ML042960593
| ML042960593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/2004 |
| From: | Speight L - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0307 | |
| Download: ML042960593 (7) | |
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PERSONNEL STATEMENT Steve Banks Unit 3 On-shift STA X3207 At approximately 0744, after a unit oscillograph alarm, I noticed the Main Generator load varying, it was observed that U2 tripped, then the Unit 3 Main Generator & reactor tripped. It was noticed that a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the switchyard had occurred. The SBCS was observed to be open after the reactor trip, then a MSIS actuation occurred due to an apparent failure of the SBCS. After the MSIS, I observed that SBCS valve #3 was open and modulating closed. I performed the STA post-trip actions of monitoring the EOP standard post-trip actions, EOP event diagnosis (discussed with the CRS & SM), and E-Plan event classifications. An NUE was declared based on EAL [2-1] and [8-2]. I performed the Safety Function Status Checks for the ESD EOP which were met. I prepared an ENS form, had it approved and notified the NRC via the ENS of the Unit 3 specific details. Bill Sullivan was already on the ENS phone and was discussing the status of each PVNGS status. I provided the details for Unit 3. The exit conditions were met for the ESD EOP, we then transitioned to the LOOP EOP. I performed the STA actions of EPIP-01 Section 6. I prepared the following rough outline and circulated it for input from the CR staff. We remain in the LOOP EOP until the RCPs are started. I'm continuing to monitor SFSCs and discuss with the CRS as this statement is written.
Unit 3 CR Log:
6/14/04 07:44 - A Loss of Offsite Power occurred, the Main Generator and Reactor tripped. A MSIS actuation occurred due to an apparent SBCS malfunction.
07:58 - An NUE was declared based on EAL [2-1] and [8-2]. Entered the Excess Steam Demand (ESD) EOP.
(STSC activated wzivien) 08:12 - The Safety Function Status Checks (SFSC) for the ESD EOP met. The exit conditions were met for the ESD EOP; transitioned to the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
EOP.
09:27 - Offsite power restored to 13.8kV busses 3E-NAN-S06, -S04 &- S02.
08:17 - The Safety Function Status Checks foithe LOOP EOP met.
09:57 - Paralleled offsite power to the 3EPBBS04 bus being supplied by DG 'B' and shutdown DG 'B 10:24 - Continuous monitoring of SFSCs for LOOP EOP. STA/CRS discussed parameter values and trends (i.e. SIG levels, RCS subcooling, PZR level, Containment temperatures, etc.)
10:36 - Valve SGN-V928 located in 100' MSSS is blowing steam. Entry restricted to 100' MSSS 11:38 -Normal supply breaker 3ENANSO5D successfully closed to restore offsite power to 13.8Kv bus 3ENANSO5. Had contacted Electrical Maintenance for assistance in closing the breaker after it failed to close from B01 earlier. The breaker was racked down, then back up before it was closed from B01 successfully.
11:40 - EW 'A' surge tank level lowered unexpectedly following removal of cross-tie to supply SFP cooling. The level has been restored by manual makeup. Investigating source of leakage.
11:46 -SIP319 (SI header to RC loop 2A) alarming.
11:51 - Offsite power restored to 13.8Kv bus 3ENANS05, -S03 & -SOl.
12:07 - NUE terminated for each PVNGS Unit.
12:15 - 'A' SDCHX relief valve, 3PEWPSV47 found to be lifting. The EW outlet valve 3MEWAHV53 was opened (was throttled per EOP guidance) and the relief valve3PPSV47 reseated.
12:17 - 'A' DG secured following offsite power restoration to 3EPBAS03.
12:23 - PZR level restored to <56%
13:21 - Completed 72ST-9RX14, Shutdown Margin surveillance 14:00 - Remaining in the LOOP EOP, SFSCs continued to be monitored. STA/CRS periodically discuss appropriate parameter values and trends.
14:34 - MSIS signal has been reset.
15:00 - AFA-POI operability impacted due to unavailability of critical steam traps.
15:03 - FWIV-132 has low accumulator pressure. Valve remains closed.
15:26 - SFSCs continued to be monitored. STA/CRS periodically discuss appropriate parameter values and trends.
16:15 -SIP319 (SI header to RC loop 2A) has been alarming since 'approximately 9:30. The header has been depressurized three times with subsequent re-pressurization. The rate of re-pressurization is less than the 1100f/min requiring performance of 40ST-9RC02, but the 'B' LPSI remains inoperable due the header pressure.