ML090350076

Exercise on October 21, 2008 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

ML090350076
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	01/20/2009
From:	Sarubbi J US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
Download: ML090350076 (142)

Text

U.S. Department of Homeland Security One Independence Mall, Sixth Floor 615 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404 SFEMA JAN 2 0 2009 NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Enclosed is the final report for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise that was held on October 21, 2008.

If you have any questions, please contact Darrell Hammons at (215) 931-5546.

Sincerely, K

'Jonathan Sarubbi Regional Administrator Enclosure www.fenia.gov

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Exercise -

October 21, 2008 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program January 9, 2009 FEMA Region III

Final Exercise Report Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Licensee:

Exercise Date:

Report Date:

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company October 21, 2008 January 9, 2009 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FEMA REGION III ONE INDEPENDENCE MALL, 6 FLOOR 615 CHESTNUT STREET PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19106-4404

TABLE OF CONTENTS I.

Executive Summary 1

II.

Introduction.............................................

3 III.

Exercise Overview...................

............................... 6 A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description..........................................................

6 B. E xercise Participants..................................................................................................

8 C. Exercise Timeline..........................

.............................. 13 IV.

Evaluation and Results...............................................

16 A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation............................. I.................................. 16 B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated..............................................................................

20 1.0 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.................................

22 1.1 Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Center (observed only).................

22 1.2 State Joint Information Center (observed only)......................................

22 1.3 Accident Assessment Center - Bureau of Radiation Protection (observed only).........................................

22 1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (observed only).....................................

23 1.5 Media Operations Center (Utility Joint Information Center).................. 23 1.6 Mobile Command Vehicle (observed only)............................................

23 1.7 State Field Air Monitoring Team A - Eastern Region............................

23 1.8 State Field Air Monitoring Team B - Eastern Region............................

24 1.9 State Traffic/Access Control Point........................................................

24 2.0 R isk Jurisdictions.............................................................................................

25 2.1 Columbia County.......................................

25 2.1.1 Columbia County Emergency Operations Center...........................

25 2.1.2 Columbia County Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station..........................................................................................

.. 25 2.1.3 Beaver Township Emergency Operations Center...........................

27 2.1.4 Berwick Borough/Briar Creek Borough Emergency Operations C enter............................

I................................................................. 2 8 2.1.4.1 Berwick/Briar Creek Back-up Route Alerting.................................

30 211.5.Fishing Creek Township Emergency Operations Center............... 31 i

2.2 Luzerne County.........................................

31 2.2.1 Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center............................ 31 2.2.2 Luzerne County Emergency Worker Monitoring/

Decontamination.........................................

32 2.2.3 Hunlock Township Emergency Operations Center........................ 32 2.2.3.1 Hunlock Township Back-up Route Alerting...............................

33 2.2.4 Nescopeck Township Emergency Operations Center;....................

34 2.2.5 Nuangola Borough Emergency Operations Center.........................

34 2.2.6 Salem Township Emergency Operations Center............................

35 2.2.7 Sugarloaf Township Emergency Operations Center...................... 36 3:0 Support jurisdictions.........................................

37 3.1 Lackawanna County.......................................

37 3.1 1 Reception Center (Big Lots Center)................

37 3.1.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Middle Valley

'High School)...,.

i...

.3

.. H igh S ch ool).....,......,)i,................................................................

37 3.2 LycomingCounty........

................................................................ 38 3.2. 1; Reception Center (Lycoming M all)...................................................

38

-3.2.2 Mass: Care : Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Montoursville High School).......................................

38 3.3 Montour County........................................

39 3-.4 ' N orthum berland County........................................

................................ 39 3.4.1 Reception Center, Monitoring/Decontamination Center, and Mass Care (Shikellemy High School, Sunbury).....................................

40 3.5 Schuylkill County 41 3.5.1 Reception Center (M arion High School)...........................................

41 3.5.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Tamaqua Jr./Sr.

H igh School Com plex)...................................................................

42 3.6 Union County.........

................................. 42 3.6.1 Reception Center (Montandon Elementary School, Montandon)....... 42 3.6.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Lewisburg Area Middle School).......

................................. 43 ii

3.7 W yom ing County....................................................................................

43 3.7.1 Reception Center & Mass Care (Tunkahannock Middle School C om p lex),..............................................

.... 43 3.7.2 Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Tunkahannock Middle School Complex).........................................

44 4.0 School D istricts.................................................

............................................. 45 4.1 Columbia County 45 4.1.1 Benton Area School District and Benton Area Middle School.....

45 4.1.2 Berwick Area School District and Nescopeck Elementary School.... 45 4.1.3 Salem Elementary School (Berwick Area School District)............ 45 4.1.4 Bloomsburg Area School District and Bloomsburg Area Middle School

................. 46 4.1.5 Central Columbia Area School District and Central Columbia High S ch ool

.............................. 4 6 4.1.6 Columbia M ontour Vo-Tech........................................................... 46 4.2 Luzerne County....... 0.................................

47 4.2.1. Crestwood School District and Rice Elementary School............... 47 4.2.2 Greater Nanticoke Area School District and Greater Nanticoke Education Center 47 4.2.3 KM Smith Elementary School (Greater Nanticoke Area School D istrict).......

........................................ 4 7 4.2.4 Hazleton Area School District and Drums Elementary School.....

48 4.2.5 Northwest Area SchoolDistrict and Huntingdon Mills Elementary School............................................

................................................ 4 8 4.2.6 West Side Vo-Tech..........

48 4.2. W es eV o Tech............................................................49 4.2.7 W ilkes-Barre V o-Tech:..........-................... I......................................

.. 49 iii

0 APPENDICES APPENDIX 1: Acronyms and Abbreviations...................................

50 APPENDIX 2: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders.

52 APPENDIX 3: Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria and Extent of Play Agreement.....................

57 APPENDIX 4: Exercise Scenario..........................................

124 APPENDIX 5: Planning Issues.................................

128 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 - Exercise Timeline 14 Table 2 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation 17 iv

I.

Executive Summary On October 21, 2008, a full-scale plume exercise was conducted in the 10-mile plume exposure pathway, emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region III. Out-of-sequence demonstrations were conducted on October 21 and 22, 2008. The purpose of the exercise and the out-of-sequence demonstrations was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. The exercise and out-of-sequence demonstrations were held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

The most recent prior full-scale exercise at this site was conducted on September 19, 2006.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; its two risk counties (Columbia, Luzerne) and risk municipalities (Beaver Township, Berwick Borough, Briar Creek Borough, Fishing Creek Township, Hunlock Township, Nescopeck Township, Nuangola Borough, Salem Township, and Sugarloaf Township); and the seven support counties (Lackawanna, Lycoming, Montour, Northumberland, Schuylkill, Union, and Wyoming) who were, evaluated at this exercise.

Protecting the public health and' safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities:

" Reception Center. Conducted on October 22, 2008 between 1900 and 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> in Lackawanna, Lycoming, Northumberland, Schuylkill, Union, and Wyoming Counties.

• Mass Care, Monitoring and Decontamination: Conducted on October 22, 2008 between 1900 and 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> in Lackawanna, Lycoming, Northumberland, Schuylkill, Union, and Wyoming Counties.

• Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination: Conducted on October 22, 2008 between 1900 and 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> in Columbia, Luzerne County

" Schools: Conducted on October 22, 2008 between 0900 and 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> in Columbia and Luzerne Counties.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies identified. Four Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) were identified as a result of this exercise; one of the ARCAs was successfully re-demonstrated during the exercise.

1

Five ARCAs from a previous exercise were successfully demonstrated at this exercise. Five new planning issues were identified during the exercise.

In addition six planning issues from prior exercises were resolved and 2 planning issues remain unresolved (see Appendix 5 for resolution for all planning issues).

2

II. Introduction On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities were conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of Tribal, State, and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures developed by State and local governments;

" Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

• Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993; and

" Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region III Radiological Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

3

A REP exercise was conducted on October 21, 2008 to assessthe capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES). The purpose of this exercise report, is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the off-site response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region III RAC Chairperson and approved by FEMA Headquarters.

These reports are provided to the NRC and participating States. State and local governments utilize the findings contained in these reports for the purposes of planning, training, and improving emergency response capabilities.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in the following:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; FEMA Guidance Memoranda MS-i, "Medical Services," November 1986; FEMA-REP-14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual," September 1991;

• 66 FR 47546, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Alert and Notification,"

September 12, 2001; and

• 67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise evaluation areas at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains:

(1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the Tribal, State, and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and resolved at this exercise, 4

including the corrective action demonstrated, as well as ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and scheduled for demonstration at this exercise which remain unresolved.

The final section of the report is comprised of the appendices, which present the following supplementary information: acronyms and abbreviations, exercise evaluators and team leaders, exercise evaluation area criteria and extent of play agreement, and the exercise scenario. It also presents information on planning issues (both new planning issues identified during this exercise and resolved planning issues identified during previous exercises).

5

0 III. Exercise Overview Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the October 2.1, 2008 exercise to test the off-site emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES). This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A.

Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The SSES is located in northeastern Pennsylvania on the Susquehanna River in Salem Township, Luzerne County. The plant is owned and operated by Pennsylvania Power &

Light Company. Two boiling water reactors generate an electrical output of 1,194 megawatts each. Unit 1 began commercial operation on June 8, 1983, and Unit 2 on February 12, 1985.

The site encompasses 2,566 acres and is divided into two parts. The principal portion, containing the major operating equipment and buildings, is located 3,000 feet west of the river. The other portion houses the water intake apparatus located near U.S. Route 11.

Route 11 passes through the site in a north/south direction, providing both primary and secondary access to the plant. The plant occupies approximately 100 acres of the site. The coordinates are approximately 410 5'30" north and 76' 8'55" west.

The topography of the plant site is hilly, with elevations ranging from 500 feet above mean sea level (MSL) at the river to about 1,100 feet above MSL at the northwest comer of the site. The plant grade is 670 feet above MSL. The minimum exclusion distance is 1,800 feet; all land within the exclusion area is owned by SSES. The surface soil in the area is considered to be glacial outwash and glacial till soils, which are typical of uplands and terraces. The bedrock consists primarily of red shale of the catskill formation.

The immediate vicinity of the plant is rural, surrounded by farms and undeveloped land.

A total of 112 sirens are used for notification of the public; the sirens were installed for coverage of the plume exposure pathway. The nearest population center is Shickshinny Borough (Luzeme County), with a population of 959, located about four miles north of the plant. The nearest population center with more than 20,000 people is the City of Hazleton, with a population of 23,329, located 13 miles to the southeast.

The Berwick Airfield in Salem Township, Luzerne County, serves private aircraft and lies approximately five miles west of the plant. The airfield presents no risk to the plant.

The closest major airport is the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Airport, located 28 miles northeast of the site.

6

The 10-mile EPZ contains an estimated population of 68,511 according to 2000 census data.

7

0 B.

Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the SSES out-of-sequence activities on October 21-22, 2008, or the exercise on October 21, 2008.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pennsylvania Bureau Radiological Protection Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Pennsylvania Department of General Services Pennsylvania Department of Health Pennsylvania Department of Military and Veteran Affairs Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania National Guard Pennsylvania Office of Administration Pennsylvania Office of Personnel and Resources Services Pennsylvania Office of State Fire Commissioner Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission Pennsylvania State Police Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Susquehanna Steam Electric Station RISK JURISDICTIONS Columbia County Beaver Township Benton Volunteer Fire Department Berwick Borough Ambulance Berwick Fire Department Berwick Police Department Borough of Berwick Borough Council Borough of Berwick Communications Officer Borough of Berwick Deputy Emergency Management Director Borough of Berwick Emergency Management Director I Borough of Berwick Security -Officer Columbia County 911 Columbia County Agriculture Columbia County Commissioner Columbia County Department of Aging

.8,

Columbia County Emergency Management Agency Columbia County Graphic Information Systems Columbia County Information Technology Columbia County Police Columbia County Public Works Columbia County Schools Federal Emergency Management Agency Fishing Creek Township Supervisors Orangeville Borough Volunteer Fire Department Orangeville Borough Volunteer Fire/Police Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania State Police Luzerne County Children Services Center Community Counseling Emergency Medical Services Hanover Township Fire Police Hunlock Creek Fire Company Hunlock Emergency Management Agency Hunlock Township Board of Supervisors, Luzerne County 911 Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency Luzerne County Engineer's Office Luzerne County Mental Health Luzerne County Sheriffs Department Luzerne County Transportation Nescopeck Fire and Rescue Nuangola Emergency Management Agency Nuangola Fire Department Nuangola Mayor and Borough Council Nuangola Police Department Pennsylvania Department-of Transportation Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania State Police Rice Township Police Department

.Shickshinny Police Department, Sugarloaf Emergency Management Agency Sugarloaf Fire Company/Emergency Medical Services Sweet Valley Volunteer Fire/EMS Company Wilkes-Barre Police Department 9

0 SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS Lackawanna County Carbondale Township Emergency Management Agency Community Medical Center Dunmore Fire Department Federal Emergency Management Agency Lackawanna Commissioner's Office Lackawanna County Emergency Management Agency Lackawanna Planning Commission Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania State Agriculture Extension Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Public Safety for the City of Scranton Taylor Borough Emergency Management Agency Lycoming County Lycoming County Agricultural Agency Lycoming County Commissioners Lycoming County Department of Public Safety Lycoming County Department of Public Services Lycoming County Department of Resource Management Lycoming County Disaster Communications Team Lycoming County Emergency Management Agency Lycoming County Local Emergency Planning, Committee Montgomery Borough Emergency Management Agency Montgomery Emergency Management Agency Montoursville Police Department Muncy Township Emergency Management Agency Muncy Township Fire Police Muncy Township Fire/Ambulance Company Muncy Township Police Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Williamsport Emergency Management Agency Montour County Danville Area School District School Services Officer Montour County Commissioners Montour County Emergency Management Agency Montoursville Fire Department Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 10

Northumberland County Northumberland County Emergency Management Northumberland County Public Safety PEMA Liaison Officer Schuylkill County Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Schuylkill County and Frackville)

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Quakake Fire Department Schuylkill County 911 Schuylkill County Emergency Management Agency Schuylkill County Geographic Information System Schuylkill County Radiological Officer Schuylkill County Transportation System Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Tamaqua Area School District Tamaqua Fire Department (South Ward and Citizens Fire Co)

U.S. Department of Agriculture Union County Penn State University Extension Service Pennsylvania Emergency.Management Agency Union County 911 Union County Commissioners Union County Emergency Management Union County Public Safety William Cameron Engine Company Wyoming County Tunkhannock Fire Department Wyoming County Dept. of Health Wyoming County Emergency Management Agency Wyoming County Emergency Management Staff 11

0 PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS The following private and volunteer organizations participated in the SSES exercise at many different locations throughoutthe area. We thank them and all those who volunteer their services to State, county, and municipal governments during emergencies.

Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) and Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES), including the following clubs:

Columbia-Montour Amateur Radio Club Endless Mountains Amateur Radio Group Lackawanna County Amateur Radio Civil Emergency Services Luzerne County RACES Lycoming County Radio Amateur Civil EmergencyService Schuylkill Amateur Responder Association Union County ARES/RACES American Red Cross, including the following local chapters:

American Red Cross of Lackawanna County Hanover Red Cross Northcentral Pennsylvania Chapter Pennsylvania American Red Cross Schuylkill and East Northumberland Chapter Scranton Chapter Union County Chapter Wayne/Pike Chapter Wyoming County Chapter Berwick Fire Department Bloomsburg Fire Department Bloomsburg University Bower Bus Company Boy Scout Troop 42 - Scranton, PA Bucknell University Security Community Medical Center Lycoming Radiological Monitoring Team Many Volunteer Emergency Operations Center Staff Martini, Inc. (School Bus Provider)

Schuylkill County Fire Chief s Association Union County Community Emergency Response Team 12

C.

Exercise Timeline Table 1,. on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the SSES exercise on October 21, 2008. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

13

TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE DATE AND SITE: October 21, 2008 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken Emergency Classification Time Berwick Levelnor Ent Utility E

t-Columbia Boro./Briar

• Luzerne Hunlock Declared PA State AA State Media Ops County Beaver Creek Boro.

Fishing County Twp.

Nescopeck EOC EOF JIC

BRP, Center,

EOC

.Twp. EOC EOC Creek Twp EOC EOC Twp. EOC UnusualzEvent N/A N/A N/A N/A..

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Aklrt 1721 17371' 1721.

"-739.

1737 1751-17.28, N/A 1737

'..:1749 1728 1735

.1740 Site Area Emergency 1850

.- 1909

.,850;- :.1910 1902.

4853`.: '19.00 1913:

1907 1909 1857 1901 1904 General:Eriergency' 2010 -

2026 2010 2028 2024 2014 2022 2037 2033 2031 2019 2030 2030 Simiulated Radiation ReleaSe Started 2010 2010 1956 2007 1950 12006 2017 2028 2025 2026 2019 2030 2026 Simulated Radiation Release Terminated.....

I..

Qngoing at termination "

Faciliity Declared Operational 1700..

-.1820 1943

-. '1749 1825 1800 1807 1730 1820 1810 G6vernor's Declaration of State of Emergency

1930,

.2110

9.

94-3 2110.:1 2144:. '

N/R 1937 1948 2014

. N/R 2054 ExerciseTerminated ".

2150 2145 2150 2150 2145 2150 2135 2151 2135 2149 2124 2111 Precautionary Actions:

1919 1935 1935 N/R

2113 2027 2037 2036 2036 2010 2022 2024 e......

....... a..e I

restrict rail traffic 1930 1935 " 1935 N/R 2113 2027 2037 2036 2036 N/R 2022 2024 restrict water traffic 1930 1935 1 1935 N/R 2113 2027 2037 2036 2036 2010 2022 2024 shelterlivestck, -feed-&-Water 1926 1935 1935 1935 2113 1936 2025 1937 1936 2010 2022 2024 1st A&N Decision.(State [made]; local [received])

1930

-N/A 1935 N/R N/R 1930.

1940 1930 1935 1935 1935 1940 Tune radio/TV to EAS station 1st Siren Activation 1940 1940 1940 IstEAS-1943 1943 1943 2nd A&N Decision.(State [made]; local [received])

2050 N/R 2050 2114 2106 2043 2100 2058 2100 2050 2055 2054 Shelter: Mercy; Specialty &.Berwick Hospital Evacuate 3600 to, 10 miles 2nd Siren Activation 2103 NN/ MM, 2100 2100 2nd EAS Message 2103 H

E 2103 2103 KI"Administration Decision:

2 2W 205 205 KI"dmifisratonDecsio:

"i'.,,2056 2053 :'2050 N/R.

.2114 -,,-2050 2102 NIR 2122.

• 250 205 04

. Emergency Workers advised to take KI.

2 General Public advised to take KI Legend: N/A - Not Applicable N/R - Not Received 14 a

Ba a

0

0 0

0 0

TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE DATE AND SITE: October 21, 2008 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Emergency Time Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken LevelaorEvento.

Utility Nuangola Salem Twp. T Sugarloaf Lackawanna Lycoming Northumberland Schuylkill Union Wyoming Delre Boro. EOC

.EOC

• Tp O

County.EOC County EOC I'County EOC County EOC County EOC Cut O

Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert 1721 1724 N/A "

1746

[

1804 1747 1743 1809 1806 1820 SiteArea Emergency 1850 1903*

N/A j

1903--.

-1912 1908 1857 1911 1909 1957 General Emergency 2010 2030 N/A 2030

[

2042 2034 2036 2036 2036 2036 Simulated Radiatiorn Release Started 2010 2026 N/A 2040.

2021 2034 2036 2036 2036 2036 Simulated Radiation Release Terminated N/A Ongoing at termination Facility Declared Operational 1743 N/A

.'1805 1912 1817*

1755 1928 1855 1849 Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency N/R N/A-2055 2013 2011 2117

• 2014 2010 2110 Local Declaration of State of Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A 1924 N/A N/A 1915 N/A Exercise Terminated 2120 -

N/A N/R 2153 2153 2148 2110 2153 2200 Precautionary Actions:

2024 N/A 2014 2023 2014 2023 2023 2013 2023 re s.t. ri. c t. a irs

.p...e restrict rail traffic

-2024 N/A 2014 2023 2014 2013 2023 2013 2023 q.e.r.....

ra...

2 2

/

0 4:

0 32 1

0 ! 32 2

0 32 2

restrict water traffic 2024 N/A 2014 2023 2014 2013 2023 2013 2023 shelter livestock, place on stored feed N/R N/A 2014 2023 2014 2013 2021 2013 2023 lstA&N Decision (State [made]; local [received])

1937 N/A 1937 1919 1935 1935 1935 1935 1935 Tune radio/TV to EAS station 1ýstSSiten Activation

.EMER IstEAS XM M//

2nd'A&N Decision"(State [made]; local [received]).

2053.

N/A 2055 2055 "2059 2042 2042 2042 2042 Shelter: Mercy Specialty & Berwick Hospital Evacfu-ate'3600 to-i0 miles 2'nd Sifen-Activatio'n W//1/1,,1////

2nd EA S Message KI.Administration Decision:

7 N

2052 2

2052 2052 2052 Emergency Workers advised to take KI N

0 2052 2052 General Public advised to take KI j

15

0 IV. Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and locations that participated in the October 21, 2008, biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise. The exercise was held to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of local governments in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES).

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of the exercise evaluation area criteria contained in the REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria andtheebxtent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in. Appendix 3 of this report.

A.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following pages, presents the status of the exercise evaluation area criteria from the REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional eiftities.'Exercise evaluation'area criteria are'listed by number and the demonstration status 6f the criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M -

Met (No Deficiency or Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) assessed and-no un-esolved ARCAs from prior !exefcises)

A ARCA(s) assessed A...'1.

ARCA(s) assessed, but successfully re-dem6nstrated R-Resolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises 16

0 0

0 0

TABLE 2.

SUMMARY

RESULTS OF EXERCISE EVALUATION DATE AND SITE: October 21, 2008 Susquehanna Steam Power Station JURISDICTIONILO J0 a

i dCV

.d df

ý CATO

.1.

6.1d.

I.

1

1.

1 2:

2.

2.2 2..

3.I3.3.

3.

13 3.

32 1 141 F 2

3

.5.6.

6

6. 16.

1.

7 18 1,

b.

a.b.

e.

f.J al a.j~ a.

a.

a a

b.d.

STATE/COMMONWEALTH Pennsylvania EOC (observed only)

State JIC (observed only)

Accident Assessment Center (BRP)

(observed only)

Emergency Operations Facility (observed only)

Media Operations Center (Utility)

M Mobile Command Vehicle (observed only)

State Field Monitoring Team A Eastern Region State Field Monitoring Team B M

M M

M M

M Eastern Region State Traffic/Access Control Point M

M M

M M

M (Bloomsburg Barracks)

RISK JURISDICTIONS Columbia County Columbia County EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M Emergency Worker Mon/Decon Station (Columbia Montour Vo-M M

MIR MIR Tech School)

Beaver Township EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

Berwick Borough/Briar Creek BruhOCM M

M M

M M

• M A [M A

M M

M Borough EOC Berwick/Briar Creek Back-up M

M M

M A

Route Alerting I

Fishing Creek Township EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

Luzerne County Lucerne County EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M.

M M

M M

M Emergency Worker Mon/Decon Station (Sweet Valley Fire Co.,

M M

M MM Ross Township)

HunlockTownship EOC M

MM M M M

A' M

M M

M M

M Hunlock Township Back-up Route M

M M

M M

Alerting Nescopack Township EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M

.M M

M Nuangola Borough EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M -M M

M Salem Township EOC R

SugarloafTownship EOC M

M M

M M

M M

M M

M M

-M IM M

LEGEND: M = Met (no Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed)

R = Resolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises A = ARCA(s) assessed U = Unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise 17 A' = ARCA(s) assessed but successfully re-demonstrated Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration

TABLE 2.

SUMMARY

RESULTS OF EXERCISE EVALUATION DATE AND SITE: October,21,.2008 Susquehanna Steam Power Station a:1~

1 2:

35.

~

5 6

16ý 6 6

.1 1

1

2.

"2.

2.

2.

'2.

2...

3.

3.." 3.

3,

3.

3.

3..

3.

4.

4 4

5.

5

5.

5 6

6 JURISDICTION/LOCATION

a.

b

c.

a.

b.2 c

d.

e.

a.

b 2.

d.

e. e.

f a.:

3 a

a

a.

a.3 b

b dl SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS Lackawanna County Lackawanna County EOC M

M M

M M

M Reception Center (Big Lots Center)

M M

M M

Mass Care - Mon/Decon Center M

M M

(Middle Valley HS)

Lycoming County Lycoming County EOC M

M M

M M

Reception Center (Lycoming Mall)

M M

M Mass Care - Mon/Decon Center M

M M

M (Montoursville HS)

Montour County Montour County EOC M

M M

M Northumberland County Northumberland County EOC M

M M

M M

M Reception Center, Mon/Decon Center & Mass Care (Shikellerny M

M M/R M/R HS, Sunbury).

Schuylkill County

[.,

Schuylkill County EOC M

MM

• M M

Reception Center,(Marion HS)

M j

M M

Mass Care 4-Mon/Decon Center I

M M

M (Tamiagua Jr/Si HS Complex)

M

+/-

Union County Union County EOC M

M M

M M

M Reception Center (Montandon ES, I

M.

Montandon).

IM M

Mass Care - Mon/Decon Center "

(Lewisburg Area MS)

M M

M M

Wyoming County I

Wyoming County EOC M

M M

M M

"-M Reception Center &,Mass Care 1M (Tunkahannock MS Complex)

M__

Mon/Decon Center (Tunkahannock M

M M

MS Complex)

I..

LEGEND: M Met (no Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed)

R = Resolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises A = ARCA(s) assessed U = Unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise 18 A' = ARCA(s) assessed but successfully re-demonstrated Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration is00 0

0

0 0

0 TABLE 2.

SUMMARY

RESULTS OF EXERCISE EVALUATION DATE AND SITE: October 21, 2008 Susquehanna Steam Power Station q

1.

1 I.

.., 2.

2.

2.2.

2.

3.

. 3.

3:

3.

3.:

3.

3.

4.

4.

4. " 4.

4.6

ý 1,6 JURISDICTION/LOCATION d

2. 1' 2

13 d

d.

e

,1 2

2 c

b-b

c.

d.

e.O N.

a..3 SCHOOLS Columbia Count, Benton Area SD M

Benton Area MS M

Berwick Area SD M

Nescopeck ES M

Salem ES M

Bloomsburg Area SD M

Bloomsburg Area MS M

Central Columbia Area SD "

M CentralColumbia HS M

Columbia Montour Vo-Tech M-Luzerne County.

[

Crestwood-SD L"M Rice ES M..

M If Greater Nanticoke Area SD M

Greater:Nanticoke Education M

Center KM Smith ES M

Hazelton Area SD M

Driums'ES M

Northwest Area SD M

Huntingdon Mills ES M

West Side Vo-Tech School M

Wilkes-Barre Vo-Tech School

[ M LEGEND: M = Met (no Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed)

R = Resolved ARCA(s) from prior exercisesi A -ARCA(s) assessed U =Unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise 19.

A'.= ARCA(s) assessed but successfully re-demonstrated Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration

0 B.

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating and functional entity in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this subsection relative to criteria demonstration status.

• Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

• Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective Action - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise'

• . Not Demonstrated' Listing of the exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled t6.b6 demonstrated during this exercise; but were not demonstrated and the reason they were not demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAszassessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included are the reasons the ARCAs remain unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report.

A Deficiency is defined in the FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

20

An ARCA is defined in the FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

" Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

• Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

• Evaluation Area Criterion - A, letter and number corresponding to the criteria in the FEMA REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology:.

Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise..

21

0 1.0 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 1.1 Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Center (observed only)

a.

MET: None

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIORARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.2 State Joint Information Center (observed only)

a.

MET: None

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR-ARCAs - RESOLVED: None-

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: None 1.3 Accident Assessment Center - Bureau of Radiation Protection (observed only)

a.

MET: None

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 22

1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (observed only)

a.

MET: None

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.5 Media Operations Center (Utility Joint Information Center)

a.

MET: 5.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None,,,

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.6 Mobile Command Vehicle (observed only)

a.

MET: None

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.7 State Field Air Monitoring Team A - Eastern Region

a.

MET: 1.d.1 3.a.1 4.a.1 1.e.1 3.b.1 4.a.3 23

0

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.8 State Field Air Monitoring Team B - Eastern Region

a.

MET: 1.d.1 3.a.1 4.a.1 0

1.e.1 3.b.1 4.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.9 State Traffic/Access Control Point

a.

MET: 1.d.1 3.a.1 1.e.1 3.b.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs,- RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 24

2.0 RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 Columbia County 2.1.1 Columbia County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.I 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 5.b.1 1.d.1 3.c.1 1.e.1 3.c.2 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.2 Columbia County Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.1.a 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Two Issue Number: 63-06-6.a.1-A-01 Condition: The Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station did not adequately demonstrate the following activities:

Proper monitoring techniques - Survey instrument probe speed was too fast, the probe was held too far away from the body, and the monitoring path width was too wide.

25

Monitoring was casually accomplished without adequate attention to a monitoring pattern and detail.

No thyroid monitoring was done.

No actual or simulated distribution of decontamination supplies to monitored individuals.

Contamination control of portal monitor - monitor was not periodically checked for contamination.

No whole-body 4-minute survey for contaminated individuals was completed. Monitors surveyed only hands and arms.

0 Corrective'Action Demonstrated: Two potentially

contaminated individuals were observed being monitored with a Ludlum 2241 instrument with a pancake probe. Two different'radiological monitors performed monitoring. Each performedda whole body survey of the contaminated e

• mergency worker. The monitors used appropriate probe speed, appropriate proximity to the person being monitored (probe Within one-inch) and each paid careful attention to performing a complete survey of the individual.

'Thyroid monitoring of the throat area of two simulated contaminated individuals was successfully demonstrated by m ;onitors using a Ludlum 2241 instrument with the pancake probe in accordance with the Columbia County Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Decontamination supplies (cloths, gloves, and tape) were

'used during decontamination of individuals. Use of modesty clothing was simulated.

The portal monitor was covered with a paper sheet to protect against the monitor becoming contaminated and facility monitoring personnel stated that portal monitor would be surveyed for contamination every 30 minutes.

All monitoring of potentially contaminated workers (who had been found to be contaminated by the portal monitor) were whole body surveys, not limited surveys of only handsand feet.

26 a

I

Issue Number: 63-06-6.b.1-A-02 Condition: The Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station did not adequately demonstrate the following vehicle monitoring and decontamination activities:

Proper monitoring techniques - The probe was held too far away from the vehicle and the monitoring path width was too wide. Monitoring was casually accomplished without adequate attention to a monitoring pattern and detail.

Vehicle interior was not monitored Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Emergency Worker. Monitoring and Decontamination Station successfully demonstrated vehicle monitoring techniques in accordance, with the Columbia County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP). The radiological monitor. used a Ludlum 2241 instrument with a pancake probe to monitor one. emergency vehicle. The monitor used appropriate monitoring techniques, holding the probe within one-inch of the tires, wheel wells, and other parts of the vehicle surface using an appropriate scan rate. The monitor opened the doors of the vehicle and monitored indoor areas including the floor, seats, door handles, and steering wheel.,Areas of the vehicle selected for monitoring were as specified in the RERP. The width of the monitoring path was appropriate.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.3 Beaver Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.a.lI 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1

..L.

,c. 1

2. c.1.

3:b,.

l.d.1 3.c.1I L.e.l

- 3.c.2 37d.1 3.d.2 b....

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 27

0

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.4 Berwick Borough/Briar Creek Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: L.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.c.1 1.d.1 3.d.1 1.e.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None c.,

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Two (3.b. 1, 3.c.2)

Issue Number: 63-08-3.b.l-A-01 Condition: The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) received notification from the Columbia County EOC over the radio andtelephone that Emergency Workers were to ingest potassium iodide (KI). However, these messages

.were not passed forward to the Emergency Management Coordinator.

Possible Cause: The Communication Officer (CO), who is stationed outside the main EOC room, apparently did not

.receive all messages, b

References:

'. NUREG-0654, J.10.e

.."Berwick/Briar Creek Borough Radiological Response Plan Effect: Emergency workers in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone could have been exposed to radioactive iodine without the protection of KI.

Recommendation: The CO should be trained to obtain, log, and distribute all messages; The Emergency Management Coordinator should be kept informed about

'important miiessagesuaffecting the emergency workers and the public.

28

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees with the above recommendation. The Communications Officer will be provided additional training to obtain, log, and distribute all important messages and shall demonstrate during the next scheduled biennial exercise.

Issue Number: 63-08-3.c.2-A-02 Condition: The Emergency Medical Services Representative did not provide Fire/Rescue personnel with contact information for all hearing impaired individuals for their use in route alerting and failed to notify or address other special needs individuals.

Possible Cause: The Medical Services Representative was not cognizant of his responsibilities with respect to special needs individuals.

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g Berwick/Briar Creek Borough Radiological Response Plan, V.E and X.F

...Effect: Some hearing impaired and other special needs L individuals., including visually impaired, wheelchair-bound, and transportationdependent individuals, might not have been alerted to:the evacuation decision and would not have received timely transportation assistance.

Recommendation: The Medical Services Representative should. receive training in the position's responsibilities and activities as specified in the Berwick/Briar Creek Borough Radiological Response Plan and standard operating procedures.

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees with the above recommendation. The Emergency Medical Services Representatives will be retrained to ensure they are competent in the.use of the Berwick/Briar Creek Borough Radiological Response Plan and standard operating procedures and shall demonstrate during the next scheduled biennial.exercise.

Sd.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 29

0

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.4.1 Berwick/Briar Creek Back-up Route Alerting

a.

MET: l.d.1 3.a.1 1.e.1 3.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: One (5.a.3)

Issue Number: 63-08-5.;a.3-A-03 Condition: The crew that'demonstrated the Berwick Borough/Briar Creek Borough (BBC) backup alert route (Zone 1) ran'the route simulating the use of the vehicle's siren, emergency lights and public address system. After completing the route, the crew was asked to demonstrate the vehicle's -emergency notification equipment. The siren and emergency lights tests were satisfactory. However, the volume of the public address system was insufficient to provide adequate carrying power of the message. The volume was not much louder than ordinary conversation level. Several minutes were spent attempting to raise the volume without success. T-he crew was advised that if the volume could be raised, a re-demonstration could occur.

Eventually, the BBC: Emergency Management Director and the Fire/Rescue Officer were informed and agreed that the Volume could not be improved.

Possible Causes A mechanical malfunction within the public address system is the most likely cause.

References:

NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7 Effect: Without sufficient volume, any emergency message delivered over the 'vehicle's public address system could not be understood at any distance beyond 30 feet of the

• truck. This could delay intended recipients from taking the proper course of action and might also lead to more confusion as to why the fire engine is passing by with lights on and intermittent siren soundings.

30

Recommendation: It is recommended that the BBC authorities correct the insufficient volume of the public address system.

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees with the above recommendation. The mechanical malfunction within the public address system for this vehicle has been repaired and tested. This vehicle will be available for demonstration during the next scheduled biennial exercise.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.5 Fishing CreekTownship Emergency Operations Center

..a.

MET: l.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1.

5.a.1 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 1.d. 1 3.c.1 1.e.1 3.c.2 3.d. 1, 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None S

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.2 Luzerne County 2.2.1: Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: La.l 12.a. 1 3.a.1 5.a.1 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1.

5.b.1 1.d.l 3.c.1 L.e.1 3.c.2 3.d.1 3.d.2 31

0

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.2.2 Luzerne County Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

"PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.2.3 Hunlock Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: I.a.I 2.a.1 3*b.1 5.a.1 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.c.1

..d l 3.c.2 L.e.1 3.d.1 3'd.2 0

01

b.

'DEFICIENCY: None'

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: One (3.a.1 Re-demonstrated)

Issue Number: 63-08-3.a.1-A-04 Condition: The Hunlock Township Radiological Officer lacked sufficient knowledge to conduct the radiological briefing for emergency workers and did not have the "standardized" radiological briefing material provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He was not 32 a

knowledgeable on the use of the electronic dosimeters, did not know the correct exposure limits, and was unaware of the requirements and cautions regarding ingestion of potassium iodide (KI).

Possible Cause: The Radiological Officer was new and lacked familiarity with procedures regarding radiological exposure.

References:

NUREG-0654, K.3.a; K.3.b SOP-I (Radiological Protection Services Officer) of the Hunlock Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan of 1996, 2008 revision Effect: Emergency workers were not informed of their exposure limits and the requirements and cautions regarding ingestion of KI.

Recommendation: Provide additional training to the Radiological Officer.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Radiological Officer was provided retraining regarding SOP-I and given an opportunity. toread.mriaterial associated with dosimetry andKI. He successfully re-demonstrated an adequate radiological briefing,

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None,:

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.2.3.1 Hunlock Township Back-up Route Alerting

a.

MET:,.I.d.1 3.a.,l 5.a.3 1.e.1 3.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None c.,

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 33

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.2.4 Nescopeck Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.a.1 2.a.4 3.a.1 5.a.1 1.c.1 2.c.11, 3.b.1 1.d.1 3.c.1 L e. I 3..2 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.'

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.2.5 ý,Nuaingola Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: I.a.1-2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1

.* *:, : I.c:l 2.,c.1:' 3.b.1I 1.d.1 3.c.1 1.e.1 3.c.2.

3.d.1I 3.'d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None' c.-

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d.-,1, NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 34

2.2.6 Salem Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: One Issue Number: 63-06-1.c.l-A-03 Condition: According to the Salem Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan Standard Operating Procedures, personnel filling each of nine key functions are responsible for assuring around the clock shift scheduling for their

'function. to assure continuity of response.

The positions of Public-Works Officer and Transportation Officer were not filled. In addition, only the Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC). and Police Services Officer positions had names designated for the second shift.

The EMC doubled the duties of the Medical Officer to include those of the Transportation Officer. This position was.filled by a recruit from the Fire Department not trained for either position. In addition, the plan's Notification and Resource Manual did not include contact names for Public Works officials.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: A 24-hour staffing roster for Salem Township EOC was provided by Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

.35

0 2.2.7 Sugarloaf Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET: 1.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 1.b.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 1.c.1 3.c.1 1.d.1 3.c.2 1.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None.

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 36

3.0 SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS 3.1 Lackawanna County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 5.b.1 1.b.1 1.c.1 1.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None:

3.1.1 Reception Center (Big Lots Center)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.1.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Middle Valley High School)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 37

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.2 Lycoming County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 5.b.1 1.c.1 1.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

.3.2.1 Reception Center (Lycoming Mall)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.2.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Montoursville High School)

a.

MET:'l.e.1 3.a.1l 6.a.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 38

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3 Montour County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 1.c.1 1.d.1 i.e. 1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.4 Northumberland County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 5.b.1 1.b.1 1.c.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: None

.39

0 3.4.i Reception Center, Monitoring/Decontamination Center, and Mass Care (Shikellemy High School, Sunbury)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Two Issue Number: 63-06-6.a.1-A-04 Condition: No "range of readings" stickerwas affixed to the side of the survey instrument indicating acceptance criterion for a source check.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: All four Ludlum survey meters had range of readings stickers affixed to the side of the instrument indicating acceptable values for source checks with the Cs-137 sources, also affixed to the side of the meter. Source checks of two meters were observed and were within the acceptable range indicated.

Issue Number: 63-06-6.a.1-A-05 Condition: Contrary to the Extent of Play, the same player demonstrated all 3 monitoring tasks at the facility: portal monitor, survey meter monitoring of the contaminated individual, and..vehicle monitoring. In an actual event one individual would not be able to perform required tasks simultaneously.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: During the out-of-sequence evaluation of the monitoring and decontamination exercise for the Susquehanna Nuclear Power Plant on October 22, 2008, at the Chief Shikellemy Elementary School, three monitoring teams of two individual each were used. One individual performed the monitoring tasks with the other recording the readings. After contamination was indicated on an evacuee by the portal monitor, one team performed a complete survey of the evacuee and after 40

locating the contaminated area sent the evacuee with escort to.the appropriate decontamination area. A separate monitoring team was located at both the male and female decontamination areas, but no females were monitored during this exercise. The controller stated that the monitor teams had been well trained, which was indicated by their observed monitoring techniques.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.5 Schuylkill County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 5.b.1 1.c.1 1.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None.

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d'.

-NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None L.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.5.1 Reception Center (Marion High School)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.I b..

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED:.None e..

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None f.:

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 41

a 3.5.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Tamaqua Jr./Sr.

High School Complex)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.6 Union County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 5.b.1 1.b.1 1.c.1 1.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None L.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.6.1 Reception Center (Montandon Elementary School, Montandon)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 42 a

a 4

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.6.2 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Lewisburg Area Middle School)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.7 Wyoming County

a.

MET: 1.a.1 5.b.1 1.b. 1 1.c.1 1.d.1 i.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.7.1 Reception Center & Mass Care (Tunkahannock Middle School Complex)

..a.

MET: 1.e1

-,6.c.1..,

b.

DEFICIENCY:,None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 43

0

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.7.2 Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Tunkahannock Middle School Complex)

a.

MET: 1.e.1 3.a.1 '6.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: -None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None-..

e.,

,PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None-40 a

44

4.0 SCHOOL DISTRICTS 4.1 Columbia County 4.1.1 Benton Area School District and Benton Area Middle School

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs.-- RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.1.2 Berwick'Area School District and Nesc-opeck Elementary School

a.

MET: 3'c:2.

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.1.3 Salem Elementary School (Berwick Area School District)

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 45

0 4.1.4 Bloomsburg Area School District and Bloomsburg Area Middle School

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None Central Columbia Area School District and Central Columbia High School-a 4.1.5

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None L.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.1.6 Columbia Montour Vo-Tech

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None.

a e.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs. RESOLVED: None PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 46 4

4.2 Luzerne County 4.2.1 Crestwood School District and Rice Elementary School

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2 Greater Nanticoke Area School District and Greater Nanticoke Education Center

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None L.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.3 KM Smith Elementary School (Greater Nanticoke Area School District)

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS:REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIORARCAs - RESOLVED:: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 47

a 4.2.4 Hazleton Area School District and Drums Elementary.School

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None*

4.2.5 Northwest Area School District and Huntingdon Mills Elementary School

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.6 West Side Vo-Tech

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 48

4.2.7 Wilkes-Barre Vo-Tech

a.

MET: 3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None'

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 49

0 APPENDIX 1:

Acronyms and Abbreviations A&N Alert and Notification ACP Access Control Point ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ARC American Red Cross ARC 3031 American Red Cross document Mass Care - Preparedness and Operations ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ATL..

Assistant Team Leader ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram BBC Berwick Borough/Briar Creek Borough BRP Bureau of Radiation Protection CFR Code of Federal Regulations CO Communication Officer cpm Counts per minute DEP Department of Environmental Protection DHS Department of Homeland Security DILs Derived Intervention Levels DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alerting System EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator ENC Emergency News Center EOC Emergency Operations Center.

EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency, EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ES Elementary School FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FR Federal Register FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection HS High School ICF ICF International IPZ Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone 50

JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide mR/h Milliroentgen(s) Per Hour MS Middle School MS-1 Medical Services Drill MW Megawatt NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants), November 1980 ORO Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guidance PAR Protective Action Recommendation PEMA Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency PRD Permanent Record Dosimeter R

Roentgen(s)

RAC Regional Assistance Committee Rem Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan R/hr Roentgens per hour SAE Site Area Emergency SD School District SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedure SSES Susquehanna Steam Electric Station TCP Traffic Control Point TL Team Leader TSC Technical Support Center TWP Township

.51

0 APPENDIX 2:

Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders The following, is a list of personnel who evaluated the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station exercise on October 21 & 22, 2008. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by '"(TL)" after their organization's name. Alternate Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by "(ATL)" after their organization's name. Evaluators scheduled to assess the School Exercise (morning of 22 October) also.evaluated Reception, Care, and Monitoring and Decontamination facilities (evening of 22 October). The organization that each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:..

0 DHS EPA NRC ICF Department of Homeland Security.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ICF International OBSERVERS-AT-LARGE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Chief, CNPPD, Philadelphia Field Office.

Darrell Hammons DHS Prject Officer" Bart Freeman DHS-.

ICF Regional Coordinator Roger Kowieski ICF PLUME EXERCISE - October 21,12008 COMMONWE ALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Pennsylvania-EOC..

John Price DHS,(TL)

The SEOC will participate, but will not be' Robert Black ICF

• evaluated-

-PEMA.JIC will participate, but will not be evaluated...

?,_

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Gary Goldberg ICF.

The.. EOF will participate,. butwill not be evaluated (evaluated for Limerick "07W,).

Medial Operations Center (UtilityJIC).

Paul Nied ICF (East Mountain Business Center)

Accident Assessirient (State EOC.- BRP) The Reggie Rodgers ICF (TTL)

AAC will participate, but will not be evaluated Mobile Command Vehicle

• Ronald Biernacki ICF Mobile Command Vehicle will play in support of Field Monitoring Team, but will not be evaluated.

State Field Monitoring Team A, Eastern Region James Hickey ICF State Field Monitoring Team B, Eastern Region Paul Cormier ICF a

• 52 4

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA - Cont.

RISK JURISDICTIONS EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Columbia County Columbia County EOC Roy Smith ICF (TL).'

Alan Bevan ICF Frank Cordaro ICF Beaver Township EOC Thomas Essig ICF.

Berwick Borough/Briar Creek Borough EOC Walter Gawlak ICF Route Alerting Dave Petta ICF Fishing Creek Township EOC Clark Cofer ICF Luzerne County Luzerne County EOC Joe Suders DHS (TL)

Wendy Swygert ICF (ATL)

Marcus.Aquino EPA-.

Robert Vork ICF.

Alexis Kacho IcF Hunlock Township EOC

.,Dick Wessman..

ICF "::-.'

Back-up Route Alerting

-Earnest Boaze.

ICF Nescopeck Township EOC Don Calsyn ICF TCP evaluated at EOC via' interview Nuangola Borough EOC Jon Christiansen ICF Salem Township EOC Wendy Swygert ICF Municipality will submit 24 hr staffing roster to clear issu e Sugarloaf Township EOC Nancy Johnson ICF TCP evaluated at EOC via interview SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS John Price, DHS (TL)

Lackawanna Co. EOC Robert Lemeshka ICF Lycoming Co. EOC Mark Dalton DHS Northumberland Co. EOC George McDonald ICE Schuylkill Co. EOC James McClanahan

,ICF.

Union Co. EOC Sam Nelson

-ICF Wyoming Co. EOC

,*William O'Brien ICF-,.

Montour Co. EOC Out-of-Sequence

.53

0 OUT OF SEQUENCE DEMONSTRATIONS MASS CARE RECEPTION, MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION, MASS CARE

- October 22, 2008 Wednesday, 22 October 2008 1900-2130 EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Columbia County EmergencyWorker Mon/Decon Station, Earl Shollenberger ICF Columbia Montour Vo-Tech Luzerne County......

Emergency Worker Mon/Decon Station, Dave Stuenkel ICF Sweet Valley Fire Company Lackawanna County Reception Center - Big Lots Robert Black ICF

.. Mass Care Center - MjidValley High School Mon/Decon & Mass Care Center -

Nicholas DePierro" ICF M id V alley H igh. School...

Lyeoming County Receptionj, nte~r. Ly.CQming Mall Hariold Spedding CF Mon/Decon. & Mas'.:Care Center

` Gary Goldberg -

ICF..

Montoursville High School___

,,Northumber!land County-.

."i Reception Center James McClanahan ICF Mon/Decon & Mass Care Center'-

W. Morrison-Jackson ICF

.. Sh kelam yHigh Sch o :' "

'I 1..

7 :.".,

Schuylkill County Reception' Center..- Marioh High'School Bruce Swiren.....

ICF Mass Care - Tamaqua Jr/Sr High School Cotrplex-Mon/Decon &, Mass.. Care -'Tamaqua Michael Petullo ICF.

Jr/Sr High School Conplex Union County Reception Center - Montandon Carl Wentzell ICF Elementary School Mass Care Center - Lewisburg Middle School Mon/Decon & Mass Care Center -

Bart Ray ICF Lewisburg Middle School Wyoming County Reception Center & Mass Care Center -

David White ICF

- Tunkhannock Middle School Mon/Decon - Tunkhannock Middle Ronald Biernacki ICF (TTL)

School 0

.54 01

OUT OF SEQUENCE DEMONSTRATIONS SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND SCHOOLS - October 22, 2008 Wednesday, 22 October 2008 0900-1100-EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Columbia County School Districts - Gary Goldberg - TL (Schools)

Benton Area S.D.

Benton Area Middle School Reggie Rodgers ICF Berwick Area S.D.

Nescopeck Elementary School Nicholas DePierro.

ICF Salem Elementary School Bruce Swiren ICF Bloomsburg Area S.D.

Bloomsburg Area Middle School Gary'Goldberg ICF Central Columbia Area S.D.

Central Columbia High School W. Morrison Jackson ICF Columbia Montour AVTS Mike Petullo ICF Luzerne County School Districts - Gary' Goldberg-- TL :(Schools)-

Crestwood S.D.

Rice Elementary School (-/S EPZ)

Bart Ray ICF Greater Nanticoke Area S.D.D Greater Nanticoke Education Center.'

Ronald Biemacki..

ICF, KM Smith Elementary School Earl Shollenberger ICF Hazelton Area S.D.

Drums Elementary School DaVe'Stuelikl, ICF Northwest Area S.D.

Huntington Mills ES Carl Wentzell

ICF, West Side AVTS Daid White ICF Wilkes-Barre AVTS Harold Spedding ICF 55

OUT OF SEQUENCE DEMONSTRATIONS MONTOUR COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER -

October 22, 2008 Wednesday, 22 October 2008 1000 - 1200 EVALUATION SITE I

EVALUATOR I ORGANIZATION Montour County EOC Sean Howley ICF OUT OF SEQUENCE DEMONSTRATIONS PA STATE POLICE TRAFFIC & ACCESS CONTROL - October 22, 2008 Wednesday, 22 October 2008 1000 - 1200 EVALUATION SITE IEVALUATOR I ORGANIZATION PSP Bloomsburg Barracks Tracey Green.

ICF 6

56 a

APPENDIX 3:

Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria and Extent of Play Agreement This appendix contains the extent of play agreement from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III on July 10, 2008.

The exercise evaluation area criteria, contained in the "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology", 67FR 20580, 'April 25, 2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," No.vember 1980.

Because the exercise evaluation area-criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites; and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent of play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the evaluation area criteria.

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 2008 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE METHOD OF OPERATION

1. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)

The facility normally uses off-watch section personnel to participate in the exercise. The plant's simulated events, radiation readings, and emergency classifications will trigger offsite exercise actions. A pre-approved exercise scenario will be used. The SSES will notify the State EOC, the Bureau of Radiation Protection and Risk Counties of emergency classifications.

2. Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP)

Personnel from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) will be present and participate in the following aspects of the exercise as follows:

Plume Exercise - Nuclear facility EOF - (NOT Evaluated)

Plume Exercise - Field Sampling Teams & Command Vehicle - (10/21/2008)

BRP personnel working in the SEOC will NOT be evaluated as participants 57

0

3. PEMA Operations at State EOC / PEMA Headquarters This "Method of Operation" Document includes activities for the Full-Scale Plume Exercise 10/21/2008, and the "Out of Sequence" Activities 10/22/2008.

A. Plume Exercise - (10/21/2008)

PEMA Bureau of Operations and Training staff, augmented by designated PEMA personnel firom the Fire Commissioner's Office, the Bureau of Administration, Technical Services, Plans, plus Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO's) with accompanying response team members from designated state departments/agencies, including representatives from the USDA State Emergency Board will comprise initial operations at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The State EOC will participate but will NOT be evaluated during this exercise.

B. Plume Exercise'- "Out of Sequence" Activities -(10/22/2008)

PEMA Bureau of Operations and Training staff, augmented by designated PEMA personnel-will disseminate exercise related messages to the participating Counties for dissemination to the participating School Districts during the morning of 10/22/2008. The

'State Emergency'Operations Center (EOC) and County EOC's will participate however NOT be evaluated during the "Out of Sequence" component. PEMA personnel will serve as "observers" at tfe 4identified School Districts.'

NOTE: The Montour County EOC will be evaluated during the school district exercise during the morning of 10/22/2008.

C. "Out of Sequence?? Activities-- (10/22/12008).

PEMA personnel will serve as 5'Observers" at the various field exercise locations during

• the evening."Out-of-Sequence" component 10/22/2008. An exercise coordinatormwill remain -in the State EOC. The State Emergency Operations Center. (EOC) and Counties

• will NOTbe. evaluated duringthe evening "Out of Sequence" component..

4. PEMA Area Office Operations The PEMA Area Offices (Hamburg -Eastern Area and Harrisburg - Central Area) will not be activated nor evaluated during this exercise. Selected staff of the Area Offices will serve as Liaison Officers to Risk and Support Counties as assigned. Liaison Officers are exercise participants.-.,

5. Counties Designated to Participate A. Plume Phase Exercise: (10/21/2008)

The two risk counties (Columbia and Luzerne), in coordination with PEMA, will demonstrate the capability to mobilize appropriate staff, activate their respective 58 0

Emergency Operations Centers, andimplement emergency response operations to include sheltering and/or evacuation. County government will provide direction and coordination to risk municipalities. The seven supportQ.unties (Lackawanna, Lycoming, Montour, Northumberland, Schuylkill, Union and, Wyoming).will participate in their assigned support roles. Actual sheltering or evacuation of the general public will be simulated.

6. PEMA Liaison Officers Liaison officers will be present at the participating risk / support county-EOC's, the SSES Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) andthe Emergency, News Center. (ENC) to provide assistance, guidance, and support. These liaison officers will participate as players in the plume phase exercise 0on'10/21/2008.,

..1:.

7. Controllers Controllers will be supplied'by the. uti!ity and will beppresen at the emergency worker monitoring/decontaminating stations and the mass care monitoring/ decontamination centers 10/22/2008. Controllers are not players.,Contr.oI:lers will prqyide pre-approved injects and information to the pla}yers, as appropriate, regarding.radjological readings during the-monitoring of personnel. Live.radioactive sources will ;nQtile used.-Exception: individuals tasked with the setupofportal monitiorjig. equipment. ill u~se a standard] micro curie Cesium.1.37..source for. the purpos. of con ýucting, operational, týes.

Additionally, appropriate test sources will be available and used to, eriif the :opepafon ofthq monitoring i.survey instruments per manufacturer's recommendations.

8. PEMA Observers PEMA staff, qualified county emergency ri aaement personnel, and/or nuclear power plant personnel will be assigned, if required, to key locations for the purpose of observing, noting response acti6ns and conditions, and rec*ordingobseividtionsý for rftire uIse. Observeris will not take -an active part'in the pr0ceedingS, butv-w ill intetaet ith staff members to the extent necess ary to fulfill their'observer responsibilities.Co"aching

• of Players by observers isnot permitted'except to provide training as appropriate to participants awaiting a re-demonstration. (Refer to paragraph 13)

9. Department of Homeland Security (FEMA/REP) Evaluators A. Plume Exercise:- *..

Out of Sequence Period: (10/22/2008) Federal evaluators will be present atlthe,"'

identified "out-of-sequence" demonstration sites per Attachment A, Section 1. 1 and I.A.5 These include the identified Public School Districts anrdthe'Penmsylvania State -Police location.

Plume Phase Exercise: (10/21/2008) Evaluators representing the federal government will beý lresehtfat.vthe identified~risk and-support county EOC.s to evalu'ate'playeri

.)

• i *'.-

)

• i.,V.'...

I 59

0 response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario. Additionally, one-third of the risk municipalities in Columbia and Luzerne counties will be federally evaluated. As required, a "'floating-evaluator" will be made available for the purpose of evaluating any ORO locations not scheduled to have a federal evaluator, but having a prior issue Attachment A,Section I.A.2 and I.A.3 Out of Sequence Period: (10/22/2008) Federal evaluators will be present at identified Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Stations and Mass Care / Shelters and Mass Care Monitoring and Decontamination Centers, as identified in Attachment A,Section I.B. 1, I.B.2 and I.B.3.

10. Demonstration Windows In orderto provide for more effective demonstrations, as well as to permit'the release of volunteers from exercise play at a reasonable hour, periods of time.'(Demonstration,

Windows) have been designated during which specified actions will be accomplished /

demonstrated.

The "demonstration windows" for this exercise are:

A. Plume Phase Exercise

'The out--of-sequehce6MS-1 hospital demonstrationwas federally evaluated at Gelsinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center, Luzerne County, April 7, 2007.

The out-of-sequence exerciseý window for sc ool demonst-ratins will be from 9:00-lOOa.m. on Wednesdsy, 10/22/2008.

" The 6 out-f-seqýuence demonstration of reception centers,, mass'care centers, monitoring /

decontaminationicenters anid emergency worker stations will be conducted from 7:00 -

9:30 p.m. on Wednesday, October 22, 2008. Locations are specified within Attachment A,Section II.

The out-of-sequence interview of Pennsylvania State Police traffic control / access control points will be fromn 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon on Wednesday, 10/22/2008.

All demonstrations: will commence promptly and, barring any complications,'n'ot continue beyond the time of the designated dembiistration window.

County'and municipal EOC operations will be conducted on 10/21/2008 with the exception of Montour County whichi will be, evaluated during the out'of sequence

'school phase o.n 10/22/2008. (Plea'se refer6to the Extent of Play Demonstration Tables, Attachment A) 60

B. Post Plume Exercise NOTE: The post-plume exercise was conducted August 2004 for the SSES.

11. Stand-down All jurisdictions will request approval on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis prior to stand-down..

A. Upon completion of all requirements and after having informed the FEMA / REP evaluator that all evaluation areas have been demonstrated and/or completed, the risk.

municipality EOC's may request approval from their county EOC to "stand-:down".

B. Support counties may likewise request approval from the State EOC to terminate the exercise upon completion of all evaluated objectives.

C. The risk county EOC's will remain operational until the exercise is officially terminated by the State. The Lead exercise controller at the SEOC will coordinate an exercise termination message and have it communicated via a SEOC Watch Officer.

12. General Concepts An emergency plan is drafted to address the generally expected conditions of a n-emiergency.

Not everything in the emergency plan may be applicable for a given scenario. The main purpose of an emergency plan is to assemble sufficient expertise -and officials.so as to properly react to the events as they occur. The responders should not be so tied to a plan that they cannot take actions that are. more protective of the public. Therefore, if, by not following the plan, the responders protect the public equally as well as pv'ided 'in theplan, it should be noted for possible modification of the plan, but'not'classified as a negative incident.

Furthermore, if, by following the plan there is a failure, t protect. the public health and safety, it should be noted so that the plan can be modified and.the apropirfi"te negative assessment applied.

13. Re-demonstrations During the out!of sequence demonstrations on 10/22/2008, or thie plume phase demonstrations on 10/21/2008, any activity that is not satisfactorily demonstrated may be re-demonstrated by the, participants during the exercise, provided it does not negatively interfere with the exercise. Refresher training may be provided by the players, observers, and/or controllers. Evaluators are not permitted to provide refresher training. Re-demonstrations will be negotiated between the players, observers, controllers, and evaluators. PEMA may advise the RAC Chair prior to initiating.any,.re-demonstrations. It is permissible to extend the demonstrationowindow, within reason, to accommodate the re-demonstration. Activities corrected from a re-demonstration will be so noted.

6.1

a SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 2008 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT EVALUATION AREA 1 Emergency Operations Management Sub-element l.a - Mobilization INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion L.a.l: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; 11.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive 'notification of an emergency situation from the licenseej verify the notificatiori, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner: Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations: Activation of facilities should-be completedin accordance with the plan and/or procedures: Pre-positioning :of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commutingdistance. from the individual's duty location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with:the extent of play agreement:-

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play: Lackawanna, Wyoming, Union County EOCs Pre-positioning of state emergency personnel (Liaison Officers) at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Utility Joint Information Center (JIC) and Risk and Support Counties is appropriate due to the commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Risk municipalities will conduct call-outs to demonstrate the mobilization of key personnel. The utility JIC wiil b~ evaaluatedf6r this drill...........

• Actual calls (orpager notifications) will be made to the municipal EOCpersonnelfor the Plume Phase exercise, 10/21/2008 per plans and procedures.

62

" In all instances, the demonstration of a shift change is NOT required Twenty-four hour staffing, will be demonstrated by means of a roster or staffing chart.

" All out-of-sequence players and equipment will be pre-positioned (School District personnel, Pennsylvania State Police ACP,. Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Stations and Monitoring and Decontamination Centers and for the purpose of this exercise, Montour County EOC).

Sub-element 1.b - Facilities INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.b.l: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H.3)

EXTENT OF PLAY Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have-substantial.

changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of the areas to be consideredare: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility,(if required to% support operations.)

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and, demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above.or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement...

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play: NOTE: Lackawanna, Union and Wyoming counties have new EOCs and will require baseline evaluations. These evaluations may be completed anytime prior to the exercise.:..,

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(NUREG-0654, A.AAd; A.2.a, b) 63

0 EXTENT OF PLAY Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment - N/A INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations :(ORO) should establish reliable primaIry and backup communication: Systems to ensure cornim-iniccations with key emergency personnel at locations suchlas the following:

appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal.

emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and -field teams.*s Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least-one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exeicise. If a cbmimunications'system or systems are not: functional, but exercise perfoffrance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units"should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and* field teams should have the capabilityto access at least one -cofmftunication system that is independent-of the c ommercial telephone system. Responsible OROs: should demonstrate the capability to -manage the commiujication systems and ensure that all message, traffic -is 'handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROS 'should efnsure that a coordinated communication link. for fixeid and mobile medical support facilities exists.' The specific communications capabilities of OROS should be; commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/0r procedures. Exercise scenarios could'reqhire the-failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate 'system, as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.

64

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

The plant will communicate to the risk counties via the State EOC utilizing the Automatic Ring Down system (ARD), and Support Counties will communicate with the State EOC via SEVAN.

PASTAR will serve as backup in both cases:.

Risk Counties will communicate with their risk municipalities via public safety radio frequencies (EMA Radio), Commercial Telephone, Fax, or Amateur Radio, Communications (ARES/

RACES) or other available means.

Sub-element i.e - Equipment and Supplies. to Support Operations INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that offsite Response, Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to0 support the, emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.l: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e;J.11;.K.3.a)-

EXTENT OF PLAY Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and' cdnsiSe'nt With the role' assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, including air sampling flow meters (field teams only), should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in..

accordance withthe manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendationishould be calibrated annually.

Modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such-calibration should be on each instrument, or the calibration frequency may be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being, used, to measure activity should have a range of reading.sticker affixed to the side of the.,-

instrument. The above, considerations should be included in 4.a. 1 for field team. equipment; 4.c. 1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment; reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.,l;, and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d. 1.

.65

0 Sufficient quantities'of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimeters and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry (Direct Reading Dosimeters) should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-13 8s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and repla6ed if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities;. and, where: stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, members of the general public (including'transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quahtities of dosimetry a nd KL available and storage locitions(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the eexefcise, provided iii the Afifnual Letter of Certification submission,"andior verified during a Staff Assistahce Visit. Available supplies of KI should be&within the 6ixpiration datjindicated on KI bottles or blister-pac'ks. As an alternative, the' ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory iiidicafifig that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance' with U.S.

Pharmacopoeia standards.

At locations where traffic and ad&ess' control personiel are deployed, appropriate equipment (for example;,vehicles, bairiers;- traffic cones and signs, etc.') should be available or their av-ailability descr'ibed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play..

In Pennsylvania CD V-700s "are calibrated per* manufactures recommendations (every 4 years).

Support counties do not hav'eDRDs, or KI, but those responsible for reception'centers and/or monitoring and decontamination centers will have' PRDs.

Evaluation of KI quantities will be verified using inveniory sheets. KI will not'b'e removed from storage locations and boxe's /packages will not be opened. K! questions' will bea'iddressed through interviews.

KI extension letters will be available to the evaluator.

66

NOTE. OROs located within the SSES EPZ are in the process of "phasing-in" electronic Direct Reading Dosimeters with the intent to "phase-out" aging and failure prone ion-chamber type Direct Reading Dosimeters. Both styles (electronic and the pocket ion-chamber DRDs) may be found to be available within the SSES EPZ Both types are acceptable provided leakage testing or appropriate documentation is available.

EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision-Making Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control.

INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received:by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans and procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency. workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates emergency workers may. be permitted to incur :dring an emergency-. T~hese; limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits, (that take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits), identified in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an-exposure control sYstem, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation,.,:

exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4;,J.1O.e, f)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathwayEPZ. should.,

demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning.the authorization. of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to, the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.,AS appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective. measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PA.Gs) for KI.administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

67

0 PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological briefings (either. verbal or via video) will be provided to address exposure limits and procedures to replace those approaching exposure limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtainedfrom the municipality and county. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI and on whose authority. Distribution of KI will be simulated.

The completion of a "Dosimetry-K] Report Form" will be demonstrated.

Sub-element 2.b. -Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency INTENT This sub-element derives from:NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to use all available data to independently project integrated dose and compare the estimated dose savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency situation. OROs base these choices on PAGs from the ORO's plans and procedures-or EPA 400-R,92rO-04 and other criteria, such as,-plant conditions, licensee protective action recornmendatibns-, coordination of protective action: decisions with other political, jurisdictions! (for example,-other affected OROs), availability, of appropriate in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations that create higher than normal *risk from evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well:as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

(NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10; Supplement 3)

EXTENT OF -PLAY;.

During theinitial stage of the emergency response; following notification of plant conditions that may warrant-offsite :protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate-means, described in'the-plan and/or procedures, to develop-protective action.

recommendations (PARs) for decision-makers based on available information-and-,

recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

When the-licensee provides -release and meteorological data, the OROG also considers these data.

The ORO shoulddemonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections.

The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on-the data available and4the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose.should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to quantities. and units of the PAGs to which they will be compared. PARs should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

ý68

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of K1, if ORO policy).

(NUREG-0654, J.9; J.10.f,'m)

EXTENT OF PLAY

• Offsite Response Organizations (ORO). should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs: They should demonstrate the capability! to make initial,PADs in'a:timely :

manner appropriate to the situation, based. on notification from the. licensee, assessment :of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility, and ORO staff..............

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based' on the' subsequent-dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions:. The; decision-makers, should demonstrate the capabilityto change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for' the general public:

under off-site plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to supplement shelter and'evacuation. This decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected.thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration.

The KI decision-making process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.' "

If more than onie ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should'communicate and..

coordinate PADs Withaffected OROs. OROs should demonstrate-the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and, procedures and completed as they would'be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

69

0 Sub-element 2.c -Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to determine protective action recommendations, including evacuation, sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for special population groups (for example, hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NNUREG-0654, J.9; J.10.d, e)

EXTENT OF PLAY Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end: of the range of PAGs, except for. situations where there is a high-risk environment or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases,. examples of factors that should be considered are weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportationassets, risk. of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In,. situations:were aninstitutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should beýconsidered by the OROs.

Applicable OROs should-demonstrate the capab1ility to alert and notify: all.public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts withhpublic school systems/districts must be actual..

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials ofpubic school, systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials shoulddemonstrate that the decision making process for protective actions considers (that is, either, accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by. ORO personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for. example,,whether the students are stillat home, enroute to the school, or at the school),.

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on theORO's plans and procedures, and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the. extent of play agreement.

70

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

The State EOC will not be evaluated during this exercise,- however, this element will be demonstrated during the plume phase exercise as a control mechanism.

Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, Which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate protective action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway.

During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the accident and, depending on the nature of theý release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

Sub-element 2.e. - RadiologicalAssessment and Decision-Making Concerning'Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs; apply de'isioh' criteria for relocatior Of those' individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated butfwhere projected doses are in -

excess of relocation PAGs, and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. Decisions are made for relocating' members of the evacuated public who lived ini areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs.

Determination of-areas to be restricted-should be based on factors such as the mix of radio' nuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and field samples of vegetation and soil analyses.

Re-entry: Decisions should be made regarding the location of control points and'policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and* members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are: the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding the individual's objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates;, advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit ihcluding: monitoring of individuals,,'ehicles, and equipment; decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure recoids.

,7J

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the restricted zone, based on established decision criteria. OROs should demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols),

for maintenance Of essentialservices (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and for other critical functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g.,

to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or to retrieve important possessions.

Coordinated policies for access and exposure control should be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone. The extent that OROs need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: Decisions are to be based on environmental data and political boundaries or, physical/geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO should consider are, for example: conditions that permit the:

cancellation of the EEmergency Classification Level: and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures; basing return recommendations (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated'to reoccupy their homes-and lbusinesses:on an unrestricted basis) on measurements of radiation froim ground ddpdgition; and the,capability to"-identify.servics and facilities that require restoratiofi i'*ithin a 'few days and-to identify the procedures andresources for their restoration.

Examples ofthese s6exices -and facilities' are: medical and social servicers, utilities, roads, schools, 'and'intehnediate term.h6asing for relocated persons.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will NOT be evaluated during this exercise:. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week ofAugust]6, 2004.

EVALUATI ON ARIEA 3.

IProtective Action, Impolemfentation.

Sub-element 3..a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control INTENT This sub-elerent derives from NUREG-0654, which provides thati*R~ s should have the capabilityito provide for the following distributi6h, use, collection, andprocessing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the'reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency Workers at appropriate frequencies; iriaintaihing a radiation doserecord for each' emergency worker; and establishing a decisiojnchain or authorization.procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

'72

Criterion 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

(NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saying activities):,

contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the.ORO's plan and/or. procedures. Procedures togmonitor and-record dosimeter.-.

readings and to-manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.;-

During a plume: phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be, followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values -re reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures-during the exercise as indicated in thle plans and.

procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan. and/or. procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to. authorize the worker to. incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview atLleast two emergency, workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use anyavailable resources (for example, written procedures, and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the tea'm'by one dosimeter worn bythe team leader. Emergency workers,.who are assigned to. low exposure rate areas, for example, at receptioncenters, counting laboratories, emergency operations cenfies, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as. farmers for aiiiinmal care, essential utility service personniel, or other members of the public who muist re-enter an evacuated area following'or 'during the plume passage, should be.ilimited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missidns.

73

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits and procedures to replace those approaching limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtained from the municipality and county. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI and on whose authority.

Distribution of KI will be simulated The completion of a "Dosimetry-KI Report Form" will be demonstrated.

OROs should also demonstrate the use of all applicable dosimetryforms.

At any time, players may'ask other players'or supervisors to clarify radiological information.

In.Pennsylvania, emergency workers outside.of the EPZ do.not have turn back values.

Emergency workers who are. assigned. to low exposure rate areas, eg.,.at counting laboratories, emergency operati6ns.centers;, and.communications centers, may have individual permanent record dosimeters or theyýmay be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area.

In Pennsylvania. this will. be-accomplished, through the use of an area kit. The area kit process is explained inState,' County aridMunicipal Plans..

Standard issue of dosimetry and potassium iodide for each category of emergency worker. is as follows:

Category A:.1 ýPRD, 1DRD,-and ] unitiof KI Category B: 1 PRD and ] unit of KI Category C: 1 PRD All locations that have :dosimetry equipment, indicated within their Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), will make the dosimetry equipment (and KI) available for-inspection by.

the Federal Evaluator. In order to demonstrate an understanding of the use of the dosimetry equipment, KI and associatedforms"; the location need only remove and distribute / issue a maximum of six (6) units of dosimetry from their inventory.

SimulatiohnPRDs with mock serial numbers maybeu used.

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision INTENT

/

This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO)'should have the capability to provide radio pr6tective drugs for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, 'to-the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed.

While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to emergency workers and 74 0

institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general public is an ORO option and is reflected in ORO's plans and procedures. Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of radio protective drugs.

Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)

EXTENT OF PLAY Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan,,

and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency. workers and-institutionalized individuals" who have ingested KI, including documentation. of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the. designated ORO health officialý is voluntary.

For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI-is not necessary. OROs should: demonstrate the capability to formulate.and disseminate appropriate instructions on'the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the generaltpublic'to take. KI=,appropriate -,

information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This-can be accomplished through an interview by the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would bein an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Within Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department.ofHealth is responsible for distribution of KI to the general public located within the EPZ. Pre-distribution is accomplished on an annual basis. KI is not distributed to the general public at the time of an emergency.

Evaluation of emergency worker KI quantities will be verified using inventory sheets. KJ will not be removed from storage locations and boxes will not be opened KI questions will be addressed through interviews.

Personnel assigned-to operate Monitoring / Decontamination centers and stations are not issued DRDs or KJ since the centers/stations are located outside the EPZ,.

75

0 Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations'(ORO) should have the capability to implement protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear powei plant.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

EXTENT OF PLAY.

Applicable OROs Should demonstrate the'capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendationS and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired-individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special popitlati6ns' in'a'c6rdanc' 'With the ORO's plai s and procedures.:

Contact with special populations and reception facilities mnay be actual or' simulated, 'as agreed to in the Extent. of Play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent Of play. All actual and simulated COntacts should be logged.

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as, they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

The names,' 1oations and contact information of idehtified individuals with identified special needs are maintained on a list at their respective municipal 7EOC (based upon residential jurisdiction). Copies of these lists will not be provided to the evaluators; however, evaluators will be allowed to inspect the lists during the exercise.

Initial contact; by the County, with special populations (hospitals, nursingxhomes and county correctional facilities) will be actual. All subsequent calls will be simulatedActual contacts (up to two per risk county) will be made with transportation providers per their plan. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools.

(NUREG-0654, J 10.c,-d, g) 76

EXTENT OF PLAY Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action.

decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, dismissing. early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective.action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to anyvprivate, schools, private kindergans and *da care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans and procedures as negotiated in the. Extent of Play.Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's pltains and'procedures anid compl eted,as theY would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the.extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

School Students will not be involved during the exercise. Actions and activities,associated with the demonstration of Criterion 3. c. 2 will be limited to the School District Administration key personnel and~the County. Evacuation of students will be conducted through an interview process with School District personnel or the building principal..,

The role of the bus driver may be conducted through an interview with school or transportation, officials (or designee) if a bus driver is not available. Actual demonstration of the bus route is not required and will not be demonstrated Maps or route descriptions will be available for.

illustration purposes.

Risk County school plans do not require communications between the school and,.vehicdes. Bus drivers are not considered emergency workers and therefore do not require dosimretry.

Private schools, private kindergartens, and day care centers do not participate in REP exercises.

However, OROs will be prepared to show evaluators lists of these facilities that they will contact in the event of an emergency in accordance with plans and procedures.

77

0 Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response, Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, andstaffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10-g,jD EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action. decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is c6ntrolld*d Traffic and acce*s control staff shbuld demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles arid responsibilities. This capablhty may be demonstrated' by "actual deplo'yment or by interview, in accordance with the extent of play.

In instances where OROS lack' authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic

'iail;' waklr, and-air traffic); they' sihould demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.'

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA 'Negotiated Extent of Play:

Municipal; Traffic and Access control Will be demonstrated by interview at the applicable EOC of jurisdiction. The traffic / access control personnel will riot be deployed to the 'traffic /'access control p6 int(S).If tl-i e designated'assignment is a locatioti within the EPZ; a radiological briefing will be provided to the assigned individuals.

Criiterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, 78

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to. deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

ORO's should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as tow trucks, need not be demonstrated; however, simulated contacts.

will be logged (Risk counties only).

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs shoulcIhave the-capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion.pathway zone, (IPZ),, the area within an.

approximate 50-mile radius of the nuclear power plant. This sub-element focuses on those, actions required for implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.1: The. ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of.

adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)

EXTENT OF PLAY Applicable ORO's should demonstrate the capability to secure and utilize current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries;, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ. ORO's should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e. g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

Evaluation of these criteria will take, into consideration the level of Federal and other. resources.

participating in the exercise.

All activities must be~based on the OR0's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

.79

0 PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Not demonstrated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the SSES Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week ofAugust 16, 2004.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action -decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)

EXTENT OF PLAY Development of measures and strategies for implementation of IPZ protective actions should be demonstrated by formulation of protectiveaction information for the general public and food producers and processors. This includes either pre-distributed public information material in the IPZ orthe capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions, to pre-determined individuals and businesses. ORO's should demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors.

Exercise play should include demonstration of communications and coordination between orgahizations to irriplemrent prOtective'actions. Actual field play of implementation activities may be simulated. Foilkeamiple, cOmmUnications andccoordinationwithagencies responsible for enforcing Tf0d controls-within. the IPZ should be demonstrated, but actual communications with food prducei~sland processo-s may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would bein, an'actual-emergency,'unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play'agreement.,-

PEMA Negotiated.Extent of Play:"

Not demofistrated:during this exercise.,"This element was demonstrated during the SSES Post.

Plume Exercise conducted during the week ofAugust 16, 2004.

Sub-element 3.f-Impleinentation, of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides thatOffsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for relocation, re-entry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential for the protection of the public from' the direct long-term exposure :to deposited radioactive' materials from a severe accident at a commercial nuclear power plant.

80

Criterion 3.f.I: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3)

EXTENT OF PLAY Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs.

OROs should also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels above the PAGS. Areas of consideration should include the capability to communicate with OROS regarding timing of actions, notification of the population Of the procedures for relocation, and the notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs-should also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisionsl. ORO's should also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels above the (first -, second -, and fifty-year) PAG's.

Re-entry: OROs should demonstratethe capability to control re-entry andexit of individuals who need to temporarily-re-enter.the-restricted area, to protect them from. unnecessary radiation.

exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be, established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedure 'subjects are: (1) the assignment of, or checking for, direct-:

reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questionsregarding the individuals' objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for. exit, ?,.,.

including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment, decision criteria regarding contamination,,proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records...

Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to, areas that were evacuated during the plume phase., OROs should demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examplesof these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons.,._

Communications among OROs for relocation, re-entry, and return may be simulated; however all simulated or actual contacts should,,be documented, These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

,81

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g.,

compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will NOT be demonstrated during this exercise. This was demonstrated during the SSES Post-Plume Exercise conducted the week ofAugust 16, 2004 EVALUATION AREA 4 Field Measurement and Analysis Sub-element4.a _-Plume Phae Field Measuremehts and Analyses" me Phaase Fil M

eaan n

INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capabilityi todeployfield'teams With th* equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to, determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume emergency planning zone to measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of* noble gases and to measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby populatiOn and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to project*the extent and magnitude of a ireleasle, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in, rder to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement effo rts."

Criterion 4.a.i: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; 1.7, 8, 9)

EXTENTOF PLAY, Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission.. This' should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and*

detecting the prese'nce o fbeta radiation. These inistruments should be'capable of measuring a range of activity'anid exposure, including radiological protection/exposure co.trol of team members and detection of activity on the air sample collection media; consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans and procedures. An appropriate radioactive I

82

check source should be used to verify proper operational response for each. low range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 Rihr) and for high range instruments when available. If a.

source is not available for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist,to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) field teams will be evaluated during this exercise. The muster area will be located at the SESS EOF.

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP,), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) field teams are equipped with the necessary instrumentation and supplies. Evaluators will meet the field teams from the DEP South Eastern Regionai Office at the redr'of the SSES East Mountain Business Center (EOF) at 3:30p.m. on October 21, 2008, to observe instrumentation checks and equipment inventory verification prior to deployment.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams areimanaged to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654,- HJA2; 1.8, 11; J.1O.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstiat.e the caPability'to bri'ef teams on predicted plume location

.and direction, travel speed, 'and ex postiie control rocedui'es before deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the' release and to 'support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licens6ee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak. measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are, necessary to sufficiently characterize -the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams(licensee, federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody' form, to a' radiological laboratory, should be demonstrated.

83

0 OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc), if available.

Evaluation of this criterion will'take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise' All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Field Team Control will be performed within or near the 10 mile EPZ using the DEP.

Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle (R3 V). The R3 V will be located at the rear of the SSES East MountainBusiness Center (EOF),.

Field Team control is expected to initially be out of 0

sequence,with the plume timeline. During the exercise the field teams will be directed to take measurements in -locations to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. In addition to field team measurements, remote detectors will be located by the field teams near the expected plume pathway, these detectors will automatically transmit data to the R3V These detecitors will be used to keep field team dose ALARA. A FEMA Evaluator will be located at the R3 V location, arriving at the same time as the Field Teams, expected to be at 1430 on October 21, 2008.

Criterion.4,a.3: Ambient. radiation measurements are made and recorded at:

-. appropriate locations, ands radioiodine and-particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been

.collected on the sampling-media. (NUREG-0654, L.)

EXTENT OF PLAY Field teams -should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement, of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the. field team coordinator, dose:assessment, or other appropriate authority., If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for. expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in acc.ordance with the-ORO plan and/or procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources aszidentified in the FRERP, and other resources.(for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

,.at g

in th exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

18 4

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Measurements will be made by Department ofEnvironmental Protection.(DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), in accordance with the BRP Standard Implementing Procedures (1Ps). Two mobile monitoring teams from BRP DEP South Eastern Regional Office will demonstrate ambient radiation monitoring and radioiodine and particulate sampling. Field teams will be equipped with appropriate dosimetry and KI. Both teams will be evaluated by FEMA. Each team will be directed to monitoring locations and perform actual radiation measurements at each location. Measurements may consist of truck installed radiation monitor or hand-held radiation instruments. An actual air sample will be taken at the first location that meets the requirements for taking an air sample (>- 1 mR/hr) as directed Teams will then take additional simulated air samples; as directed, at additional locations, if conditions are appropriate for radioiodine sampling and relay information to the Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle (R3 V). In place of silver zeolite cartridges, charcoal cartridges will be used for the exercise. All measurements will be forwarded to: theR3 V immediately upon obtaining data.

Evaluators will meet the field teams at%

the rear of the SSES East Mountain Business Center (EOF) at 2:30pm on October 21, 2008:

Sub-element 4.b -'Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-:0654, which provides that:OROs should have'he capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and 1oations**6f,fadiologicat hazards'"in the IPZ and for-relocatiofl, re-entry and return measures.

This sub-element focuses on the collection of environmental 'samples :for.laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protection of the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The, field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate-'

measurements and to colect appropriate samples (eig., food cr6ps, milk, water,.'

vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-':

making. (NUREG-0654, 1.8;'J.11)

EXTENT OF-PLAY The ORO's field team should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-eentry)' relocati6n, and return decisions. When resources are available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All-methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples,, and:a chain-of-custody form, for:

transfer to a laboratory, will-be in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

85

0 Ingestion pathway samples should be secured from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return should be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs should'use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g.,

compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This element will NOT be demonstrated during this exercise. This was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise the week ofAugust 16, 2004.

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid,'and:envirohnimen'tal samples to support protective action decision-making.

Criterion, 4.c.1: The laboratory is capableof performing. required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11)

EXTENT OF PLAY The laboratory staff should demonstrateý the capability to follow, appropriate procedures for receivingsamples, includingiogging-of information, preventing contamination of the laboratory, preventingbuildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross.

contamination ofsampiles; preserving samples'that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide analyses of media, as requested, on a timely basis,!of sufficient quality and: sensitivity to support assessments and. decisions as anticipated by the ORO's plans and procedures. The laboratory (laboratories) instrument calibrations sht'uldý be' traceable to'standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in'a reactor incident should be as"described-in the plans and procedures' New or revised methods may be used to analyze 'atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics oras, aresult of a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstances-of the event, Analysis. may require".resourices beyond those of' 86

the ORO. The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures..

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g.,

compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this SSES exercise. This element was demonstrated during the 2007 TMIExercise.

EVALUATION AREA 5 Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System INTENT.

This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654,,which provides:that OROs.should have the.

capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived from the.Nuclear, Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix. E.IV.D.), and FEMA:REP-I 0,,:"Guidelfor.the Evaluation of Alert and Notification systems for Nuclear Power Plants."

Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner. following the.initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.The -initial instructional message.to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7).:

EXTENT OF PLAY Responsible Offsite, Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed.by an initial instructional message~to populated areas (permanent resident: and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification, system, in accordance: with the ORO'.s plan:,

and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished. in a timely -manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification.; The initial, message should include, the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.-

ý87

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most-difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is,. the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not, actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed upon location. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

For exercise purposes, timely is defined-as "the responsible ORO personnel/ representatives

%demonstrate actions to ýdissemfinate the-appropriate information-instructionswith a sense of urgency, and-without undue delay." If message dissemination is to-be identified asnot having been accomplished in a timely manner,the evaluator(s)will document a specific-delay or cause as to whyý a message wasý not considered.-timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should be demonstrated-up'to-the point!.of actual activation.

The capability of the primary.notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis-should be verifiedduring an interview with appropriate personnel from the.primary notification system..

All -activities for this'criterion -must be based-on the ORO's 'plans and procedures. and completed'as they-would-be ini-an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:.-

The Commonwealth ofPennsylvania has implemented a Statewide EAS Control-system in cooperation with the Pennsylvania. Association of Broadcasters per the State Emergency -

Communications Committee and Pennsylvania Emergency Alert System. State EAS Plan (April 1, 2004). The State EOC (PEMA) is the initiating point for the activation of the EAS. Risk Counties have,the control equipment for'activation-of sirens:. Coordination will occur between the State.

EOC and the affected. counties-with respect to the Alert and Notification System (ANS)-process.

Sirens will be'c-bordinatedwand the sounding simulated at the appropriate time-'with the simulated activation of EAS taking place approximately 3 minutes following the simulated activation of the sirens. Regular Broadcasting'will not be interrupted-on the EAS-Stations.- All subsequent actions to broadcast stations will be-simulated Broadcast of the message (s)!or test message(s) is NOT required and NOT requested. Counties may elect to provide Subsequent News Bulletins or County Specific EAS messages to their EAS stations.

88

Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, ANS activation should be accomplished in a timely manner for primary alerting/notification.

All actions to broadcast stations will be simulated Systems that use automatic sending technology may be demonstrated by explanation during an interview.

One municipality per risk county will demonstrate route alerting of the. hearing impaired residents within theirjurisdiction. (Please refer to Attachment A, Section 114)

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: 'Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 -minutes following the initial decision by. authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed Within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654,E.6;*,

Appendix 3.B.2.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY -

Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-approved exception areas, (identified in the-approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting andnQtification ofthe:,.:

exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-minute. clock will.

begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should,. ata, minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where,to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However; the mostdifficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. -All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (thatis, the message that would actually be used is read for-the evaluator,.

but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play.. Actual testing of the mobile public address-system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup atert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 -minutes following the detection by the ORO.of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting only needs to, be demonstrated and, evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures and the 'extent ofplay agreement, if the exercise'scen~ario calls.-for: failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any portion.of the primary system(s) actuallyfails to.:

fUnction.., If demonstrated, only one~route needs to be.selected and demonstrated. All alert and -

notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not' actuially broadcast) as agreed upon in the'extent 89

of play. Actual testing. of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon. location.

All activities for this criterion must be based on: the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This element is notapplicable. The SSES EPZ does not have 'any Alert, and Notification System "exception areas.

Sub-element S.b-Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654; which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to disseminate to the public appropriate emergency information' and instructions, including any recommended protectiveactions. In addition,_NURE&G-0654 provides that OROs should-ensure that the. apability exists for.

providing inAformation to the nedia. This includes the' availability of.a physical location for use by.the. media during an emergency: NUREG-9654 also"provides that a system should -be availabtekfor dealing with rumors. This system.will hereafter be known' as~the public-inquiry hotline.

Criterion 5.bA: OROs provide:accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.c)

EXTENT OF-PLAY Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will-not be, subject to specific time requirements). 'For exercise purposes, timely is defined as,"the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with.a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished ina timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a. specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely; The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable, instructions (for example, evacuation instructionhs, evacuat'ion routes, reception center locations, what to 'take when evacuating, information concerning p'ets, Shelternin-place instructions, information conicerning protective actions for schools and special populations, ýpublic inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The ORO should also be 90

prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability, to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by' broadcast media. In addition, the OROs shoulddemonstrate the, capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathwayinformationto pre-determined individuals and businessesinaccordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.:

J OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information*to.the. news media for subsequentdissemination to the public. Thiswould include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and, pertinent media briefings and distribute, media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should demonstrate thec~apabilityto respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in :media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency,-,.,

information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information: kits should.be~available for dissemination to the media...

OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to thc public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information.for callers~or: refer, them to an appropriate information source. Information. from the".

hotline staff,; including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the. public,-

media briefings, and/or media'releases.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures' and, completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above orotherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provicled to the public and, the media in a timely manner. This, will NOT be subject, to specific time requirements.

One. media briefing will be-demonstrated in each risk county.

"91

0 Risk and Support Counties will receive and handle "Public Inquiry" messages via their individual "Public Inquiry" processes (In compliance with NIMS terminology, Rumor Control is now considered to be "Public Inquiry"). Counties will receive approximately ten (10) public inquiry calls from the State Exercise cell assign this responsibility. Counties will be expected to receive and log the calls, identify any trends and take appropriate, actions to include follow-up message development, distributions, and/or briefings.

EVALUATION AREA 6 Support Operation/Facilities Sub-element 6.a --Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees INTENT This sub-element derives -from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response' Organizations'(ORO),havetthe capability-to implement 'radiolo gical monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers,'while 'minimizing contamination of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion i6.a.l: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and'trained personnei to provide! monitoring, decontamination, and registration' of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY Radiological: monitoring,:ddecontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/ emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency.on as indicated in the extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Before using monitoring instrument(s),,the~m'onitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the '

instrument(s) 'for' proper operation.

Staff responsiblefor'the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and' sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20%

emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />., This' monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring statioi* should be monitored, using eqclipment 'dnd procedures" specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monifoitoing team'will be tiimed by the evaluaidrs in order to'determine"whether the tWelve-hour requiirement can be'met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-92

hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be,demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview.

The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the -spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for.

decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated forassessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans, and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not, simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated.. The registration activities demonstrated should:,include the establishment of a registration record for, each individual, consisting ofthe.inrdividual's nam. e, address, resultsof monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any,:or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency,unless otherwise indicated in the. extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological monitoring demonstration sites should possess a roster of the, monitoring personnel required to process 20% of the population allocated to the facilitywithin a_12 hour period.

To demonstrate -the monitoring process, a minimum of six individuals posing as simulated evacuees should be monitored per monitoring facility. As an option, it will be acceptable to monitor one individual six times.

Water from decontamination activities may go directly to a storm drain or other sewer or drain system or area normally designated for wastewater that has been used for bathing Or washing of vehicles and or. equipment.

At each reception center, a minimum of three volunteer evacuees will be processed, briefed, issued the appropriate strip map or directions, and instructed to proceed to a mass care center 3

0 designated for demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration. A sample of the appropriate strip maps or directions will be made available for the demonstration.

One mass care center and one mass care monitoring/decontamination center will be demonstratedper support county during the out-of-sequence window county (Exception -

Montour County does not operate any mass care centers). The support counties will provide space at designated mass care centers for operation of monitoring/decontamination centers.

Schematics of these monitoring/decontamination centers will be available to show the organization within the facility and space management for monitoring and decontamination.

Procedures will be demonstrated to evidence the separation of contaminated and non-contaminated (clean) individuals.:

At the evacuee monitoring/decontamination: center, a 'minimum of six (6) volunteer evacuees will be monitored (or one volunteer evacuee may be monitored six times).. Suitable radiological0 monitoring instruments will be issued to and demonstrated by the initial monitoring team(s). A monitoring team consists of one monitor and one recorder equipped with one survey instrument.

Those individuals found to be free of "contamination ", based upon scenario injects, will be directed to the mass care registration point for further processing. Note: Actual radiological sources' willlnot be attached to or hidden upon the volunteer evacuees.

One of thesimulated evacuees, based upon controller injects, will not be able:to,-be decontaminated Discussions concerning the processing of contaminated personnel will include capabilities and written procedures for showering females.separate fom males.:,Showering will be simulated, water wilt~not be used: Note: If portal monitorsare used, the Portal Monitor, Extent of Play described below shall be used.

At the emergency worker monitoring/decontamination stations, one emergency worker will be monitored: ýDiscussions concerning processing of contaminatedpersonnelmwill include capabilities and written procedures for showering females separate from males.. Showering will be simulated,'waterwill notebe used: Suitable radiological monitoring:instruments will be issued to the. initialmonitoring team. Note:If portal monitors are used,.the Portal Monitor Extent of Play described below shall be used.

Portal Monitor Use:. Risk and Support counties may, during this exercise, utilize portal monitors to monitor simulated evacuees and /,or emergency, workers. The monitoring / decontamination team requirements will be based on the portal monitor capabilities as applicable based on the procedure / guidelines, and the-recommendations ofthe manufactuie.' Note: PEMA Circular C2004-2'shall apply.

Monitoring/decontamination centers and Emergency Worker monitoring and decontamination station personnel are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers and stations.are, outside the EPZ.

Category "C" Dosimetry applies. Personal Record Dosimeters (PRD 's) will be simulated Radiation readings /!contamination data for. the evacuees and vehicle willbe provided by the controller as. appropriate based upon information contained in. the scenario package. Set-up of the facility will be performed the-same asfor an actual emergency with all route, markings and contamination control measures in place including step-offpads...Long runs. ofplastic covered, 94

with paper will not be demonstrated, but the materials-shall be available and explained Positioning of afire apparatus on-site may be simulated if otherwise required Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment; including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

EXTENT OF PLAY The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, -including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans and

• procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment; including vehicles, thatrwas in contact with-individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability toý make decisions on the need for decontamination-ofequipment, including vehicles,.

based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency; with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping -and. contamination-control measures in place-Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated fora minimum of one vehicle: It'is generally not necessaryto monitor the entire surface'of -vehicles. Howeverý,the.!,

capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires; and-door handles, should: be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of,ehicles that Were iri contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment -that cannot be decontaminated, may belsimulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated. with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Emergency worker station personnel will consist of a minimum of one monitor and one recorder and sufficient personnel to demonstrate'monitoring of at least one vehicle. Schematics of these-'

monitoring/decontamination stations will be -available to:show organization and space --.

management. The evaluator will request that vehicle decontamination procedures be explained after the vehicle (with-simulated contamination) has been monitored -One radiological survey 1 95

0 meter, will be issued to each vehicle monitoring/decontamination team. One vehicle and/or piece of equipment will not be able to be decontaminated. Simulated radiation contamination data will be included in the scenario package, and injected by a controller. Set-up of the facility will be performed as closely as possible to that for an actual emergency with all route markings in place.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, will be simulated and conducted by interview. Water will NOT be used Sub-element 6.c Temporary Care of Evacuees INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response.

Organizationis (ORO) demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host areas. The American 'Red Cross (ARC) normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and. accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in.MASS CARE m Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers demonstratethe procedures-toassure that evacuees have been monitored for contaminationand have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12)

EXTENT OF PLAY Under this criterion, demonstration of.congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play 'agreements.

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (for example, cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

96

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Each of the support counties (Exception - Montour County) will demonstrate the operation of one mass care center during the out-of-sequence window. Floor plans with flow diagrams of the mass care centers will be available to show organization within the facility and space management during a real emergency. Mass care center locations are listed in the demonstration tables "Demonstration of Mass Care Centers (Attachment A, Section 11. 2)".

Personnel, at a minimum, will consist of one manager and one assistant for each mass care.

center opened during the out-of-sequence window. The responsible American Red Cross chapter will show the source-and quantities, by job functional description, to be provided to mass care centers to support the 24-hour operation.,.The responsible Red Cross Chapter(s),..will.be visited or telephonically contacted during business hours on October 22,..2008, by an exercise evaluator, to provide information regarding the 24-hour operation. Schematicsoftheseý mass care centers will be available, during the demonstration window, to show organization within the facility and space allocation for theregistration and sheltering.the, evacuating public.

Necessary signs, directional arrows and forms will be available, and used to-demonstrate registration, at a.minimum,, of three evacuees requiring emergency.ho/using. Evacue.es will. be shown the lucation where they would be housed. in an actual situation. Bedding, cots, food; etc.

normally associated:with mass care will not.be moved to the site,- but the sources of those items should be explained to FEMA evaluators. This out-of-sequencedemonstration ywindow will be from 7:00 PM-9:30 PM on 10/22/2008.

,97

0 American Red Cross risk and support county chapters:

Greater Berwick Chapter 344 Market Street Berwick, PA 18603 (570)-752-7221 Fax: (570)-759-6895 E-mail: nihoffk@epix.net Bloomsburg Chapter 119 E. 7th Street Bloomsburg, PA 17815 (570)-784-1395 FAX: (570)-784-1577 E-mail: blmrdcrs@sunlink.net 0

Wyoming County Chapter 49 E: Tioga Street Tun"annock,PA 18657 (570)-836-2626 FAX: (570)-836-3691 E-mail: redlrossepix-ne:"

Lycomin gCounty Chapter Mrs. Joy Hanner 320 East 3 rd Street Williamsport, PA 17701 (570)*326-9131i FAX: (570)-326-2514 E-mail: jhanner@ncparedcross.org Scranton,Chapter 545 Jefferson Avenue'.

Scran6ton, PA 185 10 (570)-344-7281 FAX: (570)-344-6534 E-mail: bhaber@neparc.org' ARC in Schuylkill and Eastern Northumberland County 1402 Laurel Boulevaid Pottsville, PA 17901 (570)-622-9550 FAX: (570) -622-96541 E-mail:'redcross@infi.net.

a 98

Upper Northumberland County Chapter 560 Mahoning Street Milton, PA 17847 (570)-742-4171 E-mail: darc@evenlink.net Union County Chapter 249 Farley Circle P.O. Box 82 Lewisburg, PA 17837 (570)-524-0400 FAX: (570)-524-0462 E-mail: unionarcdis@yahoo.com Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsit& Response Organizations (ORO's) should have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.l: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resour'ces, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L1, 4)

EXTENT OF PLAY Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts will not delay urgent mledical' care for the victim.

Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability totransp6rt contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service forf an extende d time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medikal, facility, this communication must occur prior to releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation-monitoring results,-if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whome to cOntact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed prior to transport, done en route, or deferred jo the medical facility. Prior to using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities should be completed, as they would be in an actual emergency.

99

0 Appropriate contamination control measures should be demonstrated prior to and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make decisions On the need for decontamination of the individual, to follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain records of all survey :measurements. and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of the' individual should be ýdemonstrated or described to'the evaluator-.

All activities associated with thiscriterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as. they would be in an actual emergency,. unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of playagreement.

Frequency for Evaluation of New Criteria NOTE: This sub-element was evaluated at Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center (Luzerne County.), April 7, 2007.

0 100

ATTACHMENT A Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 2008 Extent of Play Demonstration Tables I. PLUME PHASE EXERCISE -

A. Activities - 10/22/2008

1. Risk Public School Districts with schools located within the EPZ and those districts situated outside the EPZ, but with students, living within, the EPZ, will participate and be evaluated by the Department of Homeland Security. Each identified District Administration Office will be evaluated. When a school system is comprised of multiple buildings (High School, Middle*School, Elementary School),

the affected buildings (those with students from the EPZ) Will be evaluated on a.

rotational basis to coincide with the six-year exercise cycle Time: Out of Sequence-9:00- 11:00 AM COUNTY Columbia Columbia Columbia Columbia Columbia Luzerne Luzeme And Hazleton Area School District Northwest Area School District West Side AVTS Wilkes Barre AVTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; Berwick Area School District Benton Area School District Bloomsburg Area School District Central Columbia School District Columbia Montour AVTS (Vo-Tech)

Crestwood Area School District Greater Nanticoke Area School District KM Smith Elementary School Drums Elementary Huntington Mills ES West Side AVTS Wilkes Barre AVTS SCHOOL(s)1 participating in the 2008, exercise, Nescopeck ES and Salem ES Benton Area Middle, School Bloomsburg Area Middle School Central Columbia High School Columbia Montour AVTS Rice Elementary School Greater Nanticoke Education Center Luzerne Luzerne Luzerne Luzerne NOTE: Montour County EOC will be evaluated during this phase.

i101

0

2. County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)

Time: Per Scenario DEMONSTRATION FOR EOC MOBILIZATION COUNTY Columbia Luzeme Lackawanna Lycoming

• Montour Northumberland Schuylkill Union Wyoming

• NOTE: Montour 10/22/2008.

FOR COUNTIES (Plume Phase Exercise)

. DATE.

Time 10/21/2008 Per scenari 10/21/2008 Per scenari 10/21/2008 Per scenar:

10/21/2008 Per scenar:

10/22/2008 09:00 - 11 10/21/2008 Per scenar 10/21/2008 Per scenar 10/21/2008 Per scenari 10/21/2008.

Per scenar:

County EOC will be evaluated during the sch io io io

00 io ioio io

• ools exercise on 0

a

.1 02 4

3. Municipal Emergency Operations Centers (EOC)

Time: Per Scenario NOTE: Only the agencies in BOLD will be evaluated for this exercise RISK COUNT)

Columbia Luzerne

• Joint EOCs DEMONSTRATION FOR EOC MOBILIZATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES (Plume Phase Exercise)

(

MUNICIPALITY DATE Beaver Township 10/21/2008 Berwick Borough/ Briar 10/21/2008 Active Police Dept, Creek Borough*

Berwick Boro only Briar Creek Township Active Police Dept Fishing Creek Township 10/21/2008 Mifflin Township North Centre Township South Centre Township Black Creek Township Butler Township/

Active Police Dept Conyngham Borough*

Conyngham Township Dorrance Township Hollenback Township Hunlock Township 10/21/2008 Huntington Township/ New Columbus Borough*

Nanticoke City Nescopeck Borough Nescopeck Township Newport Township Nuangola Borough Shickshinny Borough Slocum Township Sugarloaf Township Union Township Salem Township Active Police Dept Active Police Dept 10/21/2008 Active Police Dept 10/21/2008 Active Police Dept 10/21/2008 Active Police Dept 1.03

0

4. One backup route alerting will be demonstrated by one municipality in each risk county during scenario exercise.

Columbia Berwick/Briar Creek 10/21/2008 Borough Luzerne Hunlock Township 10/21/2008

5. Traffic and Access Control Points

a. The Pennsylvania State Police will brief at the PSP Bloomsburg Barracks, Those attending the briefing will not actually deploy to the TCP/ACPs.

b. The PSP briefing will be performed out of sequence in a demonstration window of 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Wednesday, 10/22/2008.

c. Each municipal/ regional police force with a TCP assigned in its plan will demronstrate all pieparation duties including TCP responsibilities and radiological briefing9:Disjpatch' of persons to the TCP site will not occur durifig the exercise.

d. Municipal and county staffs will be prepared to brief the FEMA evaluator on actions to be taken should there be an impediment to evacuation on a designated route. This will be demonstrated anytime during the exercise.

104

B. October 22, 2008

1. Reception Centers (Out of Sequence)

COUNTY Lackawanna Lycoming Northumberland Schuylkill Union Wyoming COUNTY Lackawanna Lycoming Northumberland Schuylkill Union U o. i. n..

g Wyoming DEMONSTRATION of Reception Centers DATE Time 10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m 10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. -. 9:30 p.m Reception Center Location Big Lots Lycoming Mall Shikellemy High School, Sunbury Marion HS Montandon Elementary School - Montandon Tunkhannock Middle School,,Tunkhannock.,

.105

0

2. Mass Care Centers and Monitoring / Decontamination Centers (Out of Sequence)

COUNTY Lackawanna Lycoming Northumberland Schuylkill Union.

Wyoming, COUNTY Lackawanna Lycoming Northumberland Schuylkill Union Wyoming'-

DEMONSTRATION of Mass Care Centers DATE Time 10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

10/22/2008 7:00 p.m. L 9:30 p.m.

Mass Care Center Locations Quantity-Mid Valley High School 1

Montoursville High School :.1 Shikellemy High School, 1

Sunbury Tamaqua Junior / Senior 1I

'High School Complex Lewisburg Middle School:

1 I Tun*khannock Middle

1

'School Complex

3. Emergency Worker Monitoring / Decontamination Stations (Out of Sequence)

Time: 7:00 - 9:30TPM Columbia Columbia Montour Vo-Tech Luzerne Sweet Valley Fire Company, Ross Township 10/22/2008, 10/22/2008 II. POST PLUME EXERCISE Not Applicable for this Exercise. The Post-Plume Exercise was conducted in conjunction with the SSES 2004 exercise.

106 4

Attachment B 2006 SESS Listing of Prior Issues (Pennsylvania)

Reference 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 FACILITY EVALUATED Montour Vo-Tech School, Columbia Montour Vo-Tech School, Columbia Salem Township Emergency Operations Center Mass Care -

Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Shikellamy High School, Sunbury)

Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center Public Emergency Information Materials (Columbia County),

Columbia Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station Briar Creek Township Route Alerting Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center Salem Township Emergency Operations Center Northumberland County Reception Center' Berwick School District Columbia-Montour Area Vocational Technical School Greater Nanticoke Area School District North West Area School District North West Area School District Luzerne County Accident Assessment Center (Bureau of Radiation Protection)

CRITERIA Current Status 63-06-6.a.1-A-01 redem 10/22/08 63-06-6.b.1-A-02 redem 10/22/08 63-06-1.c.1-A-03 redem 10/22/08 63-06-6.a.1-A-04 redem 63-06-6.a.1-A-05 10/22/08 63-06-5.b.1-P-01

resolved, 63-06-5.b. l-P-02 resolved 63-06-6.a. P-04 resolved 63-0.6-5.a.1 -P-05 resolved.

63-0,6-5.b.1-P-06 resolved 63-06-1.b. 1-P-07 resolved 63-06-6.a.1-P-08 resolved 63-03-3.c.2-P-09 resolved 63-06-3.c.2-P-10 resolved 69-06-3.c.2-P-0 1 I resolved 63-06-3.c.2-P-12 resolved 63-06-3.c.2-P-13 resolved 63-04-5.a. 1 -P-04 resolved 63-04-2.a. 1-P-02 resolved Note: 1 Salem Township EOC staff to provide FEMA evaluatorr6ster of EOC personal only.

!107

E0 Reference 1 Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station (Montour VoTech School, Columbia County)

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Issue No.: 63-06-6.a.1-A-01 Condition: The Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontarnination Station did not adequately demonstrate the following activities:,

Proper monitoring techniques - Survey instrument probe speed was too fast, the probe was held too far away-from the body, and the monitoring path width was too wide.

Monitoring was casually accomplished without adequate attention to a monitoring pattern and detail.

No thyroid monitoring was done.

No actual or simulated distribution of decontamination supplies to monitored individuals.

Contamination control of portal monitor - monitor was not periodically checked for contamination.

'No whole-body 4-minute surtvey for contaminated individuals was 6ompleted. Monitors, surveyed only hands and arms.

... ~~~~.'

r-Possible Cause! It appreais that monitoring and decontamination staff were not trained and experienced in the plans and procedures for the facility, or in monitoring: processes in.general.

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a Columbia County Emergency Response-Plan, Appendix 13, Attachment A

..Columbia' County Emergency Response Plan, Appendix 13, Attachment.D:

Effect: Individuals actually contaminated with radioactive materials would not be discovered, 0

identification of contamination could not have been accurate or. complete, the.portal monitor could be rendered useless, and adequate backup surveys would not-be.performed.

Recommendations:

Establish a training program for workers at this facility.

Consider adding a more appropriate tool for protecting the portal monitor from contamination, such as a sticker pad designed for contamination control.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Area Requiring Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

.108

Schedule of Corrective Actions for issue 63-06-6.a.1-A-01:

The Columbia County Emergency Management Agency is conducting meetings and.training sessions for the Radiological Monitoring and Decontamination teams assigned to staff and operate the Columbia County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Facility at the Columbia Montour Vo-Tech School. This training includes personnel monitoring in accordance with the County Plan and State Guidance materials.

The Columbia County Emergency Management Agency is working in consultation with,the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection regarding contamination control methods related to the portal monitor.

This facility and its operation will be demonstrated during the, 200,8 SSES Full-Scale Exercise scheduled for the week of October 20, 2008.

Reference 2 Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station (Montour Vo-Tech School, Columbia)

Issue No.: 63-06-6.b.1-A-02 Condition: The EmergencyWorker Monitoring and Decontamination, Station did not, adequately demonstrate the following vehicle. monitoring and decontamination activities:

Proper monitoring techniques - The probe was held too far away from the vehicle and the monitoring path width was too wide. Monitoring was casually accomplished without adequate attention to a.monitoringpattern and detail.

Vehicle interior was not monitored Possible Cause: It appears.that monitoring and decontamination, staff were. not trained and experienced in the plans and procedures for -vehicle monitoring. The Standard Operating Procedures were not utilized.

References:

ýNUREG-0654, K.5.b..:

Columbia County Emergency Response Plan, Appendix-13,,Attachment F Effect: Vehicle monitoring would be incomplete and contaminated vehicles could be released, Recommendation: Establish a training program for workers at.this facility;regarding vehicle monitoring, Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Area Requiring Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

'109

0 Schedule of Corrective Actions for issue 63-06-6.b.1-A-02:

1. The Columbia County Emergency Management Agency is'conducting meetings and training sessions for the Radiological Monitoring and Decontamination teams assigned to staff and operate the ColUmbia County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Facility at the Columbia MontourVo-Tech School. This training includes Vehicle monitoring in accordance with the-County Plan and State Guidance materials.

This facility and its operation will be demonstrated during the 2008 SSES Full-Scale Exercise scheduled for the week of October 20, 2008.

Reference 3 Salem Township Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-1.c.1-A-03 Condition: According to the Salem Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan Standard Operating Procedures, personnel filling each of nine key functions are responsible for assuring around-the-clocck shift scieduilifi foftheirfunction to assure continuity of response.

The positions of Public Works Officer and Transportation Officer were not filled:. i-'addition, only the Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) and Police Services Officer positions had names designated for:thesec6nd shifts. The EMC, doubled -the duties of the Medical Officer to include those of the Transportation Officer. This position was, filled by arecruit from the Fire Department who 'was n6t tfained:.f&r either position,'In addition, the plan'.sNotification and Resource Manual did not include c6ntact names for Public Works officials.-

Possible Cause: The Township did not request assistance to assure su'fficient personnel to.

sustain.0round the clock iesphnsecapability. The plaih was not sufficieitlyupdatedstoidentify, alternate officials to filllkey posi'*ions,.

References:

NUREG-0654,'J.9; J.l0.d, e.

Effect: Important functions identified in the plan could be missed without the focus of a key player familiarWith that functidn. For example, the Police Services Officer wasaware that the township had fuel stored at a township facility, but didn't know how to get it to where it might be needed during an evacuation if an evacuee ran out of gas.

Recommendation: Update the' Notification and Resources Manual' to accurately reflect staff and train.them for assigned key positions. Train the EMC to ask the county for assistance in filling unmet personnel needs.

Response: Please accept the, following response regarding the identified Area Requiring Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

110

1. The Salem Township Notification and Resource Manual will be updated to include contact information for all required staff.

2. The Salem Township Emergency Management Coordinator will be trained to exercise the provisions available within the Incident Command System (ICS) and either a) assign any unfilled staff position responsibilities to an available / trained staffer; or b) utilize the provisions of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Code and request additional resources through the County EMA to fulfill the unmet need...

Schedule of Corrective Actions for issue 63-06-1.c.1-A-03:

This organization (Salem Township) will be requested to demonstrate the indicated item(s) during the 2008 SSES Full-Scale Exercise scheduled for the week of October 20, 2008. The State will request DHS to have these specific items reviewed by an evaluator during the 2008 exercise.

Reference 4 Mass Care - Monitoring/Decontamination Center (Shikellamy High School, Sunbury)

Issue No.: 63-06-6.a.!-A-04 Condition: No "range of readings" sticker was affixed to the side of the survey instrument, indicating, acceptance criterion for a source check..

Possible Cause: Information on expected readings for a source-check, in the instruments' -various ranges was not available-on the instrument, or elsewhere at the facility.,

References:

NUREG-0654, 110.h; J.12, K.5.a.

Effect: Instruments may indicate contamination above the action level when none was, present, or more seriously, falsely indicate contamination level below the action level.

Recommendation: The expected readings with the check source should be providedon a sticker on the side of the instrument.

Response:Plea~se accept the following response regarding the identified Area Requiring-Corrective Action (Issue No.: 63.-06-6.a. 1 -A-04).

Representatives of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and the Department of Environmental Protection / Bureau of Radiation Protection(BRP) vyisited the Northumberland County Emergency Management Agency, 911 :Greenoughi Street, Sunbury, PA on Friday October 27, 2006. During that visit, the Northumberland County representative responsible for the County Radiological Instrumentation was provided with instruction and was witnessed while he affixed "range of reading"labels to the sides-of the:two instruments.,Pleasef refer to Attachment A of this document.

F1L11

0 The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) respectfully requests that Issue No.: 63-06-6.a. 1-A-04 be re-classified as "corrected" and indicated as such in the Final Report.

Schedule of Corrective Actions for issue 63-06-6.a.1-A-04:,

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency certifies that this issue has been corrected as of October 27, 2006.

Issue No.: 63-06-6.a.1-A-05 Condition: Contrary to the Extent of Play, the same player demonstrated all 3 monitoring tasks at the facility: portal monitor, survey meter monitoring of the contaminated. indiý,idual, and vehicle monitoring. In an actual event one individual would not be able to perform required tasks simultaneously.

Possible Cause: This could be due to an inadequate number of trained personnel. A roster of trained personnel was not available

References:

NUREG-0654, J.l0.h; J.12; K.5.

Effect: During a-real emergency requiring the mnonitor'ing and decontamination of evacuees,

.there mayrnot~be'an adeqhate number':of trained personnel to processallevacitees Recommendation: Demonstrate a full functionality of the facility: by staffing all positions simultaneously..

Response: Please accept the following -response regarding the identified Area Requiring Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

A review of those. present (per exercise attendance roster for September 20, 2006), indicates that a sufficient number of personnel.were present and available.

Additional "function based" training will be encouraged for the personnel who may be called

• upon to staff the facility.

Northumberland County will be encouraged to conduct a functional "non-evaluated'! exercise at the Shikellamy High School with all positions staffed simultaneously-.

Northumberland County will be encouraged to participate in the 2008 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station exerciseiand demonstrate the Shikellamy High School, Mass Care Monitoring and Decontamination Center with all positions staffed simultaneously and evaluated.

112

Schedule of Corrective Actions for issue 63-06-6.a.1-A-05:

Northumberland County will be requested to demonstrate the full operation of the Shikellamy High School Mass Care Monitoring and Decontamination Facility during the 2008 SSES Full-Scale Exercise scheduled for the week of October 20, 2008.

Planning Issues Reference 5 Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-5,b.1-P-01 Condition: The Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan does not include information in appropriate procedural sections regarding the distribution and use of KI for the general public.

Possible Cause: The Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) does not include information on the use of KI by the general publicin appropriate Plan sections.,. -

Appendix 10, Protective Response, does not contain information regarding the use of KI by the general public. Limited information regarding the use of KIby the general. public is incorrectly.

included in Appendix 13,' Section :6.E.4, Radiological Exposure Control-for Emergency. Workers.

Appendix 13 states that KI is made available to the general public in the Emergency Planning Zone by the Pennsylvania Department of Health. Appendix 1-3, Attachmrent B, PA:Department of Health Policies on KI, does not address the use of KI by the general public (it addresses emergency workers and special populations). Information regarding the use of KI (by the general public) is not included'in Appendix.13, Section 5, Radiological Exposure Control for the General Public.

References:

Luzerne County Radi6logical.Emergency-Response Plan, (RERP), Appendix 4, Public Information; Appendix 10, Protective Response; Appendix 13, Radiological-Exposure Control..

Effect: Local officials could be confused regarding the current policy regarding the distribution and use of KI for the general public.

Recommendation: Update the Luzerne County RERP to include appropriate information regarding the use of potassium iodide by the general public.

Response: Please-.aiccept the followifg response regarding the identified Planning, Issue -

Corrective Action, and add' this, statement to the FinaL Report.

During the next plan review, the Luzerne County RERP will be updated to include the appropriate information regarding the use of potassium iodide by the general public. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency will provide copies of the "Potassium Iodide 1:13

0 Administration Plan" as developed by the Pennsylvania Department of Health (PaDOH) to all risk Radiological Emergency Response Counties statewide. PEMA will provide appropriate language for incorporation in the affected County plans. A copy of the PaDOH material is provided as Attachment B.

Schedule of Corrective Actions for issue 63-06-5.b.1-P-01:

The Luzerne County plan will be updated during the next review cycle.

Copies of the PaDOH Potassium Iodide Administration Plan will be available in the Luzeme County EOC within 120 days of the September 19, 2006 SSES Exercise (NLTý December 31, 2006).

An Errata Sheet indicating the reference to the PaDOH Potassium Iodide Plan will be provided to Luzeme County EMA to be inserted within Appendix 10 of the current plan (NLT.December 31, 2006).

Reference'6 Public Emergency 'Information Materials Issue No.: 63-06-5.b.1-P-02 Condition: The Colufbia County emergency information section of the local telephone directory (blue pages) does not include information, regarding the use of potassium iodide (KI) by the general public.

Possible Cause: The emergency information. section of the telephone:directory has, not been updated to include information regarding the use of potassium iodide by the~general public.

Reference:

Emergency Information Section of Columbia County telephone directory(ies).

Effect: Public confusion regarding the use of KI could easily arise due to unavailability of information. Public Inquiry phone lines may be inundated with calls recquesting information about KI. Including KI information in phone directories may preclude this.

Recommendation: Update the telephone directory to include appropriate information regarding distribution: and use of potassium iodidefor the general public..

Response: Please accept the' following response -regarding the identified. Planning Issue.

Corrective Actionand add this statement to the Fifial Report:...

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency has provided suggested language to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Emergency Planning Personnel and the other Nuclear Utilities statewide, for the update of their Public Emergency Information Materials including the 1.14

telephone directories. Telephone directories are updated on a variety of schedules depending upon the telephone company and their telephone book vendors. Every effort is being made to have the KI information for the general public appear in the next publication of the telephone.

directories.

Reference 7 Columbia Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station Issue No.: 63-06-6.a.l-P-04.

Condition: The procedure does not include a facility layout plan.

Possible Cause: The plan has not been reviewed for completeness.,

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a.

Effect: Contaminated individuals did not have decontamination supplies available to them.

Recommendation: Design a specific layout to include supply. staging:;area andinqludle that layout in the standard operating procedures of the facility and the county emergency response plan.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding,the identified Planning Issue, Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report...,,,.

The Columbia County Emergency Management Agency has developed and provided a copy of the specific design and layout for the Columbia County Emergency.Worker Monitoring and;,

DecontaminationStation Reference 8 Briar Creek Township Route Alerting Issue No.: 63-06-5.a.1-P-05 Condition: The printed card used to inform hearing. inipaired individuals of an incident: at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) contained possible confusing terminology. The card states "There is an Alert at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)." This message was issued during a Site Area Emergency. It is believed that the term '.'alert" was meant to describe.

that there was a situation at SSES and not meant to identify an Emergency Classification Level (ECL).

Possible Cause: It-is a misuse of theoword Alert.

.'115

References:

NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7.

Effect: Possible confusion by hearing impaired individuals of the emergency situation.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the card for the hearing impaired individuals replace the statement "There is an Alert at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station"- with the following statement "There has been an incident at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station."

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the'identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

New materials have been developed and additional copies will be provided to the Briar Creek Township Emergency Management Agency. Copies will be available for their use within the allotted 120 days. Please refer to Attachment F. Delivery of the materials to the Briar Creek EMA will occur no later than December 31, 2006.

Reference 9 Luzerne Count Emeigehcy Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-5.b.1-P-06 Condition: The Luzere :County pre-rimade media kit and the emergency information section of the local telephone directory (blue pages) do not include information regarding the use of potassium iodide (KI) by the general public.

Possible Cause: The emergency inform'ati6n' sectionbof the telephone directory has not been updated to include information regarding the use of potassium iodide by~the general public.

Pre-made media kits with-additional' enmergency information were available for media representatives. The media kits inchide' informfation regarding evacuation (e'g. transportation, special needs, pets, what to take with you when evacuating, etc); however, they have not been updated to iticlude information regarding distribution ot use of KItby the evacuating public.

References:

NUREG-0654, G.1; G.5; Luzerne County Media Kit; Emergency Information Section of Luzerne County telephone directory(ies),

Effect: Public confusion regarding the use of KI could easily,.arise due to unavailability of information. Public Inquiry phone lines may be inundated with calls requesting information about KI. Including KI information in phone directories and medial kits may preclude this.

Recommendation:'Update'the media kit and telephone directory: to include appropriate information' re'gardinig distributionand use of potassium iodide for the general, public..

116

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency has provided suggested language to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Emergency Planning Personnel and the other Nuclear Utilities statewide, for the, update of their Public Emergency Information Materials including the telephone directories. Telephone directories are updated on a variety of schedules depending upon the telephone company and their telephone book vendors. Every effort is being made to have the KI :information for the general public appear in the next publication of the telephone.

directories.

Reference 10 Salem Township Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-1.b.1-P-07 Condition: The Salem Township Emergency Operations Center (STEOC) was movedto' 'a new location in 2005. This exercise was the first graded, exercise at the current..facility. Although the facility proved adequate to support the exercise, it is not the facility described in the Salem Township Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (STLCRERP.)..-

Possible Cause: The STLCRERP. was not updated.to include the. new facility location.,

Reference:

NUREG-0654, H.3.

Effect:. Emergency response personnelmight report to the wrong location.

Recommendation: Update theplan to reflect the current location.

Response: Please.accept~the following response regarding:thejidentified Planning Issue....

CorrectiveAction, and add this-statement to the Final Report The Salem Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan will be, updated during the next review cycle.

Reference 11 I Northumberland County Reception Center Issue No.: 63-06-6.a.1-P-08.

Condition: The Northumberland County EmergencyManagement Agency Nuclear/Radiological Incident Plan Appendix 3 page E-3-2, D., 2). b incorrectly idenrtifies Northumberland, County as

.117

6 having Reception and Mass care centers co-located. Strip maps were actually provided and the only error occurs in the plan and not in actual operations Possible Cause: Clerical error

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.h; K.5.b.

Effect: Untrained personnel could fail to provide strip maps.

Recommendation: Remove this sentence from the plan or move the Reception Center to the Mass Care Center and make the necessary plan changes.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action;and add this statement to the Final Report.

The Northumberland County Radiological Emergency Response Plan has been revised.* The cited area has been corrected.

Referenice.12 Berwick School District Issue No.: 63-03-3.c.2-P-09 Condition:.The-current radiological emergency response plan for the Berwick School District does not include formal procedures forpotassium iodide (KI),usage including :storage,.,

authorization, administration, and associated procedures.

Possible Cause: Failure:to'correctly. update and maintain plans and procedures.

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g, e.

Effect: The school provides KI to all students located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. With no formalized'instructions, or procedures located' in the emergency plan for its..,

authorization or administration, officials may have opted to order the administration of KI to students at an inappropriate time (i.e., before authorization by the proper State Health Department official). Also, because there is risk-benefit considerations involved with the ingestion of KI, a number of persons may have suffered side effects without sufficient or proper justification.

Recommendation: Update the radiological response plan to include specific procedures for KI storage, authorization, associated documentation, and other factors pertaining to KI usage by students and 'taff of the school district.

!118

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report..

The Berwick Area School District has been provided with "Appendix E - KI School Plan" for inclusion within their School District Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Reference 13 Columbia-Montour Area Vocational Technical School Issue No.: 63-06-3.c.2-P-10 Condition: The plan has not been reviewed and updated. The Business Managerjis now.Child Accounting/Transportation Specialist. All students now go ýfrom the Home Room' to.jhe Gymnasium where those that live outside the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are dismissed, instead of being dismissed from the Home Room. The numberof students-living in the EPZ needs to be updated with the Transportation Contractors.

Possible Cause: The Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Columbia-Montour Area Vocational Technical School for Incidents at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, page 3,,

section V, Policy Guidelines, paragraph D, states that the. "Administrative Director will provide for periodic (at least annually) updating of this plan".

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g.

Effect: Since the plan is not current. and titles and responsibilities may have changed,: new EOC staff, using outdated plans, and procedures may take incorrect action.,!

Recommendation: Review and update plan as require&.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

The Principal of the Columbia Montour Area VoTech School has been informed of the requirement to:update the plan and. to furnish copies to the -ColumbiaCounty Emergency..

Management Agency and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.

Reference 14 Greater Nanticoke Area School-District Issue No.: 69-06-3.c.2-P-11 Condition: The current radiological emergency response plan, for. the'Greater Nanticoke Area School District does not include formal procedures for potassium iodide (KI) usage including storage, authorization, administration, and associated procedures

'11.9

0 Possible Cause: Failure to correctly update and maintain plans and procedures.

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g,e.

Effect: The school provides KI to all students located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. With no formalized instructions or procedures located in the emergency plan for its authorization~or administration, officials may have opted to order the administration of KI to students at aný inappropriate time (i.e., before authorization by the proper State Health Depaftmentbfficiil). Also, because thereis risk-beriefit considerations involved with the ingestion of KI, a number of persons may have suffered side effects without sufficient or proper justification.

Recommendation: Update the radiological response plan to include specific procedures for KI storage, authorization, associated documentation, and other factors pertaining to KI usage by students and staff of the school district.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue:

Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

Greater Naditico'ke Area SchoolDistrict has been'pro Vided with "Appeidix E -'KI School Plan" for inclusion within'theitrSchool DistricttRadiological Emergency ResponsePlan.

Reference 15 North West Area School District Issue No.: 63-06-3.c.21-P142 Condition: The current radio logical 6mergency response plan,fcr the North West Area School District does not'include formal procedures for potassiumriodide* (KI) usage including storage, authorization, administration, and associated procedures Possible Cause: Failure to correctly update and maintain plans and procedures.

6

References:

NUREG-0654, J.A0.c, d&g, e.

Effect: The school provides KI to all students located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. With no formalized instructions or procedures located in the emergency plan for its authorization or administration, officials may have opted to order the administration of KI to students at an inappropriate time (i.e., before authorization by the proper State Health Department official). Also, because there, is risk-benefit considerations involved with the ingestion of KI, a number of persons may have suffered side effects without sufficientor proper justification.

.120

Recommendation: Update the radiological response plan to include specific procedures for KI storage, authorization, associated documentation, and other factors pertaining to KI usage by students and staff of the school district.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.,

The Northwest Area School District has been most cooperative. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency has provided the District' with a revised draft Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The Superintendent has provided a. statement regarding the status and the actions of the School District.

Reference.16 North West Area School District Issue No.: 63-06-3.c.2-P-13 Condition: The current Plan (Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Northwest Area School District for Incidents at-the.Susquehanna Steam Electric, Station,; dated November2001).

is outdated, with respect,to., approval signature; current numbers of students and, staff, and day care procedures.

Possible Cause: Lack of annual update.

References:

NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g.

Effect: Operating from an outdated procedure could result in incorrect decisions by the.staff.

Recommendation: Updatethe Plan. signed by thecurrent respopnsible official, provide current.

numbers rof students and,staff, and provide procedure applicable to day-care centers.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the, Final Report.

The Northwest Area School District has been most cooperative. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency has provided the District with a revised draft Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The Superintendent has provided a statement regarding the status and the actions of the School District.

Reference 17 Luzerne County:,,

Issue No.: 63-04-5.a.1-P-04 121

0 Condition: Route Alerting (Route #3) for Nanticoke City took approximately 1 1/2 hours to complete.

Reason Unresolved: Nanticoke City was not scheduled for demonstration at this exercise.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

The Luzerne County EMA has indicated that they will work with the Nanticoke City EMA to review the Route Alert Sectors and based upon the analysis, the City may need to further divide the area into smaller and more manageable sectors.

Reference 18 UNRESOLVED PLANNING ISSUE Accident Assessment Center (Bureau of Radiation Protection)

Issue Number: 63-04-2.a.1-P-02 Condition: The Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) Plan, BRP-ER-7.3.2.2, Rev. 1, 07/04, page 5, KI Administration, states, "BRP will recommend to DOH that KI be administered to the general public, emergency workers and special groups when a General Emergency is declared...

or a projected child thyroid dose of> 5 rem CDE." In contrast, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Plan, Appendix 5, Annex E, Section 6-C page E-5-5, Radiological Exposure Control, states, "KI should be taken only on the advice of the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health. The projected dose that triggers this advice is 25.0 Rem CDE to the adult thyroid." Also, in Appendix 5, Annex E, Section 3-B Pennsylvania Department of Health Policies on KI, pages E-5-38 and E-5-39, states, "Dose projection criterion [for recommending KI to emergency workers] is 25.0 rem CDE adult thyroid.

Reason Unresolved: Issue is still unresolved.

There have been no changes to either the BRP procedures or the State Plans. The Directors of the BRP, Health and PEMA have yet to agree on the resolution.

During the exercise the BRP used their procedures to make a recommendation for the ingestion of KI to the Health Department. The decision for the ingestion of KI was made when it was projected that the dose to the adult thyroid was 17 Rem CDE at 2 miles.

Response: Please accept the following response regarding the identified Planning Issue Corrective Action, and add this statement to the Final Report.

Significant efforts are underway for the conversion of the current State Radiological Emergency Response to Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, "Annex-E" to the National Plan format. With the advent of the National Response Plan and HSPD-5, The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has

.122

developed and the Governor has promulgated the State Emergency Operations Plan dated May 2005 which is based upon the NRP format. As such, the Commonwealth is developing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Nuclear / Radiological "Incident Specific Plan" to the May 2005 SEOP. The Bureau of Radiation Protection Nuclear Power Station Plan with revisions dated 3/06 supersedes the information contained within the 2002 version of "Annex-E".

.123

/0 APPENDIX 4:

Exercise Scenario This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) during the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) exercise on October 21, 2008.

The exercise scenario was submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The scenario was approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III on September 3, 2008.

The summary presented in this appendix is a compilation of exercisei scenario materials submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania Power and Light. Events at the plant site that are not pertinent.to the ORO response have been.omitted.

,Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Exercise. Scenario October 21, 2008 The scenario starts with SSES Unit I at 100% power. Unit 2 is also at 100% power. Routine work is in progress in both units.

Ul turnover items:.

1. "B" -Turbine Building Chiller is out of service.

.2. Reactor Coolant Injection Cooling quarterly surveillance will be conducted some time during this shift.

3. Containment nitrogen usage has increased slightly. A Containment Instrument Gas investigation is in progress U2 turnover items:

1. System Engineering.is:pursuing resolution of the Electric Hydraulic Control standby pump auto-start issue.

Common turnover items:..,

1. "E" Diesel Generator has been substituted for the "C" Diesel Generator for "C" diesel overhaul. The "E" diesel is running for the supervising operator.

.124

The scenario begins with a fire in the "E" diesel generator building.

A fire is detected in the "E" diesel bay. In the control room, both fire detections and fire suppression alarms are received. The Field Unit Supervisor/Fire Brigade Leader is dispatched to investigate. They report that a fire is burning at the "E" diesel itself. (A fuel oil leak has sprayed onto the diesel exhaust piping, igniting the fuel oil.) The fire brigade begins efforts to extinguish the fire, and a request for offsite fire fightingassistance is simulated' Other than the fire brigade leader, the fire brigade actions will be simulated.

As a result of the fire, an Alert is declared per EAL OA-6 and the required offsite notifications are made: In addition, the Nuclear Emergency Response Organization (NERO) is activated.

The fire is extinguished before the requested offsite assistance arrives. Investigations are begun to asses the damage resulting from the fire and to determine if the "C" diesel can be restored to service. The Pennsylvania Poweri-and Light Emergency Response facilities are staffed.

Later, the main turbine trips as Aa result of a load reject. The reactor scrams,, but many of the' control rods do not insert. The Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) power level exceeds 5% power and the Alternate Rod Insertion system does not succeed in terminating the ATWS (hydraulic ATWS). The Stand-By Liquid Control system injects boron to the reactor vessel. Manual control rod insertion is in progress, and reactor water level is lowered to reduce reactor power level. No fuel damage hýis occurred and, themain cofidenser remains available as a heat sink. Condensate/Feedwater is being used for Reactor inventory control.

Because of the ATWS condition, a Site Area Emergency is declared per EAL MS-3 and the required offsite notifications are made.

Assembly and accountability will be conducted for this exercise.

The Operations Support Center should dispatch the "0" team and request that a coolant sample be collected to identify extent of any potential fuel damage. (Note: actual valve manipulations and the drawing of a coolant sample will be*:Isimrulated.) C6olant sample :results 'will be provided to Emergency Operations Facility(EOF) engineering personnel-for use in'evaluating the extent of fuel damage. Offsite monitoring teams are dispatched from the EOF.

Later, a steam leak develops in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pumpiroom.*This leak raises HPCI room temperature to above the HPCI isolation set point. The HPCI steam supply isolation valves both fail to close and the HPCI room blow out panel opens. The transient associated with this steam leak produces about 2% fuel cladding damage. Offsite dose projection calculations indicate that the criteria for a General Emergency declaration Ihave beeni met.

A General Emergency will be declared per EAL RG-1 or FG-l and the required offsite notifications and Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) will be made. The reactor will: be, rapidly depressurized to reduce the driving force for the steam leak.

.125

0 Reactor Building and Turbine Building ARM readings are provided throughout the event, as are Split Particulate Noble Iodine Gas readings. All of these :data sources are used to asses the ongoing event and to project offsite doses.

The release to the environment will exceed the requirements for a General Emergency. Field Teams and remote Monitoring System data confirms the increased radioactive release rate. The plume will, extend from the plant in the down wind direction. Exercise participants will be permitted to achieve success in isolating the HPCI steam leak.

Expected NERO priorities:

• Extinguish the fire/assess, damage/recover the "C" diesel generator

• Achieve shutdown (Alternate Rod Insertion,/ Stand-by'Liquid Control/Manual control rod insertion)

" Isolate the HPCI steam leak

" Assess offsite consequences,

• Depressurize the reactor' When all. qbjectives for the exercise have been met, the Lead Controller will terminate the drill.

Critiques will then be held in each emergency response facility.,.

126 61

Exercise Timeline:

The following is a short version of the timeline for the 2008 SSES Biennial Exercise. This timeline identifies the approximate times the Performance-Indicator evaluations will*occur. This scenario is being run live from the simulator; all times are subject to change.

TIME.

'EVENT (approximate) 1700 Plant public address announcement starting the drill 1710 Fire alarm(s) are received in the control room (simulator) 1725 An Alert is declared per EAL OA-6 (PI opportunity) 1730 NERO is activated 1740 Offsitenotifications for theAlert are made (PI opportunity) 1755 The fire at the "E" diesel is extinguished 1825 The TSC takes control of the emergency 1845 An ATWS occurs 1855 The EOF is ready to take control of the emergency 1900 A Site Area Emergency is declared per EAL MS-3.(PI',opportunity):

1915 Offsite notifications for the Site Area Emergency are made (PI opportunity).

1945 A steam leak develops in.the HPCI room 1953 HPCI fails to isolate 2001 HPCI blow out panel opens 2012 Dose projection calculations indicate doses above a Projective Action Guideline at the Emergency Planning Boundary 2020 The reactor is rapidly depressurized 2027 A General Emergency is declared per EAL RG-1 or FG-1 (PI opportunity) 2035 Offsite notifications for the General Emergency are made (PI opportunity) 2035 A PAR is provided to the senior state official (PI opportunity) 2105 HPCI steam leak is isolated 2200 The exercise is terminated 127

6 APPENDIX,5:

Planning Issues This appendix contains the Planning Issues assessed during the October 21, 2008 exercise at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) and those outstanding from earlier exercises.

Planning Issues are issues identified in an exercise or drill that do not involve participant performance, but, rather involve inadequacies in the plan or procedures. Planning Issues are required to be corrected though the revision and update of the appropriate State and local radiological emergency responseplans (RERPs) and/or procedures in accordance with the following schedule:

Within 120 days of the date of the exercise/drill when the Planning Issue is directly related to protection of the public health and safety.

s Duringthe annual plan review and update (reported in the Annual Letter of Certification) when ifie. Planning Issue does not directly. affect thepublic he'lth and safety. However, whe th lann I su doe not diecl afettepubli halthadsft.Hwvr when the date for the annual plan review and update is imminent and the responsible organization does not have sufficient time to make the necessary revisions in the plans and/or procedures, the revised portion of the plans. and/or proceduresshould be submitted in the subsequent annual plan review and update and reported in the Annual Letter of Certification...

Any requirement for ad.ditional training of responders to radiological emergencies necessitated by the revision and update of the plans and/or procedures must be completed within the timeframes described above in order for, the Planning Issue to be considered resolved.

NEW PLANNING ISSUES NuangolaBorough Emergency Operations Center Issue Number: 63-08-3.d.1-P-01 Condition: The Nuangola Borough EmergencyManagement Coordinator (EMC) identified an error in the Police Services Officers Standard Operating Procedure (SOP-D). The Traffic Control Points (TCP), identified in Attachment D-3, page 6 of 9, are not located within Nuangola Borough. The EMC stated the correct TCPs were located on the borough map displayed on the Emergency, Operations Center (EOC) wall. The agencies assigned to control the flow of trafficat athe TCPs were identified on another wall display.

Possible'Cause:Verification of information provided during.revision of the SOPs may not include a peer review by the Borough EMC.

4128

Reference:

NUREG-0654, J. 1O.g, j Effect: Dispatch of police for traffic control operations could delay the flow of traffic during evacuation prior to staffing correct TCPs.

Recommendation: Prior to distribution of the plans and SOPs to the municipality, the Licensee should verify information with the Borough EMC.

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees with the above reconmendation. These procedures are scheduled for comprehensive review and subsequent revision by the utility during the 2009 calendar year and will be utilized during the next 'scheduled biennial exercise.

Sugarloaf Township Emergency Operations Center Issue Number: 63-08-1.b.1-P-02 Condition: The Sugarloaf Township EOC was relocated two months prior to this exercise. However, the address and floor plan for the Sugarloaf Tovvnship Emergency Operations Center (EOC) are incorrect.

Possible Cause: The plan was 'not updated.'

References:

Sugarloaf Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan Emergency Operations Plan (EOP),Section IV (c), page 2 - address for the EOC; EOP,Attachment A-4, page 11.

floor plan'f6r the EOC is incorrect.

Effect: This could result in delayed activation and delivery of infofination-.-..

Recommendation: Review and update all applicable portions of the plan.

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees with the above recommendation. These procedures are scheduled for comprehensive rev'iew and subsequent revision during the 2009 calendar year and will be utilized during the next scheduled biennial exercise.

Sugarloaf Township Emergency Operations Center Issue Number: 637081.e.1-P-03 Condition: Not all sections of the Sugarloaf Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) have been updated to indicate that dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI) is pre-distributed to the townshipý Portions of the RERP, SOP-I still indicate that dosimetry and KI will be delivered by the Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center toSugarloaf' r

wnship at the Alert stage,

.129

0 and the checklist for the Radiological Officer indicates that acknowledgement of receipt is required.

Possible Cause: Not all portions of the RERP were updated when this procedure was modified.

Reference:

Sugarloaf Township RERP, SOP-I, pages 2 and 8

-Effect: None Recommendation: Review and update all applicable portions 0of the plan.

ý.Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealthagrees-with the above recommendation. These procedures are scheduled for comprehensive review and subsequent revision during the 2009 calendar year and will be utilized during the next scheduled biennial exercise.

Columbia County Issue Number: 63-08-3.c.2-P-04 Condition: The: Columbia County RERP;,Change 6, 2008 in Appendix 14,

.. AttachrfientB indicates theHost School for the Salem Elementary School as being the Mahoney-Cooper Elemehtary. School. The correct listing should be the Liberty Valley Elementary School, which is reflected in theBerwick School District's plans.!

Possible Cause:-Change.'was made a few years ago, and this portion of the

'"Columbia County Plan was-not changed to:reflect this.

Reference:

NUREG-0.654, P.4

.Effect: Possible confusion at Columbia County EOC about. location of host school for, the SalemElementary School..

Recommendation: Update Columbia County RERP in Appendix 14, Attachment B to reflect~current host school.

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees with the above recommendation. These procedures are scheduled for comprehensive review and subsequent revision during the 2009 calendar year and will be utilized during the next scheduled biennial exercise.

130 6

Luzerne County Issue Number: 63-08-3.c.2-P-05 Condition: There is a discrepancy between the Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), Appendix 14, "School Services," and the Hazleton Area School District (HASD) Emergency Plan, Annex L, "Evacuation."

The Luzerne County RERP, Attachment A indicates there are a total of 1,200 evacuees from the entire school district, all of whom would be.evacuated to McAdoo-Kelayres Elementary School, according to Attachment B. Annex L of the HASD plan indicates that there are 811 evacuees who wouldbe evacuated from Drums Elementary School to Freeland Elementary Middle School, and 1,157 evacuees who would be evacuatedlfrom Valley Elementary Middle School to McAdoo-Kelayres;Elementary School.

Possible Cause: The Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), Appendix 14, "School Services" has not been updated to include the most recent information.

References:

NUREG-0654 J.10.d Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Appendix 14, "School Services"..

Hazleton Area School District Emergency Plan; Annex L, "Evacuation".

Effect: Parents and guardians of students might have beenprovided inconsistent or incorrect, information about the host schools where they could pick-up their children if the Luzerne County Public Information Officer-(PIO) used the information in the. Luizerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Recommendation: The Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Appendix 14, "School Services" and, if necessary, the Hazleton Area School District;Emergency.Plan, Annex L, "Evacuation" should be revised to insure that information about the number of evacuees.and the designated host schools are correct and consistent.

Commonwealth Response: The Commonwealth agrees. with the above recommendation. These procedures are scheduled for comprehensive review and subsequent revision during the 2009 calenda.ryear and will. be utilized during the next scheduled biennial exercise.

131

a PRIOR PLANNING ISSUES RESOLVED State Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-5.b.1-P-01 Condition: The Columbia and Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plans do not include information in appropriate procedural sections regarding the distribution and use of KI for the general public.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Columbia and Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency Radiodlogical Emn(rgency Response Plan 2008, Revision 1, Appendix 13, paragraph 6.C (5) has been revised to reflect how KI willbe made'availableto the general public.

Columbia County Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-5.b.1-P-02' Condition: The Columbia County emergencyirnformation section, of the local telephone directory (blue pages) does not include information regarding the use of potassium iodid6 (KI) bygthe general publi' Cotrrective' Ation Demionstrated:'The Pennsylvania EEmergency"Management Agency has pr'6vided suggested language to the Susquehanma Steam Electric Staii6n'Emiergency'Pfaniing Personnel and the otheirNuclear Utilities statewide, for the update of their Public Emergency'Information Materials including the telephone directories. Telephone directories are updated on a variety of schedules dependihng upon'the'telephone company and their telephone b6ok vendors. Every

-effort is being mnadeto have the KI information for the general public appear in the next publication of the telephone directories.

Luzerne County Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-5.b.1-P-03 Condition: The Luzerne County pre-made media kit and the emergency informafion*section of the' local telephone directory (blue pages) do not include iniformation-regardinig the use of potassium iodide (KI) by'the general public.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Luzerne County Emergency Mahagement Agency included in the emergenicy.informationsebtion of the local telephone directory (bIue pages), the appropriate informationfor the general public, regarding theue of potassium iodide (KI); In,.addition, Luzerne County pre-made media kits now include a one page information sheet addressing the use 132

of KI for the general public and will address its distribution to the general public in future media briefings.

Salem Township Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: 63-06-1.b.1-P-04 Condition: The Salem Township Emergency Operations Center (STEOC) was moved to a new location in 2005. This exercise was the first graded exercise at the current facility. Although the facility proved adequate to support the exercise, it is not the facility described in the Salem Township ýLuzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (STLCRERP).

Corrective, Action Demonstrated;: The Salem Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan has been updated during to reflect the correct location of the STEOC.

Columbia-Montour County Area Vocational Technical School, Issue No.:,63-06-3.c.2-P-05 Condition: The plan has not been reviewed and updated. The Business Manager is now Child Accounting/Transportation Specialist. All students now go from the Home Room to the Gymnasium where those that live outside the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are dismissed, instead of being dismissed from the Home

..:Room. The number of students. living in the EPZ needs lto be updated with the Transportation Contractors.

State Response: The Columbia Montour Area Vo-Tech School has updated the plan and furnished copies to the Columbia;County Emergency Management Agency.

North West Area School District Issue Number: 63-06-3.c.2-P-06

.Condition: The current Plan (Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Northwest Area School District for Incidents at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, dated November 2001). is outdated, with respect to approval signature, current numbers of students and staff, and day care procedures.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Northwest Area School District has adopted a revised Emergency Response: Plan which incorporates up to date signatures, current student and staff populations,, :and procedures. for alerting local day care. centers..

133

PRIOR PLANNING ISSUES UNRESOLVED Luzerne County Issue No.: 63-04-5.a.1-P-04 (Extent-of-Play Reference 17)

Condition: Route Alerting (Route #3) for Nanticoke City took approximately 1 1/2 hours to complete.

Reason Unresolved: Nanticoke City was not scheduled for demonstration at this exercise. The Luzerne County EMA has indicated that they will work with the Nanticoke City EMA to review the Route Alert Sectors and based upon the analysis, the City may need to further divide the area into smaller and more manageable sectors.

Accident Assessment Center (Bureau of Radiation Protection)

Issue Number: 63-04-2.a.1-P-02 (Extent-of-Play Reference 18)

Condition: The Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) Plan, BRP-ER-7.3.2.2, Rev. 1, 07/04, page 5, KI Administration, states, "BRP will recommend to DOH, that KI be administered to the general public, emergency workers and special groups when a General Emergency is declared...

or a projected child thyroid dose of > 5 rem CDE." In contrast, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Plan, Appendix 5, Annex E, Section 6-C page E-5-5, Radiological Exposure Control, states, "KI should be taken only on the advice of the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health. The projected dose that triggers this advice is 25.0 Rem CDE to the adult thyroid." Also, in Appendix 5, Annex E, Section 3-B Pennsylvania Department of Health Policies on KI, pages E-5-38 and E-5-39, states, "Dose projection criterion [for recommending KI to emergency workers] is 25.0 rem CDE adult thyroid.

Reason Issue Unresolved: The current Annex E is dated March 2002 and is undergoing review and revision to make it consistent with the new National Response Plan format as used in the Interim Change to the Emergency Operations Plan dated January 2008. For this reason Appendix 5 to Annex E has not changed.

However in order to address the Issue 63-04-2.a. 1.P-02 the PEMA Bureau of Plans issued a letter to Darrell Hammons FEMA Region III dated April 16, 2007.

The letter states that operationally the governing document on criteria used to make the decision on KI is the BRP Plan and procedure BRP-ER-7.3.2.2, Rev 1, 07/04. The BRP will recommend the ingestion of KI to the Secretary of Health when the criterion in the BRP procedure is satisfied. The Secretary of Health will make the decision. This procedure was demonstrated during the SSES exercise on 134

October 21, 2008. The Bureau of Plans has indicated that when Annex E, Appendix 5 is revised it will be consistent with-the BRP procedure,

-135