ML042090258
| ML042090258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/08/2004 |
| From: | Hamer M Vermont Yankee |
| To: | Devincentis J, Lukens L, David Pelton, Rusin R, Beth Sienel, Wierzbowski G - No Known Affiliation, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0267 | |
| Download: ML042090258 (3) | |
Text
Sienel, Beth From:
Sent:
To:
Hamer, Mike Thursday, January 08, 2004 3:01 PM Devincentis, Jim; Sienel, Beth; Pelton, David; Lukens, Larry, Rusin, Richard; Wierzbowski, George Wanczyk, Robert; Meyer, Jeff PRO-0302622 - Relief Valve Set Point Test Failure - SR-1 3-26.pdf Cc:
Subject:
This PRO is for CR-VTY-2003-02622 that has been evaluated as not reportable.
H.
PRO-0302622 -
Relief Valve Set...
1 01\\q
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM REGULATORY COMPLIANCE POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT TO:
MIKE DESILETS, TECHNICAL SUPPORT MANAGER FROM:
MIKE HAMER, TECHNICAL SPECIALIST. III
SUBJECT:
CR-VTY-2003-02622: RELIEF VALVE SETPOINT TEST FAILURE SR-1 3-26 DATE:
JANUARY 8, 2004 PRO NUMBER: PRO-03-02622 EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On 12-3-03 with the reactor at full power, relief valve SR-13-26 failed a setpoint test. This valve is a 1I"xl" Crosby model 9611821 E with a setpoint range of 67 to 71 psig. During bench testing, the valve failed to lift up to the procedural limit of 125% of setpoint or 86 psig. At that time the test was determined to have failed.
SR-1 3-26 is the second of two relief valves in -the IST functional group, therefore no additional expansion testing is required as a result of this test failure.'This valve was replaced with a newly purchased valve during a scheduled RCIC LCO on 12-2-03.
The following regulations were considered when determining reportability of this event.
Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Speciflcatlons
§50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) "[The licensee shall report:] Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications except when:
Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented the' Fulfillment of a Safety Function
§50.73(a)(2)(v) "[The licensee shall report:] Any evenitor condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(I) Mitigate the consequences of an accident."
DISCUSSION/BASES:
After the valve lift-test failed, the pressure was bleed off and the valve was manually cycled using the lifting lever. When re-tested, the valve lifted within the acceptable range of 67 to 71 psig. On 12/05/03 the valve was disassembled and inspected with a Crosby Valve representative present. No mechanical misalignment or surface corrosion of the valve internals was found. No specific cause for the failure 1
was identified. The following failure modes have been eliminated as possible causes following the investigation and testing:
- mechanical binding of valve internals,
- galling of valve internals,
- Improper set-point adjustment.
Additional detailed evaluations as to the exact cause(s) are being pursued with the manufacturer to identify if system chemistry, misapplication of materials, maintenance practices or testing frequencies that may be influencing the failures.
Five other valves of this model that are located in the Service Water System had previously failed to lift at 125% during as-found testing. This was attributed to silting deposits, to which the Crosby representative agreed to be a credible failure hiode. SR-13-26 is the first non-raw water valve that failed toe lift before 125%.
Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, States the following in section 3.2.2(1):
"For testing that is conducted within the required time (i.e., the surveillance interval plus and allowed extension), it should be assumed that the discrepancy occurred at the time of its discovery unless there is firm evidence, based on a review of relevant information such as the equipment history and the cause of the failure, to indicate that the discrepancy existed previously."
A review of this valves history and the cause of the failures does not indicate that this discrepancy has existed previously.
Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function' RCIC System component failures are not reportable under this criterion per NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-14, which states; If the plant's safety analysis considered RCIC as a system needed to mitigate a rod ejection accident then its failure is reportable'under this criterion; otherwise, it is not reportable under this section of the rule.
CONCLUSION:
This event is not reportable pursuant to §50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) or §50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
.4-QML-,
% I 9i-m RECOMMENDED:
APPROVED:
I Wv %,
X I 1 olv-7 Michael Jamer Date Technial S ialist Mng Technical Support Manager 2