ML043010077
| ML043010077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/2004 |
| From: | NRC Region 1 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Event #41142 | |
| Download: ML043010077 (4) | |
Text
-41012212004 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pace I Power Reactor E /ent# 41142 Site: FITZPATRICK Notification Date I Time: 10/22/2)04 11:00 (EDT)
Unit: I Region: 1 State: NY EventDate/Time: 10/08/2)04 18:31 (EDT)
Reactor Type: [1] GE-4 Last Modification: 10/22/2 )04 Containment Type: MARK I NRC Notified by: TIMOTHY PAGE Notifications: RONALD BELLAMY R1 HQ Ops Officer: ARLON COSTA ANNE BOLAND) R2 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY JULIO LARA R3 10 CFR Section: BOB DENNIG NRR 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH VERN HODGE NRR RODGER LANIESBURY R3 JACK WHITTENI R4 Unit Scram Code RX Crit Init Power Initial RX Mode Curr Power Current RX Mode I N No 0 Refueling 0 Refueling PART 21 REPORT: AUXILIARY RELAYS FAILURE "In accordance with 10CFR21.21(d)(3), initial notification of a reportable defect is being made by J.ames A.
Fitzpatrick (JAF).
"The failure of two General Electric (GE) IRMA auxiliary relays in a short period of time were identified in the corrective action system as a potential common mode failure. Initial troubleshooting revealed thai both relay coils indicated open. There was no evidence of any obvious cause for the coils to open circuit (e.g. discoloration, smell, physical damage). Both relays are normally de-energized relays located in a mild environment in die relay room (controlled humidity, no vibration at the panels, no local heat source that could cause accelerated <ging). Both relays were Installed in 1988 along with 21 other relays. A total of 33 relays were purchased from 4'iE with the same lot/date code.
"An extent of condition review was conducted. By checking the continuity of related relay coils, tw: other coil failures were detected. A failure analysis of the relays was performed. The failure mode was detelmined to be an open in the coil due to corrosion of the coil wire. This open in the coil will prevent the relay from ch Bnging state as the relay is energized. An independent laboratory concluded that the coil insulation was damaged End that the under lying wire was damaged during coil manufacture. The damage allowed the copper wire to corrode over the years to the point of failure.
"These HMA relays were installed in multiple Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and other systems. Each component was evaluated to determine the specific impact on the respective system. The systems. affected included: Residual Heat Removal (RHR, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of opera ion),
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Reactor Core :;olation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray (CS), and High Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI).
"JAFs evaluation concluded that a substantial safety hazard existed in that there was a potential for a major deficiency/major degradation of essential safety-related equipment, specifically for the RHR (LPCI mode of 19
U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Panee Power Reactor E lent# 41142 operation) and HPCI systems.
"No other safety functions would have been lost for the other identified systems.
"Component and Supplier GE HMA Type auxiliary relays GE Part No. 12HMA124A2 GE Dwg No. DA137C6164P001 Date Code 14VC; 8836 Serial #s: D88542-0001D R02 through D88542-0033D R02 "All were purchased as safety-related from GE under JAF PO # 88-5628 "All installed safety-related relays from this lot were replaced during the recent refueling outage."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
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_OTFCnT4 WX FCIU1Y OR O2ANIZATION fNIT OF aIACK 8 CALL lo l JAMES A. FITZPATRICK I TIMT PAGE (315) 349-2 Ed4rE&TIME"D CA E 2 9.0fo POEW1_ pMa AFTR GDY 1831 ES 10108/2004 O%/MODE5 O%/IMODES EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-4r. Non-Ernorgency10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) _ SD:
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huhSn bod dua .nd &Iai tdmat u&4nata ago, dhA1 vXwnt pit vwiL s takmn wd ,nint qb. (Consi On Decoy In accordance with I OCFR21.21 (d)(3), initial notification of a reportable defect is being made by James A. FitzPatrick (JAF).
The failure of two General Electric (GE) HMA auxiliary relays in a short period of time were identified in the corrective action system as a potential common mode failure. 1:Titial troubleshooting revealed that both relay coils indicated open. There was no evidence of any obvious cause for the coils to open circuit (e.g. discoloration, smell, physical dra nage). Both relays are normally decenergized relays located in a mild environment in the re]pLy room (controlled humidity, no vibration at the panels, no local heat source that could c:auwe accelerated aging). Both relays were installed in 1988 along with 21 other relays. A total of 33 relays were purchased from GE with the same lot/date code.
An extent of condition review was conducted. By checking the continuity of related relay coils, two other coil failures were detected. A failure analysis of the relays was performed.
The failure mode was determined to be an open in the coil due to corrosion of tke coil wire.
This open in the coil will prevent the relay from changing state as the relay is eIergized. An independent laboratory concluded that the coil insulation was damaged and that; the under lying wire was damaged during coil manufacture. The damage allowed the copper wire to corrode over the years to the point of failure.
(continued)
NOTIFICATIONS NRC RESIDENT STATE(s) f YES NO
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ALLSE ANYTHING UNUSUAL O NOT UNDERSTOOD?
DID ALL SYSTEMS (E__in__bo__)DI NO_YES LOCAL - FUNCTION AS REQUIRED? WYS El So (Eqhabov)
OTHER GOV AGENCIES _OEPATION M-ODOF I Es"IUATED ,r04VMDoN>Y O MEDARRES3 RELEASE Vu TUMOREcTEM MODE RESTTDATE: YuA0O NRC FoRM 301 (12-20) 10/22/2004 FRI 10:56 1T:4/RX NO 8061] Ia001
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J1 PA0E20F2 sDIOLOGIC61-LASS INE LICAKOLIF _ 1 _1ewrl-srCc LIOUID RELEASE GASEOUS RELEASE UNPLANNED RELEASE PLANNED RELEA6E ONGOING _ TEFWINAT MONB)RED lUNMONITORED OFFSITE RELEASE IT. S. EXCEEDED RM ALARN S AREACUATED PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED *S uusul- ,din P
______ _ I _ Raloas. Rha (ClVxec) -A T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Total Actityl (Cl) S.T M.
HOO GUIDE Noble G.CaI 0.1 CIee 1000 Cl Iodine 10 UCt/eC _ 11 Q.01 Cl Pancul___ *______ _ I 1I__1 ma Liquid (excluding SIrftln and _00.1 Cl Uiquld (tritfun Oa Cnin, S Cl
___________ PLANT STACK CONbENSERAREE MAIN STEAM LINE -soD.ODN OTE RAD MONITOR READINGS X I _ _ Q . _
ALARM SETPOINTS ______L\
% S.. LIMIT if ap~lcebAJ L _ w _
RCS OR SO TUIBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN CABLE ITEMS: (specc de .la xplann*fftsshoulo'bw coverndh1 evnt dseerptron)
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LEWRAT. W S - l ITS !UmENORLNEDe; EVINDe3wflON (C6MandftznftW These HMA relays were Installed in multiple Emergency Core Cooling Systens (ECCS) and other systems. Each component was evaluated to determine the specific impac:t. on the respective system. The systems affected included: Residual Heat Removal (PHR) (the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of operation), Emergency Diesel Gen-.rators (EDGs),
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (R.CIC), Core Spray (CS), and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI).
JAFs evaluation concluded that a substantial safety hazard existed in that there wa.; a potential for a major deficiency/major degradation of essential safety-related equipment, specifically for the RHR (LPCI mode of operation) and HPCI systems.
No other safety functions would have been lost for the other identified systems.
Component and Supplier: General Electric Nuclear E nergy GE HMA Type auxiliary relays M/C 397 GE Part No. 12HMA124A2 175 Curtner Ave.
GE Dwg No. DA137C6164POOl San Jose, CA 95125 Date Code 14VC; 8836 Serial #s: D88542-OOO1D R02 through D88542-0033D R02 All were purchased as safety-related from GE under JAF PO # 88-5628 All installed safety-related relays from this lot were replaced during the recent tefu eling outage.
10/22/2004 FRI 10:56 [TX/RI, NO 8061] ID002