ML061630453

Tech Spec Pages for Amendments 247 and 246 on Revision of Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Listing, Allowed Outage Times, Requirements, and Surveillances

ML061630453
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	05/31/2006
From:	Plant Licensing Branch III-2
To:
Monarque, S R, NRR/DORL, 415-1544
Shared Package
ML061500048	List: ML061500044 ML061630453
References
TAC MC7971, TAC MC7972
Download: ML061630453 (7)

Text

TS 3.7-2

2. With less than the minimum number of explosive gas monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the action shown in Table 3.7-5 (a). Exert best efforts to return the instruments to operable status within 30 days and, if unsuccessful, prepare and submidt a Special Report to the Commission (Region HI) to explain why the inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner.

E. Prior to the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure exceeding 350*F and 450 psig, respectively, the accident monitoring instrumentation listed in Table 3.7-6 shall be OPERABLE in accordance with the following:

1. With one required channel inoperable, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or submit a report to the NRC within the next 14 days. The report shall outline the cause of inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.

2. With two required channels inoperable, either:

a. Restore an inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate function and submit a report to the NRC within the next 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the function, the cause of inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring an inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.

b. If no preplanned alternate method of monitoring the function is available, restore an inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be less than 350*F and 450 psig within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Amendment Nos. 2471246

TS 3.7-7 steam line pressure setting limit is set below the full load operating pressure. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide protection in the event of a large 3

steam line break. ( )

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The primary purpose of accident monitoring instrumentation is to display unit parameters that provide information required by the control room operators during and following accident conditions. In response to NUREG-0737 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Revision 3, a programmatic approach was developed in defining the RG 1.97-required equipment for Surry. The Surry RG 1.97 program review examined existing instrumentation with respect to the RG 1.97 design and qualification requirements. The operability of RG 1.97 instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected unit parameters to monitor and assess unit status and response during and following an accident. The availability of accident monitoring instrumentation is important so that the consequences of corrective actions can be observed and the need for and magnitude of further actions can be determined.

RG 1.97 applied a graded approach to post-accident indication by using a matrix of variable types versus variable categories. RG 1.97 delineates design and qualification criteria for the instrumentation used to measure five variable types (Types A, B, C, D, and E). These criteria are divided into thre separate categories (Categories 1, 2, and 3),

providing a graded approach that depended on the importance to safety of the measurement of a specific variable. Category I variables, listed in Table 3.7-6, are defined as follows:

Category I1-are the key variables deemed risk significant because they are needed to:

" Determine wieher= other systems important to safety are performing their intended functions,

" Provide information to the operators that wilil enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the banriers to radioactivity release, and

• Provide information regarding the release of radioactive zniterials to allow early indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public and to estimate the magnitude of any impending threat.

The RG 1.97 criteria on redundancy requirements apply to Category 1 variables only and address single-failure criteria and supporting features, including power sources.

Failures of the instrumentation, its supporting features, and/or its power source resulting in less than the required number of channels necessitate entry into the required actions.

AmendrocatNos. 247/246

TS 3.7-8

'The 30 day allowed outage time applies whien one (or more) fuinction(s) in Table 3.7-6 has one required channel that is inoperablee. The 30 day allowed outage time to restore one inoperable required channel to OPERABLE status is appropriate considering the remaining channel is OPERABLE, dhe passive nature of the instrument (i.e., no automatic action is assumed to occur from this instrmnain, and the low probability of an event requiring accident monitoring intuetton during this interval. The 7 day allowed outage time applies when one (or more) function(s) in Table 3.7-6 has two required channels that are inoperable. The 7 day allowed outage time to restore one of the two inoperable required channels to OPERABLE status is appropriate based on providing a reasonable time for the repair and the low probability of an event requiring accident monitoring instrument operation. Long-term operation with two required channels inoperable in a function and with an alternate indication is not acceptable because the alternate indication may not fully meet the performance qualification requirements applied to the accident monitoring instrumentation. Requiring restoration of one of the two inoperable channels limits the risk that the accident monitoring instrumentation function could be in a degraded condition should an accident occur. If there is no preplanned alternate, the 7 day allowed outage time is followed by a requirement to be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be Less than 350*1F and 450 psig within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. If the 30 day allowed outage time or 7 day allowed outage time to restore an inoperable channel to OPERABLE stwats is exceeded and either a redundant channel or a preplanned alternate method of monitoring is OPERABLE, a report to the NRC within the next 14 days is required. The report to the NRC in lieu of a shutdown is appropriate because the instrument functionial capability has not been lost and given the low likelihood of unit conditions that would require the information provided by the accident monitoring instrumentation.

Note that the Categories 2 and 3 RO 1.97 variables are addressed in a licensee controlled document and are defined as follows:

Category 2. - provides less stringent requirements and generally applies to instrumentation designated for indicating system operating status.

Category 3. - is the least stringent and is applied to backup and diagnostic instrumentation.

Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation is provided for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the Waste Gas Holdup System. The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR P=r 50.

Amendment Nos. 247/246

TlS 3.7-9 Non-Essential Service Water Isolation System The operability of this functional system ensures that adequate intake canal inventory can be maintained by the Emergency Service Water Pumps. Adequate intok canal inventory provides design service water flow to the recirculation spray heat exduingers and other essential loads (eg.g, control room area chillers, charging pump lube oil coolers) following a design basis loss of coolant accident with a coincident loss of offsite pow=r Tis system is common to both units in that each of the two arains will actuate equipment on each unit.

Clarification of Operator Actions The Operator Actions associated with Functional Units 10 and 16 on Table 3.7-1 require the unit to be reduced in power to less than the P-7 setpoint (10%) if the required conditions cannot be satisfied for either the P-8 or P-7 permissible bypass conditions. Thw requirement to reduce power below P-7 for a P-8 permissible bypass condition is necessary to ensure consistency with the out of service and shutdown action times assumed in the WCAP-10271 and WCAP-14333P risk analyses by eliminating the potential for a scenario that would allow sequential entry into the Operator Actions (i.e., initial entry into the Operator Action with a reduction in power to below P4,ý followed by a second entry into the Operator Action with a reduction in power to below P-7). This scenario would permit sequential allowed outage time periods that may result in an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> that was not assumed in the risk analysis to place a channel in trip or to place the unit in a condition where the protective fhnction was not necessary.

References (1) UFSAR - Section 7.5 (2) UFSAR - Section 14.5 (3) UPSAR - Section 14.3.2 AmendmentNos.. 247/246

TS 3.7-29 TABLE 3.7-6 ACCIDENT MONIMO1UNG INSTRUMENTATION NOTE: Separate entry into Specffication 3.7.E is allowed for each Function.

Function Rnguired Channels

1. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow 2

2. Inadequate Core Cooling

a. Reactor Vessel Coolant Level 2

b. Reactor Coolant System Subcoolizlg Margin 2

c. Core Exit Temperature 2 (a)

3. Containment Pressure (Wide Range) 2

4. Containment Pressure 2

5. Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Ronge) 2

6. Containment Area Radiation (Hfigh Range) 2

7. Power Range Neutron Flux 2 (b)

8. Source Range Neutron Flux 2 (b)

9. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Temperatur (Wide Range) 2

10. RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Wide Range) 2

11. RCS Pressure (Wide Range) 2

12. Penetration Flow Path Contaiunment Isolation Valve Position 2 per penetration flow path (c)(d)

13. Pressurizer Level 2

14. Steam Generator (SG) Water Level (Wide Rang) 2

15. SG Water Level (Narrow Range) 2 per SO

16. SG Pressure 2 per SO

17. Emergency Condensate Storage Tank Level 2

18. High Head Safety Injection Flow to Cold Leg 2 (a) A minimum of 2 care salt thermocouples per qaadrant are required for the channel to be OPERABLE.

(b) This indication is provided by the Oarnmametxic channels (c) Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration is isolated by at leant one closed and deactiated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, cc check vain with flow through the valve secured.

(d) Only one position indication channel is required forpenetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication channel.

AmendmentNos. 247/246

TS 4.1-3 Other channels are subject only to the "drift" errors induced within the instrumentation itself and, consequently, can tolerate longer intervals between calibration. Process systems instrumentation error resulting from drift within the individual instruments are normally negligible.

During the interval between periodic channel tests and daily check of each channel, a comparison between redundant channels will reveal any abnormal condition resulting from a calibration shift, due to instrument drift of a single channel.

During the periodic channel test, if it is deemed necessary, the channel may be tuned to compensate for the calibration shift. However, it is not expected that this will be required at any fixed or frequent interval.

Thus, minimum calibration frequencies of once-per-day for the nuclear flux (power level) channels, and once per 18 months for the process system channels are considered acceptable.

Testing The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and ESFAS instrumentation systems and interlocks ensures that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy are maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the RTS and ESFAS instrumentation, and 3) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

Amendment Nos. 2 47/ 2 46

TS 4.1-9a TABLE 4.1-2 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUI]RE1ENT7S CHANNEL cHA NNEL INSTRUME.NT CHECK (1) CALMBRATION I1. Auxiliaiy Feedwater Flow M R

2. Inadequate Core Cooling M R

3. Containment Pressure (Wide Range) M R

4. Containment Pressure M R

5. Containment SuMp Water Level (Wide Range) M R

6. Containment Area Radiation (High Range) M R

7. Power Range Neutron Flux M R (2)

8. Source Range Neutron Flux M R (2)

9. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Temaperature (wide M R Range)

10. RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Wide Range) M R

11. RCS Pressure (Wide Range) M R

12. Penetration Flow Path Containment Isolation Valve Position M R (3)

13. Pressurizer Level M R

14. Steam Generator (SG) Water Level (Wide Range) M R

15. SG Water Level (Narrow Range) M R

16. SOGPressure M R

17. Emergency Condensate Storage Tank Level M R

18. High Head Safety Injection Flow to Cold Leg M R (1) Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required instruinetation channel that is nomally energized (2) Neutron detectors ar= excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(3) Rather th= CHANNEL CALIBRATION, this surveillance shall be an operational test, consistin~g of verification of operability of all devices in the channel.

M - Monthly R - Once per I8 months AmendmentNos. 247/246