ML051950152

U1R28 OCC Interactive Turnover with Handwritten Notations

ML051950152
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach  (DPR-024)
Issue date:	05/06/2004
From:	Nuclear Management Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0282
Download: ML051950152 (8)

Text

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T I ComminJttd to Nuclear Eclec

~~~LEXULLOE MIfT BIRCH

• UIR128 Point Beach Nuclear Plant U11R28 OCC Interactive Turnover Meeting Agenda Thursday, May 6, 2004 Start Time:

0600 NSB Cafeteria ATTENDEES Shift Outage Directors Shift Outage Managers (SOM)

Operations Coordinators (SOC)

Maintenance Coordinators (MOC)

Engineer/ Projects Coordinators (EOM)

Rad Protection Manager (RPM)

Site Safety Coordinator (SSC)

Shutdown Safety Assessor (SSA)

Site Management (SSM)

General Supervisors First Line Supervisors, Agenda

1.

Safety Issue Discussion (SSC)

2. Radiation Protection (RPM)

3.

Operations Coordinator Turnover (SOC)

4. Shutdown Safety Assessment (SSA)

S. Maintenance Coordinator Turnover (MOC)

6.

Engineering Coordinator Turnover (EOM)

7.

Major Projects Update (EOM)

8.

Schedule Review (SOM)

9.

Management Expectations (SSM)

10. ACEMAN Assessment Results (SOM)

11. Shift Goals (SOM)

Items Included In Daily Package:

Site Communication Safety Snippet Outage Alara Report Outage Status Report Shutdown Safety Assessment Defined Critical Path Work Activity Risk Assignment Outage Schedule Infcma1on Il tdsmad WaS &*Wd In aodac With Freedom Orf Ir1fo Ad, exempt 4 BRIEFING NOTES

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Use ACEMAN during U1R28 - a message from Gary VanMiddlesworth The foundation of Point Beach Excellence is Individual Excellence. Our path to Excellence is based on every individual/employee understanding our Picture of Excellence and how their actions and behaviors integrate into the picture.

Part of demonstrating the picture requires employees to exemplify the six basic individual results.

These six basic individual results outline what each one of us, individually, can do to support Point Beach.

Accident Free Control Dose Event Free Meet Schedule T

Attend Training No Rework I'd like to review some of the events we've had during this outage that demonstrate the importance of individual performance and the impact it has on our overall results.

Letdown gas stripper secured early (CAP055326)

The Unit 1 Letdown Gas Stripper was inadvertently removed from service too early. The Reactor Coolant System hydrogen gas concentration was well above its limit.

Why did it happen? There was a lack of knowledge in the outage schedule, in addition to a lack of communication verifying/validating that the system should be secured.

The gas concentration in the RCS was specifically discussed at the 0600 OCC meeting the day before this event. The gas concentration was high and site management was assured that the letdown gas stripper system would resolve the issue. Later that night the system was secured with gas concentration still high.

Individual results not met: Event free, Meet schedule and Rework Steam generator nozzle dams (CAP055538)

The potential was there to not have a hot leg vent path during the installation of Unit 1 steam generator nozzle dams.

Management communicated at the 0600 OCC turnover meeting the importance of ensuring the hot leg vent path was maintained. In addition, regulatory commitments clearly state in Generic Letter 88-17 and NUREG-1449 the requirement for a hot leg vent path. A hot leg vent path is and was sequenced correctly in the U1R28 outage schedule as follows:

• Remove hot leg S/G man ways

• Remove cold leg SIG man ways

• Install cold leg nozzle dams 2

Remove pressurizer man way (hot leg vent path)

• Install hot leg nozzle dams We encountered some difficulties in removing the pressurizer man way, which would have established the hot leg vent path. At this point individuals decided to deviate from the schedule and proceed with the installation of the hot leg nozzle dams - while developing a plan to remove the pressuizer man way.

Why did it happen? Employees were performing in the knowledge base area and proceeded in the face of uncertainty. We should have stopped, got the right people together to adhere to the schedule.

Individual results not met: Control dose, Event free, Meet schedule and Rework Bolted fault work; opened wrong breaker during lineup During preparations for the Bolted Fault modification, the incorrect breaker was opened, which resulted in the loss of the 'A' Spent Fuel Pool cooling pump.

An employee was performing the lineup needed for the modification work to begin. The correct breaker was identified, the control room was notified, and then the worker opened the breaker next to the correct one.

Why did it happen? Inattention to detail, failure to self-check, and the lack of obtaining a peer check were a few of the major contributors.

As a result, the work was stopped and the modification was removed from the outage. We later placed the modification back into the outage schedule. As a result of removing the work and reinserting it -

additional time was added to the outage.

Individual results not met: Event free, Meet schedule and Rework Polar crane failures A growling noise was identified on the auxiliary and main hook of the polar crane. This noise was noticed during previous outages; however, with the heightened emphasis on "doing things right" the organization decided to investigate and fix the issue. THIS IS THE RIGHT BEHAVIOR!

However, troubleshooting and repair communications (between days and nights) resulted in rework.

Why did it happen? We did not implement the Issue Manager process to establish a single point of ownership. This resulted in plans being changed depending on who was on shift, poor communications also contributed to rework.

Individual results not met: Meet schedule and Rework Reactor head lift; bullet nose inadvertently lifted (CAP055951)

During the Unit 1 reactor head lift, one incore thermocouple guide (bullet nose) was inadvertently lifted along with the head. This prevented cavity flood up.

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A white rag used as a temporary FME barrier while preparing the thermocouple penetration for the head lift was inadvertently left. The rag had jammed in the annulus between the T/C bullet nose guide and the head penetration; this caused the guide to be lifted with the head instead of slipping through it and remaining on the upper internals.

Why did it happen? Past practices used the rag as an FME barrier. There wasn't a formal (such as a procedure requirement) barrier in place to ensure it was removed.

Individual results not met: Control dose, Event free, Meet Schedule and Rework These examples illustrate the importance of individual performances in regards to the Point Beach Picture of Excellence.

It is important to remember: EVERY TASK, EVERY JOB, EVERY DAY, EVENT FREE.

By using the Picture of Excellence we wll do the job right the first time! Remember to use the individual results associated with ACEMAN.

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Committed to Nuclear Eircellnce fE OF PORIT BERH

• UVIRi Point Beach Nuclear Plant UlR28 Refueling Outage Safety Topics for week of May 2 - 8, 2004 Theme for the week This week's theme is Hand Protection. During the last week of April. there were a lot of minor hand injuries reported. Although we have come a long way in the last few years, we still have not eliminated hand injuries. It is time we hand protection to the next level.

Daily Safety Snippets Sunday

'It's difficult to grip when your finger gets snipped" Could you imagine doing your job without your hands? We tend to take it too much for granted that we have two hands at our command, Immediately ready to do what we want them to. They not only perform amazing manual tasks, but they also make us money. Just ask anyone who has lost the use of his or her hands.

Monday "Concerning fingers. do not ignore: Cut one off and you'll grow no more" Limmerk 1999, While lowering a 20001b. flow diffuser from the high pressure turbine, a worker lost a substantial portion of one finger when the cribbing and jack used to support the diffuser failed and pinned the worker's hand between the diffuser and an I-beam used as part of the cribbing.

Tuesday "Safety gloves worn Is a hand not torn" OE12632 Davis Besse, While performing a search, a security officer ran his hand between the front and back seat of a vehicle. A utility knife with the blade partially open cut the leather outer covering of the search glove, but the Kevlar liner gloves the officer had on protected his hand and prevented a serious injury.

Wednesday

'Where danger lingers, watch your finczers" Workers need to know accidents can happen in the strangest ways. Some accidents are simply bizarre. Others happen when no hazard is apparent. Doors were the source of more than 10,000 hand injuries a year in the US. Vending machines caused more than 100 lost-day hand injuries.

And 52 workers injured their hands while walking, according to the statistics.

Thursdav "Practice safety until it fits like a glove" Do you consider gloves as much a part of your normal PPE as your hardhat, safety glasses, and hearing protection? If not, maybe you should be. Always carry a pair of gloves with you when in the plant and use them when operating the valve or picking up scrap metal.

Friday "A finger tip - don't leave work without thernl" On April 4, 2001, a contract employee at Braidwood Station suffered a fractured right hand when an electric hoist disengaged from a crane hook and fell on to the new fuel storage rack. The electric hoist was being used to drag test new spent fuel racks being installed at the station. Workers attached a load cell and the electric hoist to the auxiliary hoist of the fuel building overhead crane, and then connected the electric hoist to a test gage. As the crane operator lowered the auxiliary hook, the test gage hung up on the fuel rack and caused the rigging to move laterally. The electric hoist became disengaged because the safety latch on the auxiliary hook was not used.

Saturday

'It's no hand live... Proper gloves protect all five" OSHA 1910.138(a): General requirements. Employers shall select and require employees to use appropriate hand protection when employees' hands are exposed to hazards such as those from skin absorption of harmful substances; severe cuts or lacerations; severe abrasions; punctures; chemical burns; thermal burns; and harmful temperature extremes.

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Point Beach Nuclear Plant Outage 1 R28 DAY Supporting Operational Excellence 31 Path IA Picture Meets Outaae Radiation Performance lif--#

I I

I UUt:ZII LIVIWUL FLUU I

This indicator measures cumulative dose radiation exposure and total number of personnel-contamination events (PCE's > 5000 cpm) during refueling outages. The dose indicator is measured in Rem and individual PCE events.

Day 31 - May 4 Actual = 0.907 Cumulative = 51.104 Cumulative Forecast = 59.488 Meets:

<=75 Rem Actual Cum.

Daily dose and PCE goals reforecasted on 4/23.

PCE #7 on 5/4, individual performing cut-out of valve I RC-526B was found to have 10,000 ncpm contamination on modesty bottom (and 2,000 ncpm on eg).

lExceeds:

<=71 Rem Dose:

51.104 Rem IMeets: <= 18 Exceeds: <= 12 Actual PCE's:

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Personnel Contamination Events Cummulative Dose Exposure 4

CL 0

C5 0

U 0

5E z

20 18 16 14 12 10 8

6 4

2 0

.Forecast 0

GM-coat s6o l

SS 60 a40 2 4 o 20-b 0 2 4 6 8 1012141618202224262830323436384042

+-Actual

-GGoal 0 2 4 6 8 101214161820222426283032343638404244464850

Ne c Commilled to Nuclear Excellencu -7 Outage Status Report Plant:

Point Beach Unit I Day:

Thursday Today's Date I Time:

5/06/04 0400 Outage Duration: Day r'.33 Of Refueling Outage Number UIR28 Safety Status Industrial - Within the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OSHA Recordables 0

First Aid cases 0

Significant near misses 0

Total for this outage I

Summary:

Radiological Dose to date 51.104 Projected to date

• 59.488 Outage Goal 575 R Difference

-8.384

• Reforecast on 4/23 Number of PCEs 8

Summary:

5/5/04 - An individual performing disassembly of valve ISC-953 was contaminated.

Nuclear Significant human performance errors and events in last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 0

Summary:

Plant Status Mode:

0 Hot Standby (Mode 3) a Hot Shutdown (fode 4)

E Cold Shutdown (Modes)

Z Refueling Shutdown (Alode 6)

RCS:

Temperature:

'84 Pressure:

VWened tjAtimjo'1sere RV Level:

Refeiing Height Time to Boil:

3_ _

__rS Shutdown Safetj Assessment Protected Equipment:

Major Activities Completed In Last 24 Hours Critical Path and Near Critical Path Activities (Next 24 Hours)

• 1B-42 MCC Vertical Bracing

• IB-42 MCC Bus and Bucket Work MOB Package IWP-037-07

• CVCS Restoration

• IY04 Instrument Panel

• Restoration of IB-42

. IP-1SB SI Pump Seal Repair

• Reactor Head Repair

• SI System LRPM Testing Significant Outstanding Issues Date Issue Due Responsibility 4/28/04 IW-3B Shroud Fan Backdraft Damper FME 5/09/04 Terry Guay 5/03/04 Reactor Vessel Head Repair Penetration #26 5/16/04 Jim Schweitzer Upcoming Ma or Milestones Scheduled Actual Scheduled Actual Date Time Date Time Date Time Date Time Cooldown <2000 4/03/04 2100 4/03/04 2230 RCS Fill & Vent 4/23/04 1500 Head Lift 4/09/04 0900 4/21/04 1_ 550 Heatup >2000 4125/04 0900 Refueled 4114104 0300 5/02/04 1848 Reactor Critical 4128/04 0800 RV Headset 4/18/04 1900 On-Line 4/30/04 0100 7

Point Beach Nuclear Plant PBNP SHUTDOWN SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND FIRE CONDITION CHECKLIST OUTAGE SAFETY ASSESSMENT UNIT:

1 DATE:

May 6,2004 TIME:

0200 KEY SAFETY FUNCTIONS:

REACTIVITY:

CORE COOLING:

POWER AVAILABLE:

INVENTORY:

CONTAINMENT:

SFP COOLING:

GREEN GREEN GREEN GREEN GREEN NA PROTECTED EQUIPMENT:

COMMENTS:

RCS Time to Boil is 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> Fire Protection Condition IV: Credit is taken for fire rounds as fire prevention contingency PBF-1562 Revision 2 10/30/02

References:

NP 10.3.6 NP 10.2.1 8

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