ML051670019
| ML051670019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/2005 |
| From: | George Wunder NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| Wunder G, NRR/DLPM, 415-1494 | |
| References | |
| TAC MC4456, TAC MC4457 | |
| Download: ML051670019 (17) | |
Text
August 11, 2005 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way, KA 3-E Kennett Square, PA 19348
SUBJECT:
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: ELIMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN MONITORS (TAC NOS. MC4456, AND MC4457)
Dear Mr. Crane:
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 256 and 259 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated September 15, 2004 The amendments delete the TS requirements to maintain hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen/oxygen monitors and related Surveillance Requirements. The revised Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.44, "Combustible Gas Control for Nuclear Power Plants," eliminated the requirements for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed safety classifications and licensee commitments to certain design and qualification criteria for hydrogen and oxygen monitors.
A copy of the safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
George F. Wunder, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 256 to Renewed DPR-44
- 2. Amendment No. 259 to Renewed DPR-56
- 3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page
ML051670019 OFFICE PM/PD1-2 LA/PD1-2 Tech Branch SC/PD1-2 NAME GWunder MOBrien WReckley DRoberts DATE 7/26/05 7/26/05 06 /08 /05 8/02/05
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC PSEG NUCLEAR LLC DOCKET NO. 50-277 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 256 Renewed License No. DPR-44 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon Generation Company), and PSEG Nuclear LLC (the licensees), dated September 15, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I.
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (I) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 256, are hereby incorporated in the license. Exelon Generation Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Darrell J. Roberts, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 11, 2005
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 256 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-44 DOCKET NO. 50-277 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.3-25 3.3-25 3.3-26 3.3-26 B 3.3-70 B 3.3-70 B 3.3-74 B 3.3-74 B 3.3-75 B 3.3-75
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC PSEG NUCLEAR LLC DOCKET NO. 50-278 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 259 Renewed License No. DPR-56 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon Generation Company), and PSEG Nuclear LLC (the licensees), dated September 15, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (I) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 259, are hereby incorporated in the license. Exelon Generation Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Darrell J. Roberts, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 11, 2005
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 259 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-56 DOCKET NO. 50-278 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.3-25 3.3-25 3.3-26 3.3-26 B 3.3-71 B 3.3-71 B 3.3-75 B 3.3-75 B 3.3-76 B 3.3-76
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 256 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-44 AND AMENDMENT NO. 259 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-56 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC PSEG NUCLEAR LLC PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated September 15, 2004, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination was published in the Federal Register on February 1, 2005 (70 FR 5244).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has revised 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-water-Cooled Power Reactors." The amended standards eliminate the requirements for hydrogen recombiners and relaxed the requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitoring. In letters dated December 17, 2002, and May 12, 2003, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) proposed to remove requirements for hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen and oxygen monitors from the standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREG 1430 - 1434), on behalf of the industry, to incorporate the amended standards. This proposed change is designated TSTF-447.
The NRC staff prepared this model safety evaluation (SE) for the elimination of requirements regarding containment hydrogen recombiners and the removal of requirements from the TSs for containment hydrogen and oxygen monitors and solicited public comment (67 FR 50374, published August 2, 2002) in accordance with the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). The use of the CLIIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen and oxygen monitors requirements from the TSs. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this model applies were informed (68 FR 55416; September 25, 2003) that they could request amendments conforming to the model, and, in such requests, should confirm the applicability of the SE to their reactors and provide the requested plant-specific verifications and commitments.
The proposed changes would delete the TS requirements related to hydrogen recombiners and references to the hydrogen and oxygen monitors. The proposed TS changes support implementation of the revisions to 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors," that became effective on October 26, 2003.
The deletion of the requirements for the hydrogen recombiner and references to hydrogen/oxygen monitors resulted in numbering and formatting changes to other TSs, which were otherwise unaffected by this proposed amendment. Specifically the proposed changes would revise the following for both Peach Bottom Units:
1.1 TS Section 3.3.3.1, Table 3.3.3.1-1, Item 9, "Drywell H2 & O2 Analyzer," and Item 10, "Suppression Chamber H2 & O2 Analyzer," would be deleted.
1.2 Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.3.1.2, "Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the Drywell and Suppression Chamber H2 & O2 Analyzers," would be deleted, and SR3.3.3.1.3 would be modified to read, "Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each required PAM instrumentation channel."
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power Reactors, was issued on March 20, 2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes.
This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the STS in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed changes to the STSs following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. The NRC staff evaluates any comments received for a proposed change to the STSs and either reconsiders the change or proceeds with announcing the availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject change to their TSs are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
The Commissions regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs are set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.36. This regulation requires that the TSs include items in five specific categories. These categories include 1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; 2) limiting conditions for operation (LCO); 3) surveillance requirements; 4) design features; and 5) administrative controls.
However, the regulation does not specify the particular TSs to be included in a plants license.
Additionally, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) sets forth four criteria to be used in determining whether an LCO is required to be included in the TSs. These criteria are as follows:
1.
Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
2.
A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that assumes either the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
3.
A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
4.
A structure, system or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
Existing LCOs and related surveillances included as TS requirements which satisfy any of the criteria stated above must be retained in the TSs. Those TS requirements which do not satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents.
As part of the rulemaking that revised 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission retained requirements for ensuring a mixed atmosphere, inerting Mark I and II containments, and providing hydrogen control systems capable of accommodating an amount of hydrogen generated from a metal-water reaction involving 75 percent of the fuel cladding surrounding the active fuel region in Mark III and ice condenser containments. The Commission eliminated the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) hydrogen release from 10 CFR 50.44 and consolidated the requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitoring to 10 CFR 50.44 while relaxing safety classifications and licensee commitments to certain design and qualification criteria. The Commission also relocated, without change, the hydrogen control requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f) to 10 CFR 50.44 and the high-point vent requirements from 10 CFR 50.44 to 10 CFR 50.46a.
3.0 EVALUATION The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for combustible gas control were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that were operating at the time of the Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2, accident are likely to have been the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the combustible gas control functions described in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, as obligations. The issuance of plant-specific amendments to adopt these changes, which would remove hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen and oxygen monitoring controls from the TSs, supersede the combustible gas control specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.
3.1 Hydrogen Recombiners The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines a design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, and eliminates requirements for hydrogen control systems to mitigate such a release. The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The Commission has found that this hydrogen release is not risk-significant because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the onset of core damage. In addition, these systems were ineffective at mitigating hydrogen releases from risk-significant beyond design-basis accidents. Therefore, the Commission eliminated the hydrogen release associated with a design-basis LOCA from 10 CFR 50.44 and the associated requirements that necessitated the need for the hydrogen recombiners and the backup hydrogen vent and purge systems. As a result, the staff finds that requirements related to hydrogen recombiners no longer meet any of the four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in the TSs and the existing TS requirements may, therefore, be eliminated for all plants.
3.2 Hydrogen Monitoring Equipment Section 50.44(b)(1), the STSs, and plant-specific TSs currently contain requirements for monitoring hydrogen. Licensees have also made commitments to design and qualification criteria for hydrogen monitors in Item II.F.1, Attachment 6 of NUREG-0737 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident. The hydrogen monitors are required to assess the degree of core damage during a beyond design-basis accident and confirm that random or deliberate ignition has taken place. If an explosive mixture that could threaten containment integrity exists during a beyond design-basis accident, then other severe accident management strategies, such as purging and/or venting, would need to be considered.
The hydrogen monitors are needed to implement these severe accident management strategies.
With the elimination of the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen monitors are no longer required to mitigate design-basis accidents; therefore, the hydrogen monitors do not meet the definition of a safety-related component as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 recommends classifying the hydrogen monitors as Category 1. RG 1.97, Category 1, is intended for key variables that most directly indicate the accomplishment of a safety function for design-basis accident events and, therefore, are items usually addressed within the TSs. As part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission found that the hydrogen monitors no longer meet the definition of Category 1 in RG 1.97. The Commission concluded that Category 3, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the hydrogen monitors because the monitors are required to diagnose the course of beyond design-basis accidents. Hydrogen monitoring is not the primary means of indicating a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Section 4 of to SECY-00-0198, Status Report on Study of Risk-Informed Changes to the Technical Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 (Option 3) and Recommendations on Risk-Informed Changes to 10 CFR 50.44 (Combustible Gas Control), found that the hydrogen monitors were not risk-significant. Therefore, the staff finds that hydrogen monitoring equipment requirements no longer meet any of the four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in the TSs and, therefore, may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents. However, because the monitors are required to diagnose the course of beyond design-basis accidents, each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain, a hydrogen monitoring system capable of diagnosing beyond design-basis accidents.
The elimination of Post-Accident Sampling System requirements from some plant-specific TS (and associated CLIIP notices) indicated that during the early phases of an accident, safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration. The staff has subsequently concluded that Category 3 hydrogen monitors also provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration during the early phases of an accident.
1 While discussing the designation of the oxygen monitors as Category 2, the NRC acknowledged in the final rule (68 FR 54123) that the monitors need not be qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49. The amended rule implements performance-based requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitors to be functional, reliable, and capable of continuously measuring the appropriate parameter in the beyond-design-basis accident environment.
3.3 Oxygen Monitoring Equipment STS and plant-specific TSs currently require oxygen monitoring to verify the status of the inert containment. Combustible gases produced by beyond design-basis accidents involving both fuel-cladding oxidation and core-concrete interaction would be risk-significant for plants with Mark I and II containments if not for the inerted containment atmospheres. If an inerted containment was to become de-inerted during a beyond design-basis accident, then other severe accident management strategies, such as purging and venting, would need to be considered. The oxygen monitors are needed to implement these severe accident management strategies. Oxygen concentration also appears extensively in the emergency procedure guidelines/severe accident guidelines of plants with inerted containment atmospheres.
With the elimination of the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, the oxygen monitors are no longer required to mitigate design-basis accidents; and, therefore, the oxygen monitors do not meet the definition of a safety-related component as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. RG 1.97 recommends that, for inerted containment plants, the oxygen monitors be Category 1 which is intended for key variables that most directly indicate the accomplishment of a safety function for design-basis accident events. As part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission found that Category 21, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the oxygen monitors, because the monitors are required to verify the status of the inert containment. Oxygen monitoring is not the primary means of indicating a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Oxygen monitors have not been shown by a probabilistic risk assessment to be risk-significant. Therefore, the staff finds that oxygen monitoring equipment requirements no longer meet any of the four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for retention in TS, and, therefore, may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents.
However, for plant designs with an inerted containment, each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain, an oxygen monitoring system capable of verifying the status of the inert containment. In addition, separate requirements for primary containment oxygen concentration will be retained in the TSs for plant designs with an inerted containment. The basis for retention of this requirement in the TSs is that it meets Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) in that it is a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This is based on the fact that calculations typically included in Chapter 6 of Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports assume that the primary containment is inerted, that is, oxygen concentration <4.0 volume percent, when a design-basis LOCA occurs.
4.0 VERIFICATIONS AND COMMITMENTS As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this TS improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific verifications and commitments:
The licensee has verified that it has a hydrogen monitoring system capable of diagnosing beyond design-basis accidents. The licensee has committed to maintain the hydrogen monitors within its Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The licensee will implement this commitment within 120 days of the date of this amendment.
The licensee has verified that it has an oxygen monitoring system capable of verifying the status of the inert containment. The licensee has committed to maintain the oxygen monitors within its TRM. The licensee will implement this commitment within 120 days of the date of this amendment.
The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensees administrative processes, including its commitment management program.
Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements.
The staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements which would require prior NRC approval of subsequent changes. The NRC staff has agreed that NEI 99-04, Revision 0, Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes, provides reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to the NRC staff.
(See Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, "Managing Regulatory Commitments Made by Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC Staff," dated September 21, 2000.) The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these commitments in a future inspection or audit.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (70 FR 5244). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.229(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
7.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: W. Reckley Date: August 11, 2005
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 cc:
Site Vice President Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC 1848 Lay Road Delta, PA 17314 Associate General Counsel Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 Plant Manager Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC 1848 Lay Road Delta, PA 17314 Regulatory Assurance Manager Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC 1848 Lay Road Delta, PA 17314 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station P.O. Box 399 Delta, PA 17314 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Roland Fletcher Department of Environment Radiological Health Program 2400 Broening Highway Baltimore, MD 21224 Correspondence Control Desk Exelon Generation Company, LLC P. O. Box 160 Kennett Square, PA 19348 Rich Janati, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Environmental Protection Rachel Carson State Office Building P.O. Box 8469 Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469 Board of Supervisors Peach Bottom Township 545 Broad Street Ext.
Delta, PA 17314-9203 Mr. Richard McLean Power Plant and Environmental Review Division Department of Natural Resources B-3, Tawes State Office Building Annapolis, MD 21401 Dr. Judith Johnsrud National Energy Committee Sierra Club 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16803 Manager-Financial Control & Co-Owner Affairs Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 Manager Licensing-Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way, KSA -3E Kennett Square, PA 19348
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 cc:
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 Vice President-Operations Mid-Atlantic Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way, KSA 3-N Kennett Square, PA 19348 Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 Director-Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way, KSA 3-E Kennett Square, PA 19348