ML041110875
| ML041110875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  (NPF-039, NPF-085) |
| Issue date: | 04/13/2004 |
| From: | Gallagher M Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML041110875 (38) | |
Text
Exel, n,.
Exelon Nuclear 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 www~exeloncorp.comn Nuclear 10 CFR 50.90 April 13, 2004 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85 NRC Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353
Subject:
Request for Amendment to Technical Specifications to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
References:
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specifications Change Traveler TSTF-447, Revision 1, "Elimination of Hydrogen Recombiners and Change to Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors' Federal Register, Volume 68, Number 186, Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement to Eliminate Hydrogen Recombiner Requirement, and Relax the Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitor Requirements for Light Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, published September 25, 2003, (68FR55416).
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for Amendment of License or Construction Permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) proposes changes to Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TS), for Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The purpose of this license amendment request is to eliminate the requirements for hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen/oxygen monitors from the Technical Specifications. The proposed Technical Specification changes support implementation of the revisions to 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors," that became effective on October 16, 2003.
The proposed changes are consistent with Revision 1 of NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-447, "Elimination of Hydrogen Recombiners and Change to Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors." The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on September 25, 2003 as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). provides a description of the proposed change, the rediuested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications and commitments. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS and TS Bases pages mnarked-up to show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides retyped TS and TS Bases pages with the proposed changes incorporated. Attachment 4 provides a listing of Regulatory Commitments made with this submittal.
/
Request for Amendment to TSs to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors April 13, 2004 Page 2 EGC requests approval of the proposed changes by October 15, 2004, with the amendment being implemented within 60 days of issuance.
The proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board in accordance with the requirements of the EGC Quality Assurance Program.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b), EGC is notifying the State of Pennsylvania of this application for changes to the TS by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Dave Robillard at (610) 765-5952.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Respectfully, Executed on 04-( 3 04 Michael P. Gallagher Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: - Description and Assessment - Markup of Technical Specification and Bases Pages - Retyped Technical Specification and Bases Pages - Regulatory Commitments cc:
H. J. Miller, Administrator, Region I, USNRC A. L. Burritt, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS S. Wall, Project Manager, USNRC R. R. Janati - Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
ATTACHMENT 1 Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Description and Assessment
LGS U1 &2: Request for Amendment to TSs to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners Page 1 of 3 and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT
1.0 DESCRIPTION
The proposed license amendment deletes TS 3/4.6.6.1 "Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Systems" and references to the Hydrogen/Oxygen monitors in TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1 "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" and "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements;" respectively. The proposed TS changes support implementation of the revisions to 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors," that became effective on October 16, 2003.
The proposed changes are consistent with Revision 1 of NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-447, "Elimination of Hydrogen Recombiners and Change to Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors." The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on September 25, 2003 as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP).
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Consistent with the NRC-approved Revision 1, of TSTF-447, the proposed TS changes include:
TS Table Item 8, Drywell Oxygen Concentration Analyzer; Deleted 3.3.7.5-1 Item 9, Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer; and Action 82 TS Table Item 8, Drywell Oxygen Concentration Analyzer; Item Deleted 4.3.7.5-1 9, Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer and notes TS Section Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Systems Deleted 3/4.6.6.1
3.0 BACKGROUND
The background for this application is adequately addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability published on September 25, 2003 (68FR55416), TSTF-447, the documentation associated with the 10 CFR 50.44 rulemaking, and other related documents.
4.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE The applicable regulatory requirements and guidance associated with this application are adequately addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability published
LGS U1&2: Request for Amendment to TSs to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners Page 2 of 3 and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors on September 25, 2003 (68FR55416), TSTF-447, the documentation associated with the 10 CFR 50.44 rulemaking, and other related documents.
5.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) has reviewed the Safety Evaluation (SE) published on September 25, 2003 (68FR55416) as part of the CLIIP. This verification included a review of the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support TSTF-447. EGC has concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the Limerick Generating Station TS.
6.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
A description of this proposed change and its relationship to regulatory requirements and guidance was provided in the NRC Notice of Availability published on September 25, 2003 (68FR55416), TSTF-447, the documentation associated with the 10 CFR 50.44 rulemaking, and other related documents.
6.1 Verification and Commitments As discussed in the model SE published in the Federal Register on September 25, 2003, (68FR55416) for this TS improvement, EGC is making the following verifications and regulatory commitments.
EGC is not proposing any variations or deviations from the requirements of the STS changes described in TSTF-447, Revision 1 or the NRC staff's model safety evaluation dated September 25, 2003. In accordance with the NRC staff's safety evaluation the hydrogen and oxygen monitoring capability will be maintained but no longer considered safety related as defined in 10 CFR 50.2.
- 1.
EGC, has verified that a hydrogen monitoring system capable of diagnosing beyond design basis accidents is installed at Limerick Units 1 and 2 and is making a regulatory commitment to maintain that capability.
The hydrogen monitors are included in the plant's Emergency and Operating procedures and the Maintenance Program. This regulatory commitment is currently implemented.
- 2.
Limerick Units 1 and 2 have an inerted containment. EGC has verified that an oxygen monitoring system capable of verifying the status of the inerted containment is installed at Limerick Units 1 and 2 and is making a regulatory commitment to maintain that capability. The oxygen monitors are included in the plant's Emergency and Operating procedures and the Maintenance Program. This regulatory commitment is currently implemented.
LGS U1 &2: Request for Amendment to TSs to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners Page 3 of 3 and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors 7.0 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION EGC has reviewed the proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the CLIIP.
EGC has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice (68FR55416) is applicable to the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a).
8.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION EGC has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation dated September 25, 2003 (68FR55416) as part of the CLIIP. EGC has concluded that the staff's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to Limerick Units 1 and 2 and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application.
9.0 PRECEDENT This application is being made in accordance with the CLIIP. EGC is not proposing variations or deviations from the TS changes described in TSTF-447, Revision 1 or the NRC staff's model SE published on September 25, 2003 (68FR55416).
10.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specifications Change Traveler TSTF-447, Revision 1, "Elimination of Hydrogen Recombiners and Change to Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors"
- 2. Federal Register, Volume 68, Number 186, Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement to Eliminate Hydrogen Recombiner Requirement, and Relax the Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitor Requirements for Light Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, published September 25, 2003, (68FR55416).
ATTACHMENT 2 Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Markup of Technical Specification and Bases Pages Unit 1 Unit 2 xiii xiii 3/4 3-85 3/4 3-85 3/4 3-86 3/4 3-86 3/4 3-87 3/4 3-87 3/4 6-57 3/4 6-57 B 3/4 3-5 B 3/4 3-5 B 3/4 6-6 B 3/4 6-7
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Suppression Chamber - Drywell Vacuum Breakers.........
3/4 6-44 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity.....
3/4 6-46 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Integrity........
3/4 6-47 Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves......................................
3/4 6-48 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves......................................
3/4 6-50 Standby Gas Treatment System - Common System..........
3/4 6-52 Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System................
3/4 6-55 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL r4rimry Containment Hydrogen Reenbinei-Systems.
i 3/4 6-57 Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System........................
3/4 6-58 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Oxygen Concentration..
3/4 6-59 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Residual Heat Removal Service Water System - Common System................................................
3/4 7-1 Emergency Service Water System - Common System........
3/4 7-3 Ultimate Heat Sink....................................
3/4 7-5 LIMERICK - UNIT 1 xiii Amendment No. 17,40,105 DEC 2 0 W5
TABLE 3..,.5-1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENT
- i.
Reactor Vessel Pressure MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 1
2 2
APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS ACTION 1,2 80 1,2 80 1,2 80 1,2 80 2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13 Reactor Vessel Water Level Suppression Chamber Water Level Suppression Chamber Water Temperature Suppression Chamber Air Temperature Drywell Pressure Drywell Air Temperature iywel Oxygen Czozrctration Aiqljzc; LTL&TC-T)
Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators Primary Containment Post-LOCA Radiation Monitors North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor**
Neutron Flux 2
8, 6 locations 1
2 1
1/valve 4
3*
2 1
6, 1/location 1
1 1
1/valve 2
3*
1 1
1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 80 80 80 80 81 81 80 LIMERICK - UNIT I 3/4 3 -85 Amendment No. 29, 151
Table 3.3.7.5-1 (Continued)
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TABLE NOTATIONS
- Three noble gas detectors with overlapping ranges (10-7 to 10-1, 10-4 to 102, 10' to 105 pLCi/cc).
- High range noble gas monitor.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 80 -
- a.
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b.
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 81 -
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitor-ing the appropriate parameters within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and
- a.
Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or
- b.
Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION 82 -
71 E
t b
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumenat nnels less than the Required Number of Channels show 1/2 Table 3.3..
-1, restore the inoperable channel to OPERAB status within 3 s or prepare and submit a Special port to the Commission pur nt to Specification 6.9.
thin the following 14 days outlining preplanned alt te method of monitoring, the cause of the noper ility, the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentat annel of the function to OPERABLE status.
- b. With the numb of OPERABLE accident moni ng instrumentation channel s than the Minimum Channels OPERA equirements of Tab
.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s)
OPERABLE atus within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN wi in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3 -86 Amendment No. 151
ACCIDENT MONITORING INM INSTRUMENT
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature
- 5.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature
- 6.
Primary Containment Pressure
- 7.
Drywell Air Temperature
- 8.
Orywell Oxygen Concentration Analyzer
- 9.
9t yvw~i 1 di.
og, eiCeiti-ata ion Anaiyzert 4
- 10.
Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators
- 11.
Primary Containment Post LOCA Radiation
- 12.
North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor" P.
- 13.
Neutron Flux TABLE 4,3.7.5-1 iTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT CHANNEL CHECK M
M M
M M
M M
+Ii-M M
M M4 H
CHANNEL CAL1BRATION R
R It R
It R
R R
R**
n n
5F46TC3)
M onitL-or Monitors r***
0 0
u`
os Sevcn volume per-rcnt hisdrogns le b
itrogenr
- CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check installed or portable gamma source.
- High range noble gas monitors.
nin cali*rtio gas eentaininj:
C---n v!olume perent oxygen, ba ance nitrogen.
I the channel, not including the detector, of the detector below 10 R/h with an I
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 1
3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 T; indepen ent primary zonainment hydregen r-:z~ner 9yztem: Thail be -OPERABhE. PcZEiTL APPLICA8ILITY:
OPERATIO CONDITIONS I an 2.
ACTION:
With one primary con inment hydrogen combiner system operable, restore the inoperable sys m to OPERABLE St within 30 days/or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within tn e next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.6.6.1 E g primary contai hydrogen reco r system shal be de strated rERABLE:
/. At least o eOpr 6 months b efrance of://
- 1.
CHANNEL CHECK of 1 Control Room Recombine Instrumentation.
- 2.
A Trickle Heat rcuit check.
A Heater Coi /
heck.//
- 4.
A verifi tion of valve operation b stroking all the alves to their
/
proper? oitions.
- b.
At least ce per 24 months by:
- 1.
erforming a CHANNEL CAL RATION of all ntrol room reco iner
/ nstrumentation and contl cuiruts.
//
2 Verifying the integri of all heater e ctrical circuits y perform-ing a resistance to round test withl 0 minutes follo ng the below required function test.
The res tance to ground or any heater phase shall be eater than or e 1 to one (1) me nm.
- 3.
Verifying th ugh a visual ex ination that the is no evidence of
/abnormal c ~itions within terecombiner e cgsre; i.e., loosp
/wiring o
vsrdctural conne C ons, deposits o v rign materialW etc.
- 4.
Verif n during a reco ner system fun oa test that minimum hear outlet gas tem erature increase/t grater thanv~ equal to 1I ° within 120 m' utes and maintai ed for at least e hour.
- c.
By m suring the syste leakage rate:
1/
As a part of the overall it rated leakage r e test required y
/
Specificati n 3.6.1.2, or
- 2.
By meas ing the leakage ate of the syst outside of the ntain-ment olation valves P., 44.0 psig, n the schedule r uired by Spe fication 4.6.1.2 and including t measured leakag as a part
/
of he leakage det ied in accorda e with Specific on 4.6.1.2.
LIMERICK -
UNIT 1 3/4 6-57 Amendment No. 2$, 71 JUL 2R 1QQ4
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels, and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.
The specified surveillance interval for the Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor has been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,' as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).
3/4.3.7.2 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE UFSAR.
3/4.3.7.3 (Deleted) -
INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.
3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A.
3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident.
This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident,"
December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
November 1980.
Drywell and containment hydrogen and oxygen analyzers are Category I instrubm rovided to detect high hydrogen or oxygen concentration conditioD that represen otential for containment breach. This variable is al~a---
important in verify e quacy of mitigating actions.
When two hydrogen monito s are inop
, one hydrogen monitor channel must be restored to OPERABLE sta in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on the low alit e occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in a capable of exceedin lammability limit; the length of time af e event that operator action woul equired to prevent hydro ccumulation from exceeding this limit; and the ava-i lity of the n recombiners, the Containment Purge System, and the Post Accidel pming Systems.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 48, -53, A, A, 151, ECR 02-00470 I
l
CONTA CENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CYNTAflzMENT (Continued)
The field tests for bypass leakage across the SGTS charcoal adsorber and HEPA filter banks are performed at a flow rate of 5764
- 10% cfm.
The laboratory analysis performed on the SGTS carbon samples will be tested at a velocity of 66 fpm based on the system residence time.
The SGTS filter train pressure drop is a function of air flow rate and filter conditions.
Surveillance testing is performed using either the SGTS or drywell purge fans to provide operating convenience.
Each reactor enclosure secondary containment zone and refueling area secondary containment zone is tested independently to verify the design leak tightness.
A design leak tightness of 2500 cfm or less for each reactor enclosure and 764 cfm or less for the refueling area at a 0.25 inch of vacuum water gage will ensure that containment integrity is maintained at an acceptable level if all zones are connected to the SGTS at the same time.
The Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves and Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves can be found in the VFSAR.
The post-LOCA offsite dose analysis assumes a reactor enclosure secondary containment post-draw down leakage rate of 2500 cfrm and certain post-accident X/Q values.
While the post-accident X/Q values represent a statistical inter-pretation of historical meteorological data, the highest ground level wind speed which can be associated with these values is 7 mph (Pasquill-Gifford stability Class G for a ground level release).
Therefore, the surveillance requirement assures that the reactor enclosure secondary containment is verified under meteorological conditions consistent with the assumptions utilized in the design basis analysis.
Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment leakage tests that are successfully performed at wind speeds in excess of 7 Aph would also satisfy the leak rate surveillance requirements, since it shows compliance with more conservative test conditions.
3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAIlNENT ATHOSPMERE CONTROL
%The.
oGPrEL1nIF of the systezm rsuit-ed for Qthz ietc.tion an ee
.f-hy-drogen comfbust-ible mitrsof hhydroq=A
.=4 -Xygea ensuresg tha~t tos st Uilrso ns~r~le n malizt*-a
-ths- *hy-naen -c-earit-natian wirbin the p-4sp.=y Qc*n-taiK=Zt below tho lower Ylmoobilit3-limxit duingY post LOAD conditions "bo pram='-.
A i-h$"=A"' r~o~ne i; psovi6ed to S~itabn ticomg "irned to operate cither-in tAndb-rontirnuous wda
-A r"igndonrsa opciatmion.
-s gonn
^-ootwAci e
X3-iZ.;Z~
A t
OMZw^
a=
primary containment atmospheric mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen and oxygen from exceeding the lower flammability limit aoea-l c'.rp on' i-co' a
ue' f t w th<<
aeo=m-4mtcong ofr
,Q; CuiAe 1 '7
'Qfbatro!
Pt CQmk~nv=~1o1 lzc Cooerto r.i Gentarkzazet F9A!Q~aai%% a LCQiA Mirc AUG 1 3 2Tj' I
.-LM=-
UNIT I B 3/4 6-6 Amendment No.
4, *-5, 122
-~
~
R00-00132 All nuclear reactors must be designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metal water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis. The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment. With the primary containment inert, that is, oxygen concentration < 4.0 volume percent (v/o), a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen K
concentration. The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen <
4.0 v/o works together with the Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System to provide redundant ad d methods to mitigate events that produce hydrogen.
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Suppression Chamber - Drywell Vacuum Breakers.........
3/4 6-44 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity.....
3/4 6-46 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Integrity........
3/4 6-47 Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves.......................................
3/4 6-48 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves......................................
3/4 6-50 Standby Gas Treatment System - Common System..........
3/4 6-52 Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System................
3/4 6-55 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL Pr Mary C......ai.;men.t Hydrogen Recbib nr Syste.
PIL.
.O. 3/4 6-57 3/4.7 3/4.7.
Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System........................
Drywell and Suppression Chamber Oxygen Concentration..
PLANT SYSTEMS
.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Residual Heat Removal Service Water System - Common System................................................
Emergency Service Water System - Common System........
Ultimate Heat Sink....................................
3/4 3/4 6-58 6-59 3/4 3/4 3/4 7-1 7-3 7-5 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 xiii Amendment No. 69 DEC 2 0 1995
TABLE 3.>5-.7.5-1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENT
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS 2
2 2
8, 6 locations MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 1
1 1
6, 1/location APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 ACTION 80 80 80 80 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature Drywell Pressure Drywell Air Temperature Dr;..we41 Oygoen Cocrcntration Analyer P6) AFrixp pryw'cl Hy4drc9cn Czn cntrat-ion Analyzer be4grCP Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators Primary Containment Post-LOCA Radiation Monitors North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor**
Neutron Flux 1
2.
1 1
1 1/valve 4
3*
2 1
1/valve 2
3*
1 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 80 80 80 80 81 81 80 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3 -85 Amendment No. 115
Table 3.3.7.5-1 (Continued)
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TABLE NOTATIONS
- Three noble gas detectors with overlapping ranges (10-7 to 10-1, 10-4 to 102, 10' to 105 pCi/cc).
- High range noble gas monitor.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 80 -
- a.
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b.
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 81 -
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitor-ing the appropriate parameters within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and
- a.
Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or
- b.
Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION 82 - bC &Th4b7 With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentatio nels less than the Required Number of Channels shown i able 3.3.7 restore the inoperable channel to OPERABL tus within 30 or prepare and submit a Special R t to the Commission purs t
reto Specification 6.9.2 in the following 14 days outlining t replanned altern
_pAmethod of monitoring, the cause of the inoperagt44,y, an e plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation nnel of the function to OPERABLE status.
- b.
With the number PERABLE accident monito instrumentation channels 1 than the Minimum Channels OPERABL uirements of Table
.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to ERABLE s
u~s within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN wit he next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3 -86 Amendment No.
115
IABLE 4.3 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTAT INSTRUMENT M
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature
- 6.
Primary Containment Pressure
- 7.
Drywell Air Temperature
- 8.
Qvrywell Oxygen Concentrpatin Analyzer E
- 9.
Dny.cl lydrogen Conczntration Analyzeir D4:/ZL-C76
- 10.
Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators 00 4
- 11.
Primary Containment Post LOCA Radiation Monitors
- 12.
North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor***
- 13.
Neutron Flux
.7.5-1 ION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT CIIANNEL CHECK M
M 14 14 14 14 14 4--
14 14 M
14 S
CHANNEL CALIBRATION R
R R
R R
R**
it It
[a.
CD A
-90
- Usingy tuilbtaull gas Cltulain11TT.;
E eVen volume pereent hydregem, balance nitrogen.
Z<
- CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of Wo for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check C-installed or portable gamma source.
- High range noble gas monitors.
g fIsJing caibration ga-s containing4 Seyein volume percent oxygen, balance ntrogen.
I the channel, not including the detector, of the detector below 10 R/h with an I
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 Two independent primary containment hydrogen recombiner systems shall be-OPERABLE-. DtIEVED E--
PLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL COND IONS 1 and 2.
/ACTION:
With one pri ary containment drogen recombin system inopera e, restore the inoper le system to OPABLE status wit n 30 days or be n at least HOT SHUTDOWN ithin the next hours.
SURVE iLNCE REQUIREMES///-
- 4.
Each primar containment dr en recombiner s tet shall be d on-s t ted OPERABLE:////
- a.
A ast once per 6 nths by perao b sri af:
/
v
- 1.
A CHANNEL ECK of all Recomb r Instrumectbtir e sA Tric e at Circuit r
.circits
- 3.
A fnter Coil C teck./
/
a
- 4.
verification o glve operati o stroking all wie valves b
po their pshl b gositions. o e t
- b.
east once pehro 4onths by:
a v e
t
- 1.
Performal a CHANNEL c
t wt TION of a e ntrol room i e. oobis er iinstr sntation and co erol circuits.
d o
- 2.
Ver fying the ing a
om all heat electrical ci ts by performi at resistan se ra test in esn 30 minutes owing the bel rquired functinal mitest n
nItance to ga d for any heoer 1
phase shall bp of th a ntegrqual to one ratmegohm.
t pVerifaing rough a nisua nation th there is no of
/abnormal/conditions witi the recombine /nclosure; i.e.
os
/wiri nago structural c etions, depovs' of foreign m ras etc.
- 4.
Ve a
fying durint a
biner systh sunctional test the minimumn nater outlet g yemperature inc4 es to greate sc han or equal b
/
150'F within ?
minutes and m ntained for at 9 st one hour./
- c.
B masuring the ssem leakage rav:
/.
As a pa Xof the overal /
ntegrated lagerate test r ured by
/
~Specification 3.6 1. 2,
//
/
- 2.
Byjauring the lefae rate of th Hsstem outsi de /
he contain-
/At isolation v ~es at P., 44.0 Xsg, on the sch ule required b Specification 4.1.2, and inclu ing the measure eakage as a pa inof-teordance with S cification 4.6..
LIMERICK -
UNII Z 3/4 0-0/
AMendment No.-4 JUL ZU 1134
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels, and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variable following an accident.
This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.
The specified surveillance interval for the Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor has been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specification," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R. D. Binz, IV, from C. E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).
3/4.3.7.2 (Deleted) -
INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE UFSAR.
3/4.3.7.3 (Deleted) -
INFORMATION FROMTHIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.
3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. The Unit 1 RHR transfer switches are included only due to their potential impact on the RHRSW system, which is common to both units.
3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.
rywell and containment hydrogen and oxygen analyzers are Category I instrumen z-9tovided to detect high hydrogen or oxygen concentration condi that represent )sa ential for containment breach.
This variable is o
important in verifyin adequacy of mitigating actions.
When two hydrogen monitor s are in ble, one hydrogen monitor channel must be restored to OPERABLE sta ithin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on the lI babilit the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in s capable of exceedi e flammability limit; the length of time a he event that operator action wo required to prevent hydra umulation from exceeding this limit; and the bility of the hyd r recombiners, the Containment Purge System, and the Post Accl gSystems.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 14, 14, 33, 36,
-15, ECR 02-00470
CONTAIMENT SYSTEMS 3/4-6.6 PRIMTARY CONTAINMET ATMOSPHERE CONTROL hrdrogen Combustible =4 xf-u 4
-re of ydoa and -qc9sQu onW WOO that thece Sy-stems il,,;431 IW e
edait h XA aydn r-a wAn rte:erit Viit=;
thepr
~ot~'n b1-3cv' tbe low=
~
limi~~4
t;
.'4&gpo3tLC2 W~ho pzimawy b-ra udS-cm=77e--5i is P=rt-cSto ainai the w7ygef is da6nid a to opo-ca ithc'-
0i s
irnd1 or
=ontino m
ode duringz--zi opzration.
howeer. the comb'ustiblo gas analyzer in rcqiairod ~tocniu-m~onitor h~idrogen and Olsn concantrations~ith p^22ri>=tbr-containmiont following 4LC The primary containment atmospheric mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containmzent atmosphere to prevent localized of hydrogen and oxygen from exceeding the lower flammability limit g
G.droao 1
cnnrol f
-= -
iiemp wit h r.memnda-Z r
of9 Reg i
sQ"'Re 1 7 Ifont-0; of Meb~i1ANs^-t to5i ctxmn olwn I
b L;C,
" mlacn 15f.'-_
-, =----I-1)
II---
All nuclear reactors must be designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metal water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis. The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment. With the primary containment inert, that is, oxygen concentration < 4.0 volume percent (vlo), a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen concentration. The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen <
4.0 v/o works together with the Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System to provide redundant and diverse methods to mitigate events that produce hydrogen.
I i
,\\
LIMERZCK -
UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-7 AUG 1 8 2CGG ECR 00-00132
ATTACHMENT 3 Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Retyped Technical Specification and Bases Pages Unit 1 Unit 2 xiii xiii 3/4 3-85 3/4 3-85 3/4 3-86 3/4 3-86 3/4 3-87 3/4 3-87 3/4 6-57 3/4 6-57 B 3/4 3-5 B 3/4 3-5 B 3/4 6-6 B 3/4 6-7
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Suppression Chamber - Drywell Vacuum Breakers......
............. 3/4 6-44 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity.....
.......... 3/4 6-46 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Integrity.....
............. 3/4 6-47 Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves................................................ 3/4 6-48 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves................................................ 3/4 6-50 Standby Gas Treatment System - Common System......
.............. 3/4 6-52 Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System.......
................... 3/4 6-55 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL Deleted.......................................................
3/4 6-57 Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System.........
......................... 3/4 6-58 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Oxygen Concentration....
........ 3/4 6-59 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Residual Heat Removal Service Water System - Common System.......................................................
3/4 7-1 Emergency Service Water System - Common System.....
............. 3/4 7-3 Ultimate Heat Sink.
.............................................. 3/4 7-5 LIMERICK - UNIT I Amendment No.
2X, 4X, a-5,
TABLE 3.3.7.5-1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENT
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature
- 5.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature
- 6.
Drywell Pressure
- 7.
Drywell Air Temperature
- 8.
Deleted
- 9.
Deleted
- 10.
Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators
- 11.
Primary Containment Post-LOCA Radiation Monitors
- 12.
North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor**
13 Neutron Flux REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS 2
2 2
8, 6 locations 1
2 1
1/valve 4
3*
2 MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 1
1 1
6, 1/location 1
1 1
1/valve 2
3*
1 APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 ACTION 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 81 81 80 LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3 -85 Amendment No. 2-,
- 151,
Table 3.3.7.5-1 (Continued)
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TABLE NOTATIONS
- Three noble gas detectors with overlapping ranges (10' to 10', 10- to 102, 10' to 105 pCi/cc).
- High range noble gas monitor.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 80 -
- a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 81 -
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitor-ing the appropriate parameters within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and
- a. Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or
- b.
Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION 82 -
DELETED LIMERICK - UNIT I 3/4 3 -86 Amendment No. 4-54,
TABLE ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMEN INSTRUMENT
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature
- 5.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature
- 6.
Primary Containment Pressure
- 7.
Drywell Air Temperature
- 8.
Deleted
- 9.
Deleted
- 10.
Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators
- 11.
Primary Containment Post LOCA Radiation Monitors
- 12.
North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor***
- 13.
Neutron Flux 4.3.7.5-1 TATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHECK C
M M
M M
M M
M N
M N
N CHANNEL ALIBRAT ION R
R R
R R
R R
R R**
R R
- CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/h with an installed or portable gamma source.
- High range noble gas monitors.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3 -87 Amendment No. 4-1-6,
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 DELETED LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6 -57 Amendment No. 2-8, 7-,
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels, and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip sE'point is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.
This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.
The specified surveillance interval for the Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor has been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.D. Binz, IV, from C.E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).
3/4.3.7.2 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE UFSAR.
3/4.3.7.3 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.
3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A.
3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident.
This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident,"
December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
November 1980.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 48, 63, 10, 7-,
151, -W 00470,
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (Continued)
The field tests for bypass leakage across the SGTS charcoal adsorber and HEPA filter banks are performed at a flow rate of 5764 +/- 10% cfm.
The laboratory analysis performed on the SGTS carbon samples will be tested at a velocity of 66 fpm based on the system residence time.
The SGTS filter train pressure drop is a function of air flow rate and filter conditions.
Surveillance testing is performed using either the SGTS or drywell purge fans to provide operating convenience.
Each reactor enclosure secondary containment zone and refueling area secondary containment zone is tested independently to verify the design leak tightness. A design leak tightness of 2500 cfm or less for each reactor enclosure and 764 cfm or less for the refueling area at a 0.25 inch of vacuum water gage will ensure that containment integrity is maintained at an acceptable level if all zones are connected to the SGTS at the same time.
The Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves and Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves can be found in the UFSAR.
The post-LOCA offsite dose analysis assumes a reactor enclosure secondary containment post-draw down leakage rate of 2500 cfm and certain post-accident X/Q values. While the post-accident X/Q values represent a statistical inter-pretation of historical meteorological data, the highest ground level wind speed which can be associated with these values is 7 mph (Pasquill-Gifford stability Class G for a ground level release).
Therefore, the surveillance requirement assures that the reactor enclosure secondary containment is verified under meteorological conditions consistent with the assumptions utilized in the design basis analysis.
Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment leakage tests that are successfully performed at wind speeds in excess of 7 mph would also satisfy the leak rate surveillance requirements, since it shows compliance with more conservative test conditions.
3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The primary containment atmospheric mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen and oxygen from exceeding the lower flammability limit during post-LOCA conditions.
All nuclear reactors must be designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metal water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis.
The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment.
With the primary containment inert, that is, oxygen concentration
<4.0 volume percent (v/o), a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen concentration.
The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen <4.0 v/o works together with Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System to provide redundant and diverse methods to mitigate events that produce hydrogen.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 8, 4-05, 4-2-9, ECR 00 00132
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Suppression Chamber - Drywell Vacuum Breakers......
............. 3/4 6-44 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity.....
.......... 3/4 6-46 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Integrity.....
............. 3/4 6-47 Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves................................................ 3/4 6-48 Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valves................................................ 3/4 6-50 Standby Gas Treatment System - Common System......
.............. 3/4 6-52 Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System.......
................... 3/4 6-55 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL Deleted.......................................................
3/4 6-57 Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System........
.......................... 3/4 6-58 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Oxygen Concentration....
........ 3/4 6-59 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Residual Heat Removal Service Water System - Common System.......................................................
3/4 7-1 Emergency Service Water System - Common System.....
............. 3/4 7-3 Ultimate Heat Sink.
.............................................. 3/4 7-5 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 xiii Amendment No. At,
TABLE 3.3.7.5-1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENT
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS 2
2 2
8, 6 locations 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature Drywell Pressure Drywell Air Temperature Deleted Deleted Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators Primary Containment Post-LOCA Radiation Monitors North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor**
Neutron Flux 1
2 1
1/valve 4
3*
2 MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 1
1 1
6, 1/location 1
1 1
1/valve 2
3*
1 APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 ACTION 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 81 81 80 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3 -85 Amendment No. 4-15-,
Table 3.3.7.5-1 (Continued)
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TABLE NOTATIONS
- Three noble gas detectors with overlapping ranges (10- to 10', 10- to 102, 10- to 105 gCi/cc).
- High range noble gas monitor.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 80 -
- a.
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b.
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 81 -
With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitor-ing the appropriate parameters within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and
- a.
Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or
- b.
Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION 82 -
DELETED LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3 -86 Amendment No. 115,
ACCIDENT MONITORING INS INSTRUMENT
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 2.
- 3.
Suppression Chamber Water Level
- 4.
Suppression Chamber Water Temperature
- 5.
Suppression Chamber Air Temperature
- 6.
Primary Containment Pressure
- 7.
Drywell Air Temperature
- 8.
Deleted
- 9.
Deleted
- 10.
Safety/Relief Valve Position Indicators
- 11.
Primary Containment Post LOCA Radiation Monitors
- 12.
North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor***
- 13.
Neutron Flux TABLE 4.3.7.5-1 STRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHECK CA M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
CHANNEL LIBRATION R
R R
R R
R R
R R**
R R
- CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/h with an installed or portable gamma source.
- High range noble gas monitors.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3 -87 Amendment No. ;89,
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 DELETED LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 6 -57 Amendment No. -34,
INSTRUMENTATI N BASES 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels, and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variable following an accident. This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.
The specified surveillance interval for the Main Control Room Normal Fresh Air Supply Radiation Monitor has been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specification," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R. D. Binz, IV, from C. E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).
3/4.3.7.2 (Deleted) -
INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE UFSAR.
3/4.3.7.3 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.
3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. The Unit 1 RHR transfer switches are included only due to their potential impact on the RHRSW system, which is common to both units.
3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident.
This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 44, AL, 3X, 3X,
-1k, EPv 02
- 4O7O0,
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The primary containment atmospheric mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen and oxygen from exceeding the lower flammability limit during post-LOCA conditions.
All nuclear reactors must be designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metal water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis.
The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment.
With the primary containment inert, that is, oxygen concentration <4.0 volume percent (v/o), a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen concentration.
The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen <4.0 v/o works together with Drywell Hydrogen Mixing System to provide redundant and diverse methods to mitigate events that produce hydrogen.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-7 Amendment No.
ECR 0 00132
ATTACHMENT 4 Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Regulatory Commitments
LGS Ul &2: Request for Amendment to TSs to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors Page 1 of 1 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Dave Robillard at (610) 765-5952.
Regulatory Commitments Due Date / Event Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC)
Currently implemented in the plant will maintain the capability of monitoring emergency and operating procedures and containment Hydrogen for beyond design the maintenance program.
basis accidents Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC)
Currently implemented in the plant will maintain the capability of monitoring emergency and operating procedures and containment Oxygen to verify the status of the maintenance program.
the inerted containment.