ML040370457
| ML040370457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2004 |
| From: | Merschoff E Region 4 Administrator |
| To: | Anderson C Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-01-006 | |
| Download: ML040370457 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000313/2001006
Text
,LP REco,
F4t
too
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064
Craig G. Anderson, Vice President
Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
.
Russellville,'Arkansas 72801-0967 '
'
-
A'
- -
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO BACKFIT CLAIM REGARDING
RC INSPECTiOfK4
REPORT 50-313/01-06; 50-368/01-06
Dear Mr. Anderson:
As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-3pda
e',A
st 20, 2001, the NRC
identified an unresolved issue in the Unit 1 eiberigncydiedsel generat rCorridor and the Unit 1
north electrical switchgear room 'concerni
useof inahnualctionsilieu of providing protection
for cables associated with equipment necessary fom'achlin'g
aintaining hot shutdown as
specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendi~ ,ASedtiordf
il.G.2.This issue was 'considered
unresolved pending further NRC reve and tWt'<dete rmi rtion of its risk. -Subsequently, in an
exit meeting 'held on August 30,-2661,,the NRC informed&Entergy'Operations,' Inc., that the
existing configurations did not ctoifbrm to thtitequirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section 111.G;2. However, the issue remai
ii'nrelved pending the completion of the NRC's
risk deteur
irgon.
i
_
Your letter'ofSepteember 28 200,.1J '8clatimed that our position that manual actions cannot be
used to comply with-lO CFR Part.50"Appendix R, Section lII.G.2, was a backfit. At issue is
your use of ma~ Pacions for achl&A'ng and maintaining hot shutdown conditions in the event
of a fire in th
riit1iemergency diesel generator corridor (Fire Zone 98J) and north switchgear
room (Fire Zone 99M)-lnthis'etter, you asserted that the NRC has accepted such manual
actio sin the past, and ba~cXthat our position with respect to disallowing the use of manual
acti'ns for complying wjgh Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R should be considered a backfit that is
geii6'ic to all plants. g-
4rAOctober 26, 200lrand again on January 17, 2002, we convened a backfit panel in
accor'danietw~ithl4 RC Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-
Sps0eifi Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in your'
Iettrof September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined
that (1) the NRC did not impose a regulatory staff position that is new or different from a
previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section lIl.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north
/\\
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-
electrical switchgear room in lieu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section IlI.G.2.a, IlI.G.2.b, or IlI.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in
the event of a fire in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room), in lieu of
ensuring that one train of redundant cables and equipment of systems needed for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage, does not comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Your claim that our7position (that
manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lil.G.2) is
a generic backfit will be addressed by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reator 1Rbguiation in their
response to a letter from the Nuclear Energy Institute datedl' bpuary00n20-2x Accordingly,
Unresolved Item 50-313;368/0106-02 has been reclassiped&as an Ap
a
oation pending
NRC's assessment of the risk significance associated with this finding? When complete, theW
results of the risk determination will be forwarded to yoby separatecorr
basis for this conclusion is enclosed.
If you disagree with this evaluation of your I
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulati
Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Managem(
Plants."
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the N.
enclosure will be available electronicallyftor
Room or from the Publicly Available Record
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accesli8
frc
3ackfit claim,
[on in accord
ant of Plant-
,C'
les`of`Pracice,"t
copy of this letter and its
public)nspectid
NRC Public Document
Is (PARS) co poht of NRC's document
m~t~e NRC WebFsite at
I(t~he Public Electronic Reading Room).
Deih~re y,
Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
En(
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-3-
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russeliville, Arkansas 72801
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
David D. Snellings, Jr., Director
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-386
Mike Schoppman
Framatome ANP, Inc.
/1 '
Suite 705
.
1911 NortW6rtXMyer Dn"
Rosslyn, Vi eiraf222 09
II
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-4-
Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
W. F. Kane, DEDO
S. J. Collins, D:NRR
Regional Administrator (EWM)I
Deputy Regional Administrator (TPG)
DRS Director (ATH)
DRP Director (KEB)
DNMS, Director (DDC)
K. D. Smith, RC (KDS1)
G. F. Sanborn, D:ACES (GFS)
ACES, Enforcement Staff (GMV)
Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)
Branch Chief, DRPID (US)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (JAC)
Senior Resident Inspector (RLB3)
Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
G. M. Holahan, NRR
S. C. Black, NRR
S. A. Richards, NRR
R. J. Barrett, NRR
J. N. Hannon, NRR
M. R. Johnson, NRR
R. A. Gramm, NRR
T. W. Alexion, NRR
OGC (GSM)
S. A. Morris, OEDO
M. C. Nolan, OE
OEMAIL
11l
I
I
I
I
I
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone
E=E-mail
F=Fa,
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operatio s
(Ent
ed that
Region IV's position that manual actions cannot be'usedt6 comply).vith' 10 CER.Iart 50,
Appendix R.Section III.G.2; was a backfit, generic to ailjlants'. Backfittingis definedin.
10 CFR 50.109 "as the modification of or addition to systems, structures, compron'ent,'r
design of a facility; or the design approval 'or'manufactbrirj'lid'nse for a facilit
procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may
result from a new or amended provision in the Commissionriuleso'or'the imposition of a
regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that ithl:new or different from a
previously applicable staff position...
"
-..
On October 26, 2001, the NRC convened aib6ckfit' a'n'elto-review Eritergy's backfit claim as
presented in their letter of September 28/8
1, an6bi
c cbmpa'yingttachments. -As a result of
that meeting, the panel requested an evaluation olihe foling foir key points presented in
Entergy's backfit claim.
,.
I.'
'NRC's Past and Prese t Positions;Rgardin the Use of Manual Actions for
- Meeflng the Re uiirh!m nts of 10 CER
50, Appendix R,Section III.G
- Intheif.[letter dated Septehibe28, 2001 Entergy stated that the NRC had accepted on
for cor
,3wsthi 0 C F
5, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. Entergy stated that
NRC generi ,5 ix R g1ipance documents, the NRC's Triennial Fire Protection
Inspection Procedur'7-1i11.05, and recent NRC fire protection reports all supported
thsposition.
4.W;
g
Entergy claimed that certain'statements in NRC fire protection inspection reports and
Et.
inspection procedures provide an NRC position that permits the use of manual actions
- E-zC
o achieving post-fire safe shutdown. With respect to NRC inspection reports, the
statem'ent uoted by Entergy were'taken from the description of the scope of the
inspe'ction, not from the inspection findings section of the reports. The triennial fire
lion inspection scope consists of a review of the licensee's methodology for
reaching safe shutdown, including any manual actions that are credited in that
rmiethodology. These scope'statements are not an endorsement f6r' the'iise of manual
actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R,- merely statements describing what
1 Entergy's claim that this position is a backfit generic'to` all plants will be addressed by
the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in their response to a letter from the Nuclear
Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002.
II
.9
ENCLOSURE
the inspectors reviewed. As described in NUREG 14092, NRC inspectio procedures
are not approved NRC positions.
Y
In 1981, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection," an~d(pendix R to
10 CFR Part 50, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power F iliaiesOperating Priorto
January 1,1979." ANO, Unit 1 was licensed in-1974, ardn t2'as
6iensed in,978;
therefore, for both units, the licensee was required to meet the provistons'6of\\
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, IlI.Jand,1110..
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, "Firetroft'eciio6hof Safe Shutdown
Capability," provides the requirements for ensrg tst
one train of equipment
needed for safe shutdown is free of, fire darnag
As d-sed'inthe Statements of
Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10.CFRP1art'50,
it is not possible to
predict the conditions-under which firand
proagate; therefore, the
Commission established three specific met
sfor pro
g safe shutdown equipment
so that at least one train remains;free of fire'damage
hese three methods are
specified in Section III.G.2 of~Appendix RVThe fir t~method is separation of redundant
safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by 3-our fire rated barriers. The second
method is a combination ofeparatioriiof redundant safe shutdown trains and
associated circuits by20 feet or meofspcd with no intervening combustibles or fire
hazarspius area( vi-Q
.aqtomatic
fi
pi-pression and detection. The third method is a
combiiation.of sepatattinof re
a safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by
a 1-Hourfire.rated barrie-plsautomatic fire suppression and detection capability. If
these conditibns~cannot be.met,,a.n exemption from Section III.G.2, or an alternative or
dedicateds&fe&IJ'Ndown capbility specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Sectioi IIrG:31i'Jired. Specific requirements for alternative or dedicated shutdown
arel.provided in 10 :C1R lart 50, Appendix R,Section III.L.
/%JThe requirementslfor ensuring that at least one train of equipment needed for safe
/ shutdown is freepbi fire damage is described and discussed in numerous generic NRC
Zo4Iocum ents su8as:
~i~i~~.at~ments of Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R
2 In response to a question regarding whether NRC Inspection Manual guidance is
considered an approved position, Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states,
"No, inspection procedures are not approved staff positions, which is the reason they are not
reviewed by CRGR." NUREG 1409 further states, "Licensees cannot be required to implement
positions discussed in an inspection procedure or manual unless the same positions exist in the
form of an approved regulatory staff position. Examples of approved staff positions are
described in Manual Chapter 0514 and include the SRP [Standard Review Plan], branch
technical positions, regulatory guides, generic letters, and bulletins."
-2-
ENCLOSURE
Generic Letter 81-12, "Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980)"
-- *
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12
Information Notice 84-09, "Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire
Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R
NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, "Fire Proteciiohnfrogram"
In addition, in ANO-specific licensing basis d ocu
nfe.such aa
vauation
reports and exemptions, the NRC staff describedithe same s
requirements for.
ensuring one train of safe shutdown equipmentf
ofi
I
t
documents, the NRC restated the requirementsofi0CFR Part 50, AppendixRs
Section III.G, and discussed the three methods
re
ing that one train of equipment
and cables for systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions was free of fire damage, as requiredSby
t
S irilll:G.2. The NRC further
explained that if these methods could not be met, then an alternative fire protection
configuration must be provided in accordancmwith SectiosniiiiG3"(alternative'or
dedicated shutdown), of Appendix R Spe ific requirementsNfo meeting Section III.G.3
Section
ll.L
a
ni.dre-proy ldjdfn`A0.CFPRt
(alternative or dedicated shutdown
_pro,.art
50, Appendix R,
Section il;.L.
tf
Conclusion: The regulations tatement of consi 5 ration, and generic correspondence,
as well as ANO-specific doocmentation: are in agreement concerning the use of manual
actions for achieving and
1intainin
Aot shutdown conditions as required in
Section III.G of Appendibx<R o 10 GFIV.ParteW*As these documents show, the NRC
has'otin the pa6st~iidFides not cGrrently-consider manual actions to be acceptable for
coviplyitfg with 1CFR.Rart 50, Ap 5endix R,Section III.G.2, unless specifically
revi'Ape'and approved3,
'
lhe-panel concludes that the position to disallow the use of
manual actibns~for meetin"g6.J0;(R Part 50,'Appendix R,Section III.G.2 is not an
imposition'ofiaregulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either
newoAiffdr6nfrho
a previously applicable staff position. Therefore, this position is
no4a backfit speific tbANO. Entergy's claim that NRC inspection report statements
,66nstitute a bas0s'4Ftheik backfit claim is addressed in Section IV of this enclosure.
II '~x~ANO's PositiRegarding 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G
j~$-t
rln
a
d
er 28, 2001, Entergy summarized their positions concerning
r<¢5zM,;e usero ,manual actions as:
-3-
ENCLOSURE
"1.
The use of manual actions to operate necessary components . . . outside the
identified fire areas is permitted by IOCFR50 Appendix R, Section 111.G. 1 and
does not violate 10 CFR 50, Section //l.G.2;
"2.
Compliance with IOCFR50 Appendix R, Section Il.G..2 does not require
protective features on circuits that are not required to function and, therefore, are
not necessary systems required to achieve safe shutdown conditions and,
regardless of fire damage cannot prevent the ability to achieve safeshutdown
conditions."
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 prolides therove'radmae protection
objective to protect equipment so that in the event"?faire in ahy~fir~lrea, (a) one train
of systems necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (frth~The control room
or emergency control stations) is free of fire' darmage; and (b),syste
s sary faf
reaching cold shutdown conditions (from eitherithecontrslroom or emeenc
ol
stations) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Section 1di G'i a. can be met byenring one
train of safe shutdown systems, is free from fire da
gesspecified in Section III.G.2 of
Appendix R, or by using an alternative safe sh
pability specified in
Section III.G.3. While Section llI.G.1.a. contemu
plates t'eiofinanual actions, these
are provided in the context of alternative or dedicated std6Wiow'uIder Section III.G.3.
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 C
PF
Part 50 provides threb acceptable methods for
ensuring cables and equipment associated withone train of systems necessary for
achieving and maintaining hot sputdown cdn'ditions is' frrof fire damage. None of the
three methods in Section I I I G describoss'the usefrif manual actions to mitigate the
effects of a fire on safe shuf~twn eqi
ridcables. Rather, these methods have
the objective of preventina fire damage throughthe use of specific protection features.
Section III.G.2 also requires these same fireprotection features for circuits whose
damage (by fire) couidla&ersely aff66tthe'ccomplishment of safe shutdown functions.
Contratto Enterg
on (2) ab.e$ cables associated with systems necessary for
are required to be free of fire damage, whether the cables themselves
are 'oisidered "nnecess'ar
'not. In addition, certain circuits which may not be
required to'bfib!on, butNhdsedThialoperation could adversely affect safe shutdown,
must also'bdbfre offire damage.
licensee caninot mee the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
SSection III.G.2 forer'ai fire areas, then an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability
+
is required as
itned in Section III.G.3. -Under Section III.G.3, manual actions may be
'
taken. The goais and requirements associated with alternative and dedicated shutdown
capability under Section'll.G.3 are specified in Section III.L of Appendix R, and include
-a
require, mtlrthat alternative shutdown capability be implemented by procedures.
would be to request an exemption from those portions of Section III.G.2
N<,thatycannot be met.
-4-
ENCLOSURE
Conclusion: For the ANO plant, Entergy must meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Section III.G.1. In addition, where a fire area contains redundant trains
of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, Entergy must
meet either Section III.G.2 or Section IlI.G.3 for the protection of cables and equipment
associated with systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions, or request an exemption.Section III.G.2 provides three specific methods for
preventing fire damage to equipment and cables associated with systems necessary for
achieving and maintaining hot shutdown, and to circuits whose maloperation could
adversely affect the licensee's ability to achieve hot shutdown., Section llf&G.3 provides
the option of using alternative or dedicated shutdown capabilit/f6r those fire areas in
which the licensee cannot meet the requirements ofSection IlL
-Therefore, the use
of manual actions for meeting the requirements of-S6ction IlI.'G.i2snot permitted,
unless these actions were specifically reviewed andapprovedrbytihe"NRC and
documented in a safety evaluation report.
ll.
NRC Review and Approval of.Manual
Meeting the Requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G in i
n
at ANO
-In their-letter-of.September 28, 2001 ,Entergy tated attheuse~of manual actions to
achieve safe shutdown conditions in the eyent of a fire has beeh6K'standard practice at
ANO since the inception of Appendix
1losprt of this position, Entergy cited an
August 31, 1982,' meeting between N* Ch'nd AW a¢inas Power -nd Light (documented
by the NRC in a meeting summa r~dated SeptM& b[1982) and an Arkansas Power
and Light response to an NRC c4iquest foplfdditio ralinfor'ration (RAI), dated
October 5, 1982.
While we acknowledge tatithe NR staff was aware that the ANO strategy for post-fire
safe shutdown includedr ore mar),,
action the docketed NRC correspondence on
the Oubject was wriftten inthe context ofralternative shutdown, 10 CFR Part 50,
Appe'ndix R. Sedfti6o1`'WliG!3. For e~r
- the subject line of the September 3, 1982,
metJin'gss9mmary
8re'adSbmmary of Meeting with Arkansas Power and Light
Company (?P&L)
on August'.'31*-j;1982, Concerning the Alternate Safe Shutdown
'igir'th'Event ofJaE'ir&0t Arkansas Nuclear One Units Nos. 1 & 2 (ANO-1 &
2)." Clearl yisieeting w~, held and manual actions discussed in the context of
altefri'e shutd'6`Wnj hich is governed by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3
-Hand Section lll. (spe'cific~requirements for meeting Section III.G.3 shutdown are
,. provided in Section4sjL).. The RAI .(to which the licensee responded via a letter dated
October 5, 1982$'vas transmitted to the licensee by letter dated September 3, 1982,
ffi
which stated 'gle have reviewed your submittal dated July 1, 1982, with regard to your
Do review of the#fternate shutdown capability for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units Nos. 1 and
l 2and we dleiussed our review with you at the meeting of August 31, 1982. As a result
and the meeting of August 31, 1982, we have identified the additional
,nfdorm ation (Enclosure 1) which we need to complete our review." In this letter, the
-5-
ENCLOSURE
NRC stated that the RAI was in support of the staff's review of the licensee's alternate
shutdown capability.
The NRC subsequently issued a safety evaluation report (SER) dated May 13, 1983,
which provided the staffs review of the licensee's methodology for meeting
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections Ill.G.3 and lll.L. The SER was entitled, "Safety
Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Arkansas Nuclear One -
Units 1 and 2, Dockets Nos. 50-313 and 50-368, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50,.tems III.G.3
and lll.L," and referenced the meeting of August 31, 1982, and the licensfee's response
of October 5, 1982.- In this SER, the NRC reviewed rjianual ac
credited in 14 fire
zones in the context of Sections III.G.3 and lll.L, staFng, "AlI oherteareas of the plant
not required to have alternate safe shutdown will comply with the requirements of
k
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, unless an exemption request hbbseht
'roved by thi'
staff." The licensee did not identify Fire Zones 98J and 99A1 'in the list'fbenqig
zones requiring manual action, and did not reqsm
ar exeption from SectioiiL:G.2.
Upon review of these statements, we believethatiteyshould be interpreted as
constituting NRC's review and approval of the use of'ranualactions for alternative
shutdown, in accordance with 10 CFR Part
ions III.G.3 and III.L.
Conclusion: The NRC reviewed the use 6fmaritfalactions identified by the licensee in
14 fire zones for the purposes of alteh ive h
6tdownm10 CF
50, Appendix R
Section III.G.3). Manual actions fOraddres Ag-kfii'fe.
artes
98J and 99M were
not included in these 14. For allother ares the tR! expected the licensee to either
comply with Section III.G.2 ol(quest aniexemptiod. The licensee did not a request an
exemption from. Section IlltG2 for the
-se
of man'a~ actions in Fire Zones 98J and
99M. Therefore, for Fire Zbdes 98J..d 99M Ahe use of manual actions for achieving
and maintaining hot-hufrwn coni
reviewed and approved by the NRC.
IV.
NRC('sAlleged Tacit'Approval of iheILicensee's Methodology for Complying with
i 04CiFR0art.50, Appendi*!RtSection llI.G
In the
ptemb
01, Entergy stated that in 1982, they submitted to the
NRdcdwoIni~their met~odology for complying with Appendix R, which included a
statement thaWunde certain conditions credit for manual operation of equipment was
ken. Entergy
stated that because this statement was not challenged in
subsequent NRC correspondence (such as inspection reports) or safety evaluation
reports, this sile~e constituted tacit approval of the use of manual actions, thus, making
g'
it part of the ANO licensing basis.
g # i' '9'
U
Ge
-6-
ENCLOSURE
As discussed in NUREG 14093, simply not challenging a licensee's practice in inspection
reports would not be considered tacit approval. Furthermore, contrary to Entergy's
claim, the NRC was not silent regarding the use of manual actions. In an
August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light C6mpany, as
documented by the NRC in a letter dated September 3, 1982, th'e NRC/rbouested
additional information for fire zones that required some sort of ;anuar'lttion or non-
routine operation. Fire Zones 98J and 99M were no'identified",e'b
RIicensee as
requiring manual actions. By this licensee omissie 'tihe
NRC staff9W06ld have
concluded that no manual actions would be credited for mitigating, res-iiiFire
Zones 98J and 99M.
Y
In submitting the results of their Appendix R cor',lianreview in a letter
I
ated
July 1, 1982, the licensee stated, that in certain cass, c$redit for manual operation of
equipment was taken if controls (and power foriave'si-'s6d~be damaged by a fire.
Such credit was taken only if:
%5
"a.
the component to be operateds not 1ocated in the a
ted fire zone,
although the cable may be damaged ki"'
"b.
sufficient time, is avaae
/to
perforn the re
anual actions; and
"c.
personnel are available/beyond the fire bigade and minimum operations
shift crew limitatiosnt
'm the manual actions.'
ConfArbry to the abovze~c ditions,
d not perform an analysis that
deimbinstrated sd4ficib-ii`tie was avilabe and sufficient trained personnel were
avalablet.Ao take alithe'actions required to mitigate all the failures, which could occur as
a resultof fires in Fire Zdnes;98J and 99M. As discussed in Section III of this enclosure,
manual actions Were reviewed:and approved for use in alternative shutdown areas
(10e -Rad.50,AppendixReSection III.G.3). Even if the NRC's approval of manual
actio'ns could berconstrued as acceptable for meeting the requirements of
<i0 CFR Part 50,lApop.'ndix R, Section Ill.G.2 (which, as discussed in Section IlIl, there
was no such apptrovl)', the licensee did not comply with their own criteria for the use of
,
manual actions.>
, Conclusionen if, as Entergy claims, the NRC approved (tacitly or otherwise) the use
2 kof ma nual actions for meeting Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R (which it did not), this
ia4~:~;pprl'wl Would have been dependent on the licensee doing so under the conditions
3 Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states, "Cases where an
inspector provides tacit approval are relatively rare. Simply not challenging a licensee's
practice would not be considered tacit approval."
-7-
ENCLOSURE
described in their Appendix R compliance methodology. However, for Fire Zones 98J
and 99M, the licensee did not meet their own conditions set forth for the use of manual
actions.
-8-