ML082381186
| ML082381186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/2008 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ER-08-301 | |
| Download: ML082381186 (57) | |
See also: IR 05000338/2008301
Text
Draft Submittal
(Pink Paper)
Senior Reactor Operator Written Exam
NORTH ANNA JUNE 2008 EXAM
05000338/2008301 & 05000339/2008301
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC examSRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
1. 005 AA2.02 076INEW//HIGHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Initial conditions:
A spurious Turbine Runback occurred on Unit 1.
Tave was 5.5 degrees F higher than Tref and rising.
Control Bank D rods were inserting at the required rate.
Current conditions:
Reactor power 58%.
Steam Dumps closed.
Rod Motion stopped.
Tave and Tref are approximately equal and stable.
Control Bank D Group Step counters are at 170 steps.
All Control Bank D rods indicate approximately 170 steps, with the exception of
Rod H-8, which is at 184 steps.
A blown fuse is the cause of the mispositioned rod.
The crew determines that recovery will be to restore the misaligned rod to its group.
Which ONE of the following describes (1) the rod speed of rod H-8 PRIOR to the blown
fuse and while being realigned, and (2) the Technical Specification implications for the
alignment of rod H-8?
Reference Provided
A. 64 SPM prior to failure, 64 SPM while realigning; Shutdown Margin must be verified
or boration initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to ensure safety analysis assumptions remain
valid.
B. 64 SPM prior to failure; 64 SPM while realigning; the rod may be misaligned up to
24 steps for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period because reactor power is less than
75%
and Hot Channel Factors are less likely to be exceeded in a design transient.
C. 72 SPM prior to failure, 48 SPM while realigning; the rod may be misaligned up to
24 steps for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period because reactor power is less than
75%
and Hot Channel Factors are less likely to be exceeded in a design transient.
D~ 72 SPM prior to failure; 48 SPM while realigning; Shutdown Margin must be verified
or boration initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to ensure safety analysis assumptions remain
valid.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:22 PM
1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. Rod speed is incorrect, as a 5 degree mismatch will cause rods to insert at
72 SPM (maximum speed) 64 SPM prior to the failure is close, and also plausible
because manual shutdown bank speed is 64 SPM. Realignment after the failure also
represents shutdown bank rod speed. Basis is also correct.
B Incorrect. Rod speeds incorrect but credible as in A above, and basis is incorrect. A
note in the technical specification LCO allows rod position indication to be 24 steps
deviant for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> only if it is not known that an actual misalignment exists.
Plausible because power level is below the threshold and an applicant could
misinterpret the note.
C Incorrect. Same basis incorrect but plausible as B, but rod speed is correct.
D Correct. a 5 degree F mismatch will cause Bank D to auto insert at maximum rate
(72 SPM) 48 SPM is control bank speed when operated in manual. In this case,
shutdown margin must be verified because the rod is misaligned by >12 steps.
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control
Rod: Difference between jog and run rod speeds, effect on CRDM of stuck rod
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
2
Importance Rating:
3.0
Technical Reference:
Rod Control LP, TS 3.1.4 basis
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
TS 3.1.4 & BASIS
Learning Objective:
U 6512, U 6514
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
41.7,43.2
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
D B C A C B B A B D
Source If Ban1e
Difficulty Level :
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Comments:
KA Match: Difference between jog and run speeds is a B&W term, but it has been previously
applied to Westinghouse exams as auto versus manual speeds. This item evaluates
understanding of control bank speed in a transient circumstance versus a manual realignment.
Also, this item meets SRO criteria because the SRO must determine whether the LCO applies
and basis based upon a note in the LCO versus plant conditions. The interpretation of these
conditions is exclusive to the SRO.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
2
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
2. 005 G2.2.40 077INEWIIHIGHERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
Unit 1 is in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level at 289' 10".
Upper internals have been removed.
1A RHR pump is in service.
An electrical fault on 1H bus causes a loss of the bus.
Which ONE of the following describes the action required, and the basis for the action
in accordance with Technical Specifications?
Reference Provided
A.
Immediately suspend any RCS makeup from sources.with a boron concentration
less than that required by TS 3.9.1; ensures that there will be NO reduction in RCS
boron concentration from its current value from allowable RCS makeup sources.
B~ Immediately suspend any RCS makeup from sources with a boron concentration
less than that required by TS 3.9.1; ensures that if RCS boron concentration is
reduced due to RCS makeup, acceptable margin for subcritical operation is
maintained.
C. Immediately initiate action to establish >/= 23 feet of water above the top of the
reactor vessel flange; ability to remove decay heat and ensure mixing of borated
RCS water is degraded.
D. Immediately initiate action to establish >/= 23 feet of water above the top of the
reactor vessel flange; provides acceptable results in conjunction with actions to
initiate containment closure to limit radioactive release to the environment.
A Incorrect. Action is correct, and reason is plausible because only borated water
sources that will not reduce boron concentration below TS limits will be allowed to
make up. Incorrect because those sources may be lower than the current value.
B Correct. 289 feet is >23 feet above the flange, and the SRO must determine this
piece of information. Action and basis is correct.
C Incorrect. Cavity level is already more than 23 feet above the vessel flange. The
applicant must determine that from the given cavity level. Basis would be correct if this
was the correct action.
o Incorrect for same reason as C. Basis information is consistent with the wording in
TS and would be a correct answer if the action was correct based on conditions of
cavity <23 feet above the flange.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
3
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Equipment Control: Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
2
1
Importance Rating:
4.7
Technical Reference:
TS 3.9.5 and TS 3.9.6 and basis
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
TS 3.9.1, 3.9.5
3.9.6 & BASIS
Learning Objective:
U 444 U 12006
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA Match: item directly evaluates tech spec requirements, action, and basis with respect to
operation of RHR.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
o 123 4 5 6 7 8 9
BDBAADABDA
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Version:
Answer:
1.00
Points:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level is met because the SRO must determine which Tech Spec LCD entry is required,
and the basis for the action on the applicable LCD. This selection is made from among 2
plausible conditions that require evaluation, and plausible reasons for each action potentially
selected.
Time:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
4
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
3. 006 A2.03 078INEW//HIGHER/ISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
Unit 1 has been at 100% power for 9 months.
The following alarms are received approximately 5 minutes apart:
1J-D7, ACCUM 1A-1B-1C HI-LO LEVEL
1J-D8, ACCUM 1A-1B-1C HI-LO PRESS
SI Accumulator levels and pressures are as follows:
Pressure
1A
1B
1C
655 psig
670 psig
610 psig
Which ONE of the following describes the impact on the unit, and the Technical
Specification basis for the action required?
A':' SI Accumulator check valve leakage is occurring and requires Chemistry sample of
1B SI Accumulator contents to ensure that subcriticality can be maintained in a
post-LOCA environment.
B. SI Accumulator check valve leakage is occurring and requires Chemistry sample of
1B SI Accumulator contents to ensure that accident analysis assumptions for Cold
Leg to Hot Leg Recirculation switchover remain valid.
C. SI Accumulator vent valve leakage is occurring and pressurization of 1C SI
Accumulator is required to ensure that peak cladding temperature remains within
limits following a design basis LOCA.
D. SI Accumulator vent valve leakage is occurring and pressurization of 1C SI
Accumulator is required to ensure that accident analysis assumptions for SI
Accumulator injected volume during the reflood portion of a large break LOCA
remain valid.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
5
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Correct. With the core at MOL, RCS boron concentration will be lower than
accumulator concentration. Chemistry must sample to ensure that boron concentration
remains within limits. Check valve leakage is occurring because 1B accumulator is
high in presure as well as level.
B Incorrect. Plausible because leakage is correct, but basis for recirc switchover is for
high Accumulator boron concentrations, not low concentrations.
C Incorrect. Incorrect leakage but plausible because 1C accumulator is near the low
limit, and significantly lower than 1A or 1B accumulators in level and in pressure. Basis
would be correct if this was the correct failure.
D Incorrect, and reason is same as C
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and
(b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the
consequences of those malfunctions or operations: System leakage
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
2
1
3.7
TS 3.5.1 and basis; 1J-D7, D8, OP-7.3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
U 3414
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA Match because SI system leakage can either be in-leakage or out-leakage. In this case,
procedures are provided to ensure the plant remains within design basis due to a plant
condition where in-leakage is occurring.
SRO level because the SRO must choose between 2 failures resulting in the presented plant
conditions, and among plausible reasons for the actions that may be required for those
conditions, in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Note: We have developed questions in the past with similar basis statements for SI
accumulators; none with these conditions.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
A DAD D B B C B C
Scramble Range: A - D
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
6
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Source:
NEW
Source If Banlc
Cognitive Level:
HIGHER
Difficulty Level:
Job Position:
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Date:
6/2008
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
7
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
4. 007 G2.2.44 079INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
Unit 1 is at 100%
power.
The following alarm is received:
1B-F1, PRZ RELIEF TK HI PRESS
PRT pressure indicates 14 psig and rising slowly.
PRT temperature is 92 degrees F and stable.
PRT level is 70%
and stable.
RCS pressure indicates 2225 psig and stable.
Which ONE of the following describes the appropriate operator response?
A. Ensure PZR PORVs are closed, and PG and N2 to PRT are isolated; Go to
1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.
B~ Ensure PZR PORVs are closed, and PG and N2 to PRT are isolated; Vent the PRT
in accordance with 1-0P-5.7, Operation of the Pressurizer Relief Tank.
C. Submit a WR, verify PG water alignment and cool the PRT by draining and refilling
in accordance with 1-0P-5.7, Operation of the Pressurizer Relief Tank.
D. Submit a WR, and cool the PRT by draining and refilling in accordance with
1-0P-5.7, Operation of the Pressurizer Relief Tank. Refer to 1-AP-16, Increasing
Primary Plant Leakage.
A Incorrect. Alarm response directs transition to 1-AP-16 if PRT level is rising.
Plausible because temperature and pressure are elevated, but level is stable, so AP-16
would not be performed.
B Correct. Alarm response directs venting and/or draining and filling for the listed
parameters (Rising pressure and elevated temperature).
C Incorrect. A WR would not be submitted unless the alarm was received without the
corresponding indications to cause the alarm (ie, PRT pressure below 14 psig).
Plausible because the action would restore PRT parameters, at least temperature.
o Incorrect. See above explanation for plausibility and incorrect reason.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
8
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation
of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system
conditions.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
2
1
Importance Rating:
4.4
Technical Reference:
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA Match: Item evaluates knowledge of PRT parameters, as well as interpretation of the
indications given, with one parameter in alarm status and the other parameter at an elevated
value. It also evaluates understanding of actions and directives based on those indications by
evaluating knowledge of the actions required.
SRO level because the applicant must assess abnormal plant conditions relateOd to the PRT,
and select the appropriate procedure and process for response, from among plausible choices
directed by the procedure used.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
New item; have written similar items on other exams, with abnormal PRT parameters.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
B C B DCA B C C B
Source IfBan1e
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM
9
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
5. 008 G2.4.8 080INEWIIHIGHERJISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
Unit 1 was at 100% power when off-site power was lost.
1J EDG failed to start, and CANNOT be started.
The crew is preparing to transition from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
The switchyard is reenergized.
Off-Site power is available from RSS transformers.
The following plant conditions exist:
RCS pressure is 950 psig and lowering.
Containment pressure is 23 psia.
PZR level is 100%
RCS subcooling indicates 0 degrees F.
AFW flow is 360 GPM.
SG narrow range levels are off-scale low.
SG pressures are 1000 psig and slowly lowering.
Which ONE of the following describes the procedure entry required upon transition
from 1-E-0, and the method of re-energizing 1J 4160 volt emergency bus?
A. Enter 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; 1J Emergency Bus will be
restored upon exit from the EOP network.
B~ Enter 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical
Power, will be performed concurrently to restore off-site power to the emergency
busses.
C. Enter 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation; 1J Emergency Bus will be restored
upon exit from the EOP network.
D. Enter 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation; 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power,
will be performed concurrently to restore off-site power to the emergency busses..
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
10
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. Plausible because it is true that plant design basis is met with only 1 bus,
and also because the step in E-O for restoration of busses is already past. The
applicant must know that E-1 provides for this action.
B Correct. E-1 is entered because RCS pressure is causing SG pressure to lower.
(SGs are heat source) PZR level at 100% indicates a vapor space break. ,E-1 directs
implementing 0-AP-10 for restoration if emergency busses are not energized from
off-site power.
C Incorrect. Plausible for same reason as A, and also because SG pressures are
lowering, but SRO must determine that pressure drop is due to RCS pressure lowering.
D Incorrect. Procedure entry same as C, but actions related to restoration of off-site
power are correct.
Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in
conjunction with EOP's.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
1
Importance Rating:
4.5
Technical Reference:
E-O, E-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 13683
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA match: Item evluates use of AOPs associated with a PZR vapor space break. In this case,
E-1 will be performed for PZR LOCA, and restoration of off-site is determined in E-1. O-AP-10
is 1 of 2 AOPs that may be performed while in E-1.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
B A B B B C B A C A
Source If Ban1e
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the applicant must assess plant conditions and determine appropriate
procedure based on entry conditions present for 2 EOPs, and also because AOP strategy is
evaluated by the given conditions.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
11
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
6. 012 A2.04 081lNEWIIHIGHERlISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
1K-G1, SFGDS PROT SYS TR A TROUBLE has been alarming intermittently.
Instrument Department has determined a 48VDC power supply in Train A is degrading
and will most likely fail completely in the near future.
Which ONE of the following describes the correct response?
Reference Provided
A. Online replacement of the power supply is NOT permitted; make notifications and
preparations for plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
B. Online replacement of the power supply is NOT permitted; make notifications and
preparations for plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
C~ Online replacement of the power supply is permitted; following power supply
replacement the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker may be closed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to
perform 1-PT-36.1A, Train A Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation Logic
Test.
D. Online replacement of the power supply is permitted; following power supply
replacement the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker may be closed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to
perform 1-PT-36.1 A, Train A Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation Logic
Test.
a.
Incorrect. This is an infrequent evolution governed by an Instrument Shop procedure
vice an operations procedure, the candidate may not be aware that online maintenance
is possible since most maintenance of this nature is performed during outages. The 24
hour action time is reasonable since it is the mode 1&2 action time for one train
b.
Incorrect. This is an infrequent evolution governed by an Instrument Shop procedure
vice an operations procedure. The candidate may not be aware that online maintenance
is possible since most maintenance of this nature is performed during outages. The 48
hour action time is reasonable since it is the mode 3-5 action time for one train
c.
Correct. Tech Specs specify 4 hrs for full train testing but only 2 hrs for breaker or
breaker trip device testing.
d.
Incorrect. On-line replacement is allowed however the action time of 8 hour~ (which
coincides with other action times for different item in TS 3.3) is incorrect.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
12
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b)
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of
those malfunctions or operations: Erratic power supply operation
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
2
1
Importance Rating:
3.2
Technical Reference:
1-PT-36.1A and O-ICM-SSP-PW-001
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
TS 3.3.1 & BASIS
Learning Objective:
U 8966
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2,43.5
Comments:
KA Match: The item evaluates the impact of a power supply malfunction on the RPS, and the
actions required for mitigation. A low voltage power supply failure meets the criteria for the
required topic.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the SRO must determine that the maintenance activity is permitted.
Additionally the SRO must have knowledge of procedural requirements during testing.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
CDCADDDDB D
Source If Banle
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
13
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
7. 017 A2.02 082lNEWIIHIGHERIISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
A LOCA is in progress on Unit 1.
All RCPs are stopped.
RVLIS Full Range is 270/0.
Core Exit TCs are reading 1250 degrees F.
ALL SG NR levels are OFF-SCALE low.
NO source of SG feed has been established.
NO source of ECCS has been established.
The crew has attempted secondary depressurization in accordance with FR-C.1,
Response to Inadequate Core Cooling, but the attempt was ineffective.
The crew is evaluating start of one RCP.
Which ONE of the following describes the remaining strategy for mitigation of this
event?
A. Remain in FR-C.1 , start ALL available RCPs, and evaluate Core Exit TCs to
determine if core cooling has been established.
B. Start one RCP and immediately transition to SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control
Room Guideline Initial Response.
C~ Remain in FR-C.1 , open PZR PORVs and Block Valves, and other RCS Vent Paths
if necessary. Re-attempt secondary depressurization and evaluate Core Exit TICs
to determine if core cooling has been established.
D. Open PZR PORVs and Block Valves, and other RCS Vent Paths if necessary.
Re-Attempt secondary depressurization while referring to SACRG-1 , Severe
Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response.
A Incorrect. RCP will not be started because SG level must be >11 % to constitute an
available loop. Plausible because no other method of core cooling has succeeded and
starting an RCP will initiate forced circulation of any remaining RCS fluid.
B Incorrect. Will not start an RCP due to unavailability of loop. Plausible because if
RCPs were started and temperature did not trend down, the crew would transition to
SACRG-1.
C Correct. Without an available loop, RCP start will not be performed. RNO is to open
primary vent paths and re-attempt secondary depressurization to initiate accumulator
injection.
D Incorrect. Plausible because action is correct, but wrong because SACRG-1 would
only be entered if available RCPs were running and ineffective at reducing RCS
temperature.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
14
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits)
associated with operating the ITM system controls including: Core damage
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
2
2
4.1
FR-C.1 step 20 and 21
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
U 11670
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA Match: Item evaluates observation of parameters displayed on the ICCM, and predicts the
impact by testing knowledge of effectiveness of RCP start on an inadequate core cooling
situation against the actual success path that would be attempted under these co*nditions. Use
of procedures is tested as expalined above.
SRO level because the SRO must assess conditions during a severe accident and determine
EOP strategy, including selection of controlling procedure for the event or conditions observed.
Time:
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Points:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
Scramble Range: A - D
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
15
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
8. 025 AA2.03 083INEW//HIGHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
Unit 1 is in Mode 5.
The crew observes 1B RHR Pump discharge flow and motor amps
oscillating.
The crew enters 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR, isolates known RCS drain paths, and
maximizes Charging flow.
RCS level continues to decrease.
The following alarm is subsequently received:
Containment Sump Pumps 1-DA-P-4A and 1-DA-P-4B are running continuously.
An operator leaving Containment reports leakage observed from the PZR.Surge
Line.
Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the event in progress?
A.
Remain in 1-AP-11 and ensure that RCS level is +10 inches above centerline; start
1A RHR pump and ensure that RHR flow meets the requirements of Attachment 3.
(Determining Acceptable RHR Flow Reductions)
B.
Remain in 1-AP-11 and vent both RHR Pumps; start either RHR pump, and verify
that RCS level is adequate for the indicated RHR flow per Attachment 2. (Minimum
RCS Level for Indicated Flow)
C~ Go to 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA; initiate Attachment 7, Cold Leg Injection.
D. Go to 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA; initiate Attachment 8, Hot Leg Injection.
A Incorrect. Would not remain in AP-11 for current conditions because an RCS leak is
occurring as indicated by sump pumps running and makeup at full flow. Actions would
be correct if AP-11 were in use and LOCA was not occurring, if the RHR pump did not
trip ue to air binding.
B Incorrect. Same reason as A, and also actions would be correct if AP-11 was in use
and the RHR pump tripped due to air binding.
C Correct. If leak. location is on the surge line then it is on hot leg, use Cold Leg
Injection as directed by AP-17.
D Incorrect. Procedure is correct, but the applicant must know that the strategy is to
inject on the legs opposite that of the break location.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
16
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat
Removal System: Increasing reactor building sump level
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
1
Importance Rating:
3.8
Technical Reference:
1-AP-11, 1-AP-17
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
None found
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
55.43.5
Comments:
KA Match: Applicant must use information stem for Containment Sump Pump run time to
determine that a shutdown LOCA is occurring. This implies that sump level is rising.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
o 1 234 5 6 7 8 9
CCACBDDDCC
Source If Ban1e
Difficulty Level :
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Version:
Answer:
1.00
Points:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the SRO is assessing conditions in a shutdown environment that require
determination of 2 separate items; which procedure applies and which strategy to use for each
procedure.
Time:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM
17
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
9. 026 G2.1.7 084/NEW//HIGHER//SRO/NORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Unit 1 is at 100% power. Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
Unit 1 and 2 CC systems are split.
The OATC reports the following alarms and indications:
1G-E8, COMP COOL PP 1B AUTO TRIP
1G-B3, CC HX 1A-1 B CC OUTLET LO FLOW
1C-C4, RCP 1A-B-C CC THERM BARR HI/LO FLOW
1A-E6, RCP 1B VIBRATION ALERT/DANGER
RCP Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger flow indicators all read 0 GPM.
RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are 146°F and rising at 5°F per minute.
1B RCP Vibration readings:
2-3 mils Seismic
8-10 mils Proximity
Which ONE of the following describes the appropriate operator response?
A~ Enter 1-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling; attempt to restore CC flow, verify
proper Service Waterflow to CC HXs. A TS 3.7.19, CC Subsystems Limiting
Action is NOT entered because functions required for cooldown to Cold Shutdown
are met.
B. Enter 1-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling; attempt to restore CC flow, verify
proper Service Water flow to CC HXs. A TS 3.7.19, CC Subsystems Limiting
Action is entered because functions required for cooldown to Cold Shutdown are
degraded.
C. Enter 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection; once the Reactor is verified tripped
then stop 1B RCP. A TS 3.4.5, RCS Loops - Mode 3, Limiting Action is NOT
entered because RCS loop operability requirements for decay heat removal are
met.
D. Enter 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection; once the Reactor is verified tripped
then stop 1B RCP. A TS 3.4.5, RCS Loops - Mode 3, Limiting Action is entered
because RCS loop operability to support decay heat removal is degraded.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
18
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Correct. For the conditions given, a loss of CC is in progress, and RCPs have not
reached trip setpoints on temperature or vibration. Since 3 CC susbsystems are
required and there are still 3 available between Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS action entry is not
required.
B Incorrect. TS action is plausible because the applicant may interpret split units as
separate CC systems, and action would be required if one system is OOS.
C Incorrect because tripping the reactor would only be required if Seismic was reading
8-10 mils not Proximity as given, but applicant may confuse the two. Action plausible
because the distractor include stopping of a RCP and following a trip from 100% power
SG levels will shrink below the narrow range, and the basis for RCP operability in
Mode 3 is decay heat removal.
D Incorrect for same reason as C, and plausible because SG level would be sufficient
to support an operable loop once level is recovered with the AFW system. This option
also adds balance for determination of action vs. no action lAW TS.
Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments
based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretion.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
1
1
4.7
1-AP-15, 1-AR-A-E6
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
U 11659
43.2,5
Comments:
KA Match: The KA is matched because an evaluation of alarms and indications is required
during a loss of CC, as the KA topic requires. The operational judgment is selection of
procedure and TS applicability.
SRO level is met because the applicant must evaluate indications and alarms and choose from
among the 2 most plausible procedures, then after selecting the correct procedure, must
interpret TS applicability by applying TS basis knowledge
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
A C D D A C D B C B
Scramble Range: A - D
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
19
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Source:
NEW
Source IfBanle
Cognitive Level:
HIGHER
Difficulty Level:
Job Position:
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Date:
6/2008
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
20
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
10. 027 G2.2.25 085INEWIILOWERIISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
Unit 1 is in Mode 3 during a plant cooldown.
Chemistry sample of the Quench Spray System Chemical Addition Tank
determines that NaOH concentration is 100/0 by weight.
Chemical Addition Tank volume is approximately 5510 gallons.
1-QS-P-1 B, Quench Spray Pump 1B, is out of service.
Which ONE of the following describes the Technical Specification implications of the
current plant conditions?
A. Chemical Addition Tank volume is outside of limits which affects the ability to
maintain Containment within design pressure limits and affects the ability to
maintain Iodine at acceptable levels following a DBA LOCA.
B~ Chemical Addition Tank NaOH concentration is outside of limits which affects the
pH of the resultant Containment sump water solution and the ability to effectively
remove Iodine following a DBA LOCA.
C. Inoperabilityof 1-QS-P-1 B will result in a Containment peak pressure higher than
the value calculated in the accident analysis for a DBA LOCA and affects the ability
to maintain Iodine at acceptable levels following a DBA LOCA.
D. Inoperabilityof 1-QS-P-1 B will result in a Containment peak temperature higher
than the value calculated in the accident analysis for a DBA LOCA and affects the
ability to maintain Iodine at acceptable levels following a DBA LOCA.
A Incorrect. Volume is not within limits, but within 10 gallons of the upper limit.
Plausible because half of the reason is correct, but volume does not apply to
containment pressure reduction.
B Correct. See TS 3.6.8 and basis. The 10% value given in the stem was chosen
since it corresponds to the required range of the spray solution in pH (8.5-10.5). the
student may not pick this as the correct answer if they confuse the number for the
requirements of concentration with those of pH.
C Incorrect. Plausible because 1 QS pump is out of service, but the accident analysis
assume that only one will be available so the cntmt peak pressure achieved will not be
higher than the calculated value. Also credible because the applicant may incorrectly
assume that with the chem add system in a TS action statement, it could affect
operability of the Quench Spray System. In this case, the TS is not cascaded.
D Incorrect. Plausible because 1 QS pump is out of service, but the accident analysis
assume that only one will be available so the cntmt peak temperature achieved will not
be higher than the calculated value.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
21
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Equipment Control: Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for
operations and safety limits.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
2
2
Importance Rating:
4.2
Technical Reference:
TS 3.6.6, 3.6.8, and bases
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 5880
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA Match because the facility does not have a dedicated Iodine Removal System. The
function is provided by spray and by chemical addition. This item evaluates knowledge of TS
limits and basis for limits for the Chemical Addition System as well as for Quench Spray.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
o 1 234 5 6 7 8 9
BAABAACCAA
Source If Banle
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
NEW
LOWER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because it directly evaluates knowledge of the limits and basis for limits according to
Tech Specs. The SRO must choose between valid bases for each option, and valid operability
issues for each option. This is a memory level item that discriminates at the correct level based
on 3 different TS action.statements
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
Answer:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
22
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
11 . 034 A2.03 086INEW//HIGHER//SRO/NORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
Unit 1 core off-load in progress.
The 3 most recently off-loaded irradiated fuel assemblies are stored as follows:
Assembly(Enrichment)
Assembly A (4.6%)
Assembly B (3.20/0)
Assembly C (3.2%)
Burnup
30,000 MWD/MTU
30,000 MWD/MTU
20,000 MWD/MTU
Location
Non-Matrix location
Low-Reactivity 5X5 matrix
Low Reactivity 5X5 matrix
Which ONE of the following describes the Technical Specification implications of the
fuel assembly arrangement stated above?
Reference Provided
A. ONLY ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5X5
matrix configuration. The'other 2 assemblies may remain as-is. This ensures that
Keff will remain <0.95 for all postulated conditions with NO soluble boron in the
Spent Fuel Pool.
B. ONLY ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5X5
matrix configuration. The other 2 assemblies may remain as-is. This ensures that
Keff will remain <0.95 for all postulated conditions with soluble boron in the Spent
Fuel Pool at the TS minimum LCO limit.
C. ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5 X 5 matrix;
ONE fuel assembly must be moved to either a non-matrix location OR a High
Reactivity location in a 5X5 matrix configuration. This ensures that Keff will remain
<0.95 for all postulated conditions with NO soluble boron in the Spent Fuel Pool.
D!' ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5 X 5 matrix;
ONE fuel assembly must be moved to either a non-matrix location OR a High
Reactivity location in a 5X5 matrix configuration. This ensures that Keff will remain
<0.95 for all postulated conditions with soluble boron in the Spent Fuel Pool at the
TS minimum LCO limit.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
23
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. Two assemblies must be moved. Assembly A is in an unacceptable
configuration and must be moved to a 5X5 matrix configuration in a high reactivity area.
Assembly C must be moved either to a non-matrix location or a 5X5 matrix
configuration in a high reactivity area. Basis is plausible because Keff<0.95 is for
conditions where soluble boron is at TS minimum, but normal configuration will ensure
Keff <1.0 with NO soluble boron.
B Incorrect. See A above, and basis is correct for conditions presented.
C Incorrect but plausible because TS action is correct. TS basis is incorrect, but
plausible as in A.
D Correct. See A for explanation of required moves. Basis is correct.
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fuel
Handling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or
mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Mispositioned fuel element
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
2
2
Importance Rating:
4.0
Technical Reference:
TS 3.7.18 and basis
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
TS 3.7.18, figures
3.7.18-1 and 3.7.18-2
Learning Objective:
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA is matched because knowing the basis predicts the impact of the condition, and using
procedures is satisfied by TS action required for the condition presented for mispositioned fuel
assemblies. This is the guidance provided for this event at this facility
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because a technical specification entry must be made on given conditions (Also use
of reference) and knowledge of the basis is required in accordance with technical specifications
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
DBDBDDADB B
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
24
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
12. 038 EA2.15 087/MODIFIEDIIHIGHER/ISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081
Unit 1 is experiencing a Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Containment pressure is 11 psia.
The crew has completed 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
The crew is performing 1-ES-3.1, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill.
1C RCP is running and the crew commenced depressurizing the RCS using
normal pressurizer spray.
The following conditions exist after closing spray valves:
RCS Pressure
AVG of 5 highest CETs
Pressurizer level
380 psig and lowering
375 degrees F
38%
and lowering
Which ONE of the following correctly describes an advantage of the backfill method of
post-SGTR cooldown,
.
AND
Assuming RCS temperature remains constant and the remaining trends continue,
which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy?
A. Facilitates processing of contaminated primary coolant.
Stop 1C RCP when #1 sealleakoff decreases to 0.9 gpm; enter ECA-3.1, SGTR
with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressure
reaches 260 psig.
B. Allows for faster cooldown of ruptured SG.
Stop 1C RCP when #1 sealleakoff decreases to 0.9 gpm; enter ECA-3.1, SGTR
with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressure
reaches 220 psig.
C~ Facilitates processing of contaminated primary coolant.
Stop 1C RCP when seal DIP decreases to 200 psid; enter ECA-3.1, SGTR with
Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressure
reaches 220 psig.
D. Allows for faster cooldown of ruptured SG.
Stop 1C RCP when seal DIP decreases to 200 psid; enter ECA-3.1, SGTR with
Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressure
reaches 260 psig.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM
25
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. See background document. Both seal dip and leakoff will decrease with
RCS pressure. Leakoff of .9 is below the normal operating range, but allowable for low
pressure conditions.
B Incorrect. Basis is incorrect but plausible because it is the basis for using steam
dump for post-SGTR cooldown. Values used for transition is correct and again seal
leakoff is plausible since it is below the range allowed during normal plant operation.
C Correct. Basis correct and RCP seal DP must be maintained at >200 psid for
continued operation. Subcooling must be maintained >25 F to prevent transition.
D Incorrect. incorrect basis and transition value for pressure requirement for RCP seal
DIP correct however.
Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: Pressure at which to
maintain RCS during S/G cooldown
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
1
Importance Rating:
4.4
Technical Reference:
ES-3.1 CA Page, Background Doc
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 13882
Question History:
Modified from North Anna 2006 exam - FJE
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA Match because the item evaluates knowledge of RCS pressure setpoints where action is
required in relation to SG cooldown with a SGTR.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
MODIFIED
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the applicant must assess conditions and select procedure as well as know
the basis for use of the procedure in progress.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
CADDCAAABD
Source If Bank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
26
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
13. 051 G2.2.44 088INEWIILOWERJISRO/NORTH ANNA/6120081
Given the following:
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
The following alarm is received:
1B-A5, CW PP 1A-1B-1C-1D AUTO TRIP
CW Pump 1B motor indicates 0 amps
CW Pumps 1A, 1C, and 1D motors indicate 300-310 amps.
Condenser vacuum is 3 inches and degrading.
Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the event in progress?
A.
Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; reduce CW Pump
amps to prevent motor damage.
Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; guidance for estimating RCS boration
flow rates during a load reduction is provided in 1-AP-14.
B. Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; reduce CW Pump
amps to prevent motor damage.
Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction, must
be used to estimate required RCS boration flow rates during the load reduction
C~ Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; 'contact HP to
determine if liquid waste release must be secured.
Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; guidance for estimating ReS boration
flow rates during a load reduction is provided in 1-AP-14.
D. Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; contact HP to
. determine if liquid waste release must be secured.
Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction, must
be used to estimate required RCS boration flow rates during the load reduction
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
27
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. Plausible because 1-AP-13 is performed, but CW Pump amps are not
quite high enough to require reduction. 340 amps is the limit. Second half is correct by
use of attachment 3.
B Incorrect because 1-AP-2.2 is not required due to attachment 3 of AP-14 being
available. Plausible because AP-2.2 is used for fast load reductions. Also see A.
C Correct. Procedures will "be performed in parallel, and each procedure will have
specific goals based on current indications.
o Incorrect. Reason for use of AP-13 is correct, but reason for use of AP-14 is
incorrect but plausible. See B.
Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation
of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives effect plant and system
conditions.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
2
Importance Rating:
4.4
Technical Reference:
1-AP-13, 1-AP-14
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U11409,U11411
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA is matched because an interpretation must be made for status and operation of condenser
air removal and Circ Water systems. Understanding of directives and actions (procedures) is
evaluated by the use of procedures for AP strategy.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
LOWER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the applicant must assess conditions and determine procedures used as
well as mitigation strategy for use of procedures. One procedure is given and strategy is
evaluated. The other procedure is given and a determination must be made as to whether the
appropriate strategy requires use of another procedure or whether the in-use procedure will
provide the strategy (1 OCFR55.43(b) item 5)
Time;
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
C CDDADAACA
Source IfBan1c
Difficulty Level :
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
28
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 1108
14. 056 G2.2.36 089lNEWIILOWERJISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
120 VAC Vital Bus Inverter 1-11 has failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ago.
Maintenance Department now reports they estimate repairs and PMT will take
approximately 2 days.
Which ONE of the following describes the relationship of the estimated repair time to
the Action Time and the Basis for the Action time?
Reference Provided
A~ Repair time is within the allowable action time; Action time is based on a balance
between reliability of AC power sources and potential to challenge safety systems
with a plant shutdown.
B. Repair time is within the allowable action time; Action time is based on an additional
single failure which would render certain ESF equipment incapable of performing
their design functions.
C. Repair time exceeds the allowable action time; Action time is based on a balance
between reliability of AC power sources and potential to challenge safety systems
with a plant shutdown.
D. Repair time exceeds the allowable action time; Action time is based on an
additional single failure which would render certain ESF equipment incapable of
performing their design functions.
A Correct. TS 3.8.7 and bases discuss the 7 day time frame (this is a change to Tech
Specs that makes other distractors more plausible since a candidate may rely on past
knowledge).
B Incorrect. Correct but basis applies to the deenergized 120 VAC vital bus that has a
2 hr action time, plausible since the bases of electrical system tech specs are often
confused or misunderstood.
C Incorrect. Action time being exceeded would be correct based on past knowledge,
as noted above basis is correct.
D Incorrect. Action time being exceeded would be correct based on past knowledge,
as noted above same justification for basis applies here.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
29
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 0411 08
Equipment Control: Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded
power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
1
Importance Rating:
4.2
Technical Reference:
TS 3.8.7,3.8.8,3.8.9,3.8.10
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
TS 3.8.7 & 3.8.9
and BASIS
Learning Objective:
U 5500
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA is matched because it evaluates the impact of a maintenance activity (time to repair the
failed inverter) on LCOs.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
A A B B DAD C C A
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
1.00
Points:
NEW
LOWER
6/2008
SRO is matched because the applicant must determine if repairs can be completed within
allowable action time and also make a call on correct basis for operability in the current Mode
of operation.
Time:
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
30
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
15. 059 G2.1.23 090/MODIFIEDIIHIGHERIISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is in progress.
Attempts to establish Aux Feedwater flow are unsuccessful.
RCS Bleed and Feed has NOT been initiated.
Main Feedwater flow has just been established and SG levels are as follows:
'1 A' 400~ wide range and rising
'1 B' 40%
wide range and stable
'1 C' 29%
wide range and lowering
Core exit TCs are stable.
Containment pressure is 19.2 psia.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate operator action?
A.
Return to procedure and step in eff~ct and continue efforts to establish AFW flow.
B.
Perform Steps 14 through 23 of 1-FR-H.1 to initiate RCS bleed and feed.
C..., Remain in 1-FR-H.1 until Core Exit TCs indicate a decreasing trend.
D.
Remain in 1-FR-H.1 until all SG wide range levels indicate an increasing trend.
A Incorrect. Return to step in effect when AFW is restored lAW FR-H.1, after verifying
minimum AFW flow requirements are met. This transition only applies to AFW flow, not
Main Feedwater flow; for main feedwater SG level and core exit TC trends must be
verified in order to exit prior to meeting 11 % NR level criteria. Plausible because it is
the first and most logical transition from FR-H.1.
B Incorrect. Feed and bleed criteria are not met for the given conditions. ONE SG is
lower than the feed and bleed setpoint for adverse containment conditions, but 2 of 3
are required below the setpoint to initiate feed and bleed. Plausible because setpoint is
met for 1 SG.
C Correct. SG level trends are acceptable however Core exit TC trend must also be
acceptable (decreasing) to exit FR-H.1.
D Incorrect. Wide range levels rising are part of the RNO step for establishing Main
Feedwater, but transition is not allowed until NR level is >11 % or core exit TCs are
verified decreasing. Plausible because' it is a condition of the procedure step.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
31
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures
during all modes of plant operation.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
2
1
Importance Rating:
4.4
Technical Reference:
FR-H.1 step 3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 11276
Question History:
Modified from Harris 2007 NRC Exam (See attached)
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
55.43.5
Comments:
KA Match: This item evaluates operation of the system (Main Feedwater) in emergency
circumastances (integrated plant procedure), specifically, performance of an EOP under
conditions where transition is or will be required based upon observation of parameter trends.
SRO level because the SRO must assess conditions and determine when transition to an
appropriate procedure may occur, based on 4 plausible options for transition
Items Not Scrambled
NORTH ANNA
MODIFIED
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Item- was modified in accordance with NUREG 1021, as conditions were changed (MFW
instead of AFW restored) and change in conditions resulted in a different correct answer. One
distractor was also significantly modified.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
C C C C C C C C C C
Source If Bank:
Difficulty Level :
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
32
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
16. 061 AA2.04 091INEWIIHIGHERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
The Unit is in Mode 6.
Rod Unlatching is in progress.
Manipulator Crane radiation monitor, 1-RM-RMS-162, suddenly pegs high.
The following alarms are received:
1K-D2, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI RAD LEVEL
1K-D3, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI-HI RAD LEVEL
HP has confirmed that radiation levels on the refueling deck are normal and Operations
has declared 1-RM-RMS-162 inoperable.
Which ONE of the following describes the required actions?
A. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation; rod u'nlatching may continue without
interuption.
B~ Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation; rod unlatching may resume provided
continuous HP coverage is present at the manipulator crane.
C. Verify Control Room Bottled Air dump; rod unlatching may continue without
interuption.
D. Verify Control Room Bottled Air dump; rod unlatching may resume provided
continuous HP coverage is present at the manipulator crane.
A Incorrect. Automatic action is correct; allowing the activity to continue is plausible
since the candidate may not consider that rod unlatching does constitute a core
alteration.
B Correct. Automatic action is correct; continuous HP coverage is required since rod
unlatching constitutes a core alteration.
C Incorrect. Automatic action is incorrect, botttied air will not dump as a result of the
failure of this RM channel; allowing the activity to continue is plausible since the
candidate may not consider that rod unlatching does constitute a core altertation.
D Incorrect. Automatic action is incorrect, botttied air will not dump as a result of the
failure of this RM channel; continuous HP coverage is required since rod unlatching
constitutes a core alteration so this portion of the distractor is correct.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM
33
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring
(ARM) System Alarms: Whether an alarm channel is functioning properly
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
1
2
Importance Rating:
3.5
Technical Reference:
1-AP-5
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 12001
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA Match: The KA is matched because the applicant must determine what actuations will occur
based on the malfunction.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
B DABABDAC C
Source If Bank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the applicant must have knowledge that rod unlatching constitutes a core
alteration and must be knowledgable of the actions required to continue the activity
(1 OCFR55.43(b) item 2
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
34
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
17. 062 AA2.05 092INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
Both units are at 100%
power.
Service Water Reservoir level is 314 feet.
1-SW-P-1A and 1-SW-P-1 B are running.
The OATCs reports.the following alarm and indication:
1J-D3, SW PP 1-P1A, 2-P1A, AUTO TRIP
Breaker position for 1-SW-P-1A has GREEN and AMBER lights lit.
The crew enters 0-AP-12, Loss of Service Water.
2-SW-P-1 B breaker fails to close when operators attempt to start the pump.
Which ONE of the following describes the action required, and the Technical
Specification implications of this event?
A. Align Service Water to both headers using Attachment 4; Service Water to CC Heat
Exchangers must be throttled within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to avoid pump runout conditions.
Ensures design flows to the RS Heat Exchangers may be achieved following a
LOCA with one additional worst case failure.
B~ Align Service Water to both headers using Attachment 4; Service Water to CC Heat
Exchangers must be throttled within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to avoid pump runout conditions.
Ensures design flows to the RS Heat Exchangers may be achieved following a .
LOCA with no additional failures.
C. Place Aux Service Water Pumps in Service using Attachment 8; The unit must be
placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> because the Service Water System cannot perform
its safety function, making CC and RHR also inoperable.
D. Place Aux Service Water Pumps in Service using Attachment 8; The unit must be
placed in Mode 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> because the Service Water System cannot
perform its safety function, making CC and RHR also inoperable.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
35
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. Statement is correct except that a single failure has already occurred.
Design basis is LOOP and 1 single failure. At this point there are 2 SW Pumps
inoperable, so the action, is to throttle within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to ensure design on RSS with no
additional failures. (See basis)
B Correct. Correct action and correct compensatory measure per procedure.
C Incorrect. Aux Service Water Pumps would be started if no SW pump could be run
on the header. At this point, since there are 2 pumps available, Aux Service Water is
unnecessary. Plausible because it is the next procedure step. TS basis is correct for
conditions where time requirement cannot be met. Plausible if applicant chooses this
action.
D Incorrect. See C, and action plausible because this is action taken with SW loops
not available (E). Plausible because it wiould be a correct choice if the applicant chose
the action to start Aux SW Pumps, depending on circumstances of SW inoperability.
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service
Water: The normal values for SWS-header flow rate and the flow rates to the components
cooled by the SWS
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
1
1
2.5
O-AP-12
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
U 11657
43.2,5
Comments:
KA Match: KA is matched because the action taken base9 on the given conditions is designed
to ensure that design basis flow rate to RSS Heat Exchnagers will be maintained in the event of
a large break LOCA. There is no actual GPM number for this value, but throttling CC ensures
that adequate SW Pump discharge pressure can be maintained and that if a CDA occurs, RSS
HX flow from SW will be adequate.
SRO level is met because the applicant must select between 2 plausible actions, and also
select between plausible bases in technical specifications for why the action is required.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
B B B B A CDC D A
Scramble Range: A - D
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
36
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Source:
NEW
Source IfBanlc
Cognitive Level:
HIGHER
Difficulty Level:
Job Position:
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Date:
6/2008
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
37
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
18. E13 G2.4.20 093INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
A reactor trip has occurred on Unit 1.
Following transition to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the STA reports all
CSF status trees GREEN with the EXCEPTION of Heat Sink, which is YELLOW.
The following SG conditions are observed:
A SG pressure 1050 psig and stable.
A SG level 25%
NR and rising.
B SG pressure 1150 psig and stable.
B SG level 92%
NR and rising.
C SG pressure 1050 psig and stable.
C SG level 20%
NR and rising.
B MSIV indicates CLOSED.
AFW flow is 160 GPM to each SG.
The crew determines that entry to a Yellow Path procedure will help mitigate the
event.
Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy used to restore the Heat
Sink Critical Safety Function to GREEN?
A.
Perform 1-FR-H.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure; Isolate AFW flow
to B SG and do not restore AFW flow until a steam release path is established.
B. Perform 1-FR-H.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure; Verify Main
Feedwater Isolation. Dump steam from B SG to reduce Hot Leg temperatures.
C. Perform 1-FR-H.3, Response to Steam Generator High Level; Verify Main
Feedwater Isolation. Dump steam from B SG to reduce Hot Leg temperatures and
initiate blowdown from B SG.
DY- Perform 1-FR-H.3, Response to Steam Generator High Level; isolate AFW flow to
B SG. Initiate blowdown from B SG and DO NOT dump steam from B SG.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
38
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. If pressure was high but level was below 900/0, this strategy would be
consistent with the objectives of the EOP network. Plausible because it is action that
may be taken for a yellow path on heat sink based upon pressure.
B Incorrect. If pressure was high but level was below 90%, this strategy would be
consistent with the objectives of the EOP network. Dumping steam to Thot below 542
would ensure that the affected SG pressure ws below the low set safety valve setpoint.
Plausible because this is action performed if level was below 90%.
C Incorrect. Combination of actions from FR-H.2 and FR-H.3. Incorrect because at
92%
NR level, steam will not be released until an overfill evaluation is performed.
Additionally, if the applicant believed that actions of FR-H.2 were applicable for these
conditions, they may choose this because FR-H.2 requires this action.
D Correct. Pressure above 1135 psig, FR-H.2 entry conditions are met, but if that
procedure was used, it would direct the crew to FR-H.3 based upon SG level >90%.
The strategy" as contained in a caution in FR-H.3 is to perform an overfill evaluation
prio~ to releasing steam.
Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings,
cautions, and notes.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
1
2
4.3
FR-H.2, FR-H.3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
U 11307
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA Match: This item evaluates the requirements for mitigation of SG High Pressure and SG
High level. High pressure (FR-H.2) is the required topic, and that procedure may be used for
mitigation of this event. Part of that strategy is to use FR-H.3 when level is high. There are
notes and cautions in both of these procedures being evaluated in this item.
SRO level because the applicant must evaluate plant conditions, and choose the correct
procedure as well as procedure strategy to mitigate the event. The knowledge required to
answer is specific to the SRO.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
D A A A B B B D B C
Scramble Range: A - D
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
39
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Source:
NEW
Source IfBanlc
Cognitive Level:
HIGHER
Difficulty Level:
Job Position:
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Date:
6/2008
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
40
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
19. G2.1.4 094INEW//LOWER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
The date is 6/5/2008.
Both Units are in Mode 1.
Shift complement is at MINIMUM allowed by Technical Specifications.
One of the Reactor Operators becomes ill and must be transported to the
hospital.
TWO potential replacements are identified for call-in.
BOTH replacements have been assigned to OPS Support for the last year.
The last times they were on shift are as follows:
Operator A
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on March 24 BOP
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on February 23 BOP
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on February 22 BOP
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on January 19 RO
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on January 18 RO
Operator B
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on March 21 BOP
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on March 20 BOP
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on March 19 BOP
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on March 18 RO
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on December 31 RO
. Which ONE of the following describes the Technical Specification requirement to
initiate action to replace the Reactor Operator, and which operator will be selected as
the replacement?
A~ Action must be taken to ensure the Reactor Operator is replaced within 2 h.ours;
Operator A will be selected.
B. Action must be taken to ensure the Reactor Operator is replaced within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />;
Operator B will be selected.
C. Action must be initiated within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to find a replacement for the Reactor
Operator; Operator A will be selected.
D. Action must be initiated within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to find a replacement for the Reactor
Operator; Operator B will be selected.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM
41
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 1-1 08
A Correct. Operator A has an active license. Operator B has 4 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts in the
previous quarter, so his license has gone inactive. 5 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts per quarter are
required. TS 5.2.2 requires action tQ be initiated immediately and a replacement to be
in place in less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
B Incorrect. Operator B is inactive. Plausible because Operator B has stood the 4 most
recent shifts, and also because to reactivate a license, 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> under instruction is
required. If the applicant confuses the time requirements, Operator B will possible be
chosen.
C Incorrect. The replacement must be in place in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The TS does not allow 2
hours to begin the search.
o Incorrect. Same as C, plausible for reasons given in Band C.
Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to
shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license
status, 10CFR55, etc.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
3
1
Importance Rating:
3.8
Technical Reference:
TS 5.,2.2, VPAP 2702
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 13586
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA Match: Maintenance of active license is a required topic covered by this generic KA. The
applicant must determine the active license from among a selection of 2 operators. Further
discriminates by requiring knowledge of TS time to replace a member of the shift.
NORTH ANNA
NEW
LOWER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because 1OCFR55.43(b) item 1 and 2 are met because plant staff is a condition of
the facility license, and minimum staff is a TS administrative requirement
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
A B D A C D A C B A
. Scramble Range: A - D
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
42
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
20. G2.1.6 095INEWIIHIGHERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
The Shift Manager is in the control room discussing an upcoming evolution with
the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor.
The Unit 1 Unit Supervisor is on a plant walkdown when the following events
occur:
Unit 1 experienced a spurious Turbine runback.
While stabilizing the unit at 65%
power, a turbine trip occurs.
The Unit 1 reactor does NOT trip, either automatically or manually from the
control room.
PZR PORV, 1-RC-PCV-1455C, is stuck OPEN.
The associated block valve will NOT close.
Safety Injection is actuated.
The Unit 1 Unit Supervisor is injured returning to the control room and needs
medical assistance in the Turbine Building.
Which ONE of the following identifies who will be the EOP 'Reader', and describes the
EOP flowpath upon exiting 1-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS?
A.
Shift Manager; return to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to
1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, when directed.
B. Shift Manager; transition directly to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant;
actions of 1-E-0 were performed in parallel with 1-FR-S.1 due to safety injection
actuation.
C~ Unit 2 Unit Supervisor; return to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, when directed by 1-E-0.
D. Unit 2 Unit Supervisor; transition directly to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
Coolant; actions of 1-E-0 were performed in parallel with 1-FR-S.1 due to safety
injection actuation.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
43
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. An ATWS will result in the SM performing duties as the Emergency
Manager, he/she will be unable to perform as the reader. Plausible because it is the
only other SRO on the unit, and also because the SM could be the reader if no
emergency classification was required.
B Incorrect. Same reason as A, but also because procedure use is incorrect. Upon exit
from FR-S.1, crew will return to proceduire in effect (E-O, step 1). Plausible because
steps of E-O are performed in parallel with FR-S.1 if SI actuates.
C Correct. Unit 2 SRO or an RO with no other duties may perform as the reader. STA
and SM (if Emergency Manager) are excluded from performing this task.
D Incorrect. Same reason as B, except that the position of reader is correct.
Conduct of Operations: Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
3
1
Importance Rating:
4.8
Technical Reference:
DNAP-0509, FR-S.1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 11569
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA is matched because' it places the SRO in an abnormal position of having to replace the
person assigned to fill the SRO function during an EOP event. The KA is further matched by
requiring the SRO to determine procedure use (crew mgmt) for a specific event
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
o 123 4 5 6 7 8 9
CBCBCADABA
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level because the applicant must determine a suitable replacement for an injured SRO,
and also dtermine appropriate procedure flowpath strategy for a given set of conditions.
(10CFR55.43(b) item 5)
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
Answer:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
44
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
21 . G2.2.11 096INEWIILOWERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081
Given the following:
Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.
The following alarm is received several times in a 10 minute period:
1D-H5, HIGH CAPACITY S/G BLOWDOWN TROUBLE
Local indication at the High Capacity S/G Blowdown Control Panel is normal.
The Instrument Technician investigating the alarm determines that the
comparator card for the annunciator is failing.
A replacement comparator card is unavailable and assistance has been
requested from Engineering.
To restore functionality of the alarm in the interim a jumper must be installed.
Which ONE of the following procedures will govern the installation of the jumper, and
who, by title, must provide FINAL approval of the jumper?
A. OP-NA-200-1 001, Equipment Clearance Process; Shift Manager.
_8. OP-NA-200-1 001, Equipment Clearance Process; FSRC.
C. VPAP-1403, Temporary Modifications; Shift Manager.
DY- VPAP-1403, Temporary Modifications; FSRC.
A Incorrect. Equipment Clearance process is used for removing equipment from
service. Since this equipment is inoperable, it is plausible to believe this process could
be used to restore operability of the annunciator. Additionally, when the annunciator is
repaired, a clearance will be used for the work performed.
8 Incorrect. Same reason as A, but approval authority is correct for conditions
provided.
C Incorrect. Correct procedure but the Shift Manager has an approval signature prior
to the FSRC. The Shift Manager also has other responsibilities relating to the
installation of the change..
D Correct. Final approval for Temporary Modifications lies with FSRC. A lifted lead or
jumper qualifies as a Temporary Modification.
All distractors are plausible because they either contain the correct approval authority,
a required signature for the approval process, and the governing procedures for either
installing the jumper or replacing the card.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
45
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
3
2
Importance Rating:
3.3
Technical Reference:
VPAP-1403
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 13122
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
55.43 item 3 and 5
Comments:
KA Match: The KA is matched because the SRO must determine that a lifted lead or jumper
falls under the Temporary Modification procedure, and the process for approval requires a final
approval from FSRC.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
LOWER
6/2008
SRO level is met because processing of Temporary Modifications is an SRO responsibility and
the SRO has a signature in the approval process. ROs do not have a role in the proces except
for being cognizant of the effect of the Temporary Modification on plant operation.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
D DAB C B C A A D
Source IfBanle
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
46
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
22. G2.2.35 097INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
A Unit 1 RCS heatup is in progress.
RCS temperature is 342 degrees F.
1H Emergency Diesel Generator is declared INOPERABLE due to failure of the
Shutdown Relay.
Which ONE of the following correctly lists (1) the OPERATIONAL MODE that Unit 1 is
currently in, and (2) the requirements for Mode change that apply for the current plant
conditions?
A. (1)
(2)
B. (1)
(2)
C. (1)
(2)
D~ (1)
(2)
Mode 3
Mode Change may be performed without restriction as long as the action
requirements related to the 1H EDG inoperability are met.
Mode 3
Mode Change may be NOT performed without a risk evaluation and
permission from the NRC.
Mode 4
Mode Change may ,be performed without restriction as long as the action
requirements related to the 1H EDG inoperability are met.
Mode 4
Mode Change may be NOT performed without a risk evaluation and
permission from the NRC.
A Incorrect. Hot Standby is Mode 3, which is >350 degrees F.
Additionally, Mode
change is plausible because some tech specs indicate TS 3.0.4 is not applicable. In
this instance, 3.0.4 does apply, and even though action requirements are met, the LCO
does not have an indefinite time requirement as defined by TS section 3.0.
B In*correct Mode as described in A, but action for Mode change is correct.
C Incorrect. Correct Mode is identified, but incorrect Mode change action is applied.
Plausible as in A, and reference indicates situations where Mode change may be
performed.
D Correct. See descriptions above
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
47
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Equipment Control: Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
3
2
Importance Rating:
4.5
Technical Reference:
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
U 6295
Question History:
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.2
Comments:
KA is matched because the applicant must determine the mode. Additionally enhanced
discriminatory value requires interpretation of TS 3.0.4 for applicability to Mode Change
allowance.
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
SRO level is met lAW 10CFR55.43(b) item 2 because the SRO must determine TS
requirements for Mode Change given equipment inoperability and mode applicability, as well as
understanding of where action requirements apply to the Mode Change (3.0.4).
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
DBA A A C C C B C
Source IfBan1e
Difficulty Level:
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
48
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
23. G2.3.6 098INEW//LOWER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Which ONE of the following describes the process for obtaining a Release Permit for a
Waste Gas Decay Tank AND the Bases for the maximum curie content in each gas
storage tank?
A':" Operations initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes the
release permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 0.5 rem total
body exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.
B. Chemistry initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes the
release permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 0.5 rem total
body exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.
C. Chemistry initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes the
release permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 2.5 rem total
body exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.
D. Operations initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes the
release permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 2.5 rem total
body exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.
A Correct. Operations is responsible for initiation and HP authorizes. Basis for TS limit
correct.
B Incorrect. Initiator is incorrect, but authorization is correct. Basis for TS limit correct.
C Incorrect. Initiator is incorrect, but authorization is correct. Basis incorrect but
plausible since it is a small fraction of 10CFR50.67 limits.
D Incorrect. Initiator is correct and authorization is correct. Basis incorrect but plausible
since it is a small fraction of 10CFR50.67 limits.
All are plausible since both Chemistry and HP have roles and responsibilities dealing
with sampling, surveying, and analyzing. A candidate who is unfamiliar with the
process/Bases is likely to consider any of the distractors plausible. The 2.5 rem value
is reasonable since it represent a fraction (100/0) of the 1OCFR50.67 AST limit of 25
rem.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM
49
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Radiation Control: G2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
3
3
3.8
Procedure
TRM 3.10.3 and Bases
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
New
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10
SRO level because it evaluates the process for initiating and authorizing gas releases along
with knowledge of the Bases of the TRM limit of curie content; RO candidates are not required
to know this level of detail from memory.
Note: At NAPS the Shift Manager does not have a specific authorization or approval signature
on release forms.
Demonstration of understanding the process including the approvals
required and Bases of the TRM limit meets the intent of the KA.
Time:
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Points:
NEW
LOWER
6/2008
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
AAAAAAAAAA
Items Not Scrambled
Source IfBank:
Difficulty Level :
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
50
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
24. 02.4.27 099INEW//HIOHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Initial conditions:
Unit 1 is in Mode 3 shutting down for a scheduled refueling.
A fire is in progress in the Motor Driven AFW Pump House.
The Fire Brigade is at the scene.
Current conditions:
The fire was burning for 12 minutes and is now extinguished.
The 1B MDAFW Pump motor was destroyed by the fire.
Which ONE of the following describes the impact on Safe Shutdown Functions, and
whether E-Plan action is required in accordance with O-FCA-O, Fire Protection -
Operations Response?
A':I The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 4 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, Emergency
Manager Controlling Procedure MUST be implemented.
B. The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 4 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, Emergency
Manager Controlling Procedure MAY be implemented at the discretion of the Shift
Manager.
C. The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 5 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, Emergency
Manager Controlling Procedure MUST be implemented.
D. The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 5 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, Emergency
Manager Controlling Procedure MAY be implemented at the discretion of the Shift
Manager.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
51
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A is Correct. Degredation of the AFW system due to a fire will affect safe shutdown to
Mode 4 (350 degrees F) conditions. Additionally, the fire affects safety related
equipment and has been burning for >10 minutes, so an emergency classification will
be required.
B is incorrect because the Shift Manager must follow the' requirements of FCA-O and
initiate the Emergency Manager procedure. Plausible because if the fire was <10
minutes or did not affect safety related equipment, it would be SM determination of'
whether a classification would be required. Also, with plant conditions beginning in
Mode 3, the applicant could believe that the requirements do not apply as in Mode 1.
C is incorrect because loss of AFW only affects safe shutdown to Mode 4. The
applicant should be able to determine that AFW is required in Modes 1-3, and therefore
AFW should not be required below 350 degrees F when RHR will be placed in service.
E-Plan implementation is correct for this option.
D is incorrect but plausible for reason stated in C as well as E-Plan implementation as
stated in B.
Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of "fire in the plant" procedures.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
3
4
3.9
FCA-O Att 2 and steps 13, 14
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
U 13390
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA matched because the item evaluates knowledge of the Fire implementation procedure and
associated attachment for safe shutdown considerations. It also evaluates knowledge of plant
conditions requiring E-Plan implementation.
SRO level is met because it is the SRO responsibility to know plant conditions required for
E-Plan implementation, and also plant conditions required for Safe Shutdown Monitoring and
potential performance of other FCA procedures.
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
A B B B B B B'C D C
Scramble Range: A - D
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
52
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Source:
NEW
Source If Ban1<:
Cognitive Level:
HIGHER
Difficulty Level:
Job Position:
Plant:
NORTH ANNA
Date:
6/2008
Previous NRC?:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
53
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
25. G2.4.6 IOOINEW//HIGHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/
Given the following:
A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.
RCS pressure i*ndicates 190 psig and stable.
RCS temperature is 260 degrees F and lowering.
.Containment pressure is 27 psia.
Low Head SI flow indicates 1200 gpm on each train.
All equipment is operating as designed.
The crew is performing 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.
SI has been reset.
NO other actions have been performed.
A RED path on the INTEGRITY CSF Status Tree is received and verified by the
STA.
Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the existing plant
conditions?
A.
Immediately transition to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal
Shock; perform actions of 1-FR-P.1 to stabilize RCS temperature, and return to
1-ES-1.3 when directed by 1-FR-P.1.
B. Immediately transition to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal
Shock; verify that RCS pressure is below the limit required for implementing
1-FR-P.1, and return to 1-ES-1.3.
C. Remain in 1-ES-1.3 until transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is complete through
step 8; go to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock and
perform actions of 1-FR-P.1 to stabilize RCS temperature, then return to 1-ES-1.3
when directed by 1-FR-P.1.
D~ Remain in 1-ES-1.3 until transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is complete through
step 8; go to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock and
verify that RCS pressure is below the limit required for implementing 1-FR-P.1, then
return to 1-ES-1.3.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
54
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
A Incorrect. Once ES-1.3 is entered, FR procedures are not performed until the
swapover is complete. Plausible because standard EOP use would require transition to
FR-P.1 A Actio'ns are plausible because the applicant may miss the fact that adverse
containment conditions exist, and RCS presure above 225 would require use of the
procedure to stop the cooldown and stabilize pressure.
B Incorrect procedure transition but correct action once FR-P.1 is entered. ES-1.3
would be followed through step 8 prior to transition.
C Incorrect because the use of FR-P.1 is incorrect. Transition point is correct, but with
adverse containment, 300 psig is below the value that requires checking LHSI flow
>1000 gpm for transition to procedure and step in effect. Normal containment value is
225 psig, whuich would require use of FR-P.1 with the current RCS pressure indication.
o Correct, alignment of the recirc path initially takes presedence to ensure a suction
source to ECCS pumps after which FRPs may be addressed. Once it is verified that
plant conditions will not support a PTS type event, P.1 will return the operator to the
ORP in effect to continue event mitigation.
Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.
Question Number:
Tier:
Group:
Importance Rating:
Technical Reference:
3
4
4.7
ES-1.3 Note prior to step 1, FR-P.1, step 1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
None
Learning Objective:
Question History:
U 13689, U 13011
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
43.5
Comments:
KA Match: Generic knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies, this item is a match because it
evaluates the use of FRPs in special circumstances that are outside of normal EOP use
guidelines.
SRO level because it meets 1OCFR55.43(b) item 5 for assessment of multiple plant conditions
and selection of procedures, and discriminates at a higher level because the applicant must
determine specific procedure strategy based on abnormal plant conditions.
This is a new item. We have seen similar items in other bank questions about use of ES-1.3
but do not have any containing this strategy. No other bank question was used to develop this
item.
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
55
Scramble Range: A - D
NORTH ANNA
NEW
HIGHER
6/2008
QUESTIONS REPORT
for NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08
Time:
1
Points:
1.00
Version:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Answer:
DACACAB BAD
Source IfBanle
Difficulty Level :
Plant:
Previous NRC?:
Source:
Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
Date:
Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM
56