ML073370759
| ML073370759 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  (DPR-072) |
| Issue date: | 12/03/2007 |
| From: | Widmann M Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Young D Progress Energy Florida |
| References | |
| 50-302/07-301 | |
| Download: ML073370759 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000302/2007301
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GA 30303-8931
December 3, 2007
Mr. Dale E. Young, Vice President
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)
ATTN: Supervisor, Licensing &
Regulatory Programs
15760 West Power Line Street
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708
SUBJECT:
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000302/2007301
Dear Mr. Young:
During the period of October 22-25, 2007, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
administered operating examinations to employees of your company who had applied for
licenses to operate your Crystal River Unit 3. At the conclusion of the examination, the
examiners discussed the examination questions and preliminary findings with those members of
your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by your
staff on October 30, 2007.
Two Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants passed both the written and operating
examinations. Two SRO applicants failed the administrative portion of the operating test and
one SRO applicant failed the written examination. There was one post examination comment.
This comment is summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulation Facility Report is included in this
report as Enclosure 3.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
2
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.
Sincerely,
\\RA\\
Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No.: 50-302
License No.: DPR-72
cc: (See page 3)
Enclosures:
1.
Report Details
2.
NRC Post Examination Comment Resolution
3.
Simulation Facility Report
3
cc w/encls:
Jon A. Franke
Director Site Operations
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)
Electronic Mail Distribution
Michael J. Annacone
Plant General Manager
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)
Electronic Mail Distribution
Phyllis Dixon
Manager, Nuclear Assessment
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)
Electronic Mail Distribution
Stephen J. Cahill
Engineering Manager
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)
Electronic Mail Distribution
R. Alexander Glenn
Associate General Counsel (MAC - BT15A)
Florida Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Steven R. Carr
Associate General Counsel - Legal Dept.
Progress Energy Service Company, LLC
Electronic Mail Distribution
Attorney General
Department of Legal Affairs
The Capitol
William A. Passetti
Bureau of Radiation Control
Department of Health
Electronic Mail Distribution
Craig Fugate, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
Department of Community Affairs
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
Citrus County
110 N. Apopka Avenue
Inverness, FL 36250
Jim Mallay
Framatome Technologies
Electronic Mail Distribution
Daniel L. Roderick
Vice President, Nuclear Projects and
Construction
Crystal River Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Mr. Richard Hons
Training Manager
Crystal River Nuclear Plant
8200 W Venable Street
Crystal River, FL 34429
Tallahassee, FL 32304
David M. Varner
Manager, Support Services - Nuclear
Crystal River Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
_________________________
OFFICE
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RII:DRS
RII:
SIGNATURE
MTM
MAB7
SJV
NAME
M.Widmann
M. Bates
S. Vias
DATE
12/ /2007
12/ /2007
12/ /2007
12/ /2007
12/ /2007
12/ /2007
12/ /2007
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO
Enclosure 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.:
50-302
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Progress Energy Florida (Florida Power Corporation)
Facility:
Crystal River Unit 3
Location:
15760 Power Line Street
Crystal River, FL 34428
Dates:
Operating Tests - October 22 - 25, 2007
Written Examination - October 30, 2007
Examiners:
M. Bates, Chief, Senior Operations Engineer
G. Laska, Senior Operations Examiner
R. Walton, Operations Engineer
Approved by:
Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000302/2007301, 10/22-30/2007; Crystal River Unit 3; Licensed Operator Examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the
guidance in NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power
Reactors. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of October 22-25, 2007. Members
of the Crystal River Unit 3 training staff administered the written examination on October 30,
2007. The written examinations and the operating tests were developed by the Crystal River
Training Staff.
Two SRO applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. Two SRO
applicants failed the administrative portion of the operating test. One SRO applicant failed the
written examination. One SRO applicant was issued an operating license; however, one of the
SRO applicants who passed the written examination and operating test, passed the written
examination with an overall score between 80% and 82%. This applicant was issued a letter
stating that he passed the examination and issuance of his license has been delayed pending
any written examination appeals that may impact the licensing decision for his application.
There was one post examination comment.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1
Report Details
6.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a.
Inspection Scope
The Crystal River Unit 3 Training Staff developed the operating test and written
examinations in accordance with NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination
Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9. The licensees examination team reviewed
the proposed examinations. Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and
the licensee were made according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final
version of the examination materials.
The examiners reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing
and administering the examinations to ensure examination security and integrity
complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests.
The examiners evaluated five SRO applicants who were being assessed under the
guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the operating tests
during the period of October 22-25, 2007. Members of the Crystal River Unit 3 training
staff administered the written examination on October 30, 2007. The evaluations of the
applicants and review of documentation were performed to determine if the applicants,
who applied for licenses to operate the Crystal River Unit 3, met requirements specified
in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The NRC determined that the details provided by the licensee for the walkthrough and
simulator tests were within the range of acceptability expected for the proposed tests.
Two SRO applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. Two SRO
applicants failed the administrative portion of the operating test. One SRO applicant
failed the written examination.
The final RO and SRO written examinations with knowledge and abilities (K/As) question
references/answers, examination references, and licensees post examination
comments may be accessed in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers,
ML073321278, ML073321274, and ML073321268).
The examination team noted two generic weaknesses associated with applicant
performance on the administrative section of the operating test. The applicants
displayed a weakness with their ability to correctly determine emergency action level
classifications and determining protective action recommendations. The applicants also
displayed weaknesses in generating a tagging order in accordance with plant
administrative procedures. Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the
facility Training Manager for evaluation and determination of appropriate remedial
training.
3
Enclosure 1
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 25, 2007, the examination team discussed generic issues with
Mr. D. Young and members of the Crystal River Unit 3 staff. The inspectors asked the
licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered
proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
D. Young, Vice President - CR3
J. Franke, Director Site Operations
R. Hons, Manager Training
P. Dixon, Manager Nuclear Assessment
M. Van Sicklen, Manager Operations Training
M. Broussard, Supervisor Operator Initial Training
B. Wunderly, Manager Shift Operations
D. Herrin, Licensing
F. Lawrence, Nuclear Operations Instructor
F. Dola, Training
NRC personnel
G. Laska, Senior Operations Examiner
Enclosure 2
NRC Resolution to the Crystal River Post Examination Comment
A complete text of the licensees post-exam comments can be found in ADAMS under
Accession Number ML073321268.
ADMIN JPM - Equipment Control, Develop an Operations Clearance for FWP-7
LICENSEE COMMENT:
The licensee contends that double valve isolation on the discharge side of FWP-7 is not
a critical aspect for successful completion of the task. The licensee contends that the
safety afforded by double isolation is met if an operator only tags a single manual
isolation because there is a check valve between the high energy source and the
maintenance boundary. The licensee contends that with one valve tagged and the
check valve functioning as designed, two failures would have to occur in order to allow a
high energy source to the work area.
The licensee contends that the OSHA standard requires verification of energy isolation,
which may be accomplished by observation as frequently as necessary if there is a
possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy. The licensee further contends that the
OSHA standard would be met by having a vent open inside the maintenance boundary,
which provides a means of continuously monitoring for stored energy.
After the licensee submitted their formal comment, they also provided evidence that
there were two check valves between the high energy source and the maintenance
boundary. The licensee also provided documentation that they take periodic
temperature readings between these two check valves.
The licensee contends that the double isolation requirement is not criteria for an
unsatisfactory grade for this task.
NRC RESOLUTION:
In accordance with procedure OPS-NGGC-1301, Equipment Clearance, Revision 17,
double isolation is required OR SSO permission shall be obtained and a notification to
the workers shall be included in the special instructions of the clearance order. The
following is an excerpt from Page 31 of the procedure:
When plant design allows, systems that operate with temperatures greater than
200°F, pressures greater than 500 psig, caustic or acid systems (excluding boric
acid) should be isolated from the work area by two in series closed valves when
the system is to be breached. SSO permission shall be obtained to hang any
clearance that meets the above requirements and does not use double valve
isolation. This permission and a notification to the workers of the clearance
boundary limitations shall be noted in the clearance Special Instructions.
Furthermore, OPS-NGGC-1301 also states that check valves should not be used as
clearance boundaries, but if they are used, then the check valve is required to be tagged
and a vent path between the check valve and the maintenance boundary must be
established and tagged. The following is an excerpt from page 87 of the procedure:
2
Enclosure 2
Boundary
Device
Restrictions
Tagout Method
- Should not be used as a
boundary device
- If used, place a tag on the check valve to
prevent inadvertent removal from the
system
- If possible, establish a vent path between
the check valve and work location
- Tag the vent path if possible
The task was designed to allow the applicants to receive credit for successful completion
of the task if single isolation was used on the discharge side of FWP-7 if SSO
permission was obtained and the special instructions in the clearance order contained a
notification to the work group. When using single valve isolation, the applicants were
required to either write these administrative requirements on the clearance order, or
state to the examiner that these administrative requirements would apply.
The Job Performance Measure (JPM) Task Standard, the standard that was required to
be met in order to successfully complete the task, was to develop the clearance
boundary in accordance with OPS-NGGC-1301. Therefore, the NRC disagrees with the
licensees contention because OPS-NGGC-1301 requires either double isolation on the
discharge side of FWP-7 OR that SSO permission is obtained for single isolation and
that the work group notification is stated in the special instructions. OPS-NGGC-1301
also states that check valves should not be used as a boundary device. The NRC
believes the answer key was correct as written in the approved examination. In order to
complete the task with a satisfactory score, an applicant was required to either use
double isolation on the discharge side of FWP-7 OR obtain SSO permission for using
single isolation and make the appropriate work group notification in the special
instructions of the clearance order.
Enclosure 3
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Crystal River Unit 3
Facility Docket Nos.: 05000302
Operating Tests Administered on: October 22-25, 2007
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit
or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with IP
71111.11, are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee action is
required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, examiners did not observe any
simulation fidelity issues.