ML053130095

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AIT Issue and Followup Item List
ML053130095
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 07/07/2004
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0307
Download: ML053130095 (9)
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Text

Palo Verdi Issue and SEilo1 July 7, 2004 i:

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ic Isciosure in ccor ance WI

,7Potential ise.

ErF'ollowui Reliability of 230kV protective relays

1. The redundancy of the protective relay scheme has been improved by APS.

2 APS has indicated that OC protection would be installed on their 230kV transformers.

3. Modifications to included double trip coils on the WWV and Devers breakers is being considered.

that over current protection installed na Power System transformers ed to Palo Vgirde 500kV systems.

'that breakers in West Wing and i~av.brenimodified to include dual trip

':i Independence of 500kV transriiislion

1. Hassayampa negative sequcence protective relaying was jlemo;ed by APSAi,,.\\

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,,Pdblic 1' N/ia.

No action needed

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Emergency Diesel f

GeneratorFailure ;>

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'r Apparent cl DG faium

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failure,>ot Iide: irniexc itje ctifiercitcuit.

[OKl;Resulted in lssofkower to Train "jAESF busses. \\

r Note: Diode failed after -65 hours of Iservice.

izf URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Verify that licensee's corrective actions are consistent with industry operating experience for these tMies of diodes.

-Withhold from 

Dlsdoun in., Accordarie with I CFR2.390(d)(1) 22

-aus TRecommendations for!

G Problems were identified with the Public Ugl; A

tReview licensee determination of root and emergency notification of state and SiP Cntributing cause(s).

local officials.

L 2

9v licensee'eextent of condition 3~orssesst Ae~vnse corrective actions.

'r 4. Cmir if finding or violation occurred and assi gnificance..

Problems were identified with the ability Public WI

1. Review licensee determination of root and to develop protective action contributing cause(s).

f recommendations following a LOOP.

a2.

Review licensee's extent of condition piSg

+, Hianalysis.l

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred A1.9 L LigZ and assess significance.

Problems were identified with theo Public

1. Review licensee determination of root and implementation of emergency rjespopse g

contributing cause(s).

organization notification of anivent

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2. Review licensee's extent of condition ff ad Vanalysis.

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Assess licensee corrective actions.

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred B

.and assess significance.

l6EiCs -x_4lfiess am withhold firom Public Dis IUR; ill Mcuordance witn 10 CF 2-.393901(d)(1) 3

EMG

.Riith 10 CR SR2390(d)(14 I Li.

I Witnhoia trom iubIic Disclosurc in Accordanco wGFRO1}

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-Potent al lss

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IU3; Response to lLoss-:

e.f!'-Offsite P

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'-L Bypass valve control system caused a Unit 3 main steam isolation. The licensee declared apparent cause as control system "anomaly." The teams review found potential design issues.

the electrical characteristics of the Focus particularly on how the inets arepowered and what role the

, switchdlad on the controls.

Iicen-se determination of cause and

3. Deleminie if a design control violation occurred
4. Compare control system design to analyses assumptions.

>5. Review extent of condition.

06. Assess significance Given the actual plant conditions, the team could not explain why U3 responded differently than U1 and U2 The licensee noted that the genergtor excitation current on the U3 generatoi responded differently than exppeed and plans on conducting an evaluatioj of the exciter control systeim; 'This m, explain4both the VOPTiand~the bvyas
1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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U3, Reactor-Coolant PumpLift Oil Rump Breaker Therma-Overloads

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Reactor olanit pu~mp lubeililplift'pUmp circuit breakiertthermal overlodadr, only set 0;1npiabpaoveinbormal t~pIng current;WThis resusIt&swinhc~r~eased prjobability of break&rr iping

~r1i' hB§nd

,,perator distraction du

'plant v!recovery.

i URI

1. Review design of thermal overload protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.
2. Assess significance of delay on plant recovery.

'.Vitliliuld from iubIIc DIbuIude in A uzdojii vvutli 10 CFR 2.30(d)(1) 55

Wlithhold fa-u ubc scsuein Acuurdance-Mth n iu Ck-2:390d)1

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! jj' "-2nd U3 am1,a,,Low 4

Pressuras e,!

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U3;:owu~resu 4 '-,*44.4A Gaenera Electric Magnam.

BllastBrakers-ti<l^<>ak

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Reactor coolant pump starting procedures do not caution operators on potential thermal overload trip if pumps are operated for an extended duration.

iew design control aspects of ations to the thermal overload protection

,lube oil puqgp breakers.

nmine if design control or procedure Operators were required to manually implement low pressure safety injection system depressurization procedures to prevent over-pressurization. Operator distraction. Licensee apparent cause involved a thermal and hydraulic phenomena that caused the leakage.

[Not OK] Most likely apparent cause was mechanical misalignment of Borg-:-f Warner check valves.

1. Revieicdnsee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.

,3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred focusing particularly on the effectiveness of Borg-Warner corrective actions from past issues.

4. Focus on whether the licensee is adequately assuring check-valve operability.
5. Focus on adequacy of check-valve as-found testing and what the results of as-found testing imply about operability.
6. Assess significance.

URI cause cycled raised

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Review licensee's use of industry operating experience for GE Magna Blast breakers.
5. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
6. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

Wfithi~l101J frem Public. Disclonsure in Accnrdlance wit 0CR2.0()1 6

Withiho fivza fLl D~slouiue fiirAccoidduanc whla 10 Cr#R 2.390(d)(

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I For Followup' Team :4t

-Auxiliary. Feedwatert'.

System

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4.s During plant recovery, Ul experienced thermally induced vibration of the feedwater piping.

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.'Review licensee determination of root and Ko'ttributing cause(s).

,520evjew licensee'sbxtent of condition 3Ns,,sisessicefe corrective actions.

4. D'terrn ta finding or violation occurred and ass~~sesisgnificance.

Emergency procedures which direct a main steam isolation do not caution operators on the fact that the MSIS isolated TDAFW steam drains. The emergency procedures do not result in the implementation of manual drain processes to ensure TDAFW

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operability.

1. Review design control aspects of the TDAFW manual drains.
2. Determine if a design control or inadequate procedure violation exists.
3. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.

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.,iI Following the 1990 TDAFW trip, the licensee directed co actions that included procedc revisions and the use of' a to ensireko1erabitv

1. Review design control aspects of the TDAFW manual drains.
2. Determine if a design control or inadequate procedure violation exists.
3. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
4. Assess the adequacy of previous corrective actions.

URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess significance.

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.Y t-!.'Recommendations for*i FolwpTa-: -

Use of Plant Technical Specifications p.G f'i r

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iri Inspectors noted that the licensee did not enter TS LCO's until EOP's directed a review of LCO status. This occurred very late into EOP implementation. In addition, when the LCO was entered, the time clock started when directed in the EOPs. This resulted in LCO entry hours after the condition occurred. If the practice continued, the inspectors were concerned that some TS LCO Action Statements could not be implemented when necessary.

valuate potential Conduct of Operations JS violations for the event:

Jri\\FW operabiyty

,U2-EDG operability 0

iBattery Charger I

, essure Safety Injection inificance.

4 Technical Support.

.Center Emergency;.

Diesel-GeneratorTrip

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' '.-r,i : \\:,.tr,,-W-,,l Licensee electrician failed to return test switch to the normal position followingsa test run six-days prior to the event.,

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1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

U2_T ain ",'-'Positiv6,9`-.j DiplcementC Cargingl>;

The tebrnTfound that.the-actions of the CoQ olo1o Supervsornotto be in accorncelw tn the req uirementsi of the emergeqcyqoperating proi; lu(for the plant conditio~ns'at the tima26 did-not followmEO.

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1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

W*t.IiIi1Id fiutip PubIi Disclosure in Accoraanc with 10 Gi-K 2.0(d)(t) 88

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PubIlsh-l I. I The team found that the auxiliary operator did not implement Appendix 10, Step 1 of emergency operating Procedure 40EP-9EO10. Instead of requesting a radiation protection person to accompany him, the operator went to the radiologically controlled area access to perform a routine entry.

Public U6'

>1 Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).

+/-2..Review licenseesjextent of condition 3S'ssesWil Isens§e corrective actions.

4. Determiin.if'a finding or violation occurred and assessysignificance.

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The team found that the auxiliary operator did not properly implement emergency operating Procedure 40EP-9EO10 as required.

1. Review licensee determination of root and

,contributing cause(s).

i2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

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--,VVttjJjjNA +" PuNG Diselesure in AGoordaneeAvdh-tO-eflt-2-.390td)(ty 9

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