ML053130098

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AIT Issue and Followup Item List, with Handwritten Notes
ML053130098
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/2005
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0307
Download: ML053130098 (10)
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Text

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/,v'1 X-sr Palo Verde AIT Issue and Followup Item List NOTE (GENERIC Unresolved Issues):

(1) URI 2004012-01 involves an NRC review of the licensee's cause and/or corrective actions (2) URI 2004012-02 involves an NRC review of the potential design control issues (3) URI 2004012-03 involves an NRC review of the potential safety analyses issues (4) URI 2004012-04 involves Technical Specification usage questions during emergencies Information in this record was deleted in awcordance withbe Freedom of Infoumation Actexempbo FOl;I S'

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r-Reliability of 230kV protective relays

1. The redundency of the protective relay scheme has been improved by APS.
2. APS has indicated that OC protection would be installed on their 230kV transformers.
3. Modifications to included double trip coils on the WW and Devers breakers

-is being considered.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Verify that over current protection installed on Arizona Power System transformers connected to Palo Verde 500kV systems.
2. Verify that breakers in West Wing and Devers have been modified to include dual trip coils.

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AG,I kII Independence ot 500kV transmission Public N/A No action needed 5c-f frl vJ

1. Hassayampa negative sequence o IeC i L rS -

protective relaying was rempved by P i]gkID YLl I A APS l¢p,4 re.lilb}dy _- bvd 1-k, ovt-

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URI 2004012-01 C

1. Review licensee determination of root and tncributin -cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition ysis.
3. Verify that licensee's corrective actions are consistent with industry operating experience for these types of diodes.

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Problems were identified with the emergency notification of state and local officials.

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.-ERecimmendations 7,

1. Review licensee determinatio of root and contributing cause(s).

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2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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Problems were identified with the Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and ability to develop prtective acti 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

recom mendations folloving a LOOP.

2. Review licensee's extent of condition

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3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred I

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Problems were identified with the implementation of emergency response organization notification of an event.

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1. Review licensee determina contributing cause(s).

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2. Review licensee's extent c analysis.
3. Assess licensee correctivE
4. Determine if a finding or vi and assess significance.

tion of root and if condition

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olation occurred

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Ul, Atm'ossphericDu-mp 4-Apparent cause was internal control air Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and Valve 185-Failure.:

leakage allowlanpval o

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-drift close on 2004012-01 contributing cause(s) low demand signals. [OK] Operator

2. Review licensee's extent of condition v:

distraction during event rt,

analysis

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3. Verify licensee's corrective actions
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't-4 for AOVs Ul, Le tdow Heat Apparent cause was poor design Public URI

1. Review adequacy of temporary Exchange r solation'ii control, inadequate training on design 2004012-02 modification.

il modification, and inadequate

2. Review adequacy of training.

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"'l procedures. [OK] Operatordistraction

3. Review adequacy of procedures.

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Tracking Recom me ndations U3PBypass'Valve Bypass valve control system caused a Public URI

1. Review the electrical characteristics of the

,Contra ISysMqn Issue Unit 3 main steam isolation. The 2004012-02 U3 event. Focus particularly on how the licensee declared apparent cause as o

re powered and what role the 4,QY Ak7j control system "anomaly." The teams static swit had on the controls.

review found potential design issues.

Vi nsee determination of cause and corrective actions

3. Determine if a design control violation occurred
4. Review extent of condition.
5. Assess significance Determine if existing bypass valve Public URI
1. Compare control system design to control system meets the plant design 2004012-03 analyses assumptions.

bases. System response appeared 2.. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

. u i-different than what was analyzed.

and assess significance.

Given the actual plant conditions, the Public

1. Review the licensee's assessment why U3 team could not explain why Unit 3 2004012-03 responded differently than Ul and U2.

responded differently than Units 1 and

2. Determine if a finding or violation occurred
2.

and assess significance.

U3, ReactorCoolant.

Reactor coolant pump lube oil lift pump Public URI

1. Review design of thermal overload Pump Lift Oil Pump circuit breaker thermal overloads are 2004012-02 protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.

Breaker Thermal only set 0.1 amp above normal running

2. Assess significance of delay on plant Overloads current. This results nincreased recovery.

probability of breaker tripping and a44.

operator distraction during plant

d recovery.

Reactor coolant pump starting Public URI

1. Review design control aspects of procedures do not caution operators 2004012-02 modifications to the thermal overload on potential thermal overload trip if protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.

pumps are operated for an extended

2. Determine if design control or procedure duration.

violation occurred.

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Potential lsue A ent Cause' P' U Ish '!

Tracking 7

Ro mmendations I

U3, LowPressureX Safe'ty in e'ctiohn Syosteim' in-leakage -' -;,--'i;;

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_ o.7a\\r Operators were required to manually implement low pressure safety injection system depressurization procedures to prev gse-pressurization. Op eratordistractj.

Licensee apparen is oved a thermal and hydraulic phenomena that caused the leakage. [Not OK] Most likely apparent cause was mechanical misalignment of Borg-Warner check valves.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred focusing particularly on the effectiveness of Borg-Warner corrective actions from past issues.
4. Focus on whether the licensee is adequately assuring check-valve operability.
5. Focus on adequacy of check-valve as-found testing and what the results of as-found testing imply about operability.
6. Assess significance.

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The Unit 1 and 2 reactors tripped on DNBR and the Unit 3 reactor tripped on VOPT. The Unit 3 response was not the anticipated plant response documented in the FSAR for a LOOP.

A review of data indicated that U1, U2, and U3 bus frequency increased to nearly 67Hz, much higher than anticipated. Apparent cause may be associated with turbine control response.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Focus on the licensee's assessment of the impact of the high frequency (e.g., RCS hydraulic affects, electrical affects @ high frequency, etc.)
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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l Recommendations 7j FSAR Section 10.2.2.3.1.4, "Power/Load Unbalance," indicates that... "150 ms delay is based on a three-phase bolted fault a PVNGS 525 kV switchyard as a worst case scenario...' Also.... "... load control unit is a rate sensitive power/load unbalance circuit whose purpose is to initiate control valve fast closing action under load rejection conditions that might lead to rapid rotor acceleration and consequent over speed."

Given the characteristics of the LOOP which occurred @ PVNGS, it appeared that the licensee's analyses documented in the FSAR may not identify the worst-case scenario.

Public URI 2004012-03

1. Review licensee's assessment of whether the June 14, 2004 LOOP represented a new worst-case scenario and proposed corrective actions to update the FSAR analyses.
2. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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~Geera, iecri, Magn Xwo GE Magna Blast breakers failed Vo opprat upon demand during plant

_recver.The licensee's apparent cause was that the breakers "were not cycled often enough." [Not OKI NRC raised issues associated with licersee-apparent cause and planned Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Review licensee's use of industry operating experience for GE Magna Blast breakers.
5. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
6. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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During plant recovery, Ul experienced thermally induced vibration of the feedwater piping.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

Emergency procedures which direct a Public URI

1. Review design control aspects of the main steam isolation do not caution 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

ehe MSIS

2. Determine if a design control or inadequate steam drain The procedure violation exists.

emergency procedre result in

3. Assess whether the issues identified the implementation of manual drain involved any human performance or PI&R processes to ensure TDAFW aspects.

operability.

Following the 1990 TDAFW overspeed Public URI

1. Review design control aspects of the trip, the licensee directed corrective 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

actions that included procedure

2. Determine if a design control or inadequate revisions and the use of manual drains procedure violation exists.

to ensure operability.

3. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
4. Assess the adequacy of previous corrective actions.

Assess licensee management emergency response effectiveness in directing the equipment needed to manually drain the TDAFW steam traps away from U2 (the unit with one ESF bus denergized).

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess significance.

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Specifications 6_§I Inspectors noted that the licensee did not enter TS LCO's until EOP's directed a review of LCO status. This occurred very late into EOP Implementation. In addition, when the LCO was entered, the time clock

,started when directed in the EOPs.

This resulted in LCO entry hours after the condition occurred, If the practice continued, the inspectors were concerned that some TS LCO Action Statements could not be implemented when necessary.

Public URI 2004012-04

1. Evaluate potential Conduct of Operations and TS violations for the event:
a. TDAFW operability
b. U2 EDG operability
c. U2 Train "A" Battery Charger
d. U3 Low Pressure Safety Injection e-Ii>

Technical Support; Licensee electrician failed to return Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and Center Emergency';

test switch to the normal position 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

Diesel Generator Trip,-: following a test run six-days prior to

2. Review licensee's extent of condition the event.

analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

U2 Station Batteryv' Considering the discharge of the U2 Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and station battery, need to evaluate 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

whether battery discharge

2. Review licensee's extent of condition characteristics are as expected.

analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

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Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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The team found that the actions of the Control Room Supervisor not to be in accordance with the requirements of the emergency operating procedure for the plant conditions at the time... did not follow EOP...

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

The team found that the auxiliary Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and operator did not implement Appendix 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

10, Step 1 ot emergency operating

2. Review licensee's extent of condition Procedure 40EP-9EO10. Instead of analysis.

requesting a radiation protection

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

person to accompany him, the

4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred operator went to the radiologically and assess significance.

controlled area access to perform a routine entry.

The team found that the auxiliary operator did not properly implement emergency operating Procedure 40EP-9EO10 as required.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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