ML063460247

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LER 06-S01-00 for McGuire Nuclear Station Regarding Unauthorized Individual Escorted Into the Protected Area
ML063460247
Person / Time
Site: McGuire Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/2006
From: Gordon Peterson
Duke Energy Corp
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
M-06-4456 LER 06-S01-00
Download: ML063460247 (6)
v • d • e


Text

GARY R. PETERSON P6Energy Duke Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation MG0O VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.

Huntersville, NC 28078 704 875 5333 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy. corn November 30, 2006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369 Security Event Report 369/2006-SO1 Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-4456 Pursuant to 10 CFR 73 Appendix G, paragraph I(b), attached is Security Event Report 369/2006-S01. This report documents the escort of an unauthorized individual into the protected area.

This event was determined to be of no significance to the health and safety of the public. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this Event Report.

R.

APeterson Attachment www. duke-energy. corn

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 30, 2006 Page 2 cc: W. D. Travers Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 6.1 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. F. Stang (Addressee Only)

NRC Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 J. B. Brady Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Site

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06-30-2007 (6-2004) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See reverse for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, digits/characters for each block) DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to raqnnnrl fn thp infnrmntinn r-nlprtinn

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE McGuire Nuclear Station 05000 369 1 OF 4
4. TITLE Unauthorized Individual Escorted into the Protected Area
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER [ 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I SEQENTIL1RACIACITYN AME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR McGuire 50-370 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 1 2006 2006 - S01 - 00 11 30 2006
9. OPERATING 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMI'TED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

MODE 1 20.2201 (b 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) " _ ,50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER 20.2201 (d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) ,50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL 100 U 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) ,73.71 (a)(4)

___ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(5)

.___ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) OTHER Specify in Abstract below or 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) X in NRC Form 366A

__, 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) X _

___ 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) .r . ,

__._ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) .50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

________ '____ _ i 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) .- __

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME jTELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Kay L. Crane, Regulatory Compliance 1 704-875-4306

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MANLU REPORTABLE MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FA CTURER TO EPIX
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH 2DAY YEAR

. SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete 15.EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

Unit Status: At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power and Unit 2 was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0 percent power.

Event

Description:

On October 1, 2006, it was discovered that an escorted visitor badge was issued and access was granted to the protected area to a vendor employee who was previously denied unescorted access at another nuclear power plant. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 73 Appendix G, paragraph I(b).

Event Cause: The causes are 1) human error due to the failure to self-check and follow the appropriate procedure and 2) a design deficiency with the visitor badge issue process.

Corrective Action: Visitor authorization paperwork was revoked and access was immediately denied. Refresher training was conducted with qualified officers. The visitor badge process will be evaluated for enhancements.

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE I SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station 05000369 2006 - S01 - 00 2 OF 4
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A)

EVENT DESCRIPTION On October 1, 2006 it was discovered that a visitor had been authorized escorted access to the Protected Area (PA) who had previously been denied unescorted access at another nuclear power plant. The denial was based upon a pattern of criminal history not favorably adjudicated. Escorted access was granted on three separate occasions during the period of 9/26/06 through 9/30/06. The Video Badge Network (VBN) officers entered the appropriate data into the Personnel Access Database System (PADS) to validate authorization criteria, received a "Contact Access" indicator and failed to recognize the indicator which is designed to prohibit access to the PA. Data entry into PADS generates one of two indicators: "ID Check OK" or "Contact Access." A "Contact Access" indicator was generated on the individual, however; this status was overlooked by the VBN Officers. The escorted vendor employee was performing welding services on the Unit 2 moisture separator reheater system. A review of badge transactions revealed that the individual did not access any vital areas Of the plant.

Reportable Occurrence This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 73 Appendix G, paragraph I(b) which requires a one hour notification and a written report within sixty days following discovery of an actual entry of an unauthorized person into the PA. The individual was not authorized for PA access per the requirements of the Duke Energy Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan.

CAUSAL FACTORS Two causes were identified: 1) human error due to the failure to self-check and follow the appropriate procedure and 2) a design deficiency with the visitor badge issue process. The terminology in the procedure step was determined to be misleading in that VBN officers expected to see the same indications in the VBN system as in the PADS system. The VBN system is utilized to make unescorted access badges which produce photo identification badges and contains a database for access authorization verification. VBN officers are trained to react to the VBN System indication "NO ACCESS NO ACCESS." This VBN system indication is enclosed in asterisks, repeated, capitalized and seen frequently. The PADS system is an industry computer application used to record access authorization, training, and radiation protection information. In contrast, a "Contact Access" indication in the PADS system is the same size, font and color of other lettering in the system. This is an atypical indication that only applies to applicants who have been denied unescorted access to any nuclear reactor facility in the industry. When access has been previously denied, it is unusual for such individuals to attempt to process through NRC FORM 366A (1-2001)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE' I SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER INUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station 05000369 2006 - S01 - 00 3 OF 4
17. NARRATIVE (If more space isrequired, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) another system unless their situation has been adjudicated. This uncommon indication encountered in the PADS system was a first time evolution for the specific VBN officers other than in their initial training.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Immediate:

1. Visitor authorization paperwork was revoked and access denied.
2. All VBN officers were notified about the incident.
3. Specific critical elements of task were reviewed with on duty and on-coming shift VBN officers.

Subsequent:

1. The VBN officers were coached and counseled on the proper behaviors/expectations for performing associated tasks.
2. Refresher training with qualified VBN officers was conducted on the entire badging process including the lessons learned from this event.
3. The VBN task guide 5000 12A was revised to include a requirement to demonstrate PADS lookup of all types of responses (ID Check OK, Contact Access).

Planned:

1. Perform an evaluation of the visitor badge issue process to include additional barriers where needed.
2. Revise the Security Badging procedure/directive to be consistent in terminology when discussing the PADS operation screen and indicators.
3. Evaluate a revision to the Badge Authorization Form to include VBN/PADS results verification documentation for visitors.
4. Submit a request to the Nuclear Energy Institute to evaluate changing the PADS lookup screen to make the denial message more prominent thus eliminating the human error trap.

NRC FORM 366A (1-2001)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER YEAR NUMBER McGuire Nuclear Station 05000369 2006 - S01 - 00 4 OF 4
17. NARRATIVE (if more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A)

SAFETY ANALYSIS The individual was escorted at all times, did not enter any vital areas and demonstrated no malevolent intent. This event is of no safety significance and resulted in no adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A three year search of the McGuire corrective action database (PIP) and LER database revealed no other similar events. Therefore, this event is not considered recurring.

NRC FORM 366A (1-2001)

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