ML082960801

Ltr. to Elmo E. Collins, Dated 10-14-2008, from FEMA Region 6, Denton, Texas, Copy of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Final Report to STP Plume Pathway Exercise Evaluated on 7-23-2008

ML082960801
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	10/14/2008
From:	Peterson W US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Collins E Region 4 Administrator
References
Download: ML082960801 (36)

Text

U.S. Department of Homeland Security FEMA Region 6 800 North looo 288 Denton, TX 7k209-3698 FEMA October 14,2008 Mr. Elmo E. Collins, Jr.

Regional Administrator, U.S. NRC, Region IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 760 1 1-4005

Dear Mr. Collins:

Enclosed is a copy of the radiological emergency preparedness final report for South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STP) Plume Pathway exercise evaluated on July 23,2008.

There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) and no Planning Issues identified during the plume exercise. Therefore, based on the results of this exercise, the off-site radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Texas and the affected local jurisdictions are deemed adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, 44 CFR Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Texas site-specific to STP will remain in effect.

A copy of this report was mailed to the Document Control Desk at NRC Headquarters. Should you have questions, please contact Lisa Hammond, Regional Assistance Committee Chair, at (940)898-5 199, or Nan Calhoun, Texas Site Specialist, at (940)898-5398.

Sinckrel y, william Peterson Regional Administrator Enclosure cc: GDEM-Johnna Cantrell GDEM-Jim Ogden DSHS-RCP-Bob Free DSHS-RCP-Rae Walker STPEGS-R. Leo Meier NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk www. fema.gov

South Texas Project Exercise Report - 2008-07-23 Final Report = Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program 2008-1 0-1 4

FEMA Exercise Report South Texas Project Exercise Date: 2008-07-23 Report Date: 2008-08-08 US. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Emergency Management Agency REP Program 800 North Loop 288 Denton, TX 76209

Table of Contents Chapter 1 Executive Summary Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Exercise Overview Section 3.1 EPZ Description Section 3.2 Exercise Participants Section 3.3 Exercise Timeline Chapter 4 Exercise Evaluation and Results Section 4.1 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Section 4.2 Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1 Texas Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1 Governor's Division of Emergency Management-State Operations Center 4.2.1.2 Department of Public Safety, Disaster District Sub-2C Pierce 4.2.1.3 Department of State Health Services, Radiation Control Program -

Headquarters 4.2.1.4 Department of State Health Services - Radiation Control Program at the Emergency Operations Facility 4.2.1.5 Department of State Health Services - Radiation Control Program Field Monitoring Team One 4.2.1.6 Department of State Health Services - Radiation Control Program Field Monitoring Team Two 4.2.1.7 Joint Information Center, Bay City 4.2.2.1 Matagorda County Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point 4.2.2.2 Tidehaven Independent School District 4.2.3.1 EAS Radio Station KMKS 4.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions 4.2.3 Private Jurisdictions Appendices Appendix 1 - Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix 2 - Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Appendix 3 - Exercise Evaluation Areas and Extent of Play Agreement Appendix 4 - Exercise Scenario and Timeline

1. Executive Summary On July 23, 2008, a biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the South Texas Project (STP) located near Wadsworth, Matagorda County, Texas. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS-FEMA), Region VI, evaluated the exercise. The purpose was to assess the level of preparedness of state and local responders to react to a simulated radiological emergency at STP. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the implementation of state and local radiological emergency preparedness plans and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conducted on June 7, 2006. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise to satisfy FEMA rule 44 Code of Federal Regulations 350 requirements for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing to operate the facility was conducted on April 8, 1987. There have been twelve evaluated exercises, including the exercise on July 23, 2008, plus several drills conducted since 1987.

FEMA, Region VI wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the State of Texas, Matagorda County, Bay City, and surrounding jurisdictions who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants was evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final written evaluation of the biennial exercise. All state and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies, no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA), no Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFI), and no Plan Issues identified during this exercise.

2. introduction On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of state and local governments radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on state and local government's participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of state and local government emergency plans, ensuring that the plans meet the federal criteria set forth in NUREG-O654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980)

- Determining whether state and local emergency response plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdiction

- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993), and

- Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies, listed below, serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA:

- U.S.

- U.S.

- U.S.

Department of Commerce Nuclear Regulatory Commission Environmental Protection Agency 2

- US. Department of Energy

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security-FEMA

- US. Department of Transportation

- U.S. Department of Agriculture

- U.S. Department of the Interior

- US. Food and Drug Administration.

The findings presented in this report are based on the federal &3am1s assessment of the participants' response to a simulated radiological incident at the South Texas Project that affected the offsite population. The RAC Chair made the final classification of any issues identified, and FEMA Region VI Regional Administrator approved the report.

The criteria utilized in the evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-06541FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980, and

- Interim REP Program Manual, including the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology (August 2002).

Section Ill of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ),

a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents information on the demonstration of applicable exercise evaluation areas at each jurisdiction or functional entity. If applicable, this section also contains descriptions of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assessed during this exercise and recommended corrective actions, as well as descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the current status of each.

3

3. Exercise Overview This section contains data and basic information relevant to the July 23, 2008, plume exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the South Texas Project (STP). This section of the report includes a description of the emergency planning zone (EPZ), a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the times of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

3.1. EPZ Description The area within a 10-mile radius of the South Texas Project (STP) is located in the State of Texas, entirely within Matagorda County. The plant site is located approximately 14 miles southwest of Bay City and 75 miles southwest of Houston.

There are no incorporated jurisdictions within the IO-mile radius of the facility. The EPZ includes several unincorporated towns and subdivisions. The remainder of the EPZ consists of unincorporated farmland and fields. Industrial facilities within the EPZ include the OxeaEeIanese Chemical Plant, Lyondetl Bassell, and oil or gas pipelines.

Based on the 2000 Census, the total population of the EPZ is 2,875, a decrease from the 1990 census.

The Colorado River runs north to south through the EPZ and forms the eastern boundary of the site. A public wharf, located at the Port of Bay City, 4.8 miles to the north-northeast of the plant, is used for loading and unloading gasoline and diesel oil from barges on the Colorado River. The Burlington NorthernlSanta Fe Railroad runs north to south through the EPZ, about 8 miles east of the plant. The Union Pacific Railroad runs east to west through the northern part of the EPZ, approximately 7 miles from STP. Various railroad spurs run off these rails to support industrial locations. Two state highways are within the EPZ. State Highway 35 forms the northwestern and western boundary of the EPZ. State Highway 60 runs north to south through the EPZ, about 7 miles from STP.

There are three schools within the IO-mile radius. Matagorda Elementary is located 8.5 miles south-southeast of STP. Tidehaven High School and Junior High School are also within the EPZ at 8 to 8.5 miles north-northwest of the plant. FM-521 River Park is located about 3 miles from the plant. Recreational facilities, Riverside Park and Rio Colorado Golf Course, are located 9 miles from the plant. Another recreational area, 4

Matagorda Beach, is about 15 miles south of STP. Evacuation of the beach area is north on State Highway 60, through the EPZ. There are no other public institutions or commercial recreational areas in the EPZ.

The EPZ is divided into 11 zones, based primarily on natural boundaries, for the purpose of emergency response planning and the implementation of protective actions.

3.2. Exercise Participants Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the South Texas Project exercise:

State Jurisdictions Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Control Program Texas Governor's Division of Emergency Management Texas Department of Public Safety, Disaster District Committee Sub-2C Pierce Texas Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol Texas Commission on Environmental Quality Texas Department of Public Works Texas Engineering and Extension Service Texas Department of Agriculture Texas Public Utility Commission Matagorda County Emergency Management Bay City independent School District Matagorda County Hospital District Matagorda County Sheriffs Office Matagorda County Department of Transportation Support Jurisdictions City of Bay City City of Palacios Private Jurisdictions South Texas Project Electric Generating Station American Red Cross EAS Primary Radio Station, KMKS 102.5 United States Coast Guard Risk Jurisdictions Federal Jurisdictions 5

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 st Protective Action Decision:

1 st Siren Activation 1 st EAS or EBS Message 2nd Protective Action Decision:

2nd Siren Activation 2nd EAS or EBS Message 3rd Protective Action Decision:

3rd Siren Activation 3rd EAS or EBS Message KI Administration Decision:

3.3. Exercise Timeline 1036 0857 0858 I039 I040 1019 Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the South Texas Project exercise on July 23, 2008.

1029 I

I Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2008-07-23, SITE: South Texas Project, TX I

I I

I I

I Early Precautionary Actions:

I I

I I

I I

I I

6

4. Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the July 23, 2008 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of state and local governments in the 1 0-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding the South Texas Project.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 80, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25, 2002). Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

4. I.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page, presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions [ARCAs] assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 7

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE: 2008-07-23 SITE: South Texas Project, TX A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met Laboratory operations 4c 1 Emergency Notification and Public Info

,Activation of the prompt alert and notification system Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees

,Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment Temporary care of evacuees Transportation and treatment of contaminated iniured individuals 5al M

M 5a2 5 a3 5bl 6a I 6bl 6c 1 6d I M M 8

4.2. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to demonstration status.

Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which no Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain Unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise evaluation area criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report:

9

A Deficiency is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

An ARCA is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies, ARCAs, and Plan). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies, ARCAs, and Plan issues includes the following

elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-):

Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

Evaluation Area Criterion - A letter and number corresponding to the Evaluation Area criterion.

Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA, and P = Plan).

Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

4.2.1. Texas Jurisdictions 10

4.2. I.

I.

Governor's Division of Emergency Management-State Operations Center

a. MET: l.a.ll l.c.1, l.d.1, l.e.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2. I

.2. Department of Public Safety, Disaster District Sub-2C Pierce

a. MET: l.a.ll l.c.ll l.d.ll 1.e.l.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

e. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.3. Department of State Health Services, Radiation Control Program - Headquarters

a. MET: l.a,ll l.c.1, l.d.1, l.e.llZ.b.l.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.4. Department of State Health Services -

Radiation Control Program at the Emergency Operations Facility 11

a. MET: l.a.1, l.c.1, l.d.1, l.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1 5.

Department of State Health Services -

Radiation Control Program Field Monitoring Team One

a. MET: l.d.1, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.lI4.a.3.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.6. Department of State Health Services -

Radiation Control Program Field Monitoring Team Two

a. MET: l.d.1, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.ll4.a.l, 4.a.3.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.7. Joint Information Center, Bay City

a. MET: l.a.1, l.d.1, l.e.1, 5.b.l.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 12

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2. Risk Jurisdictions 4.2.2. I.

Matagorda County Emergency Operations Center and TraffidAccess Control Point

a. MET: l.a.1, l.b.1, l.c.1, l.d.1, I.el, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.l.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.2. Tidehaven Independent School District

a. MET: 3.a.1, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.3. Private Jurisdictions 4.2.3.1. EAS Radio Station KMKS

a.

b.

C.

d.

e.

f.

MET: 5.a.l.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 13

APPENDIX I ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action EAS Emergency Alert System

, ECL Emergency Classification Level EDRD Electronic Direct Reading Dosimeter EMC Emergency Manaqement Coordinator EMD Emergency Management Director EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPZ Emergency Planning Zone EW Emergency Worker FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FM Facility Manaqer FMT Field Monitoring Team FMTL Field Monitoring Team Leader FTL Field Team Leader GE General Emergency HP Health Physicist ISD Independent School District

,JIC Joint Information Center NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation

.PI0 Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee

?RCP Radiation Control Program

,REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RLO Regional Liaison Officer RO Radiological Officer SA Staging Area SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center

,soc State Operations Center

.SOP Standard Operating Procedure STAMPEDE STEP Special Transportation Evacuation Program STPEGS South Texas Assessment Model Projecting Estimated Dose Evaluation South Texas Proiect Electric Generating Station ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS UHF UPS VFD Ultra High Frequency Uninterruptable Power Source Volunteer Fire Department 14

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS DATE: 2008-07-23, SITE: South Texas Project, TX LOCATION EVALUATOR AGENCY Governors Division of Emergency Management-State

• Shyrlee Fox DHSIFEMA Operations Center RVI Department of Public Safety, Disaster District Sub-2C Pierce DHSlFEMA Department of State Health Services, Radiation Control

• Alan Bevan ICF Program - Headquarters Department of State Health Services - Radiation Contra1 LawrencePLarry ICF Program at the Emergency Operations Facility Harrington Evaluator

• Marynette Hemdon ICF program Field Monitoring Team One Department of State Health Services - Radiation Control

-Program Field Monitoring Team Two Joint Information Center, Bay City

• Bill Bischof DHS/FEMA Elsa Lopez DHSIFEMA Matagorda County Emergency Operations Center and Ernie Boaze ICF TrafWAccess Control Point Scott Flowerday DHSIFEMA Chad Johnston DHSIFEMA Tidehaven Independent School District Ernie Boaze ICF EAS Radio Station KMKS Ernie Boaze ICF

• Linda Gee Department of State Health Services - Radiation Control

• George Brozowski EPA-R6 David Jacobson ICF

• Team Leader 15

Appendix 3 EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.a - Mobilization Criterion l.a.1: Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3,4; E.l, 2; H.4)

Locations:

State Operations Center at Austin (SOC),

Department of Public Safety (DPS) Disaster District Sub-2C Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Pierce (DD Sub-2C),

Department of State Health Services (DSHS) Radiation Control Program (RCP)

Headquarters at Austin, DSHS RCP at South Texas Project (STP) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),

Joint Information Center (JIC), and Matagorda County Emergency Operations Center (MCEOC)

Extent of Play:

e e

e e

e e

e e

e m

DSHS RCP personnel will pre-stage at the RCP staging area in Bay City.

Regardless of the scenario, no facilities/activities will relocate during this exercise.

DSHS Mobile Lab will be located at the staging area but will not be evaluated.

At Site Area or General Emergency, the SOC will notify agencies that comprise the Emergency Management Council. However, only those agencies on the primary notification list will be requested to send representatives to the SOC.

Four (4) Field Monitoring Teams will be deployed for training purposes. Only (2) teams will be evaluated. Drill evaluators may be required to travel in separate vehicles due to space restrictions in DPS vehicles.

Disaster District Committee personnel not stationed at DD Sub-2C EOC may be pre-staged.

To allow for maximum amount of play, DSHS-RCP and JIC staff will pre-stage in the area.

An extra dispatcher will be placed on duty at the Matagorda County Sheriffs office, in Bay City, to handle the regular workload.

Non-local GDEM personnel will be pre-staged in the area.

To facilitate play, the Joint Information Center furnishings may be set up prior to the exercise.

ARCAs: None 16

Appendix 3 Sub-element 1.b - Facilities Criterion l.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG-0654, H.3)

Locations:

Matagorda County Emergency Operations Center (MCEOC)

Extent of Plav: None ACRAs: None Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control Criterion l.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the OR0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG 0654, A.1.d; A. Z.a,b.)

Locations:

SOC, DD Sub-2C EOC, DSHS RCP Headquarters, DSHS RCP at STP EOF, and MCEOC Extent of Plav: None ARCAs: None re rails ble, Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment Criterion l.d.1: At least two communication systems perate properly, communication links are established with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.l, 2)

Locations:

SOC, DD Sub-2C EOC, DSHS RCP Headquarters, JIC, and DSHS RCP at STP EOF, DSHS RCP Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs),

MCEOC, including Traffic Access Control Points (T/ACP) 17 nd

Appendix 3 Extent of Plav:

0 0

A controller phone cell will be established to ensure appropriate communications are accomplished and to ensure fluid exercise play.

Correction on the spot requested, for local agencies.

• ARCAs: None Sub-element 1.e - Eauipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion l.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7,lO; J.

lO.a,b,e; J. 11; K.3.a)

Locations:

SOC, DD Sub-2C EOC, 0

DSHS RCP Headquarters, 0

0 JIC, and MCEOC, including T/ACP DSHS RCP at STP EOF, DSHS RCP Field Monitoring Team (FMTs),

Extent of Plav:

Donning and doffing of anti-contamination clothing will be demonstrated out of sequence by one player, and will not be worn during the exercise.

Equipment not required to demonstrate exercise objectives may be left at the Staging Area to allow for additional space within the vehicles.

Correction on the spot requested, for purposes of dressing out and for local agencies.*

ARCAs: None EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.a - Emervencv Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J. lO.e,f; K.4)

Locations:

MCEOC DSHS RCP at STP EOF and Extent of Play: None 18

Appendix 3 ARCAs: None Sub-eiement 2.b. - RadioloPicaI Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the plume Phase of the EmerPency Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on data from the plant (licensee) or field, plume and dose projected through use of models, and knowledge of on and off-site conditions that may warrant consideration. (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10; Supp.3)

Locations:

DSHS RCP Headquarters or DSHS RCP at STP EOF m:

If STP EOF has been staffed by DSHS RCP at this time, it will be the only facility evaluated for this criterion.

ARCAs: None Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADS) for the general public (including the recommendation for thewe of KI, if OR0 policy). (NUREG 0654, J.9; lO.f,m)

Locations:

MCEOC Extent of Play:

The protective actions that result from this decision-making process will not be implemented. No members of the public will be relocated.

ARCAs: None Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9; J. lO.d,e)

Locations:

MCEOC 19

Appendix 3 Extent of Play:

Protective actions for special needs individuals will be considered at the MCEOC; however, actual demonstration of protective actions will not be performed.

MCEOC staff will demonstrate this criterion through discussion and showing the evaluator a roster of special needs individuals in the 1 0-mile emergency planning zone.

ARCAs: None EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergencv Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, 3.b)

Locations:

0 0

MCEOC, including T/ACP, and BusDriver DSHS RCP at STP EOF, DSHS RCP Field Monitoring Teams, Extent of Play:

Exercise TLD will be used for the exercise. TLDs for real events are packaged in the Emergency Planner box at the staging area. DSHS Emergency Planners can show evaluator real TLDs at staging area.

Correction on the spot requested.

• ARCAs: None Sub-element 3.b Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7.,J. lO.e.,f.)

Implementation of KI Decision Locations:

DSHSatEOF DSHS Field Monitoring Teams MCEOC TACP 20

Appendix 3 Extent of Play:

If the decision is made to have emergency workers ingest KI, actual ingestion of KI will not be done.

The use of KI by the general public is not recommended in the State of Texas, and there are no institutionalized individuals within the STP IO-mile EPZ; therefore, KI will not be issued to the general public or institutionalized individuals.

Distribution and actual ingestion of KI to emergency workers will be simulated by using copies of the Patient Packet insert or copies of the packet to represent actual KI supplies.

Correction on the spot* is requested for the traffic and access control point demonstrations.

ARCAs: None Sub-element 3.c -Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUNC-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c.d.e.g.)

Locations:

MCEOC Extent of Play:

• Contact with facilitieshndividuals will be simulated.

Contact with transportation providers will be demonstrated.

Protective actions for special needs individuals will be considered at the MCEOC, however, actual demonstration of protective actions will not be performed.

Contact with mobility impaired and transportation dependent will be simulated.

ARCAs: None Criterion 3.c.2: The OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools.

(NUREG-0654, J. 1 O.c,d,g.)

Locations:

MCEOC Tidehaven High School Extent of Play A bus driver demonstration will take place during the evaluated exercise. The demonstration will occur at the County EOC out of sequence of the exercise scenario, but during the exercise, at time agreed upon by the MCEOC controller and FEh4A evaluator.

Upon dispatch, the driver will be sent to Tidehaven High School to pick up students (simulated by driving through the Tidehaven parking lot). The driver will then 21

Appendix 3 transport the simulated students to Markham Elementary in Markham TX (simulated by driving through the Markham parking lot).

Correction on the spot requested.*

ARCAs: None Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.g, j)

Locations:

0 MCEOC, including T/ACP Extent of Play:

A controller inject during the exercise will identify one (1) T/ACP location. The controller inject will not interfere with the T/ACP decision-making process. The T/ACP location demonstrated for the exercise will be at Le Tulle Park, West Hwy 35 (3 miles west of downtown).

The demonstration will occur out of sequence of the exercise scenario, but during the exercise, at a time agreed upon by the MCEOC controller and FEMA evaluator.

A law enforcement officer (from the Sheriffs Department) assigned to T/ACP will be evaluated by FEMA.

DSHS RCP Contamination Control Team (CCT) will support Matagorda County at T/ACP but will not be evaluated.

Several simulated evacuees will test the T/ACPs.

Correction on the spot requested.*

ARCAs: None Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.k.)

Locations:

MCEOC Extent of Play:

This criterion will be demonstrated by inject.

No impediment will actually occur, however, the situation and solution will be discussed in the MCEOC.

Correction on the spot requested.*

ARCAs: None 22

Appendix 3 EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analvses Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7,8,9)

Locations:

DSHS RCP FMTs Extent of Play:

Activated charcoal filters will be used in lieu of silver zeolite filters for exercise

'purposes but FMTs will demonstrate availability of silver zeolite filters.

Correction on the spot requested.*

ARCAs: None Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654,1.8,11; J.1O.a; H.12)

Locations:

DSHS RCP at STP EOF Extent of Play: None ARCAs: None Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams should move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sample media. (NUREG0654,1.9)

Locations:

DSHS RCP FMTs Extent of Play:

Correction on the spot requested.*

ARCAs: None 23

Appendix 3 EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification Svstem Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum: 1) identification of the State or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message; 2) identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant; 3) reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and 4) a closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.1V.D; NU-REG, E.5,6,7.)

Locations:

MCEOC,and EAS Radio Station KMKS 102.5 Extent of Play:

Siren and alert radio activation will be simulated.

Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages will be sent to the EAS radio station; however, broadcasts will be simulated.

Route alerting will not be demonstrated.

Rapid Notify (auto dialer) will not be demonstrated.

There are no FEMA approved exception areas.

ARCAs: None Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5,7; G.3.a; G.4.c.)

Locations:

JIC, and MCEOC Extent of Play:

Information will not be provided to the public and/or the media not participating in the exercise.

ARCAs: None 24

Appendix 3 GENERAL EXTENT-OF-PLAY:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

With regard to last minute additions or changes to any previously approved Extent-of-Play, all suggested changes, including decisions due to inclement weather, must be forwarded to the RAC Chair for approval.

As a statement of fact, no OR0 will deliberately deviate from its plans and procedures with the intent of avoiding responsibility.

The exercise may be suspended or terminated due to a real emergency situation.

Draft copies of procedures may be used during the exercise, if the procedure is under revision at the time of the exercise.

• Correction-on-the-spot is defined in the FEMA REP Program Manual at 111-235 and in the FEMA Policy Paper, Strategic Review Steering Committee, Initiative 1.5, Correct Issues immediately, effective March 3 1,2000, signed by Kay C. Goss, CEM, Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and Exercises.

25

6.0 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME -

SEOUENCE OF EVENTS MESSAGE THIS IS A UNIT 1 DEP EXERCISE SCENARIO 0790 htial Conditions - Unit 2 is and has been at 100% Power for 207 days.

Unit 1 is and has been at 100% Power for 250 days. Core bum up is 9,000 MWDIMTU.

Planned Maintenance activities include the Essential Cooling Water

[ECW] Pump 1B 00s for Strainer Inspection Maintenance (Component Cooling Water [CCW] Pump lB, and Essential Chilled Water Pump 1B are all in pull to lock) #12 Standby Diesel Generator [SDG] is in pull to stop. Supplemental Purge is in service for containment pressure control.

Met conditions are as follows: Winds out of the south east (105) at 3 mph and ambient temperature is 75°F.

Refer to Mini-Scenarios No. 1 07:05 The Unit 1 Control Room Simulator receives indications of a 250 gpm leak on the A RCS Loop. Containment sump level begins to increase.

Operators enter procedure OPOPO4-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage and OPSP03-RC-0006, Reactor Coolant Inventory. Normal Letdown is isolated.

Operators initiate a manual reactor trip and safety injection. Operators enter procedure OPOP05-EO-E000, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Operators enter procedure OPOPO~-RA-OOO 1, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response and initiates securing the Containment Supplemental Purge.

When Containment Supplemental Purge is secured, the inside supplemental purge valve (MOV-005) will fail open giving dual indication.

Refer to Mini-Scenario No. 2 07:20 The Unit 1 Control Room Simulator receives Annunciator Alarm RC LOOP 1 FLOW LO RX PRETRP indications of reduced Loop A Flow (FI-0417A) and RCP 1A Motor Amperage decreasing. RCP 1A has suffered a sheared pump shaft. Control Room Simulator also receives a Loose Parts Monitor System Alarm (OPEP02-B-0001, Vibration And Loose Parts Monitoring System Data Collection and Processing).

1 Operators transition into procedure OPOP05-EO-EOl O, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

26

Appendix 1 6.U SCENARIO TIMELINE 0720 08:OO 08: 15

-08120 i)8:30 SEOUENCE OF EVENTS The Emergency Director enters procedure OERPO 1 -ZV-ENOl, Emergency Classification, and declares an ALERT, based on Initiating Condition FAl, EAL-2, RCS PL, RCS Leak Rate-Un-isolable leak exceeding the capacity of one centrifugal charging pump in the normal charging mode.

Initiator Time:

Classification Time:

Classification EAL:

Con troller Information: The 15 minute Emergency Classification evaluation clock begins when the Emergency Director receives indications of an Un-isolable leak exceeding the capacity of one centrifugal charging pump in the normal charging mode.

Upon Public Address Announcement, Security activates the Emergency Notification and Response System (ENRS) in accordance with OERPO1-ZV-INO3. (Scenario ID Code 301, Drill Alert Red Team).

The State and County authorities are notified of the Alert Declaration in accordance with OERPO 1 -ZV-IN02.

State and County Notification Time:

NRC Notification Time:

If reactor pressure reaches 1745 psig, Then Operators may secure safety injection and transition into procedure OPOP03-ZG-0006 Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby and procedure OPOP03-ZG-0007, Plant Cooldown.

The Unit 1 Control Room Simulator receives Annunciator Alarm QDPS ALARM SVCS SUMP LVL,. A plant operator is dispatched to investigate the sump alarm.

If Normal Letdown is reestablished, then the Failed Fuel Radiation Monitor 8039 goes into High Alarm.

As the watch operator approaches the SI pump room, he/she observes water spraying from the 1 C LHSI pump seal.

Refer to Mini-Scenario No. 3 Containment Radiation Monitors (RT 80506 1) indicate greater than 100 Rkr.

27 MESSAGE 2c 3c 4

,4ppendix 4 6.0 SCENAFUO TIMELINE TIME -

08:15 Note 09:oo 09:30 SEOUENCE OF EVENTS The Emergency Director enters procedure OERPOl -ZV-NO 1, Emergency Classification, and declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on Initiating Condition FS 1, EAL-5, Clad Loss, RCB Rad greater than 100 R/hr, EAL-5, RCS Loss, RCB Rad greater than 100 R h Controller Information: The 15 minute Emergency Classification evaluation clock begins when the Emergency Director receives indication that containment radiation levels are greater than 100 R/hr.

Initiator Time:

Classification Time:

Classification EAL:

Upon the announcement of a Site Area Emergency, the Security Manager uses procedure OERPOl -ZV-IN04 to develop a plan for Assembly and Accountability.

TSC Controller safety note: Contact the EOF Controller to ensure the weather is not hazardous for Assembly and Accountability activities. If it is direct the Security Manager to simulate the Assembly and Accountability Public Address Announcement.

The State and County authorities are notified of the Site Area Emergency Declaration in accordance with OERPOl -ZV-M02.

State and County Notification Time:

The Unit 1 Control Room Simulator receives the following indications Breaker 1 G trip which causes ESF E1B 4.16 KV bus lockout. Operators enter procedure OPOP04-~E-0001, First Response to Loss of Any or All 13.8 KV OR 4.16 KV Bus.

Refer to Mini-Scenario No. 4 The "A" loop suffers a large break LOCA. Operators enter procedure OPOP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA.

When the Operators realize "A" Train ECCS water is flowing out the RCS brcak and onto the containment floor they will attempt to transfer from Cold to Hot Leg Recirculation, this will not work due to the failure of "SI MOV-0008A and LHSI MOV-OO19A to change valve positions.

MESSAGE 5c 6

Refer to Mini-Scenario No. 5 Sr 6 28

Appendix 4 6.0 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME 1o:oo 10:07 10:15 11:30 SEOUENCE OF EVENTS MESSAGE Containment Radiation Monitors (RT 8050/5 1) indicate greater than 1,000 Rkr.

The Unit 1 Control Room receives indications that Valve FV-9777 Opened. The radioactive release begins. Containment atmosphere discharges through the Unit Vent to the environment.

Refer to Mini-Scenario No. 7 The Unit 1 RWST low level alarm is received initiating swap over to the Containment Emergency Sumps.

The Emergency Director enters procedure OERPOl-ZV-INO1, Emergency 7c Classification, and declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY based on Initiating Condition FGl, EM-5, Clad Loss, RCB Rad greater than 100 R/hr, E&-5, RCS Loss, RCB Rad greater than 100 R/hr and EAL-5, RCB PL, RCB Rad greater than 1000 Rhr, OR EAL-4, RCB Loss, Containment isolation signal AND Valves not closed AND A pathway to the environment exists. OR EAL-4, RCB PL, Containment Bypass VALID increase in reading on area or ventilation monitors in areas adjacent to the containment boundary with a known LOCA inside containment.

Controller Information: The 15 minute Emergency Classification evaluation clock begins when the Emergency Director receives indication that containment radiation levels are greater than 1000 R/hr.

Offsite Dose Assessment calculations using STAMPEDE result in Protective Action Recommendation of evacuating Five mile radius and 10 miles downwind (Zones 1,2,3,4,5,9, 10, 1 1) Affected Sectors are N, P, Q, R.

Initiator Time:

Classification Time:

Classification E m :

The State and County authorities are notified of the General Emergency Declaration in accordance with OERPOl -ZV-IN02.

State and County Notification Time:

The in-plant repair team is successful in securing FV-9777, and the radioactive release has been terminated. STP and State of Texas offsite field teams continue to monitor and track the plume.

29

Appendix 4 6.0 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 1230 Exercise Terminated MESSAGE 8

30

Appendix 4

5. NARRATWE

SUMMARY

THIS IS A UNIT 1 DEP EXERCISE SCENARIO The given initial conditions are Unit 1 is and has been at 100% Power for 250 days. Core bum up is 9,000 MWD/MTU.

Planned Maintenance activities include the Essential Cooling Water [ECW] Pump 1B 00s for Strainer Inspection & Maintenance, this results in the following equipment being unavailable: Component Cooling Water [CCW] Pump lB, #12 Standby Diesel Generator [SDG], and Essential Chiller 1B [None of this equipment will return to service during the exercise]. Containment Supplemental Purge is in service for pressure control. Station Meteorological Tower indicates winds are out of the southeast (1 05') at 3 mph and ambient temperature is 75°F.

The Control Room receives indications of approximately 250 gpm leak on RCS Loop A. Containment sump level and radiation monitors begin to trend up. Once operators identify the RCS leakrate exceeds 200 gpm and Pressurizer level is lowering they will initiate a manual reactor trip and initiate safety injection.

The Shift Supervisor enters the Emergency Classification procedure and upon recognizing Initial Condition FAI, Any Loss of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) has been met announces himself the Emergency Director and declares an ALERT.

Upon the Control Room public address announcement, the security alarm station officer activates the Emergency Notification and Response System ( E m )

to activate the ERO.

When Containment Supplemental Purge is secured, the inside containment valve (MOV-005) will fail open (or partially open) and its power supply breaker trips. [This valve will remain open for the duration of the exercise due to elevated radiation levels inside containment]

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1A trips due to a sheared pump shaft generating impeller fragments which impact the fuel cladding causing mechanical defects (cracks), approximately 20% of the fuel gap activity is released into the reactor coolant over the course of the exercise. The Loose Parts Monitor System confirms that internal pump components entered the core [causing mechanical damage to the he1 cladding].

The State, County and Nuclear Regulatory Commission contact points are notified of the Alert declaration.

The Emergency Director responsibilities may be transferred to either the Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility once they are activated.

The Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1 C (LHSI) located on the -2 1 ' Elevation of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) develops approximately 20 gpm leak from its seal area. The pump is in reticulating mode with its suction fi-om the Reheling Water Storage Tank (RWST). This will provide a decision point for the ERO to initiate pump repairs.

The continual fuel cladding damage and RCS leak into containment results in radiation levels reaching 100 Rk.

The Emergency Director enters the Emergency Classification procedure and declares a SITE 31

Appendix 4

5. NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

AREA EMERGENCY based on Initiating Condition FSl, Loss of both Fuel Clad and Reactor Coolant System.

Upon the announcement of a Site Area Emergency, the TSC Security Manager develops a plan and implements Protected Area Assembly and Accountability.

The State, County and Nuclear Regulatory Commission contact points are notified of the Emergency Classification change.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Co-location Team arrives at the Joint, Information Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Control Room, and the Technical Support Center.

Indications are received in the Control Room that the Engineered Safety Feature 4.16 KV Bus ElB suffers a breaker failure locking out offsite power [This removes from service High Head Safety Injection Pump lB, Low Head Safety Injection Pump lB, and Containment Spray Pump 1B for the remaining duration of the scenario].

Reactor Coolant System Loop A suffers a large break Loss of Coolant Accident of between 4,000 and 5,000 gpm resulting in containment radiation levels reaching 1,000 R h.

Containment Supplemental Purge Valve FV-9777 located on the outside containment wall opens allowing the contaminated atmosphere to enter the Unit Vent duct work and into the environment initiating a radioactive release.

The Emergency Director enters the Emergency Classification procedure and declares a GENEUL EMERGENCY based on Initiating Condition FG1, Loss of both Fuel Clad and Reactor Coolant System and Potential or Loss of Containment.

Offsite Dose Assessment calculations using STAMPEDE result in Protective Action Recommendation of evacuating Five mile radius and 10 miles downwind.

The State, County and Nuclear Regulatory Commission contact points are notified of the Emergency Classification change and Protective Action Recommendation.

The 4 Train Safety Injection (SI) Pump water is flowing out the Reactor Coolant System pipe break and onto the containment floor. The operators may attempt to transfer A Train SI tiom Cold to Hot Leg Recirculation; this will not work due to the failure of HHSI MOV-0008A and LHSI MOV-OO19A to change valve positions.

The RWST low level alarm is received initiating swap over to the Containment Emergency Sumps. The Fuel Handling Building -2 1 Elevation radiation levels increase The in-plant repair team is successful in closing the Containment Supplemental Purge Valve FV-9777, and the radioactive release is terminated. STP and State of Texas offsite field teams continue to monitor and track the offsite plume.

32