ML053220386

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PSEG Nuclear L.L.C. SH.OP.AP.ZZ-0101 (Q) - Rev 6 Post-Transient Response Requirements
ML053220386
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Hope Creek  
Issue date: 05/13/2002
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0191 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q), Rev 6
Download: ML053220386 (37)
v • d • e


Text

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A EXHIBIT 9 Case No. 1-2003-010 Exhibit 9

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'"E ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 PSEG Internal Use Only rage i oi 4 PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.

SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) - Rev. 6 EXHCBT POST-TRANSIENT RESPONSE REQUIREMENT SPONSOR ORGANIZATION:

Operations Biennial Review performed Yes _

No NIA v

REVISION

SUMMARY

Based on issues identified under Orders 70022264, 70022345,80042025, 80035645,80036719, 80039655, and 80639672 and senior management input the following changes were made:

(Due to the extent of changes revision bars have also been omitted)

Removed section 5.4 - Restart Team, including associated responsibilities.

Added Form 2 - Post Event Data Collection.

Revised Figure 1 - Post Transient Response Flowchart, to reflect changes made in body of procedure. Most notable of these changes is that a TARP Team callout does not occur for a reactor scram/trip, instead, a callout of the FORT-SOM now occurs for these events.

Revised first item of Attachment I Transient or Undesired Occurrence Decision Matrix for events requiring TARP team initiation from "Unplanned Unit scram/trip/runback or power reduction > 5% power" to "Unplanned runback or power reduction > 5% power".

Removed "Responsibilities" bullets from the "All Personnel" group for, "Informing the operating shift of abnormal conditions", and, "Participating in actions required to place the plant/system in a safe condition".

Removed "Responsibilities" bullets from the "Operations Superintendent (OS)" group for, "Stabilizing the plant LAW with approved procedures", and, "Providing initial notification to the Operations Manager of abnormal conditions".

Added "Responsibilities" bullet to the "Operations Superintendent (OS)" group to implement the actions of the significant plant transient flow chart (Figure 1) following a plant transient. Figure 1, as revised, ensures the Operations Manager is informed, and, that responsibilities for the investigation are clearly defined. (see previous two bulleted revision summary items)

(Continued)

IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS Effective date 5/13 l)z None APPROVED.

APPROVED:

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'VE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 PSEG Internal Use Only Page z 014 PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.

SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) - Rev. 6 POST-TRANSIENT RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS SPONSOR ORGANIZATION:

Operations REVISION

SUMMARY

CONTINUATION SHEET Changed "Responsibilities" bullet for the "Operations Superintendent (OS)" group which required that the OS coordinate the investigation, to having the OS participate in the investigation.

Added "Responsibilities" bullet to the "Operations Superintendent (OS)" group to notify the Forced Outage Response Team-Shift Outage Manager (FORT-SOM) to activate the Forced Outage Response Team (FORT). This was previously an Operations Manager responsibility.

Added "Responsibilities" bullet to the "Operations Superintendent (OS)" group to notify the NRC Resident whenever an event warrants TARP Team activation. This was previously an Operations Manager responsibility. This is also reflected in step 5.1.3.

Removed "Responsibilities" bullets from the "Shift Technical Advisor (STA)" group for coordinating initial response to the event/issue and insuring all appropriate actions are being taken prior to TARP Team arrival, and, advising the OS about the performance of immediate corrective actions following transients.

Added "Responsibility" bullet to the "Shift Technical Advisor (STA)" group for compiling the information for Form 1 with the assistance of the Production - Shift Engineer, WCC SRO/RO, and Shift Clerk. This is also reflected in step 5.2.1.

Changed "Responsibility" bullet for the "Shift Technical Advisor (STA)" that required compiling the data package lAW SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-O1Ol. This responsibility previously allowed the CRS or TARP team to assist in the compilation., now, the responsibility allows the Production - Shift Engineer, WCC SRO/RO, and Shift Clerk to assist in the compilation.

Added new "Responsibility" for the Assistant Operations Manager to ensure the OS is relieved post-scram/trip to perform data reviews, assemble the information package for SORC, and present the package to SORC for re-start consideration.

Removed "Responsibilities" bullet from the "Operations Manager" group that required notification of the NRC Resident whenever an event warrants TARP Team activation.

This is now part of the OS responsibilities.

Removed "Responsibilities" bullet from the "Operations Manager" group for notification of the Forced Outage Response Team-Shift Outage Manager (FORT-SOM) to activate the Forced Outage Response Team (FORT). This is now part of the OS responsibilities.

Removed "Responsibilities" bullet from the "Operations Manager" group for appointing a Restart Coordinator.

Changed "Responsibility" bullet for the "Operations Manager" that required reviewing post-scram/trip report findings with the OS and STA for concurrence, to requiring reviewing post-scram/trip report findings with the OS and TARP Team Lead.

(Continued)

EXHIBIT -

y PAG E

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IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 PSEG Internal Use Only Page 3 of 4 PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.

SH.OP-AP.ZZ-001(Q) - Rev. 6 POST-TRANSIENT RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS SPONSOR ORGANIZATION:

Operations REVISION

SUMMARY

CONTINUATION SHEET Added new "Responsibility" for the Training Manager to perform the requirements of Form 2, and, to review post-scram/trip report findings with the OS and TARP Team Lead.

. Changed Engineering Outage Manager responsibility from ensuring the Operations Superintendent is supplied with support from Reactor Engineering and I&C Engineering to evaluate proper response to a scram/trip or ECCS Actuation/Safety Injection Actuation, to, ensuring the FORT-SOM and TARP Team Lead are supplied with support to evaluate proper response to plant transients.

Throughout procedure direction which required notification of or action required by the Vice-President Operations has been changed to requiring notification of or action required by the Director - Operations.

Added Forced Outage Response Team (FORT) responsibilities at step/section 3.9 and FORT-SOM responsibilities at step/section 3.11.

Changed "Responsibility" bullet for the "TARP Team Lead" which required developing Long Term plans and responsibilities, to providing information and guidance to the evaluation manager that develops long-term plans and corrective actions.

Removed "Responsibility" bullet for the "TARP Team Lead" which required assisting the OS as required.

Removed "Responsibility" bullet for the "TARP Team Lead" which required turning over follow-up investigation to Root Cause Team, if applicable.

Removed "Responsibility" bullet for the 'TARP Team Lead" which required that prior to TARP Team termination the Restart Manager, Outage Manager and/or Root Cause Team Leader have had a proper turnover of TARP findings.

Added new "Responsibility" for the "TARP Team Lead" to direct the short-term response to plant transients, generally within the first 8-12 hours of initiation using the guidance in Figure 1 and to maintained this responsibility until turnover to the evaluation manager and/or FORT-SOM has been completed.

Added new "Responsibility" for the "TARP Team Lead" to call the FORT-SOM to assist with troubleshooting and repair efforts for threats to generation, or emergent entry into <72 hour LCO's, Per the guidance in Figure 1.

Removed "Responsibility" bullet for the "TARP Team Lead" which required owning the issue from "beginning to end" including all requirements of this procedure and periodic updates to the Director - Operations until corrective actions have been completed.

Transferred Vice President - Operations responsibility for granting or denying approval for reactor startup/continued operation to the Director - Operations at step/section 3.14, 5.4.3, and page 11 of 12 of Form I signoffs.

(Continued)

EXHIBIT_

PAGE3F3 OPAGE(S)

1

,VE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 PSEG Internal Use Only rage 4 O14 PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.

SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) - Rev. 6 POST-TRANSIENT RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS SPONSOR ORGANIZATION:

Operations REVISION

SUMMARY

CONTINUATION SHEET Added a Duty Senior Manager responsibility at step/section 3.13.

Changed Process Description step 4.1 from a six step process to a four step process by combining three of the original six process steps into one step which also now identifies the evaluation manager as the owner of the process step.

Removed the identification of the root cause(s) of the transients/events/scram/trip/ECCS actuation from the objectives of this procedure stated in step/section 4.2.

Added requirement at step 5.1.6 that the simulator, as a minimum, be used to verify the control room and plant response to reactor scrams and trips. The step previously only offered considerations for simulator use.

Removed Note 5.2 which stated "If time and plant conditions permit, the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) may assist the STA in collecting data. Station desk guides, SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-0101, contain detailed direction and forms for Hope Creek and Salem specific data collection."

Added new step at 5.2.2 for FORT-SOM and Engineering Outage Manager actions.

Changed "TARP Team may assist" to "Other members of the station staff may assist" in the data collection statement of step 5.2.3.

Removed CRS from data collection requirement stated in step 5.2.3 and replaced with WCC SRO.

Removed Reactor Engineering and I&C Engineering from assisting in the data evaluation completed by the OS in step 5.3.1. Instead, the TARP Team lead and data gathering team will assist.

Removed step 5.3.3. This step limited the performance evaluation of safety-related equipment during the Post Scram/Trip Review process to the verification that the equipment did or did not operate since the detailed manner in which the equipment operated is sufficiently verified during surveillance testing.

Replaced OS and STA reviews of the available information previously contained in steps 5.3.4, 5.3.5, and 5.3.9 with OS and Operations manager review in step 5.3.2. Step 5.3.2 also contains the OS recommendation to the OM for restart or continued shut down which previously was a stand alone step.

Moved."Review with Shift", page 6 of 12, of Form 1 - Post Event Data Package, to occur at page 8 of 12 of same attachment.

Changed signoff for item 12.0 (D) of Form 1 from Operations Manager - Support Staff to just Operations Manager.

A.3. EXHIBIT 9 PAGE__AOF~ib PA G E(S)

VE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.0Y-AP.LZAJ1U1(Q)

POST-TRANSIENT RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE

.2 2.0 SCOPE

.2 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES.....................................................................................................3 4.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

.7 5.0 PROCEDURE.................................................................................................................8 5.1 Transient/Event Response.................

8 52 Data Collection.................

9 5.3 Data Evaluation.................

9 5.4 Approval Requirements for Reactor Startup Following a Reactor Scram/Trip/ECCS Actuation/Safety Injection.....................................

11 6.0 RECORDS.....................................

12 7.0 DEFINITIONS..............................................................................................................12

8.0 REFERENCES

12 ATTACHMENTS Attachment I -Transient Assessment Response Plan (TARP)........................................

14 - TARP Duty Roster and Callout List........................................

15 FORMS Form 1 - Post-Event Data Package........................................

16 Form 2 - Post-Event Data Collection...........................................................................28 FIGURES Figure 1 - Post Transient Response Flowchart........................................

32 EXHIBI PAOF PAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page I of 32 Rev. 6

-. IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure directs station actions in response to plant transients/events as defined in. Actions required for all transients/events include, data collection and assessment, including generation of a Transient Assessment Report.

In case of a reactor scram/trip, additional required actions include management of the forced outage, SORC recommendation for restart, and Director - Operations approval of reactor startup.

2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Section 5.1, Transient/Event Response, is to be used for events identified in Attachment 1, Transient Assessment Response Plan (TARP). Emergency events classified at Alert or higher IAW the ECG are covered by the Emergency Plan and are exempt from the guidance in section 5.1.

2.2 The data collection requirements, IAW Form I & 2 of this procedure, apply to all events and transients regardless of rod motion and all ECCS Actuations/Safety Injections.

Implementation is required in all operational conditions. Reactor scram/trip signals intentionally inserted as part of testing such as operation of the mode switch for testing while shutdown, are outside of the scope of this procedure.

[CD-142D, CD-833D, CD-557D, CD-965E, CD-330A]

2.3 The post-scram/trip review process consists of an initial post-scram/trip review and the detailed follow-up analysis conducted using this procedure. This post-scram/trip review process also establishes a consistent, comprehensive, and systematic method to determine the causes and conditions associated with Reactor Protection System trips. The review results provide for. [CD-557D, CD-160B, CD-833D]

A detailed root cause analysis of the scram/trip.

Identification of any anomalous plant response.

Identification of necessary corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

Determination of the readiness of the plant to safely return to operation.

2.4 This procedure is also used to diagnose and evaluate ECCS Actuations/Safety Injections.

GGEXHIBiT/,

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Salem/Hope Creek Page 2 of 32 Rev. 6

NE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-O101(Q) 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 All Personnel Plant personnel involved in an unplanned transientlevent/scram/trip are responsible for providing the OS and STA with objective comments that describe their observations of or participation in the event or both. Plant personnel should make recommendations to the OS to prevent recurrence of the event. [CD-557D1 The Notification creator should perform the initial quarantine of equipment and report actions taken to the SRO Screencr.

3.2 Operations Superintendent (OS)

Implement the actions of the significant plant transient flow chart (Figure 1) following a plant transient.

Participates in the investigation, along with the STA and CRS, to evaluate the cause of the event. The OS will review and approve the results of the investigation, and presents the findings to the Operations Manager and SORC for startup approval if applicable. [CD-142D, CD-557D1 Ensures the SRO Screener implements NC.WM-AP.ZZ-OOO0(Q), Notification Process, Quarantine Guidelines, to preserve evidence for the purpose of cause analysis.

Notifies the Forced Outage Response Team-Shift Outage Manager (FORT-SOM) to activate the Forced Outage Response Team (FORT).

Notifies the NRC Resident whenever an event warrants TARP Team activation.

3.3 Shift Technical Advisor (STA)

Aided by the Production - Shift Engineer, WCC SRO/RO, and Shift Clerk, compiles the Data Package 1AW SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-O101 per the Post-Scram/Trip Data Collection Guidelines.

Aided by the Production - Shift Engineer, WCC SRO[RO, and Shift Clerk, compiles the information for Form 1.

Ensures an information package is provided to the TARP Team Lead upon arrival.

This includes, fact finding documentation, copies of any pertinent information, names of personnel involved and status of the issue/event.

Evaluates the Post-Trip report and presents the findings to the OS.

Ensures that a Notification is initiated IAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ0000(Q), Notification Process.

a E IBIT I

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Salem/Hone Creek Page 3 of 32 Rev. 6

VE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 3.4 Operations Superintendent - Assistant Operations Manager (OS-AOM) r Ensures the OS is relieved post-scram/trip to perform data reviews, assemble the information package for SORC, and present the package to SORC for re-start consideration.

3.5 Operations Manager (OMW Reviews post-scram/trip report findings with the OS and TARP Team Lead.

Ensures post-scram/trip report is completed and presented to SORC.

Notifies Director - Operations (DIR-OPS).

Notifies the TARP Team Lead if event warrants TARP Team activation.

Determines ifjust-in-time training or immediate lessons learned rollouts are appropriate for oncoming shifts.

3.6 Training Manager Performs the requirements of Form 2.

Reviews post-scram/trip report findings wif O and TARP Team Lead.

Shl11 assist the Operations Manager i mplmenting corrective measures (e.g.

,~1 Ling) rio Io 3.7 EnLecrn utae eManagerM ager 0

Ens B e FORT-SOM and TARP Team Lead are supplied with support to evaluate (ysponse to plant transients.--'-

3.8 ttion rations Review Committee (SORC)

Reviews the results of the investigation and makes recommendations to the Director - Operations. SORC shall review the post-scram/trip review report prior to restart.

In addition, SORC should review follow-up analysis reports that identify significant safety implications or potential generic aspects.

[CD-965E, CD-557D]

3.9 Forced Outage Response Team (FORT)

Ensure SORC recommendations for forced outage are tracked by an outage schedule.

Ensure the extent of the condition is addressed by an outage schedule.

EXHIBIT 9 PAGE 8 OF3_ PAAG Sailem/Hope Creek Page 4 of 32 Rev. 6

IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.0r-AP.LZ-U1U14(Q)

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3.10 TARP Team Lead Per the guidance in Figure 1, directs the short-term response to plant transients, generally within the first 8-12 hours of initiation. This responsibility is maintained until turnover to the evaluation manager and/or FORT-SOM has been completed.

Per the guidance in Figure 1, calls the FORT-SOM to assist with troubleshooting and repair efforts for threats to generation, or emergent entry into <72 hour LCO's.

Assembles the TARP Team.

Notifies Emergency Response Manager (ERM) and QA.

Receives turnover of the investigation from the STA.

Performs an immediate needs evaluation to ensure the plant is in a safe condition.

Performs short-term needs evaluations such as schedule impact, chemistry plan or reactivity plan.

Provides information and guidance to the evaluation manager that develops long-term plans and corrective actions.

Generates event report.

Shall ensure that all TARP Team findings and the TARP Team Report are captured in the confirmation for any SAP order initiated as a result of the transient.

Communicate with PSEG personnel and offsite organizations.

The following organizations should be considered as appropriate:

0 NBU OE personnel for input to INPO Nuclear Network.

0 NTC management for input into training for lessons learned.

0 Co-owners representatives.

0 Nuclear Communications Group for:

o Inclusion in Outlook Today and/or PSEG Nuclear Web site on the next business day.

o State and Local emergency management groups to enhance stakeholder relations.

3.11 Forced Outage Response Team - Shift Outage Manager (FORT-SOM)

Per the guidance in Figure 1, calls the TARP Team Lead and Alpha pages V.P.s and Directors.

Per the guidance in Figure 1, calls the Engineering Outage Manager fored t

personnel to support data gathering and validation post-scram/trip.

Per the guidance in Figure 1, directs troubleshooting and repair efforts for threats to generation and emergent entries into <72 hour LCO's. This responsibility is maintained until turnover to the evaluation manager or FORT-SOM initiates the OCC.

/

j SalenmHope Creek Page 5 of 32 EXHIBIT R7ev. 6 PAGE.JL.0F3f6'AGE(S)

.'IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 3.12 TARP Team Members Ensure actions required by NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0000(Q), Notification Process, including assisting the STA in data gathering and ensuring appropriate quarantine occurs.

Mobilize additional expertise and resources as necessary to support assessment and restoration.

Develop and submit a restoration plan for appropriate management review prior to implementation.

0 C-Review all -"After-the-Fact" ECG classifications to ensure that the station is not in an emergency situation as well as the circumstances concerning why an "After-the-Fact" classification was made.

j V-e N

EP TARP team personnel should review all Unusual Event classifications and I

subsequent notifications for accuracy and timeliness. Create a timeline on EP related activities and perform "Observation Checklist" from NC.EP-DG.ZZ-000I(Z),

Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicator (PI) Data.

3.13 Duty Senior Manager

,T 

Provides oversight for TARP team and maintains senior management team cognizant of issues related to events requiring a TARP team.

3.14 Director - Operations (DIR-OPS)

After satisfactory completion of SORC recommendations, shall either grant or deny approval for reactor startup/continued operation.

[CD-965E, CD-557Dl Notifies the Vice President - Operations of all TARPs.

EXHBIT 7

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Salem/Hope Creek Page 6 of 32 Rev. 6

.IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 4.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION C(

Refer to Figure 1 4.1 The review is a four-step process consisting of:

[CD-142D, CD-5S7D]

Data collection.

Initial post-scranm/trip/transient/event review.

Restart decision. (if applicable)

The evaluation manager performs follow-up analysis, identification of lessons learned, and follow-up actions.

4.2 The objectives of this procedure are to:

[CD-142D, CD-557D]

Identify any associated safety implications.

Determine the acceptability of performing a reactor restart.

Perform a detailed follow-up analysis to confirm root cause(s).

Identify any abnormal/rregular plant response.

Determine corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the event.

(

Identify any lessons learned.

Identify any trends.

Initiate any needed changes to:

0 Equipment 0

Procedures 0

Training 0

Standards for Operation EXHIBIT i

PAGE-// OF~ i;PAGE(S:

Salem/Hope Creek Page 7 of 32 Rev. 6

'IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ70101(Q) 5.0 PROCEDURE

[CD-142D]

5.1 Transient/Event Response 5.1.1 Notification of the Operations Manager or designee should take place within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the initiating event.

NOTE The OS, Operations Manager, or Director - Operations can initiate TARP Team call out at any time. TARP duty cycle is the same as the Emergency Plan duty cycle. TARP Team members who are ERO "Duty Responders" are expected to be Fit-for-Duty and within 60 minutes of their e -

cy response facility. TARPITeam members who are not ERO "Duty Responderer#re expect~p be Fit-for-Duty and within 90 minutes of the plant.

5.1.2 Operations Manager should notify the TARP Team Lead as soon as possible. If the TARP Team Lead cannot be reached, TARP Team Lead responsibility defers to the duty ERM.

5.1.3 Operations Superintendent should notify the NRC Resident whenever a TARP callout is initiated.

5.1.4 Investigation-For any TARP Team activation, the STA should coordinate the immediate fact finding and data gathering and provide the completed information package to the TARP Team Lead upon arrival or as soon as practical. This should be accomplished using k

investigation tools and techniques described in Form 1, Post-Event Data Package, NC.CA-TM.ZZ-0003(Z), Root Cause Manual, and SH.SE-DG.ZZ-0003(Z), Technical Issue Resolution. If the event involves a plant scram/trip or ECCS Actuation/Safety Injection, data collection is IAW SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-O0I1, Post-Trip Data Collection Guidelinre, and the applicable sections of Form 1.

5.1.5 Restoration - restoration plan should be approved by the Operations Manager as a minimum, and have concurrence of Director - Operations and/or SORC, as determined by the Director - Operations.

5.1.6 The simulator, as a minimum shall be used to verify the control room and plant response to reactor scrams and trips. Additionally, the simulator should be considered for use in:

Verify event results/current plant condition.

Enhance investigation into apparent/root cause.

Validate restoration plan prior to plan implementation.

Input event details into simulator model improvements.

EXHIBIT PAGE /'.> OF 7 PAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 8 of 32 Rev. 6

.IVE 20020627 ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 5.2 Data Collection 5.2.1 As soon as plant conditions permit, the OS TLhA, WCC SRO, Production -

Shift Engineer, and the Shift Clerk initiatS olection IApation Post-Trip Data Collection Guideline, SC(a c.sP-DG.ZZ0 an ections of Form 1.

STA or WCC SRO shall ensure a Notification is initiated 1AW NC-WM-AP.ZZ-0OOO)'

and the Notification/Order number is recorded on Form 1. [CD-557D\\

5.2.2 For reactor scrams and trips, the FORT-SOM will contact the Engineering Outage Manager to provide support for data gathering and validato These individuals will perform the actions necessary to answer the requirements 2 or their respective areas of responsibility.

5.2.3 The STA/ WCC SRO is responsible for collecting the data necessary to complete Form 1 and the forms in SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-0101. Other members of the station staff may assist in data collection. [CD-330A]

5.2.4 Thea hld reviewall "After the Fact" ECG classifications to ensure that the statio ilSFan emergency situation as well as the circumstances under which the "After-the-Fact" classification was made.

5.3 ta Evaluation 5.3.1 Post scram/trip, the OS, with assistance from the TARP Team Lead and the data gathering/

team, shall evaluate the Post-Event Data. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the following: [CD-557D]

The cause of the transientlevent/scram/trip is determined.

All key safety-related and other equipment, required to function during the event, operated as anticipated or expected.

The transient/event/scram/trip/transient did not cause any detrimental effects on plant equipment.

Any corrective actions that are required prior to the unit return to service/continued operation are identified.

5.3.2 The OS notifies the Operations Manager of the findings of the review team. The Operations Manager then reviews the Post-Event Data with the OS. The OS will recommend to the Operations Manager that the plant be restarted or maintained shut down based on the following considerations: [CD-557D]

The cause of the scram/trip is identified and corrected.

All safety-related and other important equipment functioned properly during the scram/trip or, if not, the malfunction is corrected.

EXHIBITT PAGE_/_3L_ oF PAGIE SI Salem/Hope Creek Page 9 of 32 Rev. 6

.IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627

.SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 5.3.3 At Hope Creek, the Initiating Parameter Sequence of Events Checklist in HC.OP;DG.ZZ-0101 is to be used for verification of the scram and safety-related equipment operation. [CD-557D1 5.3.4 If the transient/event results in a Level 1 Notification, the Operations Manager will designate a Root Cause Team lAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-OOOO(Q). The Root Cause Team should include a person who has Human Performance Improvement experience.

The Root Cause Team is to perform or determine the following: [CD-557D]

Root cause analysis to determine the actual or most probable cause of the transient/event/scram/trip.

The maintenance and testing required before reactor restart including additional measures to verify the most probable cause.

Contributing factors.

Corrective actions or recommendations.

Safety systems actuation and performance.

Control system actions.

Operator actions.

Radiological response.

Transient data for pertinent plant parameters.

Unexpected or unexplained aspects of transient behavior.

Performance of systems or components.

Procedural deficiencies and required changes.

Operator response and/or errors.

Past similar events, or trends.

Lessons learned for operator and plant staff training.

The conditions necessary for a reactor restart.

EXHIBIT f PAGE JŽL0F3.k PAGE Salerm/Hope Creek Page 10 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL -C

  • IVE 20020627 ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 5.4 Approval Requirements for Reactor Startup Following a Reactor Scram/Tripl/ECCS Actuation/Safety Injection 5.4.1 Prior torequesting approval to startup the reactor after any Reactor Scram/Trip/ECCS Actuation/Safety Injection, the Post-Event Data packages are completed and evaluated.

[CD-557D, CD-142DJ 5.4.2 Upon satisfactory review and evaluation of the Post-Event Data packages, the results are to be presented to SORC. Upon completion of the evaluation of the event, SORC is to make recommendations to the Director - Operations.

[CD-965E, CD-557DJ 5.4.3 Approval for taking the reactor critical is to be granted by the Director - Operations after recommendations are made by SORC. The Operations Manager may grant the necessary approval.in the absence of the Director - Operations after recommendations are made by SORC. [CD-965E CD-557DJ EXHIBIT PAGE

_1OI AGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 11 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL ACTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 0020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 6.0 RECORDS [CD-142D, CD-557D]

6.1 Retain the following lAW NC.NA-AP.ZZ-001 1(Q), Records Management Program:

Form 1 6.2 Retain the following IAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0002(Q), Performance Improvement Process, which allows uploading of TARP Report into DCRMS from SAP:

TARP Report 7.0 DEFINITIONS 7.1 Data Package - a collection of information used to conduct an investigation and review of any Transient/Event/Scram/Trip/ECCS Actuation/Safety Injection. The data package includes the Post-Event Data Package, Form 1, and applicable forms from the station Post-Trip Data Collection Guideline, SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-0101, hard copy of the associated computer printouts and copies of the appropriate recorder charts.

7.2 ESF Actuation - the manual or automatic initiation of those systems or components as outlined in ECG.

7.3 SRO Screener - Licensed SRO designated to review Notifications.

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1 INPO Good Practice, OP-21 1, Post Trip Reviews. September 1984 (INPO 88-024) and 8

July 1991, Rev. 01.

8.2 Generic Letter 83-28, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWT Events", July 8, 1983.

8.3 INPO 88-024 8.4 Generic Implications of ATWT Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-0 1000 8.5 Sl(2).OP-SO.AF-0001(Q), Auxiliary Fcedwater System Operation 8.6 Si (2).OP-SO.ANN-0001 (Q), Overhead Annunciator Operation 8.7 Letter, E. G. Adensan, NRC to C. A. McNcill, PSE&G, February 3, 1985 and January 22, 1986. PSEG to NRC letters dated March 30, 1984, December 17, 1984, August 7, and October 30, 1985, and January 24, 1986.

8.8 HC.OP-AP.ZZ-01 12(Q), Management Audits 8.9 Cross References 8.9.1 HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0105(Z), Operations Department Information System 8.9.2 SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0105(Z), Information Distribution 8.9.3 NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0000(Q), Notification Process 8.9.4 NC.CA-TM.ZZ-0003(Z), Root Cause Manual 8.9.5 NC.NA-APZZ0011 (Q), Records Management Program EXHIBIT 8.9.6 SH.SE-DG.ZZ-0003, Technical Issue Resolution Og 8.9.7 SC(HC).OP-DG.ZZ-0101, Station Post-Trip Data Collection GuidelinAGE 0

8.9.8 NC.OM-AP.ZZ-0002(Z), Operational Readiness Assessment Program Salem/Hope Creek Page 12 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL )ACTIVE

.20020627 ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) 8.10 Closing Documents CD-330A INPO SER 09-80 CD-160B INPO SER 67-83 CD-142D NRC GL 83-28 CD-383D INPO SER 65-84 Inadvertent ECCS Actuation Due to Maintenance Activities Plant Trips and Loss of Cooling Water Due to Fouling of Traveling Screen Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Event Loss of Turbine Generator and Offsite Power Results in Loss of All AC to Emergency Safeguards Systems (ESS) Buses INPO Good Practice - Post-Trip Reviews Failure of High Voltage Transmission Line (LER 354/86-056) Torus Vacuum Breakers INPO Self Evaluation CD-557D CD-833D CD-626E CD-965E INPO GP OP-211 INPO SER 18-85 NHO INCI 354/86-163 NHO ISE 87.OP.2-3 8.11 Corrective Actions BP 981123223 SORC open item (assigned at MTG 98-068) Additional Management Reviews for Attachment 1, Part C, Steps 5, 6 (Rev. 6)

EXHIBIT IT PAGE / CF.

6AGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 13 of 32 Rev. 6

A)LL 4.CTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 ATTACHMENT I

(*.

TRANSIENT ASSESSMENT RESPONSE PLAI (Page 1 of 1)

SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

N (TARP)

Transient or Undesired Occurrence Decision Matrix As a minimum, the following events require TARP team initiation:

(

  • Unplanned runback or power reduction > 5% power.

2

)

  • I UnplannedESFactivations.

cl * ;2Valid ECCS/SI actuations with discharge to the RC/vesseL if*

Significant Equipment failure resulting in entry into LCOs 5 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

C

  • Exceeding any Tech Spec Safety Limit.
  • qViJolation of Tech Spec Action Statements or design basis.
  • Any reactivity mismanagement event (e.g., any mispositioned control rods due to equipment or human performance not addressed by procedure).

q # 5 Unplanned or inadvertent criticality.

6 + Major incident covered by spill plan.

(I * "Radioactive or non-rad spill/discharge onsite orfrom offsite that adversely affects the unit(s).

(.2

  • 7 Any occurrence resulting in an environmental impact (NJPDES, EPA reportable occurrence, ECG reportable environmental event).

1 3 *+<Anyradiation over-exposureperECG.

/4 *C Unexpected contamination of> 100ft2 area outside plant structures OR discovery that contaminatedperson or material may have left the Protected Area (5

  • Significant personnel contamination > 25% of dose limit.
  • i,

+ Unplanned radioactive release (gas or liquid) to environment 17

  • Significant human performance event (e.g., breakthrough tagging event).
  • 9

+1IPlant in a condition not covered by normal/abnormal or emergency procedures.

  • , 3SIgnlflcant Loss of Control of Security Protective Measure.

t b

  • Unplanned change in plant risk significance to orange or red.

EXHIBI

  • I'PZRcode.safetyvalved~ichargeatSalem.

E IT

PAGE L8 22AGE

  • Onsite or near site demonstration.

97 + Unusual Event emergency declaration per the Event Classification Guide. (Alert or higher classification requires ERO activation and TARP activities will be responsibility of the ERO as part of Recovery.)

X OS/Ops Manager/ Director - Operations judgment that the transient or situation requires implementation of the TARP.

A"itallcized items In this list may require reporting per ECG.

Salem/Hope Creek Page 14 of 32' Rev. 6

ALL tCTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZO0101(Q:

F.

ATTACHMENT 2 TARP DUTY ROSTER AND CALLOUT LIST (Page 1 of 1)

Consult with Emergency Preparedness concernin en of personnel.

Web page change is only required for permanent ea xies.

Duty rotation is the same as Emergency Plan Duty Team rotation (see EP website for duty week schedule).

If an emergency (ALERT or higher) is declared after or during T(RP team implementation, e TARP team will be terminated and superseded by the Emergency Response Organization.

If a TARP team duty swap is needed, then notify the TARP Team Lead of the temporary member's name and phone numbers and the dates of the duty swap.

)

"A" "B"

"C""D POSITION SR. MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT (Team Leader)

OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE SAMPLE b,ENGINEERING RAD PRO WORK MGMNT CHEMISTRY RX. ENGJFUELS LICENSING QA EP TRAINING EXHIBIT i

PAGE

/ 7OFr3YAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 15 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL ACTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM I POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 1 of 12) 1.0 Personnel Statement/InterviewlRoot Cause Input Form Prepare a written statement, using the descriptions below as an outline. Describe your knowledge or involvement in the transientlcvent/condition. Your statements should cover time before, during and after the event.

A.

Plant conditions prior to the event B.

Indications that a problem existed C.

Unusual noises D.

Actions as a result of event E.

Observations of any equipment malfunctions or inadequacies F.

Procedures in progress G.

Is there any guidance, from other sources, which conflicts with our procedures? If yes explain.

Night Order Book

+

Procedure steps vs. bases

+

Engineering input or memos Direction from supervision/management

+

Other procedures H.

In your opinion: If no explain.

  • +

Did we act consistent with our operating philosophy?

+

Did we keep plant and personnel safety as a top priority in our response to the condition?

+

Did we treat the transient/event/condition the same in the simulator as we did in the plant?

Were the procedures used during the transientlevent/condition consistent with simulator training?

+

Were the actions taken during the transient/event/condition consistent with simulator training?

I.

From your prospective during this transientlevent/condition:

What were you thinking about?

What were/are your concerns?

Were your concerns addressed by the procedures used?

Are there any procedure changes/revisions needed?

Note all dates, times, locations and specific readings or values. Include pertinent conversations or discussions.

Identify any information that may be relevant to this event or warrant further evaluation.

EXHIBIT 7 PAG 0AGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 16 of 32 Rev. 6 I

kLL AC{TVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM I POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 2 of 12) 1.0 Personnel StatementlInterview/Root Cause Input Form (continued)

Prepare a written statement, using the descriptions on previous page. Describe your knowledge or involvement in the transientlevent/condition. Statements should cover time before, during and after the event.

Print Name:

Position/Title:

Signature:

Date:

Additional pages used and attached: Yes No Time:

EXHIBIT d

PAGE °2/

OFL YPAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 17 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL ACTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101 (Q)

I FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 3 of 12) 2.0 Event Description (Filled out by STA/CRS)

Describe sequence of events which led to initiation of event and actions performed to place plant in a stable condition. Include observations and actions of specific individuals and adequacy of procedures used. After providing an individual personnel statement, individuals involved in event should meet together to critique event and reconstruct event as it occurred. This description should be the result of an event critique.

Additional sheets used and attached Yes No EXHIBIT 7 PAGE; F36 PAGE(S Salem/Hope Creek Page 18 of 32 Rev. 6

. ALL A,'IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM I POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 4 of 12) 3.0 Event Classification What is classification of event as defined in event classification guide?

Time Declared:

Time Terminated:

a.

b.

Were all required notifications made?

Yes No Was the emergency classification timely (within 15 minutes) and accurate (correct EAL)?

Yes No If no, explain why:

C.

Were additional classifications required?

Yes No If yes, explain why:

4.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Are there any Technical Specifications or other commitments which would prevent unit from returning to service?

Yes No If yes, list and explain below:

Technical Specification Action Statement(s)

Other EXHIBIT PAGE 2 OF P

GE(S)

Rev. 6 Salem/Hope Creek Page 19 of 32

ALL AtCTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM 1 POSn-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 5 of 12) 5.0 Equipment Response Yes No A.

Was equipment/plant response other than normal (expected)?

B.

WVere any Safety Limits exceeded?

C.

Were any Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) exceeded without proper RPS response?

D.

Did any Reactor Protective Instrumentation (RPS) fail to initiate at the correct point and/or setpoint during the transient?

E.

Did any safety systems which were required to operate, fail to function on demand or as designed?

F.

Did Power Oscillations occur?

EL El 17 El El3 El1 If a "YES" is given to any question above, then the post-transient response is considered abnormal and a separate Notification should be submitted LAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-OOOO(Q).

Preparer (Signature)

EXHIBIT PAGE GE(S)

Salem/lope Creek Page.20 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL ACTIVE 20020627 ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 6 of 12) 6.0 Corrective Actions for Return to Service Are there any corrective actions which should be performed before returning unit to service?

Yes_

No___

If Yes, provide specifics and recommendations as appropriate.

Additional pages used and attached Yes

  • No EXHIBIT PAGEPAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 21 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL A.C;IVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 002062 SH.OP-AP.Z FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 7 of 12) 7.0 Long Term Corrective Actions Long Term Corrective Actions NOT required prior to startup. Use additional sheets as necessary.

Z-O0101(Q)

Additional pages used and attached Yes No Shift Technical Advisor (STA)

Os Date Time Date Time E 181FTPA PAGEOF3£ 0-PAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 22 of 32 Rev. 6

A;i 4.,ZIIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 0020627 FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 8 of 12) 8.0 Review with Shift Operations Manager Review with OS and STA Da SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

I ite Time

a.

Crews involved in the startup should receive startup training in the Simulator.

In addition to this training, Is additional refresher or requalification training needed?

Yes 0 No al if yes, explain what training is required and for whom it is required.

b.

The Post Trip report was properly prepared and evaluated.

c.

All equipment and systems required to function during the event did operate except as noted in comments.

d.

Any corrective actions recommended prior to the unit's return to service/continued operation have been identified, documented, and the required corrective actions have been initiated

e.

The OS and STA are satisfied and agree with the conclusions of the package.

  • If No, a Root Cause team investigation should be recommended to the Director-Operations Yes El1 El1 No El El El El El
  • Operations Manager (review and concur)

(Signature)

Comments:

EXHIBIT f~-

PAGE.__ OF3S-PAGE(S)

Salemn/Hope Creek Page 23 of 32 Rev. 6

ALL ACTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE

.20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM I POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 9 of 12) 9.0 SORC and Director - Operations - Station Operations Review

[CD-965EJ

a.

Major findings of Investigations.

(Attach additional sheets if necessary)

EXHIBIT-4,

-PAGE 2_

O 0PA.GE(S)

Sale/Hop Crek Pge 2 of32 Rv.

Salem/Hope Creek Page 24 of 32 Rev. 6

<LL.CTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 0020627 FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 10 of 12) 10.0 SORC Recommendations SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

I NOTF

  1. 4 S/U Restr Y/N Dept.

Resn.

Comp Init.

Date Comm.

Recommendation D

X

-Il-r 7I

_I L =

=-

.I

_ I _

I _

_ I I

_ I (Attach additional sheets if necessary)

All actions are tracked by using task ID numbers referenced to the Notification number. For startup restraint items, this form documents completion of the assigned action(s); task closure in the Corrective Action Program may be updated when time allows. [CD-142D]

EXHIBIT PAGEŽ.

-1 OF3 PAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 25 of 32 Rev. 6

Ak.

4JTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 0020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZO0101(Q)

FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE (Page 11 of 12)

NOTF NO.

11.0 Package Completion Root Cause Summary and Corrective Action Recommendations completed.

OS - AOM Date Post-Trip Review Report package review completed.

Operations Manager Date Post-Trip Review Report package review completed. Report is satisfactory to recommend startup.

SORC Chairman Date SORC Open Item initiated for tracking any corrective action that cannot be accomplished via issuance of a notification.

SORC Secretary Date Post-Trip Review Report package is satisfactory and Startup/Continued Operation may proceed.

Director - Operations Date (Forward completed package to Operations Manager for retention and processing)

EXHIBIT PAGE g OFS PAGE(S)

Salem/Hope Creek Page 26 of 32 Rev. 6

'S ALL DAepIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 90020627 FORM 1 POST-EVENT DATA PACKAGE

- '(Page 12 of 12) 12.0 Records Retention and Closeout SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101 (Q)

A.

Sequence Number assigned NOTP No.

B.

Copies of the report sent to the following:

Initials

/ Date

+

Nuclear Review Board I

Nuclear Training I

SORC Secretary I

C.

Original report package is ready for transmittal, within 60 days, to the Technical Document Room IAW NC.NA-AP.ZZ-001 l(Q), Records Management Program.

(CD-142D, CD-557DJ D.

Original report sent to Technical Document Room for permanent record retention.

I Operations Manager Date EXHIBIT P

PA G Ej30 oF3

-PAGE Salem/Hope Creek Page 27 of 32 Rev. 6

ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM 2 POST-EVENT DATA COLLECTION (Page 1 of 4) 1.0 Reactor Engineering Yes A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Were any Safety Limits exceeded?

En No 17 El Did any Reactor Protective Instrumentation (RPS) fail to initiate at the correct point and/or setpoint during the transient?

Were any Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) exceeded without proper RPS response?

Was fuel performance other than normal (expected)?

Did any safety systems which were required to operate, fail to function on demand or as designed?

El E3 El El1 El1:

F.

Did Power Oscillations occur?

El If a "YES" is given to any question above, then the post-transient response is considered abnormal. Document the issue below, and submit a separate notification LAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0000(Q).

Preparer OS / TARP Team Lead (Signature)

(Signature)

EXHIBIT PAGE.2OF PAGE(

Salem/Hope Creek Page 28 of 32 Rev. 6

ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM 2 POST-EVENT DATA COLLECTION (Page 2 of 4) 2.0 ReliabllIt3 Engineering A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Peiform secondary/ BOP walk-down.

Did walk-down reveal any physical system damage?

Perform containment/reactor building walk-down.

Did walk-down reveal any physical system damage?

Did any safety systems which were required to operate, fail to function on demand or as designed?

Were there abnormal component/ system responses?

Did the reactor/ steam generator feedwater systems respond as expected?

Were there abnormal digital system responses?

Yes No N/A

[]

El El El El El El 0

El El El El El E

El F lEl F.

El El1 El El G.

Were there abnormal control system responses?

If a "YES" is given to any question above, then the post-transient response is considered abnormal. Document the issue below, and submit a separate notification JAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0000(Q).

Preparer (Signature)

OS / TARP Team Lead (Signature)

EXHIBIT.?.

PAGE 3 OF 3PAGE(S Rev. 6 Salem/Hope Creek Page 29 of 32

/,-A_ TIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 0020627 FORM 2 POST-EVENT DATA COLLECTIO X

(Page 3 of 4) 4.0 Station Chemistry SH.OP-AP.ZZ-01 01(Q)

IN Ycs No A.

Is primary and secondary water chemistry within specification?

B.

Will primary and secondary water chemistry support plant start-up?

C.

Did any chemistry systems fail to function as designed?

1 If a "YES" is given to any question above, then tho post-transient response is considered abnormal.

the issue below, and submit a separate notification IAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-OOOO(Q).

Document Preparer (Signature)

OS / TARP Team Lead (Signature)

EXHIBIT PAG' F_

PAGE

'l Salem/Hope Creek Page 30 of 32 Rev. 6

ALI: IACTIVE ON-THE-SPOT CHANGES MUST BE ATTACHED FOR FIELD USE 20020627 SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q)

FORM 2 POST-EVENT DATA COLLECTION (Page 4 of 4) 5.0 Operations Training Perform transient in the applicable simulator to determine the following:

Yes No A.

Was the operating crew response to the transient appropriate?

(]

B.

Will procedure revisions be required?

a a

C Does this event require further validation in the simulator, or make El current simulator response incorrect?

D.

Is operating crew rernediation necessary prior to returning to duty?

[]

E.

Is operating crew training necessary prior to plant re-start.

If a "YES" is given to any question above, then the post-transient response is considered abnormal. Document the issue below, and submit a separate notification IAW NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0000(Q).

Preparer (Signature)

OS I TARP Team Lead (Signature)

EXHIBIT?.

PAGE _-oOF2PAGE(,'

Salem/Hope Creek Page 31 of 32 Rev. 6

FIGURE I POST TRANSIENT RESPONSE FLOWCHART (Page 1 of 1)

O r or-O 'S' o I~

o) C.'

SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0101(Q) N -

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-4 0m TARP TM= Led O1tad TARP tm m Duty Senior Managvw d OA and dire team to reW to a*eWdiL r

OS dirdcs STA. Shift Engineer.

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noon ppaaN pep Form 1 2t TARP Te de e at 1mm needs and stfons TARP T"m Led te repor.

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