ML053130098

AIT Issue and Followup Item List, with Handwritten Notes

ML053130098
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/02/2005
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0307
Download: ML053130098 (10)

Text

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A.A./,v'1X-sr Palo Verde AIT Issue and Followup Item List NOTE (GENERIC Unresolved Issues):

(1) URI 2004012-01 involves an NRC review of the licensee's cause and/or corrective actions (2) URI 2004012-02 involves an NRC review of the potential design control issues (3) URI 2004012-03 involves an NRC review of the potential safety analyses issues (4) URI 2004012-04 involves Technical Specification usage questions during emergencies Information in this record was deleted inawcordance withbe Freedom of Infoumation Actexempbo - -

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,, . ,. ,; . - , r;  ! ,. ,; + . Z; Reliability of 230kV protective relays Public URI 1. Verify that over current protection installed I i. . O

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!, a 1. The redundency of the protective 2004012-01 on Arizona Power System transformers

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• h relay scheme has been improved by connected to Palo Verde 500kV systems.

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URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and 2004012-01 tncributin -cause(s).

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2. Review licensee's extent of condition ysis.

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3. Verify that licensee's corrective actions are consistent with industry operating experience for these types of diodes. '.

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1. Review licensee determinatio of root and

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.Orgalllzatlon ;'- *-. ,.:,,  ! emergency notification of state and contributing cause(s). -ii4v 4'r u4-1+0-0 Ch'allenhges', j';i.S-i ..,':"r O'.., 1 local officials. I, .- v.,r'viti4 flvt 2. Review licensee's extent of condition 1'.S

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3. Assess licensee corrective actions. )rftii

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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" Problems were identified with the Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and IVI 144,5> -

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recom mendations folloving a LOOP.

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2. Review licensee's extent of condition tr<K1'analysis.

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response organization notification of d,,lk- 2. Review licensee's extent cif condition I-l ., . '

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Ul, Atm'ossphericDu-mp-4 Apparent cause was internal control air Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Valve 185-Failure.: leakage allowlanpval -drift o closev on 2004012-01 contributing cause(s)

- -, low demand signals. [OK] Operator 2. Review licensee's extent of condition distraction during event , rt , analysis v:

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econsistent with industry operating experience

I 't-4 for AOVs Ul, Letdow Heat Apparent cause was poor design Public URI 1. Review adequacy of temporary Exchange r solation'ii control, inadequate training on design 2004012-02 modification.

il - modification, and inadequate 2. Review adequacy of training.

1 "'l procedures. [OK] Operatordistraction 3. Review adequacy of procedures.

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U3PBypass'Valve Bypass valve control system caused a Public URI 1. Review the electrical characteristics of the

,Contra ISysMqn Issue Unit 3 main steam isolation. The 2004012-02 U3 event. Focus particularly on how the licensee declared apparent cause as o re powered and what role the

- 4,QY Ak7jcontrol system "anomaly." The teams static swit had on the controls.

review found potential design issues. Vi nsee determination of cause and corrective actions

3. Determine if a design control violation occurred

4. Review extent of condition.

___ __ __ __ ___ __ _ _ __ 5. Assess significance Determine if existing bypass valve Public URI 1. Compare control system design to

, control system meets the plant design 2004012-03 analyses assumptions.

bases. System response appeared 2.. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

. u i- different than what was analyzed. and assess significance.

Given the actual plant conditions, the Public 1. Review the licensee's assessment why U3 team could not explain why Unit 3 2004012-03 responded differently than Ul and U2.

responded differently than Units 1 and 2. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

- - 2. and assess significance.

U3, ReactorCoolant. Reactor coolant pump lube oil lift pump Public URI 1. Review design of thermal overload Pump Lift Oil Pump circuit breaker thermal overloads are 2004012-02 protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.

Breaker Thermal only set 0.1 amp above normal running 2. Assess significance of delay on plant Overloads ', current. This results nincreased probability of breaker tripping and operator distraction during plant a44.

d recovery. ,.

recovery. _ _ _ _ __

Reactor coolant pump starting Public URI 1. Review design control aspects of procedures do not caution operators 2004012-02 modifications to the thermal overload on potential thermal overload trip if protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.

pumps are operated for an extended 2. Determine if design control or procedure duration. violation occurred.

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- F-Focus Area-- i' :Potential lsue A ent Cause' P'U Ish '! 7 Tracking - - mmendations Ro I U3, LowPressureX Operators were required to manually Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Safe'ty ine'ctiohn Syosteim' implement low pressure safety 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

in-leakage -' -; ,--'i;; injection system depressurization 2. Review licensee's extent of condition procedures to prev gse- analysis.

pressurization. Op eratordistractj. 3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred Licensee apparen is oved a focusing particularly on the effectiveness of thermal and hydraulic phenomena that Borg-Warner corrective actions from past caused the leakage. [Not OK] Most issues.

_ o.7a\r likely apparent cause was mechanical 4. Focus on whether the licensee is misalignment of Borg-Warner check adequately assuring check-valve operability.

valves. 5. Focus on adequacy of check-valve as-ss .e. ... .dfe ' n 3, found testing and what the results of as-found testing imply about operability.

6. Assess significance.

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'Assesst duff ,ernce i.3 The Unit 1 and 2 reactors tripped on Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and response,,to:OP.i;, DNBR and the Unit 3 reactor tripped 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

on VOPT. The Unit 3 response was 2. Review licensee's extent of condition not the anticipated plant response analysis.

documented in the FSAR for a LOOP. 3. Focus on the licensee's assessment of the

,,ji i. ..1....::.. . A review of data indicated that U1, U2, impact of the high frequency (e.g., RCS and U3 bus frequency increased to hydraulic affects, electrical affects @ high nearly 67Hz, much higher than frequency, etc.)

anticipated. Apparent cause may be 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred associated with turbine control and assess significance.

response.

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! cus Ar F Poteial ssueslA arent aus Publish !'- acki  : :l  ; Recommendations FSAR Section 10.2.2.3.1.4, Public URI 1. Review licensee's assessment of whether "Power/Load Unbalance," indicates 2004012-03 the June 14, 2004 LOOP represented a new that... "150 ms delay is based on a worst-case scenario and proposed corrective three-phase bolted fault a PVNGS 525 actions to update the FSAR analyses.

kV switchyard as a worst case 2. Determine if a finding or violation occurred scenario...' Also .... "... load and assess significance.

control unit is a rate sensitive power/load unbalance circuit whose purpose is to initiate control valve fast closing action under load rejection conditions that might lead to rapid rotor acceleration and consequent over speed."

Given the characteristics of the LOOP which occurred @ PVNGS, it appeared 7j that the licensee's analyses documented in the FSAR may not identify the worst-case scenario.

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( Xwo GE Magna Blast breakers failed Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Vo opprat upon demand during plant 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

_recver.The licensee's apparent 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

~Geera, iecri, Magn cause was that the breakers "were not analysis.

cycled often enough." [Not OKI NRC 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

raised issues associated with 4. Review licensee's use of industry operating licersee-apparent cause and planned experience for GE Magna Blast breakers.

5. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.

6. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

Offioial 'Jco OnI'; Do Nct flelcacc

DNot-Rease F;ocu .Area  :-l'- 11sues Potentia arent CaseQPublish l- ' aki Recommen dations

. 6-, ._i ., . .t  % .; s 1 _W>  ;;sr, w, z f  ; r; Auxiliary Feedwater -'-,Sj ',.. During plant recovery, Ul experienced Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and System  %<is .; - ;- w<- w.-.

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. '  : .' . 9;^ .'  ;. thermally induced vibration of the 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

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feedwater piping. 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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Emergency procedures which direct a Public URI 1. Review design control aspects of the main steam isolation do not caution 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

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ehe MSIS 2. Determine if a design control or inadequate steam drain The procedure violation exists.

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emergency procedre result in 3. Assess whether the issues identified

',':', ','.-.' Thin' V ,,*W U the implementation of manual drain involved any human performance or PI&R

..-. ! { ; - . i. processes to ensure TDAFW aspects.

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operability. .

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i _ 4 r I) f . s o . S.0, .-.... X ... _..,.,, it, ' g Following the 1990 TDAFW overspeed Public URI 1. Review design control aspects of the

.. . X 4..'; ' I .  :'. .S. o ' C'.2. ',: ." E trip, the licensee directed corrective 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

actions that included procedure 2. Determine if a design control or inadequate

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, ' 7. r y revisions and the use of manual drains procedure violation exists.

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<;<v.f.PL to ensure operability. 3. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R l . A .. , .. _ .. It ...

aspects.

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4. Assess the adequacy of previous I ;.

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corrective actions.

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{ x is O/t s Hang B4g Assess licensee management Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and emergency response effectiveness in 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

directing the equipment needed to 2. Review licensee's extent of condition l ' ' ;'C5v'1' manually drain the TDAFW steam analysis.

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I . .: . ..*- he.; - \- ,,/ a- \ ,, - - traps away from U2 (the unit with one 3. Assess significance.

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'Official Use Only - Do iou-Retease Useo Plat~ecnica F  : Poten -I u Tracking -i ;Recommendations Use of Plant Techn aica ¢. Inspectors noted that the licensee did Public URI 1. Evaluate potential Conduct of Operations not enter TS LCO's until EOP's 2004012-04 and TS violations for the event:

directed a review of LCO status. This a. TDAFW operability Specifications * , -- 6_§I occurred very late into EOP b. U2 EDG operability Implementation. In addition, when the c. U2 Train "A" Battery Charger LCO was entered, the time clock d. U3 Low Pressure Safety Injection

,started when directed in the EOPs.

This resulted in LCO entry hours after e-Ii>

the condition occurred, If the practice continued, the inspectors were concerned that some TS LCO Action Statements could not be implemented when necessary.

Technical Support; Licensee electrician failed to return Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Center Emergency'; test switch to the normal position 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

Diesel Generator Trip,-: following a test run six-days prior to 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

- the event. analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

U2 Station Batteryv' Considering the discharge of the U2 Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and station battery, need to evaluate 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

whether battery discharge 2. Review licensee's extent of condition characteristics are as expected. analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

, .4. - Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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-Official Use unly- Uo Nor Ml~e1 Foc. s Ara . P.otertiai ls se's/A 4 arent ase; ;Pu Ish Tr ackl' R ecommendations U2,.T~r~ain' E-':os'itive ,'- The team found that the actions of the Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Displacement'Charging:- Control Room Supervisor not to be in 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

accordance with the requirements of 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

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the emergency operating procedure for analysis.

the plant conditions at the time... did 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

not follow EOP... 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

. .t.. .. -; .. Y VNs-.r. .' The team found that the auxiliary Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and operator did not implement Appendix

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contributing cause(s).

10, Step 1ot emergency operating 2. Review licensee's extent of condition Procedure 40EP-9EO10. Instead of analysis.

requesting a radiation protection 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

person to accompany him, the 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred C.. .! .. 3. ,_,; . operator went to the radiologically and assess significance.

controlled area access to perform a routine entry.

The team found that the auxiliary Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and operator did not properly implement 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

emergency operating 2. Review licensee's extent of condition Procedure 40EP-9EO10 as required. analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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