ML050880518

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NRC Meeting Presentation (Attachment 3)
ML050880518
Person / Time
Site: Kewaunee Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 03/17/2005
From: Satorius M
Division Reactor Projects III
To:
References
ea-05-021, IR-04-009
Download: ML050880518 (10)


Text

Regulatory Conference Kewaunee Containment Hatch Closure Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III Lisle, Illinois March 17, 2005

Introduction and Opening Remarks Mark Satorius Director Division of Reactor Projects

Agenda

1. Introduction and Opening Remarks
2. Overview of Event and Inspection Finding
a. Description of Containment Hatch Issue
b. Description of Apparent Violation
c. Preliminary Safety Significance Determination
3. Licensee Presentation
4. NRC Caucus
5. Closing Remarks

Description Steel Rail System Installed for Reactor Head Replacement Curvature of Containment Hatch Not Considered in Design Steel Rail System Obstructed Hatch Closure Inability to Close Containment Equipment Hatch Expeditiously Fuel was in the Reactor Vessel Time to Boil < 30 minutes One Emergency Diesel Generator Out of Service Reactor Coolant System Opened to Containment Atmosphere

Performance Deficiency NUMARC 91-06, Section 4.1.1 Applicable to Containment Hatch or Penetrations that Communicate with Containment Atmosphere Hatch Either be Closed or Capable of being Closed Prior to Core Boiling Following a Loss of Decay Heat Removal Addressed by Procedure Procedure Developed to Close Hatch If Needed Poor Track Design Not Identified Numerous Opportunities for Identification

Apparent Violation 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V:

Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings Plant Procedure CMP-89-A-02 required that any equipment which passes through and could obstruct containment hatch closure be designed to allow rapid removal in order to ensure expeditious containment building equipment hatch closure.

Interior Rail System was not designed to allow rapid removal in order to ensure expeditious containment hatch closure.

Safety Significance Determination (Preliminary)

Phase I:

IMC 0609 Appendix A (Attachment 1) and Appendix H Type B Finding (affects only LERF, not CDF)

Phase II:

IMC 0609 Appendix H In-depth Mitigation Capability White Finding Phase III:

Station Blackout Scenarios White Finding

Licensee Presentation NRC Caucus Closing Remarks Mark Satorius Director Division of Reactor Projects