Text

Letter to Craig G. Anderson Response to Backfit Claim Regarding NRC Inspection Report 05000313-01-006 & 05000368-01-006 with Handwritten Notes
	ML040360409
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	01/14/2003
From:	Merschoff E; NRC Region 4
To:	Anderson C; Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
	FOIA/PA-2003-0358, IR-01-006
	Download: ML040360409 (27)
	v • d • e

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.,P'^ ^tC@4 UNITED STATES

O2% ,> NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400

ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011.8064

Craig G. Anderson, Vice President,

Operations

Arkansas Nuclear One

Entergy Operations, Inc.

1448 S.R. 333

Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO BACKFIT CLAIM REGARDING NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 50-313/01-06; 50-368/01-06

Dear Mr. Anderson:

This letter is written in response to your letter of September 28, 2001, in which you claimed

that our position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix

R,Section III.G.2. was a backfit. At issue is your use of manual actions for achieving and

maintaining hot shutdown conditions in the event of a fire In the Unit I emergency diesel

generator corridor and north switchgear room. In your letter of September 28, 2001, you

asserted that the NRC has accepted such manual actions in the past, and stated that our

position with respect to disallowing the use of manual actions for complying

of Appendix R should be considered a backfit that is generic to all plants.

On October 26, 2001, and again on _ _ , we convened a backfit panel in accordance

with NRC Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-Specific

Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in your letter of

September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined that (1)

the NRC did not Impose a regulatory staff position that is new or different from a previously

applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,

Section Ill.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north

switchgear room; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in the event of a fire in

the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room), in lieu of ensuring that one

train of redundant equipment needed for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions

was free of fire damage, does not comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix R, Section IlI.G.2.XThe bases for these conclusions are described in Enclosures 1,

2, and 3. Enclosure 4 lists the licensing basis documents we reviewed in reaching these

conclusions

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document

system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

httD:/lwww.nrc.aov/NRC/ADAMSfindex.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

fShould you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (817) 860-8225

or Mr. A. T. Howell at (817) 860-8180. ;

-'A.1

Sincerely,

IRA/

Ellis W. Merschoff

Regional Administrator

Enclosures: As stated

Dockets: 50-313; 50-368

Licenses: DPR-51; NPF-6

cc: w/Enclosure

Executive Vice President

& Chief Operating Officer

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Vice President

Operations Support

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations

ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear

Power

12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330

Rockville, Maryland 20852

County Judge of Pope County

iKana Zrnitrt - MIUMI~t IMMtf -LU^d'IJ YVIU I aL.IIL.I.TVPU -

Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-

Pope County Courthouse

100 West Main Street

Russeliville, Arkansas 72801

Winston & Strawn

1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005-3502

David D. Snellings, Jr., Director

Division of Radiation Control and

Emergency Management

Arkansas Department of Health

4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30

Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867

Mike Schoppman

Framatome ANP, Inc.

Suite 705

1911 North Fort Myer Drive

Rossylin, Virginia 22209

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-

Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:

EDO

W. F. Kane, DEDO

S. J. Collins, D:NRR

Regional Administrator (EWM)

Deputy Regional Administrator (TPG)

DRS Director (ATH)

DRP Director (KEB)

DNMS, Director (DDC)

K. D. Smith, RC (KDSI)

G. F. Sanbom, D:ACES (GFS)

ACES, Enforcement Staff (GMV)

Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)

Branch Chief, DRPID (LJS)

Senior ProJect Engineer, DRP/D (JFMI)

Senior Resident Inspector (RLB3)

ANO Site Secretary (VLH)

Chief, DRPITSS (PHH)

RITS Coordinator (NBH)

G. M. Holahan, NRR

S. C. Black, NRR

S. A. Richards, NRR

R. J. Barrett, NRR

J. N. Hannon, NRR

lat'COGC (GSM)

Scott Morris (SAMI)

M. R. Johnson, NRR

BGramm (RAG)

TAlexion (TWA)

NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)

DOCUMENT: R:\ ano\2001\an0106backfit-rln.wpd

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ENCLOSURE 1

BACKFIT ANALYSIS

In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc., claimed that Region tVs

position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,

Section III.G.2. was a backfit, generic to all plants.

Backfitting is defined in 10 CFR 50.109 "as the modification of or addition to systems,

structures, components, or design of a facility, or the design approval or manufacturing license

for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a

facility; any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules or

the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either new

or different from a previously applicable staff position..."

FIRE PROTECTION REGULATIONS

In 1981, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection," and Appendix R to 1 0 CFR Part 50,

"Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."

Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit I was licensed in 1974, and Unit 2 was licensed in 1978;

therefore, for both units, the licensee was required to meet the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix R, Sections IllI.G, lll.J, and 111.0.

10 CFR 50.48, Fire protection.

(b) 'Appendix R to this part establishes fire protection features required to satisfy

Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part with respect to certain generic issues for

nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979.

(2) With respect to all other fire protection features covered by Appendix R, all

nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, must satisfy

the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this part, including specifically the

requirements of Sections l/l. G, III.J, and 111. ."

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Paragraph Il.G. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability

2. 'Fire protection features shallbe provided for structures, systems, and

components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of

limiting fire damage so that:

a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is

free of fire damage; and

b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either

the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -7-

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

-_ 3. Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or

equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation

or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of

redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment,

one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of

fire damage shall be provided:

a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits

of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural

steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected

to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits

of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no

intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an

automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of

one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition,

fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed

in the fire area; ...

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits,

independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room or zone under

consideration, shall be provided:

a. Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot

shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2 of this

section; or

b. Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in

the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression

activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression

systems.

In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system

shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.'

STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION for IOCFR50.48 and 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R

1. As shown below, in the statements of consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part

50, Appendix R (FR 76606, Vol. 45 No. 225, November 19, 1980), the Commission

explained that there were three ways to ensure that one means of achieving safe

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -8-

shutdown is available (Appendix R.l1l.G.2), and that if none of these three methods is

feasible, then alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability is required (Appendix

R. III.G.3).

'G. Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability Technical Basis.

The objective for the protection of safe shutdown capability is to

ensure that at least one means of achieving and maintaining safe

shutdown conditions will remain available during and after any

postulated fire in the plant. Because it is not possible to predict

the specific conditions under which fires may occur and

propagate, the design basis protective features are specified

rather than the design basis fire. Three different means for

protecting the safe shutdown capability outside of containment

-are acceptable. The first means is separation of redundant safe

shutdown trains and associated circuits by means of 3-hour fire

rated barriers. The second means is a combination of separation

of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by a

1-hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire suppression and

detection capability for both redundant trains. The third means,

which may be used only when redundant trains and associated

circuits are separated by 20 feet or more of clear space, requires

automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the area. An

alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability independent of

the fire area is required if fire protection for safe shutdown

capability cannot be provided as outlined above.. .

GENERIC NRC GUIDANCE

Generic Letter (GL)81-124 shown below, in the first paragraph of GL 81-12 and again in

Enclosure 2 to GL 81-12, the NRC explained that cables for or associated with redundant safe

shutdown systems must be protected from the effects of fire by the methods described in

Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix R), or provided witlyaltemative or

dedicated shutdown capability as described in Section III.G.3 of Appendix R_

'Paragraph 50.48(b) of 10 CFR Part 50, which became effective on February

17, 1981, requires all nuclear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979

to meet the requirements of Section lIl.G, ll.J and 111.0 of Appendix R to 10

CFR Part 50 regardless of any previous approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) for altemative design features for those items. This would

require each licensee to reassess all those areas of the plant ". . . where cables

or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits, that could prevent

operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to

ground or (sic) redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain

hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary

containment. . ."* to determine whether the requirements of Section I/I. G.2 of

Appendix R are satisfied. If not, the licensee must provide alternative shutdown

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -9-

capability in conformance with Section III.G.3 or request an exemption if there is

some justifiable basis... Quoted from Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R to

10 CFR Part 50. . .'

Section lil. G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 required cabling for or

associated with redundant safe shutdown systems necessary to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown conditions be separated by fire barriers having a

three-hour rating or equivalent protection (see Section III.G.2 of Appendix R) ...

Safety related and non-safety related cables that are associated with the

equipment and cables of the alternative, or dedicated method of shutdown are

those that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by

Section 111.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50..

Clarification of GL 81-1 2{Lhe NRC further clarified the requirements of Appendix R, Section

III.G In a memorandum from Darrell G. Elsenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR, to Roget

J. Mattson, Director, D'vision of system Integration, NRR, dated March 22, 1982, which was

sent to all licensees.

mUsing the requirements of Sections Il.G and IILL of Appendix R, the capability

to achieve hot shutdown must exist given a fire in any area of the plant in

conjunction with a loss of offsite power for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Section ill.G of Appendix

R provides four methods for ensuring that the hot shutdown capability is

protected from fires. The first three options as defined in Section III.G.2

provides methods forprotection from fires of equipment needed for hot

shutdown:

1. Redundant systems including cables, equipment, and associated circuits may

be separated by a three-hour fire rated barrier; or,

2. Redundant systems including cables, equipment and associated circuits may be

separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening

co'r sfbs

combutibles. In

inaddition, fire detectionn.-and an automatic fire suppression

-

system are required; or

3. Redundant systems including cables, equipment and associated circuits may be

enclosed by a one-hour fire rated barrier. In addition, fire detectors and an

automatic fire spression sysptehitie required.

The last option as defined by Section III. G.3 provides an alteinative shutdown

capability to the redundant trains damaged by a fire.

4. Alternative shutdown must be independent of the cables, equipment and

associated circuits of the redundant systems damaged by the fred

I %CMa 'Jig &..II , - , " - -

Entergy Operations, Inc. -10-

"Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown," of IN 84-09 states,

"Appendix R, Section Ill.G. 1, requires that fire protection features shall be

provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.

These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of

systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from

either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage.

Sections lll.G.2 and lll.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be implemented

outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment,

cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

remains free of fire damage. The alternatives are:

1. Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by

a three-hour fire barrier.

2. Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by

a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems

installed in the area.

3. Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by

a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles and with fire

detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed in the area.

4. Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the

equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation

of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in the area containing this

alternative or dedicated shutdown capability."

NUREG 0800, STANDARD REVIEW PLAN 9.5.1, "FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM"

In 1981, the NRC issued Revision 3 of NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1,

"Fire Protection Program" as guidance to NRC staff in performing fire protection program

reviews. NUREG 0800 included Revision 2 to Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1,

"Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," which provided guidance acceptable

for implementing .10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R. Section C.5.b, "Safe Shutdown Capability,"

of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 states,

M(1) Fire protection features should be provided for structures, systems, and

components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of

limiting fire damage so that:

(a) One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions from either the control room or emergency control stations(s)

is free of fire damage; and

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -11-

(b) Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either

the control room or emergency control stations(s) can be repaired within

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

(2) To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b. 1, one of the following means of

ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be

provided:

(a) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of

redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel

forming part of or supporting such fire barriers should be protected to

provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;

(b) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of

redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no

intervening combustible or fare hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an

automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area; or

(c) Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated circuits of one

redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire

detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed

in the fire area.

(3) If the guidelines of Positions C5.b. 1 and C5.b.2 cannot be met, then alternative

or dedicated.shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of

cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration

should be provided.'

ANO EXEMPTIONS AND SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTS

In the following safety evaluation reports (SERs) and exemptions, the NRC restated the

requirements of Appendix R,Section IlI.G, and clarified how to ensure that one train of

equipment and cables necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was

free of fire damage. These documents explain that there are three methods specified in

Section IlI.G.2 of Appendix R of ensuring one train free of fire damage, and that if these

methods cannot be met, then an alternative fire protection configuration must be provided in

accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R.

Exemption and SER Dated March 22. 1983: Section II of the Exemption states,

Section III. G of Appendix R requires fire protection for equipment important to

safe shutdown. Such fire protection is achieved by various combinations of fire

barriers, fire suppression systems, fire detectors, and separation of safety trains

(II.G.2) or alternative safe shutdown equipment free of the fire area (lIl.G.3).

The objective of this protection is to assure that one train of equipment needed

for hot shutdown would be undamaged by fire, and that systems needed for

Entergy Operations, Inc. -12-

cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .'

Section 1.0 of the SER issued with the Exemption states,

'Section III. G.2 requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to

achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire damage by one

of the following means:

a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of

redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Stnrctural steel forming

a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire

resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of

redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no

intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an

automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one

redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors

and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.

If these conditions are not met,Section III.G.3 requires alternative shutdown

capability independent of the fire area of concem. It also requires a fixed

suppression system installed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large

concentration of cables or other combustibles.

These alternative requirements are not deemed to be equivalent for all

configurations; however, they provide equivalent protection for those

configurations in which they are accepted.

Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires

may occur and propagate, the design basis protective features are specified in

the rule rather than the design basis fire. Plant specific features may require

protection different than the measures specified in Section Il.G. In such a case,

the licensee must demonstrate, by means of a detailed fire hazards analysis,

that existing protection or existing protection in conjunction with proposed

modifications will provide a level of safety equivalent to the technical

requirements of Section II. G of Appendix R.

In summary, Section IlI.G is related to fire protection features for ensuring that

systems and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown

are free of fire damage. Fire protection configurations must either meet the

specific requirements of Section III.G or an alternative fire protection

configuration must bejustified by a fire hazards analysis. a

Exemption and SER Dated October 26. 1988: The Exemption states,

a Uko- IV I

Entergy Operations, Inc. -13-

"Section 111. G of Appendix R requires fire protection for equipment important to

post-fire shutdown. Such fire protection is achieved by various combinations of

fire barriers, fire suppression systems, fire detectors, and separation of safety

trains (lII.G.2) or alternate post-fire shutdown equipment free of the fire area

(III.G.3). The objective of this protection is to assure that one train of equipment

needed for hot shutdown would'be undamaged by fire, and that systems

needed for cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (111. G.1).'

Section 1.0 of the SER issued with the Exemption states,

wSection ll/.G.2 requires that one train of cables and equipment necessaryto

achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire damage by one

of the following means:

a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of

redundant trains by a fire barrierhaving a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming

a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire

resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of

redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no

intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an

automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one

redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors

and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.

If these conditions are not met, Section Ill.G.3 requires an alternative shutdown

capability independent of the fire area of concem. It also requires a fixed fire

suppression system be installed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large

concentration of cables or other combustibles. These alternative requirements

are not deemed to be equivalent; however, they provide equivalent protection

for those configurations in which they are accepted.

Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires

may occur and propagate, the design basis protective features are specified in

the rule rather than a design basis fire. Plant specific features may require

protection different than the measures specified in Section I//.G. In such a case,

the licensee must demonstrate, by fire hazards analysis, that existing protection

or existing protection in conjunction with proposed modifications will provide a

level of safety equivalent to the technical requirements of Section /11. G of

Appendix R.

In summary, Section IlI.G is related to fire protection features for ensuring that

systems and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown

Entergy Operations, Inc. -14-

are free of fire damage. Fire protection configurations must either meet the

specific requirements of Section III.G or another fire protection configuration

must be justified by a fire hazards analysis.

BACKFIT ANALYSIS CONCLUSION

In reviewing the above documents, the panel found that the regulations, statements of

consideration, generic correspondence, as well as ANO-specific safety evaluation reports are

in agreement concerning the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot

shutdown conditions as required in Section Ill.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.. As these

documents show, the NRC did not consider manual actions to be acceptable for complying

with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2; however, if the requirements of Section

III.G.2 could not be met, manual actions were permitted under Section III.G.3. The panel

concluded that the position to disallow the use of manual actions for meeting i 0 CFR Part 50,

Appendix R,Section III.G.2 is not an imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the

Commission rules that are either new or different from a previously applicable staff position.

Therefore, this position is not a backfit generic to all plants, nor is It a backfit specific to ANO.

Entergy Operations, Inc. -15-

Enclosure 2- Section III.G.2 LiErtsirEmsa~ioaW'siac. -16-

ENCLOSURE 2

APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G.2 LICENSING BASIS ANALYSIS

In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), claimed that

Region [V's position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with Section III.G.2 of

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (Appendix R) was a backfit. In addition to the backfit claim,

Entergy asserted that during the review of their fire protection program in the 1980's, the NRC

was aware that manual actions were sometimes credited for complying with Section III.G. of

Appendix R at ANO, and that the NRC's failure to'categorically deny the use of all manual

actions for complying with Section III.G.2 implied tacit approval. Because of this tacit approval,

the licensee stated that the use of manual actions became part of the licensing basis.

NRC EXEMPTIONS AND SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTS

ANO-1 was licensed prior to January 1, 1979; therefore, was required to meet 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix R,Section III.G.

Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated May 13, 1983: This SER contained the NRC's review of

the licensee's methodology for altemativ esafe shutdown in accordance with Appendix R,

Sections III.G. 3 and III.G.L.

SER, "Introduction,' reads

'By submittals dated July 1 and July 29, 1982, the licensee described the

means by which safe shutdown can be achieved in the event of fire and

proposed modifications to the Arkansas Nuclear One Units I and 2 to meet the

requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Items III.G.3 and Ill.

SER, Section C. "Remaining Plant Areas' (

' MAII other areas of the plant not required to have alternate safe shutdown will

comply with the requirements of Section III. G.2 of Appendix R, unless an

exemption request has been approved by the staff."

Exemption and (SER) dated March 22. 1983: In this SER, the NRC clearly described the

requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2, and added that if those requirements could not be

met, then the licensee was required to meet the provisions of Appendix R,Section III.G.3.

SER, Section 1.0 reads,

'Section III.G.2 requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to

I

Enclosure 2 - Section Ill.G.2 LlmtsiREmpisativalysic. -18-

capability independent of the fire area of concern. It also requires a fixed fire

suppression system be installed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large

concentration of cables or other combustibles. These alternative requirements

are not deemed to be equivalent; however, they provide equivalent protection

for those configurations in which they are accepted."

LICENSEE SUBMITTALS

Licensee letter dated July 1. 1982: Arkansas Power & Light submitted the results of their

Appendix R compliance review by letter dated July 1, 1982. This review evaluated fire areas in

ANO Units 1 and 2 for compliance.to 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R, incorporating

recommendations, clarifications, and evaluation crfe-tia of Generic Letter 81-12 (see

Enclosure I 'for relevant excerpts from GL 81-12). In the general description of their

Appendix R analysis methodology, the licensee'staTed that they: first, credit manual actions;

second, provide protection for the remaining vulnerable safe shutdown equipment using the

separation criteria of Section Ill.G of Appendix R; and third, provide 'altemative methods of

mitigating the effects of fire damage to any remaining equipment whose da'mage from fire

could adversely affect safe shutdown. later statement

that this methodology would divert "piiyreliance from adminit-raveo-trols to preclude

fires or damage due to fires." The reliance on manual actions to operate equipment that is

damaged by a fire does not preclude damage. In addition, the licensee failed to specify that _

manual actions were credited for complying with Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R in Fire Zones (

98J and 9OM] ;X

Section I, 'Introduction,' of this submittal, the licensee stated, -_

6. In certain cases, credit for manual operation of equipment was taken if controls}

(and power for valves) could possiblfy] be damaged by a fire. Such credit was I 7

taken only if:

a. the component to be operated is not located in the affected fire zone,

although the cable may be damaged by fire;

b. sufficient time is available to perform the required manual actions; and

c. personnel are available, beyond the fire brigade and minimum

operations shift crew limitations, to perform the manual actions.

7. For redundancies that were still identified as potential safe shutdown concerns

following the above review, specific physical separation, barriers, intervening

combustibles, and suppression systems were evaluated to determine

compliance with Section lIl.G of Appendix R."

8. For those redundancies remaining as a potential safe shutdown concern

following 7 above, alternative means for accomplishing the necessary function

was reviewed.

Enclosure 2 - Section III.G.2 I-I~-19E-satiaWysIsc. _1 9_

'The evaluations described above were performed in accordance with the

criteria of appendix R, including: consideration of cable insulation as

combustible; taking no credit for cable coatings to act as a thermal or radiant

barrier to protect cables; and diverting primary reliance from administrative

controls to preclude fires or damage due to fires."

Licensee letter dated October 5, 1982: In a meeting held on August 31, 1982, and in the

meeting summary dated September 3, 1982, the NRC requested additional information

Including a description of the manual actions in fire zones that the licensee had indicated were

in full compliance with Appendix R. In the letter of October 5, 1982, the licensee listed the

following fire zones as being in full compliance with Appendix R, but requiring some sort of

manual or non-routine operation: 149E, 67U,68P,128E,170Z, 38Y,79U,1121, 46Y, 47Y,

2084DD, 211 IT, 2097X, and 2155A. Fire Zones 98J and 99M were not listed.

Licensee letter dated August 15. 1984: In this submittal, the licensee forwarded their

re-evaluation of their compliance with Appendix R using additio~nal guidance provided in

Generic Letter 83-33, and Information Notice (IN) 84-09.' s'shown below, the licensee stated

that credit for manual action may be taken; however did no specify whether these manual

actions w~ere- for meetin~g Section lIl G.2 o

as an acceptable method for complying with Appendix R, Section IlI.G.2 ,

Section II.B 'Initial Conditions)aYd Assumptions," of this reanalysis reads,

"The reanalysis of ANO-1 and 2 was performed under the initial conditions

defined by Appendix R to 10CFR50. Those conditions are consistent with those

utilized in AP&L's original Appendix R compliance submittal dated July 1, 1982

(OCAN078202). and subsequent correspondence dated November 11, 1982

(OCANI18210). ... Where adequate time is available, and the valve is not

physically located in the vicinity of the postulated fire, credit is taken for manual

operation of manually operable valves.'

Section III.D, 'Activities Required for Achieving Hot Shutdown" of this reanalysis reads,

"The activities required for achieving hot shutdown are those credited in our

previous Appendix R submittals referenced earlier in this report."

Section lll.F, "Separation Criteria," of this reanalysis reads,

"... The method of operability of any component in a given system is to

determine whether it is sufficiently protected or separated from the postulated

fire. The separation criteria to be used are specified in Appendix R to 10CFR50,

Section 1ll.G and in clarification of that regulation presented in Generic Letter 83-33 and IE Information Notice 84-09."

APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G.2 LICENSING BASIS ANALYSIS CONCLUSION

In reviewing the above documents, the panel found that the regulations and the ANO-specific

safety evaluation reports are in agreement concerning the use of manual actions for achieving-

and maintaining hot shutdown conditions as required in Section III.G of Appendix R.

APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G.2 COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS

for FIRE ZONES 98J AND 99M

In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), claimed that

Region IV's position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with Section III.G.2 of

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (Appendix R) was a backfit. In addition to the backfit claim,

Entergy asserted that during the review of their fire protection program, the NRC was aware

that manual actions were sometimes credited for complying with Section III.G. of Appendix R

at ANO, and that the NRC's failure to challenge the use of all manual actions implied tacit

approval. The issue of whether manual actions were part of the ANO licensing basis is

addressed in Enclosure 2. Entergy further asserted that the unprotected circuits in Fire Zones

98J and 99M interface with systems and equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining

hot shutdown conditions, but are not part of the safe shutdown systems. Therefore, because

these cables are not "necessary," for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, in

Fire Zones 98J and 99M, Entergy is in compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2.

FINDING

During an NRC triennial fire protection inspection conducted on June 11 - 15, 2001, at

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified.

Note that ANO-1 was licensed prior to January 1, 1979; therefore was required to meet

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.

Enclosure 2 - Section III.G.2 LiGiEisalinaIVbc. -21-

10 CFR 50.48, Section (b) states, "Appendix R to this part establishes fire

protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part with

respect to certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate

before January 1, 1979.... With respect to all other fire protection features

covered by Appendix R, all nuclear power plants licensed to operate before

January 1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this

part, including specifically the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O."

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Paragraph III.G. states,

1. "Fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and

components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of

limiting fire damage so that:

a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is

free of fire damage; and

b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either

the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

2. Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or

equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation

or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of

redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment,

one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free

of fire damage shall be provided: