ML053130094

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E-Mail from Tony Gody Re Draft Palo Verde AIT Issues List
ML053130094
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 07/02/2004
From: Gody A
NRC Region 4
To: Calvo J, Stephen Dembek, Dyer J, Fields M, Mallett B, Merschoff E
NRC/RGN-II
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0307
Download: ML053130094 (10)
v • d • e


Text

Chuck aulk - Draft Palo Verde AlT Issues List Page 1 ?I bhuck PaiA - Draft Palo Ve'rde AIT issues List Page 1 ;'I From:

Tony Gody To:

Calvo, Jose; Dembek, Stephen; Dyer, Jim; Fields, Mel; Mallett, Bruce; Merschoff, Ellis Date:

07102/2004 11:00AM

Subject:

Draft Palo Verde AIT Issues List Attached is a draft issues list from the Palo Verde AIT. Please note that this is predecsional and sensitive.

Tony Gody P.S. Steve Dembeck and Mel Fields indicated that they would assure proper headquarters distribution.

CC:

Chamberlain, Dwight; Hodge, C. Vernon; Howell, Art; King, Mark; Marschall, Charles; Mathew, Roy; Paulk, Chuck; Pruett, Troy Information In this record was deleted

-in awcordance with the Freedom of InfrnalUon Act, exemptions FOIA.,Ot

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Focus Area I Potential Issues/Apparent Cause I Publish

[ Tracking I Recommendations Ohf-site Power Systems V

Reliability of 230kV protective relays

1. The redundency of the protective relay scheme has been Improved by APS.
2. APS has Indicated that OC protection would be Installed on their 230kV transformers.
3. Modifications to included double trip coils on the WWand Devers breakers is being considered.

Public URI 200401 2-01

1. Verify that over current protection Installed on Arizona Power System transformers connected to Palo Verde 500kV systems.
2. Verify that breakers In West Wing and Devers have been modified to Include dual trip coils.

(1 Independence of 500kV transmission

1. Hassayampa negative sequence protective relaying was removed by APS Public I NWA 1

U2, Train A' Emergency Diesel Generator Failure Apparent cause of EDG failure was failure of diode In exciter rectifier circuit. [OKI Resulted in loss of power to Train A' ESF busses.

Note: Diode failed after 75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> of senrice.

Public URI 2004012-01 No action needed

1. Review licensee determination of root ana contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Verify that licensee's corrective actions are consistent with industry operating exrerlenea for these tvnes of diodes.

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Emergency Response Organization Challenges Problems were Identif ied with the emergency notification of state and local officials.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determInation of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurread and assess sionificance.

Problems were Identified with the Public URI

1. Review licensee determination ot root and ability to develop protective action 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

recommendations following a LOOP.

2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine If a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

Problems were identified with the Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and implementation of emergency 200401 2-01 contributing cause(s).

response organization notification of

2. Review licensee's extent of condition an event.

analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation

________________________________occurred and assess significance.

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U1, Atmospheric Dump Valve 185 Failure Apparent cause was internal control air leakage allowing valve to drift close on low demand signals. [OK)

Minor operator distraction during event.

Note: Ucensee still troubleshootina Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determinaticn of root and contributing cause(s)
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis
3. Verify licensee's corrective actions consistent with Industry operating experience for AOVs Ut, Letdown Heat Apparent cause was poor design Public URI
1. Review adequacy of temporary Exchanger Isolation control, Inadequate training on 2004012-02 modification.

Failure design modification, and Inadequate

2. Review adequacy of training.

procedures. [OK] Moderate operator

3. Review adequacy of procedures.

distraction during event.

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U3, Response to Loss-of-Offsite Power Bypass valve control system caused a Unit 3 main steam Isolation. The licensee declared apparent cause as control system 'anomaly.' The teams review found potential design issues.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review the electrical characteristics of the U3 event. Focus particularly on how the control cabinets are powered and what role the D-1 1 static switch had on the controls.
2. Review licensee determination of cause and corrective actions
3. Determine If a design control violation occurred
4. Compare control system design to analyses assumptions.
5. Review extent of condition.
6. Assess significance Given the actual plant conditions, the team could not explain why U3 responded differently than Ul and U2. The licensee noted that the generator excitation current on the U3 generator responded differently than expected and plans on conducting an evaluation of the exciter control system. This may explain both the VOPT and the bypass valve control cabinet anomaly.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

4 U3, Reactor Coolant Pump Lift Oil Pump Breaker Thermal Ovdrloads Reactor coolant pump lube oil lift pump circuit breaker thermal overloads are only set 0.1 amp above normal running current. This results In Increased probability of breaker tripping and operator Public URI 2004012-02

1. Review design of thermal overload protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.
2. Assess significance of delay on plant recovery.

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Reactor coolant pump starting procedures do not caution operators on potential thermal overload trip If pumps are operated for an exended duration.

Public UFII 2004012-02

1. Review design control aspects of modifications to the thermal overload protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.
2. Determine if design control or procedure violation occurred.

U3. Low Pressure Operators were required to manually Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and Safety Injection System implement low pressure safety 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

In-leakage Injection system depressurization

2. Review licensee's extent of condition procedures to prevent analysis.

over-pressurization. Operator

3. Determine if a finding or violation distraction. Ucensee apparent cause occurred focusing particularly on the Involved a thermal and hydraulic effectiveness of Borg-Wamner corrective phenomena that caused the leakage.

actions from past Issues.

[Not OKI Most likely apparent cause

4. Focus on whether the licensee Is was mechanical misalignment of adequately assuring check-valve operability.

Borg-Warner check valves.

5. Focus on adequacy of check-vatve as-found testing and what the results of as-found testing Imply about operability.

___6.

Assess significance.

General Electric Magna Two GE Magna Blast breakers failed Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and Blast Breakers to operate upon demand during plant 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

recovery. The licensee's apparent

2. Review licensee's extent of condition cause was that the breakers 'were analysis.

not cycled often enough.' [Not OKI

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

NRC raised issues associated with

4. Review ticensee's use of Industry licensee's apparent cause and operating experlence for GE Magna Blast planned review, breakers.
5. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.
6. Determine if a finding or violation

___occurred and assess significance.

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Auxiliary Feedwater System During plant recovery, Ul experienced thermally induced vibration of the feedwater piping.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine If a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

Emergency procedures which direct Public URI

1. Review design control aspects of the a main steam Isolation do not caution 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

operators on the fact that the MSIS

2. Determine I a design control or Isolated TDAFW steam drains. The inadequate procedure violation exists.

emergency procedures do not result

3. Assess whether the Issues Identified In the Implementation of manual involved any human performance or PI&R drain processes to ensure TDAFW aspects.

operability.

Following the 1990 TDAFW Public URI

1. Review design control aspects of the overspeed trip. the licensee directed 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

corrective actions that Included

2. Determine If a design control or procedure revisions and the use of Inadequate procedure violation exists.

manual drains to ensure operability.

3. Assess whether the Issues Identified Involved any human performance or Pl&R aspects.
4. Assess the adequacy of previous corrective actions.

Assess licensee management emergency response effectiveness In directing the equipment needed to manually drain the TDAFW steam traps away from U2 (the unit with one ESF hus deneMie dR).

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess significance.

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Use of Plant Technical Inspectors noted that the licensee did Public URI

1. Evaluate potential Conduct ot Operations Specifications not enter TS LCO's until EOP's 2004012.04 and TS violations for the event:

directed a review of LCO status.

a. TDAFW operability This occurred very late Into EOP
b. U2 EDG operability implementation. In addition, when
c. U2 Train 'A' Battery Charger the LCO was entered, the time dock
d. U3 Low Pressure Safety Injection started when directed in the EOPs.

This resulted In LCO entry hours

2. Assess significance.

after the condition occurred. If the practice continued, the inspectors were concerned that some TS LCO Action Statements could not be implemented when necessary.

Technical Support Ucensee electrician tailed to return Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and Center Emergency test switch to the normal position 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

Diesel Generator Trip following a test run six-days prior to

2. Review licensee's extent of condition the event.

analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

U2 Station Battery Considering the discharge of the U2 Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and station battery, need to evaluate 2004012.01 contributing cause(s).

whether battery discharge

2. Review licensee's extent of condition characteristics are as expected.

analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine If a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

U2 Train E Positive Displacement Charging Pump Trip The team found that the actions of the Control Room Supervisor not to be in accordance with the requirements of the emergency operating procedure for the plant conditions at the time... did not follow EOP...

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess slanificance.

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rChuck Paulk - final issue list.wpd Page 9 1 official Use only - Do1 ror Re~e The team found that the auxiliary Public URI

1. Review licensee determination of root and operator did not Implement Appendix 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

10, Step 1 of emergency operating

2. Review licensee's extent of condition Procedure 4OEP-9EO10. Instead of analysis.

requesting a radiation protection

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

person to accompany him, the

4. Determine If a finding or violation operator went to the radiologically occurred and assess significance.

controlled area access to perform a routine entry.

The team found that the auxiliary operator did not properly Implement emergency operating Procedure 40EP-9EO10 as required.

Public URI 2004012-01

1. Review licensee determination of root and contributing cause(s).
2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.
3. Assess licensee corrective actions.
4. Determine If a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

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