ML043420135

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Ssdpc Inspection Notification Letter - IR 05000261-05-006
ML043420135
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/07/2004
From: Ogle C
Division of Reactor Safety II
To: Moyer J
Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-05-006
Download: ML043420135 (5)


See also: IR 05000261/2005006

Text

December 7, 2004

Carolina Power & Light Company

ATTN: Mr. J. W. Moyer

Vice President

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2

3581 West Entrance Road

Hartsville, SC 29550

SUBJECT:

NOTIFICATION OF H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 -

SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION -

NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2005006

Dear Mr. Moyer:

The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Region II staff will conduct a safety system design and performance capability inspection at

your H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 during the weeks of February 14-18, 2005, and

February 28 - March 4, 2005. A team of five inspectors will perform this inspection. The

inspection team will be led by Mr. McKenzie Thomas, a Senior Reactor Inspector from the NRC

Region II Office. This inspection will be conducted in accordance with baseline inspection

program Attachment 71111.21, Safety System Design and Performance Capability.

The inspection will evaluate the capability of installed plant equipment to detect and respond to

a loss of coolant accident. Procedures which direct the mitigating actions for this event will also

be evaluated.

During a telephone conversation on November 30, 2004, Mr. Thomas of my staff, and

Mr. Chuck Baucom, Supervisor, Licensing and Regulatory Programs, of your staff, confirmed

arrangements for an information gathering site visit and the two-week onsite inspection. The

schedule is as follows:

Information gathering visit: Week of January 17, 2005

Onsite inspection: February 14-18, 2005 and February 28 - March 4, 2005

The purpose of the information gathering visit is to obtain information and documentation

outlined in the Enclosure needed to support the inspection. Mr. Walter Rogers, a Region II

Senior Reactor Analyst, may accompany Mr. Thomas during the information gathering visit to

review probabilistic risk assessment data and identify risk significant components which will be

examined during the inspection. Please contact Mr. Thomas prior to preparing copies of the

materials listed in the Enclosure. The inspectors will try to minimize your administrative burden

by specifically identifying only those documents required for inspection preparation.

During the information gathering visit, Mr. Thomas will also discuss the following inspection

support administrative details: office space; specific documents requested to be made

available to the team in their office space; arrangements for site access; and the availability of

CP&L

2

knowledgeable plant engineering and licensing personnel to serve as points of contact during

the inspection.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions regarding the

information requested or the inspection, please contact Mr. Thomas at (404) 562-4673 or me at

(404) 562-4605.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

\\\\RA\\\\

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.: 50-261

License No.: DPR-23

Enclosure:

Information Request for the Safety System Design and

Performance Capability Inspection

cc w/encl:

William G. Noll

Director, Site Operations

Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Daniel G. Stoddard

Plant General Manager

Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Chris L. Burton, Manager

Performance Evaluation and

Regulatory Affairs CPB 9

Electronic Mail Distribution

cc w/encl contd - (See page 3)

CP&L

3

(cc w/encl contd:)

C. T. Baucom, Supervisor

Licensing/Regulatory Programs

Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

J. F. Lucas, Manager

Support Services - Nuclear

Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Henry J. Porter, Director

Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Dept. of Health and Environmental

Control

Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Mike Gandy

Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

S. C. Department of Health and

Environmental Control

Electronic Mail Distribution

Beverly Hall, Acting Director

Division of Radiation Protection

N. C. Department of Environment,

Health and Natural Resources

Electronic Mail Distribution

Steven R. Carr

Associate General Counsel - Legal Dept.

Progress Energy Service Company, LLC

Electronic Mail Distribution

John H. O'Neill, Jr.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

2300 N. Street, NW

Washington, DC 20037-1128

Peggy Force

Assistant Attorney General

State of North Carolina

Electronic Mail Distribution

Chairman of the North Carolina

Utilities Commission

c/o Sam Watson, Staff Attorney

Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert P. Gruber

Executive Director

Public Staff - NCUC

4326 Mail Service Center

Raleigh, NC 27699-4326

Public Service Commission

State of South Carolina

P. O. Box 11649

Columbia, SC 29211

Enclosure

INFORMATION REQUEST FOR THE H.B. ROBINSON SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN

AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION

LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (Small Break, Large Break, Inter-System)

(Please provide the information electronically in searchable .pdf files on CDROM. The

CDROM should be indexed and hyperlinked to facilitate ease of use. Information in

lists should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who has a

knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology.)

1.

Design basis documents for the engineered safety features (ESF) and emergency core

cooling systems (ECCS) used to mitigate the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) event.

Design basis documents for the high, medium, and low voltage electrical systems that

power the ESF and ECCS components/systems.

2.

All procedures used to implement the mitigation strategy for the LOCA event. Include

alarm response procedures as well as normal, abnormal, and emergency operating

procedures (EOP) as appropriate. Also include the EOP users guide and EOP setpoint

document as well as calculations used to support the setpoints in EOPs for the LOCA

event.

3.

Piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) for the ECCS and other systems used to

mitigate the LOCA event. Two (2) paper copies are preferred for these.

4.

List of surveillance procedures used to ensure the operability of equipment required by

your Technical Specifications that is used during the mitigation of the LOCA event.

5.

List of engineering calculations (electrical, mechanical/nuclear, instrumentation and

controls) applicable to the ECCS components and other related systems used for a

LOCA event.

6.

List of temporary modifications and operator work-arounds involving any components

required for mitigation of a LOCA event for the past 3 years

7.

System descriptions and operator training modules for the LOCA event, the ECCS, and

other systems used to mitigate the event.

8.

List of operating experience program evaluations of industry, vendor, or NRC generic

issues related to a LOCA event.

9.

A list of major modifications completed in the past five years to the ECCS and other

systems used to mitigate a LOCA event.

10.

Calculations used to support the setpoints in EOPs for a LOCA event.

11.

A brief description of the mitigation strategy for handling a LOCA event, including

operator actions and equipment used.

2

Enclosure

12.

Calibration and functional test procedures for instruments used to monitor RCS

pressure, pressurizer level, RCS hot and cold leg temperatures, RCS subcooling, HPI

flow, LPI flow, RWST level, AFW flow, CST level, and containment sump level.

13.

Quality Assurance audits and/or self assessments performed on the ECCS and other

systems used to mitigate a LOCA in the past 24 months.

14.

Plant Technical Specifications, Bases, and Technical Requirements Manual.

15.

A current copy of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

16.

Procedures that provide implementation guidance for the following programs: Corrective

Action Program, Maintenance Rule Program, Design Control Program, and Operating

Experience Program.

17.

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) event tree for the LOCA event. A list of PRA

identified system dependencies and success criteria for the ECCS and other systems

used to mitigate a LOCA. Provide LOCA cutsets and risk achievement worths for those

basic events (assuming only a LOCA initiating event).

18.

System health reports and/or other performance monitoring information for the ECCS

and other systems used to mitigate a LOCA event.

19.

A list of condition reports and non-routine work requests initiated since 1999 affecting

the ECCS and other systems used to detect and mitigate a LOCA event.

20.

Maintenance Rule performance criteria for systems used to detect and mitigate a LOCA

event. A list of maintenance rule failures of equipment used to detect or mitigate a

LOCA event.

21.

Key one line diagrams for the alternating current and the 125-volt direct current systems

that provide power for the pumps, valves, and instrumentation and control circuits

associated with the ECCS and other systems used to mitigate the LOCA. Also, include

the one line diagrams for the Class 1E medium and low voltage switchgear and the 480

volt motor control centers. (Paper copies are preferred for these)

22.

Provide a list of valves used to mitigate a LOCA that are required to change position or

are manually manipulated during implementation of the LOCA mitigation strategy.

Provide equipment failure rates over the past 10 years for these components.