ML090300240

Meeting Agenda on Oconee Regulatory Conference

ML090300240
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Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	01/29/2009
From:	NRC/RGN-II/DCI
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ML090300220	List: ML090300225 ML090300240 ML090300249
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OCONEE REGULATORY CONFERENCE JANUARY 22, 2009 UNIT 1 DRAINDOWN EVENT ON APRIL 15, 2008 Enclosure 2

AGENDA OPEN REGULATORY CONFERENCE OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION January 22, 2009 NRC REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GA.

I. OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING INTENT Mr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator II. NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICY Mr. L. Wert, Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVES Mr. L. Wert, Division Director, DRP IV.

SUMMARY

OF IDENTIFIED FINDING Mr. L. Wert, Division Director, DRP V. LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION VI. LICENSEE RESPONSE TO IDENTIFIED FINDING VII. BREAK/NRC CAUCUS Mr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator VIII. CLOSING REMARKS Mr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator Enclosure 2

Identified Performance Deficiency/Finding The Performance Deficiency/Finding concerns a failure to implement a main generator automatic voltage regulator (AVR) maintenance procedure that met the standards/ expectations of Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 703, Administrative Instructions for Technical Procedures, to achieve the intended purpose by being technically accurate, safe, and complete. More specifically, AVR maintenance procedure IP/0/B/2005/001, Main Generator Automatic Voltage Regulator Maintenance and Channel Transfer, failed to identify and electrically isolate all AVR trip outputs to the main generator lockout relays. Consequently, during AVR maintenance in Unit 1 on April 15, 2008, a main generator lockout occurred, resulting in a loss of power event that ultimately led to a loss of RCS inventory (70 inches to 54 inches on LT-5) while in Mode 6 (reactor head closure bolts de-tensioned) on decay heat removal. As such, this event challenged the safety function of inventory control.

In addition to the above inadequacy, the AVR procedure was also not coded to prevent it from being performed during even higher risk periods of reduced inventory, as had been the case from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (12.5 inches on LT-5) to six hours (23 inches on LT-5) prior to the actual event.

Considering the aforementioned inadequacies and the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, the associated Finding (i.e., Failure to Implement an Adequate AVR Maintenance Procedure), is considered to have a cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures H.2(c), as described in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area.

Note: The Performance Deficiency/Finding (including its significance) discussed at this Regulatory Conference is subject to further review and change prior to any resulting agency action. Enclosure 2

OCONEE REGULATORY CONFERENCE JANUARY 22, 2009 UNIT 1 DRAINDOWN EVENT ON APRIL 15, 2008 Enclosure 2