ML062620341
| ML062620341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/18/2006 |
| From: | Blough A Division of Reactor Safety I |
| To: | Lash J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| EA-06-215 IR-06-009 | |
| Download: ML062620341 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000334/2006009
Text
September 18, 2006
Mr. James Lash
Site Vice President, Beaver Valley Power Station
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATED EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2006009 AND
Dear Mr. Lash:
On August 22, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at your Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), which evaluated the performance of your
emergency response organization during the June 27, 2006, exercise and the post-exercise
critique conducted on June 29, 2006. The inspectors briefed your staff regarding the
preliminary results of this inspection on June 29, 2006. Subsequent to the onsite portion of this
inspection, the team conducted additional interviews and discussions with your staff and
examined additional documents. The NRC conducted the exit meeting for this inspection with
you and members of your staff via telephone conference on August 22, 2006.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed emergency plan procedures and previous drill reports, observed the
exercise activities, and interviewed selected emergency preparedness personnel from your
staff.
This report documents one finding concerning the performance of your staff related to the dose
projections and protective action recommendations made during the exercise. Specifically, the
NRC inspection team noted that your dose assessment team made dose projections without a
sound technical basis for some of the inputs, in that the technical support center staff was not
relied on to characterize the source of the release nor to determine a projected release
duration. This deficiency is similar to an NRC-identified weakness in your May 2004 exercise,
which was detailed in NRC Inspection Report Numbers 05000334/2004008 and
05000412/2004008. Facility licensees, such as BVPS, are required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.F.2.g, to correct all exercise critique weaknesses, including those identified by the
NRC. The 2006 NRC team reviewed your staffs corrective actions for the 2004 exercise
weakness and determined that those corrective actions had not been effective in that a similar
weakness recurred in the 2006 exercise.
2
J. Lash
This finding was assessed using the emergency preparedness Significance Determination
Process (SDP) and was preliminarily determined to be White (i.e., a finding with some
increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspection). The finding
appears to have low to moderate safety significance because not adequately correcting the
BVPS process for dose projection may adversely impact the timeliness and adequacy of PARs
made in the event of a radiological release from BVPS.
This finding is an apparent violation of NRC requirements specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.F.2.g, and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with
the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current policy is included on the NRC's website at
http://www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Enforcement Policy.
We believe that we have sufficient information to make our final risk determination for the
performance issue involving the inadequate corrective actions for a previously-identified
emergency preparedness exercise weakness. However, before the NRC makes a final
decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to: (1) present to the NRC your
perspective on the facts and assumptions used by the NRC to arrive at the finding and its
significance at a Regulatory Conference, or (2) submit your position on the finding to the NRC
in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of receipt of
this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to
the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory
Conference is held, it will be open for public observation and a press release will be issued to
announce it. If you decide to provide a written response in lieu of the Regulatory Conference,
the submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter.
Please contact Mr. Raymond Lorson at (610) 337-5282 within 10 business days of the date of
this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within that time,
we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision, and you will be
advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter. Since
the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being issued
for the inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the characterization of
the apparent violation described in this letter may change as a result of further NRC review.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
A. Randolph Blough, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412
3
J. Lash
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000334/2006009 and 05000412/2006009
w/Attachments: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
G. Leidich, President and Chief Nuclear Officer
J. Hagan, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer
D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering
J. Rinckel, Vice President, Fleet Oversight
L. Myers, Executive Vice President, Special Projects
R. Anderson, Vice President, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Manager, Fleet Licensing, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
R. Mende, Director, Site Operations
T. Cosgrove, Director, Maintenance
P. Sena, Director, Engineering
L. Freeland, Director, Site Performance Improvement and Manager, Regulatory Compliance
D. Jenkins, Attorney, FENOC
B. Sepelak, Supervisor, Nuclear Compliance
M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA
D. Allard, PADEP
C. OClaire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio
Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio
Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of Ohio
D. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia
J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia
W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency
J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club
A. King, PA Emergency Management Agency (PEMA)
Darrell Hammons, RAC Chair, DHS Region III
4
J. Lash
Distribution w/encl:
S. Collins, RA
M. Dapas, DRA
R. Bellamy, DRP
R. Fuhrmeister, DRP
B. Sosa, OEDO
R. Laufer, NRR
R. Guzman, NRR
P. Cataldo - Senior Resident Inspector
P. Garrett - Resident OA
M. Satorius, DRS-RIII
ROPreports@nrc.gov
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
SECY
OEMAIL
OEWEB
L. Reyes, EDO
W. Kane, DEDR
L. Lopez, OE
O. Samuel, OE
L. Chandler, OGC
B. Jones, OGC
M. Elwood, OGC
J. Schlueter, OSTP
J. Dyer, NRR
M. Weber, NRR
B. Boger, NRR
Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV
E. Hayden, OPA
H. Bell, OIG
G. Caputo, OI
L. Tremper, OC
D. Screnci/N. Sheehan, PAO, RI
D. Holody, EO, RI
K. Farrar, ORA
R. Summers, ORA, RI
R1DRP_Mail
R. Kahler, NSIR/EPD
S. LaVie, NSIR/EPD
A. Blough, DRS
M. Gamberoni, DRS
R. Lorson, DRS
S. Barr, DRS
Region I OE Files (w/concurrences)
4
J. Lash
Distribution w/encl:
S. Collins, RA
M. Dapas, DRA
R. Bellamy, DRP
R. Fuhrmeister, DRP
B. Sosa, OEDO
R. Laufer, NRR
R. Guzman, NRR
P. Cataldo - Senior Resident Inspector
P. Garrett - Resident OA
M. Satorius, DRS-RIII
ROPreports@nrc.gov
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
SECY
OEMAIL
OEWEB
L. Reyes, EDO
W. Kane, DEDR
L. Lopez, OE
O. Samuel, OE
L. Chandler, OGC
B. Jones, OGC
M. Elwood, OGC
J. Schlueter, OSTP
J. Dyer, NRR
M. Weber, NRR
B. Boger, NRR
Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV
E. Hayden, OPA
H. Bell, OIG
G. Caputo, OI
L. Tremper, OC
D. Screnci/N. Sheehan, PAO, RI
D. Holody, EO, RI
K. Farrar, ORA
R. Summers, ORA, RI
R1DRP_Mail
R. Kahler, NSIR/EPD
S. LaVie, NSIR/EPD
A. Blough, DRS
M. Gamberoni, DRS
R. Lorson, DRS
S. Barr, DRS
Region I OE Files (w/concurrences)
SUNSI Review Complete: STB (Reviewers Initials)
DOCUMENT NAME: E:\\Filenet\\ML062620341.wpd
After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE
RI/DRS
RI/DRS
RI/DRS/SRA
RI/ORA
RI/DRS
NAME
SBarr/STB
RLorson/NSP for
WCook/WAC
DHolody/RJS for
ABlough/ARB
DATE
09/15/06
09/15/06
09/15/06
09/18/06
09/18/06
OFFICE
NAME
DATE
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Enclosure
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket Nos:
50-334, 50-412
License Nos:
Report Nos:
05000334/2006009, 05000412/2006009
Licensee:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
Dates:
June 26 - August 22, 2006
Inspectors:
S. Barr, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Lead)
S. LaVie, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist (NSIR)
P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Werkheiser, Resident Inspector
M. Brown, Operations Engineer
Approved by:
Raymond K. Lorson, Chief
Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
ii
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000334/2006009, 05000412/2006009; 06/26/2006 - 08/22/2006; Beaver Valley Nuclear
Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Exercise Evaluation.
The report documents an inspection of the Beaver Valley emergency preparedness exercise
conducted on June 27, 2006. The inspection was conducted by NRC regional and
headquarters inspectors. One apparent violation (AV) with potential low to moderate safety
significance was identified (Preliminary White). The significance of most findings is indicated by
their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may
be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
Preliminary White. The inspector identified an apparent violation for the
licensees failure to provide adequate corrective actions to a previously-identified
emergency preparedness exercise weakness. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.F.2.g, requires that any emergency preparedness weakness or deficiency that
is identified shall be corrected. An apparent violation of that requirement was
identified involving the licensees failure to adequately correct a performance
deficiency in the area of Protective Action Recommendation development
identified by the NRC in the May 2004 evaluated exercise. Specifically, in the
2006 exercise, the licensee dose assessment team did not adequately consider
plant-specific situational information to develop the best dose projection estimate
achievable at the time, which was an apparent repeat of a problem exhibited in
the 2004 exercise. The licensees 2006 performance regarding the development
of a dose projection without a sound technical basis demonstrated that the
licensee had implemented ineffective corrective actions for the 2004 inspection
finding.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency
Response Organization Performance attribute and affected the objective of the
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone to ensure that the licensee is capable of
implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in
the event of a radiological emergency. The Emergency Preparedness SDP,
Section 5.3, Failure to Correct Drill or Exercise Weaknesses, was used to
evaluate the significance of this finding. Because the licensees corrective
actions were not adequate and the weakness involved a Risk Significant
Planning Standard area that is not covered by performance indicators (i.e.,
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)), a loss of planning standard function was assessed,
resulting in a White finding. (Section 1EP1)
Enclosure
Report Details
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (71114.01 - 1 Sample)
a.
Inspection Scope
Prior to the exercise, an in-office review was conducted of the exercise objectives and
scenario submitted to the NRC to determine if the exercise would test major elements of
the emergency plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14). The evaluation of the
licensees performance during the exercise is described below. Overall, this inspection
activity represents the completion of one sample on a biennial cycle.
The exercise evaluation consisted of the following review and assessment:
The adequacy of Beaver Valleys performance in the biennial full-participation
exercise regarding the implementation of the risk-significant planning standards
(RSPS) in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), (5), (9) & (10) which are emergency
classification, offsite notification, radiological assessment, and protective action
recommendations, respectively.
The overall adequacy of Beaver Valleys emergency response facilities with
regard to NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,
and Emergency Plan commitments. The facilities assessed were the control
room simulator, the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support
Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Other performance areas, such as the emergency response organizations
(EROs) recognition of abnormal plant conditions, command and control, intra-
and inter-facility communications, prioritization of mitigation activities, utilization
of repair and field monitoring teams, interface with offsite agencies, staffing and
procedure adequacy, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan and
its implementing procedures.
Past performance issues from the last NRC exercise report and Beaver Valleys
drill reports to determine effectiveness of corrective actions as demonstrated
during this exercise to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14).
The post-exercise critique to evaluate Beaver Valleys self-assessment of its
ERO performance during the exercise and to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.F.2.g.
The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to this report.
2
Enclosure
b.
Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E,
Section IV.F.2.g, for failure to correct a previously identified exercise weakness.
Specifically, the inspectors identified a performance deficiency in the licensees method
of dose projection, potentially affecting their ability to make the proper protective action
recommendation (PAR). This performance issue appeared to be similar to a weakness
that the licensee failed to critique in the May 2004 exercise, which was documented in
NRC Inspection Report 50-334 & 412/2004008.
Description The 2006 exercise scenario involved a containment bypass event, where
the offsite dose occurred primarily due to an exothermic reaction in the charcoal filter
beds, releasing the accumulated radiological particulates into the atmosphere. The
licensee Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection (EA&DP) team did dose
calculations assuming a one-hour release, not as a default number, but because they
believed the duration of the release could not be estimated. This assumption was
clearly recognized by the remainder of the EA&DP team. When the plant conditions
indicated the release would last greater than one hour, the EA&DP team performed an
additional dose assessment and suggested to the states that the second assessment be
added to the first. These activities were performed in accordance with site procedures
(e.g., Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.3, Step 8.1.2.4.1), which state that, if the duration of
the release cannot be estimated, then use 1.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and repeat the projection as better
data become available. The NRC team observed that the EA&DP team did not
estimate the release duration, nor did they confer with the technical support center
(TSC) staff to develop a technically-sound release duration estimate. The EA&DP team
used this non-default one-hour release duration, rather than making a dose projection
based on the actual current plant conditions.
In the 2004 evaluated exercise, the licensee EA&DP team performed dose projection
calculations using the default one-hour release time. The use of the default release
duration was invalid during this exercise because less than one full train of containment
spray was available. The one-hour release projection is based in part on a design
assumption that the operation of the containment spray will restore the containment to
sub-atmospheric pressure within an hour. The EA&DP team was not aware of the
degraded containment spray capability and used the default one hour release duration.
The NRC team noted that licensee players in the TSC were aware that less than one full
train of containment spray was available, yet they did not provide any technical input for
the estimation of a projected release duration. The 2004 inspection concluded that,
although EA&DP personnel were aware throughout the exercise of releases and release
rates via the radiation monitors, the licensee used an invalid release duration time in the
dose projections and that they also did not know the basis for the one hour release time.
The NRC issued a Green Finding for the failure of the licensee exercise critique to
identify an invalid radiological release duration time.
3
Enclosure
In both the 2004 and 2006 exercises, the licensee used a one-hour release duration
after they did not obtain a release duration from the TSC. In both cases, since the
exercise scenarios involved events which challenged the basis for the default one-hour
release duration, the EA&DP team should have recognized that a projected release
duration of greater than one hour would have been appropriate. As stated in the 2004
inspection report and as observed by the 2006 inspection team, this practice can
reasonably be seen to adversely affect the PAR if the dose from subsequent hours
results in a significant dose to the public. The lack of communication and technical
analysis was not identified by the licensee as a contributing cause in their followup of the
2004 NRC finding, and no corrective actions were implemented in this regard. Similarly
in the 2006 exercise, the EA&DP personnel did not obtain a release duration estimate
from the TSC and resorted to the one-hour non-default release time. The licensees
reliance on using a one-hour release duration, and then repeating an analysis when
better data became available, did not ensure the accurate assessment of the magnitude
of the offsite release based on best-available information.
The NRC reviewed the licensee corrective actions implemented in response to the 2004
finding. Corrective actions included a review of: the Final Safety Analysis Report basis
for the one hour duration; dose assessment processes and procedures; and associated
training. The licensee concluded, in Condition Report (CR) 04-04232-01 and -04, that
the one hour default release time is appropriate for Beaver Valley Power Station and
revision to the procedures referenced in this CA are not necessary. Further, CR 04-
04966-01 concluded that CR 04-04966 and CR 04-04232 were reviewed at Rad-Pro
TAC Meeting 04-09" and no further actions are required by RP training on these CRs
because the conditions described in the CRs are addressed in the applicable
Emergency Response training lessons.
The inspectors determined that the corrective actions had been narrowly focused on
establishing the validity of the one-hour default release duration, and did not address the
potential non-conservative impact of this default value on protective action
recommendations. The licensee performed a review of the BVPS design basis accident
release durations (ranging from 15 minutes to 30 days) and also considered default
durations obtained from other sites. Although the licensee determined that one hour
was valid, the basis of how the disparate release durations were reduced to a generally
applicable one-hour default was not evident. Since the licensee determined the one-
hour default as being adequate, corrective actions were largely limited to adding a
precaution requiring users to consider the bases of the default duration, with an explicit
example of ...one full train of containment sprays, etc... The inspectors determined
that the dose assessment procedure emphasis remained focused on the one-hour
default, rather than on developing an estimated release duration based on plant-specific
information. Changes to licensee emergency response organization computer-based
training were apparently limited to cross-referencing the added precautions. Based on
the observation of the 2006 exercise, the NRC inspectors determined that the
corrective actions had been ineffective. Specifically, the EA&DP personnel did not
request nor receive any technical assessment of the radiation release duration from the
TSC and used the non-default one-hour duration when it was not supported by the
plant condition. The licensee continued to make dose projections without a sound
4
Enclosure
technical basis, which had the potential to adversely impact the timeliness and accuracy
of the PARs.
Analysis. The inspectors determined that the licensee did not take adequate corrective
actions (e.g., proper procedure changes) to prevent recurrence of the weakness
identified in the 2004 evaluated exercise, which was the failure to determine a sound
technical basis for the release projection time used in the formulation of PARs.
Therefore, the performance deficiency in the 2006 exercise was the failure to correct an
exercise weakness, as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(14). The observed weakness
directly related to the licensees ability to provide adequate methods for assessing actual
or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition, as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency
Preparedness Significance Determination Process, states, under Section 5.3, Failure to
Correct Drill or Exercise Weakness:
If corrective actions are not adequate and the WEAKNESS involves a Risk
Significant Planning Standard (RSPS) area that is not covered by the DEP PI
(e.g., 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)), the NRC staff should assess a LOSS OF PS
FUNCTION (i.e., a White finding). All non-RSPS areas would be Green.
In this case, the planning standard function lost was 10CFR50.47(b)(14), which requires
licensees to correct deficiencies identified as a result of exercises and drills. The
licensees failure to comply with this standard is the entry point in Sheet 1 of the EP
SDP. The specific problem was a planning standard problem, but not a risk significant
planning standard problem. The Sheet 1 logic shows that a planning standard problem
that results in a planning standard function failure (as the above citation from the SDP
Section 5.3 defines) is a White finding.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.g requires , in part, that any
weaknesses or deficiencies that are identified in an emergency preparedness exercise
shall be corrected. Contrary to that requirement, FENOC failed to adequately correct a
performance deficiency in the area of PAR development identified by the NRC in the
May 2004 evaluated exercise. Specifically, in the 2006 exercise the licensee dose
assessment team failed to consider plant-specific situational information to develop the
best dose projection estimate achievable at the time, which was a repeat of the
deficiency exhibited in the 2004 exercise. This finding is identified as an apparent
violation in accordance with Section VI.A.5.b of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (AV
05000334/2006009-01, 05000412/2006009-01)
5
Enclosure
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151- 3 Samples)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed data for the EP PIs which are: (1) Drill and Exercise
Performance (DEP); (2) ERO Drill Participation; and (3) Alert and Notification System
(ANS) Reliability. The inspectors reviewed supporting documentation from drills and
tests from all four quarters of 2005, and the first quarter of 2006, to verify the accuracy
of the reported data. The review of these performance indicators was conducted in
accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance criteria used for
the review were 10 CFR 50.9 and NEI 99-02, Revision 2, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guidelines. This inspection activity represented the completion
of three samples on an annual cycle.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
40A6
Meetings, including Exit
The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. James Lash, Beaver
Valley Power Station Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff, at the
conclusion of the onsite inspection on June 29, 2006. Due to the preliminary nature of
those results, the NRC inspection team subsequently conducted additional in-office
inspection activities, including interviews and discussions with BVPS staff and the
examination of additional documentation. The NRC conducted an exit meeting via
telephone conference call with Mr. Lash and other members of his staff on August 22,
2006. No proprietary information was provided to the inspectors during this inspection.
A-1
Attachment
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
J. Lash, Vice President, Beaver Valley Power Station
G. Halnon, Director, FENOC Fleet Regulatory Affairs
S. Vicinie, Manager, Beaver Valley Emergency Preparedness
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000334/2006009-01, 05000412/2006009-01
Failure to provide adequate
corrective actions to a previously-
identified emergency preparedness
exercise weakness.
Closed
None.
Discussed
None.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1EP1: Exercise Evaluation
BVPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
BVPS Evaluated Exercise Executive Summary
BVPS Evaluated Exercise Scope and Objectives
BVPS Evaluated Exercise Scenario and Radiological Release Data
BVPS Evaluated Exercise Event Logs
Procedure 1/2-EPP-I-5, General Emergency (Revision 22)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6, Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection Controlling
Procedure (Revision 17)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.1, Dose Projection - Backup Methods (Revisions 13)
A-2
Attachment
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.2, Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With FSAR Defaults
(Revision 13)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.3, Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With Real Time Inputs
(Revisions 11, 12, and 13)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.4, Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With Manual Inputs
(Revisions 12, 13, and 14)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.5, Alternate Meteorological Parameters (Revision 11)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.6, Dose Projection By hand Calculation Known Isotopic Release
(Revision 7)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.7, Release Source Term Determination Based On Field
Measurements (Revision 9)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.8, Dose Assessment Based On Environmental Measurements and
Samples (Revision 7)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.9, Integrated Dose Assessment (Revision 7)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.10, Ground Contamination Assessment and Protective Actions
(Revision 8)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.11, Dose Projections Miscellaneous Data (Revision 12)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.12, Dose Projections - ARERAS/MIDAS With Severe Accident
Assessment (Revision 10)
Procedure 1/2-EPP-IP-4.1, Offsite Protective Actions (Revisions 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22)
CR 04-04063, ERO Evaluated Exercise Recognition of Equipment Failure
CR 04-04071, Evaluated Exercise: Improve Methods for Determining Release Duration
CR 04-04081, Logic in Initial PAR Did Not Meet Procedural Requirements
CR 04-04232, Evaluated Exercise Potential Green Finding for Critique Failure
Supplemental Information from the BVPS Evaluated Exercise (dated July 10, 2006)
Additional Information from the BVPS Evaluated Exercise (dated July 12, 2006)
Additional Information from the BVPS Evaluated Exercise (dated August 3, 2006)
Emergency Recovery Manager Training Material
EA&DP and Environmental Personnel Training Material
Section 4OA1:Performance Indicator Verification
Procedure 1/2-ADM-1111, NRC EPP Performance Indicator Instructions
Drill and Exercise Performance PI Data, January 2005 - March 2006
ERO Drill Participation PI Data, January 2005 - March 2006
Alert and Notification System Reliability PI Data, January 2005 - March 2006
A-3
Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Alert and Notification System
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CR
Condition Report
Drill and Exercise Performance
EA&DP
Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection
Emergency Response Organization
Emergency Response Organization
Final Safety Analysis Report
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
Performance Indicator
Risk Significant Planning Standard