ML072760128
| ML072760128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/2007 |
| From: | Chamberlain D Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Rosenblum R Southern California Edison Co |
| References | |
| 4-2007-016, EA-07-232, FOIA/PA-2011-0221 IR-07-016 | |
| Download: ML072760128 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000361/2007016
Text
September 27, 2007
Richard M. Rosenblum
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
SUBJECT:
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 05000361/2007016; 05000362/2007016, AND NRC INVESTIGATION
REPORT 4-2007-016
Dear Mr. Rosenblum:
This refers to information provided by your staff at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
on December 29, 2006, which indicated that a qualified contract fire protection specialist
falsified records for fire watch rounds. Specifically, the Fire Watch Certification Sheets were
falsified to indicate that hourly fire watch rounds had been completed when they had not been
completed. Subsequently, your investigation indicated that this individual had falsified fire
watch records in this manner from April 2001 to December 2006. As a result of San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Stations notification, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an
investigation on January 9, 2007, into the circumstances surrounding this matter. NRC
Inspection Report 05000528/2007016; 05000362/2007016 has been assigned to this case.
Based on the results of the OI investigation, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9 and San
Onofre Units 2 and 3 License Condition 2.C(14), Fire Protection, was identified and is being
considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. Part 50.9 of Title 10 of the Codes of Federal
Regulations states, in part, that information required by regulation or license condition to be
maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. The
approved Fire Protection Program requires that compensatory fire watch rounds be performed
for degraded or inoperable required fire protection features, including maintaining a record of
the completion of the time, date and location of rounds performed on Fire Watch Certification
Sheets. The apparent violation involves inaccurate information (the falsified Fire Watch
Certification Sheets) on a required record, as well as the failure to perform required
compensatory fire watch rounds. The NRC is concerned that this apparent violation may have
involved willfulness in the form of deliberate misconduct. A factual summary of the OI report is
enclosed.
Southern California Edison Company
-2-
In response to this event, your staff performed an investigation into the circumstances. The
contractor company unfavorably terminated the worker, and your staff made entries to reflect
this in the Personnel Access Data System. Additional corrective action was taken to improve
oversight and verification to ensure that fire watch rounds were being performed and
documented as required. By checking Fire Watch Certification Sheets against security access
printouts, as well as interviews, you also determined that this issue was limited to only the
individual in question, and that the conditions that permitted this to go unnoticed for so long
were specific to the midnight shift.
Our assessment concluded that the missed fire watch rounds, absent the willful aspect, have
very low safety significance based on a bounding risk analysis. This is primarily because of the
robust nature of defense in depth used in the fire protection program and plant design. The risk
was partially mitigated by the fact that there was never a time period in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
before another person performed a fire watch round, since fire watch rounds were swapped
every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
The NRC is considering escalated enforcement due to the apparent willfulness involved with
this apparent violation and because of the lack of management oversight over fire watches
during the midnight shift for an extended period of time. Willful violations are a particular
concern to the Commission because its regulatory program is based on licensees and their
employees acting with integrity. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than
the underlying noncompliance if it involves willfulness. It is particularly concerning that your
programs did not contain supervisory oversight of the contractor or periodic audits to confirm
that fire watch rounds were being performed as required, as evidenced by the fact that this
apparent violation continued for 51/2 years.
The circumstances surrounding these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and
the need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with members of your staff at
the inspection exit meeting on September 26, 2006. Before the NRC makes its enforcement
decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either: (1) respond to the apparent violation
addressed in this letter within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a predecisional
enforcement conference.
If you request a predecisional enforcement conference, its purpose will be to obtain information
to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. This may include information to
determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation,
information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective
actions taken or planned to be taken. The conference will provide an opportunity for you to
provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC
should take into consideration in making an enforcement decision. The conference will be
closed to public observation, and will be transcribed.
Southern California Edison Company
-3-
Regardless of which option you select, we request that your staff provide information regarding
the following issues:
We are interested in your assessment of the causes of this issue, and whether similar
conditions exist in other organizations doing work for you.
We are interested in your oversight controls for contractor personnel in general, and
specifically for fire protection specialists. In particular, we are interested in
organizational issues that permitted this problem to have gone undetected for a
prolonged period.
We would like to know how your programs addressed industry operating experience,
including NRC Information Notices, which reported problems with fire watches not being
performed, particularly by contract personnel.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a "Response to An
Apparent Violation in Inspection Report Nos. 05000361/2007016; 05000362/2007016;
EA-07-232" and should include: (1) the reason for the apparent violation, or, if contested, the
basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the
results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4)
the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include
previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required
response. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of
time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or
schedule a predecisional enforcement conference.
Instead of a predecisional enforcement conference or responding in writing, you may request
alternative dispute resolution with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. Alternative
dispute resolution is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflict
outside of court using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ
is mediation. Additional information concerning the NRC's program is described in the enclosed
brochure (NUREG/BR-0317) and can be obtained at www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution at Cornell University
has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as an intake neutral. Please contact the Institute on
Conflict Resolution at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested
in pursing resolution of this issue through alternative dispute resolution.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being
issued for the inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number
and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may
change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of
the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Please contact Linda Smith at (817) 860-8137 within 7 days of the date of this letter to notify the
NRC of your intended response.
Southern California Edison Company
-4-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs
document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy,
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without
redaction.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Dwight D. Chamberlain, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No.05-361, 05-362
Enclosure:
1. Factual Summary of OI Report 4-2007-016
cc
Chairman, Board of Supervisors
County of San Diego
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335
San Diego, CA 92101
Gary L. Nolff
Assistant Director-Resources
City of Riverside
3900 Main Street
Riverside, CA 92522
Mark L. Parsons
Deputy City Attorney
City of Riverside
3900 Main Street
Riverside, CA 92522
Dr. David Spath, Chief
Division of Drinking Water and
Environmental Management
California Department of Health Services
850 Marina Parkway, Bldg P, 2 Floor
nd
Richmond, CA 94804
Southern California Edison Company
-5-
Michael J. DeMarco
San Onofre Liaison
San Diego Gas & Electric Company
8315 Century Park Ct. CP21G
San Diego, CA 92123-1548
Director, Radiological Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Mayor
City of San Clemente
100 Avenida Presidio
San Clemente, CA 92672
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Sacramento, CA 95814
Douglas K. Porter, Esq.
Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, CA 91770
Mr. Raymond W. Waldo, Vice President,
Nuclear Generation
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
A. Edward Scherer
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Brian Katz
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Southern California Edison Company
-6-
Mr. Steve Hsu
Department of Health Services
Radiologic Health Branch
MS 7610, P.O. Box 997414
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Mr. James T. Reilly
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Southern California Edison Company
-7-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EEC)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRP Deputy Director (AXV)
Senior Resident Inspector (CCO1)
Branch Chief, DRS/EB2 (LJS)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (JAC)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (GDR)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (GBM)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (CJP)
RITS Coordinator (MSH3)
V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)
D. Pelton, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DLP)
ROPreports
K. S. Fuller, RC/ACES (KSF)
C. A. Carpenter, D:OE (CAC)
OE:EA File (RidsOeMailCenter)
M. Burrell, OE (MRB3)
M. Ashley, NRR (MAB)
M. Vasquez, RIV (GMV)
C. Maier, RIV (MCM1)
W. Maier, RIV (WAM)
R4ALLEGATION
J. McArthur, OI (JCM4)
D. White, D/OI RIV (DBW)
SUNSI Review Completed: _NFO_ ADAMS: X Yes
G No Initials: _NFO_
X Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive
X Non-Sensitive
S:\\DRS\\REPORTS\\SO 2007016 NFOtk.wpd
ACES
EB2
C:EB2
C:RPBE
D:DRP
RC/ACES
GMVasquez
NFOKeefe
LJSmith
JAClark
ATHowell
KFuller
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/RA/
/RA/
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/RA/
NA
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D:DRS
DDChamberlain
/RA/
09/27/07
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
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Enclosure 1
FACTUAL SUMMARY OF OI INVESTIGATION
REPORT NO. 4-2007-016
On January 9, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of
Investigations (OI), Region IV (RIV) Field Office, initiated an investigation to determine if a
qualified fire protection specialist at Southern California Edisons San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station (SONGS) deliberately falsified compensatory fire watch records.
On December 29, 2006, a manager at the SONGS facility provided information to the resident
inspectors indicating that a contract firewatch failed to perform required firewatch tours and
falsified fire watch logs. The previous day, a contract supervisor identified this when he
positioned himself in a fire area requiring a firewatch tour, but the firewatch did not enter the
room. Upon investigation, the firewatch logs were signed indicating the tour was completed
during the period the supervisor was in the room, but security data indicated that the firewatch
had not entered the plant. The individual was interviewed before returning to work and was
uncooperative, but did not deny failing to conduct the required checks. The individual was
denied access to the plant and was unfavorably terminated.
The individual had been a fire protection specialist performing firewatch duties at SONGS for
approximately 20 years. The individual was fully trained to perform the duties assigned. The
individual had been a fire protection shift supervisor prior to 2001, when the contract was
revised to have utility personnel perform supervision of firewatches. The individual was then
reassigned as a firewatch on the midnight shift.
The licensees investigation report indicated that the individual consistently failed to perform
firewatch rounds between May 2001, and December 28, 2006. The review sampled roughly
one shift per month, and indicated that the individual failed to complete rounds during 22 out of
33 shifts sampled, with discrepancies noted in 32 of those shifts. The individual performed
rounds inconsistently during April 2006. This conclusion was based on a sampling of dates
using a site sampling procedure, by comparing firewatch logs to security access data. Similar
checks for all other firewatch personnel noted no other inconsistencies.
The licensees investigation indicated that the individual had a good reputation as a worker, and
had trained other firewatches in the proper performance of their duties. Also, other workers had
noticed that the individual appeared to complete rounds faster than other firewatches.
However, the individual took action to cover up not performing rounds, such as moving the
individuals hardhat and clipboard to different positions. The individual was never observed to
be asleep, but was occasionally noted to somewhat inattentive in front of a computer. The
individual was generally assigned to work with relatively new people on the midnight shift, and
these workers may have been less suspicious. Also, the firewatch personnel only saw each
other briefly to swap rounds, and would not actually observe performance of firewatch rounds.
-2-
Enclosure 1
A PROTRAC device, a type of bar code reader, had been used in the past to track completion
of firewatch rounds. A firewatch would be assigned to scan a bar coded label in each fire area
requiring an inspection, ensuring physical presence in the correct areas. However, the
requirement to use the PROTRAC device was removed as a procedure requirement in 2001.
The signed firewatch logs were then used as a round completion record.
During an interview with OI on May 16, 2007, the individual verified employment and job
assignment, but provided no additional information useful to the investigation.
Based on the information developed during the OI investigation, the NRC is concerned that the
contract fire watch employee at SONGS deliberately failed to conduct required fire protection
surveillances and falsified firewatch logs..