ML100070550

Initial Exam 2009-301 Post Exam Comments

ML100070550
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	01/07/2010
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Duke Energy Carolinas
References
50-413/09-301, 50-414/09-301
Download: ML100070550 (13)

Text

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FACILITY NAME: _ _ _~C!o<!a"-!t~aw!!Jb~ai!-- _-_-

REPORTNUMBER: _ __ __ _ __ _~2~O~O~9-~3~01~-----

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POST EXAM COMMENTS CONTENTS:

o Post Exam Comments o "As-submitted" post-exam comments from licensee Location of Electronic Files:

Flies:

Not applicable.

\2 /~C / 0 9 a Duke

" JAMES R. R. MORRIS Vice President r#

r*,Energy Ener9Y*

Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 803*

803-701 701 -4251 803-701-3221 fax December 29, 2009 Mr. Frank J. Ehrhardt, Senior Operations Examiner Region"II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S.w.

S.W.,, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303

SUBJECT:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 413 and 50-414 Post Examination Documentation initial license The post examination materials for the Catawba Nuclear Station inrtiallicense examination completed on December 22, 2009 submitted in accordance with NUREG ,1 021 ES 501 C.1.a, as listed below, 1021 below, are enclosed.

enclosed.

aa.. The original examination answer sheets

b. A clean copy of the original examination answer sheets

c. The master examination

e. The answer keys for the RO and SRO examinations f.f. The questions asked by and answers provided to applicants during the written examination

g. The written examination seating chart

h. The written exam performance analysis

i. Post examination comments and supporting documentation for the operating and written examination portions Form ES-201-3 Examination Security Agreement will be submitted at a later date.

duke-enerBy.com www.duke-energy.com

\\oWW,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Post Examination Documentation December 29. 29,2009 2009 Page 2 If you have any questions or need additionaladd~ional information, please contact Steve Tripi, Initial Training Supervisor at (803) 701-3770 or Alan Orton, Orton, Operations Training Manager at (803) 701-3977.

Sincerely, A,J4A~ 71!~

A.,,,~ jl!~

V F FT James R.

T .,i\r ~,/fora's

r(JJY1eJ "l1oo-!s I6r ..

f'()J'Itj R. Morris xc: without attachments Malcolm T T.. Widmann, Chief U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, Street, S. S. W.,

W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.D.C. 20555-0001 G. A. Hutto, III Senior NRC Resident - Catawba CN01NC

Regional Administrator, Region II Post Examination Documentation December 29, 2009 Page 3 bxc: without attachments R.D.Hart CN01RC ELL EC050 bxc: cover letter with wijh correspondence review documentation only Date File CN01RC CN-940.00 CN04DM

Time Q# Student Posing Question Question Answer provided Provided to:

Provided to:

Question 1117 7 Chad Kidd Can I get a confirmation there is a correct Can correct Yes, there is a correct answer.

Yes, answer. Individual answer for #7?

1. 7?

Given SPP-1 ACTION , All 'c' SPP-1 is in ALT ACTION, 'C' htrs are ON causeing pressure [increase)

[increase]

Answers:

Answers:

A. All htrs ON - No, BIU B/U Htrs Blocked on Alt action B. PORV - No, PORVs blocked on Ait Alt Action Action S(pray blocked (auto), no, 'c' C. S[pray C. 'C' htrs +

spray are only thing controlled in auto using Press Master in manual.

D. Spray + PORV - No, spray not blocked 1214 7 Jason Moore Am I to assume the Alt Action is from the Enough information is available to Individual PZR Pressure control?

control? answer the Question question..

0748 7 Jason Moore Is that supposed to be a S/G SIG PORV Question is correct as written.

written. Individual opened momentarily in stem of question?

ofquestion?

0817 7 Thomas Strouse Is the Alternate action on SPP-1 or SPP-Thomas There is enough information available to Individual

2. answer the Question.

question.

0826 12 Keith Anderko Do all aU 5 operations have to be because of No additional information provided.

provided. Individual de~energizing or can they be a 1ERPA de-energizing separate required manual action?

• • 13 Keith Anderko Does question two ask Part 2 Question should read as follows: ALL Allow 1ECS to supply 1EDC with 1ECS students still students aligned from 1EMXJ? OR Allow 1 1ECS ECS "Does OP/1/A163501008 OPI11N63501008 in room to be powered from 1EMXJ? (125VDC1120VAC Vital Instrument and (125VDC/120VAC Control Power System) allow alignment of the alternate supply to 1ECS to supply power to 1EDC based on current Unit 1 conditions?

conditions?

0954 38 Thomas Strouse The answers are confusing when In each answer the word "other" is ALL i

~nalyzi ng the question.

analyzing question ....* (of the "remaining",

equivalent to "remaining". students still remaining channels channels that input P-11)

P-11 ) in room Ch 1, 2, 3 input P-11 inputP-11 Ch 2 failed that leaves Ch 1 & & 3 that input P-11 How many of these 2 must be <P-11 to to block ECCS PZR Press 2 must be <P-11 to meet the 2/3 213 logic required 2 of the 2 remaining must be below P-11 answers the question 2 of the other 2? OTHER?

0828 40 Bobby Smith Part 2 - is this asking for TS limits based Question provides correct information.

Question information. Individual Individual on on current mode, or based on all modes No additional Information is required.

No i of applicability?

0855 40 Ray Transou Current status states 1B LCVU LeVU just enough information to There is enough to answer Individual Individual tripped then OAeOAC indications are as the question.

above stated. It shows 1B LCVU still running running.. Is OACOAe status reflecting actual plant status or has it not updated due to LCVU tripping?

tri pping?

1313 42 Thomas Strouse Is 1NI-184 and/or 1NI-185 open? The 1st No further information information is necessary.

necessary. Individual bullet says auto and manu swap to CLR failed if 184 and 185 are both closed then NS cannot be in service but @ >10 > 10 psig procedurally we try to place NS (1 (1 train) in service. @4.9% FWST <<5%) all pump suet from FWST must be secured if taking suct NS was still on FWST it would be off. off.

1159 51 Kieth Anderko 2. Does the conditions above, require Answer based on available information. Individual knowing knowing if the fuel racks will continue to stick?

-- David Shaver Should answer A be SPL-2SPL*2 instead of 1133 58 No further information is necessary. Individual SPL-1? OR Should answer C be SPL-1 instead of SPL-2?

0748 77 Ben Thombs Is inservice testing the same as a enough information to answer There is enough Individual "retest"? the Question.

question.

0820 83 David Shaver Is question 2 asking if the procedure written . No Question is correct as written. Individual requires stopping core alts, alts, or the additional information is

s required.

required.

conditions require haltino halting core alts?

1048 87 Will Fowler Question #2 asks what procedure will be There is sufficient information to answer Individual implemented NEXT. When is next? next? the question.

After the Rx trip/trip of NCPs or after NC leaklSI?

leak/SI?

1344 89 Ben Thombs states:

Stem of question states: Part 1 should read as follows:

follows: ALL "12/15/091800 IAE completed the 1A "121151091800 students still DIG sUiveillance ...""

D/G battery surveillance ".. Based on the conditions at 1500:

1500: in room What is the latest time that this First part of question asks:

asks: surveillance could have been completed "1. What is the lalest latest time that this before the LCO for Technical surveillance can be completed before the Specification 3.8.4 would not have been been LCO not met... met?"

Clarification request:

When discovered inoperable at 12/15/0912115/09 1800, the LaC LOC is not met. Are you asking ithe question based on the first time in the question and not considering the discovered inoperable battery?

battery?

• + Time this was given was not documented, however, however, based on returned sheets, it was after Bobby Smith completed his exam. All other student were still taking takina their exam.

exam.

EXAM SMITH~-~---l PROCTOR #2___ #2 RO TRANSOU BLANKENSHIP I[ MOORE (( STROUSE UNDERWOOD USRO RO [ USRO RO USRO I

[ ~S~~

FANTA USRO I

S~::~R SHAVER ISRO [ TU:~E-R U]I TURNER RO L - '_

THOMBS ISRO _ _- - - - '

~~_~_g_-----,II,-_A_N_~_~_RK_O F_~_~_R_~_R_-,

KIDD ~- [.-~ ANDERKO ~[ FOWLER

, -__ ISRO RO

__,,__ USRO

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FRONT EXAM PROCTOR #1

Catawba Nuclear Station 2009 Senior Operator Exam and 2008 Senior Operator Retake Exam (12/22/09) Post Examination Comments (12122109)

The following comment is submitted for review regarding question number 84 of the written examination administered at Catawba Nuclear Station on December 22, 2009.

Question # 84:

Unit 1 was at 3% power performing a sta startup. following::

rtup. Given the following Initial conditions

• Intermediate Range channel N-35 failed low

• The crew removed N-35 from service per the applicable abnormal procedure Current conditions

• IAE returned the channel to service and reported that the SUR circuitry for N-35 had to be disabled as part of the channel repair

• Engineering has evaluated the repair and determined that all other functions will operate designed with the SUR circuitry disabled.

as deSigned

1. When the crew removed N-35 from service per the abnormal procedure, which fuses (if any) were removed?

2. For the conditions above, is N-35 operable?

A. 1. The control power fuses

2. No B.

S. 1. The control power fuses

2. Yes C. 1. No fuses were removed

2. No D. 1. No fuses were removed

2. Yes Original Answer Key: 0

References:

1) AP/16 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation), 2) T. S. 3.3.1 3.3.1 and bases

3) ENS (Excore Nuclear Instrumentation) lesson ptanplan Page 11

Comment:

Question 84 did not provide all the necessary information to enable the Senior Reactor Operator applicant to make a proper determination of operability in accordance with approved guidelines contained in Nuclear Station Directive (NSD) 203, w"Operability/Functionality."

Operability/Functionality .~

Per the U initial conditions~

"initial conditions" contained in Question 84, 84, when the Intermediate Range channel was removed from service per the abnormal operating procedure, the channel was declared inoperable. Subsequent information provided in the "current conditions conditions"~ statement (second bullet) is not consistent with the station's expectations to use the Operability Determination Process contained in NSD 203 to determine operability.

operability. Specifically, the fact that an Operability Determination was/was not conducted is not included in the stem of the question. Without this information, the applicant could conservatively assume that the Operability Determination was not conducted conducted,, and the Structure, System or Component would remain inoperable.

Recommendation:

Based upon the above information, the Senior Reactor Operator applicant cannot make a Therefore, definitive determination of operability within the expectations contained in the NSD. Therefore.

Catawba Nuclear Station recommends that Question 84 be deleted from the SRO-only portion examination.

of the written examination.

References:

The applicable portions of NSD 203, "Operabilily/Functionalily" "Operability/Functionality" are included.

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203. OPERABILITY I FUNCTIONALITY 203.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this directive is to provide the departmental policy for performing operability determinations and functionality assessments consistent with Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-20 and its associated Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance. In addition,addition, this directive complements the guidance in NSD NSO 208, "Problem Investigation Process (PIP)" for the resolution of degraded and/or nonconforming conditions.

203.2 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY This procedure applies to degraded/nonconforming conditions and unanalyzed conditions associated with structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform specified functions as set forth in the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) for the faCility. facility. A conceptual illustration showing the scope and applicability of this directive is provided as Appendix A.1, A.1 , ~"Scope Scope and Applicability. "

Applicability:

203.2.1 OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS The Operability Determination Process (ODP) (OOP) is used to assess the operability of SSCs explicitly required to be operable in a Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). The scope of SSCs considered within the ODP OOP is as follows:

a. SSCs explicitly required to be operable in a TS LCO. 11 These SSCs (also referred to as

~"SSCs SSCs described in TSs")

TSs~ ) may perform required support functions for other SSCs required to be operable by TSs (e.g., emergency diesel generator and service water).

b. SSCs that are not explicitly required to be operable in a TS LCO, LCO , but that perform necessary and required support functions (as specified by the TS definition of operability) for SSCs that are required to be operable by TSs (i.e (Le.,.* Support SSCs)

SSCS).2' 203.2.2 FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENTS Functionality is an attribute of SSCs that are not required to be operable by TSs. TSs. Such SSCs warrant programmatic controls to ensure that SSC availability and reliability are maintained.

SSCs within the scope of functionality are divided into three subsets:

a. Support SSCs. SSCs within this subset are considered within the scope of the OOP (Refer 10 to 203.2.1.b)

b. SSCs Ihal that are described in the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual but do not fall within the scope of the OOP. SSCs within this subset are subject to Formal Functionality Assessments in accordance with Section 203.8.

I1 This includes the TSs based on NUREG-1430 (Babcock and Wilcox) and NUREG-1431 NUREG-1431 (Westinghouse) and the TSs associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).

sse Support sse not described in TSs, then the operability 2 If the ODP is entered due to a condition affecting a Suppon sse determination should be performed on the Supported sse described in TSs.

Page I 3

203.3 DEFINITIONS

c. Functional/Functionality - Functionality is an attribute of SSCs not required to be operable sse by TSs. In general, an SSC is functional or has functionality when it is capable of performing its specified function(s) as set forth in the CLB for the facility. Functionality does not apply to specified safety functions, but does apply to the ability of non-TS SSCs to perform other specified functions. SSCs described in the SLC Manual (but not described in TSs) are functional or have functionality when they are capable of performing those functions considered necessary to meet their associated COMMITMENT(s).

d. Loss of Functional Capability - A physical deterioration of an sse, SSC, such that previous assumptions are no longer valid regarding the SSCs function(s) in support of operability or functionality. Examples of conditions that can reduce the capability of a system are failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material, aging, erosion, corrosion, improper sse operation, and maintenance. When the capability of an SSC described in TS is degraded to a point where it cannot perform with reasonable assurance or reliability, the SSC should be sse declared inoperable even if, at the time of the declaration, the SSC could perform its specified safety function.

14 Page 14

Explanation of Critical task: Closure of 1NV*252A NV-2S2A and 1NV*253B NV*2538 durina during transfer to Cold Leg Reclrc Recirc during Scenario 3. Event 7 This task is NOT critical per the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guideline (ERG) Critical Task Documentation if the actions already taken will prevent cavitation of the NV pumps. Per the critical task documentation, from the ERG based critical tasks EPltlAl5000/ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg notebook, the critical task associated with EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3, Recirculation Recirculation,, is:

Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow.

'Closure Closure of these valves isolates the FWST from the NV pump suction preventing further depletion of the FWST. The NV pumps, at this point, have already had their suction aligned to the NO pump discharge, which will produce a higher suction head than the FWST. The flow from the NO pumps is prevented from flowing into the FWST by a check valve in the line, with 1NV252A and 1NV253B being closed as a PT/11A14200/013H NI/NV backup to the check valve, which is tested per PT/1/Al4200/013H NIINV Check Valve Test according to OM-10 the Catawba OM-1 EP/11A15000/ES-1.3 continues on regardless of the position of Q Testing Program. EP/1IA15000/ES-1.3 1NV252A and 1NV253B, and the final check that is made for successful transfer to Cold Leg Recirc is flow from each of the ECCS pumps, pumps, which will be present with 1NV252A and 1NV253B open or closed.

The Critical Task Review Group (CTRG) antiCipated anticipated that the performance standard standard,, for the critical task of swapping to cold leg recirc, recirc, would hinge on the following:

• Establishing ECCS recirc flow at least consistent with minimum safeguards

• Preventing loss of suction to the ECCS pu pumps mps The by/when aspect of the performance standard would be, be, ~before "before the crew is forced to stop all safety injection when the FSWT empties." This would be before the FWST decreases to the setpoint setpolnt (Le. 5%) at which the crew is required to stop all ECCS pumps.

As long as actions are taken to align the NI and NV pump suctions to the NO pumps' discharge, and action is taken to align the NS pumps to the FWST at 11 11% FWST level, no ECCS pumps will be taking suction on the FWST at 5% level.

Therefore closing 1NV-252A and 1NV*253B NV-253B during transfer to Cold Leg Recirc is NOT critical. critical.

1 NI1 OOB is also NOT critical to be closed, 1NI10QB closed, because it also has a check valve in series that will prevent backflow to FWST and because the NI pumps will also be receiving adequate suction from the NO pumps. This check valve is also tested per PT/1/Al4200/013H PT/1/A14200/013H NI/NV NIINV Check Valve Test according to the Catawba OM*OM-1010 Testing Program .

The Design Bases Document (DBD) originally referenced and the DBD for 1NV253B and 1NV252A are attached with the text highlighted that was originally used to justify closure of these valves as critical. The n

DBD uses words like ~possib il ity of ......

"possibility Ioss of suction"

..... .Ioss suction and "* ... may become inoperable" to describe the effect of not closing valves 1NV252A, 1NV253B, NV2538 , and 1NI1 OOB, implying that it is desired to close these N1100B, valves, but NOT required to ensure cold leg recirc capability.

capability. The critical task document was not originally referenced. After referencing the critical task document, document, it was seen that closure of these valves is NOT critical.

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