ML053130095
| ML053130095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/2004 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0307 | |
| Download: ML053130095 (9) | |
Text
July 7, 2004 -
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E g-Palo Verdi 4t,-
c0 Issue and SEilo1 4U0CDC 1
ic Isciosure in ccor ance WI
,7Potential ise. ErF'ollowui Reliability of 230kV protective relays that over current protection installed
- 1. The redundancy of the protective na Power System transformers relay scheme has been improved by ed to Palo Vgirde 500kV systems.
APS. 'that breakers in West Wing and 2 APS has indicated that OC i~av.brenimodified to include dual trip protection would be installed on their 230kV transformers.
- 3. Modifications to included double trip coils on the WWV and Devers breakers is being considered.
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- i. I Independence of 500kV transriiislion ,,Pdblic 1'N/i a. No action needed
- 1. Hassayampa negative sequcence protective relaying was jlemo;ed by LA'.
APSAi,,.\ A t4 i '4.
Apparent cl DG faium / URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Emergency Diesel f failure,>ot Iide: irniexc itje ctifiercitcuit. contributing cause(s).
GeneratorFailure ;> [OKl;Resulted in lssofkower to Train 2. Review licensee's extent of condition
- ."2 .:- ,, '! 'r : '.. .:. "jAESF busses. \ r analysis.
- 3. Verify that licensee's corrective actions are Note: Diode failed after -65 hours of consistent with industry operating experience Iservice. izf for these tMies of diodes.
-Withhold from Dlsdoun in., Accordarie with I CFR2.390(d)(1) 2
-aus TRecommendations - for! G Problems were identified with the Public Ugl; A tReview licensee determination of root and emergency notification of state and SiP
@ Cntributing cause(s).
local officials. L 2 9v licensee'eextent of condition 3~orssesst Ae~vnse corrective actions.
- 4. Cmir
'r if finding or violation occurred
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ and assi gnificance..
- Problems were identified with the ability Public WI 1. Review licensee determination of root and to develop protective action contributing cause(s).
f recommendations following a LOOP. a2. Review licensee's extent of condition piSg +,Hianalysis.l
- 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
. i 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred A1.9 L LigZ and assess significance.
Problems were identified with theo Public 1. Review licensee determination of root and implementation of emergency rjespopse g contributing cause(s).
- organization notification of anivent
- 4gv 2. Review licensee's extent of condition ff ad S3.
' Vanalysis.
t Assess licensee corrective actions.
XA 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred B .and significance.
assess l6EiCs -x_4lfiess am withhold firom Public Dis IUR; ill Mcuordance witn 10 CF 2-.393901(d)(1) 3
EMG .Riith 10 CR SR2390(d)(14 I Li.
I Witnhoia trom iubIic Disclosurc in Accordanco wGFRO1}
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,;~F66us Areag , -..,-Potent al lss .fnr Fnllnwiin TP;-
IU3; Response to lLoss-: Bypass valve control system caused a the electrical characteristics of the P
e.f!'-Offsite r lb+!r Unit 3 main steam isolation. The Focus particularly on how the licensee declared apparent cause as inets arepowered and what role the C-> - * '-L control system "anomaly." The teams , switchdlad on the controls.
review found potential design issues. Iicen-se determination of cause and
- 3. Deleminie if a design control violation occurred
- 4. Compare control system design to analyses assumptions.
>5. Review extent of condition.
- 06. Assess significance Given the actual plant conditions, the 1. Review licensee determination of root and team could not explain why U3 contributing cause(s).
responded differently than U1 and U2 2. Review licensee's extent of condition The licensee noted that the genergtor analysis.
excitation current on the U3 generatoi 3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred responded differently than exppeed and assess significance.
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and plans on conducting an evaluatioj
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' . '..l of the exciter control systeim; 'This m,
¢ * .- r*t o k ., s 1 .: ,, ,1, . 1 - ;-t s t w8 ! 0 explain4both the VOPTiand~the bvyas s _su ! :- .78 . t wi i,
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U3, Reactor-Coolant Reactor olanit pu~mp lubeililplift'pUmp URI 1. Review design of thermal overload PumpLift Oil Rump circuit breakiertthermal overlodadr, protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.
Breaker Therma- only set 0;1npiabpaoveinbormal t~pIng 2. Assess significance of delay on plant Overloads current;WThis resusIt&swinhc~r~eased recovery.
prjobability of break&rr iping
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,,perator distraction ~r1i' du hB§nd
'plant v!recovery. i
'.Vitliliuld from iubIIc DIbuIude in A uzdojii vvutli 10 CFR 2.30(d)(1) 5 5
Wlithhold fa-u ubc scsuein Acuurdance-Mthn iu Ck- 2:390d)1
'Potential l
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Reactor coolant pump starting iew design control aspects of procedures do not caution operators on ations to the thermal overload protection
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toriA t ! jj' "-2nd potential thermal overload trip if pumps ,lube oil puqgp breakers.
U3am1,a,,Low Pressuras 4 e ,! s7he. *er are operated for an extended duration. nmine if design control or procedure I Operators were required to manually 1. Revieicdnsee determination of root and implement low pressure safety injection contributing cause(s).
system depressurization procedures to 2. Review licensee's extent of condition prevent over-pressurization. Operator analysis.
distraction. Licensee apparent cause ,3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred involved a thermal and hydraulic focusing particularly on the effectiveness of U3;:owu~resu ., 4 '-,*44.4A phenomena that caused the leakage. Borg-Warner corrective actions from past
[Not OK] Most likely apparent cause issues.
Gaenera Electric Magnam. was mechanical misalignment of Borg-:-f 4. Focus on whether the licensee is BllastBrakers-ti<l^<>ak Warner check valves. adequately assuring check-valve operability.
.trs.iio lI. .- , *h:A 5. Focus on adequacy of check-valve as-found testing and what the results of as-found testing
. I'iri '- -X +4 imply about operability.
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- 6. Assess significance.
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- ,.~. URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
- 2. Review licensee's extent of condition cause analysis.
cycled 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
raised 4. Review licensee's use of industry operating experience for GE Magna Blast breakers.
- 5. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
- 6. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.
Wfithi~l 101J frem Public. Disclonsure in Accnrdlance wit 0CR2.0()1 6
Withiho fivza fLlD~slouiue fiirAccoidduanc whla 10 Cr#R 2.390(d)(
I -:' -:I- I For Followup' Team :4t
-Auxiliary.Feedwatert'. During plant recovery, Ul experienced .'Review licensee determination of root and System *',.'.>;-..,;.",, thermally induced vibration of the Ko'ttributing cause(s).
feedwater piping. ,520evjewlicensee'sbxtent of condition
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_z~~~~~ 4.s 3Ns,,sisessicefe corrective actions.
- 4. D'terrn ta finding or violation occurred and ass~~sesisgnificance.
Emergency procedures which direct a 1. Review design control aspects of the main steam isolation do not caution TDAFW manual drains.
operators on the fact that the MSIS 2. Determine if a design control or inadequate isolated TDAFW steam drains. The procedure violation exists.
emergency procedures do not result in 3. Assess whether the issues identified the implementation of manual drain involved any human performance or PI&R processes to ensure TDAFW / aspects.
operability.
Following the 1990 TDAFW 1. Review design control aspects of the
.A- , trip, the licensee directed co TDAFW manual drains.
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actions that included procedc 2. Determine if a design control or inadequate revisions and the use of' a procedure violation exists.
to ensireko1erabitv 3. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
- 4. Assess the adequacy of previous corrective actions.
URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
- 2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
- 3. Assess significance.
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Use of Plant Technical Inspectors noted that the licensee did :valuate potential Conduct of Operations Specifications : not enter TS LCO's until EOP's directed JS violations for the event:
a review of LCO status. This occurred Jri\FW operabiyty very late into EOP implementation. In ,U2-EDG operability
', p.G f'i -' .. r j, .,, . addition, when the LCO was entered, 0 iBattery Charger the time clock started when directed in I _ _ , essure Safety Injection the EOPs. This resulted in LCO entry hours after the condition occurred. If inificance.
- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~. C...._ iri the practice continued, the inspectors
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.77 were concerned that some TS LCO Action Statements could not be implemented when necessary.
-- 4 Technical Support. Licensee electrician failed to return test 1. Review licensee determination of root and
.Center Emergency;. ; switch to the normal position followingsa contributing cause(s).
Diesel-GeneratorTrip test run six-days prior to the event. , 2. Review licensee's extent of condition
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-'s',. ' '.-r ,i : \:,.tr, ,-W-,,l analysis.
- 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
I 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred i Y v.q and assess significance.
U2_T ain ",'-'Positiv6,9`-.j The tebrnTfound that.the-actions of the URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and DiplcementC Cargingl>; CoQ olo1o Supervsornotto be in contributing cause(s).
accorncelw tn the req uirementsi of 2. Review licensee's extent of condition the emergeqcyqoperating proi; lu(for analysis.
the plant conditio~ns'at the tima26 did- 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
not followmEO. 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred X ,,,,
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and assess significance.
W*t.IiIi 1 Id fiutip PubIi Disclosure in Accoraanc with 10 Gi-K 2.0(d)(t) 8
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7 V,--Potentiallse/paefue.' PubIlsh-l I. I The team found that the auxiliary Public U6' ,, >1 Review licensee determination of root and operator did not implement Appendix contributing cause(s).
10, Step 1 of emergency operating +/-2..Review licenseesjextent of condition Procedure 40EP-9EO10. Instead of requesting a radiation protection person 3S'ssesWil Isens§e corrective actions.
to accompany him, the operator went to 4. Determiin.if'a finding or violation occurred the radiologically controlled area and assessysignificance.
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access to perform a routine entry.
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vY + Aw; r$ The team found that the auxiliary 1. Review licensee determination of root and l ;'_Ssr 1,', ,,_,
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operator did not properly implement ,contributing cause(s).
l ,, ,,,<*,t,,8,,J,,, j-+;,-s 8, ;4,, - 8!Js_. <: ,E,, emergency operating i2. Review licensee's extent of condition l ;tt ^ ;>1 es jo r sv erj-r- ;; 4t4, , sa ;s> Procedure 40EP-9EO10 as required. analysis.
l "'@li!;' iJlA s#- -t,, .;eii -.- R *; i > ie 5 sti4 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
l s -, .' ; 1 W a S r r, >, K E - -, ,. i 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred l ' ;,.. i ..- i..rQ jL. :.,. ;.i 'gI.'.;i' _._r. :;
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