 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the Extent of Play agreement used are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A.

Table 2: Summary of Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page, presents the status of all exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise, by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number. The demonstration status of those criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D Deficiency assessed A

ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 10

Table 2 - Summary of Results of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: March 9, 2010 - Catawba Nuclear Station ELEMENT/Sub-Element EOF SC SC York Cherokee Chester Lancaster Union NC NC Charlotte-Gaston Cleveland Union SEOC DHEC County County County County County SERT RPS Mecklenburg County County County SC County NC

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1.a. 1.

Mobilization M

M M

M M

M M

M M

I.b. 1.

Facilities M

I.c. 1.

Direction and Control M

M M

M M

M M

M M

Id. 1.

Communications Equipment M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M I.e.]I Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a. 1.

Emergency Worker Exposure Control M

M M

M M

M M

M 2.b.l.

Rad. Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information M

M M

2.b.2.

PADs for the General Public M

M M

M M

M M

2.c. 1.

Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations M

M M

2.d. I.

Radiological Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure 2.e. 1.

Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry &

Return

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a. I.

Implementation of Emergency Worker Control M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M 3.b. 1.

Implementation of KI Decisions M

M M

M M

M 3.c.1.

Implementation of PADs for Special Populations M

M M

3.c.2.

Implementation of PADs for Schools M

M M

3.d.l.

Implementation of Traffic and Access Control M

M M

M M

M 3.d.2.

Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control M

M M

M M

M 3.e. I.

Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Information 3.e.2.

Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies & Instructional Materials 3.f. 1.

Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a. I.

Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment 4.a.2.

Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management M

M 4.a.3.

Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures 4.b.1.

Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis 4..c. 1. Laboratory Operations

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION 5.a.I.

Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification M

M A

M M

5.a.2.

Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification 15 Minute (Fast Breaker) 5.a.3, Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and M

M M

Notification 5.b.l.

Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the M

M M

M M

Media

6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES 6.a. 1.

Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of M

M M

M M

M Evacuees 6.b. 1.

Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment M

M 6.c. 1.

Temporary Care of Evacuees M

M M

M 6.d. 1.

Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals LEGEND:

M = Met A = ARCA D = Deficiency 11

B.

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdictional results based format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to Criterion demonstration status.

" Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

" Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria, which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason, they were not demonstrated.

" Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Description(s) of ARCA(s) assessed during previous exercises, which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

" Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Description(s) of ARCA(s) assessed during prior exercises, which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues, which may be discussed in this report.

" A Deficiency is defined in the FEMA Interim REP Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

" An ARCA is defined in the Interim REP Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

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1.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The Chief of Operations and the Fixed Nuclear Facility (FNF) Manager executed the direction and control function for this exercise. The Chief of Operations provided frequent briefings to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff whenever conditions warranted. The Public Information Officer (PIO) used the briefings to draft press releases and Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages for release and distribution. The PIO had all messages reviewed and approved prior to release. The Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) was in charge of liaison activities in support of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 10 within the South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) for the Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) exercise. The ERC provided updates to the EOC staff and decision makers for South Carolina regarding plant conditions, dose projections, and other information needed to make protective action recommendations (PAR) for the general public and emergency workers. Critical resource requests were input into WebEOC and were tracked by the Operations Section to insure they were fulfilled. Communications personnel were knowledgeable of all the different communications systems available and operated them effectively. The Chief of Operations coordinated all protective action decisions (PAD) with other State Agencies, the State of North Carolina and counties in South Carolina and North Carolina.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, I.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 5.a. I and 5.b. 1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 Dose Assessment The DHEC dose assessment was conducted in the Farrow Road Command Center. The staff in the dose assessment area was present in the facility prior to the start of the exercise. An agency wide server outage eliminated the use of the agency e-mail and internet access, both of which were a part of the planned response. The staff successfully worked around these impediments and used an air card to access the internet and made heavy use of cell phones to augment land lines to communicate to other locations. The Command Center had fax machines to send and receive hard copy of licensee forms and 13

I dose projections. The staff used the RASCAL program to make independent dose assessments based on licensee provided source terms and meteorological conditions.

Field monitoring team data was compared to dose projections to verify that dose I

projections were reasonable. The dose assessment staff provided their dose projections to the agency ERC who was located in the SEOC and to the agency liaison in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). They also communicated with the agency Mobile I

Operations Center and with the State of North Carolina dose assessment staff. All activities were conducted based on plans and procedures and were completed in a timely manner.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, l.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b. 1, 2.b.2 and 4.a.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE I

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED:

NONE 1.3 State Traffic Control Points The South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP) discussed and demonstrated their capabilities during an in-sequence evaluation in their offices at 405 Hands Mill Road, Rock Hill, SC. SCHP used multiple communications systems to coordinate operations I

with the SEOC and the York County EOC. The SCHP obtained traffic control equipment and devices from the York County Department of Transportation. In addition, the SCHP vehicles were well equipped with supplies needed for the troopers to successfully I

establish any of their traffic control points. The three electronic dosimeters provided by the SCHP District Office were all past their calibration expiration date of February 2010, however, the SCHP First Sergeant stated that the troopers normally report to theYork I

County EOC to obtain permanent record dosimeters (PRD), direct reading dosimeters (DRDs), potassium iodide (KI), and instructions for their use from the York County Radiological Officer. Therefore, even though the electronic dosimeters, on-hand, were I

past due, properly calibrated dosimetry would be available and obtained by the troopers prior to deployment. The First Sergeant provided a briefing on dosimetry and KI using a Radiological Emergency Worker Job Performance Aid. Once instructed, the SCHP I

efficiently established two traffic control points. A rotation list of wrecker services was available to assist in removing impediments the troopers could not remove using their push bumpers.

a.

MET:

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Criteria: 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1 and 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Waterway Warning Two South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR) Officers arrived at the York County EOC and assumed the duties of ESF-13, "Public Safety and Security".

Once directed by the SEOC to initiate clearing Lake Wylie the SCDNR officers were issued dosimetry, KI, and received a radiological briefing and proceeded to the Ebenezer County Park boat landing. The SCDNR Officers satisfactorily discussed SCDNR coordination with York County EOC and other agencies and jurisdictions in executing mutual efforts to safeguard the public in evacuating Lake Wylie.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.d.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.1 and 5.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

2.

JOINT OPERATIONS 2.1 Emergency Operations Facility The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), located in the utility's corporate offices in Charlotte, North Carolina, is an excellent facility from which all participating response organizations can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations.

15

I The States of South Carolina, North Carolina and York County, South Carolina, respectively, deployed representatives to the EOF to serve in a liaison capacity between the utility operator and their respective EOCs. Communications, coordination and the i

flow of technical information between the utility operator and all of the participating government officials were outstanding, which-facilitated the conduct of independent accident analyses by the participating government agencies. All State and local government officials who were deployed to the EOF were welltrained, followed applicable procedures, and overall, performed their respective responsibilities in an efficient and professional manner.

a.

MET:

i Criteria: l.a. 1, I.c. 1, 1.d. 1, l.e. 1 and 2.b. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE I

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE i

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 Joint Information Center The Joint Information Center (JIC) became operational when representatives from the States of South Carolina and North Carolina; York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties, and Duke Energy Corporation had arrived. The North Carolina Public Information I

Officer (PIO) at the JIC began generating news releases with News Release #3. South Carolina news releases were developed and approved at the SEOC and faxed to the JIC.

Both North Carolina Counties provided news releases. The South and North Carolina I

PIOs and their respective County PIOs worked together well as a JIC team. Under the direction of the Public Information Manager, a'Duke employee, information provided to the media in briefings was detailed and accurate. Rumors and public inquiries were handled promptly and accurately. The facility was satisfactory to accommodate a significant number of media and equipment. Communications and equipment within the JIC were sufficient to support the PIOs' mission.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.a. 1, 1.d. 1, I.e. I and 5.b. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE i

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 16

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3 National Weather Service, Greenville-Spartanburg Airport The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Weather Service (NWS), Greer, provides the resources for South Carolina and North Carolina to accomplish the requirements for transmitting EAS messages to the general public. The NWS staff successfully demonstrated receipt, coordination, yerification and simulated EAS activation in a timely manner. The EAS process was coordinated by South Carolina Emergency Management Department (SCEMD) with North Carolina, and the EAS test message was targeted for separate jurisdictions between North Carolina and South Carolina. York County, Mecklenburg County, Gaston County and Union County, North Carolina were the intended EAS receipt jurisdictions. The NWS staff was well trained, capable and very knowledgeable of their duties.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.d.1, l.e.1 and 5.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 3.1 State Emergency Operations Center The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Leader and staff of the SEOC successfully demonstrated commendable proficiency in the performance of their duties in the event of a radiological emergency. The SERT members were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and successfully coordinated necessary actions with the North Carolina Counties of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Gaston and Union as well as the South Carolina SEOC, the CNS EOF, the North Carolina Emergency Management (NCEM) Western Branch Office, and various other agencies throughout the exercise. The periodic briefings and Decision Line conference calls fully involved the various agencies and 17

I professionally addressed the concerns and recommendations of the county emergency management directors while achieving concurrence on key decisions.

a.

MET:

Criteria: l.a. 1, l.c. 1, 1.d. 1, l.e.1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2 and 5.b. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:, 5.a. 1

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE I

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NO

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:

Issue No.: 012-08-5.a.l-A-02

==

Description:==

During the 2008 Catawba Nuclear Station REP Exercise South Carolina decided to have only those individuals from the evacuation zones ingest KI. North Carolina decided to have all individuals within the 10-mile EPZ ingest KI. The EAS message issued by the State of North Carolina at 1205 included a statement to the effect that the health officers from both North and South Carolina decided to have individuals within the 10-mile EPZ take KI. The EAS message issued by North Carolina was factually incorrect.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: During the 2010 Catawba Nuclear Station Exercise coordination between the North Carolina SEOC and the South Carolina SEOC occurred that ensured there were no contradictory EAS messages. When North Carolina decided to have all individuals within the 10-mile EPZ ingest KI, the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message (EAS Message #7, released at 1205)

I only addressed the counties in North Carolina and was factually correct.

However, North Carolina News Release No. 9, released at 1220 stated in part, "All members of public within the 10-mile EPZ and all emergency workers are I

instructed to take. KI." SCEMD only directed the public in Zone A-0 in South Carolina to ingest KI. North Carolina was factually incorrect; therefore the findings of the prior ARCA still apply.

Recommendation: Review and revise procedures as necessary to ensure that all forms of instruction/information released to the public are internally consistent and accurately reflect the decisions made.

I I

18

3.2 Dose Assessment The North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Radiation Protection Section (RPS) dose assessment staff effectively monitored and evaluated plant conditions, radiological conditions, and meteorological data. This information was used to perform independent dose projections that validated the projections performed by the utility. The RPS Director was actively engaged with his staff and other members of the SERT. Information from the field monitoring teams and the dose assessment team enabled the RPS Director to provide effective updates to the SERT Leader and other members of the SERT, including PARs. The RPS team performed their dose assessment and field team duties in a professional manner.

a.

MET:

Criteria: L.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2 and 4.a.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: YES Issue No.: 008-08-2.a.l-A-01

==

Description:==

When interviewed as to what approach would be used to correct Direct Reading Dosimeter (DRD) readings to determine the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE), the Radiation Protection Section (RPS) staff stated that the utility would provide a Correction Factor (CF) based on the radioactive release characteristics. It was noted that this process was not found in any of the RPS procedures. The RPS staff requested the CF from the utility dose assessment staff at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) once a release had occurred. After several conversations between the state RPS staff and-the utility staff, the utility stated that "there is no correction factor associated with dosimeter dose". The utility was unable to provide the CF and there was no evidence that the RPS staff had any other means to correct DRD reading to TEDE. (Brunswick 2008)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Division of Environmental Health, Radiological Protection Section (RPS) has written a guidance document (Standard Operating Guide, Emergency Worker Exposure Control, dated 3/2/2010) that provides the methods and recordkeeping to control dose, including any potential dose from inhalation of radioactive material in a plume. The process used in this procedure allows the State of North Carolina to control dose to emergency workers within the limits specified in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Manual of Protective Action 19

I Guides (PAGs) and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA 400-R-92-001).

The RPS Director was interviewed on the new process since the scenario did not cause doses to emergency workers to reach levels that would exceed an EPA PAG limits. He clearly described the process of using a CF of 5 to adjust DRD readings to account for potential inhalation dose while working in the plume. The SOG also provides guidance that if more detailed and realistic values become available or the isotopic mix is better defined, the nuclear utility may be able to generate a source term specific correction factor to be used in place of the default CF of 5.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.3 Western Branch Office/Regional Coordination Center The NCEM Western Branch Office (WBO) served as a Regional Coordination Center (RCC) for resource support and logistics between the SERT, risk and host counties. The RCC Manager provided effective direction and control by conducting frequent briefings and providing information on plant conditions, emergency classification' levels, and I

response activities. The RCC staff members clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their procedures, and performed their functions in a coordinated and timely manner.

I

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1 and I.e. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: -NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONEi

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

4.

RISK JURISDICTIONS 4.1 YORK COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA i

4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center I

York County EOC is a new facility with a very robust, multi-faceted interoperable electronic communications system. The Emergency Management Director demonstrated confident command and control of the EOC, conducting very informative, thorough and structured briefings at regular intervals. The Assistant County Manager responded to the EOC activation and took an active part in the decision making process which would 20

impact the citizens of York County. The Director's experience, professional demeanor and reputation provided sound direction to the multi-jurisdictional decision making process. The EOC staff professionally and cohesively performed their duties and responsibilities under the tutelage of the York County Director.

a.

MET:

Criteria: l.a.1, l.b.1, l.c.1, I.d.1, I.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs -.RESOLVED: NONE,

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.1.2 Back-up Route Alerting After making the decision to activate warning sirens and the EAS, the sirens were activated (simulated) at 1100 and the EAS message was sent to the LP-1 radio station at 1105. The York County EOC received siren verification at 1120. It was simulated that siren #72 failed to function. The Operation's Coordinator in! the EOC used the Geospatial Information System (GIS) staff to bring up a map showing the coverage and overlap from not only siren #72 but the other four sirens that had overlap of some of the area covered by siren #72. The area not covered by the overlap was determined and designated for demonstration of backup route alerting. The Fire Marshal's staff was briefed on the task and demonstrated the ability to successfully complete the task within the 45 minute requirement. The appropriate equipment and procedures were used during the demonstration.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 3.a. 1 and 5.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE 21

I

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.1.3 Protective Actions for Schools The Principals and Assistant Principals from 17 schools in the York, Clover, Rock Hill and Fort Mill School Districts participated in interviews. In addition, representatives from the districts' transportation offices provided input on plans to allocate resources for the relocation of students and staff. School District participants were very familiar with district and individual school plans and the ability of decision-makers, to implement

'various safeguarding options based on severity of plant conditions, weather, and time of

schbol day. Plans call for notification of parentsof the ongoing activities, movement of supplemental buses in the event of relocation, and care of the students until they can be released to parents or guardians. The participants demonstrated a high degree of competence and confidence.

a.

MET:

Criterion: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED:

NONE 4.1.4 Emergency Worker & Equipment Monitoring & Decontamination Emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination was demonstrated at the Bethesda Fire Station and the Sharon Fire Station. The facilities at both locations had sufficient space to accommodate both personnel and vehicles, and provide separation and decontamination of potentially contaminated emergency workers. Full-time staff and volunteers representing the Bethesda and the Sharon Volunteer Fire Departments, York County Office of Emergency Management, SCEMD and DHEC participated. All personnel involved in the demonstrations worked efficiently while performing their duties, and were knowledgeable in the exposure control and contamination control processes. Both departments demonstrated that they would be able to provide I

appropriate monitoring and decontamination assistance to other emergency workers reporting to their station.

a.

MET:

Criteria: I.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1 22

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.2 CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 4.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Management Director (EMD) and EOC staff successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the safety of the citizens in the event of an incident at CNS' Upon notification of alert, the Director established and maintained direction and control throughout the exercise. The EOC was activated in a timely manner, was well organized and efficient. The Director's thorough knowledge of county plans, procedures and resources served to establish expert credibility. This aided in the efficiency of Operations through coordinated efforts between staff, lateral jurisdictions and State officials. Staff personnel were well trained, capable, and performed their tasks with enthusiasm and in accordance with established plans and procedures. The relationship between Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) volunteers and the Charlotte Fire Department was especially unique, having proven ideally beneficial in training and will undoubtedly be a valuable resource should their resources be required in the future.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.a.1, l'c.1, I.d.1, I.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2, 5.a. 1 and 5.b. 1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.2.2 Traffic Control Points Police officers from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Pineville Police Departments successfully discussed their ability to establish and manage Traffic Control Points (TCP).

23

I The officers were knowledgeable on the use of personal dosimetry and personal radiological exposure control measures. They were issued a field kit with dosimetry and KI. They understood their role in establishing and maintaining TCPs, clearing impediments, and maintaining the flow of evacuees to reception centers and shelters.

a.

MET:

I Criteria: l.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1 and 3.d.2 3

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE U

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE 3

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED:

NONE 4.2.3 Backup Route Alerting i

The County Fire Marshal satisfactorily described how he would proceed after being informed that a siren had, failed. He identified the siren coverage area, which fire stations I

would be utilized, what routes they would cover and how many units would be necessary

'to complete the route within 45 minutes. The Fire Marshal also explained what dosimetry would be issued and how personnel would be.briefedon its use.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 3.a.1 and 5.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE i

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE i

4.2.4 Protective Actions for Schools Interviews were conducted with the Assistant Principals of Southwest Middle, Lake Wylie Elementary, and Steele Creek Elementary Schools. Also interviewed were the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools' (CMS) Safety Department Director and the CMS i

24

Transportation Department Safety and Training Specialist. All schools are located within the 10-mile EPZ of CNS. Each school had a current detailed and site specific Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Plan. The Assistant Principals knew they would receive their emergency action information/orders from the CMS representative and/or Emergency Management Officials in the EOC. The Assistant Principals were knowledgeable of their plan and responsibilities for sheltering-in-place or evacuation of students and staff in the event of an incident at CNS.

a.

MET:

Criterion: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.2.5 Emergency Worker & Equipment Monitoring & Decontamination The Charlotte Fire Department (CFD) fire fighters demonstrated the ability to monitor and decontaminate emergency workers and their equipment at Fire Station # 20. The firefighters performed their duties in a professional manner. They demonstrated a good knowledge of monitoring and decontamination techniques. This would allow them to assist emergency workers reporting to their station get put back in service in a timely manner. The use of a team leader at each area, i.e. initial vehicle monitoring, was effective in ensuring that all appropriate actions were taken. They demonstrated they were well aware of their responsibilities in exposure control.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. I and 6.b. 1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 25

U 4.3 GASTON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 4.3.1 Emergency Operations Center All personnel in the EOC were well trained and responded in accordance with policies and procedures. Each position was provided plans and a checklist relative to the specific tasks of that support function. The EOC Manager kept staff well informed of the emergency situation by providing briefings on a regular basis. All decisions were made with the health and safety of the public as the highest priority. Informative displays, accurate information gathering, checklists, and communication all contributed to the effective and efficient operation of the EOC.

a.

MET:

Criteria: l.a.1; 1.c.1; l.d.1; I.e.1;.2.a.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.1;, 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.c.2; 3.d.1; 3.d.2; 5.a.1; 5.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE c;

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED:

NONE' 4.3.2 Protective Actions for Schools The Gaston County Schools System successfully demonstrated, through an interview with the Principals of W.A. Bess Elementary and Hunter Huss High Schools, the school system's Executive Director for Auxiliary Services, and the Administrator of the Office of Emergency Management, its ability to safeguard students, staff and faculty in the event of a nuclear incident. The Principals were conversant with the respective school system and individual school plans. It was apparent that key personnel were familiar with each other and had coordinated plans and responsibilities previously. The school system has sufficient buses to relocate in a timely manner and the host school is prepared to accept the relocating students and assist in their supervision and eventual release to parents/guardians. Staff and faculty have specific functions and these are addressed during in-service training and in the school's emergency checklist for staff and faculty.

All personnel interviewed were knowledgeable and demonstrated a very professional demeanor.

a.

MET:

I Criterion: 3.c.2 26

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

5.

SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS 5.1 CHEROKEE COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA 5.1.1 Reception and Congregate Care Operation of the reception center and congregate care facility at the Blacksburg Middle School was successfully demonstrated. Personnel from the Blacksburg Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD), Upstate Carolina Medical Center, City of Gaffney Fire Department, Piedmont Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC), Cherokee County Department of Social Services, Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES), and Cherokee County Emergency Management Services (CEMS) participated. Individuals involved in monitoring and decontamination activities were aware of their contamination limits, radiation exposure limits, monitoring requirements, and the process to register evacuees.

The facility had adequate space to handle the expected vehicle and personnel traffic.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 and 6.c. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 27

I 5.2 CHESTER COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA 5.2.1 Reception and Congregate Care Personnel and vehicle monitoring, decontamination, registration, and congregate care was demonstrated at the Great Falls High School. The facility had sufficient space to accommodate both individuals and vehicles, and provide separation and decontamination of potentially contaminated evacuees. Numerous agencies and volunteers were i

represented including the Chester County Emergency Management Agency, Great Falls Fire Department, Rossville Fire Department, LANDO Fire Department, Fort Lawn Fire Department, the Upper Palmetto Chapter of ARC, Chester County Department of Social I

Services, and the Great Falls Police Department. The dedicated staff of agencies and volunteers demonstrated the ability to perform personnel and vehicle monitoring and decontamination, as well as registration and shelter care of evacuees.

I

a.

MET:

Criteria: I.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. I and 6.c. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE i

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 3

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE U

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 5.3 LANCASTER COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA 5.3.1 Reception and Congregate Care 1

Operation of the reception center and congregate care facility at the Lancaster High School was successfully demonstrated. Personnel from the Lancaster City Fire Department (LCFD), Lancaster County Fire Services, volunteer fire fighters, Lancaster County Department of Social Services (DSS), the Upper Palmetto Chapter of the ARC, I

and Lancaster County Emergency Management (LCEM) participated. Full-time employees and volunteers supporting the monitoring, decontamination, registration and sheltering process were prepared to accommodate the anticipated evacuee flow. All I

personnel involved in monitoring personnel or vehicles were aware of the contamination limits and demonstrated proper monitoring techniques. Proper decontamination techniques for vehicles and personnel were demonstrated. The facility had sufficient I

areas to handle the expected vehicle traffic and potential contaminated vehicles. The facility was capable of handling the expected evacuee population.

3 28 3

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 and 6.c. 1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 5.4 UNION COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA 5.4.1 Reception and Congregate Care County Public Services personnel demonstrated the reception center and congregate care facility at the Union County High School. Personnel from the Union City Fire Department (UCFD), Union County Public Services (UCPS), DSS, DHEC, and the Piedmont Chapter of the ARC participated. Participants successfully demonstrated their knowledge and use of dosimetry and monitoring equipment, monitoring and decontamination techniques, and the registration and sheltering of evacuees.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. I and 6.c. 1

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 5.5 CLEVELAND COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 5.5.1 Traffic Control Points A Captain from the Kings Mountain Police Department successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain TCPs in the event of a radiological emergency. He was very knowledgeable on the use of dosimetry, traffic flow into the county, and the setup of 29

I operations at the reception and congregate care center. Police vehicles contained sufficient communications and warning equipment, and each police officer would receive a field kit with dosimetry and KI. The officer clearly understood the police mission, discussed removal of impediments, and was familiar with details that the public would require, such as the location of the reception center and the evacuation routes to it.

3

a.

MET:

Criteria: l.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE 3

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE 3

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 5.6 UNION COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 5.6.1 Emergency Operations Center I

The EMD successfully demonstrated the ability to provide direction and control of the EOC. Using the principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), he assumed the position of Incident Commander (IC) and provided good clear leadership throughout the exercise. The General Staff and their representatives were professional and competent in their ability to implement the Emergency Response Plan for CNS. The flow of information through the EOC was seamless with the IC conducting frequent staff updates as conditions changed at the plant. All personnel in the EOC performed professionally and displayed I

excellent teamwork.

a.

MET:

3 Criteria: 1.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, I.e. 1, 2.a. I and 3.a. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE I

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE 3

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE I

30

5.6.2 Traffic Control Points The Sheriff's Office personnel satisfactorily discussed the ability to establish and maintain TCP's in accordance with their plans and procedures. The Emergency Management Director provided accurate and concise instructions during the issuance of the dosimetry to the Deputy. The Deputy was knowledgeable in the use of dosimetry, understood exposure limits and was sufficiently equipped to successfully support emergency operations and to assist in traffic management.

a.

MET:

Criteria: 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1 and 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: NONE

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 31

6.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 6.1 2008 ARCA RESOLVED 6.1.1 008-08-2.a.1-A-01 State of North Carolina SEOC/Dose Assessment

==

Description:==

When interviewed as to what approach would be used to correct Direct Reading Dosimeter (DRD) readings to determine the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE), the Radiation Protection Section (RPS) staff stated that the utility would provide a Correction Factor (CF) based on the radioactive release characteristics. It was noted that this process was not found in any of the RPS procedures. The RPS staff requested the CF from the utility dose assessment staff at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) once a release had occurred. After several conversations between the state RPS staff and the utility staff, the utility stated that "there is no correction factor associated with dosimeter dose". The utility was unable to provide the CF and there was no evidence that the RPS staff had any other means to correct DRD reading to TEDE.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Division of Environmental Health, Radiological Protection Section (RPS) has written a guidance document (Standard Operating Guide, Emergency Worker Exposure Control, dated 3/2/20 10) that provides the methods and recordkeeping to control dose, including any potential dose from inhalation of radioactive material in a plume. The process used in this procedure allows the State of North Carolina to control dose to emergency workers within the limits specified in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Manual of Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA 400-R-92-001). The RPS Director was interviewed on the new process since the scenario did not cause doses to emergency workers to reach levels that 32

would exceed and EPA PAG limits. He clearly described the process of using a CF of 5 to adjust DRD readings to account for potential inhalation dose while working in the plume. The SOG also provides guidance that if more detailed and realistic values become available or the isotopic mix is better defined, the nuclear utility may be able to generate a source term specific correction factor to be used in place of the default CF of 5.

6.2 2008 ARCA UNRESOLVED 6.2.1 012-08-5.a.1-A-02 State of North Carolina SEOC Condition: South Carolina decided to have only those individuals from the evacuation zones ingest KI. North Carolina decided to have all individuals within the 10 mile EPZ ingest KI. The EAS message issued by the State of North Carolina at 1205 included a statement to the effect that the health officers from both North and South Carolina decided to have individuals within the 10-mile EPZ take KI. The EAS message issued by North Carolina was factually incorrect.

Possible Cause: North Carolina sought concurrence from the North and South Carolina Counties and the State of South Carolina, during the time that South Carolina was coordinating siren activation and the broadcast of their emergency instruction message through the National Weather Service (NWS). At 1145 all parties concurred with the PADs, decided to activate the sirens at 1150 and activate NWS at 1200. At 1155 North Carolina read its unmodified message #7 over the decision line. During the concurrence process the SCEMD coordinator was not on the phone until after the NC read the new message.

Reference:

E.5,7; G.3.a; G.4.c Effect: The inaccurate statement in the North Carolina EAS message could have endangered those individuals within the 10-U I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

33

mile EPZ who might be allergic to KI and led individuals in one sector to evacuate when they should have sheltered-in-place.

In addition, confusion could have resulted from three different messages broadcast in the space of 10 minutes and led to a loss of confidence in the government to provide accurate and timely information.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: During the 2010 Catawba Nuclear Station Exercise continuous coordination between the North Carolina SEOC and the South Carolina SEOC occ urred that ensured there were no contradictory EAS messages. When North Carolina decided to have all individuals within the 10-mile EPZ ingest KI, the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message (EAS Message #7, released at 1205) only addressed the counties in North Carolina and was factually correct. However, North Carolina News Release No. 9, released at 1220 stated in part, "All members of public within the 10-mile EPZ and all emergency workers are instructed to take KI." SCEMD only directed the public in Zone A-0 in South Carolina to ingest KI. North Carolina was factually incorrect; therefore the findings of the prior ARCA still apply.

Recommendation: Review and revise procedures as necessary to ensure that all forms of instruction/information released to the public are internally consistent and accurately reflect the decisions made.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: North Carolina will coordinate corrective actions with FEMA.

34

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Service ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action CFR Code of Federal Regulations CNS Catawba Nuclear Station DHEC Department of Health and Environmental Control DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DHS Department of Homeland Security DNR Department of Natural Resources DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DSS Department of Social Services EMD Emergency Management Director EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room ERC Emergency Response Coordinator EWD Emergency Worker Decontamination ERDS Emergency Response Data System FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FMT Field Monitoring Teams FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center GE General Emergency GIS Geographic Information System 35

IRIS IC ICS IPZ JIC Internet Routed Information System Incident Commander Incident Command System Ingestion Pathway Zone Joint Information Center Potassium Iodide Local Primary -lRadio Station milliroentgen milliroentgen per hour Memorandum of Understanding KI LP-l mR mR/h MOU NC NOUE NRC NUREG-0654 North Carolina Notification of Unusual Event Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, "November 1980 I

I I

I I

I U

I I

I I

I I

I I

I ORO PAD PAG PAR PD PIO R

RAC RACES REA REM REP RERP R/h RO RPS SAE SC SCEMD SCDNR SCHP Offsite Response Organization Protective Action Decision Protective Action Guide Protective Action Recommendation Police Department Public Information Officer Roentgen Regional Assistance Committee Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Radioactive Emergency Area Roentgen Equivalent Man Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency Response Plan Roentgen(s) per hour Radiological Officer Radiation Protection Section Site Area Emergency South Carolina South Carolina Emergency Management Division South Carolina Department of Natural Resources South Carolina Highway Patrol I

I 36

SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SERT State Emergency Response Team SLED State Law Enforcement Division SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRS Savannah River Site SMRAP Southern Mutual Radiological Assistance Plan TCP Traffic Control Point TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter UNCC University of North Carolina at Charlotte USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture VFD Volunteer Fire Department WBO Western Branch Office 37

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE TEAM LEADERS AND EVALUATORS The following is a list of the personnel who participated in or evaluated the Catawba Nuclear Station exercise on March 9, 2010. The organizations represented are indicated by the following abbreviations:

FEMA ICF NRC

- Federal Emergency Management Agency

- ICF Consulting, Incorporated

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Conrad Burnside Lawrence Robertson RAC Chairman Section Chief/

Central Tier Section Chief!

Northern Tier ORGANIZATION Kevin Keyes EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR Lead Evaluators Joseph Harworth (South Carolina)

Michael Dolder (North Carolina)

FEMA FEMA STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA State Emergency Operations Center Joseph Harworth Ron Shaw Wendy Swygert Quintin Ivy (OJT)

FEMA FEMA ICF FEMA DHEC Liaison DHEC Dose Assessment SC State Traffic Control Points JOINT OPERATIONS Emergency Operations Facility Joint Information Center Joseph Keller Bill Vocke ICF ICF Robert Trojanowski Deborah Bell Lynn Steffensen Nathalie Valley NRC ICF ICF ICF 38

Waterway Warning NWS Radio Station G-S Airport STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA State Emergency Operations Center Dose Assessment Radiological FMT Control Western Branch Office RISK JURISDICTIONS YORK COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Backup Route Alerting Protective Actions for Schools Emergency Worker Decontamination-Bethesda Fire Department Sharon Fire Department Michael Burriss Gerald McLemore Michael Dolder Todd Sniffen Roger Jobe Alan Bevan Terry Blackmon Robert Nash J.T. Ackermann Gregg Dawkins John Wills Walt Cushman (OJT)

Jon Fox Alan Bevan Ray Bart Jill Leatherman John Wills ICF FEMA FEMA ICF ICF ICF ICF FEMA FEMA ICF ICF FEMA ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF Joe Harworth Alan Bevan Ron Shaw FEMA ICF FEMA ICF Bart Ray CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBERG COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Odis Spencer Alex Sera Michael Burns Rosemary Samsel FEMA FEMA ICF ICF Warning Point 39

Backup Route Alerting Traffic Control Points Protective Actions for Schools Emergency Worker Decontamination Charlotte Fire Station #20 GASTON COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Protective Actions for Schools SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS CHEROKEE COUNTY Reception,and Congregate Care Center, Blacksburg High School CHESTER COUNTY Reception and Congregate Care Center, Great Falls Middle/High School Rosemary Samsel Roger Jobe Michael Burriss Roger Jobe Alan Bevan Jill Leatherman Matthew Bradley P.J. Nied Harold Spedding Bill Larrabee Joe Harworth J.T. Ackermann Ron Shaw Odis Spencer J.T. Ackermann Odis Spencer Jill Leatherman ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF FEMA ICF ICF ICF FEMA FEMA.

FEMA FEMA FEMA FEMA ICF LANCASTER COUNTY Reception and Congregate Care Center, J.T. Ackermann Lancaster High School Ron Shaw Odis Spencer FEMA FEMA FEMA 40

UNION COUNTY, SC Reception and Congregate Care Center, Joe Harworth Union High School J.T. Ackermann Ron Shaw Odis Spencer FEMA FEMA FEMA FEMA CLEVELAND COUNTY Traffic Control Point Michael Dolder FEMA UNION COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Traffic Control Point Robert Spence Robert Spence FEMA FEMA 41

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENTS This appendix contains the exercise criteria which, were scheduled for demonstration in the Catawba Nuclear Station exercise on March 9, 2010 and the Extent of Play agreements approved by FEMA Region IV.

A.

Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria Following are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria scheduled for, demonstration during this exercise.

42

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Extent of Play Agreement Catawba Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise March 9, 2010

1. Emergency Operations Management.

Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization Criterion L.a.]: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4, D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

All state and local government personnel will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond as the scenario dictates. Alert rosters will be provided to FEMA evaluators and a discussion of call-down procedures will be conducted by State Warning Point personnel.

Sub-element 1.b, Facilities Criterion 1. b.] : Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG -

0654, H)

York County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will be evaluated to establish a baseline for exercise evaluation criteria.

Sub-element I.c, Direction and Control Criterion 1. c. 1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and Control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(NUREG-0654, A.l.d., 2.a., b.)

South Carolina State Direction and Control will be at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). County Direction and Control will take place at the York County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). State Emergency Response Team (SERT) participants include the Emergency Management Division (EMD);

ESF 5, Information and Planning (SCEMD); ESF 6, Mass Care (Department of Social Services); ESF 8, Health and Medical Services (Department of Health &

Environmental Control); ESF 10, Hazardous Materials, (Department of Health and Environmental Control); and ESF 16, Emergency Traffic Management, (Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol and Department of Natural Resources, Law Enforcement). A simulation cell will represent the Office of the 43

I Governor, Office of the Adjutant General, FEMA Region IV, Georgia, and non-participating South Carolina state agencies. All telephone calls to non-participating agencies will be made by calling the simulation cell.

Sub-element 1.d, Communications U

Criterion 1.d. 1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

I (NUREG-0654, F.1., 2.)

The Selective Signaling System (SSS) is the primary means of communication to i

notify off-site response forces. Backup to the SSS are commercial telephone lines, 800 MHz and the Local Government Radio (LGR).

Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays,, dosimetry, potassium iodide.(KI), and other I

supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.. (NUREG-0654,; H.,

J.1O.a.b.e.fj.k., 11, K.3.a.)

3 Potassium Iodide for emergency workers will be simulated by candy or other means (empty envelope marked KI). KI for Emergency Workers is stored at the local EOC and/or Region 3 Health Department and at DHEC Central Pharmacy in Columbia, SC.

All radiation detection equipment will be inspected, inventoried, and operationally I

checked before each use. York County equipment will be calibrated or leak tested in accordance with existing plans by the York County Radiological Lab. All other radiation detection equipment will be inspected, calibrated or leak tested by the SCEMD Radiological Calibration and Maintenance Laboratory.

The availability of appropriate equipment (e.g., personal protective equipment, vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc,) will be described by law enforcement personnel at locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed.

3 A FEMA Verification Inspection will be conducted in York County on March 2, 2010. The inspection will include survey meter calibration procedures, and KI i

for emergency workers and the general public.

2. Protective Action Decision Making.

3 Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2. a.]: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of 44

KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4.)

Dose limits for emergency workers are pre-determined. Emergency workers may voluntarily exceed dose limits only after being informed by DHEC of the biological effects of radiation and possible consequences of excessive exposure.,

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b. 1-Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as'knowledge of on-sitel and off-site environmental conditions.

(NUREG-0654, 1.8., 10., 11. and Supplement 3.)

Protective action recommendations by DHEC (ESF-10) will be based on an evaluation of information received from the licensee, independent dose assessments and simulated field monitoring data input. Dose assessment will take place at the Farrow Road Command Center (FRCC), 8911 Farrow Road, Columbia, SC.

Criterion 2.b.2. A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors. and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KL, if ORO policy).

(NUREG-0654, J.9., 1O.M.)

The Governor or his designee will demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions (PADs) based on recommendations from SCEMD, DHEC, York County and NCEMA. The state and county will demonstrate/discuss proper resolution of conflicts in reaching PADs. York County will coordinate protective action decisions (concerning evacuation or sheltering of residents and transients in the 10-mile EPZ) with the elected county officials or their designee, these actions will then be communicated and coordinated with the SEOC.

Sub-element 2.c, Protective Action Decisions Consideration for. the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2. c. 1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.19., 10.c.d.e.g.)

Demonstration of this criterion will be performed by a school representative or the appropriate county official. The respective representative will be prepared to discuss their plans and procedures to satisfy this criterion at March 9, 2010. A list of potential special population citizens will be provided for the FEMA evaluator.

Special population groups should include public/private schools, daycare centers, and pre-schools with 10 or more students..

45

I

3. Protective Action Implementation.

Sub-element 3.a, Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3. a. ]: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

1 (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

Emergency workers or emergency worker teams will use Self Reading Dosimeters (SRDs), or electronic dosimeters and simulated Permanent Record Dosimeters (PRDs) to monitor and control their radiation exposure. Emergency workers in low exposure rate areaswill use PRDs and may'use SRDs or place them in I

centralized areas.

Dosimeters are distributed at'the county EOC to emergency service chiefs or i

designee. Emergency service chiefs, or designee, will brief emergency workers.

York County has an adequate inventory to support first-shift personnel.

Supplemental dosimeters will be provided in accordance with the South Carolina Dosimetry Redistribution Standard Operating Procedures, after discussion and consideration at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). Supplemental SRDs will not be transported for the exercise. Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol and ESF-10 Department of Health and Environmental Control maintain and distribute their own SRDs.

3 Emergency workers, will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of radiation exposure limits.

3 Sub-element 3.b, Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b. 1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to I

recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is 3

maintained.. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J., ]O.e.,f)

KI is distributed to Emergency Workers prior to their being dispatched. KI is 3

taken by emergency workers on order by the DHEC Commissioner or designee.

Record keeping will be discussed at the York County EOC. The York County Health Department representative will discuss record keeping for KI during Staff 3

Assistance Visit.

KI has been made available to the general public. KI will be offered to the 3

evacuating general public at assigned shelters. KI inventories will be made 3

463

available for inspection and KI distribution procedures will be discussed by county health services officials at participating shelters.

Sub-element 3.c, Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3. c. 1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, E. 7., 1.9.,

O.c.d.e.g.)

York County will discuss the ability and resources to implement appropriate protective actions for special population groups. A list of people with special transportation needs will be provided to evaluators. Evacuation assistance will not be demonstrated..

Criterion 3,c.2: OROs/School Officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J. 10.c., d., g.)

York County will simulate school evacuations by out-of-sequence interviews with key school staff members and one bus driver from each evaluated school district on March 2, 2010. FEMA evaluators will meet with county provided escorts at 8:00 a.m., at the county EOC.

York County schools to be evaluated are:

Central Child Development Dutchman Creek Ebinport Elementary Northside Elementary Old Pointe Elementary Richmond Drive Sullivan Middle Sunset Park Elementary Gold Hill Elem Riverview Elementary Springfield Middle Sugar Creek Elem Pleasant Knoll Elementary Harold C. Johnson Middle Larne Elementary Oakridge Middle Clover Junior H.S.

Criterion 3.d. 1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.l0.g., j., k.)

Traffic and Access Control Points (TACPs) are pre-determined. The South Carolina Highway Patrol will demonstrate traffic and access control on-scene.

Highway patrol will provide an escort from SC Highway Patrol Newport Office 305 Hands Mill Hwy, Rock Hill, SC at 8:00 am on March 9,2009 to the TACPs to be evaluated.

TACPs to be evaluated are:

TACP #1 SC-49, SC55 and SC274 TACP #2 SC-49 and Liberty Hill Road (paved) 47

I Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.,k.)

Actions to identify and remove impediments to evacuation will be by discussion with the highway patrol supervisor at the York County EOC.

4. Field Measurement and Analysis Sub-Element 4.a Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses I

Criterion 4. a. 1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.O,; 1. 7, 8, 9)

Courtesy evaluation requested: One field team and the DHEC Mobile Operations Center (MOC) will be deployed to the Rock Hill, SC National Guard Armory at 126 Museum Road, Rock Hill,*SC 29732. The MOC and staff will be pre-positioned. DHEC field team members will deploy from the MOC, the MOC will establish operations to demonstrate control of field operations within the 10-mile EPZ. The MOC will be available for evaluation of pre-deployment activities one-hour prior to the start of the exercise to facilitate initiation of field activities in a timely manner at the start of the exercise. PPE will be simulated.

Silver Zeolite filters will be simulated with charcoal "marked" filters.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help I

characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8,11; J.10.a) 3 Direction and; control of the one DHEC Field Teams will take place at the DHEC Mobile Operations Center:(MOC) located at the South Carolina 3

Army National Guard Armory 126 Museum Rd, Rock Hill, SC for a courtesy evaluation.

Criterion 4. a. 3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate'locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether l

any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9)

For all samples collected, the chain of custody will be discussed and simulated; however, the samples will not be transported to the DHEC headquarters located at 2600 Bull Street, Columbia, SC. One field team will I

participate for a courtesy evaluation.

I 483

5. Emergency Notifications and Public Information Sub-element 5.a, Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a. 1'Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial, instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654,-E.1., 4.,

5.,6.,7.)

The State will coordinate Protective Action Decisions (PAD) with the chief elected official or designee of York County in South Carolina, and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina until the state of North Carolina is requested to assume direction and control of North Carolina operations. At the appropriate decision point, sirens will be simulated and the EAS message will be transmitted to the National Weather Service offices in Greer, SC. A simulated EAS message and follow-on news release will be prepared but will not be transmitted to the National Weather Service.

Copies of the simulated EAS messages and news releases will be provided to the FEMA evaluator at the SEOC. The National Weather Service will have staff available for interview during the EAS demonstration. The sounding of the sirens will be simulated along with the EAS messages.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within: 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6.,

Appendix 3.B.2.c)

In the event of a siren failure, York County will perform back-up route alerting procedures. A siren failure will be written into the scenario.

Lake clearing will be by discussion by the Department of Natural Resources at Lake Wylie in York County. A DNR representative will meet the evaluator on March 9, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. The evaluator will be transported to Ebenezer Park and Niven's Creek Landings by DNR representative and return him/her to York County EOC at the completion of the lake clearing evaluation.

Sub-element 5.b, Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.1.- OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5., 7., G.3.a., G.4, a.,

b.,c.)

49

I The State and York County will demonstratethe ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the news media at the Joint Information Center (JIC), Charlotte, NC. Rumor control 3

for the State willbe demonstrated at the JIC. Rumor control for York County will be demonstrated at the county EOC. Rumor control personnel will provide the U

FEMA evaluator with a rumor calls log.

6. Support Operations/Facilities Sub-element 6.a, Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees I

Criterion 6.a.." The reception center/emergency-worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and.trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.JO.h.; K.5.b.)

Reception Centers will be demonstrated during out-of-sequence events March 1-4, 2010. At least six people will be monitored and registered. Two emergency I

workers will be monitored at the Bethesda Fire Department out of sequence on March 2, 2010 @ 6:30 p.m. Two emergency workers will also be monitored at the Sharon Fire Department out of sequence on March 4, 2010 @ 6:30 p.m. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-through and discussion. All necessary supplies will be on-hand and placed according to the county plan.

Walkways will be covered with barrier material (simulated). Demonstration will I

include the necessary portable portal monitors and monitoring teams required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. One vehicle at the reception centers and emergency worker decontamination point will be monitored. Personnel and vehicle decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-thru in accordance with local SOPs.

3 Reception Centers to be evaluated are:

Cherokee County: Blacksburg High School March 1, 2010 @ 6:30 p.m.

I Chester County:

Great Fall Middle/High School March 2, 2010 @ 6:30 p.m.

Lancaster County:

Lancaster High School March 3, 2010 @ 4:30 p.m.

Union County:

Union High Complex March 4, 2010 @ 6:30 p.m.

Sub-element 6.b, Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment 3

Criterion 6.b. 1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment 3

including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Emergency worker monitoring and decontamination will be demonstrated out of 3

sequence. Two emergency workers will be monitored. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-thru and discussion. One emergency vehicle will be 50 3

monitored and decontaminated in accordance with local SOPs. Water will be available to demonstrate vehicle decontamination procedures only.

The Bethesda Volunteer Fire Dept., York County, will demonstrate Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination at 6:30 p.m., March 2, 2010. The Sharon Fire Dept., York County, will demonstrate Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination at 6:30 p.m., March 4, 2010.

Sub-element 6.c, Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.]1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations; ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J. O.h., 12.)

County shelters will be demonstrated out-of-sequence and concurrently with Evaluation Area 6.a, above. Procedures that assure only non-contaminated persons enter shelters will be demonstrated.

51

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

1. North Carolina Catawba Partial Participation Exercise Criterion Matrix

2. North Carolina Extent of Play Agreement 52

2010 Catawba Partial Participation Exercise Criterion Matrix Evaluation Sub Elements (EPZ) = Emergency Planning Zone County (IPZ) = Ingestion Pathway Zone County (Host) = Host County E -

Evaluated T - Training Only 0 -

Off Scenario N

C S

E R

T R

A D

P r

0 t

e c

t I

0 n

M e

c kI e

n b

U r

g EPZ G

a s

t 0

n EPZ CI e

v eI a

n d

U ni 0

n Host I Host

1. Emergency Operations Management 1.a.1. Mobilization of Response Personnel E

E E

E

/

NA E

1... a iltesýseline Baseline,.Be sire Blne Baseline Basein~e 1..1 Fciiteset 2002 Set 2002 Set12006 Set 2002 Set 2002 Set 2002 1.c.1. Direction and Control E

E E

E N A E

1.d.1. Communications Equipment E

E E

E A

E 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations E

N/A E-O E-O E-O E-O

2. Protective Action Decision Making 2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control E

E E

E E

E 2.b.1. Rad Assessment PARs & PADs Based on E

E E

E E

E Available Information 2.b.2. Rad Assessment of PARs & PADs for General E

E E

E Public 2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Protection of N/A N/

E E

Special Populations

/

'A E

E

2. d.1. Radiological Assessment and Decision Making N/A

N*A N/A N/A,

N1/A N/* A for Ingestion Exposure

2. e.1. Radiological Assessment and Decision Making N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A for Relocation, Re-entry & Return

3. Protective Action Implementation 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure E

E E

E E

E Control 3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions E

E E

E AN/A N/A 3.c. 1. Implementation of PADs for Special Pops.

E E

E E

N/A~ N/!A 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools N/A N/A E-0 E-0 N/A N/A*

3.d. 1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control E-0 N/A E-0 F-0 N/A N/A 3.d.2. Removal of Impediments to Traffic and Access E

N/

E E

E Control 3.e.1. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions N/A' N/A N/A N/A N/A N4/A Using Adequate Information___

3.e.2. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions N/A N/IA N/A N/A N/A ShowingInstructional Materials Rtr__

3.f.1. Implement Relocation, Re-entry, and Return N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 53

R M

Evaluation Sub Elements A

e c

D c

I (EPZ) = Emergency Planning Zone County N

p k

G e

U (IPZ) = Ingestion Pathway Zone County C

I a

V n

(Host) = Host County r

e s

e S

0 n

E -

Evaluated E

b 0

a n

R e

u n

n T-Training Only T

c r

d 0 -

Off Scenario t

g I

0 n

EPZ EPZ Host Host

4. Field Measurement and Analysis 4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis N/A N/A N/A " N/A

. -N/A',',

Equipment 4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Management

-N A

IN_,

4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis N/A

!N/A N/A N/A N/Ar Procedures 4.b. Post Plume Phase Field Measurements & Sampling

-"N/A N/A

,N/A "NiA N/A*

4.c. Laboratory Operations N/A N/A

_N/A N/A N/A

5. Emergency Notification and Public Information 5.a 1. Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification E

N/A.

E E

N/A "N/A 5.a 2. Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification N/A N/A

/A N/A N/A N/A Fast Breaker N/A N/A-'ý,'ý'

N N, A 5.a.3. Exception Areas and Back-up Alert and E-O "N/A E

E-O NiAý,

N/A Notification 5.b.1. Emergency Information & Instructions for the E

N/A E

E N/A N/A Public & Media

6. Support Operations/Facilities 6.a.1. Monitoring & Decontamination of Evacuees &

N/A' N/A,:

E-O E-O N/A E-O Emergency Workers; Registration of Evacuees 6.b.1 Monitoring & Decontamination of Emergency N/A N/A E-O E-O N/A N/A" Worker Equipment 6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees N/A;, ' N/A E-O E-O N/A E-O 6.d.1. Transportation & Treatment of Contaminated, NN/A N/A Injured Individuals (MS-i)

__N/A

_ N_

54

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION North Carolina 2010 Extent of Play Agreement GENERAL INFORMATION A. SCENARIO

" Scenario will be developed by the Catawba Nuclear Station in accordance with FEMA guidelines.

• The plume should include iodine.

" Exercise will begin at approximately 8:00 a.m.

" At the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency siren activation will be simulated by conducting a Siren Silent Test. Procedures for activation and transmission of EAS messages will be discussed with the FEMA evaluator.

" Exercise termination when all demonstrations are complete.

B. OTHER State and County participants will be allowed to pre-position.

• NC Radiation Protection's Mobile Laboratory and other field activities will be conducted from the NC National Guard Facility at Douglas International Airport in Charlotte, NC.

• North Carolina will provide a liaison to SC EOC.

" South Carolina will provide liaison to NC EOC.

" Utility will provide liaisons to both NC and SC State EOC's.

" Utility to provide liaisons to NC, SC, Western Branch Office and Risk County EOC's.

• A state or county escort will be provided to FEMA Evaluator for out of sequence demonstrations.

" NC SERT will provide one observer to each county EOC being evaluated, with the exception of Cleveland County, which will not be evaluated during this exercise.

" Pre and post exercise meetings will be held in Rock Hill, South Carolina at the York County Emergency Operations Center.

55

U

• North Carolina ORO's (State and County) are in agreement With extent of play, requirements, as outlined in FEMA's Radiological Exercise Methodology Guidance, September 12, 2001, unless otherwise noted in this EOP Agreement.

U I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

56 3

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1.a - Mobilization:

Criterion l.a.l:

ORO's will use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4., D.3.,4., E. 1.,2., H.4.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston, and Union Counties.

" State and local government personnel will be allowed to pre-position in their assigned areas.

• Alert rosters will be provided to FEMA evaluators. Players will discuss alert notification procedures with the evaluator.

" Radiation Protection's Mobile Laboratory and other field activities will be conducted from the NC National Guard Facility at Douglas International Airport in Charlotte, NC.

" Union County will simulate mobilization of response personnel at the EOC when demonstrating call down procedures. Some personnel may be called-up for "Training Only" and not for evaluation.

1.b - Facilities:

Criterion 1.b.l:

Facilities are sufficient to support the Emergency Response. (NUREG-0654, H.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland, and Union Counties.

" State and Counties EOC facilities baseline for this exercise evaluation criterion was established in 2002.

• Mecklenburg County's new facility was baselined in 2006 during the Catawba exercise.

57

I 1.c - Direction and Control:

Criterion 1.c.1:

Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide Direction and Control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A. l.d.,2.a.,b.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston, and Union Counties.!

Mecklenburg County will be the lead-coordinating county in North Carolina until I

the State is requested to assume direction and control. Following the simulated sounding of sirens and issuance of the first PAD recommendations to the public at Site Area Emergency, Mecklenburg will request the State assume direction and I

control.

• State and-county EOC'swill provide periodic briefings to keep all staff members I

informed.

The State's of North and South Carolina as well as the counties of York, SC, I

Gaston, Mecklenburg, Union, and the Western Branch Office will coordinate decisions and keep each other advised on actions taken throughout the exercise.

1 1.d - Communications Equipment:

Criterion 1.d.1:

I At least two communication systems are available and operate properly, and communication links are established with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F. 1,2.)

EXENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston, and Union Counties.

Radiation Protection field activities will consist of two Radiation Protection field survey teams. The teams will be deployed from the North Carolina Air National Guard facility located at the Charlotte-Douglas International Airport. The road to I

the Guard facility is located off of the Billy Graham Parkway.

I 583

i.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operation:

Criterion 1.e.l:

Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J. 10.a.b.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland and Union Counties.

Radiation Protection field activities will consist of two Radiation Protection field survey teams. The teams will be deployed from the North Carolina Air National Guard facility located at the Charlotte-Douglas International Airport. The road to the Guard facility is located off of the Billy-Graham Parkway.

Availability and currency of KI was verified during the Staff Assistance Visit to the State and Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties during the August 2009 McGuire Exercise.

Gaston County:

Gaston County Emergency Management Date and Time: Tuesday, March 2, 2010 at 8:00.a.m.

Mecklenburg County:

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management 228 East 91h Street Charlotte, NC 28202 Date and Time: Monday, March 1, 2010 at 1:00 p.m.

Cleveland County:

Cleveland County Emergency Management 100 Justice Place Shelby, NC 28150 Date and Time: Wednesday, March 3, 2010 at 3:00 p.m.

Union County:

Union County Emergency Management 805 Skyway Drive 59

I Monroe, NC 28110 Date and Time: Tuesday, March 2, 2010 at 3:00 p.m.

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 2.a.1:

i ORO's use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an. exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

I

Participants:

NC SERT, Radiation Protection, Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland and Union Counties.

I KI will be discussed with the Federal Evaluator as~indicated in 3.b i

State and county emergency personnel will be provided the following equipment:

0-20 R SRD, simulated TLDs and individual dose cards.

(Minimum dosimetry for Emergency Workers a will be a 0-20 Roentgen (R) direct-reading dosimeter and a Thermo-luminescent Dosimeter (TLD).

(State Guidance SG-2, January 2003))

o Radiation Protection will correct the ARCA from the 2008 Brunswick exercise.

2.b - Radiological assessment and protective action recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:

Criterion 2.b.1:

Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field-monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8.,10.,l1., & Supplement 3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Radiation Protection, Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland, and Union counties Radiation Protection will establish an independent dose assessment and projection team at the State EOC.

60

" Back-up dose assessment will be demonstrated via a battery powered portable computer.

" The team will communicate with the Utility EOF, Mobile Lab and deployed field survey teams to obtain data for developing dose projections. Division of Radiation Protection will analyze technical data and make recommendations. to SERT Leader and Gaston & Mecklenburg EM Coordinators.

Criterion 2.b.2:

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD's) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

(NUREG-0654, J.9.,10.m.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Radiation Protection, Mecklenburg & Gaston Counties.

• Protective Action Decisions will be discussed between Gaston and Mecklenburg counties and the State's of North and South Carolina via the Decision Line.

" Weather data will be pre-determined.

• Decision to authorize Public KI is made by the State Health Director in consultation with County Health Directors,

• Demonsiration of KI distribution for the General Public will be accomplished during Off-Scenario activity by local Public Health officials through discussion with and presentation of distribution documentation to the Federal Evaluator.

(Demonstration times and locations are in theOff-Seenario Event Matrix) 2.c -Protective Action Decisions for Protection of Special Populations:

Criterion 2.c.1:.

Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

(NUREG-0654, J.9.,0 O.c.d.e.g.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties.

• Counties will demonstrate their procedures through discussion and review of a special populations list and resource list.

61

3.

PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION U

3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 3.a.l:

The ORO's issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

(NUREG-0654, K.3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Radiation Protection, Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland and Union Counties.I

• Turn back values will be in accordance with state plans. Personnel will describe procedures used when turn back values are reached.

• Duke Power and Division of Radiation Protection will provide technical advice and assistance to the state and counties..

State and county emergency personnel EPZ will be issued 0-20R dosimeters, simulated TLDs and individual dose cards.-

I (Minimum dosimetry for Emergency Workers a will be a 0-20 Roentgen (R) direct-reading dosimeter and a Thermo-luminescent Dosimeter (TLD).

(State Guidance SG-2, January 2003))

3.b - Implementation of KI Decision:

Criterion 3.b.1:

KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general Public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J. 10. e, f.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Radiation Protection, Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties.

" Demonstration of KI will be through "Discussion Only" at State and County EOC's.

• Decision to take KI is made by the State Health Director in consultation with the I

State Pharmacist and County Health Directors.

I 62

State and county emergency personnel EPZ will be issued 0-20R dosimeters, simulated TLDs and individual dose cards.

(Minimum dosimetry for Emergency Workers a will be a 0-20 Roentgen (R) direct-reading dosimeter and a Thermo-luminescent Dosimeter. (TLD).

(State Guidance SG-2, January 2003))

3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations.

Criterion 3.c.1:

Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, E.7.,J.9.,10.c.d.e.g.)

EXTENT OF. PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Radiation Protection, Mecklenburg, Gaston Counties.

" Current Special Needs Populations lists will be provided to the Federal Evaluator.

Evacuation/Relocation requirements will be demonstrated through discussions at the EOC, based on the scenario and county implementation procedures.

" Contact via telephone with special population groups for PAD's and transportation resources will include two to four actual telephone calls. These calls will be logged in the EOC.

Private schools will not be participating in the exercise.

Criterion 3.c.2:

ORO's/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

(NUREG-0654, J. 10.c.,d.,g.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties.

School evacuation procedures and interviews will be demonstrated via discussion with key school staff members at the following locations:

Law enforcement agencies will discuss convoy escort procedures during the Traffic and Access Control interviews.

Mecklenburg County:

63

I Southwest Middle School, Lake Wylie Elementary School, Steele Creek Elementary School Date and Time: Tuesday, March 2,2010 at 9:00 a.m., 10:00 a.m., and 11:00 a.m.

Location:

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office 228 East 9th Street Charlotte, NC 28202 Meet at Charlotte-Mecklenburg EM Office and travel to school sites. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management will provide transportation to and from schools if necessary.

Gaston County:

W.A. Bess Elementary School Date and Time: Tuesday, March 2, 2010 at 10:00 a.m.

Location:

W.A. Bess Elementary School 4340 Beaty Road I

Gastonia, NC 28056 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control.

i Criterion 3.d.1:

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are i

provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J. 10.g., j, k.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston Traffic control points will be discussed with the Federal Evaluator at each County EOC. Law Enforcement personnel will discuss REP traffic control procedures and equipment.

At least one representative will be available from each agency assigned traffic control responsibilities in the county.

If a Federal Evaluator would like to see a TCP/SRB demonstrated, one will be selected from the agencies represented and that agency representative will take him to the field location.

County

Participants:

I 64

Mecklenburg County:

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Pineville Police Department Date and Time: Tuesday, March 2,2010 at 3:00 p.m.,

Location:

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office 228 East 9th Street Charlotte, NC 28202 Gaston County:

Gaston County demonstrated this activity for the McGuire exercise in August 2009 and will not be demonstrating it for this, exercise.

Criterion 3.d.2:

Impediments to evacuation are Identified and Resolved (NUREG-0654, J. 10.,j.,k.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland, and Union Counties.

• Officers during the interview process will identify how impediments to evacuation are identified and removed/resolved based on a set of simulated circumstances and questions posed by the federal evaluator.

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Criterion 4.a.1:

The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10, 1.8., 9.,11.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC Radiation Protection Radiation Protection field activities will consist of two Radiation Protection field survey teams. The teams will be deployed from the North Carolina Air National Guard facility located at the Charlotte-Douglas International Airport. The road to the Guard facility is located off of the Billy Graham Parkway.

65

I

" Radiation Protection's mobile laboratory and other field activities will be conducted from the NC National Guard Facility at Douglas International Airport in Charlotte, NC.

" Training Only 1

Criterion,4.a.2:

Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the

'release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, 1.8., 11., J. 10.a).

EXTENT OF PLAY:

I

Participants:

NC Radiation Protection

• Radiation Protection field activities will consist of two Radiation Protection field sufvey teams. The teams will be deployed from the North CarolinaAir National Guard facility located atthe Charlotte-Douglas International Airport. The road to the Guard facility is located off of the Billy Graham Parkway.

• Radiation Protection's mobile laboratory and other field activities will be conducted from the NC National Guard Facility at Douglas International Airport in Charlotte, NC.

• Training Only i

Criterion 4.a.3:

Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams must move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures),amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.8., 9., 11.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC Radiation Protection

" Radiation Protection field activities will consist of two Radiation Protection field survey teams. The teams will be deployed from the North Carolina Air National Guard facility located at the Charlotte-Douglas International Airport. The road to the Guard facility is located off of the Billy Graham Parkway.

" Radiation Protection's mobile laboratory and other field activities will be conducted from the NC National Guard Facility at Douglas International Airport in Charlotte, NC.

• Training Only i

66

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System:

Criterion 5.a.1:

Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include: (1) identification of the State or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message; (2) identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant; (3) reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and (4) a closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information. (NUREG 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E. l.,4.,5.,6.,7)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties 0 South Carolina will be the "Lead Agency" for EAS message selection and siren activation. As Lead Agency. South Carolina will coordinate and conduct the countdown for activating sirens. Copies of individual state EAS messages will be provided to FEMA eyaluators by both South Carolina and North Carolina., An actual silent test will be conducted to simulate the sounding of sirens.

0 North Carolina counties will be in Direction and Control when Site Area Emergency (SAE) is declared. Following the sounding of the sirens and first PAD recommendations to the public at SAE, Mecklenburg County as "Lead County" will request the State to take Direction and Control.

• News releases concerning PAD's will be coordinated by the states and counties via the Decision Line.

• North Carolina will correct a previous ARCA for this criteria.

Criterion 5.a.3:

Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6., Appendix 3.B.2.c.)

67

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties.

• An actual silent test will be conducted to simulate the sounding of the sirens. A feedback sheet will, show if a siren has failed and if backup route alerting around the failed siren would be necessary.

• Participants should have necessary maps and copies of broadcast messages available.

If a siren has failed, back-up alerting will be discussed with the Federal Evaluator for a pre-determined zone (siren failure simulated).

County

Participants:

Mecklenburg County:

Mecklenburg County Fire Marshal Date and Time: On Scenario Location: Charlotte-Mecklenburg EOC Gaston County:

Gaston County will not demonstrate this criteria. It was demonstrated during the August 2009 McGuire exercise.

5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.l:

ORO's provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5.,7., G.3.a., G.4.a.,b.,c.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

NC SERT, Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties.

" PIO's will receive rumor control calls at the JIC once it is activated. Approximately six calls per hour will be made to each state and -county PIO represented at the JIC.

" Two rumor trends will be identified and appropriate actions taken to address them.

68

6. SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.l:

The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J. 10.h; K.5.b.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland & Union Counties.

Mecklenburg County:

Mecklenburg County will not demonstrate this criterion during this exercise.

Gaston County:

Gaston County will not demonstrate this criteria during this exercise. It was demonstrated during the August 2009 McGuire exercise.

Cleveland County (Host County):

This criteria has been demonstrated in the current 6-year cycle and will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

Union County (Host County):

Wesley Chapel Volunteer Fire Department Union County Emergency Management American Red Cross Date and Time:

Tuesday, March 2, 2010 at 7:00 p.m.

Location:

Marvin Ridge Middle/High School 2825 Crane Road Waxhaw, NC 28173 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment:

Criterion 6.b.l:

The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

(NUREG-0654, K.5.b.)

69

I EXTENT OF PLAY:

1

Participants:

Mecklenburg, and Gaston Counties.

Two vehicles will be monitored and one vehicle decontaminated using water. The use of water will be dependent on weather conditions at the time of the demonstration.

• Monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers will be demonstrated by the I

following agencies at the indicated locations.

Mecklenburg County:

I Charlotte Fire Department Station #20 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Date and Time:

Wednesday, March 3, 2010 at 10:00 a.m.

Location:

CFD'Station'#20 9400 Nations Ford Road Charlotte, NC 28273 Gaston County:

Gaston County will not demonstrate this criteria. It was demonstrated during the August 2009 McGuire exercise.

6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees:

I Criterion 6.c.1:

Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees 3

have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J. 10.h., 12.)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Participants:

Mecklenburg, Gaston, Cleveland, and Union Counties.

Mecklenburg County:

Mecklenburg County will not demonstrate this criteria during this exercise.

Gaston County:

7 70 3

'Gaston County will not demonstrate this criteria. It was demonstrated during the August 2009 McGuire exercise.

Cleveland County:

This criteria has been demonstrated in the current 6-year cycle and will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

Union County:

American Red Cross Date and Time:

Location:

Tuesday, March 2, 2010 at 8:00 p.m.

Marvin Ridge Middle/High School 2825 Crane Road Waxhaw, NC 28173 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals:.

Criterion 6.d.1:

The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2., H.10., K.5.a.,b., L.1.,4.)

EXTENT OF PLAY: Mecklenburg County Mecklenburg County EMS (MEDIC) and Carolina's Medical Center Emergency Room Date and Time: Fall 2010 71

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events, Exercise Scenario, which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Catawba Nuclear Station exercise on March 9, 2010. This scenario was submitted by the States of South Carolina, North Carolina, and Duke Energy and was approved by FEMA Region IV.

72

CONFIDENTIAL CATAWBA DRILL EVENT SEQUENCE MARCH 9, 2010 NRC Exercise Initial Conditions Unit 1,100% Power, EOL 112 ppm 450 EFPD All "B" Train running equipment (i.e., NV, KC RN)

Fuel Handling Crew moving spent fuel Unit 2, 100% power Weather Wind Speed 8 mph Direction from 2100 AT 0.95 °C - Stability Class F No precipitation Temperature 500 F Failures UNIT "1" Spent Fuel Assembly damage in SFP SFP Ventilation system in FILTER MODE Lockout 1 "ETA" Bus 1 "A" NCP Motor Coast down (sheared shaft)

ATWS Rx fuel damage (result of transient DNB) 73

SQUENCEOF EVENTS March 9, 2010 NRC Exercise 10-2 Time 0800 Simulator turnover - walk down boards 0805 SFP Ventilation system in filter mode with the Bypass damper(s) closed l

due to fuel handling operations in progress.

Spent Fuel Assembly damaged in SFP (Ul SF Refueling Bridge Alarm 1 EMF15) gas bubbles seen in the SFP.

1 Fuel Rod has broken, 1, Train VF on, Unit Vent Flow -93,000 cfm after I

Trip 2 on EMF36L.;

Release through filters in progress.

I No Off Site Dose PARs or KI recommendations required.

3 (Enter AP/1/A/5000/025 "SF Damage")

0820 Declare Alert i

Expected Response Alert declared on EAL 4.3.A.2-1 an unplanned."Valid Trip 2" alarm on Spent Fuel Pool "1EMF -42" n

Conduct Site Assembly; activate TSC, OSC, EOF, and JIC Operators and/or ERO should implement the following procedures:

RP/0/A/5000/001 Classification, of Events RP/0/A/5000/003 Alert i

RP/0/A/5000/006 Notifications to States and Counties RP/0/A/5000/010 Conducting a Site Assembly or Evacuation RP/0/A/5000/013 NRC Notification Requirements i

RP/0/A/5000/020 TSC Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/5000/024 OSC Activation procedure S R/O/B/2000/003 EOF Activation procedure i

AP/1/A/5500/025 Damaged Spent Fuel I

74I

Sequence of Events March 9,2010 Page Two, 0920 Letdown line pipe failure inside containment "1 NV 15B" stuck open, small NC leak to containment (50 gpm till isolated)

AP/1/A/5500/010 Case II (NC system leak) is entered. Crew actions will isolate this leak by closing 1 NV-1 A, 2A, and 1 OA.

The pipe failure causes penetration failure through containment into the annulus, a small release to annulus starts out the unit vent. (This will be the source of containment failure when the pressurizer PORV fails) 0925 Loss of ETA (Breaker opens, cannot be reclosed from Control Room)

DG "A" does not start due to Ground fault causes 86N.

(AP/1/A/5500/007 Loss of Normal Power 'Case I1')

Unit Vent Flow reduced to -48,000 cfm (Point ID "Cl Al104") due to loss of "A" Train VA filtered exhaust fans. NoOff Site Dose PARs or KI recommendations required.

0935 TSC and OSC required activated 75min after Alert declared EOF Activated (or operational) 0950 1 "A" NCP Motor Coast-down (sheared shaft)

Manual Rx Trip from outside control room (ATWS)

Expected Response EP/1/A/5000/ E-O Rx Trip or SI EP/0/A/5000/FR-S.1 (ATWS).

Local actions will trip the reactor 2 minutes after operator dispatched.

(Turbine trip by procedure) 0955 PORV "NC 34 A" auto opens and 'fails in open position' Block valve NC 33 will not shut If the crew is still in ATWS when the PORV fails, the following may occur: of the ATWS procedure may be performed due to the Safety Injection caused by the failed PORV. The PRT will not be ruptured as of yet so containment conditions will appear normal. Annulus leak will not be evident until PRT ruptures. The crew will return to E-0 and repeat these checks; the PRT should be ruptured by then.

75

Sequence of Events March 9, 2010 Page Three Loss of sub-cooling, trip NCP's Operations Manually Safety Injects.

(EP/l/A/5000/E-0 Rx Trip or SI) Second entry after ATWS (EP/1/A/5000/E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) 1000 PRT Ruptures at 100psi: Containment and annulus pressure increases.

VE flow to the stack indicates continuous leakage. Inches water column negative pressure is less than required by Enclosure 2 of E-0.

14.823 cfm unit vent flow (Point ID "ClAl 104")

0950-1005 SAE Declared - EAL 4.4.S.1, Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Set-point Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip WAS NOT Successful (from control room). ATWS I

U I

I I

I I

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I Expected. Response ERO should implement the following procedures:

RP/O/A/5000/004 Site Area Emergency Simulate sound sirens and activate EBS (Siren silent test conducted by counties),

Variable EMF53A and 53B increasing Containment pressure > 1.5 psi (No NS Pumps on) 1105 Fuel damage shows up >43 R/hr on EMF53A and EMF53B 76

Sequence of Events March 9,2010 Page Four 1120 Declare General Emergency, EAL 4.1.G.1), Loss of 3 F P barriers A. Loss Fuel Cladding - (4.1.F.3) EMF53A or 53B >43 R/hr B. Loss NC System - (4.1.N. 2) PORV. 1 NC34 A / PRT / Cont C. Loss of Containment - (4.1.C.3) Breech at 1NV15 B penetration to annulus GE PAR'S "WS 8.2 MPH" from "210 degrees" Evacuate Zones: AO, Al, B1, El, F1 Shelter Zones: A2, A3, B2, C1, C2, D1, D2, E2, F2, F3 Expected Response ERO should implement the following procedures:.

RP/0/A/5000/005 General Emergency RP/0/A/5000/015 Core Damage Assessment HP/0/B/1009/019 Off-Site Dose Projections 1120 Simulate sirens and EBS FMT dose readings indicate fuel damage (plume contains iodine).

PAG - Evacuate to five miles based on plant conditions (GE procedure RP/0/A/5000/005 evacuates two miles around and five miles downwind)

Dose Projections (>CDE) KI recommended 1200-Plant cool down in progress -

Operation trying to restore ETA Electrical damage assessment is ETA "6" hrs from being restored Continue to assess and cleanup of SF damage States and Counties will be completing their objectives 1330 Terminate Exercise after all objectives met Conduct Player Critique in EOF and CNS 153 A & B 77