ML061150351
| ML061150351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/2006 |
| From: | Gordon Peterson Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Corp, Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NEI 99-04 | |
| Download: ML061150351 (3) | |
Text
L Duke GARY R. PETERSON R~ne gymVice President PakrnergyeMcGuire Nuclear Statio'n Duke Energy Corporation MGOIVP / 12700 Hagvrs Ferry Rd.
Huntersville, NC 28073 704 875 5333 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy. com April 17, 2006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Duke Power Company LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370 Commitment Change Report Attached is a summary report of commitment changes for McGuire Nuclear Station completed during the 2005 calendar year. These changes were made per the guidance defined in NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitments" and have no adverse effect on compliance with NRC rules or regulations. Commitment Change 2004-M-001 has been included in the report. This change was inadvertently omitted from McGuire's April 15, 2004 report.
Questions regarding this submittal should be directed to Kay Crane, McGuire Regulatory Compliance at (704) 875-4306.
G. R. Peterson www. duke-energy. corn,
J1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 17, 2006 Page 2 xc:
Mr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 Mr. J. F. Stang (Mail Stop 0-8 H 4A)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mr. Joe Brady NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station
McGuire Nuclear Station Commitment Change Summary Report Docket Nos. 369 and 370 NUMBER SOURCE ORIGINAL COMMITMENT MODIFIED COMMITMENT DOCUMENT 2004-M-001 LER 369/91-13 Planned corrective action #1 of the Operations Management personnel The subject LER states: "Operations will implement appropriate Management personnel will procedure changes to ensure that implement appropriate procedure whenever the VE system doors are changes to ensure that whenever the opened for greater than 90 VE system doors are opened, seconds, administrative controls appropriate compensatory measures are in place to ensure the Reactor are implemented and fire barrier Building is declared inoperable watches are established."
(and that functionality of the Reactor Building can be restored in a reasonable time frame) and to ensure appropriate fire barrier watches are established.
2005-M-001 LER 370/02-02 Planned corrective action #1 of the MP/0/A/7700/058, "Safe Work subject LER states: "Develop Procedure for Line Breaking specific procedural guidance for Flammable Or Hazardous working with or in a potential Materials" was changed to prohibit environment of flammable and leak repairs on any pressurized hazardous systems, including the system containing explosive gases.
hydrogen dryers. Include cleaning, The intent of this procedure inspection, and restoration of restriction is to absolutely prohibit components such as threaded a repair option that could lead to connections."
sudden failure resulting in an explosive gas release. On April 26, 2005, an audible gas blow (VCT gas space) was identified on 2NV-165 from the diaphragm valve bonnet. Since there are some types of repair options on a pressurized system containing explosive gases that can be completed without the sudden release risk a temporary change was made to allow for repair of the subject valve.
2005-M-002 January 22, 2005 By letter dated January 22, 2003, Provided there is reason to believe Response to Request McGuire provided a response to a no Reactor Coolant (NC) system for Additional request for additional information leakage has occurred from Information regarding NRC Bulletin 2002-01.
components in the PZR cavity, a regarding NRC The subject response states that walkdown may not be performed Bulletin 2002-01.
Engineering performs a walkdown of in the PZR cavity during Ihe the pressurizer (PZR) cavity as part shutdown process for refueling and of the shutdown process during forced outages. Inspection for refueling outages. Also, during boric acid corrosion will be forced outages, the PZR cavity is performed during cold shutdown.
normally inspected.
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