ML033650348

FEMA Final Exercise Report for Oconee Plant

ML033650348
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	12/17/2002
From:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML033650348 (55)

Text

Final Exercise Report Oeonee Nuclear Station Licensee: Duke Power Company Exercise Date: September 17,2002 Report Date: December 17,2002 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEhlENT AGENCY REGION IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

................................................................................................. 1 II . IN I KODCTCTION ...............................................................................................................

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2 I11. EXERCISE OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... 3 A. Plume EPZ Description ............................................................................................ 4 B. Exercise Participants ................................................................................................ 4 C.

. . Fimelinc Exercise . .................................................................................................... 5 IV . EXERCISE EVALI!ATION AND RESULTS ................................................................... 7 A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .Table 2 ................................................ 7 E3 . Status of Junsdictions Evaluated ............................................................................. 9

1. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ............................................................. 11 1.1 State Emergcncy Operations Center .............................................. 11 I .2 Dose Assessment .. EOC Liaison .................................................. 11 1.3 Dosc Assessment -Mobile Laboratory ......................................... 12 1.4 Fieid Monitoring Teams ........ ................................................... iil 1.5 Lake Clearing ......................... ................................................... 16 1.6 LP-1 Radio Station - WFBC .......................................................... 17 1.7 State Traffic Control Points ................. ................17

2. JOINT OPERATIONS............................................................................... 18 2.1 Joint Information Center ................................................................ 18 2.2 Emergency Operations Facility ...................................................... 18

3. RISK JLXISDICTIONS ............................................................................ 19 3.I OCONEE COUNTY ...................................................................... 19 3.1.I Emergency Operations C.cnter ........................................... 19 3.1.2 Protective Actions for Schools........................................... 19 3.1.3 Emergency Worker Decontamination ................................ 20 1

3.2 PICKENS COUNTY ..................................................................... 20 3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ........................................... 20 3.2.2 Protective Actions for Schools........................................... 21 3.2.3 Emergency Worker Decontaniination ................................ 21

4. IIOST JLRISDICTIONS ........................................................................... 22 4.1 ANDERSON COLWTY ................................................................ -7 L-4.1.1 Reception and Congregate Care ......................................... 22 4.2 GREENVILLE COUNTY ............................................................ 23 4.2.1 Reception and Congregate Care ......................................... 23

5. SUh4MARY OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION .........24 5.1 2002 hRCAs .................................................................................. 24 5.1.1 42-02-1.e.l-A-01 Dose Assessment Mobile Lab .............24 5.1.2 42-02-4.a.3-A-02 Mobile Laboratory ............................... 24 5.1.3 42-02-4.a.l-A-03 FMT ..................................................... 26 5.1.4 42-02-4.a.l-A44 FMT ...................................................... 28 5.1.5 42-02-3.a.I-A-05 Anderson County .Reception and Congregate Care ................................................................ 29 List of Appendices N'PENDIX 1 .ACRONYMS AND ABBKEVIATIONS ................................................ 30 APPEhDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS ...................................................................

~ 32 APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT ...................................................... 34 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO ........................................................................ 35 APPEhDIX 5 .EVALUATED SCHOOLS ...................................................................... 36 List of Tables Table 1 - Exercise Timcline .................................................................................................... 6 Tablc 2 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ................................................................ 8 11

I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On September I?, 2002, a full participation exercise was conduc.ted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Oconee Nuclear Station.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological e1nergenc.y. This exercise was conduc,ted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emcrgcncy response plans (WW)and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conduc.ted on June 13, 2000. The qualif$ng emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on March 10 and 11, 1982.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in South Carolina, and in Oconee, Pickens, Anderson, and Greenville Counties who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the fuli-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

The State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and implemented them. No Deficiencies and only five Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified. Two of these ARCAs were corrected during the demonstrations. This is reflective of the preparation and commitment to public safety by Duke Power Company, the State of South Carolina's Emergency Management Division and Department of Health and Environmental Control, and the Emergency Managers in Oconee, Pickens, Anderson and Greenville Counties.

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11. INTRQDUCTION On December 7, 1949, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuc.lear planning and response. FEMAs activities are c.onducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350,351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMAs initial and continued approval of State and local governments radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMAs responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (REM) and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, I993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14. 1993).

Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

Department of Commerce,

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

- Environmental Protection Agency,

- Department of Energy,

- Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation,

- Department of Agriculture,

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Department of the Interior, and

- Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Qconee Nuclear Station to FEMA Region IV by the State of South Carolina and involved local jurisdictions occ.urred on May 7, 1982.

Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA on February 23, 1983, under 44 CFR 350.

A full participation plume exposure pathway exercise was c.onducted on September 17, 2002. FEMA Region IV assessed the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Oconee Nudear Station. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the off& response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiologicai ernergcncy.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the Chief EvaIuator and RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, Rev. 1 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of

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Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

. FEMA- "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," April 25,2002.

Section 111of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section contains a desc.ription of the plnmc pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functionai entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurxnce of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed infonnation on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity. This section also contains: descriptions of five ARCAs assessed during this exercise, actions taken to correct two of the AKCAs on the spot, and recommended corrective action, and status of the OROs' efforts to resolve the remaining three ARCAs.

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111. EXERCISE OVERVIEW This section contains data and hasic infomiation relevant to the September 17,2002, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Oconee Nuclear Station.

A. Plume EPZ Description The Oconee Nuclear Station is located in eastcm Oconee County, South Carolina, approximately 8 miles northeast of Seneca, South Carolina, on the eastcm shore of Lake Keowee. The Oconee Nuclear Station has three Bahcock & Wilcox pressurized water nuclear reactors with a combined electric power generating capacity of approximately 2,658 megawatts. Unit 1 began commercial operation on July 15, 1973. Unit 2 began commercial operation on September 8, 1974 followed by Unit 3 on December 16, 1974 The 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ encompasses Oconee and Pickens Counties in South Carolina, with the site being physically located in Oconee County. Land use is primarily agriculture and timber, with iight industries scattered throughout both counties. The Oconee County Airport is located west of Clemson, South Carolina, inside the 10-mile EPZ. The Norfolk & Southern Railway passes within six miles of the plant. Railways connect the towns of Walhalla, Seneca, Clemson, and Norris.

The major population centers within the 10-mile EPZ include Walhalla, Seneca, and Clemson. including Clemson University. Total population for the 10-mile EPZ is 67,281.

Prevailing winds move generally from west to cast over the facility, but due to foothill terrain, may not always follow this pattenr. There are 13 emcrgency response planning areas.

B. Exercise Participant5 In addition to the Oconee Nuclear Station, the following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in thc Oconcc Nuclear Station exercise on September 17,2002.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Office of the Adjutant General, Emergency Management Division Department of Health & Environmental Control, Bureau of Land Waste Management Department of Social Services Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Protective Services, and Highway Patroi

Department of Natural Resources, LAWEnforcement Division RISK JURISDICTIONS Oconee County Pickens County lIOST JURISDlCTIONS Anderson County Greenville County PRIVATEIVOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross Salvation Amiy Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service C. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time of key events and activities during the Oconee Nuclear Station exercise on September 17, 2002.

Table 1. Exercise Timeline Level or Event and special needs notified andlor evacuated Lake clearing 1st I?.atective Action Decisioii:

Distribute lo EWs on y

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the September 17, 2002 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the IO-mile EPZ surrounding the Oconee Nuclear Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise evaluation areas contained in FEMA-Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology, April 25, 2002. Exercise objectives and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise, are listed In Appencirx 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Table 2 ~

The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise evaluation areas kom FEMA-Radiological Emergency Preparedness:

Exercise Evaluation Methodology, April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise, by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise evaluation areas arc listed and the demonstration status of those criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARC.4(s) from prior cxercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection 3) 7

Table 2. Sunmmary Results of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 17,2082 - Oconee Nuclear Station Y OPER4TIONS MANAGEMENT

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LIT 1NI;ORMATION f Evaruc::.?nd EWa and ~ c g i s l r ~ l i uco nr Evacuee.

LEGEND: M = MET A = AKCAs D = Deficiency (2) Two ARCAs

• ARCA corrected durinr demonstration

• SECK includes traffic &mol and lake clearing

U. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction hased, issues only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

• Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

0 Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARGAS were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved.

Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the corrective action demonstrated ifhRCA was corrected on the spot or the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing ofthe exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

. Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during a previous exercise, which were resolved in this exercise, or during a previous exercise, and the corrective actions demonstrated.

. Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Dessniptions of AKCAs assessed during a previous exerc.ise, wrhich were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the AKCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the only two types of exercise issues which may be discussed in an exercise report.

A Deficiency is defined in FEMA- Radiological Emergency Preparedness:

Exercise Evaluation Methodology," April 25, 2002 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

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. An ARCA is defined in FEMA-Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," April 25, 2002 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organihonal performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numhering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAS). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements.

with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number comesponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

e Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

• Exercise Evaluation EEerneaat - A number, letter and number corresponding to the objective number used in FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness:

Exercise Evaluation Methodology, dated April 25, 2002.

0 Issue Classification Identifier - (D =Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

0 Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

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1. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) is located in the Emergency Management Divisions facility along with the State Waming Point and the South Carolina National Guard in Columbia, South Carolina. The facility is technologically advanced and spacious enough that it comfortably accommodates the staff and support personnel. The SEOC Director coordinated effeetiveiy with Oconee and Pickens Counties, and the Emergency Support Function (ESF) staff. The use of the Internet Routed Information System (IRIS) emergency management system, a system developed by the University of South Carolina for support coordination, allowed for rapid assessment and deployment of requested assets and kept personnel apprised of the situation within the affected area. Periodic briefings were conducted and the staff was informed of changes in plant conditions as they occurred. Recoinmendations for decisions affecting the public were made in conference witR supporting ESF functions in an expedient manner. A true tenmconcept was observed as the stafTworked well together in the decision-making and displayed their commitment to doing an outstanding job.

a. METEVALUATIONAREAS: l.a.1., 1.b.I.. I . c . ~ . ,l.~.I.,I.e.1.,2.b.2.,5.a.l.

and 5.b.l.

h. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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1.2 Dose Assessment - EOC Liaison In accordance with tRe extent of play agreement, the IPepartment of Health and Environmental Control (DIIEC) liaison a d staff were pre-positioned at the SEOC. The DHEC liaison demonstrated the ability to urganize and coordinate DIIECs command and field operations. Protective action recommendations (PAR) were appropriate and timely. The DHEC liaison and staffwere knowledgeable ofthe State plan and the agency specific standard operating procedures (SOP).

a. METEVALUATIONAWEAS: I.a.l.,l.b.I.,I.c.l.,k.d.1.,~.e.l.,2.b.I.md 2.b.2.

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h. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE Q. KOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

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f. -

PRIOR AWCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Dose Assessment - M ~ b i kLaboratory DHEC dose assessment staff and the Mobile Laboratory were pre-positioned at the National Guard Armory in Clcmson. The DIEC Emergency Coordinator and his staff successfully demonstrated the capability to perform dose assessment and efficiently direct the radiological field monitoring teams (FMT). Similarly, the mobile laboratory demonstrated the ability to receive environmental samples &omthe FMTs. prepare them for analysis, and perform appropriate radiological analysis; although appropriate contamination control was not always followed.

a. MET EVALUATION AREAS: l.a.l.. I.b.l., I.c.I., l.d.I., 2.a.1.. 2.b.l. and 4.a.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NQNE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORWECTIVE ACTION:

Issue NQ.: 42-02-1.e.l-A-01 Condition: The Potassium Iodide (KI) located in the radiological field monitoring equipment kits had an expiration date of October 2001.

Possible Csuse: The contents of the radiological field monitoring kits are not inventoried and checked for accuracy on a timely schedule. DHEC does not have an established periodic schedule to inventory the content of the radiological field monitoring team kits.

Reference:

NUREG-0654. K.3.a Effect: Field monitoring team personnel would not have protection for their possible cxposure to radioactive iodine due to the expiration ofthe supply of KI.

Recommendation: PeriodlcaHy inventory the KI in all ikld monitoring kits and replaw any that is out of date.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: A field team member was able to obtain the 12

necessary supply of KI Gom the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

Mobile Laboratory Issue No: 42-02-4.a.3-12-02 Condition: Existing practices and procedures by both the field monitoring teams and mobile laboratory staffwere inadequate to control and prevent CFOSS-contamination of environniental samples. 1) The chain-of-custody form has spaces for recording multiple samples and if used for niore than one sample could easily be separated fiom its associated samplcs during processing in the mobile lab. 2) A standardized method of labeling environmental samples wm not used.

3) Environmental samples were not double-bagged to prevent cross-contamination. 4) At the mobile lab, the technician assigned to sample receipt used one pair of rubber gbves throughout the entire exercise. This same technician also performed vehicle and personnel radiation monitoring activities.

There was no organization or segregation between potentially contaminated areas and the known clean area at the sample reception area. The sample receipt table was not dedicated to that tiask. Instruments. personnel dosimeter documents, various supplies and an empty soda can W ~ F Call on the table at one time.

Although a step off pad was established several individuals crossed the pad ignoring standard exit control practices.

Possible Cause: Inadequate procedural requirements and trainiig.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, Items 1.8 and J. I 1 Effect:

1. Samples and documentation could easily be separated during processing, compromising the chain of custody process.

2. The potential for cross contamination of field samples and the MObik lab was high. This would compromise the State's ability to effectively determine and quantify the areas affected by contamination Gom the radiological plume.

Recommendations:

1. Revise the chain-of-custody procedure and form so thdt a single form is used for each sample.

2. Establish a standard sample identification numbering method; then apply that method to sample tagging, chain of custody, receipt and analysis documentation.

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3. Provide additional instruction on contamination control of radiological materials to both field and laboratory staff. The instruction should include proper exit procedures for going from a hot zone to a cold zone.

Evaluate the logistical arrangement of current sample receipt methods and modify to provide a clear and maintainable separation between potentially contaminated and clean areas of the sample receipt area.

Schedule of Chrreetive Actions: Response nor received by report date.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARGAS - CTNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Field Monitoring Teams The State of South Carolina deployed two field monitoring teams from the Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC), located at the South Carolina hational Guard Armory in Clernson. The teams used new sets of inips of the Emergency Planning Zone to locate the desired monitoring points and to cleariy convey their location to the Field Director. The teams maintained good communication with the Field Director throughout the exercise, and wcre aware of and practiced good radiation exposure control. The teams were not called upon to ingest Potassium iodide during the exercise, though non-expired tablets were available to each team. All instruments that were sent with the field teams had been calibrated within the time period specified by the plan. Sonie problems were noted in field team equipment and procedures and are addressed below.

a. MET EVALUATION AREAS: l.d.1, 3.a.l., 3.b.i and 4.a.3.

h. DEFICIENCY: NONE E. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

PMT Issue No.: 42-02-4.a. 1-A-03 Condition: The material condition of the equipment and supplies in the field team monitoring kits increased the amount of time required to inventory and check prior to deployment. The inventory list attached to the inside ofthe supply kit did not specify quantities or provide an inventory control form to be used to verify contents and operability of equipment within the suppiy kit. Also the instruinents and supplies did not have an order for packing in the kit. For example. the FMI spent approximately 5 minutes to determine that a pair of tweezers for air sample filter handling was riot in the kit. They borrowed a pair after searching for one 14

in another kit. The replacement pair was not the type preferred for handling air sampler filter paper and no note was m d e to replace the borrowed equipment.

Later a pair of the preferred tweezers was found in the bottom of the air sampler box. The inventory list for the air sampler box did not list a pair oftweezers.

According to the DHEC staff at the FEOC the state does not have a procedure to verify equipment and supplies after being deployed for repair and re-supply as needed.

An old lantern mantle, no longer in production, was attached to the inside of the supply Kit #2 cover and marked check sourcc. Although a numerical value was written a n the plastic bag holding the mantle, no instructions were included to sap that the value was appropriate for a given type of radiation detection instrument.

Three of the five instruments carried by the field team could have detected the radiation given off by that mantle. The radiation monitoring instruments did not have information on the calibration laheis identifying the source used and expected response value for the calibration period of a given instrument. One hour and fifteen minutes was required t0 prepare FMT #2 for dcployment.

Possible Cause: Procedures for inventorying and packing equipment in the kits were lacking, as were those to assure post-event re-supply and repair of instruments if needed. Positive checks for inventory and operational readiness were not provided. Lack of radiation hstrumcnt labels that included information covering the appropriate check source type and expected response value for the current calibration period and the existence of a non-standard check source in the kit.

Referenee: NUREG-0654 element 11.10 Effest: Although this exercise did not require the rapid deployment of field teams, the situation could have resulted in improperly quippcd field teams or significant delays in their deployment.

Rercmmendation: Develop procedures for field team activation and deactivation that include the hventotory and operational checks of a11 equipment in the kits and a method for repacking and re-supply ofthe inventory and repair of instruments if needed. Consider the use of sealed field kits that provide far the periodic inspection of supply conditions and replacement. Then. the prompt use of a supply kit could be implemented if verification of an urn-broken seal was observed.

Consider compartmentalizing the kits. This will improve the ability to locate specific items, especially at night, and promote contamination control by clearly defming what materials are clean fiom those that may potentially be contaminated. Re-evaluate the methods used for radioactive source control and use. Add source type md response values for eacb instrument and for each calibration period.

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Schedule of Corrective Actions: Response not received by report date FMT Issue No.: 42-02-4.a.I-A-04 Condition: Without the knowledge of the Field Director, Field Monitoring Team

1. I deployed to the field without a high-range gamma survey instrument. The RO-20 survey meter passed operability and battery checks as it was being prepared for issue by Mobile Laboratory personnel, but failed battery checks when being issued to FMT #I. Battery replacement did not resolve the instrument problem and the team decided to deploy without this instrument. Neither the Mobile Laboratory personnel nor FMT #1 informed the Field Director that this instrument was not deployed in the field.

Possible Cause: A spare high-range gamma survey instrument was not brought to the exercise.

Reference:

NtilZEG-0654, Element I.S Effect: The field monitoring team did not have the capability to monitor high range areas.

Recommendation: Provide backup instruments for field team kits so that a replacement is readily available if needed.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: Response not received by report date.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:NONE 1.5 Lake Clearing Three law enforcement officers from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) successfully demonstrated their knowledge of lake warning procedures and individual radiological protection. They also assisted in an examination of siyiage at selected public boat landings (PBLs). Each PBL visited had a 3 x 3 (approximate) sign at the launch point that provided guidance and instructions to the public in the event sirens sounded. The signs were easily visible and generally well maintained. The DhX law enforcement personnel were professional and prepared to execute their assigned mission.

a. METEVALUATIONAREAS: I.d.l.,3.a.1.,3.b.l.and5.a.3

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 16

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NQNE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NQNE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NQRE

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f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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1.6 LP-I Radio Station - WFBG WFBC (93.7). Greenville, South Carolina, is the local primary (LP-1) Emergency Alert System ( E M ) radio statim for the Oconee Nuclear Station. At I01 8, the station received a request &om the SEOC to broadcast a pre-approved exercise message for the Oconee Nuclear Station drill. The message was broadcast at 1020. The radio station and S E W coordinated their activities and followed thek procedures. The stations staff was knowledgeable and interested in their role in EAS.

a. iMET EVALUATION AREA: 5.a.E.

1.7 State Traffic Control Points A Lieutenant and two patrol offrsers ofthe South Carolina Ilighway Patrol (SClP) demonstrated their knowledge of traffic control point (ICP) procedures during intemiews at the Oconee County Emergency Operations Center (EQC) and at two designated TCPs.

AI1 t h e e were knowledgeable of radiological exposure control procedures.

The Lieutenant has prepared TCP specific instructional packets for use by any trooper assigned bo activate a TCP. The packets include the specific purpose for which the TCP was k i n g established, standard operating procedures, maps, and inforniation to impart to the public. Troopers interviewed at each of the TCPs were aware of how to obtain assistance from the Department of Transportation for establishment of harriers as well as assistance in the removal ofimpedirnents. The troopers were wet1 prepared and highly professional in their performance and overall demeanor.

a. MET EVALUATION AREAS: l.d.l., 3.a.1.. 3.b.l., 3.d.l. Rnd 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE E. AREAS REQUIRING CQWWECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARGAS IPESOLVED: NONE t PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 17

2. JOINT OPERATIONS 2.1 Joint Information Center The Joint Informtion Center (JIC) fully demonstrated the capability to keep the public and mcdia informed. Public Information OEfcers from the State of South Carolina, Pickens County, Oconee County, Anderson County, a host county. and personnel from Duke Power conducted four professional and well-managed media briefmgs. Pre-media briefings were well planned and coordinated and staff interacted and shared information.

During the media briefmgs. relevant information was provided to the mock media, and questions Gom the media and public were answered promptly, clearly, and accurately.

The JIC personnel and Public inquiry personnel Mere well trained and conducted an excellent operation.

a. METEVAEGATIOKAREAS: I.a.I., l.b.l., I.d.1., I.e.l.andS.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. B N O R ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARC& - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 Emergency Operations Facility The utility opemtors Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is an excellent facility fiom which all participating response organi7;ttiom can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations. Cormnunications, coordination and the flow of technical information ktween the utility operator, representatives of the U. S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the participating Off-site Resespome Organizations were outstanding.

All ofthe State and local g o v e m c n t oficials who were depIoyed to the EOF were well trained, followed approved applicable procedures; and overall, they performed their respective responsibilities in an efficient a d professional manner. All ofthe exercise criterion, as specified in the Extent of Play Agreement, were satisfactorily hlfilled.

a. MET EVALUATION AREAS

l.a.l., l.b.l.9l.d.1. and 1.e.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE e* AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE 18

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE

3. RISK JURISDICTIONS 3.1 BCONEE COUNTY 3.11.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center (EOCJ was filled with a staff of experienced, well trained. and dedicated volunteer and permanent personnel. Representatives from the State Senate, the Oconee County Council, and the County Supervisor were present to support or observe the exercise. Direction and control was excellent and briefings were interactive with EQC staff reporting on thek activities during each briefing. All of the EOC members were pro-active and planned for future actions. Precautionary actions and protective action decisions (PAD) were timely and the decision for Alert and Notification of the public was coordinated with the state and Pickcns County. Back-up route alerting was simulated when two of the sirens failed to sound. Future plans to expand the EOC will enhance this excellent operation.

a. MET EVALUATIONSAREAS: l.a.1.. l.b.l.>I.c.~.,1.d.1.. l.e.1.,2.b.2.3.c.l.,

5.a.i.,5.a.3.and5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE E. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NOh'E

6. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

~

3.13 Protective Actions for Schools Five principals, one assistant principal and the Supervisor of Schools and Safety for the Oconee County Department of Transportation were interviewed on September 18,2002.

All individuals were knowledgeable of their procedures for protection and evacuation of their students and staff. Copies ofthe evacuation plans were obtained from each ofthe schools. Bus drivers are not considered emergency workers; therefore a law enforcement officer, who would have appropriate dosimetry, Thermolumininescent dosimeters (TLD) and KI would escort the buses to the pick-up points. Any student remaining at the pick-up points after five hours would be transported to the appropriate reception center under control ofthe school staff until picked up or met by family members. See Appendix 5, 19

page 37 for a listing oftke schools.

a. MET EVALUATION AREAS: I.d.1., 3.a.l.. 3.b.I. and 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE t PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

~

3.1.3 Emergency Worker Decontamination The emergency worker and vehicle decontamination demonstration was conducted at Westminster Middle School. Two emergency workers and one vehicle were used to demonstrate this activity. The facility setup provided a smooth flow for personnel through monitoring, decontamination and exit h m the decontamination area. 'The contaminated vehicle was properly monitored and decontaminated by five members of the Walhalla Fire Ikpartmed. The Walhalla Fire Dcpartmnt also provided communications to the EQC. All participants should be commended for their performance in this exercise.

a. METEVALUATION AREAS: I.d.I.,3.a.l.,h.a.l.and6.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.2 PICKENS COUNTY 3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC Director md his staff effectively managed the emergency response. 'I'he EO&'

staff was well trained and dedicated to protecting the residents and students ofPickens County. The staff included representatives kom County, State and volunteer agencies md Clemson University. The staff effectively responded to siren hilures by quickly identifying and deploying resources to notify the public in those areas covered by the 20

inoperative sirens. The stafTidentified and requested State assistance as needed.

a. METEVALUATIONAREAS: I.a.I., I.h.l., I.c.~.,l.d.l., l.e.l.,2.b.2.3.c.l.,

5.a.1., 5.a.3. and 5.b.l.

h. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUKRHNC CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE (8. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

1. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.2.2 Protective Actions for Schools Interviews were conducted with the principals and assistant principals at both schools and with the transportation coordinator. The principals were conscientious and very knowledgeable of their procedures for emergency preparedness and relocation. Both schools have safety teams, two-way radios, and facsimile machines. Buses are also equipped with radios. Both schools have volunteers to assist with their protective action response. See Appendix 5>page 37 for a listing of the schools.

a. METEVALUATION AREAS: l.d.1.,3.a.I.,3.b.l.and3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CQWWECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. -

PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 33.3 Emergency Worker Decontamination The emergency worker decontamination demonstration was conducted at the Pickens County Prison F m . Two emergency workers and one vehicle were monitored. The staff properly provided contamination control, monitored and decontaminated of the emergency workers. The contaminated vehicle was properly monitored and decontaminated by five members of the Pickens County HMMAT Response Unit. The Pickens County Mobile Command Unit provided excellent communications. All participants should be commended for their performance in this exercise.

21

8. MET EVALUATION AREAS: l d l . , 3.a.1., 6.a.l. and 6.b.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE

4. HOST JURISDICTI[QN%

4.1 ANDERSQN COUNTY 4.1.1 Reception and Congregate Care This demonstration was conducted on August 29,2002 at the McCants Middle School on haarch Banks Road. The reception center and congregate care facilities are co-located at the school. The American Red Cross directed the congregate care operation and the staff was extremely knowIedgeable of shelter nlanagemcnt practices. They were well organized and enthusiastic about the job at hand. The decontamination staff was knowledgeable of radiation detection equipment and decontamination procedures and established an effective decontamination h e . They were able to identify all simulated contamination and ensure the proper decontamination procedures were performed.

a. MET: Criteria 1.d.l..) 6.a.t. and 6.c.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NQNE

e. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Issue No.: 42-02-3.a.I-A-05 C ~ n d i t i ~ nSelf-reading

dosimeters (SRD) and TIDs were not issued to the emergency workers conducting outside monitoring and decontamination of vehicles.

Possible Camse: Several other school related activities were ongoing when the decontamination team arrived at the school. As a result the demonstration was late starting and the decontamination staffwas rushing and failed to adhere to their checklist.

Reference:

NUWEG-0654, K.3, the extent-of-play agreement, and sub-clement 22

3.a.l.

Effect: Emergency workers could not determine the amount oftheir exposure and any actions they would need to take in response.

Recommendation: Follow procedures and always issue dosimeters and TLDs to emergency workers that may be exposed to radiation.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: This ARCA was corrected during the demonstration and emergency workers were familiar with the purpose and use of dosimetry.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.2 GREENVILLE COUNTY 4.2.1 Reception and Congregate Care The reception and congregate care center was demonstrated out-of- sequence OR September 16,2002, at the Northwest Middle School. The Greenville County Sheriffs Department, Slater Volunteer Fire Department, Greenville Department of Social Services (DSS), and the IJpstate Chapter ofthe American Red Cross ( m C ) participated hthe demonstration. The ARC IJpstate Chapter supported by DSS effectively managed temporaxy care. The Greenvilie Sheriffs Department had several deputies who directed evacuees into the reception center. managed trafic, and provided security. The Slater Volunteer Fire Department successfUlly set up the reception center to survey e~acuecs and vehicles. Evacuees were directed into the reception center where they were monitored. Clean evacuees were registered into the congregate care center and contaminated evacuees were decontaminated. Emergency WOFkerS had a working knowledge of dosimetry and radiological exposure control.

a. MET EVALUATION AREAS: l.d.l., 3.a.1., 6 a.1. and 6.b.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: KONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

~

23

5.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 5.1 2002 ARGAS 5.1.1 42-02-l.e.I-A-Ql State of South Carolina Condition: The Potassium Iodide (KI)

Dose Assessment -Mobile located in the radiological field monitoring Laboratory equipment kits had an expiration date of October 2001.

Possible Cause: The contents of the radioiogical field monitoring kits are not inventoried and checked for accuracy on a timely schedule. DHEC does not have an established periodic schedule to inventory the content of the radiological field monitoring team kits.

Reference:

hTREG-0654, K.3.a Effect: Field monitoring team personnel wrould not have protection for their possible exposure to radioactive iodine due to the expiration of the supply of KI.

Recommendation: Periodically inventory the KI in all field monitoring kits and replace any that is out ofdate.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: .4field team member was able to obtain the necessary supply of KI from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

5.1.2 42-02-4.a.3-A-02 Condition: Existing practices and Mobile Laboratory procedures by both the field monitoring teams and mobile laboratory staff were inadequate to control and prevent cross-contamination of environmental samples. 1)

The chain-of-custody fomi has spaces for recording multiple samples and if used for more than one sample could easily be separated from its associated samples during processing in the mobile lab. 2) A standardized method of labeling environmental samples was not used. 3 )

23

Environmental samples were not douhle-hagged to prevent cross-contamination. 3 )

At the mobile lab, the technician assigned to sample receipt used one pair of rubber gloves throughout the entire exercise. This same technician also performed vehicle and personnel radiation monitoring activities.

There was no organization or segregation between potentially contaminated areas and the known clean area at the sample reception area. The sample receipt table was not dedicated to that task. Instruments, personnel dosimeter documents, various supplies and an empty soda can were all on the table at one time. Although a step off pad was established several individuals crossed the pad ignoring standard exit control practices.

Possible Cause: Inadequate procedural requirements and training.

Reference:

MJREG-0654, Items I 8 and J.11.

Effect:

1, Samples and documentation could easily be separated during processing. compromising the chain of custody process.

2. The potential for cross contamination of field samples and the mobile lab was high. This would compromise the States ability to effectively determine and quantify the areas affected by contamiriation from the radiological plume.

Recommendations:

1. Revise the chain-of-custody procedure and form so that a single form is used for each sample.

25

2. Establish a standard sample identification numbering method; then apply that method to sanrple tagging, chain of custody, receipt and analysis documentation.

3. Provide additional instruction on contamination control of radiological materials to both lield and laboratory staff. The instruction should include proper exit procedures for going from a hot zone to a cold zone.

Evaluate the logistical arrangement of c.urrent sample receipt methods and modify to provide a clear and maintainable separation between potentially contaminated and clean areas of the saniple receipt area.

Scliedule of Corrective Actions: Response not received by report date.

5.1.3 42-02-4.a.l-A-03 Condition: The material condition of the FhlT equipment and supplies in the field team monitoring kits increased the amount of time required to inventory and check prior to deployment. The inventory list attached to the inside of the supply kit did not specify quantities or provide an inventoq control form to be used to verify contents and operability of equipment within the supply kit. Also the instruments and supplies did not have an order for packing in the kit. For example, the FMT spent approximately 5 minutes to determine that a pair of tweezers for air sample filter handling was not in the kit. They "borrowed" a pair after searching for one in another kit. The replacement pair was not the type preferred for handling air sampier fiiter paper and no note was made to replace the borrowed equipment. Later a pair of the preferred tweezers was found in the bottom of the air sampkr box. The inventory list for the air sampler box did not list a pair of tweezers. Acc.ording to the 26

DHEC staff at the FEOC the state docs not have a procedure to verify equipment and supplies after being deployed for repair and resupply as needed.

An old lantern mantle, no longer in production, was attached to the inside of the supply Kit H2 cover and marked check sou~cc.Although a numerical value was written QII the plastic hag holding the mantle, no instructions were included to say that the value was appropriate for a given type of radiation detection instrument.

Three of the five instruments carried by the field team could have detected the radiation given off by that mantle. The radiation monitoring instruments did not have information on the cahhration labels identifying the source used and expected response value for the calibration period of a given instrument. One hour and fifteen minutes was rcquired to prepare FMT #2 for deployment, Possible Cruse: Procedures for inventorying and packing equipment in the kits were lacking, as were those to assure post-event re-supply and repair of instruments if needed. Positive checks for inventory and operational readiness wcre not provided. Lack of radiation instrument labels that included information covering the appropriate check source type and expected response value for the current calibration period and the existence o f a non-standard check source in the kit.

Reference:

NUREG-0654 clement II.10 Effect: Although this exercise did not require the rapid deployment of field teams, the situation could have resulted in improperly equipped field t e a m or significant delays in their deployment.

Recommendation: Develop procedures for 27

field team activation and deactivation that include the inventory and operational checks of all equipment in the kits and a method for repacking and re-supply of the inventory and repair of instruments if needed. Consider the use of sealed field kits that provide for the periodic inspection of supply conditions and replacement. Then, the prompt use o f a supply kit could be implemented if verification of an un-broken seal was observed.

Consider compartmentalizing the kits. This will improve the ability to locate specifk items, especially at night, and promote Contamination control by clearly defining what matcrials are clean from those that may potentially be contaminated. Re-evaluate the methods used for radioactive source control and use. Add source type and response values for each instrument and for each calibration period.

SclieduEe of Corrective Actions: Response not received by report date.

5.1.4 42-02-4.m.I - A 4 4 Conndition: Without the knowledgc of the FMT Field Director, Field Monitoring Team #I deployed to the field without a high-range gamma sun~cyinstrument. The RO-20 survey meter passed operability and battery checks as it was being prepared for issue by Mobile Laboratory personnel, but failed battery checks when being issued to FMT

1. l.Battery replacement did not resolve the instrument problem and the team dec.ided to deploy without this instrument. Neither the Mobile Laboratory personnel nor FMT #I informed the Field Director that this instrument was not deployed in the field.

Possible Cause: A spare high-range gamma survey instrument was not brought tu the exercise.

28

Reference:

NUREG-0654, Element 1.8 Effect: The field monitoring team did not have the capability to monitor high range areas.

Recommendation: Provide backup instruments for field team kits so that a replacement is readily available if needed.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: Response not received by report date.

5.1.5 42-02-3.a.l-A-05 Condition: Self Reading Dosimeters (SRD)

Anderson County and Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLD)

Reception and were not issued to the emergency workers Congregate Care conducting outside nionitonng and decontamination of vehicles.

Possible Cause: Several other school related activities were ongoing when the decontamination team arrived at the school.

As a result the demonstration was late starting and the decontamination staff was rushing and failed to adhere to their checklist.

Reference:

NUREG-0653, K.3, the extent-of-play agreement, and sub-element 3 3 . 1 .

Effect: Emergency workers could not determine the amount of their exposure and any actions they would need to take in response.

Recornmendation: Follow procedures and always issue dosimeters and TLDs to emergency workers that may be exposed to radiation.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: This ARCA was corrected during the demonstration and emergency workers were familiar with the purpose and use of dosimetry.

29

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ACP Access Control Point AKC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requirmg Corrective Action ARES Amateur IPadio Emergency Service CDV Civil Defense - Victoreen CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHEC South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DO1 Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation DNR Department of Natural Resources DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAI, Emergency Action Level EA§ Emergency Alert System EEL4 Exercise Evaluation Methodology EMS Emergency Medical Services ENC Emergency News Center E Emergency News Network EOC Emergency CPperations Center EOF Emergency Operations Faciiity EOP Merit of Play EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone EWD Emergency Worker Decontamination FAA Federal Aviation Administration FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Managenlent Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FrC Field Team Coordinator GE General Emergency GM Guidance Memorandum HIUS Internet Routed Information System 30

JIC Joint Information Center KJ Potaysium Iodide mR milliroentgen nWh milliroentgen per hour NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, Rev. 1, "Criteriufor Prepurulion und Evaluation of Radioiogical Emergency Response Plans mid Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Xovember 1980 Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PI0 Public Information Officer R Roentgen WAC Regional Assistance C o r n i t t e e RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RC Reception Center REM Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness E W Radiological Emergency Response Plan Rih Roentgen(s) per how RQ RadioIogicaI Oficer SAE Site Area Emergency SCARPdG South Carolina Army Reserve National G u a d SCEMD South Carolina Emergency Management Division SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedure TCP Trafiic Control Point TL,D  ?'hermoluminescent Dosimeter USDA U.S. Dcpartnient of Agriculture 31

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALLJATORS The following is a list ofthe personnel who evaluated the Oconec Nuclear Station exercise on Septeniber 17,2002. The organization represented by each evaluator k indicated by the folIowing abbreviations:

DOT - Department of Transportation FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency ICF - ICF Incorporated NRC ~ Nuclear Regulatory Comnission USDA - U. S. Department of Agriculture Lawrenee A. Robertson Co-RAC Chairman Stephanie P ~ s k e t t Administrative S ~ p p o r t EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Chief Evaluator Joseph Canoies FEMA STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA State Emergency Operations Center Tom Reynolds FEMA John Grijak FEM4 DHEC Liaison Thomas Brown ICF Emergency Operations Facility Robert Trojanowski NRC Joint I d o m t i o n Center Walter Gawlak ICF Robert Perdue FEM Dose Assessment Bernie Hannah ICF Mobilc Lab Cleason Ang Armory Bernie Hannah ICF Field Team - 1 J i m Willison ICF Field Team - 2 David Seebart ICF State TGP (Pickens County) Rill Lmabee ECF LP-I W i o Station WFBC - Grcenville Josh Moore ICF 501 Rutherford Street 42

OCBNEE COlJNTY Emergency operations Center Joseph Canoies FEMA Harold Dorminey DOTIFM Protective Actions for Schools Helen Wilgus FEMA 09-18-02 @, 0900 Obhie Robinson FEMA Emergency Worker Decontamination Eddie Hickman 09- 16-02 @ I 600 PPCKENS COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Lawence Robertson FEMA Helen Wilgus FEMA Obhie Robinson FEMA Protective Actions for Schools Eddie Hickman IXMA 9-17-02 @ 0900 Emergency Worker Decontamination Eddie Hickman FEMA 9-16-02 @, 1330 Pickens County Prison Farm I&e Clearing (Pickens County) Bill Larrahee ICF ANDERSON COUNTY ReceptiodCongegate Care Lawrence Robertson FEMA 8/29/02 @ 1800 Joseph Cmo6es FEMA GMEENVPLLE COUNTY ReceptiodCmgregate Care R&rt Perdue FEMA 9/16/02 @ 1800 33

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA ANQ EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix contains the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement which were scheduled for demonstration during the Oconee Nuclear Station exercise on September 17,2002.

A. Exercise Objectives B. Extent-of-Play Agreement The Extent-of-play agreement on the following pages was submitted by the State of South Carolina, and was approved by FEMA Region IV. The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each criterion listed.

34

Attachment A: SELECTED EVALUATION AREAS z.. RID Asaas.m.rst. RRR

Extent of Play Agreement Ocanee Nuclear Site Exercise September 2 7,2002 I . Emergency Operations Management Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization Criterion 1.a.l : OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4, B.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

All state and [oca1 government personnel will be pre-positioned Alert rosters will be provided to FEMA evaluators and a discussion of call-down procedures will be conducted.

S u b d e m e n t Ih,Facilities Criterion 1.b.l: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG -0654, H)

Counties will be evaluated to establish a baseline for exercise evaluation criteria. Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Sub-element l.c, Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.l: Key personnel with leadership roles for the O R 0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.l.d., 2.a., b.)

Ciredien 2nd Control wiii be at ine State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). County Direction and Control will take place at the Qconee County and Pickens County Emergency Operations Centers (EBC'sj. State Emergency Response Team (SERT) participants include the Emergency Management Division (EMD); ESF 6, Mass Care (Department of Social Services); ESF 8, Health and Medical Services (Department of Health &

Environmental Control); ESF I O , Hazardous Materials, (Department of Health and Environmental Control); ESF 13, Law Enforcement (State Law Enforcement Division); and ESF 16, Evacuation Traffic Management, (Department of Public Safety). A simulation cell will represent the Office of the Governor, Office of the Adjutant General, FEMA Region IV, and North

Carolina. All simulated telephone calls will be made by calling the simulation cell.

Subelement f .d, Communications Criterion j.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.I., 2.)

The Selective Signaling System (SSS) is the primary means of communication to notify off-site response forces. Backup to the SSS are commercial telephone lines and the Local Government Radio (LGR).

Sub-element 3 .e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1 e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),

and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.. J.lO.a.b.e.f.j.k., 41, K.3.a.)

Potassium Iodide for emergency workers will be simulated by candy or other means (empty envelope marked KI). A 14-day supply of KI for 7000 Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Individuals is stored at FNF County EOCs, and Health Departments and at DHEC headquarters in Columbia, SC.

Advance rosters of emergency workers are not maintained. KI is not stockpiled for members of the general public.

All radiation detection equipment will be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Equipment wiil be calibrated or leak tested in accordance with existing plans by the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Radiological Lab.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, the evailability of 6ppicjpiiate equipment (e.g.,vehicles, barriers, tratfic cones and signs, etc,) will be described by law enforcement personnel.

2. Protective Action Decisiom Making.

Subelement 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including

provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654. K.4.)

Dose limits for emergency workers are pre-determined. Emergency workers may voluntarily exceed dose limits only after being fully informed by DHEX of the biological effects of radiation and possible consequences of excessive exposure.

Subelement 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and O R 0 dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conaitions. (iW%EG-Q654,1.8.. IO., 11. and Supplement 3.)

Protective action recommendations by BHEC will be based on an evaluation of information received from the licensee, independent dose assessments and simulated field monitoring data input.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making ~ F O C ~involving S ~ consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if 880 policy). (NUREG-0654, J.S., 10.M.)

The Governor or his designee will demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions (PADs) based on recommendations from DHEC.

FADSthat require sheltering or evacuation of residents or transients in the 10-mile EPZ will be coordinated with the chief county elected official or designee.

Sub-element 2.c, Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Ciiierion 2.c. 1: Protaciive action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J . 3 , 10.c.d.e.g.)

Subelement ad., Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion xposure Pathway Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORQ planning criteria. (NUWEG-0654, i.8., J.11)

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Sub-element 2.e., Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Criterion 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate. based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan andlor procedures. (NUREG-0654, A.l.b., 1.10.. M)

This Evaluation Area wilD not be demonstrated.

3. Protective Action Implementation.

Sub-element 3.a, Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

Emergency Workers or Emergency Worker Teams will use Self Reading Dosimeters (SRDs) and simulated Permanent Record Dosimeters (PKDs) to monitor and control their radiation exposure. Emergency workers in low exposure rate areas will use PRDs and may use direct reading dosimeters or place them in centralized areas.

Dosimeters are distributed through county emergency operations centers.

Each county has an adequate inventory to support first-shift personnel.

Supplemental dosimeters will be provided in accordance with the South Carolina Dosimetry Redistribution Standing Operating Procedures, and will be discussed at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol maintains and distributes their own SRBs.

Emergency workers will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of radiation exposure limits.

Sub-element 3.b, implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.i'., J., lO.e.,f.)

KI is distributed to Emergency Workers prior to their being dispatched. KI is taken by Emergency Workers on order by the State Health Officer or designee. Record keeping will be discussed at risk county EOCs.

Criterion 3.c. 1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(NUREG-0654, E T . , J.Q., 10.c.d.e.g.)

Qconee and Pickens counties will demonstrate the ability and resources to implement appropriate protective actions for special population groups. A list of people with special transportation needs will be provided to evaluators.

Evacuation assistance will not take place.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROslSchooI officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.c., d., 9.)

Oconee County will simulate school evacuations by out-of-sequence interviews with key school staff members on September 28, 2002, at 9 0 0 A.M.

Oconee County schools to be evaluated are:

J. N. Kellett Elementary Northside Elementary Seneca Middle School Walhalla Elementary Walkalia Middle School Pickens County will simulate school evacuations by out-of-sequence interviews with key school staff. Evaluator will meet escort on September 17, 2002, at 900 A.M. at the Pickens County EOC.

Pickens County schoois to be evaluated are:

Lewis Elementary Six Mile Elementary Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.1O.g.. j., k.)

Traffic and Access Control Points (TCP's) are pre-determined. The South Carolina Highway Patrol will demonstrate Traffic and Access Control.

Evaluator will meet escorts at 8:OO A.M. at the Pickens County EOC.

Traffic Control Points to be evaluated are:

A - l e AC 183 and Gap Hill Woad B-I Ban Ross Road and Ridgedale Road I

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.lO.,k.)

Actions to identify and remove impediments to evacuation will be demonstrated by discussion with officers manning TCPs.

Criterion 3.e.Z: The ORQ demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9., 11.)

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for irnpkmenting protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and tigricultural production. (NUREG-0654, E.5.. 7..J.9., 11.)

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1.~3.)

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

4. Field Measurement anel Analysis.

Sub-element 4 3 , Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.lO., 1.8., 9., 1 I.)

Zeolite filters will be simulated with charcoal filters.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to keip characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, I.&, 11.. J.1O.a.)

Command and Control of DHEC Field Teams will take place at the South Carolina Army National Guard (SCARNG) Armory in Clemson. South Carolina.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations. and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified by the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.8., 9.,bl.)

Dose Assessment will take place at the SCARNG Armory located in Clemson, South Carolina.

Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.%, food, crops, milk. water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, 1.8.. J.1 I .)

Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3.. 1.8., 9, J.11 .)

The DHEC Mobile Lab wiil be located at the SCARNG Armory located in Clemson, South Carolina.

5. Emergency Notification and Public Information Subelement 5.a, Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initia! decision by authorized of;-site emergency officials lo notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a miniinurn the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. ( I O CFR Part 50, Appendix E 8, NUREG-0654, E.I., 4.. 5., 6., 7.)

The State will coordinate Protective Action Decisions (PAB) with the Chief South Carolina county elected officials or designees. At Site Area Emergency, the siren system and the Emergency Alert System will be activated. A pre-scripted "Stay Tuned" EAS message and follow-on news release will be transmittt? from the SEOC to the Local Primary (LP-1) EAS station WFBC, Greenvilk. S.C. A "test" EAS message will be simulated and an appropriate AS message will be transmitted to the LP-1 station. The LP-1 station will

have staff available for interview during the demonstration. At General Emergency, the sirens will not be sounded and EA§ will be simulated.

Criterion 5.a.2: Resewed This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the pubic is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the OR0 of n failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-8654, E.&, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Sub-element 5.b, Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timeiy manner. (NUREG-0654. E.5.,7.. G.3.a., (3.4, a., b., c.)

The State, Omnee County, and Pickens County will demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the news media at the Joint Information Center (JIC). Rumor control for the State will be demonstrated at the JIC. Rumor control for Bconee and Pickens counties will be demonstrated at the appropriate county EOC. Rumor control personnel will provide a log of rumor calls to the FEMA Evaluator.

6. Support Operations1 Facilities Sub-element &a, Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.l: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-8654, J.18.h.; K.5.b.)

Host county Reception Centers will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. At least six people will be monitored and registered. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-through and discussion. All necessary supplies

will be on-hand. Walkways will not be covered with barrier material. A monitoring productivity rate will not be developed. State and local plans require the monitoring of evacuees only when there has been an actual release. Once the determination has been made to initiate evacuee monitoring, Offsite Response Organizations (OR(3's) are prepared to monitor 100% of the evacuated population who may have been exposed to radiation as rapidly as possible. At least two vehicles will be monitored and one vehicle decontaminated in accordance with local SOPS.Water will be used to demonstrate vehicle decontamination procedures.

Reception Centers to be evaluated are:

Anderson County: McCants Middle School at a time to be determined.

Greenville County: Northwest Middle School at 6 9 0 P.M., September 16, 2002.

Sub-element 6.b, Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Criterion 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be demonstrated out of sequence. One emergency worker will be monitored. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-thru and discussion. One emergency vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated in accordance with local SOPS.

Worker Decontamination Points to be evaluated are:

Oconee County: Westminster Middre School at 400 P.M., September 16, 2002.

Pickens County: Pickens County Prison Farm at 1 3 0 P.M., September 16, 2002.

Evaluators will meet at the appropriate County EOC for escort to demonstration location.

Sub-element 6.q Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CAKE-

Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.40.h., 12.)

Host County Shelters will be demonstrated out-of-sequence and concurrently with Evaluation Area 6.a, above. Procedures that assure that only non-contaminated persons enter shelters will be demonstrated.

Sub-element 6.d, Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.l: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources. and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

(NUREG-(3654, F.2, H.tO., K.S.a.,b., L.I., 4.)

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

~

V. ONS REP Evaluation Area Summary of Outside Activities SITE: N E X E R C I S E DATE: September 17,2002 TYPE OF EXERCISE: Full Particbation PICKENS ANDERSON GREENVlbLE September 17th implement protective 9:00 A.M.

actions for schools County EOC J.N. Kellett Elem. Lewis Elern.

Northside Elern. Six Mile Elern.

i -

3.d.l Appropriate traffic and access control is 8:OO A.M. Pickens County EOC TCPS: A-1, SC ? 83 1

Walhalla Elern.

Wathalla M.S.

and Gap Hill Rd 3.d.2 impediments to B-%, Dan Ross Rd evacuation are identified and Ridgedale Rd and resolved. PBLs:

Gap Hill Public Boat Landing August 29th September 16th 6.a Monitoring and Decontamination of I 6:CO P.M.

McCants Middle 6:OQ P.M.

Northwest Middle Evacuees and Registration School School September 16th September 16th 6.a Monitoring and &OO P.M. 1:3Qp.m.

Decontamination of County EQC Emergency Workers County EOC Westminster Pickens County Middle School Prison Farm T:\trainin~\\fnnonsiOutsideActivities 2002 As of: July 30, 2002

APPENDIX 4.

EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix cor ins a summary ofthe simulated sequence of events, whic was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actiom by OROs in the Oconee Nuclear Station exercise on September 17,2002.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of South Carolina and approved by FEMA Region IV.

35

he exercise begins with Oconee Unit I at 0% power, = 552 "F and 2155 psi, following a'manual T reactor shutdown at 0424 due to a loss of power to a control room instrumentation and controls panelboard. Prior to the shutdown the Unit had an operating core life of = 440 Effective Full Power Days (end of core life). Oconee Unit 2 is shutdown for a refueling outage with core loading in progess.

Keowee Hydro Unit #2 is available as an emergency power supply through an underground path to the emergency power transformer. The Keowee Hydro overhead emergency power path is not available for emergency power since it was declared inoperable at 0900 OR 09/16/02. This situation places both Units 1 and 3 in a limiting condition for operation. All three combustion turbines at Lee Steam Station are also available to supply emergency power.

T he weather forecast for Tuesday, Septcmber 17", has winds from the SSE (165") with a wind speed of 10 - 20 mph. A low temperalure of 60 "F is expected with a high temperature of 95 "F. Severe thunderstorms with heavy rain and lightning are expected in the area later during the evening.

t 0800 Unit remains in a shutdown condition with reactor coolant system 1 (RCS) temperature and A pressure at = 552 "F miscellaneous inspections and and 2155 psi. Personnel are currently inside the reactor building performing post-shutdown maintenance. At 0805, operator checking for inputs into an the reactor building nOim3l sump reports leakage &om a valve connected to thc reactor coolant system piping. Maintenance personnel in the area are inspectingkvaluating the valve with additional support from a Radiation Protection technician. At 0810 leakage from this valve increases to = 10 gallons per minute (gpm); however, since this is identified leakage no emergency classification is applicable at this time.

A increases

. valve stem t 0815, the leaking valve's valve stem ejects due to defective/damaged valve components. The ejected to t 160 injures the gpm and numerous two maintenance personnel working the valve. RCS leakage stat on alarms, indicative increased RCS leakage in the reactor of building, are received in Unit 1 Control Room. This leakrate satisfies the conditions for an Alert classification. Control Rcom operators enter applicable sections of the Emergency Operating Procedure to mitigate the impact of the increased RCS leakage.

T he injured maintenance personnel and an RP technician evacuate the reactor building through the personnel

. . hatcch; however they are trapped between the inner and outer personnel hatch doors due to malfunctioning interlocks. A call is made to the contra1 room on the emergency line requesting help and the site's Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) is activated. Additional personnel evacuate the reactor building through the emergency personnel hatch. The emergency perscnnel hatch inner door is slightly ajar and the outer door seal has been damaged but currently appears to be secured and maintaining the containment barrier. This condition is unknown to plant personnel at this time. With containment secured, no offsite releases are occurring at this time.

fter reviewing the Emergency Classification Procedure, the Operations Shift Manager (OSM)

A declares an Alert at zi 0830 based on RCS Leakage > Makeup Capacity Of One HPIPump In Normal Mode (= I60 gpmj V'i'ith Letdown Isolated. Procedure actions are initiated to: notify offsite agencies (SC State, Oconee County, Pickens County. and the NRC); activate the site's Emergency Response Organization (ERO); initiate Site Assembly; and, activate the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The SC State Warning Point, Oconee County LEC, Oconee County EMD, Pickens County LEC, and Pickens County EMD are notified of the Alert at 0845 (or within 15 minutes after the declaration).

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s ite Assembly is completed at 0900 (or within 30 minutes after initiation) and the TSC and OSC are staffed and Operafioncrl. Also at approximately 0900, the 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Middle Seal fails, increasing RCS leakage. Control Room Operators secure the faulted pump and start the 1B1 Reactor Coolant Pump to maintain RCS flow through the 'B' steam generator.

a t approximately 0910 (no later than 75 minutes of the Alert declaration), after the TSC Emergency Coordinator

. ' has completed turnover with the QSM, the TSC is Activated. The TSC is now responsible foe Emergency Classification, Offsite Notifications, and Protective Action Recommendations.

Site emergency response,personnel are monitoring plant conditions and implementing appropriate response actions. Field Monitoring Teams are surveying the site and downuind environs to determine if there is any radioactivity being released as a result of this event. No increase in radioactivity above background is detected at this time.

A.indicated t 0920,

. a loss of the emeegency power path &om the gas combustion turbines at Lee Steam Station is in the Control Room. This problem is a result of damage from logging operations to the 100 kV lines between the Central Switchyard and Oconee.

A t 0925,a 230 kV switchyard isolation occurs due to a truck boom coming into contact with one of the transmission lines. Both Keowee Hydro Units emergency start with power being supplied to Oconee Unit 1 and 2 from Keaweec Hydro Unit #2 via the underground power path. Oconee Unit 3 is unaffected by this event. This event does not result in an upgrade in emergency classification. '

0930, an increase in RCS leakage due to further failure of the valve involved in the initiating event A t and firther failure of 1B2 RCP seals. These failures result in a loss of the reactor coolant system boundary as indicated by the inability to maintain a temperature differential between the hot and cold legs of the RCS (RCS Subcooling &gin = 0 O F ) . A failure of the Outer Door Seal also occurs at this time.

Emergency respanse personnel also report observations of steam releasing fiom the Emeegency Personnel Hatch. 8n site survey teams report an increase in radioactivity at the Protected Area Fence. This failure is indicative of a loss of the containment barrier. Conditions exist for a Site Area Emergency classification at this time.

the TSC Emergency Coordinator declares a Site Area Emergency based on Loss OfAny A t 0940, Two Barriers -Loss Of Contuinment Rnmkr and Loss OfRCS Barrier. No Protective Action Recommendations are required this time. Notification of the Site Area Emergency classification is at provided to SC State EOC, Oconee County EOC, and Pickens County EOC by 0955 (or within 15 minutes after the event is classified). Oconee and Pickens County coordinate activation ofthe Alert and Notification System (EAS and Sirens) with SC State. EAS and Sirens are activated at 1010 (or within I5 minutes of the decision by State and County Emergency Management Dieectors to activate the Alert and Notification System). The NRC informs the TSC M C Communicator that a Site Team has been dispatched and is enroute to Oconee. NOTE: If EQF acthation has occurred faster than anticbated and tmnover has been completed between the TSCand EOFprior to this time, then the event classifcation and notifcation will originate from the EQF.

M' inimum staffmg at the EOF is completed by 0945 (within 75 minutes of the Alert declaration) and the EOF is declared Operational at this time. Turnover process between TSC and EBF positions is initiated. Shortly after the EOF is declared Operational, tumover is initiated between the TSC Emergency Coordinator and EOF Director. At 0950, (or after turnover is completed) the EOF is Activated. The EOF is now responsible for Emergency Classification, Offsite Notifications, and Protective Action

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Recommendations.

t the LA High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump Breaker trips open and the pump fails. Smoke A

the OSC 1000, detectors in the Unit HPI Pump Room 1 alarm in the control room. An operator is dispatched from to investigate. Shortly after amving the HF'I Pump room, the operator observes smoke at and requests activation of the Fire Brigade. The Fire Brigade is activated at approximately 1005 and responds to the scene. The fire is a result of a short at the motor contacts for the 11%HPI Pump. By 1030 the tire is extinguished and OSC personnel have started the process for powering this pump from an alternate source. The NRC Site Team arrives at the EOF and begins to provide support to Duke Power and SC State personnel.

D ue to earlier failure of the E32 RCP seals, debris has entered the reactor core. This debris has resulted in severe cladding damage. Indications of cladding damage are seen on high range radiation detectors located inside the reactor building (RIA-57 and 5 8 ) at 1030 when their readings increase fiom background to 2.0 and 1.0 R/hr respectively. Radiation levels inside containment, indicated by these high range detectors continue to increase until the threshold for indication of a loss of the fuel clad banier is reached at 1100 (36.0 and 18.0 R/hr respectively. At this time conditions exist for a General Emergency classification. At 11 10, containment radiation levels stabilize at detector readings of 38.75 and 19.2 Mr.

fter reviewing the Emergency Classification procedure the EOF Director declares a General A Emergency at 1110 based on a Loss OfAN Three Barriers -Loss Of Fuel Chd,'RCS, and ConfainmenfBarriers. Protective Action Recommendation to evacuate A two miles radius, five miles downwind, and shelter all remaining sectors is provided to SC State by the EOF Director (this is the minimum PAR required by plant conditions). The PAR is as follows:

Evacuate: Oconee County -A& El; F1 Pickens County - AO; AI Shelter: Qconee COW^^ - DI; B2; E2; F2 Pickens County-M; B1; B2; C1; C2 he SC State EOC, Oconee County EOC, and Pickens County EOC are notified of the General T Emergency classification and Protective Action Recommendations at 1125 (or within 15 minutes of the event classification). AAer reviewing the site's Protective Action Recommendations and current plant conditions, SC State along with Oconee and Piekens Counties determine the Protective Action Recommendations that will be issued. Within 15 minutes of this determination, state and county personnel begin to implement the agreed on Protective Actions. The Alert and Notification System is activated (simulated unless required due to problems at the Site Area Emergency classification).

ite Evacuation of nun-essential personnel is initiated by 1125 if was not performed earlier. RP S' an it personnel prepare evacuation plan that sends personnel to Daniel High School due the fact that a radiclogicai release is progress. Pickens County personnel may be requested to support the site in to evacuation. With the radiological release in progress, vehicles located in the parking lots West of the plant would be unavailable for use. The OSC may be required to arrange for transportation of affected personnel. NOTE: If Site Evacuation is iniflafedpriorto the radfological release start, then aflecfed personnel may be evaruated to their personnel residence.

EXERCISE I % ~ R M TlVE T he exercise is terminated no later than 1300 once the state and counties complete demonstration of applicable objectives.

APPENDIX 5 EVALUATED SCHOOLS On September 18. 2002 evaluations were done, for objective 16, in Oconee and Pickens Counties.

The following is a complete listing of the evaluated schools:

OCONEE COUNTY SCHOOLS:

J. N. Kellett Elementary Northside Elementary Seneca Middle School Walhalla Elementary Walhalla Middle School PICKENS COUNTY SCHOOLS:

Lewis Eiementary Six Mile Elementary 36