ML040220367
| ML040220367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry |
| Issue date: | 01/21/2004 |
| From: | Ogle C NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB |
| To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR-04-006 | |
| Download: ML040220367 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000280/2004006
Text
January 21, 2004
Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060
SUBJECT:
NOTIFICATION OF SURRY POWER STATION SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN
AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION - NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 05000280/2004006 AND 05000281/2004006
Dear Mr. Christian:
The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Region II staff will conduct a safety system design and performance capability inspection at
your Surry Power Station during the weeks of March 22-26, 2004, and April 5-9, 2004. A team
of six inspectors will perform this inspection. The inspection team will be led by
Mr. Robert Schin, a Senior Reactor Inspector from the NRC Region II Office. This biennial
inspection will be conducted in accordance with baseline inspection program Attachment
71111.21, Safety System Design and Performance Capability. This inspection will focus on
the prevention and mitigation of internal flooding events.
During a telephone conversation on January 20, 2004, Mr. R. Schin and Ms. C. Lovett of your
staff confirmed arrangements for an information gathering site visit and the two-week onsite
inspection. The schedule is as follows:
Information gathering visit: Week of March 1-5, 2004
Onsite inspection weeks: March 22-26, 2004, and April 5-9, 2004
The purpose of the information gathering visit is to obtain information and documentation,
outlined in the Enclosure, that are needed to support the inspection. Mr. W. Rogers, a
Region II Senior Reactor Analyst, may accompany Mr. Schin during the information gathering
visit to review probabilistic risk assessment data and identify risk significant components which
will be examined during the inspection. Please contact Mr. Schin prior to preparing copies of
the materials listed in the Enclosure. The inspectors will try to minimize your administrative
burden by specifically identifying only those documents required for inspection preparation.
During the information gathering visit, the team leader will also discuss the following inspection
support administrative details: office space; specific documents requested to be made
available to the team in their office space; arrangements for site access; and the availability of
knowledgeable plant engineering and licensing personnel to serve as points of contact during
the inspection.
2
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions regarding the
information requested or the inspection, please contact Mr. Schin at (404) 562-4629 or me at
(404) 562-4605.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
Enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA: James H. Moorman, III For:/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Enclosure:
Information Request for the Safety System Design and Performance Capability
Inspection Focusing On Internal Flooding Events
cc w/encl:
Chris L. Funderburk, Director
Nuclear Licensing and
Operations Support
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Richard H. Blount, II
Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Virginia State Corporation Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
P. O. Box 1197
Richmond, VA 23209
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
(cc w/encl contd - See page 3)
3
(cc w/encl contd)
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Distribution w/encl:
C. Gratton, NRR
L. Slack, RII EICS
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRP
SIGNATURE
RA
NAME
RSchin
JMoorman
KLandis
DATE
01/21/2004
01/21/2004
01/21/2004
1/ /2004
1/ /2004
1/ /2004
1/ /2004
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO
PUBLIC DOCUMENT
YES
NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML040220367.wpd
Enclosure
INFORMATION REQUEST
FOR THE SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION
FOCUSING ON INTERNAL FLOODING EVENTS
Note: Electronic media is preferred if readily available. (The preferred file format is
searchable .pdf files on CDROM. The CDROM should be indexed and hyperlinked to
facilitate ease of use. Please provide 6 copies of each CDROM submitted. Information
in lists should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who
has a knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology.)
1.
Design basis documents for the engineered safety features and other systems that
could initiate internal flooding events or that are used to mitigate internal flooding events
(e.g., circulating water, stop logs / seal plates, door seals, service water, fire water,
charging / high pressure injection, auxiliary feedwater, primary and secondary power
operated relief valves). Include design basis documents for the high, intermediate, and
low voltage electrical systems that power and control these components.
2.
Piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) for the circulating water, service water, fire
water, charging/high pressure injection, safety injection, reactor coolant system,
auxiliary feedwater, main steam, and other systems used to mitigate internal flooding
events. (Two paper copies are preferred for these.)
3.
Key electrical one-line drawings depicting the high, intermediate, and low voltage
alternating current systems and of the direct current power systems that provide power
for the pumps, valves, and instrumentation and control circuits associated with the
systems that accomplish the internal flooding mitigation strategy. (Two paper copies are
preferred.)
4.
All procedures used to implement the mitigation strategy for internal flooding events.
Include alarm response procedures as well as normal, abnormal, and emergency
operating procedures (EOPs) as appropriate. Please include or have available on site
the EOP users guide, EOP setpoint document, and EOP step deviation document.
Also, please describe how Procedure 0-FCA-6.01, Uncontrollable Turbine Building
Flooding, differs from your EOPs in procedural controls (e.g., verification and validation,
step deviation document) and in rapidly cooling down and depressurizing the reactor
coolant system. Please include an explanation of why implementation of this procedure
involves 10 CFR 50.54(x).
5.
Procedures / programs used for the operational testing / inspection / preventive
maintenance of valves and other active components that could initiate flooding or are
relied upon to mitigate flooding (e.g., circulating water, service water, and fire water
valves, including circulating water valve components whose failure could initiate a water
hammer; stop logs / seal plates; sump pumps). Include the turbine building sump pump
reliability program. Also, procedures used for operational testing / inspection /
preventive maintenance of check valves / backflow preventers in the floor drain systems
that are relied upon to prevent floor drain flooding (e.g. of charging pump rooms or
switchgear rooms). Include frequency of testing / inspection / preventive maintenance,
2
Enclosure
performance history, and maintenance history of these components for the past 10
years.
6.
Procedures for preventive maintenance or inspection of expansion joints, piping,
manways, flood dikes and other passive components that could initiate or are relied
upon to mitigate internal flooding. Also, design drawings for the flood dikes. Include
frequency of preventive maintenance / inspection, performance history, and
maintenance history of these components for the past 10 years.
7.
Surveillance procedures used to ensure the operability of equipment required by your
Technical Specifications that is used during the mitigation of internal flooding events.
8.
Calibration and functional testing procedures for instrumentation used to detect an
internal flooding event or to provide an automatic actuation to mitigate an internal
flooding event.
9.
Calculations used to support the set points for alarms and automatic actuations that are
relied upon for detection or mitigation of internal flooding events. Also, calculations
used to support the operator action setpoints in procedures for mitigation of internal
flooding events (e.g., 0-AP-13.0 and 0-FCA-6.01).
10.
A list of all temporary modifications and operator work-arounds (for the past 3 years).
11.
A list of major modifications completed in the past 5 years to components or systems
that could initiate or are required for detection or mitigation of internal flooding events.
12.
A list of deferred modifications for any components or systems that could initiate or are
required for detection or mitigation of internal flooding events.
13.
System descriptions and operator training modules for internal flooding events and the
systems used to mitigate the events.
14.
A list of operating experience program evaluations of industry, vendor, or NRC generic
issues related to internal flooding events.
15.
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) event trees for internal flooding events. A list of
PRA identified system dependencies and success criteria for systems used to mitigate
internal flooding events. Provide internal flooding cutsets and risk achievement worths
for those basic events (only assuming an internal flooding initiating event).
16.
A brief description of the mitigation strategy for handling internal flooding events,
including operator actions and equipment used.
17.
System health reports and/or other performance monitoring information for systems
used to detect and mitigate internal flooding events and their power supply systems.
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Enclosure
18.
A list of condition reports and non-routine work requests initiated since 1998 related to:
1) the systems used to detect and mitigate internal flooding events, and 2) the systems
and components that could initiate internal flooding.
19.
Quality Assurance audits, self-assessments, and third party assessments performed on
the systems that could initiate or are used to detect and mitigate internal flooding
events.
20.
Maintenance Rule performance criteria for systems used to detect and mitigate internal
flooding events and their electrical power systems. A list of maintenance rule failures of
equipment and their power supplies that are used to detect or mitigate internal flooding
events.
21.
A list of equipment used to mitigate internal flooding events that changes state or is
manually manipulated during implementation of the internal flooding mitigation strategy
and the indications used by plant operators to make decisions during the event.
22.
Plant Technical Specifications, Bases, and Technical Requirements Manual.
23.
A current copy of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
24.
Current engineering / safety analyses for internal flooding events other than those in the
25.
Procedures that provide implementation guidance for the following programs:
Corrective Action Program, Maintenance Rule Program, and Operating Experience
Program.