Letter Sequence RAI |
---|
|
Initiation
- Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request
- Acceptance...
- Supplement, Supplement
Results
Other: ML060890398, ML060950574, ML073511698, ML081200606, ML081790538, ML090980515, ML092080216, ML092440479, ML100190011, NRC 2009-0113, Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors (TAC Nos. MC4705/4706), NRC 2011-0010, Plan for Completion of Actions for Generic Letter 2004-02 Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors
|
MONTHYEARML0515202022005-06-0202 June 2005 6/2/05, Turkey Point, RAI, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0515201832005-06-0202 June 2005 Request for Additional Information, Generic Letter 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: RAI ML0515202272005-06-0303 June 2005 6/3/05, Seabrook, RAI, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0603703962006-02-0808 February 2006 RAI, Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0603704382006-02-0808 February 2006 Request for Additional Information Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-basis Accidents at Pressurized-water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0603801332006-02-0909 February 2006 Request for Additional Information Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0603704912006-02-0909 February 2006 RAI - Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0608903982006-04-11011 April 2006 Requested Extension of Completion Schedule for NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors Project stage: Other ML0609505742006-04-13013 April 2006 Approval of GSI-191/GL 2004-02 Extension Request Project stage: Other NRC 2007-0085, Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2007-11-16016 November 2007 Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Request L-2007-155, Request for Extension of Completion Date of the Generic Letter 2004-02 Actions2007-12-0707 December 2007 Request for Extension of Completion Date of the Generic Letter 2004-02 Actions Project stage: Request ML0735116982007-12-20020 December 2007 GSI-191/GL 2004-02 Extension Request Approval (Tac No. MC4705/4706) Project stage: Other L-2008-030, Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2008-02-27027 February 2008 Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Request L-2008-033, Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors.2008-02-28028 February 2008 Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: Request L-2008-073, NRC Generic Letter 2004-02 Request for an Extension to the Completion Date for Ex-Vessel Downstream Effects Evaluations2008-04-14014 April 2008 NRC Generic Letter 2004-02 Request for an Extension to the Completion Date for Ex-Vessel Downstream Effects Evaluations Project stage: Request ML0812006062008-04-29029 April 2008 Approval of Extension Request for GL 2004-02 Project stage: Other NRC 2008-0038, Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Lmpact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2008-06-0909 June 2008 Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Lmpact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Request L-2008-137, Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors.2008-06-30030 June 2008 Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: Request L-2008-138, Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors.2008-06-30030 June 2008 Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: Request ML0817905382008-07-0101 July 2008 Generic Safety Issue 191/Generic Letter 2004-02, Additional Extension Request Approval Project stage: Other ML0826106902008-09-17017 September 2008 Request for Additional Information Related to GL 2004-02 Project stage: RAI ML0826107052008-09-17017 September 2008 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0834400782008-12-19019 December 2008 Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI ML0833806712008-12-22022 December 2008 Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, Request for Additional Information (TAC Mc 4725) Project stage: RAI ML0833001732009-01-0707 January 2009 GSI-191/GL 2004-02 Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI ML0836589782009-01-16016 January 2009 Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI ML0835800232009-01-22022 January 2009 Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, Request for Additional Information Project stage: RAI L-2009-063, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Responses to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2009-03-19019 March 2009 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Responses to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Response to RAI L-2009-062, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Responses to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors.2009-03-19019 March 2009 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Responses to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: Response to RAI NRC 2009-0033, Response to Request for Additional Information GSI-191/GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors2009-04-0707 April 2009 Response to Request for Additional Information GSI-191/GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors Project stage: Response to RAI ML0909805152009-04-0808 April 2009 SONGS - GSI-191 Chemical Effects Project stage: Other L-2009-084, Response to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information2009-04-22022 April 2009 Response to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information Project stage: Request NRC 2009-0053, Request for Extension of Unit 1 and 2 Completion Dates for Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors (TAC MC4705/4706)2009-06-12012 June 2009 Request for Extension of Unit 1 and 2 Completion Dates for Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors (TAC MC4705/4706) Project stage: Request NRC 2009-0059, Response to Request for Additional Information GSI-I91/GL 2004-02 Potential Lmpact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors2009-06-29029 June 2009 Response to Request for Additional Information GSI-I91/GL 2004-02 Potential Lmpact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors Project stage: Response to RAI ML0920802162009-07-27027 July 2009 Notice of Forthcoming Conference Call with Florida Power and Light Concerning Turkey Point Generic Letter 2004-02 Response Project stage: Other L-2009-180, Responses to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information on Generic Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Responses, Dated 02/27/2008 and 06/30/20082009-07-30030 July 2009 Responses to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information on Generic Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Responses, Dated 02/27/2008 and 06/30/2008 Project stage: Supplement NRC 2009-0077, Response to Request for Additional Information GSI-191/GL 2004-02 (TACs MC4705/4706) Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors2009-07-31031 July 2009 Response to Request for Additional Information GSI-191/GL 2004-02 (TACs MC4705/4706) Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors Project stage: Response to RAI ML0924404792009-09-11011 September 2009 Summary of Conference Call with Florida Power & Light, to Discuss Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blackage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactor, Responses Project stage: Other NRC 2009-0113, Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors (TAC Nos. MC4705/4706)2009-10-27027 October 2009 Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors (TAC Nos. MC4705/4706) Project stage: Other ML1001900112010-01-19019 January 2010 Notice of Conference Call with Florida Power & Light Concerning Turkey Point Generic Letter 2004-02 Response Project stage: Other ML1003512132010-02-18018 February 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML1009700022010-04-0909 April 2010 Request for Additional Information, Regarding GL 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI NRC 2010-0046, Supplemental Response for Extension Request for Completion of Actions for Generic Letter 2004-02 Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation Durian Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2010-06-11011 June 2010 Supplemental Response for Extension Request for Completion of Actions for Generic Letter 2004-02 Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation Durian Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Supplement ML1019405202010-07-14014 July 2010 Notice of Conference Call with Florida Power and Light Company to Discuss Draft Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information for Generic Letter 2004-02 Project stage: Draft RAI ML1007407182010-07-28028 July 2010 February 3, 2010, Turkey Point, Unit 3 & 4, Summary of Meeting with Florida Power & Light, on Generic Letter 2004-02 Project stage: Meeting L-2010-205, Responses to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information Dated Feb. 18, 2010 Re Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2010-09-17017 September 2010 Responses to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information Dated Feb. 18, 2010 Re Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Request ML1009903062010-09-22022 September 2010 Request for Additional Information Regarding GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML1025902742010-12-17017 December 2010 Summary of Teleconference Meeting with Florida Power & Light Company, on Generic Letter 2004-02 Project stage: Meeting NRC 2011-0010, Plan for Completion of Actions for Generic Letter 2004-02 Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors2011-02-0404 February 2011 Plan for Completion of Actions for Generic Letter 2004-02 Potential Impact for Debris Blockage in Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Other ML1103502052011-02-0404 February 2011 Forthcoming Public Teleconference with NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, to Discuss Planned Testing for Seabrook Specific Erosion Project stage: Request 2009-01-07
[Table View] |
|
---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/20230102024-01-26026 January 2024 NRC Quadrennial Focused Engineering Inspection (FEI) Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000335/2023010 and 05000389/2023010 L-2024-010, Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)2024-01-25025 January 2024 Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3) IR 05000335/20230042024-01-24024 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023004 and 05000389/2023004 L-2024-004, Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 to 20 Years2024-01-18018 January 2024 Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 to 20 Years L-2024-002, Withdrawal of Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump2024-01-0808 January 2024 Withdrawal of Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump L-2023-173, Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update2023-12-15015 December 2023 Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update L-2023-179, Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Turtle Mortality2023-12-14014 December 2023 Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Turtle Mortality L-2023-168, License Amendment Request Supplement to Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432 Revision 52023-12-12012 December 2023 License Amendment Request Supplement to Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432 Revision 5 L-2023-155, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-06542023-11-28028 November 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, ML23332A1772023-11-28028 November 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-162, Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals2023-11-21021 November 2023 Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals IR 05000335/20230032023-11-0606 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023003 and 05000389/2023003 ML23270B8882023-10-23023 October 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structure, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors EPID L-2022-LLA-0182 ML23346A1322023-10-0606 October 2023 Communication from C-10 Research & Education Foundation Regarding NextEra Common Emergency Fleet Plan License Amendment Request and Related Documents Subsequently Published ML23275A1102023-10-0202 October 2023 License Amendment Request Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432, Revision 5 L-2023-131, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Second Annual Update2023-09-28028 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Second Annual Update L-2023-136, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-26026 September 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-2023-122, Corrections to the 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-09-20020 September 2023 Corrections to the 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report IR 05000335/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000335/2023301 and 05000389/2023301 L-2023-127, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-09-18018 September 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-113, Correction to the 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-09-14014 September 2023 Correction to the 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-2023-108, Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Plant Changes2023-09-11011 September 2023 Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Plant Changes L-2023-118, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-11011 September 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-2023-112, Corrections to the 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-09-0606 September 2023 Corrections to the 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-107, Technical Specification Bases Control Program Periodic Report of Bases Changes TS 6.8.4.j.42023-09-0606 September 2023 Technical Specification Bases Control Program Periodic Report of Bases Changes TS 6.8.4.j.4 ML23219A0042023-09-0101 September 2023 Transmittal Letter - Safety Evaluation Related to the SLRA of St. Lucie Plant, Units 1and 2, Revision 1 L-2023-114, Proposed Turkey Point Units 6 and 7; Seabrook Station; Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Official Service List Update2023-08-17017 August 2023 Proposed Turkey Point Units 6 and 7; Seabrook Station; Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Official Service List Update L-2023-098, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 22023-08-0707 August 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 2 IR 05000335/20230022023-08-0707 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023002 and 05000389/2023002 L-2023-105, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-08-0303 August 2023 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23201A0872023-08-0303 August 2023 Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment ML23212B2652023-07-27027 July 2023 Operator Licensing Written Examination Approval 05000335/2023301 and 05000389/2023301 L-2023-099, Pump Relief Request 10 (PR-10), One-Time Request for an Alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump2023-07-26026 July 2023 Pump Relief Request 10 (PR-10), One-Time Request for an Alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump L-2023-102, Relief Request PSL2-15-RR-01, Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Code Examination Requirements for Reactor Vessel Bottom Area and Piping in Covered Trenches2023-07-26026 July 2023 Relief Request PSL2-15-RR-01, Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Code Examination Requirements for Reactor Vessel Bottom Area and Piping in Covered Trenches ML23200A1232023-07-21021 July 2023 Transmittal Letter for the St. Lucie SLRA Review L-2023-097, Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1 - Supplement 62023-07-13013 July 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1 - Supplement 6 L-2023-076, In-Service Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1)2023-07-11011 July 2023 In-Service Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1) ML23184A0352023-06-30030 June 2023 Notification of St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 Focused Engineering Inspection (FEI) 05000335/2023010 and 05000389/2023010 and Initial Information Request L-2023-087, Florida Power & Light/Nextera Energy, Results of the Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review, March 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A452)2023-06-29029 June 2023 Florida Power & Light/Nextera Energy, Results of the Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review, March 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A452) IR 05000335/20234032023-06-29029 June 2023 Security Inspection Report 05000335/2023403 and 05000389/2023403 IR 05000335/20234022023-06-20020 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2023402 and 05000389/2023402 L-2023-082, Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1, Supplement 52023-06-14014 June 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1, Supplement 5 L-2023-074, Addendum to 2021 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Ctsfsi) Financial Assurance Update2023-06-0202 June 2023 Addendum to 2021 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Ctsfsi) Financial Assurance Update L-2023-071, NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 29 and Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance Program Description for 10 CFR Part 52 Licenses (FPL-2) Revision 11, Annual Submittal2023-05-22022 May 2023 NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 29 and Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance Program Description for 10 CFR Part 52 Licenses (FPL-2) Revision 11, Annual Submittal IR 05000335/20234012023-05-16016 May 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000335/2023401 and 05000389/2023401 (Cover Letter) IR 05000335/20230012023-05-0909 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023001 and 05000389/2023001 ML23109A1132023-04-30030 April 2023 SLRA Change Schedule Letter L-2023-059, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 4 Supplemental Response2023-04-21021 April 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 4 Supplemental Response ML23097A1642023-04-17017 April 2023 Summary of March 23, 2023, Meeting with Florida Power and Light on St. Lucie and Turkey Point Improved Technical Specifications Conversion License Amendment Requests L-2023-055, 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report2023-04-12012 April 2023 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report 2024-01-08
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML23243A9862023-08-31031 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAIs for EP Staff Augmentation Times LAR (L-2022-LLA-0166) ML23226A0762023-08-14014 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 (L-2022-LLA-0182) ML23173A1522023-06-22022 June 2023 Request for Additional Information NextEra Fleet Emergency Plan Amendment Request ML23254A4022023-01-24024 January 2023 RP Inspection_2023-001_Document Request ML22311A5582022-11-22022 November 2022 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Amendment Request for Cep ML22325A0692022-11-18018 November 2022 RAI Set 4 ML22270A1482022-09-26026 September 2022 SLRA Second Round RAI Letter 2 - Class 1 Fatigue (Final) ML22217A0022022-08-0404 August 2022 Email from Brian Harris (NRC) to Robert Coffey (FPL) - St. Lucie SLRA Second Round RAI Letter 1) ML22217A0032022-08-0404 August 2022 SLRA Second Round RAI Letter 1) ML22193A0872022-07-11011 July 2022 Letter RAI Set 3 (Final) ML22133A0032022-05-12012 May 2022 SLRA Rai'S Set 1 ML22101A2322022-05-0202 May 2022 Summary of the Environmental Remote Audit Related to the Review of the Subsequent License Renewal Application Enclosure RCIs and RAIs ML22094A1672022-04-0101 April 2022 2022 St. Lucie POV Inspection Information Request ML22075A1212022-03-16016 March 2022 Stl Problem Identification and Resolution (Pi&R) Information Request Final Report ML21350A4262021-12-21021 December 2021 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Licensing Amendment Request Concerning Technical Specification Conversion to NUREG-1432, Revision 5 ML21119A3142021-04-28028 April 2021 Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Requests to Apply Risk Informed Completion Times (RICT) for the 120-Volt AC (EPID L-2020-LLA-0283) (Email) ML21063A3192021-03-0404 March 2021 Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request RR 15 - Extension of RPV Welds from 10 to 20 Years ML20092G3442020-04-0101 April 2020 RAIs for LAR to Revise Technical Specifications 6.8.4.o, Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Program ML20094G2022020-03-30030 March 2020 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt EAL Schemes Pursuant to NEI 99-01 (L-2019-LLA-0210) ML19225D3152019-08-13013 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Relocate the MOV Thermal Overload Bypass Devices (L-2019-LLA-0106) ML19218A2742019-08-0606 August 2019 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML19193A1982019-07-12012 July 2019 Emailed St. Lucie Heat Sink RFI ML19192A1372019-07-11011 July 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Fall 2018 Refueling Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19192A1352019-06-25025 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Fall 2018 Refueling Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19151A8312019-05-31031 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance Requirement Amendment Request ML19151A5092019-05-21021 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance Requirement Amendment Request ML19109A1392019-04-18018 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request Pertaining to the Iodine Removal System ML19053A2242019-02-0101 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 1 - Draft Request for Additional Information Related to Relief Request 6 Regarding the Refueling Water Tank Bottom Liner L-2018-018, St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Reduce the Number of Control Element Assemblies (EPID L-2018-0181)2018-10-22022 October 2018 St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Reduce the Number of Control Element Assemblies (EPID L-2018-0181) ML18296A2052018-10-22022 October 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Reduce the Number of Control Element Assemblies (EPID L-2018-0181) ML18197A4112018-08-0101 August 2018 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Reduce the Number of Control Element Assemblies ML18019A0712018-01-18018 January 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Inop AFW Steam Supply LAR (L-2017-LLA-0296) ML17331B1532017-11-27027 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie IST Relief Request #5 - PR-01 (L-2017-LLR-0113) ML17277A3692017-10-0404 October 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Rict LAR - MF5372/MF5373 ML17152A1842017-06-0101 June 2017 Request for Additional Information - RPS Rate of Change and LCO Change LAR (CACs MF9119 9120) ML16356A1432016-12-20020 December 2016 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML16326A0092016-11-18018 November 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Re. Nextera/Fpl LAR to Adopt TSTF-545 - CACs MF8203, MF8204, MF8208, and MF8209 ML16308A3232016-11-0303 November 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie EDG Day Tank LAR - MF8006 ML16292A8212016-10-14014 October 2016 Emergency Preparedness Inspection and Request for Information ML17003A0452016-10-11011 October 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) FW: St. Lucie Response to RAI on SL2-22 SG Tube Inspection Report (MF7604) ML16244A2602016-08-26026 August 2016 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML16155A3502016-06-0303 June 2016 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML16089A0052016-03-28028 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St. Lucie Srxb Mtc Surv - MF7269 & MF7270 ML16077A1062016-03-17017 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St Lucie Vacuum Gothic LAR - MF6980/MF6981 ML16068A2612016-03-0808 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St Lucie TSTF-422 - MF6683/MF6684 ML16068A0412016-03-0808 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - St Lucie Unit 1 Relief Request No. 10 - MF6685 ML16013A2152016-01-13013 January 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - St. Lucie RAIs (Rvi Aging Management Plan) MF6777 and MF6778 ML15336A8882015-12-16016 December 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Changes to the Snubber Surveillance Requirements ML15308A6152015-11-23023 November 2015 Request for Additional Information on License Amendment Request for Changes to the Required Actions for Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps ML15233A0362015-09-0404 September 2015 Redacted Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed License Amendment Request and Exemption Request to Allow the Transition to Areva Fuel 2023-08-31
[Table view] |
Text
September 17, 2008 Mr. J. A. Stall Senior Vice President, Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer Florida Power and Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 1 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) RELATED TO GENERIC LETTER 2004-02, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DEBRIS BLOCKAGE ON EMERGENCY SUMP RECIRCULATION AT PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTORS (TAC NO. MC4710)
Dear Mr. Stall:
By letters dated September 1, 2005 (Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML052490339) and June 30, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081840513), you submitted documentation to demonstrate acceptable containment sump performance, consistent with Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02,Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Part of the technical basis for your position relies on results from testing at the VUEZ facility by Alion Science and Technology.
As discussed by Mr. John A. Grobe, Associate Director for Engineering and Safety Systems, in a telephone call with you on September 10, 2008, we have identified several critical issues with the test protocol used in the testing at VUEZ, as reflected in the request for additional information (RAI) provided in the enclosure. We have had many interactions with Alion and your staff over the last year in an attempt to resolve issues with the testing protocol, including a site visit to observe testing at VUEZ. Although progress has been made in resolving some of these issues, the most significant issues affecting the VUEZ test protocol have not been adequately addressed. Our review of information provided by Alion on the VUEZ testing has led us to conclude that it is highly unlikely that reliance on the VUEZ testing performed to date to demonstrate strainer adequacy will provide you with an adequate technical basis to resolve GL 2004-02. As such, you may need to consider an alternate approach to demonstrate adequate performance of your containment sump. Should an alternate approach be utilized, response to the specific RAIs is not necessary.
To enable a timely resolution of Generic Letter 2004-02 for your plant, we request that you provide to us by October 3 your plan for demonstrating adequate sump performance. This plan should describe the approach to be taken and a completion schedule for any needed additional testing or other actions, including submittal of additional documentation, as necessary, to provide the technical basis for your conclusion of acceptability of your sump performance, in accordance with GL 2004-02.
J.A. Stall This plan must consider the concerns identified in the enclosed RAIs. A telephone call is an acceptable method to initiate communication on your plans and schedule. We expect that we will need to conduct a public meeting with you after October 3 to discuss your plan in more detail.
You will also need to submit an extension request in accordance with the established process from SECY-06-0078, Status of Resolution of GSI-191, "Assessment of [Effect of] Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump Performance" (ADAMS Accession No. ML053620174). A detailed description of your plans and schedule will need to be included in the extension request.
Note that the enclosed RAIs are from a portion of our review of your responses to GL 2004-02 and do not represent a comprehensive set of RAIs. The RAIs associated with other portions of our review will be sent to you over the next two months.
Should you have any questions on the issues discussed in this letter, contact me at 301-415-2020.
Sincerely,
/RA by Brendan T. Moroney for/
Brenda L. Mozafari, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-335
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page
J.A. Stall Florida Power & Light Company Mr. ST.
Christopher R. Costanzo LUCIE PLANT Plant General Manager cc:Mr. Mano Nazar St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Senior Vice President 6351 South Ocean Drive and Nuclear Chief Operating Officer Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Florida Power & Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Mr. Terry Patterson Juno Beach, FL 33408 Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Senior Resident Inspector 6351 South Ocean Drive St. Lucie Plant Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 6090 Don E. Grissette Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Vice President, Nuclear Operations, South Region Craig Fugate, Director Florida Power & Light Company Division of Emergency Preparedness P.O. Box 14000 Department of Community Affairs Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mr. Abdy Khanpour Vice President - Engineering Support M. S. Ross, Managing Attorney Florida Power & Light Company Florida Power & Light Company P.O. Box 14000 P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. J. Kammel Marjan Mashhadi, Senior Attorney Radiological Emergency Florida Power & Light Company Planning Administrator 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Department of Public Safety Suite 220 6000 Southeast Tower Drive Washington, DC 20004 Stuart, Florida 34997 Mr. Douglas Anderson Mark E. Warner County Administrator Vice President, Nuclear Plant support St. Lucie County Florida Power & Light Company 2300 Virginia Avenue P.O. Box 14000 Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. William A. Passetti, Chief Peter Wells, Acting VP, Nuclear Department of Health Training and Performance Improvement Bureau of Radiation Control Florida Power & Light Company 2020 Capital Circle, SE, Bin #C21 P.O. Box 14000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1741 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. Gordon L. Johnston Mr. Michael Page Site Vice President Acting Operations Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957-2000 Jensen Beach, Florida 34957-2000
J.A. Stall This plan must consider the concerns identified in the enclosed RAIs. A telephone call is an acceptable method to initiate communication on your plans and schedule. We expect that we will need to conduct a public meeting with you after October 3 to discuss your plan in more detail.
You will also need to submit an extension request in accordance with the established process from SECY-06-0078, Status of Resolution of GSI-191, "Assessment of [Effect of] Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump Performance" (ADAMS Accession No. ML053620174). A detailed description of your plans and schedule will need to be included in the extension request.
Note that the enclosed RAIs are from a portion of our review of your responses to GL 2004-02 and do not represent a comprehensive set of RAIs. The RAIs associated with other portions of our review will be sent to you over the next two months.
Should you have any questions on the issues discussed in this letter, contact me at 301-415-2020.
Sincerely,
/RA by Brendan T. Moroney for/
Brenda L. Mozafari, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-335
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC RidsOgcRp RidsNrrDorlDpr LPL2-2 R/F RidsAcrsAcnw&mMailCenter RidsNrrDraApla RidsNrrPMBMozafari RidsRgn2MailCenter RidsNrrDorlLpl2-2 RidsNrrLAGLappert RidsNrrLA ADAMS Accession Number: ML082610690 OFFICE LPL2-2/PE LPL2-2/PM LPL4/LA NRR/SSIB/BC LPL2-2/BC NAME JPaige BMozafari GLappert DHarrison TW TBoyce BMoroney for For BMoroney for DATE 9/17/08 9/17/08 9/17/08 9/17/08 9/17/08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1, RELATED TO GENERIC LETTER 2004-02, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DEBRIS BLOCKAGE ON EMERGENCY SUMP RECIRCULATION AT PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTORS TAC NO MC4710
- 1. Chemical Effects a) The NRC staff is interested in how a given licensee determines that the test parameters selected for the VUEZ loops provide test results that are conservative with respect to chemical effects. This is particularly important since test results may show that certain dissolved species remain in solution instead of forming precipitate in the period of interest.
With respect to test pH, higher pH conditions may favor greater dissolution of important materials, such as aluminum, while near neutral pH values would provide conditions that favor precipitation of aluminum hydroxide type species. Please describe how the pH profile used in testing for your plant performed at VUEZ assures conservative or realistic quantities of dissolved materials as well as precipitate generation.
b) VUEZ chemical effects tests are initially conducted for an extended period at an intermediate temperature to account for the test equipments inability to test at the short-term, peak post-accident temperatures.
Please provide the basis for considering that this is conservative with respect to material degradation (e.g., corrosion of aluminum).
c) The existing VUEZ testing does not address the effect of a sudden temperature drop from a heat exchanger and the potential for thermal cycling. During interactions with Alion, the staff was informed that efforts were under way to analyze this effect. Please provide justification to explain why thermal cycling would not affect your plants chemical effects test results.
d) The protocol for the tests observed by the staff at VUEZ was to boil the Temp-Mat' and Nukon fibers to drive off the binder or lubricant material prior adding the fiber to the tanks. The water used to boil the fibrous debris is drained off and never added to the test tank. Bench scale testing by Alion indicates that this water contains silicon and sodium. Why is it acceptable to not include the dissolved materials from the fibers in the test tank given that they may contribute to the formation of chemical precipitates such as sodium aluminum silicate? Please provide a justification for not including the materials leached out of the fibers during boiling in the 30-day tank test.
e) For the VUEZ tests observed by the staff, care was taken to thoroughly mix the tank fluid (by mechanical mixing) after the addition of the boric acid. This was done because, as VUEZ personnel indicated, it can take longer than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for complete mixing of the test tank fluid. This same procedure is not used when the buffer, the HCl, the HNO3, and the last portion of LiOH are added later in the test. This is due in part to the inability to get a mechanical mixer in the tank due to physical limitations caused by the volume taken up by coupons and baskets of material in the tank at the time of those additions. The mixing of these chemicals into the bulk fluid will take even longer due to the complex geometries and uneven flow zones created by the coupons and baskets. The reason that this is a potential concern to the staff is that the timed removal of coupons and baskets is based on the time allowed to interact with these chemicals. If the chemicals are not well mixed then the coupons and baskets may not be getting the chemical interaction they are assumed to get prior to removal. As an example: An aluminum coupon is placed in the tank at time zero. The chemicals are then added and the time of interaction of that coupon, as modeled based on the time of exposure to containment spray, begins. After four hours of interaction the coupon is removed. However if the chemicals, or the coupon/basket, were isolated in a low flow / unmixed zone of the tank, the actual time of interaction may be far less. Please describe how this potential phenomenon is accounted for in the testing for your plant.
f) In the VUEZ testing many of the debris sample baskets used for the testing are shaped like a tray, allowing for fluid interaction with the material in the basket through only one open screened surface. Thus, due to the geometry of the sample baskets, there is only minimal flow of water past the samples, which reduces the ability of the test fluid to interact with the sample materials. This problem is compounded when the baskets are densely packed with debris, which the staff observed for several tests with large debris quantities, including cases where one material was densely packed on top of a second material inside the basket, providing this material a shielding effect from the test fluid. In addition, several of the tests observed by the staff required large quantities of debris that filled a significant fraction of the available test tank volume. Stacked or closely spaced baskets have the potential to limit further the interaction of the test fluid with the sample materials in the baskets. In addition, the staff observed in one test that a sample coupon was inserted in the test tank with one side very close or adjacent to the wall of the test tank, which appeared to prevent significant flow of the test fluid to approximately half of the coupon surface area. All of these issues are tied to the staffs larger concern that the sample materials added to the test tank may not be able to interact with the test fluid in a representative manner. As a result, fewer chemical species could be dissolved into the test fluid, and therefore there may be a non-representative reduction in the potential for formation of chemical precipitates in the VUEZ test loop. Please describe the packing of
sample baskets and basket orientations used in your plants testing. In addition, please provide justification that your plants testing, and procedures for preparing baskets, provided realistic or conservative levels of dissolved materials.
- 2. Head Loss a) The method used for forming the debris bed in the VUEZ loops does not allow for prototypical bed formation (as a bed would be formed by flow through a strainer). The staff observed inconsistencies in the bed formations and in one instance noted that the debris was manually adjusted to cover an opening in the bed. In general, the beds at VUEZ appear more porous than beds made of similar debris in larger scale array tests. In addition to these observations, the staff has noted that the VUEZ debris bed head loss, prior to the addition of the components which provide the chemical effects head loss, are generally significantly lower than head losses from large scale tests with similar debris loads. The position that the initial head loss is of no consequence to the result because it is only being used as a multiplier has not been accepted by the staff. The staff considers it likely that the bed pouring process is a significant factor causing these non-prototypical differences. Please provide an evaluation that shows that the debris beds formed during the VUEZ testing was prototypical of the debris beds expected to form in the plant. Compare the initial, non-chemical, VUEZ head loss results with the head loss results obtained during larger scale testing of the strainer module. Alternately, provide an evaluation that justifies the use of the bump up factor as applied to the larger scale test results.
b) The specific methodology and technical basis for using a bump-up factor to account for the head loss due to chemical effects is not clear to the staff. The bump-up approach is based on the theory that the incremental head loss from a given quantity of chemical precipitate (after scaling) will be the same for the VUEZ debris bed as for the plant condition. One of the important assumptions upon which this theory depends is that the VUEZ debris bed and the actual plant debris bed should have sufficiently similar characteristics with respect to filtering out and spatially accumulating the chemical precipitates. Based upon testing conducted to date, it is not clear to the staff that geometric differences and other factors do not influence the debris beds properties (e.g., porosity, compression, thickness), and thus add significant uncertainty to the bump-up factor approach. It is also not clear how the bump-up approach ensures that boreholes or differential-pressure effects do not adversely affect the scaling approach. That is, would the additional chemical head loss result in differential pressure phenomena that could negate the assumptions used for temperature scaling of the test results to plant sump temperatures. Please provide a justification with evidence that the bump up approach is valid in light of the staffs questions.
c) During a series of pre-tests conducted prior to the staffs trip to VUEZ, sensitivity tests associated with the sequencing of debris into the test tank showed a significant difference in head loss associated with varying the arrival sequence of debris on the test screen for the same debris loading.
In one case, the debris was added homogeneously, which resulted in a low head loss. However, in the heterogeneous case, the test was stopped prematurely after the head loss had rapidly increased to a value approximately 20 times greater than the homogeneous case. The staff questioned the basis for such a large discrepancy between these two cases and questioned why the homogeneous addition sequence is representative. Further, because the bump-up approach implicitly assumes similarity between the debris bed formed in the larger tank test to the bed formed in the VUEZ loop, it is not clear why the same debris addition sequence should not be used for both tests. Please provide justification for the acceptability of using different debris addition sequences for the array test and the VUEZ test and then applying the results of one as a multiplier for the other. Alternately, verify that the same debris addition sequence was used for both tests.
d) Alion stated that a generic fiber size distribution was used for the VUEZ testing. The staff expectation is that an appropriate procedure for preparing fine fiber be implemented (which is particularly important for the thin bed test, since for many plants, fines may be the only debris size that actually covers the entire strainer), and that the surrogate debris used matches the plant-specific size distributions from the debris transport calculation. The staffs observations at VUEZ showed that the prepared debris contained chunks that seemed to disrupt the formation of uniform debris beds. Further, since a fixed quantity of water was used to form all of the debris slurries, the cases with the highest debris loadings had the most concentrated and agglomerated debris slurries, which resulted in the formation of the most clumpy and non-uniform beds. Also, Alion did not generally perform a verification that the size distribution of the prepared debris was adequate prior to adding it to the test loop. Please provide justification that the VUEZ testing was conducted with debris that was prepared to prototypically or conservatively represent plant debris and that the addition of this debris to the test facility did not result in non-prototypical debris agglomeration or debris bed formation.
e) Alion stated that the full load debris beds were used for VUEZ testing because they resulted in the highest head losses. Due to the bed morphology, it is possible that the addition of chemical debris to a thin bed could result in higher head losses than the addition of the same chemical debris to a thicker bed that had a higher non-chemical head loss. Please provide an evaluation that justifies that the total head loss resulting on a chemically laden thin bed would not exceed the head loss associated with a chemically laden full load debris bed. Alternately, verify that a thin bed test was conducted at VUEZ.
f) Related to the question above, Alion has stated that larger bump-up factors were calculated for maximum load cases as opposed to thin-bed cases based on previous VUEZ testing. Provided that these early tests were not unduly influenced by issues such as debris coarseness and bed pouring, and that general principles can be deduced from these results that are applicable to other plants test conditions, then it may be appropriate to use these tests as a basis to rule out the conduct of future thin bed tests. Please provide the technical basis for determining the appropriate theoretical thickness of the beds in the VUEZ tests so that the staff can evaluate the acceptability of the general assumption that thin bed testing is not required.
g) It is not clear whether the flat plate in the small VUEZ loops can be scaled for circumscribed or partially circumscribed conditions (e.g., modeling effective bed thicknesses, circumscribed / partially circumscribed flow areas and approach velocities). These geometric effects may be partially responsible for reduced head loss seen for test conditions in the VUEZ loop as compared to the large tank with the top hat arrays. Please provide an evaluation that justifies that the testing performed in the VUEZ loops prototypically modeled the plant debris bed with respect to these issues.
h) It is important to ensure gas release and boreholes do not disrupt debris bed structure. Alion has stated that improvements have been made to address this issue for the small VUEZ loops, and that the limited experience to date has not shown there is a gas issue with the large VUEZ loop. Following the improvements to the small loops, observations made during the staffs trip to VUEZ showed that significant portions of two of the four beds floated away within several hours of formation.
Please provide assurance that gas release did not affect the results of the testing at VUEZ.
i) During the staffs visit, inward warping of the debris bed away from the walls of the chimney was observed on two tests. Such warping of the debris bed could result in a significant amount of the flow passing through the thinner cross section of the debris bed nearest the chimney walls.
Additionally, as a result of the modification to reduce the potential for gas trapping beneath the bed, the suction piping was modified to draw primarily from the edges of the screen. This suction arrangement could increases the proportion of flow passing through the warped edges of the debris bed, exacerbating the staffs concern that warping of the debris bed may result in the measurement of non-prototypically low head losses.
Please provide an evaluation justifying that non-prototypical bypass did not occur during the chemical effects testing at VUEZ.
j) Confidence should exist that the VUEZ tests are repeatable. However, based upon the staffs observations from the trip to VUEZ, evidence for the repeatability for the debris bed formation process was not conclusive.
Although some of the tests appeared to demonstrate repeatability, other tests demonstrated significant variability. Among the tests observed by the staff included two pre-test cases, four test cases, and two repeat test cases that became necessary when significant portions of two debris beds floated away. Please provide justification that the testing conducted at VUEZ provides confidence that results are repeatable.
k) Between the flow rate measurement, flow control, head loss measurement, and temperature measurement, there could be a relatively high uncertainty associated with the head loss results. (Variances of independent random variables are additive.) In addition, uncertainties associated with temperature could affect the timing of the corrosion process - for example, Alion approximated in its test procedure that corrosion rates double about every 18 °F - and thus the timing of precipitate induced head loss. Another potential source of uncertainty in the tests is the removal of several liters of test fluid in order to allow addition of all of the debris and buffering chemicals. Three liters of fluid are also removed as samples. This removal results in the fluid volume of the test tank being reduced and the concentrations of the chemicals in the loop being varied from the test specification. Please explain how the physical volume change due to addition of debris was accounted for in the modeling of chemical concentrations. Small quantities of particulate that are considered non-transportable are not included in some licensees tests to assess their chemical impacts. Considering the very large scaling factor applied to this test loop, seemingly small variances can be multiplied many times. Considering the above examples, please provide justification that the test results from the small VUEZ loops were not adversely affected by uncertainty.
l) The staff noted several quality assurance issues associated with the testing. During one of the tests that was nearly completed, the staff observed a sample material basket that had been resting screen-side down (presumably for the duration of the test), such that no basket surfaces were open for fluid interaction with the test fluid. As a result, no leached material from the debris samples in this sample basket could have participated in the test. During tests for a different plant, the procedure required that boiled Temp-Mat' be added to the tank; however, the Temp-Mat' that was added to the tank did not appear to the staff to have been boiled. After significant parts of two of the four formed debris beds floated away, the vendor then stated that it was not clear that the Temp-Mat' had been boiled and attributed the partial floatation of the two debris beds to the Temp-Mat' not having been boiled. Later, it was stated that the Temp-Mat' was boiled. The confusion in this case indicates that adequate records were not kept or were not available to the personnel performing the testing. Please provide justification that quality assurance issues that could affect test results did not occur during chemical effects testing at VUEZ.