ML050900262

Annual Operating Report for 2004

ML050900262
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf  (NPF-029)
Issue date:	03/31/2005
From:	Bottemiller C, Janice Owens Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GNR0-2005/00008
Download: ML050900262 (8)

Text

GN R0-2005/00008 March 31,2005 US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

2004 Annual Operating Report Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29

Dear Sir or Madam:

Entergy Operations, Inc. is transmitting the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS)

Unit I Annual Operating Report for 2004. This report is in accordance with the reporting program described in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Part C. 1. b as modified by the NRC letter to GGNS dated May 25, 1987 (MAEC-87/0131).

Provided as attachments are:

1.

A narrative summary of operating experience during the year 2004,

2.

Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valve Challenges,

3.

A tabulated annual report of personnel exposure greater than 100 mrem/yr, and

4.

A s u ~ ~ a r y of failed fuel indi~tions~inspec~on~.

This letter does not contain any commitments.

GN RO-2005/00008 Page 2 of 2 If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact this office.

Yours truly, CAB/AMT: amt attachments:

1. Summary of Operating Experience - 2004

2. Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Challenges - 2004

3. Per-rem Exposure - 2004

4. Failed Fuel Indications/lnspections - 2004 cc:

U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Dr. Bruce S. Mallett (~12)

Regional Administrator, Region IV 61 1 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 7601 1-4005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Bhalchandra Vaidya, NRR/DLPM (w/2)

ATTN: ADDRESSEE ONLY ATTN: U.S. Postal Delivery Address Only Mail Stop OWFN/7D-1 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 NRC Senior Resident Inspector (w/o)

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Port Gibson, MS 39150 Levanway D. E.

(Wise Carter)

Reynolds N. S.

Smith L. J.

(Wise Carter)

Thomas H. L.

GO50008

Attachment I to GNRO-2005/00008 Date I /03/04 1/22/04 - 1/23/04 2004

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE Cause & Corrective Action Duration Time 7.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 7.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> Scheduled - Maintenance or Test Scheduled - Maintenance or Test The following is a summary of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Unit 1 Operating Experience for the 2004 calendar year. During 2004, the reactor was critical for 8,100.48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> with the generator on line for 8,047.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.

2/22/04 - 02/29/04 311 104 - 3/23/04 4/24/04 Scheduled - Refueling 172.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> RFI 3 (began 2/22/04) 565.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> Scheduled - Maintenance or Test 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 611 2/04 711 0104 8/7/04

- 08/08/04 8/28/04 511 5/04 - 05/1 6/04 1

Scheduled - Maintenance or Test 1 20.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> Scheduled - Maintenance or Test Scheduled - Maintenance or Test Scheduled - Maintenance or Test Scheduled - Maintenance or Test 0.9 0.9 8.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 10.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 9/25/04 10/23/04 Scheduled - Maintenance or Test Scheduled - Maintenance or Test 0.6 2.78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> GO50008

Attachment II to GNRO-2005/00008 2004 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE CHALLENGES There were no main steam line safety relief valve challenges occurring in 2004.

G050008

GGNS UNIT 1 ANNUAL REPORT MAN-REM EXPOSURE - 2004 Attachment III to GNRO-2005/00008 This section contains a tabulation of the number of station, utility and other personnel receiving exposures greater than 100 mrem/year and their associated man-rem exposure according to work and job function. Also included is a tabulation of the number of personnel by exposure range.

(3050008

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS.

39150 LICENSE :

NPF-29 2004-RG116.txt Attachment III to GNRO-2005/00008 Page I of 2 Regulatory Guide 1.16 information End of Year Report 2004 Date : 24-MAR-2005 14 :59 ROUTINE PLANT MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS RADIATION PROTECTION SUPERVISORY ENGINEERING 70 2

7 2

0 10 0

0 0

0 124 0

0 2

0 17.000 1.175 4.207 1.294 0.536 4.174 0.106 0.080 0.300 0.088 49.351 0.001 0.017 1.834 0.055 INSERVICE INSPECTION MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION 0

0 14 0.001 0.000 5.327 OPERATIONS 0

0 0.000 0.000 0.000 RADIATION PROTECTION 0

0 0

0.068 0.000 0.000 SUPERVISORY 2

1 7

0.953 0.216 1.730 ENGINEERING 0

0 0

0.000 0.000 0.000 SPECIAL PLANT MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION 3

1 23 1.361 0.368 7.137 OPERATIONS 0

0 0

0.045 0.000 0.000 RADIATION PROTECTION 0

0 0

0.255 0.000 0.000 SUPERVISORY 0

0 0

0.035 0.005 0.226 ENGINEERING 0

0 0

0.129 0.000 0.000 WASTE PROCESSING MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION 0

0 0

0.205 0.000 0.134 Number of Personnel

> 100 mrem Total man-rem work and yob Function station utility Contractor Station utility Contractor ROUTINE OPERATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION 0

0 0

0.253 0.023 0.533 OPERATIONS 43 0

1 13.649 0.324 0.951 RADIATION PROTECTION 16 0

0 3.847 0.001 0.087 SUPERVISORY 2

0 0

0.991 0.090 0.523 ENGINEERING 1

0 0

0.850 0.009 0.001,

Attachment III to GNRO-2005/00008 Page 2 of 2 2004-RG116.txt The total radiation exposure of the above personnel constitutes 100% of the site's exposure for the year.

OPERATIONS 0

0 1

0.142 0.000 0.217 RADIATION PROTECTION 1

0 0

0.488 0.000 0.000 SUPERVISORY 0

0 0

0.047 0.001 0.284 ENGINEERING 0

0 0

0.000 0.000 0.000 REFUELING MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION 0

3 44 0.623 (4399 "16.394 OPERATIONS 10 0

0 1.554 0.002 0.000 RADIATION PROTECTION 5

0 1

1.011 0.000 0.210 SUPERVISORY 5

1 0

0.859 0.144 0.009 ENGINEERING 2

0 2

0.388 0.027 0.648 Totals MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION 73 14 205 19.443 4.964 78.876 OPERATIONS 55 0

2 16.565 0.432 1.169 RADIATION PROTECTION 29 0

1 9.876 0.081 0.314 SUPERVISORY 11 2

9 1179 04756 4.606 ENGINEERING 3

0 2

1.903 0.124 0.704 Grand Totals 171 16 219 51.966 6.357 85.669,

Attachment IV to GNRO-2005/00008 FAKED FUEL INDICATIONS/INSPECTIONS-2004 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) ended Cycle 13 operation on February 22, 2004. In-mast fuel sipping was performed in RF1 3 to determine location of 2 or more suspected fuel failures in Cycle 13. Two fuel failures were found by performing sipping on ail the bundles in the core.

The first failure was in the expected Framatome Atrium 10 assembly SPJ1 00 with severe secondary damage ; a 1.5" section of cladding was mostly missing with about 6" of pellets washed out. No fuel rods were removed nor was any reconstitution performed. A follow-up inspection occurred during Cycle 14 of the failed bundle (SPJ1 00) from Cycle 13. No definite root cause was established, but is thought to most likely be a debris or primary hydriding failure based on the bundle exposure and failure timing. The second failure was determined to be in bundle GEC667, a GE1 I assembly after its 3rd cycle of operation. No definitive failure cause was established, but several rods were noted with galvanic corrosion between the endcap and the lower tie plate. No rods were removed nor reconstitution performed. The failures were both removed in RF13.

Cycle 14 began on March 22, 2004. Elevated tramp levels of fission products have existed all cycle due to the degraded Cycle 13 fuel failure. Until 9/3012004, GGNS Cycle 14 operated clearly in a failure-free condition. Between 9/30/04 and 1016104, a small (10 uCi/sec) increase in Xe-133 was noted in the offgas samples after a relatively long period of steady operation. The increase was smaller than typical for a fuel failure and was more steady than would be generally expected for the initial release of activity (which typically has some spiking and other rapid changes). However, such low activities have been noted in the industry for either very tight fuel failures or failures at low power (e.g., on the core edge), and hence a potential fuel failure was predicted.

After 1016/04, the offgas dropped back to its initial level resulting in a questioning of the earlier assessment. It was noted that if the failure was very tight that pellet swelling could set the failure resulting in no further gas release. Such behavior was noted in the past at GGNS in both Cycle 8 (for brief periods) and for the degraded failure of Cycle 13, Another possibility was that the failure was on the core edge (which includes many of the 85 reinsert SPC 9x9-5 bundles which had been discharged about 7 years ago) and once A had released its inventory it would

- provide essentially no detectable activity during steady-state operation.

During the sequence exchange on 11/20/04, no increase in offgas activity was noted (along with no obvious cesium spiking). Given the power reduction during the exchange, if pellet sealing of the failure had existed, 4 would have been expected some gap opening would have occurred and some accumulated fission products would have been released. This possibility of gap sealing has been discounted since no activity increases were noted. However, note that if the failure was on the core edge, with little accumulated fission products remaining, it would be true that little offgas increase could have resulted during the exchange. Further, for such a failure on the core edge, the power change probably would not have been adequate to result in any significant release of iodine or cesium-rich coolant in the pellet-clad gap.

Based on the above, if a fuel failure actually exists, it would be expected to be at low power.

Hence, little added activity would be expected during the cycle, except maybe for the release of long-lived water soluble radio-chemicals (e.g., Cs-134 and 137) which could be elevated/spiked during major power changes (or more likely during RCS depress urizations). Such behavior is common for similar failures in PWRs. In this case, coolant samples just prior and during major RCS depress u rizations (e.g., cold shutdown) would be important. Based on this, GGNS Chemistry has been instructed to take appropriate added sampling during such events.