ML053130086

AIT Issue and Followup Item List

ML053130086
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	07/02/2004
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0307
Download: ML053130086 (9)

Text

July 2, 2004 1

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Pale Verdle AIT Issue awd Followup Itnm List Il z 2.

Offipial UocOI u u tks

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P *  : l;;:t:-: i::: ;J-  : t; Off-,site,'.Power! Systems'- Reliability of 230kV protective relays Public URI 1. Verify that over current protection installed

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.'.4... ';. ' 'i 1. The redundency of the protective 200401 2-01 on Arizona Power System transformers

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. . . .: .  : :.';!,'- , -: , relay scheme has been improved by connected to Palo Verde 500kV systems.

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' , .' : . ,' .: ;. .' ':' APS. 2. Verify that breakers in West Wing and

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fi - 1 t i. . ' r Independence of 500kV transmission No action needed

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-! ,;_. -.: 1. Hassayampa negative sequence

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s, . M i t protective relaying was removed by

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'I U2, Tranr"A" Apparent cause of EDG failure was Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and EmergencyDiese - failure of diode in exciter rectifier 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

GeneratorFailure ; circuit. [OK] Resulted in loss of 2. Review licensee's extent of condition power to Train 'A' ESF busses. analysis.

3. Verify that licensee's corrective actions are consistent with industry operating experience for these types of diodes.

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Offic~tIse-e~~ nly-Dc-Nt4-R lease-Focus' Area  : Po ential issu/ppareit -Cau ecomendatio";

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IEmergency. Response:

. ,. . , o; . _ . . .r . ' - g Problems were identified with the Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and IOrGanizajtion,,., ...'0.'., t-4-.-,. emergency notification of state and 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

Challenges -  ; local officials. 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

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analysis.

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3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

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.,a, T . . Problems were identified with the I Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and ability to develop protective action 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

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recommendations following a LOOP. 2. Review licensee's extent of condition L

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

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¢l Problems were identified with the Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and

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,implementation of emergency 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

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w response organization notification of 2. Review licensee's extent of condition l

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.,,', 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

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' 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

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_and assess significance.

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U1,.Atmospheric"Dump Apparent cause was internal control air Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Valve 185 Failure leakage allowing valve to drift close on 2004012-01 contributing cause(s) low demand signals. [OK] Operator 2. Review licensee's extent of condition distraction during event. analysis

3. Verify licensee's corrective actions consistent with industry operating experience for AOVs

,U1,'LetdownHeat' . Apparent cause was poor design Public URI 1. Review adequacy of temporary Exchangerisiplation control, inadequate training on design 2004012-02 modification.

Failure- -  ; modification, and inadequate 2. Review adequacy of training.

- procedures. [OK] Operatordistraction 3. Review adequacy of procedures.

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Focus Area ' -Potential Issues/Apparent Cause Puishml Tracki l - Recommendations' -;

U3,'Response toLoss--,- Bypass valve control system caused a Public URI 1. Review the electrical characteristics of the of-Offsite Power Unit 3 main steam isolation. The 2004012-02 U3 event. Focus particularly on how the licensee declared apparent cause as control cabinets are powered and what role the control system "anomaly.u The teams D-11 static switch had on the controls.

review found potential design issues. 2. Review licensee determination of cause and corrective actions.

3. Determine if a design control violation occurred i ;4. Compare control system design to analyses assumptions.

5. Review extent of condition.

6. Assess significance Given the actual plant conditions, the Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and

- team could not explain why U3 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

responded differently than U1 and U2. 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

- - The licensee noted that the generator analysis.

excitation current on the U3 generator 3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred responded differently than expected and assess significance.

and plans on conducting an evaluation of the exciter control system. This may explain both the VOPT and the bypass valve control cabinet anomaly. l U3, Reactor, Coolant---' Reactor coolant pump lube oil lift pump Public URI 1. Review design of thermal overload Pump Lift Oil Pump circuit breaker thermal overloads are 2004012-02 protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.

pBreaker Thermal , only set 0.1 amp above normal running 2. Assess significance of delay on plant Overloadsb . current. This results in increased recovery.

,- - probability of breaker tripping and

-, ,operator distraction during plant

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[ Focus Area - {~Potentiallssues/Apparent Cause: '-i Publish Tracking . Reommendations ,

- Reactor coolant pump starting Public URI 1. Review design control aspects of procedures do not caution operators 2004012-02 modifications to the thermal overload on potential thermal overload trip if protection of RCP lube oil pump breakers.

pumps are operated for an extended 2. Determine if design control or procedure

- duration. violation occurred.

U3, Low Pressure, -: Operators were required to manually Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Safety~lnjection:System implement low pressure safety 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

In-leakage ',, - injection system depressurization 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

- procedures to prevent over- analysis.

- pressurization. Operator distraction. 3. Determine if a finding or violation occurred Licensee apparent cause involved a focusing particularly on the effectiveness of thermal and hydraulic phenomena that Borg-Warner corrective actions from past caused the leakage. [Not OK] Most issues.

likely apparent cause was mechanical 4. Focus on whether the licensee is

- .... misalignment of Borg-Warner check adequately assuring check-valve operability.

valves. 5. Focus on adequacy of check-valve as-found testing and what the results of as-found

. ,testing imply about operability.

-:6. Assess significance.

General Electric Magna:' Two GE Magna Blast breakers failed Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Blast Breakers to operate upon demand during plant 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

recovery. The licensee's apparent 2. Review licensee's extent of condition cause was that the breakers 'were not analysis.

cycled often enough." [Not OK] NRC 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

, raised issues associated with 4. Review licensee's use of industry operating licensee's apparent cause and planned experience for GE Magna Blast breakers.

review. 5. Assess whether the issues identified involved any human performance or PI&R aspects.

6. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

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OM Ul 4c OnlyD o Rlza Focus Area l -Potential Issues/Apparent Cause; l Pblish . Tracking -l AR co mendations-;,.

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Auxiliary Feedwater During plant recovery, UI experienced Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and System -;  ;^ thermally induced vibration of the 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

.. ........ A.-.... . . . ....... . feedwater piping. 2. Review licensee's extent of condition analysis.

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4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

Emergency procedures which direct a Public URI 1. Review design control aspects of the

" ;'''''' -' ''"'; '-'-: ^' '." ..; main steam isolation do not caution 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

.:  : .  ::- , .....  :. .  ; operators on the fact that the MSIS 2. Determine if a design control or inadequate isolated TDAFW steam drains. The procedure violation exists.

emergency procedures do not result in 3. Assess whether the issues identified

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the implementation of manual drain involved any human performance or PI&R

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processes to ensure TDAFW aspects.

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. -- L -r '  :' Following the 1990 TDAFW overspeed Public URI 1. Review design control aspects of the trip, the licensee directed corrective 2004012-02 TDAFW manual drains.

actions that included procedure 2. Determine if a design control or inadequate revisions and the use of manual drains procedure violation exists.

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involved any human performance or PI&R

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'. . .l _;' '"'." i . . ;'. . n Assess licensee management Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and emergency response effectiveness in 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

directing the equipment needed to 2. Review licensee's extent of condition manually drain the TDAFW steam analysis.

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traps away from U2 (the unit with one 3. Assess significance.

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- Focus Area I Potential Issues/Apparent Cause 1,.I. -7Publish-- ~ I, i~ :.Tracking ..; ... I' :.Recommrendations.-

'Useof Plant.Technical Inspectors noted that the licensee did Public URI 1. Evaluate potential Conduct of Operations Specifications', i ,,' ' not enter TS LCO's until EOP's 2004012-04 and TS violations for the event:

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.. directed a review of LCO status. This a. TDAFW operability occurred very late into EOP b. U2 EDG operability

..  :. . ... ..... . - . .. ...  ; implementation. In addition, when the c. U2 Train "Au Battery Charger LCO was entered, the time clock d. U3 Low Pressure Safety Injection started when directed in the EOPs.

. . , .. .: . ...... This resulted in LCO entry hours after 2. Assess significance.

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the condition occurred. If the practice continued, the inspectors were concerned that some TS LCO Action Statements could not be implemented when necessary.

Technical Support.' Licensee electrician failed to return Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Center Emergency'-, test switch to the normal position 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

Diesel Generator Trip. following a test run six-days prior to 2. Review licensee's extent of condition

-. . , the event. analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

U2 Station Battery Considering the discharge of the U2 Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and station battery, need to evaluate 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

whether battery discharge 2. Review licensee's extent of condition characteristics are as expected. analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

- - -4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

0uncwia Use Onily - Do Ndut Retease

Offioio Uco Oni': Do Not Reloase Area -Potential oFo lI;sus/A aet Cas- Pub lish Trcking ; - Recommenda tions U2-rTrain '!E".Positive ; The team found that the actions of the Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and Displacement Charging. Control Room Supervisor not to be in 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

Pump Trip - accordance with the requirements of 2. Review licensee's extent of condition the emergency operating procedure for analysis.

the plant conditions at the time... did 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

not follow EOP... 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred and assess significance.

The team found that the auxiliary Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and operator did not implement Appendix 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

10, Step 1 of emergency operating 2. Review licensee's extent of condition Procedure 40EP-9EO10. Instead of analysis.

requesting a radiation protection 3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

person to accompany him, the 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred operator went to the radiologically and assess significance.

controlled area access to perform a routine entry.

The team found that the auxiliary Public URI 1. Review licensee determination of root and operator did not properly implement 2004012-01 contributing cause(s).

emergency operating 2. Review licensee's extent of condition Procedure 40EP-9EO10 as required. analysis.

3. Assess licensee corrective actions.

.... 4. Determine if a finding or violation occurred

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