ML041890185

G20040393 - Thomas Saporito Ltr of 7/1/04 - Petitioners Supplemental Petition Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206

ML041890185
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	06/30/2004
From:	Saporito T National Environmental Protection Ctr
To:	Travers W NRC/EDO
Shared Package
ML042020377	List: ML041890185
References
2.206, G20040393
Download: ML041890185 (14)

Text

JUN-30-Z004 06:38P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:1/14 el.,

q3q5 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER Cxy/S DO DEDMRS Environmental & Whistleblower Utigation Thomas Saporito DEDH Post Office Box 1173, Jupiter, Florida 33458 Executive Director DEDM Internet: www.nepcusa.netfirms.com Phone/Fax: (561) 625-9197 DR Email: nepcusa@Isp.com Emall: saporito@isp.com 21

'My life belongs to the whole community, and as long as I live, It is my privilefe to do for it whatsoever I can, I r

want to be thoroughly used up when I die, for the harder I work, the more I live. I rejoice in life for Its own sake' Life Is no "brief candle" to me. It is a sort of splendid torch which r have got hold of for the moment, and I want to make It burn as brightly as possible before handing It on to future generations. '

- George Bernard Shaw, 1907 -

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET Date: June 30th, 2004 To:

Hon. William Travers Executive Director for Operations Company: U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commisson FAX: (301) 415-2700 Phone:

From: Thomas Saporito Total Pages Including Cover Sheet: 14 Message: If you fkll to receive the entire FAX, please request a resend.

Please take notic-The Information contained in this FAX document is Intended for the Individual(s) named above and is to be considered confidential In use by the receiver identified above. If the Individual receiving this FAX document Is not the intended receiver or an agent of the Intended receiver responsible for delivering it to the intended receiver, you are hereby notified that you have received this FAX document In error and any use of tfis document Is strictly prohlbfted and you should notify the sender Immediately. Thank you for your cooperation.

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JUN-30-2004 06:38P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:2114 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER Environmental & Whistleblower Utigation Post Office Box 1173, Jupiter, Florida 33458 Internet: www.nepcusa.netfirms.corn Email: nepcusaglsp.com Thomas Saporito Executive Director Phone/Fax: (561) 625-9197 Email: saporlto@isp.com "My Iffe belongs to the whole community, and as long as I live, it is my prtvilege to do for it whatsoeverr can. I want to be thoroughly used up when Z die, for the harder I work, the more I live. I rejoice In life for its own sake.

Life is no 'brief candle' to me. It Is a sort of splendid torch which I have got hold of for the moment, and I want to make It burn as brightly as possible before handing It on to future generations. I

- George Bernard Shaw, 3907 -

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS WILLIAM TRAVERS, EXECUTIVE DIRFCTOR FOR OPERASIONS In the Matter of:

Date: June 3 0 'h, 2004 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 (10 C.F.R. 2.206)

PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION UNDER 10 C.FJR 2.206 NOW COMES. the National Environmental Protection Center ('NEPC") and its undersigned Executive Director, and herein file Petitioners' Supplemental Petition' Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206 ("Supp. Petition") requesting that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

('NRC") take immediate enforcement action(s) against its licensee, the Florida Power & Light Company (CFPL") in furtherance of public safety and health and for the protection of the environment.

A.

Petitioners' Specific Realst for NRC Enforcement Action

1. Petitioners request that the NRC immediately ORDER the cold shut-down of FPL's Turkey Point nulcar units 3 and 4; and

2. Petitioncrs request that the NRC immediately reinstate all licensee inspection requirements in NRC ORDER EA-03-009 that were otherwise relaxed by the NRC on or about May 25'h. 2004 at the request of N RC licensee; and

'NRC regulaiocs under DT-O0-20 at NRC Directive Transmittal 8.1 1 Part m at 17, peruit public 2.206 petitiow to be amendcd.

JUN-30-2004 06:39P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO: 13014152700 P:3'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER

3. Petitioners request that the NRC immediately act on its June 10', 2004 petition filed under 10 C.F.R. 2.206 regarding operations at the licensee's Turkey Point nuclear units 3 and 4; and

4. Petitioners request that the NRC Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") investigate whether NRC employees, in attendance during a June 24th, 2004 meeting and teleconference call between the NRC Petition Review Board ("PRB") and Petitioners, acted imnroperly in terminating the public's participation at the meeting through NEPC within 30-minutes of the onset of that meeting; and

5. With respect to item #4 above. Petitioners request that the NRC 0IG investigate whether NRC employees adversely affected public safety and health regarding operations at its licensee's Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, in terminating the public's participation at the June 24eh, 2004 meeting through NEPC and over NEPC's objections thereto; and

6. Whether NRC employees who were directly or indirectly involved in the agency's safety evaluation or safety analysis of the licensee's request for relaxation of NRC's ORDER EA-03-009, acted in accordance with NRC policy, requirements, and regulations in thoroughly considering and evaluating and performing the rigors of a meaningful safety analysis of the licensee's plant specific technical specifications, equipment, procedures, and human error factors, in granting the licensee's request for relaxation of NRC's ORDER EA-03-009.

B.

Petitioners' Basis and Justification for Their Petition

1. On May 25"', 2004, the NRC in a letter authored by NRC Director, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Edwin M. Hackett. notified its licensee FPL that,

".. The NRC staff has completed it review and concludes that you have demonstrated that compliance with the Order for the RPV nozzles specified would have resulted in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. Therefore, puruant to Section IV.

paragraph F of the Order, the NRC staff finds there is good cause shown to relax the Order and authorizes the proposed relaxation and alternative inspection for the identified RPV head penetration nozzles..

Id at 1.

2. On June 10e, 2004, Petitioners submitted a petition to the NRC under 10 C.F.R. 2.206 requesting that the agency take immediate enforcement action against its licensee FPL regarding operations at Turkey Point Units 3-4.

3. On June 24e, 2004, the public, through Petitioners, participated in a teleconference call meeting with the NRC PRB in accordance with NRC Transmittal of Directive 2

JUN-30-2004 06:39P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO: 13014152700 P:4'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTJON CENTER 8.11 ("Directive 8.11"), "Review Process for 10 C.F.R. 2.206 Petitions"? The public's participation at the PRB meeting vis-h-vis NEPC was unfairly limited, and subsequently, abruptly terminated by the NRC after approximately 30-minutes of public participation3 Thus, Petitioners contend that the NRC acted improperlv in unfairly limiting the public's participation at the PRB meeting, and that in so doing, the NRC violated its Congressional mandate and its own regulations under 10 C.F.R. 50, and under other NRC regulations and requirements and policy, to ensure for public safety and health in matters of safety arising from operations at its licensees' commercial nuclear stations.

NRC's Directive 8.11 states, in relevant part. its objects:

"To ensure the public health and safety through the prompt and thorough evaluation of any potential problem addressed by a petition filed under 10 CFR 2.206..". and "To provide for appropriate participation by a petitioner in, and observation by the public of, NRC's decision making activities related to a 10 CFR 2.206 petition... '; and "To ensure effective communication with the petitioner and other stakeholders on the status of the petition, including providing relevant documents and notification of interactions between the NRC staff and a licensee or certificate holder relevant to the petition..."

Id at 1.

In the instant action, the conduct of NRC employees at the June 24h, 2004 PRB meeting in limiting the public's participation at that meeting to 30-minutes and thereafter abruptly ending the public's participation at that meeting, did nothing to ensure public health and safety with respect to operations at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.. To the contrary, because Petitioners' participation in the PRB meeting was limited to 30-minutes, the NRC was denied important information and opinion from Petitioners with respect to safety concerns regarding operations at the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, and related to the licensee's request for relaxation of NRC's ORDER EA-03-009.5 Petitioners aver here that the NRC failed to provide the public appropriate participation in, and observation of, NRC's decision making activities related to Petitioners' June 10h, 2004 4_

See, NRC TN: DT-0O-2O (Approved Jul. 1, 1999XRevised Oct. 25,2000). NRC Rules and Directives Branch.

3 A written record transcript oI'the June 2 2

4, 2004 PBR meeting was taken over the course of the meeting.

'NRC Management Directive 8.11, "Management of Allegations," provides NRC policy with regard to notifying the Office of Investigations ("Oro and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of wrongdoing matters, as well as Initiating, prioritizing. and terminating investigations. See. NRC Transmittal 8.11 at Pan I at 1-2.

S The teleconference was held by the NRC to provide the public, vis-4-vis Petitioners an opportunity to provide any relevant additional explanation and support for the request In advance of the PRB's evaluation. See. Dmroc-ive 8. 11 al Part TR at 8 (empbasis added). Signifamtly, ther is p-aWd Amp Jjnibatjk placed on the public or Petitioners' participation and/or presentation at the PRB meeting.

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JUN-30-2004 06:40P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO: 13014152700 P:5'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECT.ON CENTER petition filed under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, and that the NRC inappropriately preiudiced public sfety and health by limiting Petitioners' participation in the June 24h, 2004 PRB meeting to 30-minutes and in abruptly ending the public's participation in that meeting immediately thereafter.

In addition, prior to the public's participation at the PRB meeting, the NRC failed to ensure effective communication with Petitioners, including providing Petitioners relevant documents and notification between the NRC staff and its licensee FPL, relevant to the public's and Petitioners' 2.206 petition.

4. The NRC failed to allow Petitioners to express and to explain the facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action specified in the 2.206 petition, in support of its petition beyond any perceived "bare" assertions made in its petition, by allowing Petitioners sufficient time, and more than 30-minutes, to provide supporting facts which are credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry by the agency.

See, Directive 8.1 l at Part ITT at 1.

5. Turkey Point £'TTP3) Unit 3 was licensed by the NRC for cordmercial operation on or about July 19, 1972 and Turkey Point Unit ("TP4") 4 was licensed by the NRC for commercial operation shortly thereafter. Thus, due to the significant "age" of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, they are on the NRC's list of nuclear plants that have a "high" susceptibility to primary water stress-corrosion cracking. 6 Petitioners aver here that due to the commercial operation of TP3 and TP4 over the last 32-years, the RPVs at both nuclear stations are highly susceptible to the effects of stress-corrosion cracking, and that the rigors of NRC Order EA-03-009 safety inspection of the RPVs in TP3 and TP4 should not have been relaxed. Petitioners furthe contend that relaxation of the safety inspection requirements in NRC Order EA-03-009 as granted by the NRC on May 25*", 2004 pursuant to request made by FPL, have jeopardized public safety and health with respect to operations at IP3 and TP4.

6. The licensee's basis in requesting relaxation from the rigors of the RPV safety inspection requirements in NRC Order EA-03-009, is not sufficient to warrant the NRC's May 25', 2004 relaxation of NRC Order EA-03-009 at TP3 and at TP4.

Moreover, the purported "Safety Evaluation" by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ('NRR") in support of the NRC's granting FPL relaxation to NRC Order EA-03-009, is insufficient and makes erroneous assumptions based on industry reports and/or technical studies which are unauthonizd and unapproved by the NRC, but nonetheless were relied upon by the agency in conducting its purported safely evaluation in the present matter.

a. For nuclear plants TP3 and TP4 determined to have a high susceptibility to primary water stress-corrosion cracking in accordance with Section TV, paragraphs A and B of NRC Order EA-03-009, safety inspections are required 6,See, NKC EA-03-009,Section IV, paragaphs A and B. which require that licensees, like FPl. perform significant safety inspections of reactor pressure vessels (-P-s'v).

4

JUN-30-2004 06:40P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO: 13014152700 P:6/14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTFCION CENTER to be performed every refueling outage7 in accordance with Section IV.C-(1 )(b) of the Order as follows:

Either:

(i) Ultrasonic testing of each RPV head penetration nozzle (i.e., nozzle base material) from two (2) inches above the J-groove weld to the bottom of the nozzle and an assessment to determine if leakage has occurred into the interference fit zone, OR (ii) Eddy current testing or dye penetrate testing of the wetted surface of each J-groove weld and RPV head penetration nozzle base material to at least two (2) inches above the J-groove weld.

b. The licensee's proposed alternative is to perform a UT examination to include 2 inches above the weld to the lowest elevation possible or greater than 1 inch below the weld, whichever is greater. The licensee stated to the NRC that additional efforts to achieve the safety inspection requirements in NRC Order EA-03-009 required examination of an area below the weld that would result in a hardship due to unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safty.8 FPL further contended that the 65 RPV head penetration nofzles at TP3 are used for a variety of functions and present a variety of examination conditions. Notably, the licensee never stated to the NRC that it could not ierform the safety inspection requirements in NRC Order EA-03-009.

c. Petitioners aver here that the rigors of the safety inspection requirements in NRC Order EA-03-009 would not result in a hardship for the licensee due to unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. The licensee never stated to the NRC why other equipment that might be available in the industry, could not be acquired to perforn the RPV safety inspections as required in the NRC Order, for which the licensee maintains that its UT probe and associated equipment is not capable of interrogating all the material to the bottom of the nozzles in penetrations that were not open.

d. 'lTe NRC staff relied on misleading data and information provided by the licensee in the agency's safety evaluation of the licensee's request for relaxation from the NRC Order. Notably, the NRC relied on infornation and data provided by the licensee related to operation of its St Lucie Unit 2 nuclear plant, a system designed by Combustion Engineering and not by 7 NRC licensees, like FPL, have consistently hurried maintenance and work activities associated with refueling outages in an effort to avoid the economic consequences involving up to 1 -million dollars per day for every day that the plant remains off-line. Petitioners assert hcre that NRC may have acted inappropriately in concert with its licensee FPL in a rush to judgment" in the agency's granting FPIL relaxation frorn NRC Order EA-03-009 for economic measons overthe interest for public safrty and heal and for the protection of the environment

' Se, NRC Safely Evaluaflon at 3, (May 25, 2004).

S

JUN-30-2004 06:40P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO: 13014152700 P: 7'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMFNTAL PROTECTION CENTER Westinghouse who designed the TP system. Significantly, the NRC staff considered IPL's estimate of 17.7 man Rem in performing activities associated in compliance with the NRC's Order. However, FPL's estimate of 17.7 man Rem was bascd, in part, on portions of 9 RPV head nozzle ends at the St. Lucie Unit 2. Thus, the NRC staffs safety evaluation is bogus and not based entirely on realistic data collection from TP3 and TP4 with respect to man Rem calculations in support of the licensee's request for relaxation of the safety inspection requirements of the NRC's Order. In addition, the licensee failed to show why it could not perform to the safety inspection requirements of the NRC Order vis-A-vis dye penetration tests by taking appropriate measures to limit man-Rem dose to its workforce utilizing ALARA proven methods and techniques. Moreover, the significant age of TP3 and TP4 could result in stress-corrosion of the nozzles and penetration materials; and therein make it incumbent on the licensee to ensure for public safety and health9 in compliance with the NRC Order. Therefore, the licensee failed to demonstrate that full compliance of the NRC Order would necessarily result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.

e. The NRC staff relied on the licensee's assuptions made in its [FPL's] safety evaluation with respect to the crack-growth formula in industry report MRP-

55. However, the N RC has never approved or authorized the use of the crack-growth formula in industry report MRP-55. Moreover, the NRC staff failed to properly analyze and evaluate and consider the application of the crack-growth formula in industry report MPRP-55 to the effects of aged, (32-years old) TP3 and TP4. RPVs and associated materials and equipment would have in relation to actual stress-corrosion and crack-growth in TP3 and TP4 materials relevant to compliance of the NRC Order. Thus, the NRC sta's May 25"', 2004 safety evaluation is bogus and must be rejected by the PRB.' 0

f. The NRC staff made further assumptions in its purported safety evaluation relying on the licensee's assumptions and based on industry report "WCAP-16027-P" regarding hoop stresses and their associated level of affect with respect to transgression as the distance from the weld toe increases. Petitioners again aver that the licensee and the NRC staff have made mere assumptions in Petitioners aver hear that stress-corrosion cracking in materials associated with the RPV head and penetrations and nozzles could result in a Loss of Coolant Accident ("LOCA) much like the Three Mile Island Accident which resulted in a reactor core melt down and subsequent release of radioactive particles and materials into the environment Advey ffectig p.uybB safrty and hq1M. Although FPL contends that any nozzle failre away from the RPV would result In a limited loss of coolant, the licensee has not conducted any scienfific studies or provided any professional industry opinion to substantiate its mere asjumntions regarding any such LOCA event. Petitioners are gravely concerned about the licensee's assumptions made throughout their safety analysis in the present matter.

Moreover, Petitioners are even more concerned about the NRC's failure to challenge the licensee's assugptions made in their [FPL's) safety evaluation in support or its request to the NRC for relaxation of the NRC Order, In addition, Petitioners are disturbed that the NRC staff accepted and, in fact. relied on the licensee's bald assertions made in its [FPL's] safety evaluation when the NRC conducted its purported safcy evaluation of te licensee's request to rMl= the sa ety inspection rigors of the NRC Order.

'° See, NRC staff Safety Evaluation at 4-5 (May 25T, 2004).

6

JUN-30-2004 06:41P FROM:THOMPS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:8/14 NATIONAL ENVERONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER their respective safety evaluations regarding matters associated with compliance to the NRC Order. Such assumptions on the part of the licensee and on the part of the NRC staff are not a proper basis to support a request by the licensee for relaxation from full compliance of the NRC Order. In the balance of these assumptions lies public safety and health.

g. The licensce's proposed alternative to the NRC Order does not provide reasonable assurancesI of the structural integrity of the RPV head because part of the licensee's safety analysis relied on crack-growth formulas contained in industry reports that the NRC never authorized nor approved for use by its licensees. Thus, the mere assumptions by the NRC and by the licensee that.

the crack-growth results indicate a very low likelihood for a flaw in the unexamined area to grow through-wall and cause leakage and degrade the low-alloy steel RPV head prior to the next licensee inspection, is not based on My valid scientific analysis nor is it supported by any NRC approved crack-growth formula to justify relaxation from NRC Order EA-03-009. In other words, the NRC's granting the licensee, FPI,, relaxation from the safety inspection rigors of NRC Order EA-03-009. is apparently a very risky experiment undertak-en by the NRC and by FPL and by the nuclear industry overall, in a test case being TP3 and TP4, to establish a "new" life expectancy of RPV head assemblies and nozzles at NRC licensed facilities which have materials similar to TP3 and TP4. Such an exercise places public safety and health at extreme risk to a serious nuclear accident similar to the Three Mile Island accident in which a LOCA resulted in a core melt-down. The NRC's contention that this apparent experiment, as authorized through the agency's May 25"b, 2004 Order granting relaxation as discussed above, can be undertaken by the licensee for the duration of an entire refueling cycle without further evaluation in the interim period, also presents and unacceptable risk to public safety and health.

h. Petitioners contend that the NRC's May 25, 2004 Order granting the licensee relaxation from NRC Order EA-03-009 results in an unacceptable risk to public safety and health insofar as the licensee is now only required to perform a safety inspection of "53 RPV head penetration nozzles" rather than the -65 RPV head penetration nozzlces" required in the N'RC Order. Moreover.

the licensee has apparently never examined RPV head penetrations (#59 and

1. 60) for TP3 and TP4 in accordance with the NRC Order due to the licensee's contention that such an examination would result in a hardship witout a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.'2 As stated earlier, the licensee's alternative bases for compliance to the NRC Order EA-03-009 is based on more assmmnmpons on crack-growth fornulas which the NRC has nyeverapproved or authorized with respect to the safety inspection rigors in the NRC Order and in consideration of the degree of degradation or the TP RPV head assemblies which are some 32-years in age-

" See FPL letter to NRC al3. (FPL Vice President. William Jcfterson Feb. 25, 2003).

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JUN-30-2004 06:41P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:9'14 NATIONAL FNVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER

i. Petitioners aver that the licensee's alternative to EA-03-009, in examination of only 53 RPV head nozzles from 2 inches above the J-groove weld to a level at least I inch below the J-groove weld, does not provide reasonable assurance of the structural integrity of the RPV head, VHP nozzles and welds.

Petitioners further aver that the licensee's limited inspection of only 53 RPV head nozzles in not a proper or valid representative sample of the entire RPV head assembly, and that the un-inspected areas of the licensee's RPV head at TP3 and at TP4 could result in an 'undetected" crack which could grow through-wall and degrade the "low-alloy" steel RPV head(s) prior to the next inspection. Petitioners contend that the NRC's May 25, 2004 Order relaxing the safety inspection rigors of EA-03-009 as requested by the licensee, is simply a balance by the agency of the "economicd" interests of its licensee over the agency's Congressionally mandated duty to protect public Wefev and health. and that such an exercise by the NRC presents an unacceptable risk to public safety and health in violation of 10 C.F.R 50.

j. Petitioners further contend that industry report MRP-55 is unacceptable as applied and considered by the licensee in support of its request to the NRC for relaxation of EA-03-009. To the extent that the NRC has never approved industry report MRP-55 or authorized its use by any of its licensees in application to crack-growth scenarios of RPV head assemblies, the NRC's May 25kh, 2004 Order granting FPL relaxation frm EA-03-009 is invalid on its face, and requires that the licensee provide the NRC a written justification for continued operation of TP3 and TP4. Since the present crack-growth analysis pcrforned by the licensee in the present cycle of TP3 and TP4 was based on MRP-55 and not based on am NRC approved or NRC accepted crack growth rate formula, Petitioners request that the NRC take immediate action to cause the cold shut down of TP3 and TP4 in firtherance of public safety and health.

k. Petitioners contend that inspection equipment and delivery systems are available to the licensee, or can be obtained by the licensee, to perform a Lop down inspection of a RPV head penetration nozzle with access through a smaller diameter opening, and which would permit sufficient and proper inspection of the nozzle area from a distance of 20 feet. The licensee has not denied that such inspection equipment cannot be procured, but only that such "equipment and delivery systems are not available".' 3 I. Petitioners contend that the licensee's estimated 15-30 man rem dose to perform the manual RVLMS support plate removal and reinstallation for penetrations #59 and #60 can be reduced through application of proper ALARA techniques and practices, to lesse dose levels which would not constitute a hardship due to ALARA concerns.14 Thus, the licensee's reliance 3 See, William Jefferson letter to NRC, at 4 (Fe. 25.2003).

4 The licensee has never denied that application of proper ALARA practices and techniques could reasonably reduce its estimated man rem dose to lower levels, which would not constitute a hardship. Moreover, the NRC has 8

JUN-30-2004 06:42P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:10'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER on man rcm dose in its request to the NRC for relaxation of EA-03-009 is apparently not valid under the circumstances.

m. The licensee relies on a combination of a bare metal visual inspection of the top of the RVP head and the surface examination of the J-groove welds, to support its assumption that such inspection would provide an acceptable level of safety that a circumstantial flaw that could lead to ejection has not initiated in penetrations #59 and #60 and that leakage has not occurred into the interference fit zone. Petitioners however contend that the licensees assumrtions with respect to detecting leakage from a through wall flaw which could lead to ejection at penetrations #59 and #60 is erroneous and based primarily on field results and testing conducted and identified in industry report MRP>-75. Petitioners aver here that the NRC has not approved nor authorized industry report MRP-75 for use by the licensee as a valid basis to request relaxation from the safety inspection rigors of lEA-03-009.

Furthennore, Petitioners aver that industry report MRP-75 is not applicable to TP-3 and TP-4 RPV head degradation analysis because that report was based on testing and field results obtained from RPVs which are not similar in material, such as the "low-alloy" steel used in the TP3 and TP4 RPV head assemblies, and thc industry report MRP-75 fails to make sufficient or adequate consideration for the method of interference fit or analysis of the interference fit which could result in ejection at penetrations #59 and #f60.

Thus, Petitioners aver that FPL's surface examination of onll the weld and the one (1) inch below into the tube surface does not provide an acceptable alternative safety inspection without compromising safety.

n. Petitioners contend that assumptions made by the licensee in its safety analysis with respect to a typical CRDM nozzle ejection are erroneous and could result in violation of the safety parameters in Regulatory Guide 1.174.

The licensee's safety analysis assumes that a welded support plate associated with a CRDM nozzle would remain in place during an ejection with a resulting flow path determined vis-a-vis the diameter of the nozzle "l.D."

being "2.75 inches". Petitioners contend that a much larger flow path could result from ejection at penetrations #59 and #60 and that the support plate associated with the aforementioned nozzles would not necessarily remain in place as assumed by the licensee. Petitioners aver that the RPV head remains under a great deal of stress due to the pressure and temperature and flow of the RCS.15 To this extent, the licensee and the NRC have failed in their respective safety analysis to properly ascertain or to consider the material degradation of the TP3 and TP4 RPV head.asscmblies with respect to metal fatigue and stress-corrosion which could result in through-wall crack growth never challenged the Licensee's "bald' assertions with respect to ALARA considerations in the licensee's request for relaxation of EA-3-009.

15 Petitioners believe that the TP3 and TP4 units operate with RCS flows or6So,ooo gallons of water per minute and at sufficient pressure and temperature to provide proper heat removal from the core and to ensure from the effects of boiling.

9

JUN-30-2004 06:42P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:11'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER leading to ejection of one or more nozzles, including nozzles at penetrations

1. 59 and #60, and their respective support plates. Thus, Petitioners contend that the NRC's May 25, 2004 Order granting the licensee relaxation from the safety inspection rigors of EA-03-009 was based, in part, on the flawed safety evaluations by the licensee and by the NRC staff, and that the aged TP3 and TP4 RPV head assemblies could sustain a through-wall crack which could grow and result in ejection of one or more nozzles, including #59 and #60 and their associated support plates, and that such an event would violate NRC requirements in Regulatory Guide 1.174 and violate NRC requirements under 10 C.F.R. 50. To the extent that ejection of one or more nozzles, including

1. 59 and/or #60, would occur, Petitioners contend that the resulting force of such an ejection would lead to ejection of any associated support plate and result in a LOCA greater than the flow path of "2.75" diameter assumed by the licensee. Petitioners further contend that due to the 32-year age of TP3 and TP4 RPV head assemblies and the degraded material make-up of the RPVs and associated nozzle penetrations, that ejection of one or more nozzles could result in an "uncontrolled' loss of RC inventory resulting in a core melt-down leading to a possible release of radioactive particles and materials into the environment in violation of NRC requirements and in violation of the Atomic Safety Act of 1954.

o. Petitioners aver that the licensee's Teliance on secondary radiation leakage detection systems to alert the plant operators of a loss in RC inventory resulting from crack-growth in the un-inspected areas due to the NRC granting the licensec relaxation from EA-03-009, is erroneous and does not support its request to the agency for relaxation of EA-03-009. Although the licensee maintains a RPV head leak detection system capable of detecting leakage on top of the RPV head and inside the CRDM cooling shroud, the system is only cycled to the head detection mode and cannot therefore provide the licensee the capability of determining if the RCS is leaking at the RPV head on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operational basis. In addition, the licensee's secondary radiation leakage detection system is only "periodically" checked for functionality and operability. Moreover, the licensee has made no assurances to the NRC that such a system has sufficient redundant monitoring or reporting capabilities to ensure that failure of the system would not otherwise render the entire secondary radiation leakage detection system useless in detecting RCS leakage at the RPVs at TP3 and TP4. Thus, the licensee's reliance on its purported secondary radiation leakage detection systems in support of its request to the NRC for relaxation of EA-03-009 is not valid in such circumstances and must be reiected by the PR3B.

p. Petitioners further contend that heat #NX5940 was used to treat the 10 nozzles associated in the NRC's May 25, 2004 Order granting the licensee relaxation from EA-03-009 and that any service-induced cracking in nozzles treated with heat #NX5940 have an "elevated" risk to cracking. Moreover, heat #NX5940 was used in construction of RPVs at TP3 and TP4 and at Surry Unit 1.

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JUN-30-2004 06:43P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:12/14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER Notably, TP3 has 12-penetrations of this heat including #59 and #60. TP4 has 7-pcnctrations of this heat including *59 and #60. The licensee failed to indicate to the NRC the number, if any, of the Surry Unit 1 RPV head penetrations used heat #4NX5940. Significantly, in the fall of 2001, the licensee for Surry Unit 1 identified RPV leakage, which resulted in 6-penetrations that required repair. Notably, the FPL safety evaluation with respect to heat #NX5940 is replete with mere assumptions and unsupported opinion regarding the use of heat #NX5940 to RPVs and associated nozzle materials at TP3 and TP4, and any RCS leakage which would result in a LOCA due to metal fatigue and crack-growth in the un-inspected ares of the RPV and associated nozzles with respect to the NRC's May 25, 2004 Order granting the licensee relaxation from the safety inspection rigors of EA 009. Thus, neither the licensee nor the NRC staff has adequately addressed all safety considerations in their respective safety analysis to support granting the licensee relaxation from EA-03-009.

q. Petitioners aver that the licensee's crack-growth formula was determined using MRP-55 and that the licensee's approach therein deviates from the axial and circumferential cracking guidance provided in Jack Strosrilder's letter issued in 2001, and that the NRC has never approved the crack-growth formulas in MRP-55. Petitioners contend that the crack-growth formulas relied upon by the licensee in requesting relaxation firom EA-03-009 are not sufficiently accurate to properly determine and assess crack-growth at TP3 and TP4 RPV head assemblies and associated nozzles, and that the approach taken in the "Strosnidere letter is a safer and more conservative approach with applicability to TP3 and TP4. Thus, the licensee's repair criteria associated with RPVs and associated nozzles at TP3 and TP4 does not support its request for relaxation from EA-03-009.

r. Petitioners contend that ejection of one or more nozzles would result in a LOCA that would adversely affect the other associated RVLMS train in such a manner as to cause -inaccurate and misleading RV inventory levels.

Although the licensee's RVLMS channel pressure housings are located about 90 degrees apart in the outer row of penetrations at the RPV head, the mere force of ejection and the resultant flow of RC over associated RVLMS channel equipment and electronic control systems, would most likely cause inaccurate and misleading RV inventory levels. In addition, the licensee cannot predict the degree of physical damage that would necessarily result from an ejection of one or more RPV nozzles.' 6 Thus, ejection could result in misleading and/or inaccurate RV inventory levels and result in the plant operator taking actions, which could result in a larger LOCA than anticipated or considered by the licensee or by the NRC staff in their respective safety a Petitioners note here that the entirety of the licensee's purported safety evaluation rests on the licensee's ass=n1tion that a single nozzle would be ejected and that the associated nozzle support plate would otherwise remain in place and theby limit RC (low through the diameter of the support plate opening. Such assumptions by the licensee arc not a valid or proper basis for the NRC staffto grant thc licensee exemption from EA.03.009.

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JUN-30-2004 06:43P FROM:THOMAS SAPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:13114 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER evaluations in the instant matter. To this extent, the licensee cannot justify continued operation of TP3 and TP4 in full compliance with NRC regulations under 10 C.F.R. 50, and therefore. the NRC is required to ORDER the licensee to immediately bring TP3 and TP4 to a safc cold-shutdown condition in fiunherance of public safety and health.

s. The licensee's safety analysis with respect to the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System ("QSPDS') is erroneous and based on mere assumptions and unrealistic assessment of the probabilities associated with ejection of one RPV nozzles. The licensee assumes that with expected damage to an ejected RVLMS channel cables and connectors the input to the QSPDS would not fall into its software parameter ranges and therefore the QSPDS display would indicate a failed condition with question marks in the display, and therefore not give erroneous indication which could be mistaken for an actual level by the plant operator. Petitioners contend that while it is true that ejection of a single nozzle might result in displaying question marks on the QSPDS system, the licensee has not, and can not, provide any reasonable assurance that damaged electronics associated with input to the QSPDS respective RVLMS channel would not provide a false and misleading RV inventory level.

Because software in the QSPDS is has an "established" range of values which it monitors, any input to the QSPDS from a damaged RVLMS channel which falls within the software's "established" range, could provide the plant operator erroneous and misleading display indications of RV inventory levels which are inaccurate. Moreover, the licensce's reliance on thermocouple circuits discussed in their safety evaluation is misleading. Although, as the licensee suggests, the thermocouple circuits would also be damaged during an ejection and provide further skewing of values, the licensee has not, and cannot, make any assurances that the skewed values could not fall within plant parameters causing misleading plant conditions to the plant operator. Finally, the licensee's safety evaluation only makes assumptions and analysis with respect to a single ejection scenario. Petitioners aver that due to the aged plant conditions at TP3 and TP4 coupled with the heat used in materials associated with the RPVs and associated nozzles in those units, that one or morc nozzles in one or more RVLMS channels/trains could result in a LOCA far greater than that assumed by the licensee, and a LOCA that could result in a reactor core melt-down and release of radioactive particles and materials into the environment in violation of NRC regulations and requirements. Thus, Petitioners urge the PRB to cause the withdrawal of the NRC's May 25, 2004 relaxation of EA-03-009.

t. Petitioners contend that the licensee's safety analysis is erroneous and based primarily on unsupported assumptions and reliance on industry reports that have never been accepted by the NRC. Thus, ejection of one or more RVLMS at TP3 or at TP4 could result in plant conditions which the plant operator may not be able to properly ot timely respond and result in human error leading to a melt-down of the reactor core, similar to the Three Mile Island accident.

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JUN-30-2004 06:43P FROM:THOMAS SRPORITO 561-625-9197 TO:13014152700 P:14'14 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CENTER CONCLUSION Based on the information presented above, it is concluded that the licensee's proposed alternative inspection is replete with unsupported assumptions and based on industry rcport(s) which have never been approved by the NRC. and therefore, does pot provide an adequate level of quality and safety with respect to relaxation from the safety inspection rigors in NRC Order EA-03-009 as requested by the licensee and as granted by the NRC on May 25, 2005. Therefore, Petitioners, urge the NRC to GRANT its petition filed under 10 C.F.R. 2.206 and order the licensee, Florida Power & Light Company, to 41EDA13ATElY bring Turkey Point Unit 3 and Unit 4 to SAFE a cold-shutdown status and vacate the NRC's May 25, 2004 relaxation order.

Respectfully submitted, National Environmental Protcction Center Thomas Saporito Executive Director A copy of the foregoing was provide to:

William Travers Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Oscar DeMiranda Senior Allegations Coordinator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Hon. Jeb Bush Governor State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 JA. SWaI Senior Vice President Florida Power & Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420 Michael 0. Pearce Plant General Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant 9762 S.W. 344th Street Florida City, Florida 33035 Senior Resident Inspector

'Iurkey Point Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

9762 S.W. 344th Street Florida City, Florida 33035 Russell Wise Senior Allegations Cooridinator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

611 Ryan Plaza Dr. Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 13