Text

IR 05000220-06-011, 05000410-06-011; 10/16/06 - 1/09/07; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2; Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11
	ML070440231
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	02/13/2007
From:	Blough A; Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	O'Connor T; Nine Mile Point
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ML053400259	List: ML070440231;
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	EA-07-001 IR-06-011
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February 13, 2007

EA-07-001

Mr. Timothy J. OConnor

Vice President Nine Mile Point

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC

P.O. Box 63

Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NRC LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM INSPECTION

REPORT 05000220/2006011 AND 05000410/2006011;

PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION

Dear Mr. OConnor:

During the period October 16, 2006 through January 9, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) conducted an inspection of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Licensed

Operator Requalification Program activities. The enclosed report documents the inspection

findings, which were discussed on January 18, 2007 in an onsite exit meeting with you and

members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel. The inspection consisted of a review of the licensed operator requalification

program. Findings identified during the inspection are discussed in detail in the enclosed

inspection report.

This report documents a preliminary White finding that appears to have low to moderate safety

significance. As described in Section 1.R11 of this report, your Licensed Operator

Requalification Training Program allowed operating crews to validate simulator exam scenarios

that were substantially the same as those that were later administered to these crews as part of

their annual operating test. This shortcoming had the unintentional effect of compromising

your Unit 1 2005 and 2006 dynamic simulator exam scenarios. The apparent compromise of

the 2005 Unit 1 simulator exam scenarios is considered more serious and the basis for the

preliminary White finding since the apparent compromise was not corrected by Constellation

prior to returning licensed operators to normal duties. In contrast, for the 2006 exam

compromise problems Constellation took remedial actions by retesting all operators prior to the

end of the exam cycle. This finding was assessed using the Operator Requalification Human

Performance Significance Determination Process as a potentially safety significant finding that

was preliminarily determined to be White; i.e., a finding with some increased importance to

safety, which may require additional NRC inspection. The issue has a low to moderate safety

significance because it represented a failure to recognize and correct an apparent examination

compromise of the 2005 Unit 1 simulator exam scenarios, and a subsequent return to normal

T. OConnor 2

watch-standing duties by the licensed operators without adequate compensatory actions for the

compromised examinations. This finding was not an immediate safety concern for the following

reasons: (1) there were no significant plant performance issues related to operator knowledge

and abilities; (2) all licensed operators had participated in a continuous requalification training

program; (3) this issue, while pervasive, was limited to the 2005 and 2006 exams and did not

extend to the 2004 exams; and (4) Constellation took immediate remedial actions by

invalidating the simulator exam scenario portion of the 2006 annual operating exams and

administering new and more comprehensive simulator exam scenarios to all licensed operators

upon discovery of this concern by the NRC.

The finding is also an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for

escalated enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which can be found

on the NRCs web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Before we make a final decision regarding the preliminary White finding, we are providing you

an opportunity (1) to attend a Regulatory Conference where you can present to the NRC your

perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and assess its

significance, or (2) submit your position on the finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a

Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we

encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in

an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is

held, it will be open for public observation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such

submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter.

Please contact Mr. Marvin Sykes at (610) 337-5046 within 10 business days of the date of your

receipt of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within

10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision and you

will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being

issued for this inspection preliminary White finding at this time. In addition, please be advised

that the number and characterization of the apparent violation described in the enclosed

inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.

In addition, the report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance

(Green). One of these findings was determined to involve a Unit 2 violation of NRC

requirements involving similar but less significant exam compromise issues to those identified

for Unit 1 for reasons detailed in the enclosed report. The unintentional 2006 Unit 2 simulator

exam scenario compromise was assessed separately due to Unit 1 and 2 plant design

differences that require unique training programs for each unit, as well as unique plant and

operator licenses. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is

entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the Unit 2 exam compromise

finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement

Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of

this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Nine Mile Point

Nuclear Station.

T. OConnor 3

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Sincerely,

/RA/

A. Randolph Blough, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No: 50-220, 50-410

License No: DPR-63, NPF-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000220/2006011 and 05000410/2006011

T. OConnor 4

cc w/encl:

M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Generation

M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

C. W. Fleming, Esquire, Senior Counsel, Constellation Energy Group, LLC

M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn

P. Smith, President, New York State Energy, Research, and Development Authority

J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

P. D. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service

C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law

Supervisor, Town of Scriba

T. Judson, Central NY Citizens Awareness Network

D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network

T. Shortell, Manager, Nuclear Training

S. Glenn, INPO

T. OConnor 5

Distribution w/encl:

ADAMS (PARS)

SECY

CA

OEMAIL

OEWEB

L Reyes, EDO

W Kane, DEDR

C Carpenter, OE

L Lopez, OE

O Samuel, OE

D Solorio, OE

L Trocine, OE

L Chandler, OGC

B Jones, OGC

M Elwood, OGC

J Dyer, NRR

M Weber, NRR

B Boger, NRR

D. Pickett, PM, NRR

P. Milano, PM (backup) NRR

M. David, NRR

J Lamb, OEDO

S Collins, RA

M Dapas, DRA

Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV

E Hayden, OPA

H Bell, OIG

G Caputo, OI

L Tremper, OC

D Screnci/N Sheehan, RI

B. McDermott, DRP

K Farrar, RI

D Holody, RI

R Summers, RI

C ODaniell, RI

J Schlueter, FSME

RidsFSMEdmssa

R1DRP_Mail

Region I OE Files (with concurrences)

A. R. Blough, DRS

J. Caruso, Chief Examiner, DRS

L. Cline, SRI - NMP

E. Knutson, RI - NMP

K. Kolek, OA - NMP

DRS Master Exam File ©. Bixler (w/concurrences)

DRS File

T. OConnor 6

C:\FileNet\ML070440231.wpd

SUNSI Review Complete: JGC (Reviewers Initials)

DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML070440231.wpd

After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy

with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/ORA RI/DRS

NAME JCaruso/JGC MSykes/MDS BMcDermott/BJM RSummers/RJS WSchmidt/WLS

DATE 02/05/07 02/05/07 02/07/07 02/06/07 02/06/07

OFFICE RI/DRS

NAME ABlough/ARB

DATE 02/13/07

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No: 50-220, 50-410

License No: DPR-63, NPF-69

Report Nos: 05000220/2006011, 05000410/2006011

Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS)

Facility: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2

Location: Lake Road

Oswego, NY

Dates: October 16, 2006 - January 9, 2007

Inspectors: J. Caruso, Senior Operations Engineer

P. Presby, Operations Engineer

R. McKinley, Operations Engineer (under-instruction)

J. Sullivan, Operations Engineer (under-instruction)

Approved by: Marvin D. Sykes, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000220/2006-011, 05000410/2006-011; 10/16/06 - 1/09/07; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and

2; Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11.

This inspection was conducted by two NRC region-based inspectors and two inspectors under

instruction. Three Green findings and one Apparent Violation (AV) with potential safety

significance greater than Green, were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated

by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,

Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may

be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program

for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in

NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

TBD. An apparent violation of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and

Tests, was identified, concerning an apparent compromise of the 2005 and the

2006 annual operating exams at Unit 1. NRC inspectors identified practices that

collectively had the impact of compromising, albeit unintentionally, the

examinations; these practices included: 1) a lack of simulator exam scenario

diversity (i.e., The scenarios were substantially the same including: critical tasks;

major transients; Emergency Operating Procedure flow paths; and emergency

classifications); 2) an overuse of a single emergency operating procedure

strategy (i.e., full core Anticipated Transient Without Scram); and 3) a pattern of

crews validating scenarios substantially similar to their exam scenario sets.

Constellation had not identified and compensated for the compromise prior to

completing the 2005 exam and returning the operators to normal control room

duties. Following NRC identification of the compromise in 2006, Constellation

took immediate and substantive corrective actions prior to completion of the

annual operating exam cycle. Based on the Licensed Operator Requalification

Significance Determination Process (SDP) this finding was preliminarily

determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White). The licensee

initiated Condition Report CR-NM-2006-4808, dated October 19, 2006, that

documented this issue and later initiated a Category I Root Cause Analysis (CR-

NM-2006-4808), Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Compromise.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human

Performance attribute of the Initiating Events, Mitigation Systems, and Barrier

Integrity cornerstones and affected the combined objective of: limiting the

likelihood of; ensuring the availability and reliability of mitigating systems to

respond to; and providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect

the public from radio-nuclide releases caused by, initiating events.

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and

resolution because Constellation did not effectively collect, evaluate, and

ii Enclosure

communicate applicable external operating experience to affected internal

stakeholders nor did they conduct self-assessments that were comprehensive,

appropriately objective, and self-critical such that either Unit 1 2005 exam

compromise issues were avoided altogether or identified and corrected prior to

the end of the 2005 annual operating exam cycle. (Section 1R11.1)

Green. A Green NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR55.49 was

identified, concerning an apparent compromise of the 2006 annual operating

requalification examinations at Unit 2. NRC inspectors identified practices that

collectively had the impact of compromising, albeit unintentionally; the

examinations, these practices included: 1) a lack of simulator exam scenario

diversity (i.e., The scenarios were substantially the same including: critical tasks;

major transients; Emergency Operating Procedure flow paths; and emergency

classifications); 2) an overuse of a single emergency operating procedure

strategy (i.e., full core Anticipated Transient Without Scram); and 3) a pattern of

crews validating scenarios substantially similar to their exam scenario sets. The

licensee initiated CR-NM-2006-4808 that documented this concern and later

initiated a Category I Root Cause Analysis.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human

Performance attribute of the Initiating Events, Mitigation Systems, and Barrier

Integrity cornerstones and affected the combined objective of: limiting the

likelihood of; ensuring the availability and reliability of mitigating systems to

respond to; and providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect

the public from radio nuclide releases caused by, initiating events. The finding

was assessed as having very low safety significance because immediate and

substantive corrective actions were taken by Constellation prior to the end of the

current exam cycle.

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and

resolution because Constellation did not effectively collect, evaluate, and

communicate applicable external operating experience to affected internal

stakeholders nor did they conduct self-assessments that were comprehensive,

appropriately objective, and self-critical such that the 2006 Unit 2 exam

compromise issues were either avoided altogether or at least identified and

corrected by Constellation prior to the start of this inspection. (Section 1R11.2)

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified at Unit 1. The

finding was associated with crew performance on the simulator during the 2006

facility-administered requalification examinations. Of the six crews evaluated,

two failed to pass their simulator examinations when the newly developed more

comprehensive exams were re-administered in response to the above noted

preliminary White finding. The failures are documented in licensee-initiated

Condition Report CR 2006-5797, which resulted in Constellation conducting a

Category I Root Cause Analysis.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human

Performance attribute of the Initiating Events, Mitigation Systems, and Barrier

Integrity cornerstones and affected the combined objective of: limiting the

iii Enclosure

likelihood of; ensuring the availability and reliability of mitigating systems to

respond to; and providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect

the public from radio nuclide releases caused by, initiating events. The finding

was assessed as having very low safety significance because: 1) the failures

occurred during annual testing of the operators on the simulator; 2) there were

no actual consequences to the failures; 3) the crews were removed from watch

standing duties, retrained and re-evaluated before they were authorized to return

to control room watches; and, 4) because the crew failure rate for the 2005 Unit

1 Annual Operating Exams was less than 20%. (Section 1R11.3)

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified at Unit 2. The