Text

FEMA Final Report for the May 12, 2009, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant
	ML092110461
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/30/2009
From:	Odeshoo J; US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML092110461 (94)
	v • d • e

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region V 536 South Clark Street, Floor 6 Chicago, IL 60605 0~FEMA NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

To Whom It May Concern:

Enclosed is one copy of the Final Report for the May 12, 2009, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant. The State of Ohio, Ottawa and Lucas Counties, and the utility owner/operator, FirstEnergy Nuclear Corporation, participated in this exercise.

No Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA) were identified for the State of Ohio or for Ottawa County.

There was one ARCA identified during a previous exercise (May 15, 2007) for Ottawa County. The ARCA issued for Ottawa County was issued under i.e. 1 - Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations, whereby the hospital was unaware of the need for the monitoring instrumentation to be calibrated. This ARCA was successfully redemonstrated.

There was one ARCA identified for Lucas County during the May 12, 2009, exercise. The ARCA was issued under 6.b. 1 - The facility/Offsite Response Organization (ORO) has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles, whereby Jerusalem Fire Department did not demonstrate knowledge of the contamination action level, which was established as 300 counts per minute (cpm) or higher above background. This corrective action was successfully redemonstrated during the exercise.

A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Part IV of the Final Report.

Based on the results of the May 12, 2009, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Ohio and affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Ohio site-specific to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant, granted on June 15, 1987, remain in effect.

www.fema.gov

NRC Headquarters Page 2 Copies of this report have been provided to the DHS/FEMA National Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region III, and the State of Ohio.

If you have any questions, please contact William E. King, Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee, DHS/FEMA, Region V, at (312) 408-5575.

Sincerely,

fAcanet M. Odeshoo 0Acting Regional Administrator Enclosure (1)

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Exercise Report - 2009-05-12 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program 2009-07-23 it FEMA

Exercise Report Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Exercise Date:

Report Date:

2009-05-12 200.9-07-23 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Emergency Management Agency REP Program 536 S. Clark St. 6th floor Chicago, IL 60605

Table of Contents Chapter 1 Executive Summary Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Exercise Overview Section 3.1 EPZ Description Section 3.2 Exercise Participants Section 3.3 Exercise Timeline Chapter 4 Exercise Evaluation and Results Section 4.1 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Section 4.2 Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1 Ohio Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1 State - Initial Notification Point 4.2.1.2 State - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.1.3 State - Emergency Operations Center - Assessment Room 4.2.1.4 State - Joint Information Center - EOC 4.2.1.5 Emergency Operations Facility - Ohio 4.2.1.6 State - Joint Information Center - Toledo 4.2.1.7 Ohio StateAnalyst Ottawa County EOC 4.2.1.8 EW Monitoring/Decon Allen Clay FD 4.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions 4.2.2.1 Ottawa County - Initial Notification Point 4.2.2.2 Ottawa. County - Emergenc.y Operations Center 4.2.2.3 Ottawa County Woodmore Local School EV-2 4.2.2.4 Ottawa County Transportation Agency-Interview EV-2 4.2.2.5 Ottawa County Kerstens Korner Nursery School EV-2 4.2:2-6 Ottawa-CuntyTraffic-andA-ccessC-ontrIl-Point - Ohio Highway Patrol 4.2.2.7 Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point Ohio State, Patrol 4.2.2.8 Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point Port Clinton Police Department 4.2.2.9 Ottawa County Traffic & Access Control Port Clinton PD Briefing 4.2.2.10 Ottawa County Port Clinton Fire Department Route Verification 4.2.2.11 Ottawa County Port Clinton Fire Department Backup Route Alerting 4.2.2.12 Ottawa County Bay Twp Fire Route Verification 4.2.2.13 Ottawa County Bay Twp Fire Department Backup Route Alerting

4.2.2.14 Ohio Mid County EMS 4.2.2.15 Medical Services (MS-i) Hospital - Magruder Hospital - Ottawa County 4.2.2.16 Medical Services (MS-i) Hospital - Memorial Hospital - Ottawa County 4.2.2.17 Ottawa County Detention Facility 4.2.2.18 Lucas County - Initial Notification Point 4.2.2.19 Lucas County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.20 Lucas County Sheriff - Traffic and Access Control Point 4.2.2.21 Lucas County Sheriff-Traffic and Access Control Point Briefing 4.2.2.22 Lucas County Oregon District Transportation Special Populations 4.2.3 Support Jurisdictions

4. 2.3.1 Ottawa County Evacuee Decon RC Fremont HS 4.2.3.2 Congregate Care Center - Fremont Middle School - Ottawa County 4.2.3.3 Ottawa County Fremont Ross High School - Monitoring of Evacuee Vehicles and Equipment 4.2.3.4 Fremont Ross High School - Reception Center 4.2.3.5 Monitor & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment and Vehicle Allen-Clay FD Genoa Garage - Ottawa County 4.2.3.6 Monitor & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment and Vehicles -

Lucas - Jerusalem FD 4.2.4 Private Jurisdictions 4.2.4.1 Joint Information Center Ottawa County Liaison

.4.2.4.2 Joint Information Center Lucas County Liaision Appendices Appendix 1 - Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix 2 - Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Appendix 3 - Exercise Evaluation Areas and Extent of Play Agreement Appendix 4 - Exercise Scenario and Timeline

1. Executive Summary On May 12, 2009, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone around the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The purpose of this exercise was to assess the-level of State and local preparedness in responding to an emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on.May 15, 2007. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on March 31, 1987.

DHS/FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the State of Ohio and the Counties of Ottawa and Lucas who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all participants was evident during this exercise.

This Final Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities:

Ottawa-County Route Verification and Supplemental Route Alerting Backup Route Alerting Traffic and Access Control.Points Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination (EV-2) School Interviews Reception Center Congregate Care Center Protective Actions for Special Populations Medical (MS-i) Services 1

Lucas County Traffic and Access Control Point Emergency Worker Equipment Monitoring and Decontamination Protective Actions for Special Populations The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them.

No Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA) were identified for the State of Ohio or for Ottawa County. There was one ARCA identified during a previous exercise (May 15, 2007) for Ottawa County. The ARCA issued for Ottawa County was issued under 1.e.1 - Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations, where the hospital was unaware of the need for the monitoring instrumentation to be calibrated. This ARCA was successfully redemonstrated.

There was one ARCA identified for Lucas County during the May 12, 2009, exercise.

The ARCA was issued under 6.b.1 - The facility/Offsite Response Organization (ORO) has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles, whereby Jerusalem Fire Deprartment did not demonstrate knowledgae of the contamination action level, which was established as 300 counts per minute (cpm) or higher above background. This ARCA was successfully redemonstrated during the exercise.

A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Part IV of this report.

2

2. Introduction On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. DHS/FEMA activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

The FEMA Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for DHS/FEMA initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning.and preparedness for commercial nuclear power.plants.This approval is contingent, in part, on State and Local participation in joint exercises with licensees.

DHS/FEMA responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;

Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of, observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

Responding.to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 -(Federal Register -,.4t.58,No.76Tl8e ptember 14*,-1993); and

Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in. the radiological emergency planning process:

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

- U.S. Department of Energy,

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

- U.S. Department of Transportation,

- U.S. Department of Agriculture, 3

- U.S. Department of the Interior; and

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS/FEMA Region V Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by DHS/FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station to FEMA Region V by the State of Ohio and involved local jurisdictions occurred on May 24, 1989. Formal. approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on March 15, 1991, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted on May 12, 2009, to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during an simulated radiological.emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the DHS/FEMA Region V RAC Chairperson, and approved by DHS/FEMA Headquarters.

The criteria utilized in the.DHS/_EEMA evaluation process are contained in:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria forPreparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," No-vetber1 980;.

FEMA-REP-14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual," September 1991; and

FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" as published in the Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview", presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities 4

which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

.Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results", presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise recommended corrective actions, and (2) descriptions of resolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

5

3. Exercise Overview Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the May 12, 2009,.

REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone, and a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of the actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

3.1. EPZ Description The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) is located in Northwestern Ohio, within Ottawa County, near Oak Harbor, which is approximately 25 miles east of Toledo.

The facility is located on 954 acres on Lake Erie: 582 acres of the site, consisting of dike marsh areas which are leased to the U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, forming the Navarre unit of the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge.

All but five of the 12 Ottawa County Townships and only one of the Lucas County Townships reside within the 10-mile EPZ of the DBNPS. The 2003 permanent population of the 10-mile EPZ is approximately 20,807. The land use within the 10-mile EPZ is a combination of residential, agricultural, and recreational.

3.2. Exercise Participants Agenciesnandcorganizations-of the4ollowingqjurisdictionsýparticipated in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions FENOC Ohio Department of Health Ohio Department of Natural Resources Ohio Department of Transportation Ohio Emergency Management Agency Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Ohio State Army National Guard 6

Ohio State Highway Patrol Ohio State University Extension Service Ottawa County Emergency Management Agency United States CoastGuard Risk Jurisdictions Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Amateur Radio Emergency Services/RACES American Red Cross Ballville Township Fire Department Bay Township, Fire Department Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Fremont Fire Department Fremont Middle School Fremont Ross High School Jerusalem Township Fire Department Kersten's Korner Nursery School Lucas County Commissioners Lucas County Emergency Management Agency Lucas County Engineer Lucas County Sheriffs Department Magruder Hospital Memorial Hospital Mid County EMS Oregon Police Depamrtent.......

Oregon School District Representative Oregon School District Transportation Department Ottawa County Sheriff Ottawa-Cou nty Radioogical-Group Ottawa County Public Information Ottawa County Jobs and Family Services Ottawa County Health Department Ottawa County Fire/EMS Ottawa County Executive Group Ottawa County Engineer Ottawa County Detention Facility Ottawa County Commissioners Ottawa County Transportation Agency 7

Port Clinton Fire Department Port Clinton Police Department Woodmore Local School District Woods-Sandusky-Ottawa-Seneca (WSOS) Community Action Commission WSOS Americorps/CERT Support Jurisdictions Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Sandusky County EMA Sandusky County Health. Department Sandusky County-Amateur Radio Emergency Services Sandusky Township Fire Department 3.3. Exercise Timeline Table 1, onthe following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise held on May 12, 2009. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

8

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-05-12, SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH Evacuate Sub-areas 1.2. 3. 10. 11 and 12 KI Administration Decision: EW, public and inst. Dopulations in Sub-areas 1.2. 10 and 12 KI Administration Decision: EW, public and inst. populations in Sub-areas 1. 2, 3, 10, 11. and.

9

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-05-12, SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH 2nd EAS or EBS Message 2nd Protective Action:Recominendation: Evacuate Sub-areas 1, 2, 3. 10, 11 and 12 2nd Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Sub-areas

.1-2,_3*10_t.L and.12 3rd Siren Activation ira rAz or inz mvessage KI Administration Decision: EW, public and inst.

populations in Sub-areas 1, 2, 10 and 12 KI Administration Decision: EW, public and inst.

10

4. Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the May 12, 2009, REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent of play agreements used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

4.1. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria from Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiencies or ARCAs)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)

Blank - Not scheduled for demonstration 11

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (3 pages)

U© DATE: 2009-05-12 U

g SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH U

0 C

A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated 0

-2 t U

U U

~0oU

-~

~

-)~Q U

v),

c/),

cn Qv) C 0

0 C.)

(D C

Mobilization lal M M

M M M M Facilities 1b]

Direction and Control

]cI M M M M

M Communications Equipment 1d] M M M M M M M M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations lel M M M M

M M M M Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a]

M M M

Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b]

M M Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 M M M

PADs for protection of special populations 2c]

M M M

Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure 2d]

Pathway Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, 2el and Return Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a]

M M

M M M Implementation of KI decision 3b]

M M

MIMIM Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3cl M

M Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 M

M M

Implementation of traffic andaccess-control 3d]

M.M M

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 M

Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info

3el Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs-are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3fl Adequate Equipment for Plume Phiase Field Measurements 4a1 Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory opeiations 4c I Atiatinofth mI akerndnotificaio Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a]

_M M1 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system -Fast Breaker 5a2 Activatio n of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1 M

M M

M M Mon / decon oftevacuees and emergency workers, and registration of 6a]

evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b] 1 I

Temporary care of evacuees 6cl I 12

I T Iýti-n an,' tr-afi-t f, I

t A ", --

4 14,111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Iasp n of~

1 con am1111e11 13

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/3)

DATE: 2009-05-12 SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated C).)

0 0

0, (9

F-C)-

LI) 0

(-)

0 (9

CC 6

a E,

(9 C"

0 F-,

CC

<)

F)

C)

C) 0~

C) 0a-0 0,

C)

(9 C)

C) 0 0

0a-CC C)

C)

CC 0

H CC C)9 U-(9 (5

0 U

0 C,.)

0 C)

C) 0 C)

C)

CC U)

U.)

0 0

C)

U-CC 6

L)

(9 CC CC 9

C)

CC 0

0 C) 0 0a-(9 0

C) 0 (9

Mobilization 1 al Facilities Ibi Direction and Control 1c]

Communications Equipment ldl M M

MMMMMM M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations lel M

M M M M M M M M M Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a]

Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b]

Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 PADs for protection of special populations 2c]

Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure 2d]

Pathway Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, 2el and Return Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a] I I

I M M M A A M IA M

Implementation of KI decision 3b] I M M M M M M IM Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3cl Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 mlmna.

of taffic and access control 3d] IM

-M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 Implementation of ingestion.pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3el Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f]

Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a]

Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4cl F

eg NotfiwunýatodPubliu infd 1

a Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5al

!MI I

Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 M

M Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b]

Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of 6al I

M I IAM evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b]

M 14

Temporarv care of evacIees Transportation and treatment of contaminated inlIUred individuals 6di 15

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/3)

DATE: 2009-05-12 SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated 2

C-)

7 0

2 a-a C) cc a

a 0

Co a

C) 2 aq ai C)C)

U C-)

0 02 Co C) ga

.)

U

,-.)

U H

C.-

C.-,

C) cd~

a U

C)

C) a-C-)

H C) a C-)

C)a

~2 V)

C)

C)-

0 0to~

C)

Co C) 0-)

02 2

0o Mobilization lal M M Facilities IbN Direction and Control 1c]

M Communications Equipment Idl M M M M M M

M M M Equip & Supplies to supporl operations lel M M M M M M M M Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2al M

M Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b]

Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 M

PADs for protection of special populations 2cl M

M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2dl Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and 2el Return Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3al M M M

M M M M M M Implementation of KI decision 3b] M M M

M M M M M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3cl M

M M

Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 M

Implementation of traffic and access control 3d]

M M

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 7

Implementation ofinoestion pathway decisions - availability/use ofinfo 3el Materials -for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2..

Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f]

Adequate Eq uiplmnent for'PlUme Piase Fieldu easturemiienits 4a.

Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b]

Laboratory operations 4ci t

Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5ao M

Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b]

M M Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of 6al M

evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b]

M Temporary care of evacuees 6cq 16

I Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals j~6dl INIII\\41 I. I I I I I I I I ITransportation and treatment of contaminated MjUred individLials Illlll j6dl IMIMI F-F-FT I I 1 1, -F-]

17

4.2. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. Presented below are the definitions of the terms used in this subsection relative to criteria demonstration status.

Met -,Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no.Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs during this exercise and the recommended action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

Prior A-CAs - Resolved-Des-ciptions of AR-,*s-a-ddsse uid g I-rev-i6us exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

PriQor RCAs.R C

Unresolv~ed - Desscrip~tions,of.ARCQAs ass.ess.ed*,during.prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are defintions of the two types of exercise issues that maybe discussed in this report.

A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that 18

appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant".

DHS/FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among DHS/FEMA Regional Offices and site-specific exercise reports within each Regional Office. It also expedites tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number of Deficiencies and ARCAs include the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

Plant Site Identifier.- A two-digit number, corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

Criterion Number - An alpha and two-digit number corresponding to the criteria numbers in the six Exercise Evaluation Areas described in Federal Register Notice/Vol.

67, No. 80, April 25, 2002, which amends FEMA - REP 14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual.

. -ssue-Classification-ldentifier -r(D--

=Deficiency,-_A_=_ARCA) *.OnlQyDeficiencies-and........

ARCAs are included in the exercise reports. Plan Issues are reported to the State(s) via letter from -the RAC Chairperson. Therefore, standardized issue numbers are not assigned to the Plan Issues.

Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number, assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

4.2.1. Ohio Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1. State - Initial Notification Point 19

a.

MET: 1.a.1,1.d.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.2. State - Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.11 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2,2.c.1, 3.d.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None.

f.

PRIOR ISSUES-UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.3. State - Emergency Operations Center -

Assessment Room

a.

MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1,1.d.1,1.e.1,2.a.1,2.b.1,2.b.2,2.c.1,3.d.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e..,PRIOR ISSUES1

-5 RES LEQD:Nn

f.

PRIOR ISSUES-UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.4. S.tate.- Jo.i.nt -Info~rmation Ce.nter - EOC

a.

MET: 1.c.1,1.d.1,1.e.1,5.b.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.5. Emergency Operations Facility - Ohio 20

a.

MET: 1.a:1,1.d.1,3.a.1,3.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.6. State - Joint Information Center - Toledo

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.7. Ohio State Analyst. Ottawa County EOC

a.

MET: 1.a.1,1.d.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.8& EW Monitoring/Decon Allen Clay FD

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.

b. AREAS*REQUiRIG CORRECTiVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2. Risk Jurisdictions 21

-)

4.2.2.1. Ottawa County - Initial Notification Point

a.

MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.2. Ottawa County - Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2,2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.3. Ottawa County Woodmore Local School EV-2

-.. M

-1.1

-3_b-

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.4. Ottawa County Transportation Agency-Interview EV-2

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1,3.a.1,3.b.1,3.c.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None 22

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None.

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.5. Ottawa County Kerstens Korner Nursery School EV-2

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1,3.a.1,3.b.1,3.c.2.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.6. Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point - Ohio Highway Patrol

a. MET: 1.d.1,3.a.1,3.b.1,3.d.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES -'RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES-UNRESOLVED: None

4.2.2.7. Ottawa Cou nty Traffic and Access Control Point Ohi!o State Patrol.

a.

MET: 1.e.1,3.a.1,3.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.8. Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point Port Clinton Police Department 23.

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.9. Ottawa County Traffic & Access Control Port Clinton PD Briefing

a.

MET: 1.e.1,3.a.1,3.b.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.10. Ottawa County Port Clinton Fire Department Route Verification

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.. PRIFR, ISS-UES.- RESOLVED: None.

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.11. Ottawa County Port Clinton Fire Department Backup Route Alerting

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.3.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 24

I I

4.2.2.12. Ottawa County Bay Twp Fire Route Verification

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.l.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None c c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None I

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None I

4.2.2.13. Ottawa County Bay Twp Fire Department I

Backup Route Alerting

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.3.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.14. Ohio Mid County EMS

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.d.1.

b-. -ARE*AS REQUIRIN GCCORRECTIVE-ACTION: N-one.

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None I

4.2.2.15. Medical Services (MS-I) Hospital -

Magruder Hospital - Ottawa County

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.d.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None I

25 I

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES.- UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.16. Medical Services (MS-i) Hospital -

Memorial Hospital - Ottawa County

a.

MET: 1.e.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 1.e.1.

ISSUE NO.: 18-07-lel-A-02 ISSUE: A Johnson ahd Associates Model GSM-1 15 survey meter, serial number 5414, had no calibration label or record of calibration. The GSM-1 15 was used by'the Radiation Protection Technician to survey the contaminated individual.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: All radiological measuring and detecting equipment had calibration stickers affixed to the equipment and was within the caliration dates required for use.

-f:.PRIORISS-UEIS-

-UNRESOLVED:-None.

4.2.2.17. Ottawa County Detention Facility

a. MET: 13d.1-1.e: 1 2.a.1,

-2c.1 3.a.1131b.1, 3.c.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.18. Lucas County - Initial. Notification Point

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.

26

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None c.. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED:,None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED:None 4.2.2.19. Lucas County - Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.20. Lucas County Sheriff - Traffic and Access Control Point

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1,3.b.1, 3.d.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.21. Lucas County Sheriff - Traffic and Access Control Point Briefing

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 27

I.

I 4.2.2.22. Lucas County Oregon District Transportation Special Populations

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.C.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None I

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None I

4.2.3. Support Jurisdictions I

4.2.31. Ottawa County Evacuee Decon RC Fremont HS

a. MET: 1.d.1,1.e.1,3.a.1,6.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

... 4-.2.3.2. Congregate Care Center-Fremont Middle.

I School - Ottawa County

a.

MET: 1.d.1,6.c.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None I

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

I 4.2.3.3. Ottawa County Fremont Ross High School -

Monitoring of Evacuee Vehicles and Equipment 28 I

a.

MET: 1.d.1,1.e.1,3.a.1,6.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING'CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.3.4. Fremont Ross High School - Reception Center

a. MET: 1.d.1,1.e.1,3.a.1,6.a.1.

b.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.3.5. Monitor & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment and Vehicle Allen-Clay FD Genoa Garage - Ottawa County

a.

MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1,3.a.1,6.b.1.

b.---AREA*S*R EQ,1 IRI ilG-CO RRE*CTIVE-AC Ti.O NFNd -e-..

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NO*-T-EM-ONSTRATED D--None-

e. PRIORISSUES-RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.3.6. Monitor & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment and Vehicles - Lucas - Jerusalem FD

a. MET: 1.d.1,1.e.1,3.a.1,3.b.1,6.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 18-09-6b1-A-01 29

CRITERION: Facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

CONDITION: Monitoring of emergency worker equipment and vehicles was not properly demonstrated at the Lucas County Monitoring and Decontamination of Vehicles and Equipment Center at.the Jerusalem Township, Fire Station.

A check to determine the baseline background was not conducted before the first vehicle entered the center as required.

No member of the team knew of the contamination action level which was established as 300 counts per minute (cpm) or higher above background.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The team lacked the necessary knowledge to perform an effective monitoring operation. The team did not avail themselves of written procedures as a means of reference.

REFERENCE:

NUREG-0654, Chapter K.5.b.

EFFECT: The condition described above reduced the efficiency in the onitoring-operation.2lt.could~Iead.,to misdiagnosis-of.contaminated-equipment and vehicles.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: An agreement between the

.. -Ctfidi nafiýdthe Eva lubar wl s ade upon Wher&eyby thfe i*-conit-troller Would conduct 15 minutes of training and a re-demonstration would then be evaluated.

By.1945 hours0.0225 days 0.54 hours 0.00322 weeks 7.400725e-4 months , the Controller indicated that.the training had been completed and that the equipment and monitoring team was ready to re-demonstrate vehicle monitoring.'

The re-demonstration began at 1945 hours0.0225 days 0.54 hours 0.00322 weeks 7.400725e-4 months .

At the initial monitoring point, a baseline check for background (0 CPM) 30

I radiation was made and recorded before the first vehicle (simulated) was allowed to enter. At the initial monitoring point the, survey was properly performed (methodically covering all exterior areas, with grid side down, one inch above the surface, and at less than 1-2 inches per second including wheel wells, door handles, and air intakes; follo-wed by hood opened and 3

surveyed; trunk opened and surveyed; and interior surfaces surveyed to the extent possible, especially the area around where the driver sat. Readings were called to the recorder. Areas of contamination were recorded and marked with a-circle on the car with masking tape.

I Copies 1 and 2 of the completed Equipment Monitoring Record were given to the "clean" vehicle and the driver directed around the perimeter of the area to 3

the other side of the fire station, where the driver was told to report for monitoring. Copies 3 and 4 were kept with the recorder.

A contaminated car was simulated as being driven by the team's contaminated vehicle driver to the decontamination point to be washed (hard surfaces), wiped (interior surfaces) or blotted with tape (porous surfaces),

then drive to the second monitoring point.

I A second monitoring occurred similar to the initial monitoring. If the vehicle was tested clean, it was given Copies 1 and 2 of the Equipment Monitoring Record and released to the other side of the fire station. If it was again

.su. ve~yed.dand.,fo.unddto~b~econ.taminatedý,iLwas~either.d~econtaminated-again-.

or driven and parked in the contaminated vehicle impound area.

1 During the re-demonstration the members conferred among themselves and I

The successful re-demonstration concluded at 2010 hours0.0233 days 0.558 hours 0.00332 weeks 7.64805e-4 months .

c.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None, I

I 31 I

I I

I 4.2.4. Private Jurisdictions 4.2.4.1. Joint Information Center Ottawa County Liaison

a. MET: 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.4.2. Joint Information Center Lucas County Liaision

a.

MET: 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 32

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services cAs Crisis Action System CERT Community Emergency Response Team DBNPS Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station DC Dosimetry Coordinator DCO Dosimetry Control Officer DRD Direct-Reading Dosimeter EAS Emergency Alert Station ECL Emergency Classification Le,.el EDL Executive Decision Line EMA Emergency Management Agency EMD Emergency Management Director EMR Equipment Monitoring Record EMS Emergency. Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room EW Emergency Workers FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company FFD Fremont Fire Department GIS Global Information System HP Health Physicist IWP Initial Warning Point JIC Jlint!nlrforitibhnCenter JTFD-Jerusalem TownslFip Fire Department.

LEC Law Enforcement Coordinator LERN Law Enforcement Radio Network MARCS Multi Agency Radio Communication System NDS Nuclear Data System NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCCF Ottawa County Correctional Facility OCEOC Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center OCTA Ottawa County Transportation Agency OEMA Ohio Emergency Management Agency ORO Offsite Response Organization OSHP Ohio State Highway Patrol OSLD Optically Stimulated Luminescent Detector PAD Protective Action Decision 33

PAR Protective Action Recommendation PCFD Port Clinton Fire Department PCPD Port Clinton Police Department PI Public Inquiry PIL Public Information Liaison PIO Public Information Officer PIR Public Inquiry Representative PNS Prompt Notification System PPE Personal Protective -Equipment PRD Permanent Record Dosimeter RA Resident Analyst RAC Regional Assistance Committee RCM Reception Center Manager REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RO Radiological Officer RPT Radiation Protection Technicians SAE Site Area Emergency SAR State Assessment Room SEG State Executive Group SER State Executive. Room SOG Suggested Operating Guideline SR State Route STFD Sandusky Township Fire Department TCO.

Traffic Control Officer TCP Traffic Control Points.

TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TL Team Leader TLCHD Toledo Lucas County Health Department TLD Thermo Luminescence Dosimeter VHF VeryH.igh Frequency-__

34

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise on May 12, 2009.

Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by an asterisk "(*)" before their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DHS Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency ICF ICF International Consulting TITLE NAME ORGANIZATION Radiological Assistance Committee, Chairman William E. King DHS/FEMA Exercise Director Gary Naskrent DHS/FEMA Site Specialist Bridget Ahlgrim DHS/FEMA 35

DATE: 2009-05-12, SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH L.OC*ATION, I

,,?f.

EV-, LUATiER AGENCY:

State - Initial Notification Point Frank Cordaro ICF State - Emergency Operations Center Carl Bebrich DHS/FEMA Frank Cordaro ICF State - Emergency Operations Center - Assessment Room Frank Cordaro ICF Paul Cormier ICF State - Joint Information Center - EOC Frank Cordaro ICF Emergency Operations Facility - Ohio Bridget Ahlgrim DHS/FEMA State - Joint Information Center - Toledo Michael Meshenberg ICF Ohio State Analyst Ottawa County EOC Robert Duggleby ICF EW Monitoring/Decon Allen Clay FD Henry Ryals ICF Ottawa County - Initial Notification Point Bridget Ahlgrim DHSIFEMA Ottawa County - Emergency Operations Center Bridget Ahlgrim DHS/FEMA Robert Duggleby ICF Richard Grundstrom ICF David Petta ICF Ottawa County Woodmore Local School EV-2 Gary Goldberg ICF Ottawa County Transportation Agency-Interview EV-2 Onalee Grady-Erickson ICF Ottawa County Kerstens Korner Nursery School EV-2 Don Calsyn ICF Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point - Ohio Highway Robert Vork ICF Patrol Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point Ohio State James Groves ICF Patrol Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point Port Clinton Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF Police Department Ottawa County Traffic & Access Control Port Clinton PD Briefinq James King DHSIFEMA Ottawa County Port Clinton Fire Department Route Verification James King DHS/FEMA Ottawa County Port Clinton Fire Department Backup Route Clayton Spangenberg ICF Alerting Ottawa County Bay Twp Fire Route Verification Michael Meshenberg ICF Ottawa :County Bay Twp Fire Department Backup Route BruceSwiren ICF Ohio Mid County EMS Daniel Prevo ICF

- MedicalServices (MS-.1)._Hospital-Magruder Hospital. Ottawa - Paul-Nied.CF County Medical Services (M5-1) Hospital - Memorial Hospital - Ottawa Gary Goldberg ICF Ottawa County Detention Facility Michael Henry ICF Lucas County - Initial Notification Point Henry Ryals ICF Lucas County - Emergency Operations Center Todd Gemskie DHS/FEMA William Vocke ICF Lucas County Sheriff - Traffic and Access Control Point Robert Vork ICF Lucas County Sheriff - Traffic and Access Control Point Briefing Don Calsyn ICF Lucas County Oregon District Transportation Special Clayton Spangenberg ICF Populations Ottawa County Evacuee Decon RC Fremont HS James Groves ICF Congregate Care Center - Fremont Middle School - Ottawa Daniel Prevo ICF County Ottawa County Fremont Ross High School - Monitoring of Paul Nied ICF Evacuee Vehicles and Equipment Fremont Ross High School - Reception Center Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF I,

36

Monitor & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment and Vehicle Onalee Grady-Erickson ICF Allen-Clay FD Genoa Garage - Ottawa County Monitor & Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment and Vehicles David Petta ICF

- Lucas - Jerusalem FD Joint Information Center Ottawa County Liaison Michael Meshenberq CF

[Joint Information Center Lucas County Liaision Michael Meshenberg ICF Ll Týa-,,34j 37

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENTS This appendix lists the exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station REP..Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway.Exercise on May 12, 2009, and the offsite extent of play agreement approved by DHS/FEMA on April 9, 2009.

The exercise criteria, contained in FEMA, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology, as published in the Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67,.No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation, and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", November 1980.

Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plants sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, and Extent of Play Agreement is prepared by the State and approved, by DHS/FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criteria.

A. Exercise Criteria and Extent of Play Listed below are the specific REP criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

38

DAVIS-BES.SE NUCLEAR POWER STATION PARTIAL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT State of Ohio 01/26/09 MAY 12, 2009 39

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the decision ofthe evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Extent of Play The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and the Ohio Highway Patrol Dispatch Center will receive initial notification over the 24-hour phone line. Once the SEOC Assessment Room is activated all dedicated phone communications will be received there. The State will mobilize all the agencies that have responsibilities in the SEOC, primarily the Executive Room, Dose Assessment, State Joint Information Center (JIC); the county EOC's; and the DBNPS JIC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The state representatives assigned to the DBNPS JIC and EOF, and the county EOC's will be pre-positioned within approximately 20 minutes after the declaration of the Alert.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

Extent of Play

.The. baseline exercise for demonstration of this cprpiteio was conducted in April 2002.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response eff orb which they are responsible.

Extent of Play Direction and control of state activities will be demonstrated at the SEOC. The Executive Director of Ohio EMA will be positioned in the SEOC Executive Room and will coordinate decisions on behalf of the Governor's office. The Ohio Department of Health is responsible for determining the State PAR in the SEOC Assessment Room and will provide periodic briefings to the SEOC Executive Room.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available and operate properly and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communication capabilities are. managed in support of emergency operations..

Extent of Play 40

The primary means of communications between the State EOC and the County EOCs, DBNPS JIC and EOF is by commercial and/or dedicated telephone. Backup communications (radio and/or cellular phones) will be demonstrated.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry,'potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Extent of Play The state will demonstrate -the use of equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations. The maps traditionally used in the EOC will be available and used for exercise evaluation purposes.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

Extent of Play The SEOC Assessment Room staff will consider PAGs and Administrative Limits to develop recommendations, including KI, based on their technical evaluation of the available data. Recommendations will be forwarded to the SEOC Executive group and subsequently to the Ottawa and Lucas County EOC's. County EOC's will disseminate recommendations to their emergency workers. Field monitoring data will be provided to the SEOC Assessment Room via controller injects.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions field monitoring data and Jieensee and ORO dose projections, as wiell asknhowe ge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

Extent of Play The SEOC Assessment Room will evaluate the licensee information and complete independent dose projections based on that information and controller injected (simulated) field-monitoring data. Assessment Room staff will evaluate the data and forward protective action recommendations to the SEOC Executive Room.

Approved recommendations will then be forwarded to the Ottawa and Lucas County EOCs via a dedicated conference line established in the Assessment Room.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

41

Extent of Play The Governor or his designee will demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations based on technical information from the SEOC Assessment Room. Recommendations concerning the use of KI for the general public and emergency workers and institutionalized are the responsibility of the Ohio Department of Health. They are made in the SEOC Assessment Room in compliance with the ODH KI policy and will accompany the protective action recommendation.

Coordination will take place in the SEOC Executive Room with Ottawa and Lucas Counties to ensure consideration of local needs. After the decision is made, counties will disseminate protective actions to the general public.

At least two (2) Protective Action Decisions will be demonstrated.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

Extent of Play The recommendation to take KI is developed by the Ohio Department of Health in the SEOC Assessment Room and accompanies the PAR. -Upon approval.in the SEOC Executive Room, it is then forwarded to Ottawa and Lucas Counties for implementation.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences forjthe ingestio0 pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

E tnofPlay.....

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Extent of Play The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 42

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency wdrkers in accordance with the plan and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Extent of Play The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), Communication Van and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2008 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise.

Implementation will be demonstrated by county responders.

Implementation will be demonstrated for State personnel responding to the EOF.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of Ki be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

Extent of Play The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), Communication Van and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2008 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise.

Implementation will be demonstrated by county responders.

Implementation will be demonstrated for State personnel responding to the EOF.

No KI will be ingested.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas-subject-to protective -actions.

Extent of Play N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/school officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

Extent of Play N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Extent of Play 43

The SEOC Dose Assessment Room-in coordination with the SEOC Executive group will procedurally demonstrate restricting air, water and rail traffic within the Emergency Planning Zone.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Extent of Play N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

Extent of Play The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

r Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

Extent of Play June......Th6-St 2t'O-d6 Vtt--at-tl'

-J -h-r0 WPS exercise.It-il-demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the criad wh appropriate organiza*ionsand implemented.

Extent of Play The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

EVALUATION AREA.4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

Extent of Play 44

The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), Communication Van and Sample ScreeningPoint will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2008 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Extent of Play The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), Communication Van and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2008 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

Extent of Play The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), Communication Van and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2008 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. It.will be demonstrated again at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

Extent of Play The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

Extent of Play The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2006 PNPP exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 45

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include:

1. Identification of the state or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message

2. Identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant

3. Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency

4. A closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay.tuned for additional information.

Extent of Play The State will consult with the county EOC's in the Executive Room to determine the best immediate protective action for the populace. Once a decision is reached that requires the activation of the alert and notification system, Ottawa County will simulate the activation of the sirens. EAS messages will be prepared by Ottawa County EMA who will provide them to the EAS Station. (See the Ottawa County Extent of Play Agreement for further details.)

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to n.otJfy the.,public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification.of the public is

eompletb'd.Witi',i,5m inutes thmR faiur.

and notification system.

Extent of Play

.N/A-ý5T*hisiisac county function. -

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Extent of Play The State PIO and a representative from the Ohio Department of Health will be present at the DBNPS JIC to address protective actions being implemented and the activities taking place at the State and county level. Public information representatives from Ohio EMA will be present in the SEOC (JIC) to communicate with the DBNPS JIC.

A Public Inquiry telephone will be established and demonstrated at the SEOC JIC and driven by controller injects. Publizgnquiry will address at least 3 calls per hour

once Site Area Emergency is declared for two (2) hours. Trends in rumors will be identified and responded to as needed.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and, registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Extent of Play N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

Extent of Play N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines.

Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure-that evacuees have been monitored for

..contamination 1an 6* eKeneco as appropate prior to eftiing congregate care facilities.

Extent of Play N/A - hiis a-duifityf n*tioni.'

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained

personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Extent of Play.

N/A - This is a county function.

47

OTTAWA COUNTY 2009 RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS EXERCiSE EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, by a decision of the evaluator, include the following:

3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.l, 6.b.1, 6.c.I and 6.d.l. Criteria that maybe re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a. 1, 2.b. 1, 2.b.2, 5.a.I and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA,1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-Element 1.a - Mobilization Criterion 1.a.l:

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

All agencies identified in the Ottawa County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) will be alerted as per established procedures. The primary means of notification from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a dedicated line; therefore, a verification call will not be performed. If a back-up means of communication (commercial phone or 800 MHz radio) is necessary, a verification call will be made. Appropriate personnel shall be mobilized in accordance with the RERP to staff emergency facilities.

The Sheriff's Dispatcher and Ottawa County EMA personnel will notify the emergency according to the level of emergency. Agencies/individuals will be contacted by radio, pager or telephone and will verify the accurate receipt of the

notification message byeither reading it. back or callingthe Sheriff's -Dispatch Center (or EOC, if activated) depending upon,how the individual was notified.

£o9~ngy~ifcaiol 7 he.desig nate&d:.id, r:..

personnel within the agency by using normal inier-nal notification guidelines.

Personnel will be informed of the Plant's status so that each agency with response roles at specific levels in the emergency can take appropriate actions as specified in the plan. Individual agencies rely on telephone and/or radio to contact their personnel according to a predetermined priority call list.

The County EMA Director shall be responsible for EOC 'activation and operation. The EOC will not normally be activated for an UNUSUAL EVENT.

It may be activated for an ALERT at the discretion of the EMA Director. The EOC staff will be fully mobilized at a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY.

48

Criterion 1.a.1 (Continued)

The following field activities/facilities will be driven by controller injects and demonstrated out of sequence:

Route Verification/ Supplemental Route Alerting

+ Bay Township Fire Department Monday, May 11, 2009 - 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months Port Clinton Fire Department Tuesday, May 12, 2009-1830 hours Backup Route Alerting Bay Township Fire Department Monday, May 11, 2009-1830 hours Port Clinton Fire Department Tuesday, May 12, 2009-1830 hours Traffic/Access Control Ohio State Highway Patrol Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months Port Clinton Police Department Tuesday, May 12, 2009. - 1030 hours0.0119 days 0.286 hours 0.0017 weeks 3.91915e-4 months Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Tuesday, May 12, 2009-1830 hours Schools Woodmore Local School District Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months Kersten's Korner Nursery School Tuesday, May 12, 2008,- 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months Ottawa County Transportation Agency (OCTA)

Tuesday, May 12, 2008 - 1130 hours0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months 49

Criterion 1.a.1 (Continued)

Reception Center

. Fremont Ross High School Monday, May 11,2009 -1830 hours Care Center Fremont Middle School Monday, May 11,2009 -1830 hours Institutionalized/Special Populations Ottawa County Detention Facility Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months Contaminated Injured Memorial Hospital Monday, May 11, 2009 -1300 hours Mid County EMS Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 0730 hours0.00845 days 0.203 hours 0.00121 weeks 2.77765e-4 months Magruder Hospital Tuesday, May 12, 2009 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months SUB-ELEMENT 1..B - FACILITIES Criterion 1.b.1 Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

-Ekýd

-Pby N/A....... Baseline established in 2005..

Sub-Element 1.c - Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.l:

Key personnel with leadership-roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall, response effort for which they are responsible.

Extent of Play:

Direction and Control will be demonstrated by appropriate participating agencies in accordance with RERP and SOGs.

50

Sub-Element 1.d - Communications Equipment Criterion 1.d.1:

At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

All communications equipment at the locations listed in Criterion 1.a.1 will be demonstrated. Commercial telephone is used as the primary means of communications between the Utility, Local, County, State and Federal agencies.

The initial notification call informing County officials of an emergency at DBNPS is made on a 4-Way dedicated telephone line that connects Davis-Besse, State of Ohio, Ottawa County and Lucas County.

Upon activation of the County EOC, the 4-way dedicated (conference style) telephone hook-up will connect the Davis-Besse Emergency Operating Facility (EOF), the Ottawa County EOC, Lucas County EOC and the 'Ohio EOC.

A facsimile machine, will support verbal communications, as well as plant status and radiological dose assessment updates. This system may remain open and operational until the incident is terminated by the appropriate authority.

In addition, a 3-way conference line will connect Ottawa and Lucas County Commissioners and the. Governor's Representative and will be used to coordinate protective action recommendations and activation of the siren system and EAS.

Once notification has *been made and communication links. are established, a telephonee/radio network will be u.se.d to expedite agency Radio/backup communication will be available for demonstration by:

Amateur, Radio Emergency Service Ohio Emergency Management Agency Ohio State Highway Patrol United States Coast Guard

+ Ottawa County Schools' Liaison

+ Ottawa County Sheriff's Dispatch Sub-Element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.1:

Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to sgfport emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

All equipment, displays, supplies, etc. at the locations listed in Criterion 1.a.1 will be demonstrated.

Sufficient quantities of direct-reading.and. permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers are available for issuance to emergency workers.

Dosimetry and KI have been pre-distributed to ORO's (see 3.a.1 and 3.b.1). Available supplies of KI will be within the revised expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs.

Letters authorizing extension of the KI expiration date will also be provided to FEMA at the evaluators' pre-exercise meeting'. The letter identifying completion of the periodic requirements (identifying equipment calibration dates and KI expiration dates) will also be provided.

Monitoring kits and Dosimetry are exchanged annually; the documentation is included in the 2009 Annual Letter of Certification.

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) (through local health departments) makes KI available to the general public by pre-distribution and distribution at,reception centers.

EOC Liaisons for the Ohio Department of Transportation, Ottawa County Engineer and Ottawa County Sheriff will discuss equipment and supplies to support Traffic and Access Control.

Memorial Hospital will demon~strate compliance with annual calibration requirements for survey meters and dosimetry at 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months on Monday, May 11, 2009.

Reference 2007 ARCA 18-07-1 el-a-02.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Sub-Element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion;2.a.l:

OROs -use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and

. *appropriadte cbordiation,,,to-insure - that,-:an.expesure*-ýcontrol ýsystem; including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure *in excess of administrative limits or protective action -guides.

52

Criterion 2.a.1 (Continued)

Extent of Play:

The Ottawa County Radiological Officer (RO) will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of county emergency workers.

Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices* at all times when performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual,is. in the EPZ during a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY. Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Should the scenario dictate a revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs will be discussed.

Discussion will be driven by controller inject.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated due to out of sequence play.

The Ohio Department of Health recommends the use of KI.

Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations..

ear dosime.tr.wwillbetutilizedi(inhlieuw of individ ual~dosimetry-)-at--........

the Ottawa County Detention Facility and the Ottawa County

-EOC.

Sub-Element 2.b - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency.

Criterion 2.b.1:

Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County does not demonstrate this criterion; it relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 2.b.2:

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordinati58 is used to make protective action decisions

(PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

Extent of Play:

Protective action decisions (PADs) will be made in accordance with the RERP and SOGs. The Ottawa County Commissioners are responsible for the recommendation and implementation of protective measures for the affected public and emergency workers in Ottawa County. They will reach their decisions by weighing information, data and protective action recommendations from the State, Utility, Federal and local sources.

When a protective action has been recommended by either the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. (DBNPS').or the State of Ohio, the Ottawa County Commissioners will consult with the Ottawa County Executive Group and the Lucas County Commissioners to decide upon a coordinated protective action, thetime when the sirens will be activated, an Emergency Alert System (EAS) message and Special News Broadcasts.(SNBs).

The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

The county will demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of PADs with affected jurisdictions. The number of PADs will be dependent on the scenario, however, at least two (2) will be demonstrated.

Sub-Element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.l:

Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special

. population-gr.oups.

Extent of Play:

A list of ppeoplewith special needs (mobility impaired, hearing impaired,

~ i.minaind~~ te~ttawaCou nty.,-H~ealth. --Depaý rm et,-in coordination with the Ottawa County EMA and local fire departments, for use in an emergency.

A special needs list shall be printed by the Health Department, however, due to confidentiality concerns, simulated lists will be provided to appropriate fire departments.

Criterion 2.c.1 (Continued)

Appropriate protective actions for institutionalized/special needs shall be demonstrated at the Ottawa County Detention Facility at 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009.

Sub-Element 2.d - Radiological Assespent and Decision Making for the Ingestion

Exposure Pathway Criterion 2.d.1:

Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio.

Sub-Element 2.e - Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry and Return Criterion 2.e.l:

Timely re-location, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

Extent of Play:

Criterion not selected. Successfully demonstrated in May, 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-Element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1:

The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

............Extent ~oL~lay:.

The Ottawa County Radiological Officer will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to.monitor exp6osure of-c-uniti-emergency workers." Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices at all times when

... perforeming,,*.personnel.....,or:.-*equipment--.-contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during Criterion 3.a.1 (Continued)

a. SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a

GENERAL EMERGENCY. Should the scenario dictate a revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated via controller inject due to og:pf sequence play.

Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

Criterion 3.a.1 will be demonstrated by appropriate agencies/ personnel in conjunction with their RERP assignments.

Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Ballville Township Fire Department Bay Township Fire Department

+

Fremont Fire Department

+

Kersten's Korner Nursery School

+

Magruder Hospital Mid County EMS Ohio State Highway Patrol

+ Ottawa'County Detention Facility

+ Ottawa County Radiological Officer Ottawa County Transportation Agency

. Port Clinton Fire Department Port Clinton Police Department Sandusky Township Fire Department

Woodmore Local Schools Sub-Element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b.1:

KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made.

Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained.

In. a.ccordance -with the. RERP and SOGs,. potassium _iodide.(KI).is supplied by the Ohio. Department of Health to the Ohio EMA for pre-distribution to offsite response organizations. The Ohio EMA provides a

.f ll~db~~

- fehll*dt'skdfKId§r.d6i.iietry padcket of emergency workers with potential to enter the EPZ, thus Criterion 3.b.1 (Continued) allowing emergency workers to begin use promptly and voluntarily upon recommendation from the Ohio Department of Health. Should the Ohio Department of Health recommend the taking of. KI for emergency workers, the County Radiological Officer will coordinate with local agency dosimetry coordinators to implement such a recommendation.

KI WILL NOT BE INGESTED.

Issuance of KI to institutionalized individuals is based upon the recommendation of the Ohio Department of Health and implemented at the County and local level.

The Special Needs Communicator will notify institutional facilities, as needed, and 56

recommend that the appropriate designee for each applicable facility administer KI to institutionalized persons. Actual-administration is under the direction of the attending physician. KI WILL NOT BE INGESTED.

The. Ohio Department of Health (ODH)

(through local health departments) makes KI available to the.general public by pre-di.stribution and. by distribution at reception centers.

The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

Agencies/Individuals will demonstrate Criterion 3.b.1 in conjunction with their RERP assignments. Those available for evaluator interviews will include:

Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Ballville Township Fire Department Bay Township Fire Department

+

Fremont Fire Department Kersten's Korner Nursery School Mid County EMS Ohio State Highway. Patrol

+ Ottawa County Detention Facility

+ Ottawa County Radiological Officer Ottawa County Transportation Agency Port Clinton Fire Department Port Clinton Police Department

+ Sandusky Township Fire Department Woodmore Local Schools

. SubEleme nt-3:c.- I mple h:ta~ti6hi-frP ***~

oi~Sbedijl uti e*A-6ti6h-fo*SleciilP6 lations...

Criterion 3.c.1:

Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations, other-than s-chool0s, within areas subject to_prote~ctive actions........

Extent of Play:

A list of people with special needs (mobility impaired, hearing impaired, etc.) is maintained' by the Ottawa County Health Department, in coordination with the Ottawa County EMA and local fire departments, for use in an emergency.

A special needs list shall be printed by the Health Department, however, due to confidentiality concerns, simulated lists will be provided to appropriate fire departments.

Appropriate protective actions for institutionzilized/special needs shall be demonstrated at the Ottawa County Detention Facility at 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009.

57

Criterion 3.c.2:

OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, the Ottawa County Schools' Liaison will report to the EOC to:

1) Provide notification to local school districts.

2) Advise school district superintendents on plant status and recommended response actions.

3) Simulate the coordinating of protective actions for schools.

4) Simulate the coordinating with local school districts to provide buses and volunteer drivers for the evacuation of the mobility impaired, transportation dependent populations and health care facilities.

The Schools' Liaison communicates with the Superintendents' offices.

They, in turn, notify district personnel and coordinate district resources.

Communications between the Schools'.Liaison and the Superintendents' offices will be documented.

Fremont Ross High School willnot participate in the.2009 Exercise. No students will be transported. An administrator from Fremont Ross High School will be available for interview at Woodmore Administration Office beginning at 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009.

Woodmore participants available for interview beginning at 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009, include:

Woodmpre Superintendent, Transportation Supervisor/Dosimetry Coordinator and one bus driver.

Kersten's Korner Nursery School personnel available for interview beginning at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009, include:

Administrator Ottawa County Transportation Agency participants available for interview beginning at 1130 hours0.0131 days 0.314 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29965e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009, include:

58

Director, Transportation Supervisor/Dosimetry Coordinator and a Bus Driver Sub-Element 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criteria 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, major traffic intersections are controlled by the Ottawa County Sheriff's Office with support from the Ohio State Highway Patrol, local police departments and the Ohio National Guard.

The County Engineer - Highway Garage and ODOT also assist in traffic control efforts by delivering traffic control equipment and assigning personnel to predetermined control points.

If assistance is required to perform traffic control, clearing roads or removing stalled vehicles, it is requested from the State thrQugh Ohio EMA.

Two Traff c/Access Control Points shall be demonstrated:

8-1:

SR 2 and SR 53 (Fremont Road)

OhioState-Highway -Patrol-9-4:

Fremont Road and Portage Drive Port Clinton Police Department Thset pre d esignate',accesS-*6on :t b1p*st nece~ssaryy to* contrdl access-to an affected area will be activated (SIMULATED). Personnel from the Ottawa County Sheriff's Office, Ohio State Highway Patrol, local police departments, Ohio National Guard and ODNR supported by access control equipment from the County Engineer -

Highway Garage and Ohio Department of Transportation ensure that unauthorized vehicles do not enter the evacuated areas..

Remaining Traffic Control and Access Control Points shall be demonstrated procedurally at the Ottawa County EOC by:

Ottawa County Sheriff Liaison Ottawa County Engineer Liaison Ohio Department of Transportation Liaison 59

+ Ohio State Highway Patrol Liaison N Ohio State Highway Patrol personnel available for interview beginning at 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009 include:

Post Commander, Dosimetry Coordinator and one Trooper M Port Clinton Police personnel available for interview beginning at 1030 hours0.0119 days 0.286 hours 0.0017 weeks 3.91915e-4 months , Tuesday, May 12, 2009 Chief, Dosimetry Coordinator and one Road Officer Criterion 3.d.2:

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Extent of Play:

Ottawa County Sheriff's Office, Ottawa County Engineer's Office, Ohio State Highway -Patrol and Ohio Department of Transportation Liaisons located in the Ottawa County EOC will demonstrate the capability to:

Identify impediments to evacuation Implement appropriate actions to remove or.otherwise deal with impediments.

Controller injects will identify impediment(s) that will impact an evacuation route and necessitate re-routing traffic and drive further discussion at GE. Actual resources will not be utilized.

Sub-Element.3.e,.. ---.Implementation.of*ingestion ýPathwa.yDecisions_

Criterion 3.e.1:

The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production-within the-ingestionexposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protectJve actions.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio.

Criterion 3.e.2:

Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio.

Sub-Element 3.f - Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions 60

Criterion 3.f.1:

Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

Extent of Play:

Crite'rion not selected. Successfully demonstrated in May, 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-Element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses Criterion 4.a.1:

The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 4.a.2:

Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the.State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse

.N u clear* ower.Statio*

Criterion 4.a.3:

Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulatesamples are collected.-Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to. determine tetee r

pany

,siglnaifin cant*,,,sp.e if e.d...ý,n,,,the.,-plan.and/or,procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Sub-Element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Criterion 4.b.1:

The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (for example, food

crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

61

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State Of Ohio Sub-Element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.1:

The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protectiveaction decisions.

Extent of-Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio 62

EVALUATION AREA 5 -

EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-Element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.l:

Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

1. Identification of the state or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message 2..

Identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant.*

3. Reference. to REP-specific emergency information (e.g.,

brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency

4. A closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information.

Extent of Play:

Siren activation will be simulated at Site Area Emergency, General Emergency and prior to the announcement of PADs.

Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. PA systems will be demonstrated witha-test-message at an-agreed-upon location.-

Bay.

, ip,.

. Fire De artment Monday, May 22, 1009-1830 hours Port Clinton Fire Department Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months NOAA will be contacted. NOAA will not broadcast an emergency message.

National Weather Service (Cleveland) 63

Criterion 5.a.1 (Continued)

EAS messages will be prepared and provided to the LP 1. EAS Messages are transmitted electronically from the Ottawa County EOC to the LP-1 station via telephone lines utilizing the SAGE ENDEC. The Ottawa County ENDEC provides a printout verifying that the message was sent. The LP-1 ENDEC provides a printout verifying receipt of the message. EAS messages will be recorded but not broadcast.

+ WRVF 101.5 FM Radio Tuesday, May 12, 2009 Text telephones (TTY/TDD) are available for demonstration by the Ottawa County Sheriff's.Dispatch and by Public Inquiry.

Criterion 5.a.2:

(RESERVED)

Criterion 5.a.3:

Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within.45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Extent of Play:

Sirens 805 (Bay Township Fire Department) and 091 (Port Clinton Fire

,eptre b

oei en ifted as_-ail igmath.,.G enra-.Emergency (during the out of sequence demonstration of this criterion).

Backup Route Alerting will be demonstrated out-of-sequence.

-PA systems will be demonstrated with a test message at an agreed upon

+

Bay Township Fire Department Monday, May 11, 2009 - 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months

+

Port Clinton Fire Department Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months Sub-Element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and Media 64

Criterion 5.b.1:

OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

EAS messages will be prepared and provided to the LP 1. EAS messages will be recorded but not broadcast.

+ WRVF 101.5 FM Radio In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, the JIC will be activated and staffed by PlOs from Ottawa County, Lucas County, the State, Federal Agencies and the Utility upon declaratio h of an ALERT. News Releases will be coordinated with all participating PIOs prior to release to the news media with briefings held jointly, as appropriate.

The Ottawa County PIO will maintain contact with the Public Information Assistant in the Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) who will serve as the primary contact point for all public information related matters within the Ottawa County EOC. Ottawa County will not conduct a news briefing at the Ottawa County EOC.

Information from participating local or county agencies in the EOC will be coordinated with the Public Information Assistant. The Public Information Assistant will provide information to the PIO for development of a joint. news statement with Lucas County and the State, if appropriate.

The Public Information Assistant-will.ensure that.the Commissioners are

-- aware--of-informa~tiflo e'in Be g'--sse *lat

-to-the-`hews

'a"*e-i will coordinate with the Public Information Assistant to receive

Commissioner approval on news statements affecting Ottawa County prior to dissemination to the news media.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-Element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1:

The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate reso urces, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Criterion 6.a.1 (Continued) 65

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, if evacuation is the recommended protective action, residents are instructed to leave the affected area along designated routes and go to specific reception centers located in adjacent/host counties..

No reception centers are located in Ottawa County.

At reception centers, the evacuees are checked for contamination, provided KI (if appropriate), registered and assigned to a care center (if necessary).

The evacuee portion of this criterion shall be demonstrated at the Fremont Ross High School Reception Center, Fremont, Ohio, out of sequence on Monday, May 11, 2009, at 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months .

In accordance with applicable guidance, monitorinq will be demonstrated and decontamination will be discussed by Fremont Fire Department. The Dosimetry Coordinator will be pre-positioned at Fremont Ross High School and will distribute dosimetry from that location.

The ORO will provide six individuals to be simulated evacuees. They will be monitored for contamination and will be processed through the facility.

Initial monitoring utilizing a Bicron Portal Monitor will identify one evacuee to be referred to secondary monitoring. One locker room will be fully set up and demonstrated.

Decisions on the need for decontamination will be made based on Controller injected radiation levels.

Decontamination will be simulated.

The proper sequence for washing and for decontamination efforts, and the decisions,.to refer -individuals who cannot, be..decontaminated to medical facilities will be discussed.

Contamination.

control and

-record-keeping procedures will -be demon*trated at the initial and secondary monitoring points.

Brwn Kraft'paper w-be used for floor covering.

Registration of six evacuees will be demonstrated by Sandusky County W.S.O.S. Community Action Commission.

Transportation of evacuees from the reception center to care centers will not be demonstrated.

Participating organizations:

Fremont Fire Department Sandusky County W.S.O.S.

Community Action Commission Sandusky County Department of Health 66

Should the Ohio Department of Health recommend potassium iodide for the general public, KI will be distributed-to evacuees by Sandusky County Department of Health after initial monitoring.

Evacuee vehiclemonitoring will be demonstrated and decontamination will be discussed by members of the Sandusky Township Fire Department and the Ballville Township Fire Department at Fremont Ross High School. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area will be set up as per guideline.

One vehicle will be monitored and decontamination will be discussed.

A firefighter will be available to answer questions regarding -monitoring and decontamination guidelines, contamination, control and record keeping.

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be demonstrated at the Genoa Bus Garage out-of-sequence on Tuesday, May 12, 2009, beginning at 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months , by the Allen-Clay Joint Fire District.

The ORO will provide individuals.to be simulated Emergency Workers returning from a field assignment.

One Emergency Worker will be identified as contaminated and will be processed through the facility.

Decisions on the need for decontamination will be made based on Controller injected radiation levels.

Decontamination will.be simulated.

The proper sequence for washing and for decontamination efforts,. and the decisions to refer individuals who cannot be decontaminated to medical facilities will be discussed.

Sub-Element 6.b -

Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment C"it 6

d'U-te p resource.f**i-cedi-h-a~l-Ysi~ud*-f6or tle accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles..

Extent of Play:

Emergency worker vehicle monitoring and decontamination will be demonstrated by members of the Allen-Clay Joint Fire District at the Genoa Bus Garage. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area will be set up as per guideline. One vehicle will be monitored 6.b.1 (Continued) but not decontaminated.

A firefighter will be available to answer questions regarding monitoring and decontamination guidelines, contamination control and record-keeping.

Sub-Element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.1: -

Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with 67

American Red-Cross planning guidelines.

(Found in MASS CARE -

Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031)

Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities.

Extent of Play:

Fremont Middle School congregate care facility will be demonstrated via interview out of sequence on Monday, May 11, 2009, at 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months .

Care Center capabilities to provide food, bedding and other necessities will be demonstrated via documentation from the American Red Cross.

American Red Cross staff positions participating will include one care center manager, one registration worker, one nurse, and one family worker.

Participating organizations:

American Red Cross ARES/RACES Sub-Element 6.d -

Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.1:

The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained Dpenitorg otmai medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Extent of Play:

-..Mid,_County,,EMS,will,,demon~strate-,,this.,criterioQn in sequence with the.on-site scenario.

6.d.1 (Continued)

The utility will provide an individual who will simulate being an injured and contaminated worker.

Mid County EMS will assess the patient for injuries and contamination.

As per procedures, a DBNPS Radiation.

Protection Technician (RP Tech) will[, assist EMTs with patient radiological survey.

Once stabilized, the patient will be prepared for transport, loaded onto the squad and be transported to, Magruder Hospital (accompanied by the Rad Tech). Emergency lights and sirens will not be used.

68

Upon arrival at Magruder Hospital (approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months ), the patient will be treated by the Radiation Emergency Area (REA)

Response Team.

69

LUCAS COUNTY 2009: RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

.EXTENT OF PLA¥Y,AGREEMENT.

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, by a decision of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 -EMERGENCY OPERATIONS'MANAGEMENT Sub-Element 1.a - Mobilization Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

All agencies identified in the Lucas County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) will be alerted as per established procedures. The primary means of notification from Davis-BesseNuclear Power Station is a dedicated line; therefore, a verification call will not be performed. If a back-up means of communication (commercial phone) is necessary, a verification call will be made. Appropriate personnel shall be mobilized in accordance with the RERP to staff emergency facilities. The Sheriff's Dispatcher will notify the emergency response agencies/individuals. Agencies/individuals to be notified will vary according to the level of emergency.

Agencies/individuals will be contacted by radio, pager or telephone and will Sve r

.fy

'ahe accu rate pregceipt(ojthe e otificatiomn~messagebye b

thr reading; t back or calling the Sheriff's Dispatch Center (or EOC, if activated) depending upon how the individualwas notified. Following verification, the

..designated-individual-will-notify appropriate -personnel -within-the agency-by using normal internal notification procedures. Personnel will be informed of

tieemergencycan-tkke&aUppopate adtibns as specified in the plan. The individual/agency representative receiving initial notification will notify appropriate personnel within the agency using normal internal notification procedures. Individual agencies rely on telephone and/or radio to contact their personnel according to a predetermined priority call list. The County EMA Director shall be responsible for EOC activation and operation. The EOC will not normally be activated for an UNUSUAL EVENT. It may be activated for an ALERT at the discretion of the EMA Director. The EOC staff will be fully mobilized at a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY.

The following field activities/facilities will be demonstrated out of sequence:

Traffic/Access Control 70

Lucas County Sheriff's Office Road Patrol TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009 at 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months Emergency Worker Equipment Monitoring/Decontamination Jerusalem Township Fire Department MONDAY, MAY 11, 2009 at 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months Protective Actions For Special Population Oregon School District Transportation Department TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009 @ 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months SUB-ELEMENT 1..B - FACILITIES Criterion 1.b.1 Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

Extent of Play:

Not selected. The new Lucas County Emergency Operations Center was successfully demonstrated in 2007. There have not been any significant physical or other alterations to this facility since the 2007 evaluation.

Sub-Element 1.c - Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.1:

Key personnel With leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Extent.of Play:

Direction and Control will be demonstrated by appropriate participating agencies inh ac dor'anceWittWRERP-0-dSOPs.

Sub-Element 1.d-Communications Equipment Criterion 1.d.1:

At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication lihks are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency. operations.

Extent of Play:

71

Commercial telephone is used as the primary means of communications between the.Utility, Local,,County; State and Federal agencies. The initial notification call infotming County. officials of an6emergency at DBNPS may come through the Sheriff's Dispatch Center on the 4-Way dedicated telephone line. Upon activation of-the.County EOC, a 4-way dedicated (conference style) telephone hook-up will connect the Utility, Ottawa County EOC, Lucas County EOC and the Ohio EO.C. A fax machine will support verbal communications, as well as plant status and radiological dose assessment updates. This system may remain open and operational until the incident.is terminated by the appropriate authority.

In addition, a 3-wa4 conference line will connect Ottawa and Lucas County Commissioners and the Governor's Representative and will be used to coordinate protective action recommendations and activation of the siren system and EAS.

Once notification has been made and communication links are established, a telephone/radio network will be used to expedite agency communications.

Radio/backup communication will be available for:

Amateur Radio Emergency Service Ohio Emergency Management Agency Oregon City School Bus Garage Lucas County Sheriff's Dispatch Sub-Element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.1:

Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and

".othe. supplies are sufficient to sup portemergency.operat ons.

Extent of Play:

All equipment, displays, supplies, etc. at the-locations listed in Criterion 1.a.1 will be demonstrated.

Suffic~ient quantities of direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers are available for issuance to emergency workers. Dosimetry and KI have been pre-distributed to ORO's (see 3.a.1 and 3.b.1). Available supplies of KI will be within the revised expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs.

Letters authorizing extension of the KI expiration date will be provided to FEMA at the evaluators' pre-exercise meeting.

The letter identifying completion of the periodic requirements (identifying equipment calibration dates and KI expiration dates) will also% be provided.

Monitoring kits and Dosimetry are exchanged annually; the documentation is included in the 2009 Annual Letter of Certification.

72

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH)

(through local health departments) makes KI available to the general public by pre-distribution and distribution at reception centers-EVALUATION AREA 2-PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Sub-Element 2.a - Emeraencv Worker ExDosure Control Criterion 2.a.1:

OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

Extent of Play:

The Lucas County Radiological Officer will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of county emergency workers. Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices at all times when performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY. Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a

-GENER.AL EMERGENCY.

Should-the scenario dictate.a-revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Aldvi~ries froe Est6 e

Otofie6ld personhel will be simulated due to out of sequence play.

The Ohio Department of Health will recommend the use of KI.

Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

Sub-Element 2.b - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency.

73

Criterion 2.b.1:

Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on7site and off-site environmental conditions.

Extent of Play:

Not Applicable - Lucas County does not demonstrate this criterion; it relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 2.b.2:

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

Extent of Play:

Protective Action Decisions (PADs) will be made in accordance with the RERP and SOPs. The Lucas County Commissioners are responsible for the recommendation and implementation of protective measures for the affected public and emergency workers in Lucas County. They will reach their decisions by weighing information, data and protective action recommendations from the State, Utility, Federal and local sources. When a protective action has been recommended by either the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) or the State of Ohio, the Lucas County Commissioners will consult with the Lucas County Executive Group and the Ottawa County Commissioners to decide upon a coordinated protective action, the time when the sirens will.be activated, an Emergency Alert System (EAS) message and Specia~lNews-Broad castS*('SNBs)*.....

The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

..Theicou nty,,will-demonstrate,the*.-capabilityýto-communicate-4he -contents of PADs with affected jurisdictions.

The number of PADs will be dependent on the scenario, however, at least two (2) will be demonstrated.

Sub-Element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.1:

Extent of Play:

Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

74

There are no special facilities within the Lucas County Portion of the.

EPZ. The ability to make a decision to evacuate the mobility impaired or transportation dependent will be demonstrated in the EOC bythe Fire Coordinator by interview.

Sub-Element 2.d - Radiological Assessment and Decision Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Criterion 2.d.1:

assessed and Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

Extent of Play; Not Applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio.

Sub-Element 2.e - Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Relocation. Re-entry and Return Criterion 2.e.1:

Timely re-location, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs.plan and/orprocedures.

Extent of Play:

Criterion Not Selected: This is a six year objective and was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 3-PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-Element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1:

The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and.procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end.of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Extent of Play:

75

The Lucas-County Radiological Officer will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of Countyvemergency workers. Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices at all times When performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during, a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY. Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading.dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Should the scenario dictate a re*vised.exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated due to out of sequence play.

Dosimetry packets have.been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

Criterion.3.a.1 will be demonstrated by appropriate agencies/personnel in conjunction with their RERP assignments.

Oregon School District 0

Jerusalem Fire Department (JFD)

Lucas County Sheriff's Office (Substation locate behind Sub-Element 3-b.- Implementation of KI-Decision Criterion 3.b.1:

Kl~and appropriate instructions, are.-available should adecisiont recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOPs, Potassium Iodide (KI) is supplied by the Ohio Department of Health to the Ohio EMA for pre-distribution to offsite response organizations. The Ohio EMA provides a full dose complement of KI tablets for each dosimetry packet of emergency workers with potential to enter the EPZ, thus allowing emergency workers to begin use promptly and voluntarily upon recommendation from the Ohio Department of Health. Should the Ohio 76

Department of Health recommend the taking of KI for emergency workers, the County -Radiological Officer will coordinate with local agency dosimetry coordinators to implement such a-recommendation. KI WILL NQT BE INGESTED.

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) (through local health departments) makes KI available to the general pub!ic by pre-distribution and by distribution at reception centers. The decision to advise thelgeneral public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

Agencies/individuals will demonstrate Criterion 3.b.1 in conjunction with their RERP assignments. Those available for evaluator interviews will include:

Oregon School District Jerusalem Fire Department (JFD)

Lucas County Sheriff's Office (Substation located behind JFD)

Sub-Element 3.c - Implementation -of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c.1:

Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations, other than schools, within areas subject to protective actions.

Extent of Play:

A list with people with special needs (mobility impaired, hearing impaired, etc.) is maintained by the Lucas County EMA, in coordination with:the-Fire-Coordinator-in the. EOC-and with-the-Jerusalem. Township F

i

~i-Cti ib!tgef.b T

trequepresesnttd to a auat-r-q-t although it is considered a confidential list.

Coordination with the Oregon School District to provide buses and volunteer-rirersiforthe.,(simu lated),.evacuation of the ;mobility

..i..

mpalrealtranspoftatlonF-aepen entpopulatlonswllv*erelayeavylne Fire Coordinator in the EOC. Demonstration will be by interview.

Oregon City School District Transportation Director and a-volunteer bus driver at the Bus Garage at ClayHigh School, TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009 at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months . A bus will not be driven for this exercise.

Criterion 3.c.2:

OROs/School officials decide upon and implement.protective actions for schools.

Extent of Play:

Lucas County has no schools within the 10-mile EPZ. However, an

- Oregon School District Representative will be available for an interview 77

in the Lucas County EOC to describe the process for identifying and holding 10-mile EPZ students for parental pickup.

Sub-Element 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criteria 3.d.l:Approp.riate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOPs, major traffic intersections are controlled by the Lucas County Sheriff's Office with support from the Oregon Police Department, State Highway Patr'l and the Ohio National Guard.

The County Engineer also assists in traffic control efforts by delivering traffic control equipment and assigning personnel to predetermined control points.

Lucas County Sheriff's Office Road Patrol will demonstrate this at the Sheriff's Substation, on Jerusalem Road (Route 2) TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009 at 1300 hours0.015 days 0.361 hours 0.00215 weeks 4.9465e-4 months .

.After the Road Patrol Deputy receives his dosimetry coordinator briefing, a controller inject will be communicated to the Dosimetry Coordinator to have a Deputy report to combined Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point 11-6, located at the intersection of Elliston and Veler Road.

rra ic a--d access control points shall Ie demonstrated procedurally (simulated) at the Lucas County EOC by:

Lucas County Law Enforcement Coordinator S

LucasC thgineer Criterion 3.d.2:

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Extent of Play:

The Lucas County Sheriff's Office and the Lucas County Engineer's Office Liaison located in the EOC will demonstrate the capability to:

Identify impediments to evacuation Implement appropriate actions to remove or otherwise deal with impediments.

78

A controller inject will identify an impediment that will impact an evacuation route and necessitate re-routing traffic and drive further discussion at GE. Actual resources will not be used.

Sub-Element 3.e. - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.1:

The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio Criterion 3.e.2:

Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio Sub-Element 3.f - Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions Criterion 3.f.1:

Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organzatosadmpemened..

Extent of Play:

Not Applicable. This Criteria was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-Element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses Criterion 4.a.1:

The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 79

Criterion 4.a.2:

Field teams are' managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Criterion 4.a.3:

Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low-background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been col.lected on the sampling media.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Sub-Element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Criterion 4.b.1:

The field teams demonstrate.the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (for example, food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable.- Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio Sub-Element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.1:

The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-Element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.1:

Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must 80

include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Extent of Play:

Ottawa County is responsible for EAS and siren, activation. Lucas.

County Executive Group will coordinate with Ottawa County for the time of siren sounding and the EAS message to be broadcast.

The Lucas County Executive Group will insure that all elements of the.

EOC are'aware of all EAS messages issued to the public.

Criterion 5.a.2:

(RESERVED)

Criterion 5.a.3:

Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed, within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed* within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Extent of Play:

Not Applicable. The exercise scenario will not call for failure of any portion of primary.alert system in Lucas County.

Sub-Element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and Media accurate emergency information an-iid iinsiteru public and the news media in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

6I accordancie with teRE§RP"d'SOP sJ IC wil beactivated-and staffed by Public Information Officers (PIOs) from Ottawa County, Lucas:

County, the State, Federal Agencies and the utility upon declaration of an ALERT. News statements will be coordinated with all participating PIOs with briefings held jointly, as appropriate.

Upon arrival at the JIC, the Lucas County PIO will establish and remain in contact with the Public Information Liaison in the Lucas County EOC who will serve as the primary contact point for all public information related matters within the Lucas County EOC.

The Public Information Liaison will ensure that the Commissioners are aware of information being-disseminated to the news media. The PIO will coordinate with the Public Information Liaison to receive 81

Commissioner approval on news statements affecting Lucas County prior to dissemination to the news media.

A public inquiry telephone willbe operational and demonstrated.

A media briefing will not be demonstrated in the Lucas County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-Element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1:

The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Extent of Play:

Not Selected. This criterion was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

Sub-Element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Criterion 6.b.1:

The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomn1ishment of monitoring andcldecontamination~of emergency worker equipment, incuding vehicles.

Extent of Play:

Emergency -Worker.Monitoringand.Decontamination will be demonstrated at Jerusalemi, TownslHp Fire Station. This demonstration will be out of sequence on May 11, 2009 beginning at 1830 hours0.0212 days 0.508 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.96315e-4 months . The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area will be set up as per procedure. One vehicle will be monitored. Decontamination will be discussed by interview. A firefighter will be available to answer questions regarding monitoring and decontamination guidelines, contamination control and record-keeping.

82.

Sub-Element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.1' Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resourcesto provide serices and accommodations Consistent with American Red Cross-planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE -

Preparedness Operationhs, A C 3031) Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have bUeen.decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities.

Extent of Play:

Not Selected. This criterion was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

Sub-Element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.1:

The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Extent of Play:

Not selected. This criterion was successfully demonstrated in 2005.

83

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO AND TIMELINE This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events -

Exercise Scenario - which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by offsite response organizations in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on May 12, 2009.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Ohio and FirstEnergy Nuclear Corporation and approved by DHS/FEMA Region V on April 6, 2009.

During the exercise, controllers from the State of Ohio gave "inject.messages",

containing scenario events and/or relevant data to those persons or locations who would normally receive notifications of such events. These inject messages were the method used for invoking response actions by the OROS.

SCENARIO Operational data and event timing for this scenario were developed in

-- -conjunction-with hpraactice ru nseofl4hegPlantSi mulatora-Selected-faiil ures-were-...

injected into normal plant operations as depicted on the Simulator and Operator response was permitted to take place on a "real time" basis. No artificial time comprqassions,,were injeptedpinto the~time sequence.

During the day this scenario is conducted, plant equipment status will be based on Control. Room Simulator Operator response that day, which may be different than that which occurred during the practice runs. Controllers at the Simulator will be trying to keep the sequence of events on track; however, they will try to do this without the use of verbal overrides. Instead, should the Control Room Simulator Operators take a course of action that may significantly alter the outcome of the sequence of events, the Instructor Facility (IF) Operator will inject 84

additional faults or malfunctions that can thwart the Operator actions in a manner that is consistent with "real life" equipment failures or problems.

Because of the extensive free play being allotted to Control Room Simulator Operators, the IF Operator is authorized to take immediate action as deemed appropriate to keep the sequence of events on track. If time permits, the injecting of additional equipment failures should be cleared with the Lead Controller first.

Some Control Room Simulator Operator actions will be permitted, even though they are not listed in Section 6.4, if the consequence of these actions does not significantly affect the overall outcome of the scenario.

6.1 INTITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is running at 100% power and all systems in Automatic.

2. The plant has been operating at or above 90% power for the last 450 days.

3. It is an overcast day with a light breeze coming off the lake.

4. The Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) will be conducting a Canadian Goose Roundup and Banding starting today at 0900.

6.2 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

At 0805 hours0.00932 days 0.224 hours 0.00133 weeks 3.063025e-4 months , #2 Emergency Diesel Generator Fire Alarms sound in the CTRM Simulator. The-#2 EDG Generator is involved in an-oil fire from spraying.*il from.-

the Turbo Oil System. The Fire Brigade will respond in full turnout gear without W~-ýeffigaprtu adW ics i a~ns as a ~mini scenario/fire drill.

By 0820 the Shift Manager will declare an ALERT based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 7.A.2, Fire potentially affecting safety systems.

At approximately 0910, the Vibration and Loose Parts System will indicate loose parts in the reactor vessel (this may not be observed by the CTRM Simulator Crew).These loose parts rambling in the core will damage the fuel. At about 85

0920, Letdown Rad High Annunciator Alarm 2-1-A will alarm and will indicate fuel damage and containment radiation levels will start to increase. CTRM Simulator Operators will request an RCS Sample be taken.

At 0930, a Makeup System Flow Transmitter, FTMU 31 will fail full open. The Operations Support Center should respond by sending out an Emergency Response Team to investigate the failure.

The ODNR calls Security and informs them that the helicopter pilot is having engine problems and may need to land at Davis-Besse. At 0945, the ODNR helicopter having engine problems narrowly misses the CTMT Shield Building, but does clip one phase. of the Main Generator output high lines and takes out one phase in each of the lines going to the 01 and 02 Startup Transformers. It then lands in the protected area and just as it lands, a rotor blade flies off of the helicopter and impacts the Borated Water Storage Tank, near the top, causing about a 100 gmp leak. There is no fire associated with the helicopter forced landing.

The pilot is injured in the crash, with a broken arm and is bleeding from his left th ig6h. I neexit ingd66 the heico66pte r -he i-s spla-s-hed b y~oý contamiinate6d8 BWST a te r. _T h e pilot's injuries are not life threatening. The First Aid Team will respond to the injury and request the victim be transported offsite.

A loss of offsite power will cause the four Reactor Coolant Pumps to trip which will cause a Reactor Trip from the Reactor Protection System (RPS). When the reactor trips, a 150 gpm Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak will develop. The Reactor Trip will, in turn, cause a Turbine Trip, By 1000, the Emergency Director will evaluate the change in plant conditions associated with the aircraft crash in the Protected Area and declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. The Site Area Emergency will be declared on either EAS 86

7.B.3, Aircraft crash damaging vital structures by :impact or fire or EAL 2.A.4, Reactor-Coolant System leak..rate >50 gpm, but within High Pressure Injection Capacity AND loss of offsite. power.

With the loss of offsite power, the #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) will start and supply the Cl vital bus. The SBODG will be. manually started and power D2 bus which.the CTRM Simulator operators will use totback feed to the D1 Essential Electrical Bus.

The natural circulation of the RCS will provide core cooling. The core will heat up the water and this warmer water will rise out of the core and flow to the steam generators. The RCS water'is cooled in the steam generator and then flows back to the reactor. The Auxiliary Feedwater System will be supplying water to the steam generators to remove the heat in the RCS.

At approximately 1200, the chemistry sample of the RCS that was requested by the CTRM Simulator Operators has been confirmed. to indicate 311 uCi/gram dose equivalent 1-131. It is also noted that the containment Radiation level (as per RE4596A/RE4596B) is> 1_0e4_.R/hr. (The_ chemistry sampe will!..be sstalle#ed and,7 shall not be released "confirmed" until 1200).

The ERO evaluates the new data and recommends reclassification to a

'GEN ER'AILEMERGE'N C¥Y'"5ase L

on:El*'B:*"oreamaqe4witt e

F conditions making a release of large amounts of radioactivity possible. The Emergency Director concurs and reclassifies the emergencysituation at approximately 1215. Dose Assessment staff should provide offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) for default PARS 1, 2, 10, and 12.

At 1330, a CTMT vacuum relief valve penetration fails and releases CTMT atmosphere into the Annulus requiring updated PARs 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, and 12. It is highly unlikely that the ERO will be able to determine the specific location of the 87

release prior to the drill being terminated and the release will be terminated at 1415 due to containment pressure decreasing to atmospheric.

88

ML092110461

Text

REFERENCE:

SUMMARY

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