ML033650344

Final Exercise Report for Farley Nuclear Power Plant

ML033650344
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/07/2002
From:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML033650344 (66)

Text

Final Exercise Report Farley Nuclear Power Plant Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Exercise Date: August 21,2002 Report Date: November 7,2002 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

.................................................................................................. 1 I1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 2 I11. EXERCISE OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... 4 A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description ........................................................ 4 B. Exercise Participants ................................................................................................ 4 C. Exercise Timeline .................................................................................................... 5 IV . EXERCISE EVALUATION AND WSULTS .................................................................... 7 A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Tabie 2 ................................................ 7 R. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ............................................................................. 9

1. STATE OF ALABAMA ............................................................................ 11 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .............................................. 11 1.2 Forward Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 12 1.3 SRh4AC - Montgomery ................................................................. 13 1.4 S W A G -Dothan .......................................................................... 13 1.5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams ........................................... 14

2. JOENT OPERATIONS............................................................................... 14 2.1 Emergency Operations Facility ...................................................... 14 2.2 Joint Information Center ................................................................ 15

3. RISK JURISDICTION............................................................................... 16 3.1 HOUSTON COUNTY ................................................................... 16 3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ........................................... 16 3.1.2 Fonvard Command Post .................................................... 16 3.1.3 Protective Action for SchooIs ............................................ 17 3.1.4 Traffic and Access Control Points ..................................... 17

4. STATE OF GEORGIA .............................................................................. 18 i

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4.1 Forward Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 18 4.2 Dose Assessment ........................................................................... 18

5. RISK JURISDICTION ............................................................................... i9 5 ~ 1 EARLY COUNTY......................................................................... 19 5.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ........................................... 19 5.1.2 Traffic Control Points ........................................................ 20 5.1.3 Reception Center and Congregate Care ............................. 20 5.1.4 Emergency Worker Decontamination ................................ 21

6. STATE OF FLORIDA ............................................................................... 22 6.1 FLORIDA STATE LIAISON TEAM ............................................ 22 6.1.1 Florida State Emergency Response Team ....................... 2 2

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SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ..........23 7.1 2002 ARCA - IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED .......................... 23 7.1 .1 22-02-3.a.l-A-OIReceptiodConyegate/Early Co............23 4.2 PRIOR ARCA RESOLVED .......................................................... 23 7.2.1 07-01-11-A-01 SEOC ........................................................ 23 List of Appendices APPENDIX 1 .ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................ 26 APPENDIX 2 .EXERCISE: EVALUATORS ................................................................... 28 APPENDIX 3 .EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PIAY AGREEMENT ...................................................... 30 APPENDIX 4 .EXERCISE SCENARIO.......................................................................... 31 List of Tables Table 1 ~

Exercise Timeline 6 Table 2 - Summary Of Exercise Evaluation ............................................................................ 8 ii

I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On August 21,2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducted a plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Farley Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and Local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. In this exercise the State of Alabama fully participated and the State of Georgia partially participated. The State of Florida is affected by the ingestion pathway and sent liaisons to Alabamas Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) to monitor the situation and to provide information to the Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). This exercise was held in accordance with FEMAs policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERF) and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conducted on September 13,2000. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November I9 and 20, 1980.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals, including volunteers, in the States of Alabama, Florida and Georgia, and IIouston County, Alabama, and Early County, Georgia, who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the p.articipants was evident during this exercise. to include volunteers.

Thii report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the following out-of-sequence activities: Protective actions for schools, traffic and access control points (TCP), emergency worker decontamination, reception center-congregate care, forward command post (FCP), special populations and the distribution of potassium iodide (KI).

State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and implemented them. No Deficiencies were identified. The one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified during this exercise concerned the provision of permanent-record dosimetry to emergency workers at a reception center and emergency worker decontamination station in Early County. This ARCA was resolved during the demonstration. An ARCA identified during the 2001 Browns Ferry exercise concerning the timing of the release of protective action information to the public from the Joint Information Center (JIC), was corrected during this exercise.

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IT. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350,351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approvai of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibiiities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

0 Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans and procedures developed by State and local governments; 0 Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission WRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993);

and 0 Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- Department of Commerce,

~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

~ Environmental Protection Agency,

- Department of Energy,

- Department of Health and Human Services,

- Dep'artment of Transportation,

~ Department of Agriculture,

- Department of the Interior, and

- Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.

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Formal submission of the WRPs for the Farley Nuclear Power Plant to FEMA Region N by the State of Alabama and Houston County occurred on November 10,1980 and by the State of Georgia and Early County on June 9,1980. Formal approval of the REW for the State of Alabama and Houston County was granted by FEMA on March 11,1981, and the approval of the RERP for the State of Georgia and Early County on May 5, 1981, under Title 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was conducted on August 2 I, 2002, by FEMA Region IV to assess the capabilities of State and Iocal emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Farley Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with find determinations made by the Chief Evaluator, FEMA Region IV RAC Chairperson and approval by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-WP-I Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of I

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; m FEMA- "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise of Evaluation Methodology," April 25,2002.

Section 111, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation ofthe time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents summary information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or hnctional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains descriptions of all ARCAs assessed during this exercise and recommended corrective actions, and provides space for the State and local governments' response, and descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the ORO's efforts to resolve them.

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III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the August 2 I, 2002 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Farley Nuclear Power Plant.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The Farley Nuclear Power Plant is located on the Chattahoochee River in Houston County, approximately 17 miles east of the City of Dothan, Alabama. Parts of Henry and Houston Counties in Alabama, and Early County in Georgia, are located within the 1O-mile EPZ. Primary land use within the EPZ is m a l and agricultural with an estimated population of 10,000 in Alabama and 2,000 in Georgia. The Chattahoochee River runs north to south near the center of the EPZ.

No major airports or highways are located within the EPZ and the railroad runs through it. There are 11 evacuation-planning sub-areas in Alabama and 9 in Georgia.

B. Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of govemnent participated in the Farley Nuclear Power Plant exercise on August 21,2002.

STATE OF ALABAMA Emergency Management Agency Department of Public Health Department of Environmental Management Radiation Control Agency RISK JURISDICTION Houston County Houston County under arrangement with Henry County has responsibility for that part of Henry County that is located in the EPZ.

STATE OF GEORGIA Emergency Management Agency Department of Natural Resources Department of Agrieufture 4

RISK JURISDICTION Early County STATE OF FLORIDA Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management Department of Health. Bureau of Radiation Control PRIVATENOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Salvation Army C. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events <and activities occurred during the Farley Nuclear Power Plant exercise on August 21, 2002. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions and functional entities.

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Table 1 i3ewrise Timeline Lwcl 01Event Simulated Rad. Rekabe AB Times am Central DayEigM Time (CDTJ

• E M Messages far GA only had public warninglstay tuned. no protective actions required.

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the August 21, 2002 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local govemnients in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Farley Nuclear Power Piant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise criteria contained in Evaluation Area Methodology, dated April 25,2002. Detaiied information on the exercise objectives and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Table 2 -

The matrix in Table 2, presents the status of all exercise criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise, by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are Listed by nuniber. The demonstration status ofthose criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D Deficiency assessed A ~ ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior excrcise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 7

Table 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: August 21,2002 - Farley Nuclear Power Plant ELEMENT/Sub-Element AI. AL RAD Houston/Hetlry Shte ofGA Radiation Early County FL DEM EMA Cuntrol County Health WWBRP A* ARCA issued and corrected during exercise

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides infomation on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in ajurisdiction based, issues only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

. Met Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no

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Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Deficiency Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

e Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAS assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

. Not Demonstrated - Listing ofthe exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAS assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

. Prior ARCAs Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior

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exercises which were not reS0lVed in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are discussed in this report.

A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed OF identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

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. An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies mid ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

. Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

. Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

. Objective Number - A two-digit number corresponding to the objective numbers in FEMA-REP-14.

. Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

. Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

1. STATE OF ALABAMA 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The SEOC is located in a self-contained facility in Clanton, Alabama. The purpose of the SEOC was to support requests from Houston County for equipment and personnel beyond their capabilities and to approve news releases. The use of the EM2000 system for support coordination allowed for rapid assessment and deployment of requested assets, and kept personnel apprised of situations within the affected area. Periodic briefings updated the staff on piant conditions as they progressed. The staff worked well as a team and displayed their commitment to doing an outstandingjob.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.b.1, I.c.1, i.d.1 and I.e.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: YES Issue NO.: 07-01-1 1-A-01

Description:

A systematic problem was identified concerning information flow and release of information to the public, therefore, this AKCA has been placed at the SEOC for resolution. At 1226 Emergency Health Orders 3 and 4 were issued.

These Health Orders directed the evacuation of zones A-2, B-2, F-2, G-2, A-5 and G-5, as well as, shelter-in-place zones H-IO, 1-10, J-10, K-10, A-10 and G-10.

This information was received by the JIC at 1227 and transmitted to the SEOC, who provided the information to the counties. The JIC was having a briefing at I230 and this information was communicated to the media during that briefing.

AEMA also issued a press release at 1245 detailing the evacuation and shelter information.

At 1238 the counties concurred on the protective actions indicated in the Health Orders and agreed to activation of the sirens at 1248 and issue the EAS messages between I248 and 1250.

The Code of Alabama and the Alabama Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants (REP Pian) recognize the authority of the Health Officer to determine precautionary and protective actions to protect the public from excessive exposure to radiation. The IU3P Plan, rhe Alabama Emergency Management Agency Browns Ferry h'uclear Power Plant Standard Qperaiing Guide (SOG) and the Alabama Emergency Management Agency FixedNuclear

Facility Public inf~rmation-Edi~cQtioP? Stundard Operating Procedures also address the procedures for the release of infomation to the public. The latter states (page 1) Specifically the states role is to accomplish first notification to infom the affected public to evacuate or take protective actions.

That responsibility belongs to the affected county PIO. As a corollary, the SOG states @age 34) The decision to sheiter or evacuate will be made by Radiological Control Agency. The EOC will have the staff function to communicate directions to Birmingham Weuther -and advise the COUnty EOCs to noti& the puhlic.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The ARCA assessed against the State in the 2001 Browns Ferry exercise for carly release of protective action decisions (PAD) at the JIC was correctcd. As required by the Code of Alabama and the Alabama Radiological Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants, the Radiation Control Agency (RCA) issued the health orders for public warning and restricted access within two miles of the plant and subsequently the evacuation of sectors 4 E5, F5, E10 and F10. In each instance the correct standard operating procedures (SOP) were foflowed. The RCA issued the Health orders, sent them to AEMA, which then coordinated the PADs with Houston County. After the State of Georgia, Houston County and Early County, Georgia, concurred on the PADS, this information was then transmitted to the JIC, which appropriately briefed the media on the PADs. The JIC appropriately briefed the media on the PADs after the coordination process had been completed.

f. -

PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 Forward Emergency Operations Center

?he Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) F E W is co-located with the State Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center (SRMAC) and the Dothan-Houston County EOC. The location facilitates this AEMA liaison team in the execution of its forward coordination activities with Houston County, the adjacent States and the SRMAC. In addition to the face-to-face contact with adjacent States liaisons, SRMAC and county personnel, the FEOC has redundant communications capabilities that support its rapid and timely contact with the utility, the Georgia FEOC, and the Alabama Emergency Operation Center (AEOC) in Clanton. Personnel were well briefed on their h c t i o n s and ready to provide information to assist in the response activities.

a. MET: Criteria I.b.1, 1.d.l and 1.e.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

6. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 SRMAG - Montgomery The Radiation Control Agency (RCA) emergency response personnel were pre-assembled in a dedicated area of their Montgomery IIeadquarters. They established the SRMAC in Montgomery and provided the initial State radiological response. The SRMAC staff.

including the Director, were well trained, organized, and prepared. All necessary actions were performed in a highly effective and timely manner. Communications within the SRh4AC and with external organizations were productive and communications systems operated flawlessly. SRMAC faciiities accommodated the necessary staff and appropriate displays. The SRMAC Director was exemplary in his management of operations.

Control of the Montgomery SRMAC was transferred to the SRMAC in Dothan at 1130.

Although not required by the scenario, the SRMAC in Montgomery was capable of performing dose assessment.

a. MET: Criteriala.1; l.b.1; l.c.1; l.d.l>1.e.l and2.a.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRJZCTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 S M A C Dothan

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The § M A C in Dothan demonstrated the capability to evaluate radiation hazards and make timely PADS to protect the population. The staff was professional and demonstrated the technical ability to perform and interpret dose calculations. The staff coordinated with the utility liaison who provided information on changes in plant conditions and provided interpretation of the data. The staff also coordinated with the State of Georgia Dose Assessment Team to share information and coordinate decisions made for each State. Regular briefings were given by the SRMAC team leader to update the FEQC and the HIoslston County Emergency Operations Center (EQC) personnel. The staff performed their assigned duties in a timely and professional manner.

a. MET: CriteriaI.a.l,l.b.l,I.c.l,l.d.l,~.e.l,2.a.l,2.b.land2.c.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 13

E. AREAS REQUIRING COKRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PFUOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

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f. PMQR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.5 RadisBogicaal Field Monitoring Teams The two radiological field monitoring teams (FMTs) were pre-positioned at the Houston County I-Icalth Department. The FMTs were knouledgeable of their operating procedures and demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor the assigned areas and limit their radiological exposure.

a. MET: CriteYial.d.l,l.e.l.3.a.l,3.b.l,4.a.l,4.a.2and4.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NQNE

6. AREAS REQI[JIIRINC CORRECTIVE ACTIQN: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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2. JOINT OPERATIONS 2-1 Emergency Operations Facility The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is an excellent facility from which all participating response organizations can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations. Communications, coordination and the flow of technical information between the utility operator and ail of the participating State and local g o v e m e n t officials were outstanding. All ofthe State and local g o v e m e n t offkials who were deployed to the EOF were well trained, followed applicable procedures; and overall, performed their respective responsibilities in an efficient and professional manner. All exercise criteria, as specified in (he Extent-of-Play Agreement, were successfuily demonstrated.

Io. MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.b.1, I.d.1 and 1.e.l.

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b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

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f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 Joint Information Center The JIC in Dothan, Alabama is a well designed, state of the art facility with all the appropriate media-conscious equipment, maps and briefing area. A separate Public Information Officer (PIO) work area is provided for the various utility, State and local officials to prepare for the news media briefings, public inquiries and disseminate news releases.

The PIOs from the utility, the States of Alabama, Florida and Georgia and Houston and Early Counties worked cooperatively and in a timely manner to coordinate the dissemination of information to the public and the news media. Three media briefings were conducted to inform the media of plant conditions, protective actions and public instructions. In addition. rumors identified by the public inquiry personnel were dispelled during the briefings. The representatives of Alabama, Georgia, Florida and Southern Company provided an excellent demonstration of their ability to deal with the media and provide timely and accurate information to the public.

a. MET: Criterial.a.1, l.b.l, l.c.1, l.d.1, I.e.1 and5.b.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 15

3. RISK JURISDICTION 3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Management Director and Assistant Director effectively managed EOC operations and provided excellent direction and control. 'The Director consistently coordinated with Early County, the States of Georgia and Alabama in the formulation and implementation of PAD§. He also involved the staff in the decision making process. The Assistant County Administrator was present and participated in exercise activities. The competent EQC staff were largely volunteers and included representatives from some County agencies. EOC briefings and agency updates were conducted. Radiation Control and utility personnel also provided briefings to the EOC staff. Activation of the Public Notification System (PNS), which included sounding the sirens, activation oftone alert radios and issuance of Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages was professionally accomplished.

a. MET: Criterial.a.l,~.b.1,~.c.l,i.d.l,i.e.l,~.c.l,3.c.l,S.a.landS.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

6. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE (8. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PNBIOW ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE s

f. PFUQR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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3.1.2 Forward Command Post The County Forward Command Post (FCP) was demonstrated through an out of sequence interview with the FCP Manager, a captain within the Dothan Police Department and a volunteer firefighter. These individuals were very well versed in their responsibilities.

Procedures were thoroughly covered for providing emergency workers entering the FCP with instruction on their specific area of deployment within the EPZ and providing them with the necessary dosimetry, monitoring equipment and KI. Procedures to track all response personnel within the EPZ and to monitor, and if necessary, decontaminate them upon returning to the FCP are in place.

a. MET: Criteria I.c.1 and 3.a.i.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 16

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.1.3 Protective Action for Schools Houston County successhlly demonstrated school relocation on August 20,2002.

Participants in the demonstration included a Secondary Supervisor from the School Superintendent's office, a counselor from Ashford Elementary School, the Transportation Bus Coordinator and the Houston County Emergency Management Director and Assistant Director. Personnel were very knowledgeable of school relocation procedures. Teachers are regularly trained on procedures as part of their in service training. All affected schools have relocation procedures and resources to successfully relocate students.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY NONE

c. AREAS WQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

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f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.1.4 Traffic and Access Control Points A Captain from the Dothan Police Department demonstrated traffic and access control fuoctions out-of-sequence during an interview on August 20,2002 in the Houston County EOC. The TCPs are identified in the DothadHouston County plan. The FCP Manager directs a law enforcement lead officer to activate the TCPs. The major TCPs are staffed with m officer while a county maintenance crew sets up barricades at the non-staffed locations.

The Captain demonstrated an excellent knowledge of traffk and access control functions and impediment removal. He has had extensive experience in situations that routinely occur in the county. He was also knowledgeable of dosimetry, the use of KI and shelter locations. Dosimetry was available for the officer during the interview.

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a. MET: Criteria3.a.1.3.d.l and3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING COrPlRECTPVE ACTION: NQNE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE

4. STATE OF GEQRGIA 4.1 Fopward Emergency Operations Center The Georgia Emergency Management Agency JGEMA) FEOC is co-located with the Early County EOC The GEMA staff, Georgia Department of Agriculture and Department of Natural Resources (DNR) team quickly transformed an empty room into a fully operational direction and control center. The decisionmaking process coupled with frequent staff briefings was effective and consistent with the extent-of-play. The interaction with Early County and the State of Alabama in coordinating PADS was excellent. Communication systems worked \veil throughout the exercise.

a. MET: Criterial.a.1; 1,b.l;ls.l; l.d.1; l.e.l;2.a.l;2.b.2and5.a.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CQ13RECTIVE ACTION: NONE (8. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RE§OLVED: NONE

f. PRIQR ARGAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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4.2 Dose Assessment Tne Georgia DNR, dose assessment staff operated in the FEOC They discussed protective action recommendations (PARs) with the GEMA Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC). The PARs were then provided to the Governors Authorized Representative (GAR) to make a decision. Personnel understood their responsibilities, followed plans, and successfully demonstrated their ability to provide an independent 18

dose assessment capability and meaningful technical infomation. Members of the dose assessment staff were professional and displayed a positive attitude.

a. MET: Criteria l.b.1, l.d.1, l.e.l,2.a.l,2.b.I and2.b.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. KOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE CL PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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5. RISK JURISDICTION 5.1 EARLY COUNTY 5.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC staff were knowledgeable of responsibilities, followed plans and successfully demonstrated the ability to respond to an emergency at the Farley Nuclear Power Plant.

The Emergency Management Director, County Commissioner, Operations Manager and staff worked efficiently in performing their duties throughout the exercise. Although Eariy County was not required to evacuate, it coordinated well with the States of Georgia and Alabama and Houston County. EAS messages were disseminated alerting the public to the incident and asking them to stay tuned for additional information.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1, l.b.1, I.c.1, l.d.19 l.e.I$ 2.a.l,2.c.l, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. -

PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 19

5.1.2 Traffic Control Points The County Sheriffs Department and Georgia State Patrol cooperatively established a network of manned and unmanned TCPs designed ?O facilitate evacuation and deny reentry to the area. This information was effectively displayed in the EOC and briefed to the officers manning the TCPs. The officers were issued complete emergency worker kits and were knowledgeable ofthe kits use5 and reporting requirements. They displayed knowiedgc of procedures to remove evacuation impediments and turn back people attempting to enter the hazard area. Personnel were also knowledgeable of backup route alerting procedures, policies arid routes.

$3. MET: Criteria l.d.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.l and3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE (8. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESQLVED: NQNE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESBLYED: NONE

~

5.13 Reception Center and Congregate Case The reception center and congregate care facility were co-located at the Early County High School. This facility was laid out efficiently, with an effrctive traffic pattern that isolated decontamination facilities from the main shelter area and insured the best use of the allotted floor space. The Congregate care staff were knowledgeable and enthusiastic, and displayed a broad understanding of shelter management practices. The decontamination staff were knowledgeable of their duties and established an effective decontamination line. Their knowledge of radiation detection equipmcnt and decontamination procedures allowed them to identi6 all simulated contamination and enswe the proper decontamination procedures were perfomied. Radiation meters were effectively utilized and low range dosimetry was distributed to the emergency workers, however, thermoluminescent dosimeters JTLD) were not issued.

a. MET: Criteria l.d.196.a-126.b,land6.c.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: YE§ Issue No.: 22-02-3.a.l-A41

Condition: TLDs were not issued to reception center and emergency worker decontamination personnel.

Possible Cause: For this out-of-sequence demonstration, the State Liaison Oficer agreed to issue dosimetry to emergency workers for the County. He did not issue TLDs because he did not bring a sufficient supply of them and did not know that the extent-of-play agreement allowred for the use of simulated TLDs.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, K.3. and extent-of-play agreement. sub-element 3.a.

Effect: Since TLDs were not issued, emergency workers did not have a permanent record of their radiological exposure.

Recommendation: Issue TLDs to all workers according to established procedures.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State Liaison Officer immediately corrected the issue by giving each Emergency Worker a simulated TLD as stated in the EOP.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

~

f. -

PKIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 5.1.4 Emergency Worker Decontamination Monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and equipment wits demonstrated at the Early County High School. The personnel were fully knowledgeable of the plan and procedures they were to follow and performed in an excellent manner. The contaminated emergency workers were monitored and transported to the reception center for decontamination. Dosimetry was distributed, however, TEDs (simulated or otherwise) were not given to the persomei working at the emergency worker and equipment monitoring and decontamination functions.

a. M E T Criteria l.d.l,6.a.l and6.b.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA in the preceding Reception and Congregate Care Section.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

^.

e. PWOW ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE

6. STATE OF FLORIDA 6.1 FLORIDA STATE LIAISON TEAM 6.1.1 Florida State Emergency Response Team The Florida State Emergency Response Team (FSERT) deployed to the Alabama F E W .

The role ofthe FSER'T in support of an accident at the Farley Nuclear Power Plant is primariIy a liaison function, however, the FSERT still retains the capability to assume direction and control if required. This was aptly detnonstrated when it was anticipated that an actual airp'port disaster situation would require the Florida SEOC to discontinue exercise participation. The co-location ofthe FSERT Bith the SRMAC and liaisons from AEMA and GEMA facilitates the exchange of information and required coordination.

The FSERT communications provides the team with redundancy for both verbal and data transmission. The FSERT personnel were proactive in their coordinating within the FEOC, as well as in their interaction with the Florida SEOC and Florida's 50-mile ingcstion counties.

a. MET: Criteria 1.c.l- 1,d.I and 2.b.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AFUZAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTHQN: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE E. PRIOR ARCAS -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PNOR ARCAS -UNRESOLVED: NONE 22

7.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 7.1 2002 ARCA - IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED 7.1.1 22-02-3.a.l-A-01 Condition: ILIls were not issued to Early County reception center and emergency worker Reception Center/ decontamination personnel Congregate Care Possible Cause: For this out-of-sequence demonstration, the State Liaison Officer agreed to issue dosimetry to emergency workers for the County. He did not issue TLDs because he did not bring a sufficient supply of them and did not know that the extent-of-play agreement allowed for the use of simulated TLDs.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, K.3. and extent-of-play agreement, sub-element 3.a.

Effect: Since TLDs were not issued, emergency workers did not have a permanent record of their radiological exposure.

Recommendation: Issue TLDs to all workers according to established procedures.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State Liaison Officer immediately corrected the issue by giving each Emergency Worker a simulated TI,D as stated in the EOP.

7.2 PRIOR ARCA RESQLVED 7.2.1 07-01-11-A-01

Description:

A systematic problem was SEOC identified concerning infomation flow and release of information to the public, therefore, this ARCA has been placed at the SEOC for resolution. At 1226 Emergency Health Orders 3 and 4 were issued. These Health Orders directed the evacuation of zones A-2, B-2, F-2, (3-2, A-5 and G-5, as well as, shelter-in-place zones EI-IO,H-10, J-23

10, K-10, A-10 and (3-10. This information was received by the JIC at 1227 and transmitted to the SEOC, who provided thc information to the counties. The JIC was having a briefing at 1230 and this infomation was communicated to the media during that briefing. AEMA also issued a press release at 1245 detailing the evacuation and shelter information.

At 1238 the counties concurred on the protective actions indicated in the Health Orders and agreed to activation of the sirens at 1248 and issue the EAS messages between 1248 and 1250.

The Code ofAlahama and the Alabama Radiologicai Emergency &spoiise Piair for

,Vuclear Power Plants (REP Plan) recognize the authority of the Health Officer to determine precautionary and protective actions to protect the pubfic from excessive exposure to radiation. The REP Plan, the Alabama Emergency ibfunagementAgency Browns Ferry Nucuclear Power Plant Standard Operatirig Guide (SOG) and the Alabama Emergency Management Agency Fixed Nuclear Facility Public Information-Education S!aradard Operating Procedures also address the procedures for the release of infomation to the public. The latter states (page 1) Specifically the states role is ROf to accomplish first notification to inform the affected public to evacuate or take protective actions. That responsibility belongs to the affected county PIO. As a corollary, the SOG states @age 37) The decision to shelter or evacuate will be made by Radiological Control Agency. The EOC will have the staff function to communicate directions to Birmingham Wearher -and advise the county EOCs to notify the public.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The ARCA assessed against the State in the 2001 24

Browns Feny exercise for early release of protective action decisions (PAD) at the JIC was corrected. As required by the Code of Alabama and the Alabama Radiological Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants, the Radiation Control Agency (RCA) issued the health orders for public warning and restricted access within two miles of the plant and subsequently the evacuation of sectors A, E5, F5, E10 and F1Q. In each instance the correct standard operating procedures (SOP) were followed. The RCA issued the Health orders, sent them to AEMA, which then coordinated the PADs with Houston County. After the State of Georgia, Houston County and Early County, Georgia, concurred on the PADs, this information was then transmitted to the JIC, which appropriately briefed the media on the PADs. The JIC appropriately briefed the media on the PADs after the coordination process had been completed.

25

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The folloking is a list ofthe acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ADPH Alabama Department of Public Health ADEM Alabama Department of Enviironmenlal Management AEMA Alabama Emergency Management Agency ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action IINR Department of Natural Resources EAS Emergency Alert System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FCPO Forward Command Post FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FMT Field Monitoring Teams F-SERT FIorida State Response Team GE General Emergency GEMA Georgia Emergency Management Agency JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654EEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 Criteriafor Preparation and

~

Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980 OR0 Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation PI0 Public Information Officer PNS Public Notification System 26

RAC Regional Assistance Committee RCA Radiation Control Agency RCCC Reception CcnteriCongregate Care REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emnergcncy Operations Center

§&MAC State Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center T&AC:P Traffic and Access Control Point TLB Thermoluminescent Dosimeter USDA U. S. Department of Agriculture USCO U. S. Coast Guard 27

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Farley Nuclear Power Plant exercise on August 21,2002. The organization represented by each evaluator is indicated by the following abbreviations:

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency ICF - ICF Incorporated NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission USCG - US. Coast Guard Lawrence A. Robertson CO-RACChairman EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Chief Evaluator Robert Perdue FEMA STATE OF ALABAMA SEQC (Clanton, AL) Lawence Robertson FEMA John Grijak FEMA FEOC (Dothan) & Florida F-SERT Bill Idmabee ICF Emergency Operations Facility Robert Trojanowski NRC Radiation Control (Montgomery) Charles Phillips ICF Dose Assessment (Dothan) Deborah Blunt ICF (2) Rad. Field Monitoring Teams Walter G a d & ICF Tommy Brown ICF Joint Information Center Tom Reynolds FEMA RISK COUNTY HOUSTON COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Robert Perdue FEMA David Springer USCG 28

Protective Actions for Schools Robert Perdue FEMA 8-20-02 (out-of-sequence) 8-20-02 Forward Command Post Robert Perdue FEMA (out-of-sequence)

Traffic Cont~olPoints 8-20-02 David Springer IJSCG (out-of-sequence)

STATE OF GEORGIA Fornard Emerg. Operations Center Eddie Rickman FEMA Dose Assessment IIarry Harrison ICF RISK COUNTY EARLY COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Helen Wilgus FEMA Obhie Robinson FEMA Traffic Control Points Bbhie Robinson FEMA Reception CentedGongregate Care Helen Wilgus FEMA Out-of-sequence 8-2 1-02 Obhic Xobinson FEMA EW Decontamination Helen Wilyus FEMA Out-of-sequence 8-2 1-02 Qbhie Robinson FEMA 29

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix contains the exercise criterion which were scheduled for demonstration in the Farley Nuclear Power Plant exercise on August 21,2002 and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region 1V.

A. Exercise Criteria B. Extent-of-Play Agreement The extent-of-play agreements on the following pages were submitted by the States of Alabama and Georgia, and were approved by FEMA Region IV, in preparation for the Farley Nuclear Power Plant exercise on Augusta 21,2002.

30

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 July 25,2002 Samuel Guenera, Branch Chief Alabama Emergency Management Agency Post Office Drawer 2 160 Clanton, Alabama 35046-2160

Dear Mr. Guenera:

The exercise criteria and Extent of Play agreement far the Farley Nuclear Power Plant full participation plume pathway exercise scheduled for August 21,2002 have been accepted with the foliowing clarifications:

• Sub-element 1.d. 1 Communications Equipment.

Under the EOP where ORC is listed, we included the Field Monitoring Teams.

e Sub-elements 3.d.I and 3.d.2.

Since impediments to evacuation are normally related to traffic and access control, we recommend that Sub-element 3.13.2 be discussed during the demonstration of Sub-element 3.d.l.

Sub-element 5.a Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System.

We recommend that the Prompt Alerting and Notification system be explained thoroughly at the Federal evaluator's meeting on Tuesday, August 20,2002.

Should you have questions, please contact me at 470!220-5464 Sincerely, d / *

&E. Perdue, EiLlPS Technologicai Services Branch

STATE OF ALABAMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 5898 COUNTY KO4D 41 S P O DRANZK 2160 S CLANTON.AIABAMA 35Wb-2lblJ (205) 280-2200 FAX # (205) 280-2495 DON SIEGELMAN GOVERNOR LEE HELMS July 24,2002 A C T N O DIRECTOR Dr. Robert Perdue FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Bear Br. Perdue:

Here is the revised Extent o f Play. Some o f the items that ~ O questioned U were not under the correct Criterion, but we did address them.

AI! of the meetings and out of sequence will be held at the DothaniWouston County EOC.

Please contact me at (205) 280-2474.

Sincerely, Sam Guerrera Tech Hazards Branch Chief

State of Alabama Alabama Emergency Management Agency Alabama Department of Public Aealth, Oflice of Radiation Control Dothanilfouston C Q M Emergency R~~ Management Agency EXTENT OF PLAY FARLEY NPP July 8, 2002 Other than the exceptions noted in the Extent of Play Agreement, all exercise areas will be demonstrated for evaluation in accordance with the Alabama Radiological Emergency Plan, the respective site-

State of Alabama Alabama Emergency Management Agency Alabama Department of Public Health, Office of Radiation Control Dotban/Houston County Emergency Management Agency EXTENT OF PLAY FARLEY NPP July 24,2002 Revision 1 Other than the exceptions noted in the Extent of Play Agreement, all exercise areas will be demonstrated for evaluation in accordance with the .4labama Radiological Emergency Plan, the rcspcctive site-specific plan and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures or Guides It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be correctcd immediately, at all player locations, if it isn't disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator. This is a very useful and valuable option and offers the opportunity to expand the training benefits available in an "exercise environment."

EVALUATION AREA: 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.a- Mobilization Criterion 1-a.1 ORQs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilue emergency personnel, and activate facilities in a timely manner.

(NUREG-0654, A.4,D.3,4,E.1 32,I.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

AEMA (Alabama Emergency Management Agency)

AEMA will simulate alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency personnel. Personnel will be pre-positioned at the Alabama Emergency Operations Center (AEOC), State Liaison Office, Joint Information Center (JIC) and other locations. AEMA will demonstrate ability to receive notification from the licensee (IAW the REP Plan) and verify the notification. The facilities will demonstrate activation in a timely manner scenario dependent. Pre-positioning is necessary due to the compression of the scenario and the distances involved in traveling to the various locations.

• ORC (Alabama Office Of Radiation Control)

The Office of Radiation Control will simulate alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency personnel. Personnel will be pre-positioned at the Dothan SRMAC room in the Houston County EMA Office, and the Joint Information Center (JIC). Radiation Control will demonstrate the ability to receive notification from the licensee and verify

the notification. The facilities will demonstrate activation in a timely manner scenario dependent.

o DHCEMA (DothanMouston County EMA)

The DothadHouston County EMA staff will be prc-positioned until 8:OO am, at which time normal duty hours begin.

Staff consists of Shelby Womack, Brenda Dunning, Charles Finney, and Roshanda Walker. Administrative vuluntccr support personnel will also be pre-positioncd along with the DothadHouston County staff.

Sub-element 1.b -Facilities Criterion 1.b.I: Facilities are sufficjent to support the emergency response.

(NhTWEG-OB54,H)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

e AEMA The Alabama Emergency Operations Center, Forward Emergency Operations Center, and Joint Information Center (JIC) will demonstrate facility capabilities, scenario dependent.

9 ORC The Montgomery Emergency Room, the Dothan SRMAC, and the Joint Information Center (JIC) will demonstrate facility capabilities, scenario dependent.

e DHCEMA The Dothan EOC and the Joint Infomation C a t e r (JIC) will demonstrate facility Cdpdbilitis, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 1.c-Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.l: Keg personnel with leadership roles for the O R 0 provide direction and control to that past of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654,A.B ed.,2.a.,b-)

EXTENT OF PLAY a AEMA In accordance with the Alabama Radiological Response Plan and the Farley Standard Operating Guide, direction and control will be demonstrated by AEMA, only at the Alabama Emcrgency Operations Center, scenario dependent.

9 ORC Radiation Control will demonstrate direction and control from the Montgomery Emergency Room and thc Dothan SRMAC, scenario dependent.

o DIICEMA DHCEMA will demonstrate direction and control from the Dothan EOC, scenario dependent.

Sub-Element 1.d- Communications Equipment Criterion 1.d.l: At least t w o communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications links are established and maintained with appropriate Iocations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG4654, F.1.,2.)

EXTENT OF PLAY 0 AEMA The Alabama Emergency Management Agency will demonstrate communication capabilities at appropriate locations (AEOC, FEOC, and JIC), and between governmental agencies, scenario dependent.

0 ORC Radiation Control will demonstrate communication capabilities at the appropriate locations (Montgomery Emergency Room, the Dothan SRMAC, and the JIC), and between governmental agencies, scenario dependent.

DHCEMA DHCEMA will demonstrate Communication capabilities &om the Dothan EOC and JIC, scenario dependent.

Sub-element l.e- Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion l.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

(NUREG-0654, H., J., lOa.b.c.e.f.j.k.,ll,K.3.a.)

EXTENT OF PLAY 0 AEMA AEMA will have available equipment, maps, and displays that would be necessary to support emergency operations at the AEOC, FEOC and JIC, scenario dependent.

Dosimetry and KI are not applicable.

• ORC Radiation Control will have available equipment, maps, and displays, that would be necessary to support emergency operations at the Montgomery Emergency Room, Dothan SRMAC, and JIC, scenario dependent. Dosimetry and KI will be available for field teams, scenario dependent.

0 DMCEMA An adequate supply of TLDs and dosimetry are available for the emergency workers.

This Evaluation area will be discussed out of sequence in the Dothan EOC during the 2002 FEMA Staff Assistance visit.

E VAL UAT I O N AREA 2: PROTECTIVE AcTrOx DECJSION M AKI NG Sub-element 2.a-Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is a'n place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits o r protective action guiples.(NUBaF,G-Og54,K.4.)

EXTENT OF PLAY a AEMA Not Applicable

• ORC Radiation Control will dnnonstrate emergency worker exposure control decision-making, for the State Radiological Monitoring Field Teams only? scenario dependent.

e DHCEMA Not R p p l i c d k In accordance with the Alabama REP Plan, and the DothadHouston County REP Plan, IIouston County Emergency Workers do not contact ORr, directly, if they are to exceed designated exposure limits.

Sub- element 2.b Wadiologkaf Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.B: Approprialte protective action recommendations are based On available information on plant conditions, field monitoring, data, and licensee and O R 0 dose projections, as well as haw,ledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I-$., lo., 1 8 . and Snppkment 3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY e AEMA Not Applicable 8 ORC Radiation Control will demonstrate radiological assessment for the plume phase of the emergency, scenario dependent.

e DHCEMA Not Applicable

Criterion 2.h.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if O R 0 policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9., 10.m)

EXTENT OF PLAY AEMA Not Applicable. In Accordance with the Alabama REP Plan, PdgesA-Z,A-3,B-l, U-IO,B-

16. The ORC is responsible for issuing the PADs. However after a PAD is issued, AEMA reserves the right to review, and or recommend the PAD be changed due to any mitigating circumstances (road conditions, weather condition, etc.)

• ORC Radiation Control will demonstrate the decision-making process to make protective action decisions for the general public, scenario dependent.

DHCEMA Not Applicable Not Applicable. In Accordance with the Alabama REP Plan, PagesA-2,A-3,B-1, B-10,B-16. The ORC is responsible for issuing the PADs. However after a PAD is issued, D/HC EMA reserves the right to review. and or recommend the PAD be changed due to any mitigating circumstances (road conditions, weather condition, ctc.)

Sub-element 2.c-Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NCREG-0654, J.9., 10.c.d.e.g)

EXTENT OF PLAY

• AEMA Not Applicable

• ORC Not Applicable 0 DHCEMA DIICEMA will demonstrate from the Dothan EOC, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 2.d-Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway This Sub-element will not be evaluated this exercise finestion elernentl.

Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the O R 0 planning criteria. (NUREG-0654,1.8, J.11)

Siaab-eiesnent 2.e- RadiologicaI Assessnient and Decision-Making (Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return This Sub-ehterb will not be ~ v ~ I uthis u ~ Q ~ (imwtion elrmeiif) exercise (Criterion 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, Rased ow assessments of the radiologienl conditions and criteria in the ORQs

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMEKIATION Sub-element 3.a- Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.l; The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NWREG-0654, K.3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY

• AEMA Not Applicable OKC Radiation Control will demonstrate the implementation of emergency worker exposure control, for State Radioiogical Monitoring Field Teams only. scenario dependent.

DHCEMA Emergency workers will discuss usage of equipment (as dcscnbed in 1 .e. 11, out of sequence, Tuesday. August 20,2002 at 5 3 0 PM, in the DothadHouston County EOC.

The Forward Command Post Director is responsible for issuance of appropriate dosimetry to DothadHouston County EMA emergency workers.

Sub-element 3.h- Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.h.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made appropriate record keeping of the administration of MI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J.lO.e.,f.)

EXTENT OF PLAY AEMA Not Applicable. AEMA does not issue KI or make decisions pertaining to issuance of KI.

ORC Radiation Control will demonstrate the decision making capability for making KI available to the State Radiological Monitoring Fieid Teams only, scenario dependent.

DHCEMA This element will not be demonstrated. DothamHC EMA does not make the decision to issue KI.

Sub-element 3.c.B- Implementation of Protective Actions For Special Populations Criterion 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than sehools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, E.7.,

J.9., I0.s.d.e.g.)

EXTENT OF PLAY 0 AEMA Not Applicable 0 QKC Not Applicable 0 DHCEMA Will be discussed with applicable personnel from the Dothan EOC, scenario dependcnt.

Contact with special poputations, reception facilities, and transportation providers will be simulated.

Criterion4.c.2: OROS/SC~~QB officials decide to implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.lOx.&g.)

EXTENT OF PLAY 0 AEMA Not Applicable 0 ORC Not Applicahle 0 DIICEMA This Evaluation Area will be discussed out of sequence, with applicable personnel, in the Dothan EOC, Tuesday, August 20,2002, at 6 2 0 PM.

Sub-element 3.d- Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffk and access control is established.

Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

(NE'REG- 0654, J.BO.g, j., kJ EXTENT OF PLAY 0 AEMA Will simulate contacting applicable rail and air traffic authorities, scenario dependent at the AEOC QRC Not Applicable 0 DWCEMA

This criterion will be discussed out of sequence with applicable personnel, in our EOC, TUeSddy, August 20,2002, at 6:30 PM. Houston County Sheriff's Department, Houston County Road and Bridge Department, Alabama Department of Public Safety, and Ashford PD (if available) will participate.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.10., k.)

EXTENT OF PLAY e AEMA AEMA will demonstrate coordination of state resources assistance as needed by the County at the AEOC, scenario dependent.

• ORC Not Applicable DHCEMA The director of DHCEMA or his designee will discuss applicable procedures at the Dothan EOC, scenario dependent. Actual demonstrations will not be performed.

Sub-element 3.c- Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Sub-element 3.e. - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions This Sub-elenrent will not be evahated this exercise (inpesslion element).

Criterion 3.e.l: 'The O R 0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies. milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and per-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water. food products, milk and agricultural production.

Sub-element 3.f.- Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions This Sub-clement wiN not be evaluated this exercise finzestion ekmcnt).

Criterion 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654. M.1,3.)

EYALUATBOK AREA 4: FIELED MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4,a- Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.l The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure ( c h d and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine am61 particulates. (NUREG-0654, M.10,1.8., 9., 1I )

EXTENT OF PLAY e AEMA Not Applicable 8 ORC Radiation Control will demonstrate plume phase field measurements and analyses,

. . .~

scenario dependent. . . . ~- . . . ..* : vill be cvaluated. Fieid teams will simulate using booties and gloves fbr contamination control.

all Field Monitoring equipment will be available for the federal evaluators to examine.

Field teains will be pre-positioned at the Houston County Health Department parking lot.

e DHCEMA Not Applicable Criterion 4.a.2: Field measurement teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

(NUFtEG-0654, I.$., BI., d.lB1.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY AEMA Not Applicable e OKC Radiation Control will demonstrate plume phase field measurements and analyses, scenario dependent. Two fieid tcams will be evaluated. Field teams will simulate using booties and gioves for contamination control.

8 DHCEM.4 Not Applicable Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulates samples are collected.

T e a m will move to an appropriate low background Becation to determine whether significant cas specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been colliected on the sampling media. (NUKEG-0654, H.S., 9., 11.)

EXTENT OF PLAY AEMA Not Applicable

• ORC Radiation Control will inonstrate plume phase field measurements and analysis procedures, scenario dependent. Radioiodine sample procedures wlll be demonstrated in the parking lot of the Houston County Health Department before being deployed into the field. Due the compression ofthe scenario. radioiodine sampling will be simulated in the field during the exercise, scenario dependent. Field teams will simulate using booties and gloves for contamination control.

• DHCEMA Not Applicable Suh-element 4.h-Post Plume Phase Field Measurement and Sampling This Sub-element will not be evaluated this exercise fin.pestion element).

Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g. food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, I.S., J.11.)

Sub-element 4.c-Laboratory Operations TI& Sub-element will not be evaluated this exercise (inpestion element).

Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3.. I.&, Y.,

J.11)

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a- Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5,a.l; Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the pubsic are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an e p n e r g ~ n ~situation.

y The initial instructiona1 message must include the ekments required by current FEhIA REP guidance. (10 CFR part 50, Appendix E 63 NGREG-06554, E.1.. 4., 5.,6., 7.)

EXTENT OF PLAY e AEMA Not Applicable e ORC Kot Applicable D DHCEMA Sirens will actually be activated for the initial PXS activation (a test message will be read prior lo the actual siren activation and will not be counted as any part of the timing of the actual activation process) and simulated for any and all subsequent messages. EAS message distribution to applicable EAS stations will be provided to applicable stations.

Reading of the message will be simulated at the D o h n EOC. The testing of tone alert radios is accomplished an a weekly basis. This will be demonstrated out of sequence a t approximately 11:W AM CDT, August 21,2002 at the DINC EOC.

Sub- clement 5.a.2-RESERCED Sub-element 5.a.3 Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is mmpleted within 45 minutes n g detection by the OW0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification f ~ l l o ~ i the system. (NUREG-0644, E.6., Appendix 3.b.2.c) e AEMA Not Applicable 0 ORC Not Applicable e DHCEMA This Evaluation Area will be demonstrated by a discussion between the evaluator and the Dothan43ouston County EMA Director or his designee only in case of PNS failure.

Sub-element 5.h.l- Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.S., 7., G.3.a.,

G.4,a., b., e.)

EXTENT OF PLAY 0 AEMA Evaluation Area 5, 5.b.1,will be demonstrated. Actual message distribution to the public and media will simulated, scenario dependent.

e ORC Evaluation Area 5, 5.b.1, will be demonstrated. Actual message distribution to the public and media will be simulated, scenario dependent.

0 DHCEMA Evaluation Area 5. 5.b. 1, will be demonstrated. Actual message distribution to the public and media will be simulated, scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATIONS/ FACILITIES This EvaPatution Are@will not be demonstrated for ti& exerci,se.

Sub-element 6.a- Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.l: The reception ccnter/emergency worker facility appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUWEG-0654. J.10.b.; K.5.b)

Sub-element 6.b- Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workcr Equipment Criterion 6.b.l: The 1FaciKtylORO has adequate prosedares and resources for the accomplishment of monitodng and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NCIREG-0654, K.5.b)

Sub-element 6.c- Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.e.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide scrvices and accommodations consistent with Amerieaa Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparation Qperations, ARC 3031), Managers demonstrate the procedures to 3ssure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.h., 12.)

Sub-element 6.d-Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.l: The faciBlty/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resource^, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services Bo contaminated in-jured individuals.

(NUREG-0654, F.2, I.lO., K.5.a.b., Ll., 4.)

TABLE 2

.EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC MFo

. . ~

.... .. . _ ' I .

i

Extent of Play Agreement Farley June 12,2002 Other than the exceptions noted in the Extent of Play Agreement, all exercise areas will be demonstrated for evaluation in accordance with the Georgia Radiological Emergency Base Plan, the respective site-specific plan and appropriate Standard Qperating Procedures.

It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise piay be corrected immediately, at all player locations, if it isn't disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator. This is a very useful and valuable option and offers the opportunity to expand the training benefits available in an "exercise environment."

(1) Emerqency Operations Nlanaaernent Mobilization (l.a)

(Criterion l a 11 State personnel will be pre-positioned.

Facilities (4.b)

(Criterion 1.b.7)

Direction and Control (1.c)

(Criterion 7 .GI) Simulated Direction and Control will occur through the State Operations Center (SOC)in Atlanta until the Fonnrard Emergency Operations -

Center (FEOC) in Blakely, Early Cqunty is operational.

Communications Equipment (1.d)

(Criterion l.d.1)

Equipment and Supplies t o Support Operations (1.e)

(Criterion 1.e.q) Practice or simulated TLDs will be furnished to the emergency workers and KI will be simulated.

( 2 ) Protective Action Decision Makinq Emergency Worker Exposure Control (2.a)

(Criterion 2.a.l.)

05-31-02 1

Radiological Assessment and Protective Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the FErnesgency (2b)

(Criterion 2.b.9.)

(Criterion 2.b.2.)

Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations (2.e)

(Criterion 2.c.I)

Radiological Asse3sment and deeisi6n-Making for the Ingestion Pathway (2.d)

[Criterion 2.d.a) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Radiological assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry and Return (2.e)

(Criterion 2.e.a) This Evaluation Area wjii not be demonstrated (3) Protective Action Brnpiernentation Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control (3.a)

(Criterion 323.4.) Emergency workers in Bow exposure rate areas wiil be furnished practice or simulated TLDs (as described in 4.e.l)and may place a direct reading dosimeters in a centralized area as a area monitor. #I will be simulated.

Implementation of Ki Decision (3.b)

(Criterion 3.b.l.)

Implementation of Protective Actions for special P o p ~ l a t i o n( 3~x 1 (Criterion 3 . ~ ~ 4 . )

(Criterion 3 x 2 ) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Brnplementation of Traffic and Access Control (3.d)

(Criterion 3.d.l.) This criterion will be evaluated by interview of law enforcement officers in the Blakely, Early County EOC. Actual demonstrations will not be performed.

(Criterion 3.d.2.) Should an impediment occur, the Blakely, Early County EMA Director or his designee will discuss procedures. Actual demonstrations will not be performed.

115-31.02 2

Implementation of ingestion Pathway Decisions (3.e)

(Criterion 3 . e . l ) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

(Criterion 3.e.2) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions (3.f)

(Criterion 3.f.l) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

(4) Field Measurement and Analysis Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analysis ( 4 4 (Criterion 4.a.l)

(Criterion 4.a.2)

(Criterion 421.3)

Post Plume P h a s e Field Measurements and Sampling (4.b)

(Criterion 4.b.l) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated Laboratory Operations ( 4 s )

(Criterion 4.6.1) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated

( 5 ) Emerqency Notification and Public Information Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System (5.a)

(Criterion 5.a.1.)

(Criterion 5.a.2.) This Evaluation Area will net be demonstrated (Criterion 5.a.3.) This Evaluation Area will be demonstrated by a discussion between the evaluator and the Early County EMA Director.

Emergency Information and fnstructions for the Public and the Media (5.b)

(Criterion 5.b.l.)

(6)Support Operations/ Facilities Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees [&a)

(Criterion 6.a.t.) This criterion will be demonstrated out of sequence at 5:OO pm on August 21, 2002. 6 6vacuees will be monitored. The Reception Center is located at Early County High School, Hwy 62, Blakely, GA 05.31-02 3

Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment (6.b)

(Criterion 6.b.l.) This item will be demonstrated out of sequence as described in 6.a.l. 2 vehicles will be monitored.

Temporary Care of Evacuees (6.c)

(Criterion 6.e.l.) This item will be demonstrated by interview, out of sequence as described in 6.a.4.

Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Individuals (6.~9)

[Criterion 6.d.q.) Early Memorial Hospital MS-I Exercise is not due demonstration.

05-11.02

S T A T E OF F L O R I D A DEPARTMENT Q F C O M M U N I T Y AFFAIRS

" D e d i c a t e d to m a k i n g F l o r i d a a b e t t e r p l a c e io c a l l h o m e "

June 10,2002 Dr. Robert Perdue RegionaI Director, Region IV Federal Emergency Management Asency 3003 Chaniblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

Dear Br. Purdue:

Attached are the Florida, Farley Nuclear Power Plant objectives and Extent of Play for the August exercise. Although the spreadsheet also shows Alabama and Georgia, it is meant only to represent the Florida objectives. Please contact Scott Nelson at 850-413-9896 or by e-mail at scott.ne1soncii)dca.state.fl.u~ if you have any questions.

ency Management MJD/sn V cc: Helen Wilgus Jerry Eakins Walt Lee Enclosures 2555 S H U M A R D OAK B O U L k V A R D Phone: 850.488.84661Sun;orn 2 7 8 . 8 4 6 6

- TALLAHASSEE, F L O R I D A 32399-2100 F A X : 8 5 0 . 9 2 1 . 0 7 8 1 1 S u n c o r n2 9 1 . 0 7 8 1 In i e r n e l a d d r e S I : h t t p : l t w w w . d c a . r t a t e . I I .u I

DATE AND SITE: August 21, 2002 - Farley Nuclear Power Plant (Aiabarna - Full Paraicipation)(Georgia/l;lorida - Partial Participation) 1 ELERlENTISasb-Element ALABAMA ALABAMA RAD HOUSTON/

HENRY GEORGIA EMA GEORGIA DNR EARLY COUNTY FLORIDA OEM FLORIDA Dot{

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1.c - Direction and Control :

Criterion 1.c.l: Key personnel with leadership roles for the O R 0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654,A.1.d; A.Z.a, b)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

FSERT: Will be pre-positioned in the Houston County EOC. 'The F-SERT will consist of an F-SERT Chief, PIO, ESF 5 (Information and Planning Chief), and ESF 8 (Department of EIealtWBureau of Radiation Control). Decisions will be made Joirrliy bctwxn the F-SEXT and the State EOC.

DOHIBRC: In agreement 1.d - CQmmunk!tions Equipment:

Criterion 1.d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.l, 2)

EXENT OF PLAY:

FSERT: In agreement DOWBRC: In agreement

2. PROTECJIVE ACTIONS DECISION-_MAKDJG 2.b- Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:

Criterion 2.b.I: Appropriate protective action rccommendatiom are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORQ dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. QVIJREG-0654,I.8,10and Supplement 3)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

FSERT: In agreement DOIVBRC: In agreement

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events, exercise scenario, which was used as the hasis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Farley Nuclear Power Plant exercise on August 21,2002.

31

n. SCENARIO Timeline 2 Page I of 2

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT RADlOLOGlCAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO TIMELINE cOW1O~UnALUmlL LWu.T It. m T~OFrCEOC rmw IIAFFED I I CONDUCT FACILIW CR(1IWES I /

I IfR1*IH*If I I I EYEACISE I

Om3 oaa I\ I SPWV PUMP FbllS io s i i n i I

CWl RIQ I A RWI MONITORS P W P IRIPS INDIUIF OH .m Vcim OVEPIDAO DEI Page 2 of 2

SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUkli?URY August 21,2002 The Exercise starts at 0700. At 0715 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) W-3368B fails closed and the main turbine f d s to automatically trip. The closure of the MSIV results in a high main steam pressure on the IB Steam Generator (SG).The pressure transient results in a small steam break (fault) OR the 16, SG inside Containment and an automatic Safety Injection (ST). The failure of the main turbine to automatically trip on closure of the MSIV results in a high s t e m flow condition and possible indications of some amount of failed fuel as indicated by radiation monitors RE-2 and 7 alarming. Additionally, several control rods fail to fully insert when the Safety Injection reactor trip occurs.

By approximately 0718. the Crew has indications that the 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump has tripped on overload and that the 1B RHR pup has failed IO automatically start. When the crew attempts to manually start the lB W R pump it will not stan.

At approximately 0721, the crew has indications that the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (TJMFW) pump is tripped.

By approximately 0733 the Control Room staff should declare an ALERT based on Emergency Implementing Rwedure (EP) 9.0, EAL A5.2. Equipment Failure Loss of both uains of W.Plant staff wiU start taking actions for an ALERT per EPP-9.0 guideline 3 and the TSC and EOF staffs will be called in to the plant. Within approximately 1.5 minutes. State mdor local notifications should be complete. Witkin 65 minutes, ERDS should be activated and NRC notifications complete. Within 75 minutes of the declaration. the TSC and EOF should have minimurn staff in place and start turning over to perform designated functions. The CEOC in Birmingham wiU also have staff available to support plant operations and news release generation. ahe Connol Room crew will continue to restore non-operable equipment to service while performing the procedurally directed actions of emergency procedures EEP-0, EEP-2, EEP-1,and ESP 1.1 At approximately 0830 the crew should have indications of a Reacior Coolant System (RCS) transient as indicated by lowering RCS pressure and inventory. Per procedure. the crew is expected to reinitiate SI, re-enter EEP-0. and secure the Reactor Cwlant Pumps in response to the plant changes.

By approximately 0835 the crew should have indications that the probable source of the leak is a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) in the faulted 1B SG.

By approximately 0848. Containment pressure has risen to greater than 7-9 psig resulting in Containment Spray and Phase B Containment isolation. When the Main Control Board is checked to verify proper spray operation, the I A Containment Spray Pump is found to tripped.

The Control Room crew will continue to restore Ron-operable equipment to service while Page 7

. performing the procedurally directed actions of emergency procedures EEP-0, FWP-%.1, ECP-

3. I , and FRP-B. I.

By approximately 0850 the Control Roam staff should declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on Emergency Implementing Procedure (W) 9.0, EAL SI.1. RCS Fault - A major 103s of primary ceolant or EAL S3.9 - D e p d e d Cose/Fue%Fault - RCS activity > 300 pCi/gm dose quivdewt 1-131 with potential excessive RCS leakage or potential loss of containment. Plant staff will start tadring actions for an S A E per EP-9.64 guideline 3. %f not aiready operational, the EOF staff will activate within 95 minutes of the decha¶on. Protected area accountability shou!d be complete within 30 minutes of ehe Plant Emergency Alarm (PEA) sounding.

At approximately 1030. the 1B CRDM Cooling fan trips on overload and the crew s m s the 1A CRDM Cooling fan by procedure. Additionally radiation monitors E-10. 14. and 22. alarm indicating a potential radioactive effluent release from the Containment into the Penetration Room of &e Auxiliary Building and out &e plant vent stack to the environment.

By approxirnateiy 10195 &e staff should d e t e d n e the need to upgrade the emergency classification to a GENEXAE EMERGENCY based e n EP-9.0, EAL G2.1. fission Product Banien - Loss of two of three f i s s i ~ nproduct barriers wirh a potential loss of the third. Once declared the plant staff should k g i n taking actions for a General Emergency per W - 9 guideline 1 while the crew continues actions per ECP-3.1 or 3.1.Within approximately 15 minutes. State and local notifications should 8, complete. P a s should include at a minimum !he recommendation to evacuate zones e, E5. F5 and Shriter E10. F10. Within approximatdy 60 minutes, NRC notifications should have k n completed.

The rdease path to environment is from eke failed BB CRDM Cooling fan elecwical penena~on..

It is anticipated that the actual leak source may not be identified prior to the end of the scenario due to the high energy release that is taking place in the electrical penetration room. it is also, therefore. not anticipated that &e leak from containment can be stopped prior to the end of the exercise due to the identification problems caused by the high energy releases and high dose rates i n the area where work would need to Be performed.

The News Media Center (Nh.IC) will be activated and staffed by representatives from SNC, APC,the State of Alabama, the State of Georgia, the State oh Florida. HoustoWHenry County.

and Early County. Media and public interest will be simulated and news releases will be prepared and released.

The exercise will terminate Once the radiation monitoring teams have uacked the plume, the EOF has been staffed and is performing EQF activities and the FdMC has conducted a press conference. The termination will be coordinated with the States of Alabama. Georgia, and Florida if xcurring prior to 1300 Central time to ensure that all objectives have been demOnsRated and that adequate mining lime has been allowed.

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