ML033580395
| ML033580395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  (DPR-051, NPF-006) |
| Issue date: | 11/21/2003 |
| From: | Merschoff E Region 4 Administrator |
| To: | Anderson C Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358, IR-01-006 | |
| Download: ML033580395 (47) | |
See also: IR 05000313/2001006
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
5 .!4(tt
SREGION
IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
.4 a~
t°ARLINGTON,
TEXAS 760114064
Craig G. Anderson, Vice President,
Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO BACKFIT CLAIM REGARDING NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 50-313101-06; 50-368101-06
Dear Mr. Anderson:
As documented in Inspection Report 50-313;368/2001-06, the NRC identified an unresolved
issue in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor (Fire Zone 98J) and the Unit 1 north
electrical switchgear room (Fire Zones 99M) conceming use of manual actions in lieu of
providing protection for cables associated with equipment necessary for achieving and
maintaining hot shutdown as specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. This
issue was considered unresolved pending further NRC review and the determination of its risk.
In a re-exit meeting held on August 30, 2001, the NRC informed Entergy that the use of
manual actions in lieu of ensuring cables or equipment of redundant trains of systems
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions were free of fire damage was a
violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. The issue remained unresolved
pending completion of the risk determination.
Your letter of September 28, 2001, claimed that our position that manual actions cannot be
used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. was a backfit. At issue is
your use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions in the event
of a fire in the Unit I emergency diesel generator corridor (Fire Zone 98J) and north switchgear
room (fire Zones 99M). In this letter, you asserted that the NRC has accepted such manual
actions in the past, and stated that our position with respect to disallowing the use of manual
actions for complying with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R should be considered a backfit that is
generic to all plants.
On October 26, 2001, and again on January 17, 2002, we convened a backfit panel in
accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of
Plant-Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in
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your letter of September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have
determined that (1) the NRC did not impose a regulatory staff position that is new or different
from a previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for
complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2 in the Unit 1 diesel generator
corridor and north switchgear room in lieu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IlI.G2.a, IlI.G.2.b, or IlI.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual
actions (in the event of a fire in the Unit I diesel generator corridor and north switchgear
room), in lieu of ensuring that one train of redundant equipment needed for achieving and
maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage, does not comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. The bases for these conclusions
are described in the Enclosure. Licensing basis documents we reviewed in reaching these
conclusions, and relevant excerpts and quotes from those documents are contained in the
Attachments. Accordingly, Unresolved Item 50-313;368/0106-02 has been reclassified as an
Apparent Violation pending NRC's assessment of the risk significance associated with this
finding.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at httn://www.nrc.Covlreadina-
rmlADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
iShould you have any questions concerni
tis matter, please contuCt me at (817) 8
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lor
Mr.
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Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
Enclosures: As stated
Dockets: 50-313; 50-368
cc: w/Enclosure
Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Karla Smith - Backtui letter 2 10 ANU won An,.wpa
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
David D. Snellings, Jr., Director
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867
Mike Schoppman
Framatome ANP, Inc.
Suite 705
1911 North Fort Myer Drive
Rossylin, Virginia 22209
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Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
W. F. Kane, DEDO
S. J. Collins, D:NRR
Regional Administrator (EWM)
Deputy Regional Administrator (TPG)
DRS Director (ATH)
DRP Director (KEB)
DNMS, Director (DDC)
K. D. Smith, RC (KDSI)
G. F. Sanbom, D:ACES (GFS)
ACES, Enforcement Staff (GMIV)
Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)
Branch Chief, DRPID (LJS)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (JFMI)
Senior Resident Inspector (RLB3)
ANO Site Secretary (VLH)
Chief, DRPITSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
G. M. Holahan, NRR
S. C. Black, NRR
S. A. Richards, NRR
R. J. Barrett, NRR
J. N. Hannon, NRR
OGC (GSM)
Scott Morris (SAMI)
M. R. Johnson, NRR
BGramm (RAG)
TAlexion (TWA)
NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
DOCUMENT: R,\\ ano2001\\1anO106backfit-rln.wpd
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ENCLOSURE5
BACKFIT ANALYSIS
In a letter dated September 28, 2al1, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), claimed that Region
IV's position that manual actions c nnot be used to/comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section Il.G.2. was a backfit, generall-pilantsg Backfitting is defined in 10 CFR 50.109 "as
the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the
design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization
required to design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new or
amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position
interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from a previously applicable
staff position..."
On October 26, 2001, the NRC convened a backfit panel to review Entergy's backfit claim as
presented in their letter of September 28, 2001, and accompanying attachments. As a result
of that meeting, the panel requested an evaluation of the following four key points presented in
Entergy's backfit claim.
I.
NRC's Past and Present Positions Regarding the Use of Manual Actions for
Meeting the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G
In their letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the NRC had accepted on many
occasions, including at ANO, the use of manual actionsfor complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Section
lil.
G.2
Entergv furtzer stated tha
In 1981, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection," and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50,
'Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1 was licensed in 1974, and Unit 2 was licensed in 1978;
therefore, for both units, the licensee was required to meet the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50,
ed that certain statements in NRC Inspection rer
provide an NRC position that permits the use of
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statements quoted by Entergy were taken trom thie dsption at the scope of the Mlpection,
not from the inspection findings section of the reports. The fire protection triennia inspection
scope consists of a review of the licensee's methodology for reaching safe shutdown,
including any manual actions that are credited in that methodology. These-scope-atatement_
are not anendorsement for the use of manual actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of _
Annpndiy R. merev statements desrrihinn what the inqnprtnrs reviewed
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Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, and 111.0.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G, "Fire protection of safe shutdown capability,"
provides the requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment needed for safe
shutdown is free of fire damage. As discussed in the Statements of Consideration for
10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, it is not possible to predict the conditions
under which fires may occur and propagate; therefore, the Commission established three
specific methods for protecting safe shutdown equipment so that at least one train remains
free of fire damage. These three methods are specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. The
first method is separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by 3-hour
fire rated barriers. The second method is a combination of separation of redundant safe
shutdown trains and associated circuits by a 1-hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire
suppression and detection capability. The third method is a combination of separation of
redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by 20 feet or more o)
pace and
automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the area. If these conditions cannot be
met, an exemption from Section III.G.2. or-analternathiver-dedicated
e shutdown capability
specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G 3,ieuie
Tie requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment needed for safe shutdown is
free of fire damage is described and discussed in numerous generic NRC documents such as,
Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R
o
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12
NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Program"
In addition, the NRC staff described the same specific requirements for ensuring one train of
safe shutdown equipment is free of fire damage in ANO-specific licensing basis documents,
such as safety evaluation reports and exemptions. In these documents, the NRC restated the
requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G. and discussed the three methods for ensuring that
one train of equipment and cables necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions was free of fire damageas required by Section III.G.2. The NRC further explained
that if these methods could not be met, then an alternative fire protection configuration must
be provided in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R.
Conclusion The regulations, statements of consideration, and generic correspondence, as
well as ANO-specific documentation are In agreement concerning the use of manual actions
for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions Ad required In Section III.G of Appendix
R to 10 CFR Part 50. As these documents show, the NRC has not in the past and does not
currently consider manual actions to be acceptable for complying with 1 QCFR Pa 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G.2, unless specifically reviewed anda-rov
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panel concludes that the position to disallow the use of manual actions for meeting
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2 is not an imposition of a regulatory staff position
interpreting the Commission rules that-d.either new or different from a previou
staff position. Therefore, this =oiton is not a backf
II.
ANO's Position Regarding 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy summarized their position concerning the use of
manual actions for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G as:
01.
The use of manual actions to operate components .... outside the fire area is permitted
by IOCFR50 Appendix R, Section 111.G. I and does not violate Section IIL.G.2;
2.
Compliance with IOCFR50 Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2 does not require protective
features on circuits that are not required to function and, therefore, are not necessary
systems required to achieve safe shutdown, and regardless of fire damage cannot
prevent the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions.
Section lll.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides the overall fire protection objective to
protect equipment so that in the event of a fire in any fire area: a. one train o
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necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (from either the co
rol room or emergerc'y
control stations) is free of fire damage; and bMms
cessary for reaching
cold shutdown conditions (from either the contrworoom or emergen
control stataonja _ b6,
repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Section IlI.G.1.a. can be met by ensuring safe shutdow-
--
is free from fire damage as specified In Section III.G.2, or by using an alternative safe
shutdown capability specified in Section III.G.3. While Section Il.G.1 .a. contemplates the use
of manual actions, these are provided In the context of alternative or dedicated shutdown
under Section Il.G.3.
Section III.G.2 provides three acceptable methods for ensuring
ecessary
for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. Nori of these
methods permits the use of manual actions to mitiqate the effects of a fire on safe shutdown
equipment. Rather, these methods have the objective of preventing fire damage through the
use of specific protection features. Section lll.G.2 also requires these same fire
otection.n
features for circuits whose daae(y fire) c
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safe
shutdow
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If a licensee cannot meet the requirements of Section llI.G.2 for certain fire areas, then an
alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is required as outlined in Section lll.G.3 of
Appendix R. Under Section IllG:,,3, manual actions may be taken. The goals and
requirements associated with alternative and dedicated shutdown capability are specified in
.
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Section III.L of Appendix R, and include a requirement that alternative shutdown capability be
implemented by procedure. Another option would be for the licensee to request an exemption
from those portios o
onI.G2 that cannot be
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nconusio n: Fqr thy NO plant, Entergy must meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,
Section lIl.G.A
d%
NII.G.2 or III.G.3 for the protection of equipment necessary for
chieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, or request an exempbon.Section III.G.2
/provides three specific methods for preventing fire damage to (1) equipment and cables
necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown, and (2) circuits whos.Igdkcould
adversely.affect safe shutdown.Section III.G.3 provides the option of using alternative'
dedicated shutdown capability for those fire areas in which the licensee cannot meet the
requirements of Section III.G.2. Therefore, the licensee's methodology to credit the use of
manual actions for meeting the requirements of Section III.G.2 is not permitted, unless these
actions are specifically reviewed and approved by the NRC and documented in a safety
evaluation report.
Ill.
NRC Review and Approval of Manual Actions for Meeting the Requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G in 14 Fire Zones at ANO
A summary of a meeting between NRC and ANO documented by the NRC in a letter
date,!tmbe 3 19
ANO rsponsetotheRAIdated October5, 1982_
The subject line of the meeting summary of September 3, 1982, reads, "SUMMARY OF
MEETING WITH ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (AP&L) ON AUGUST 31,
1982, CONCERNING THE ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTO
CAPABILITY IN THE EVENT OF
A FIRE AT ARKANSAS.NUCLM
ONE
'OSI
& 2 (ANO-1 & 2)." Clearly, the
meeting was held an
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the context of
alternative shutdown, whic
6sgoverinedby 10 CFWPartF50,Appendix RSection lII.G.3. The
NRC subsequently issued an SER dated May 13, 1983, which provided the staffs review of
5
the licensee's methodology for meeting III.G.3 and III.L. In this SER, the staff referenced the
meeting of August 31, 1982, and the licensee's October 5, 1982, etter. It is clear that in their
SER of May 13,1983, the NRC reviewed manual actions credite
_
the context of Section III.G.3, stating, "All other areas of the plant not required to have
alternate safe shutdown will comply with the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R,
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inithereomp y with Section III.G.2
At an exemption. In conclusion, for Fire
rove of the use of manual actionsdf
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NRC'sfTacit Approval of the Licensee's Methodology for Complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lII.G
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that In 1982, they submitted to the NRC a
description of their methodology for complying with Appendix R which Included a statement
that under certain conditions credit for manual operation of equipment was taken. Entergy
further stated that because this statement was not challenged in subsequent NRC
correspondence or safety evaluation reports, this silence constituted tacit approval of the use
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king it part of the ANO licensing basis.
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= the licensee submitted the results of their Appendix R
compliance rev!-
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ane licensee ala not perform an analysis that aemonstratea suMclen' u11n
e or sufficient trained personnel were available to take all the actions required to
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Conclusion: Even if, as Entergy claims, the NRC
for meeting Section IlI.G.2-of Appendixj&, is-pj
the use of manual actions
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ATTACHMENT I
NRC GENERIC STATEMENTS RELEVANT TO APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G.2
FIRE PROTECTION REGULATIONS
10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection.'
(b)
'Appendix R to this part establishes fire protection features required to satisfy
Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part with respect to certain generic issues for
nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979.
(2) With respect to all other fire protection features covered by Appendix R, all
nuclearpowerplants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, must satisfy
the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this part, including specifically the
requirements of Sections III. G, lll.J, and 1//.O."
10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Paragraph III.G. 'Fire protection of safe shutdown capabilitv."
1.
'Fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and
components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of
limiting fire damage so that:
a.
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is
free of fire damage; and
b.
Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either
the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
2.
Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or
equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation
or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of
redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment,
one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of
fire damage shall be provided:
a.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits
of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural
steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected
to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;
b.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits
of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
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intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or
c.
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of
one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition,
fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed
in the fire area; ...
3.
Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits,
independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room or zone under
consideration, shall be provided:
a.
Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot
shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2 of this
section; or
b.
Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in
the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression
activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression
systems.
In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system
shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.'
STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION for IOCFR50.48 and 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R
1.
As shown below, in the statements of consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (FR 76606, Vol. 45 No. 225, November 19, 1980), the Commission
explained that there were three ways to ensure that one means of achieving safe
shutdown is available (Appendix R.lIl.G.2), and that if none of these three methods is
feasible, then alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability is required (Appendix
R. Ill.G.3).
'G. Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability Technical Basis.
The objective for the protection of safe shutdown capability is to
ensure that at least one means of achieving and maintaining safe
shutdown conditions will remain available during and after any
postulated fire in the plant. Because it is not possible to predict
the specific conditions under which fires may occur and
propagate, the design basis protective features are specified
rather than the design basis fire. Three different means for
protecting the safe shutdown capability outside of containment
are acceptable. The first means is separation of redundant safe
shutdown trains and associated circuits by means of 3-hour fire
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
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rated barriers. The second means is a combination of separation
of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by a
1-hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire suppression and
detection capability for both redundant trains. The third means,
which may be used only when redundant trains and associated
circuits are separated by 20 feet or more of clear space, requires
automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the area. An
alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability independent of
the fire area is required if fire protection for safe shutdown
capability cannot be provided as outlined above. . .
GENERIC NRC GUIDANCE
Generic Letter (GL) 81-12: As shown below, in the first paragraph of GL 81-12 and again in
Enclosure 2 to GL 81-12, the NRC explained that cables for or associated with redundant safe
shutdown systems must be protected from the effects of fire by the methods described in
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix R), or provided with altemative or
dedicated shutdown capability as described in Section III.G.3 of Appendix R.
Paragraph 50.48(b) of 10 CFR Part 50, which became effective on February
17, 1981, requires all nuclearplants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979
to meet the requirements of Section Ill.G, lll.J and 111.0 of Appendix R to 10
CFR Part 50 regardless of any previous approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for alternative design features for those items. This would
require each licensee to reassess all those areas of the plant '. . . where cables
or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits, that could prevent
operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to
ground or (sic) redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain
hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary
containment. .. . to determine whether the requirements of Section Ill. G.2 of
Appendix R are satisfied. If not, the licensee must provide alternative shutdown
capability in conformance with Section 1II. G.3 or request an exemption if there is
some justifiable basis...
Quoted from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to
10 CFR Part 50.. ..
'Section Ill. G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 required cabling for or
associated with redundant safe shutdown systems necessary to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown conditions be separated by fire barriers having a
three-hour rating or equivalentprotection (see Section Il.G.2 of Appendix R) ...
Safety related and non-safety related cables that are associated with the
equipment and cables of the alternative, or dedicated method of shutdown are
those that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. . .'
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Clarification of GL 81-12: The NRC further clarified the requirements of Appendix R, Section
III.G in a memorandum from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR, to Roger
J. Mattson, Director, Division of system Integration, NRR, dated March 22, 1982, which was
sent to all licensees.
'Using the requirements of Sections Ill.G and lll.L of Appendix R, the capability
to achieve hot shutdown must exist given a fire in any area of the plant in
conjunction with a loss of offsite powerfor 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Section lll.G of Appendix
R provides four methods for ensuring that the hot shutdown capability is
protected from fires. The first three options as defined in Section Ill.G.2
provides methods for protection from fires of equipment needed for hot
shutdown:
1.
Redundant systems including cables, equipment, and associated circuits may
be separated by a three-hour fire rated barrier; or,
2.
Redundant systems including cables, equipment and associated circuits may be
separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening
combustibles. In addition, fire detection and an automatic fire suppression
system are required; or
3.
Redundant systems including cables, equipment and associated circuits may be
enclosed by a one-hour fire rated barrier. In addition, fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system are required.
The last option as defined by Section 111. G.3 provides an afternative shutdown
capability to the redundant trains damaged by a fire.
4.
Alternative shutdown must be independent of the cables, equipment and
associated circuits of the redundant systems damaged by the Fire.
Information Notice (IN) 84-09: In 1984, the NRC issued IN 84-09, "Lessons Learned from NRC
Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)," which
discussed the requirements for protecting safe shutdown equipment and cables. Section 1II,
"Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown," of IN 84-09 states,
'Appendix R, Section 111.
G. 1, requires that fire protection features shall be
provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.
These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of
systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from
either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage.
Sections lll.G.2 and lll.G.3 specify four altematives that may be implemented
outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment,
cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
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remains free of fire damage. The alternatives are:
1.
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by
a three-hour fire barrier.
2.
Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by
a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems
installed in the area.
3.
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated circuits by
a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles and with fire
detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed in the area.
4.
Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the
equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation
of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in the area containing this
alternative or dedicated shutdown capability. X
NUREG 0800, STANDARD REVIEW PLAN 9.5.1, "FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM"
In 1981, the NRC issued Revision 3 of NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1,
"Fire Protection Program" as guidance to NRC staff In performing fire protection program
reviews. NUREG 0800 included Revision 2 to Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1,
"Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," which provided guidance acceptable
for implementing 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R. Section C.5.b, "Safe Shutdown Capability,"
of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 states,
"(1)
Fire protection features should be provided for structures, systems, and
components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of
limiting fire damage so that:
(a)
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
conditions from either the control room or emergency control stations(s)
is free of fire damage; and
(b)
Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either
the control room or emergency control stations(s) can be repaired within
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
(2)
To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b. 1, one of the following means of
ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be
provided:
(a)
Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of
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redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel
forming part of or supporting such fire barriers should be protected to
provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;
(b)
Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of
redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no
intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area; or
(c)
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated circuits of one
redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire
detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed
in the fire area.
(3)
If the guidelines of Positions C5.b. 1 and C5.b.2 cannot be met, then alternative
or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of
cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration
should be provided.'
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ATTACHMENT 2
DOCKETED INFORMATION RELATIVE TO FIRE PROTECTION AT ANO
NRC DOCUMENTS
Meeting Summary and Request for Additional Information Dated September 3. 1982:
The Subject lines states,
"SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
(AP&L) ON AUGUST 31, 1982, CONCERNING THE ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN
CAPABILITY IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE AT ARKANSA S NUCLEAR ONE UNITS NOS.
1& 2 (ANO-1 & 2)"
Enclosure 1 states,
- 2.
For the fourteen fire zones that the licensee indicates are in full compliance with
Appendix R, but require some sort of manual or non-routine operation, the
licensee should describe the safe shutdown equipment and cables that would
be effected by a fire and the specific operator actions that would be required to
obviate these effects.'
Exemption and SER Dated March 22, 1983:
Section II of the Exemption states,
'Section I11. G of Appendix R requires fire protection for equipment important to
safe shutdown. Such fire protection is achieved by various combinations of fire
barriers, fire suppression systems, fire detectors, and separation of safety trains
(III.G.2) or alternative safe shutdown equipment free of the fire area (lII.G.3).
The objective of this protection is to assure that one train of equipment needed
for hot shutdown would be undamaged by fire, and that systems needed for
cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Section IV of the Exemption states,
'The licensee has indicated that enclosure of the corridor A-train conduits in a
one-hour rated fire barrier and separation of the DC equipment room from the
corridor by three-hour rated fire barriers will be provided. With these
modifications, the area will comply with Section III.G of Appendix R, and no
exemption is needed.'
Section 1.0 of the SER states,
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ATTACHMENT 2
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Docketed Information Relative to Fire Protection at ANO
'Section 111.
G.2 requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire damage by one
of the following means:
a.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of
redundant trains by a fire banier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming
a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire
resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;
b.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of
redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no
intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or
c.
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one
redundant train in a fire barier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors
and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
If these conditions are not met, Section lIl.G.3 requires alternative shutdown
capability independent of the fire area of concem. It also requires a fixed
suppression system installed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large
concentration of cables or other combustibles.
These alternative requirements are not deemed to be equivalent for all
configurations; however, they provide equivalent protection for those
configurations in which they are accepted.
Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires
may occur and propagate, the design basis protective features are specified in
the rule rather than the design basis fire. Plant specific features may require
protection different than the measures specified in Section Ill. G. In such a case,
the licensee must demonstrate, by means of a detailed fire hazards analysis,
that existing protection or existing protection in conjunction with proposed
modifications will provide a level of safety equivalent to the technical
requirements of Section III. G of Appendix R.
In summary, Section 111. G is related to fire protection features for ensuring that
systems and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown
are free of fire damage. Fire protection configurations must either meet the
specific requirements of Section IlI.G or an alternative fire protection
configuration must be justified by a fire hazards analysis.'
Section 8.0 of the SER states,
"...
The corridor contains primarily B-train cables, however there is one A-train
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Docketed Information Relative to Fire Protection at ANO
conduit in the corridor. ... By letter dated November 11, 1982, the licensee
proposed to enclose the single A-train conduit in the corridor in a one-hour rated
barrier.^
'The level of protection provided for the corridor area and D.C. equipment room
meets Section ll. G; therefore, and exemption is not needed.^
SER dated May 13.1983:
"Introduction," of the SER states,
"By submittals dated July 1 and July 29, 1982, the licensee described the
means by which safe shutdown can be achieved in the event of fire and
proposed modifications to the Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2 to meet the
requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Items 111.G.3 and III.L. Additional
information and clarification was obtained through a meeting held on August 31,
1982, and through a telephone conference call on October29, 1982. The
licensee subsequently documented their responses in Letters dated October 5
and November 1[11, 1982."
Section C. "Remaining Plant Areas," of the SER states,
"All other areas of the plant not required to have alternate safe shutdown will
comply with the requirements of Section I11. G.2 of Appendix R, unless an
exemption request has been approved by the staff"
Exemption and SER Dated October 26. 1988:
The Exemption states,
"Section 11. G of Appendix R requires fire protection for equipment important to
post-fire shutdown. Such fire protection is achieved by various combinations of
fire barriers, fire suppression systems, fire detectors, and separation of safety
trains (III. G.2) or alternate post-Fire shutdown equipment free of the fire area
(III.G.3). The objective of this protection is to assure that one train of equipment
needed for hot shutdown would be undamaged by fire, and that systems
needed for cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (11I.G.1)."
Section 1.0 of the SER issued with the Exemption states,
"Section 111. G.2 requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire damage by one
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Docketed Information Relative to Fire Protection at ANO
of the following means:
a.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of
redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming
a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire
resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;
b.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of
redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no
intervening combustible or Fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or
c.
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one
redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors
and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
If these conditions are not met, Section IIl.G.3 requires an alternative shutdown
capability independent of the fire area of concern. It also requires a fixed fire
suppression system be installed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large
concentration of cables or other combustibles. These alternative requirements
are not deemed to be equivalent; however, they provide equivalent protection
for those configurations in which they are accepted.
Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires
may occur and propagate, the design basis protective features are specified in
the rule rather than a design basis fire. Plant specific features may require
protection different than the measures specified in Section III.G. In such a case,
the licensee must demonstrate, by fire hazards analysis, that existing protection
or existing protection in conjunction with proposed modifications will provide a
level of safety equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III. G of
Appendix R.
In summary, Section IIl. G is related to fire protection features for ensuring that
systems and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown
are free of fire damage. Fire protection configurations must either meet the
specific requirements of Section III. G or another fire protection configuration
must be justified by a fire hazards analysis.'
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Docketed Information Relative to Fire Protection at ANO
LICENSEE SUBMITTALS
Licensee letter dated July 1. 1982:
Section I, Introduction," of this submittal, states,
6.
In certain cases, credit for manual operation of equipment was taken if controls
(and power for valves) could possibly be damaged by a fire. Such credit was
taken only if:
a.
the component to be operated is not located in the affected fire zone,
although the cable may be damaged by fire;
b.
sufficient time is available to perform the required manual actions; and
c.
personnel are available, beyond the fire brigade and minimum
operations shift crew limitations, to perform the manual actions."
Section 3 of this submittal states,
"1.
For the service water pumps, install breakers outside of zones 100-M and 99-M
so the B service water pump may be powered from either the red or the green
bus. This pump can therefore be assured of power from the unaffected
switchgear room, and be able to isolate from faults in the switchgear room
where the fire occurs. ... Outside of zones 99M and 100-N, the new service
water pump B circuit breakers will be located in different zones from the pump A
and pump C cabling.
2.
For the makeup pumps, similar modifications as those described above for the
service water pumps will be made to assure that a fire in either switchgear room
will not cause loss of all makeup pump capability.
With these modifications this zone will comply with Appendix R.'
Section 4 of this submittal states,
'This zone is predominantly of the 'green"or W" safety division, although
certain cables associated with the 'red' or 'A' division are also located in the
corridor portion of the zone. The "A' cables in this zone are routed in conduit
and are predominately associated with the "red'D.C. equipment room."
The "red' division cabling located in the corridor that is required for safe shutdown will
be wrapped in a 1-hour fire barrier. The circuits involved are the power supplies
to the RS panels [120V ac to vital instrumentation] which are located in the
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Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Docketed Information Relative to Fire Protection at ANO
control room. With the suppression system in this area and the addition of the
1-hour fire barrier, the corridor portion of this zone will comply with Appendix R.
Following modifications described above, this zone will substantially comply with
Appendix R; however, two exemptions are requested for this zone:
1.
Omission of a complete 3-hour fire barrier separating 'red' D.C. equipment room
from the corridor; and
2.
Omission of sprinkler coverage over trays and equipment in the 'red' D.C.
equipment room.'
Licensee Letter dated October 5. 1982:
In this letter of October 5,1982, as requested by the NRC in an August 31,1982, meeting, the
licensee provided information concerning the following fourteen fire zones they had
determined to be in full compliance with Appendix R, but which required some sort of manual
or non-routine operation: 149E, 67U, 68P, 128E, 170Z, 38Y, 79U, 1121, 46Y, 47Y, 2084DD,
2111 T, 2097X, and 2155A.
Licensee letter dated November 11, 1982, states,
'Modifications to this zone will be made as stated in our July submittal except for
those designed to 'separate' the corridor area from the 'red' D. C. equipment
room. This separation will be accomplished by the addition of a 3-hour rated fire
door and fire dampers in the ventilation ducts...
With this modification, no
exemptions are required for zone 98J. '
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ATTACHMENT 3
LICENSING BASIS DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
DATE
TYPE
DESCRIPTION
July 1, 1982
Letter to NRC
Results of ANO's Appendix R compliance review
July 29, 1982
Letter to NRC
Results of Appendix R compliance review -
clarifying information
September 3,1982
Meeting Summary
"Summary of Meeting with Arkansas Power and
Light company (AP&L) on August 31, 1982,
Concerning the Alternate Safe Shutdown
Capability in the Event of a Fire at Arkansas
Nuclear One Units Nos. 1 & 2 (ANO-1 & 2)"
Requests for additional information (RAI) were
attached
September 3,1982
Letter to ANO -
RAI concerning alternate shutdown capability
resulting from NRC review of ANO's July 1,
1982, and discussions at the August 31,1982
meeting.
October 5,1982
Letter to NRC
Response to RAI dated September 3,1982
resulting from NRC review of July 1982
Appendix R compliance submittal
November 11, 1982
Letter to NRC
Response to RAI of September 3, 1982 and
meeting of October 6,1982, and clarifying
information concerning exemption requests.
March 22, 1983
Letter to ANO -
Exemptions from Appendix R and safety
Exemptions
evaluation report (SER) Included in the
Exemption by reference
May 13,1983
Letter to ANO -
SER regarding ANO's safe shutdown capability
evaluated against Appendix R. IIl.G.3 and III.L
August 15,1984
Letter to NRC
Reanalysis of Appendix R Compliance and
requests for exemptions from Appendix RI Ill.G
August 30,1985
Letter to NRC
Current status of Appendix R modifications and
September 3,1986
Letter to ANO -
RAls on Appendix R exemption requests
October 20, 1986
Letter to NRC
Response to RAJ of September 3, 1986. RAI
280.15 and 208/16 responses failed to identify
that make-up pump and emergency feedwater
pump cables were located in Fire Zones 98J
April 22, 1987
Letter to NRC
Information on exemption for Fire Zone 38Y only
June 24, 1987
Letter to NRC
Information on exemption for Fire Zones 38Y,
34Y and 20Y
September 13,
Inspection Report
Inspection of ANO's implementation of and
1987
compliance to the safe shutdown requirements
._______________
___________of
A ppendix R
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ATTACHMENT 2
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Docketed Information Relative to Fire Protection at ANO
October 26, 1988
Letter to ANO -
Exemptions from Appendix R and SER
Exemptions
25
okREG,,
t
0R
Recta
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE40
4
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011- 0
Craig G. Anderson, Vice President,
Operations
-
Arkansas Nuclear One
'
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT: - RESPONSE TO BACKFIT CLAIM REGARDING NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 50-313/01-06; 50-368/01-06
Dear Mr. Anderson:
As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313;-368/01-06, dated August 20, 2001, the NRC
identified an unresolved issue in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor and the Unit 1
north electrical switchgear room concerning use of manual actions in lieu of providing protection
for cables associated with equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown as
specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. This issue was considered
unresolved pending further NRC review and the determination of its risk. Subsequently, in an
exit meeting held on August 30, 2001, the NRC informed Entergy Operations, Inc., that the
existing configurations did not conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2. However, the issue remained unresolved pending the completion of the NRC's
risk determination.
Your letter of September 28, 2001, claimed that our position that manual actions cannot be
used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2, was a backfit. At issue is
your use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions in'the event
of a fire in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor (Fire Zone 98J) and north switchgear
room (Fire Zone 99M). In this letter, you asserted that the NRC has accepted such manual
actions in the past, and stated that our position with respect to disallowing the use of manual
actions for complying with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R should be considered a backfit that is
generic to all plants.
On October 26, 2001, and again on January 17, 2002, we convened a backfit panel in
accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-
Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in your
letter of September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined
that (1) the NRC did not impose a regulatory staff position that is new or different from a
previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR -Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lIl.G.2, in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north
electrical switchgear room in lieu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section IlI.G.2.a, IlI.G.2.b, or IlI.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in
the event of a fire in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room), in lieu of
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-
ensuring that one train of redundant cables and equipment of systems needed for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage, does not comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. Accordingly, Unresolved Item
50-313;368/0106-02 has been reclassified as an Apparent Violation pending NRC's
assessment of the risk significance associated with this finding. When complete, the results of
the risk determination will be forwarded to you by separate correspondence. The basis for this
conclusion is enclosed.
If you disagree with this evaluation of your backfit claim, you may submit a written appeal to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in accordance with NRC Management
Directive 8.4, " NRC Program for Management of Plant-Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power
Plants."
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
httD://www.nrc.oov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
Enclosure: As stated
Dockets: 50-313; 50-368
cc: w/Enclosure
Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-3-
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
David D. Snellings, Jr., Director
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867
Mike Schoppman
Framatome ANP, Inc.
Suite 705
1911 North Fort Myer Drive
Rossylin, Virginia 22209
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-4 -
Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
W. F. Kane, DEDO
S. J. Collins, D:NRR
Regional Administrator (EWM)
Deputy Regional Administrator (TPG)
DRS Director (ATH)
DRP Director (KEB)
DNMS, Director (DDC)
K. D. Smith, RC (KDS1)
G. F. Sanborn, D:ACES (GFS)
ACES, Enforcement Staff (GMV)
Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (LJS)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (JAC)
Senior Resident Inspector (RLB3)
Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
G. M. Holahan, NRR
S. C. Black, NRR
S. A. Richards, NRR
R. J. Barrett, NRR
J. N. Hannon, NRR
M. R. Johnson, NRR
R. A. Gramm, NRR
T. W. Alexion, NRR
OGC (GSM)
S. A. Morris, OEDO
M. C. Nolen, OE
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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ENCLOSURE
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), claimed that
Region IV's position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. was a backfit, generic to all plants. Backfitting is defined in
10 CFR 50.109 "as the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or
design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may
result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a
regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from a
previously applicable staff position..."
On October 26, 2001, the NRC convened a backfit panel to review Entergy's backfit claim as
presented in their letter of September 28, 2001, and accompanying attachments. As a result of
that meeting, the panel requested an evaluation of the following four key points presented in
Entergy's backfit claim.
I.
NRC's Past and Present Positions Regarding the Use of Manual Actions for
Meeting the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G
In their letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the NRC had accepted on
many occasions, including at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), the use of manual actions
for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. Entergy stated that
NRC generic Appendix R guidance documents, the NRC's Triennial Fire Protection
Inspection Procedure 71111.05, and recent NRC fire protection reports all supported
this position.
Entergy claimed that certain statements in NRC fire protection inspection reports and
inspection procedures provide an NRC position that permits the use of manual actions
for achieving post-fire safe shutdown. With respect to NRC inspection reports, the
statements quoted by Entergy were taken from the description of the scope of the
inspection, not from the inspection findings section of the reports. The triennial fire
protection inspection scope consists of a review of the licensee's methodology for
reaching safe shutdown, including any manual actions that are credited in that
methodology. These scope statements are not an endorsement for the use of manual
actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, merely statements describing what
the inspectors reviewed. As described in NUREG 14091, NRC inspection procedures
are not approved NRC positions. _
_
procdure
' Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states, "No, inspection
procedures are not approved staff positions, which is the reason they are not reviewed by
CRGR." NUREG 1409 further states, "Licensees cannot be required to implement positions
discussed in an inspection procedure or manual unless the same positions exist in the form of
an approved regulatory staff position. Examples of approved staff positions are described in
Manual Chapter 0514 and include the SRP [Standard Review Plan], branch technical positions,
regulatory guides, generic letters, and bulletins."
ENCLOSURE
In 1981, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection," and Appendix R to
10 CFR Part 50, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to
January 1, 1979." ANO, Unit 1 was licensed in 1974, and Unit 2 was licensed in 1978;
therefore, for both units, the licensee was required to meet the provisions of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections Ill.G, Ill.J, and 111.0.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IIl.G, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown
Capability," provides the requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment
needed for safe shutdown is free of fire damage. As discussed in the Statements of
Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, it is not possible to
predict the conditions under which fires may occur and propagate; therefore, the
Commission established three specific methods for protecting safe shutdown equipment
so that at least one train remains free of fire damage. These three methods are
specified in Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R. The first method is separation of redundant
safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by 3-hour fire rated barriers. The second
method is a combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and
associated circuits-by 20 feet or more of space with no intervening combustibles or fire
hazards, plus area-wide automatic fire suppression and detection. The third method is a
combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by
a 1-hour fire-rated barrier plus automatic fire suppression and detection capability. If
these conditions cannot be met, an exemption from Section III.G.2, or an alternative or
dedicated safe shutdown capability specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3, is required. Specifics for alternative.
dedicated shutdown aeprovided
in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section 111.
The requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment needed for safe
shutdown is free of fire damage is described and discussed in numerous generic NRC
documents such as:
Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R
Generic Letter 81-12, "Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980)"
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12
Information Notice 84-09, "Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire
Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)'
NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Program'
In addition, in ANO-specific licensing basis documents, such as safety evaluation
reports and exemptions, the NRC staff described tlee same specific requirements for
ensuring one train of safe shutdown equipment is free of fire damage. In these
documents, the NRC restated the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G, and
discussed the three methods for ensuring that one train of equipment and cables for
-2-
ENCLOSURE
systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of
fire damage, as required by Section III.G.2. The NRC further explained that if these
methods could not be met, then an alternative fire protection configuration must be
provided in accordance with Section Ill.G.3 of Appendix R.
Conclusion.
- e we h~e regulati-o6n~s, st'at~emnen~t~s of consi deir'ation, and
genbric correspondenc,
s elas ANO-specific documentation are in agreement
concerning the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions as required in Section lIl.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. As these
documents show, the NRC has not in the past and does not currently consider manual
actions to be acceptable for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section
III.G.2, unless specifically reviewed and approved. The panel concludes that the
position to disallow the use of manual actions for meeting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section Il.G.2 is not an imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the
Commission rules that are either new or different from a previously applicable staff
position. Therefore, this position is not a backfit specific to ANO. 2
II.
ANO's Position Regarding 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy summarized their positions concerning
the use of manual actions as:
M1.
The use of manual actions to operate components .... outside the fire area is
permitted by 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section lMl.G. 1 and does not violate Section
IlI.G.2,
"2.
Compliance with 1OCFR50 Appendix R, Section 111.G.2 does not require
protective features on circuits that are not required to function and, therefore, are
not necessary systems required to achieve safe shutdown, and regardless of fire
damage cannot prevent the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. "
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides the overall fire protection
objective to protect equipment so that in the event of a fire in any fire area, (a) one train
of systems necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (from either the control
room or emergency control stations) is free of fire damage; and (b) systems necessary
for reaching cold shutdown conditions (from either the control room or emergency
control stations) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Section llI.G.1.a. can be met by
ensuring one train of safe shutdown systems is free from fire damage as specified in
Section Il.G.2 of Appendix R, or by using an alternative safe shutdown capability
2 Entergy's claim that this position is a backfit generic to all plants will be addressed by
the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in response to a letter from the Nuclear
Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002.
-3-
ENCLOSURE
specified in Section III.G.3. While Section IlI.G.1.a. contemplates the use of manual
actions, these are provided in the context of alternative or dedicated shutdown under
Section III.G.3.
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R provides three acceptable methods for ensuring cables
and equipment associated with one train of systems necessary for achieving and
maintaining hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. None of the three methods
in Section III.G.2 describes the use of manual actions to mitigate the effects of a fire on
safe shutdown equipment and cables. Rather, these methods have the objective of
preventing fire damage through the use of specific protection features.Section III.G.2
also requires these same fire protection features for circuits whose damage (by fire)
could adversely affect the accomplishment of safe shutdown functions. Contrary to
Entergy's position (2) above, cables associated with systems necessary for safe
shutdown are required to be free of fire damage, whether the cables themselves are
considered "necessary" or not. In addition, certain circuits which may not be required to
function, but whose maloperation could adversely affect safe shutdown, must also be
free of fire damage.
If a licensee cannot meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R for certain
fire areas, then an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is required as outlined in
Section III.G.3. Under Section III.G.3, manual actions may be taken. The goals and
requirements associated with alternative and dedicated shutdown capability under
Section III.G.3 are specified in Section l1l.L of Appendix R, and include a requirement
that alternative shutdown capability be implemented by procedures. Another option
would be to request an exemption from those portions of Section III.G.2 that cannot be
met.
Conclusion: For the ANO plant, Entergy must meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50,Section III.G.1. In addition, at the ANO plant, Entergy must meet either
Section III.G.2 or Section III.G.3 for the protection of cables and equipment associated
with systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, or
request an exemption.Section III.G.2 provides three specific methods for preventing
fire damage to equipment and cables associated with systems necessary for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown, and to circuits whose maloperation could adversely
affect the licensee's ability to achieve hot shutdown.Section III.G.3 provides the option
of using alternative or dedicated shutdown capability for those fire areas in which the
licensee cannot meet the requirements of Section III.G.2. Therefore, the use of manual
actions for meeting the requirements of Section III.G.2 is not permitted, unless these
actions were specifically reviewed and approved by the NRC and documented in a
safety evaluation report.
-4-
ENCLOSURE
Ill.
NRC Review and Approval of Manual Actions for Meeting the Requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G in 14 Fire Zones at ANO
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the use of manual actions to
achieve safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire .as been a standard
ctice at
ANO since the inception of Apendix R. and
c
t
l
A summary of a meeting between NRC and ANO documented by the NRC in a
letter dated September 3 1982 which included a request for additional
information (RAI).__
ANO's response to the RAI dated October 5, 1982, provided additional
information concerning the 14 fire zones, in which manual actions were credited.
Ll
_
During a meeting on August 31, 182, the NRC specifically
requested additional information concerning the use of manual actions in alternate
shutdown areas, which is documented in a meeting summary dated September 3, 1982.
The subject line of the meeting summary reads, "Summary of Meeting with Arkansas
Power and Light Company (Ap&I) on August 31, 1982, Concerning the Alternate Safe
Shutdown Capability in the Event of a Fire at Arkansas Nuclear One Units Nos. 1 & 2
(ANO-1 & 2).n Clearly, the meeting was held and the summary (including the attached
RAI) written in the context of alternative shutdown, which is governed by
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.3 and Section lll.L (specific requirements for
alternative or dedicated shutdown are provided in Section lll.L). The NRC subsequently
issued an safety evaluation report (SER) dated May 13, 1983, which provided the staff's
review of the licensee's methodology for meeting Sections III.G.3 and III.L. In this SER,
the staff referenced the meeting of August 31,1982, and the licensee's
October 5, 1982, letter. It is clear that in their SER of May 13, 1983, the NRC reviewed
manual actions credited in the 14 fire zones in the context of Sections III.G.3 and lll.L,
stating, AII other areas of the plant not required to have alternate safe shutdown will
comply with the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, unless an exemption
request has been approved by the staff." The licensee did not identify Fire Zones 98J
and 99M in the list of fourteen fire zones requiring manual action, and did not request an
exemption from Section III.G.2.
Conclusion: The NRC reviewed the use of manual actions identified by the licensee in
14 fire zones for the purposes of alternative shutdown (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3). Manual actions for addressing fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99M were
not included in these 14. For all other areas the NRC expected the licensee to either
comply with Section III.G.2 or request an exemption. The licensee did not a request an
-5-
ENCLOSURE
exemption from Section Il.G.2 for the use of manual actions in Fire Zones 98J and
99M. Therefore, for Fire Zones 98J and 99M, the use of manual actions for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was not reviewed and approved by the NRC.
IV.
NRC's Tacit Approval of the Licensee's Methodology for Complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that in 1982, they submitted to the
NRC a description of their methodology for complying with Appendix R, which included a
statement that under certain conditions credit for manual operation of equipment was
taken. Entergy also stated that because this statement was not challenged in
subsequent NRC correspondence or safety evaluation reports, this silence constituted
tacit approval of the use of manual actions, thus, making it part of the ANO licensing
basis.
The NRC was not silent regarding the use of manual actions. In an August 31, 1982,
meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light Company, as documented by the
NRC in a letter dated September 3, 1982, the NRC requested additional information for
fire zones that required some sort of manual action or non-routine operation. Fire
Zones 98J and 99M were not identified by the licensee as requiring manual actions. By
this licensee omission, the NRC staff would have concluded that no manual actions
would be credited for mitigating fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99M.
In submitting the results of their Appendix R compliance review in a letter dated
July 1, 1982, the licensee stated, that in certain cases, credit for manual operation of
equipment was taken if controls (and power for valves) could be damaged by a fire.
Such credit was taken only if:
'a.
the component to be operated is not located in the affected fire zone,
although the cable may be damaged by fire;
"b.
sufficient time is available to perform the required manual actions; and
"c.
personnel are available, beyond the fire brigade and minimum operations
shift crew limitations, to perform the manual actions."
The approach taken by the licensee, as described in the fire pre-plans for Fire
Zones 98J and 99M, was to provide a list of components and safe shutdown functions
that could fail as a result of fire, and to describe actions that could be taken to mitigate
those failures as they occur. The number of manual actions that may be required to
restore safe shutdown functions in the event of a fire in Fire Zones 98J and 99M was
extensive. However, contrary to the above conditions, the licensee did not perform an
analysis that demonstrated sufficient time was available and sufficient trained personnel
were available to take all the actions required to mitigate all the failures, which could
occur as a result of fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99M..L
-6-
5
ENCLOSURE
-5
.~~~-
WINON
I
_ _
_
he licensee did
not demonstrate' hat they met the conditions under which they stated manual actions
would be credited.
Conclusion: Even if, as Entergy claims, the NRC tacitly approved the use of manual
actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R (which it did not), this approval would
have been dependent on the licensee doing so under the conditions described in their
Appendix R compliance methodology. However, for Fire Zones 98J and 99M, the
licensee did not meet their own conditions set forth for the use of manual actions.
3 Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states, "Cases where an
inspector provides tacit approval are relatively rare. Simply not challenging a licensee's practice
would not be considered tacit approval. The only example provided in Manual Chapter 0514 is
a case where the NRC has indicated tacit approval by not acting in a reasonable time on a
licensee submittal and the licensee has moved ahead to implement the proposal described in
the submittal."
-7-
AEGU
SATE
0 two
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
So
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064
,
X (
Craig G. Anderson, Vice President,
1
Operations
Arkansas Nuclear One
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russeliville, Arkansas 72801-0967
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO BACKFIT CLAIM REGARDING NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 50-313/01-06; 50-368/01-06
Dear Mr. Anderson:
As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313;-368/01-06, dated August 20, 2001, the NRC
identified an unresolved issue in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor and the Unit 1
north electrical switchgear room concerning use of manual actions in lieu of providing protection
for cables associated with equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown as
specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. This issue was considered
unresolved pending further NRC review and the determination of its risk. Subsequently, in an
exit meeting held on August 30, 2001, the NRC informed Entergy Operations, Inc., that the
existing configurations did not conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2. However, the issue remained unresolved pending the completion of the NRC's
risk determination.
Your letter of September 28, 2001, claimed that our position that manual actions cannot be
used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2, was a backfit. At issue is
your use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions in the event
of a fire in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator corridor (Fire Zone 98J) and north switchgear
room (Fire Zone 99M). In this letter, you asserted that the NRC has accepted such manual
actions in the past, and stated that our position with respect to disallowing the use of manual
actions for complying with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R should be considered a backfit that is
generic to all plants.
On October 26, 2001, and again on January 17, 2002, we convened a backf it panel in
accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-
Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in your
letter of September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined
that (1) the NRC did not impose a regulatory staff position that is new or different from a
previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IlI.G.2, in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north
electrical switchgear room in lieu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.2.a, IlI.G.2.b, or III.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in
the event of a fire in the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room), in lieu of
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-
ensuring that one train of redundant cables and equipment of systems needed for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage, does not comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. Your claim that our position (that
manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2) is
a generic backfit will be addressed by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in their
response to a letter from the Nuclear Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002. Accordingly,
Unresolved Item 50-313;368/0106-02 has been reclassified as an Apparent Violation pending
NRC's assessment of the risk significance associated with this finding. When complete, the
results of the risk determination will be forwarded to you by separate correspondence. The
basis for this conclusion is enclosed.
If you disagree with this evaluation of your backfit claim, you may submit a written appeal to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in accordance with NRC Management
Directive 8.4, " NRC Program for Management of Plant-Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power
Plants."
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.aov/readina-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
Ellis W. Merschoff
Regional Administrator
Enclosure: As stated
Dockets: 50-313; 50-368
cc: w/Enclosure
Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-3-
Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear
Power
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852
County Judge of Pope County
Pope County Courthouse
100 West Main Street
Russeliville, Arkansas 72801
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
David D. Snellings, Jr., Director
Division of Radiation Control and
Emergency Management
4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867
Mike Schoppman
Framatome ANP, Inc.
Suite 705
1911 North Fort Myer Drive
RossylinRosslyn, Virginia 22209
I
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-4-
Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
W. F. Kane, DEDO
S. J. Collins, D:NRR
Regional Administrator (EWM)
Deputy Regional Administrator (TPG)
DRS Director (ATH)
DRP Director (KEB)
DNMS, Director (DDC)
K. D. Smith, RC (KDS1)
G. F. Sanborn, D:ACES (GFS)
ACES, Enforcement Staff (GMV)
Branch Chief, DRS/EMB (CSM)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (LJS)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (JAC)
Senior Resident Inspector (RLB3)
Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
G. M. Holahan, NRR
S. C. Black, NRR
S. A. Richards, NRR
R. J. Barrett, NRR
J. N. Hannon, NRR
M. R. Johnson, NRR
R. A. Gramm, NRR
T. W. Alexion, NRR
OGC (GSM)
S. A. Morris, OEDO
M. C. Nolen, OE
OEMAIL
DOCUMENT: R:\\ ano\\2001\\anOlO6backfit-rln.wpd
RIV:DRS/PSB
C:EMB
D:DRS
C:DRP/D
D:DRP
D:DNMS
RLNeaselmb
CSMarschall
ATHowell III
LJSmith
KEBrockman
DDChamberlain
RC
D.ACES
[ OGC
j NRR/DLPM
j DRA
JRA
KDSmith
7GFSanborn
lGSMizuno
tSARichards
lTPGwynn
lEWMerschoff
OFITA
TEODCP
I
Tephn
T=-mi
F=Fa
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone
F-F-mail
F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), claimed that
Region IV's position that manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. was a backfit, generic to all plants'. Backfitting is defined in
10 CFR 50.109 "as the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or
design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; any of which may
result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a
regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from a
previously applicable staff position...'
On October 26, 2001, the NRC convened a backfit panel to review Entergy's backfit claim as
presented in their letter of September 28, 2001, and accompanying attachments. As a result of
that meeting, the panel requested an evaluation of the following four key points presented in
Entergy's backfit claim.
I.
NRC's Past and Present Positions Regarding the Use of Manual Actions for
Meeting the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G
In their letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the NRC had accepted on
many occasions, including at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), the use of manual actions
for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G.2. Entergy stated that
NRC generic Appendix R guidance documents, the NRC's Triennial Fire Protection
Inspection Procedure 71111.05, and recent NRC fire protection reports all supported
this position.
Entergy claimed that certain statements in NRC fire protection inspection reports and
inspection procedures provide an NRC position that permits the use of manual actions
for achieving post-fire safe shutdown. With respect to NRC inspection reports, the
statements quoted by Entergy were taken from the description of the scope of the
inspection, not from the inspection findings section of the reports. The triennial fire
protection inspection scope consists of a review of the licensee's methodology for
reaching safe shutdown, including any manual actions that are credited in that
methodology. These scope statements are not an endorsement for the use of manual
actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, merely statements describing what
the inspectors reviewed. As described in NUREG 14092, NRC inspection procedures
I Entergy's claim that this position is a backfit generic to all plants will be addressed by
the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in their response to a letter from the Nuclear
Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002.
2 In response to a question regarding whether NRC Inspection Manual guidance is
considered an approved position, Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," states,
nNo, inspection procedures are not approved staff positions, which is the reason they are not
reviewed by CRGR." NUREG 1409 further states, "Licensees cannot be required to implement
positions discussed in an inspection procedure or manual unless the same positions exist in the
form of an approved regulatory staff position. Examples of approved staff positions are
ENCLOSURE
are not approved NRC positjons. I)
In 1981, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire protection," and Appendix R to
10 CFR Part 50, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to
January 1, 1979." ANO, Unit 1 was licensed in 1974, and Unit 2 was licensed in 1978;
therefore, for both units, the licensee was required to meet the provisions of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.J, and 111.0.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IlI.G, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown
Capability,' provides the requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment
needed for safe shutdown is free of fire damage. As discussed in the Statements of
Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, it is not possible to
predict the conditions under which fires may occur and propagate; therefore, the
Commission established three specific methods for protecting safe shutdown equipment
so that at least one train remains free of fire damage. These three methods are
specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. The first method is separation of redundant
safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by 3-hour fire rated barriers. The second
method is a combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and
associated circuits by 20 feet or more of space with no intervening combustibles or fire
hazards, plus area-wide automatic fire suppression and detection. The third method is a
combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by
a 1-hour fire-rated barrier plus automatic fire suppression and detection capability. If
these conditions cannot be met, an exemption from Section III.G.2, or an alternative or
dedicated safe shutdown capability specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3, is required. SpeeifiesSpecific requirements for alternative or dedi ated
shutdownar
vided in 1O=CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.
The requirements for ensuring that at least one train of equipment needed for safe
shutdown is free of fire damage is described and discussed in numerous generic NRC
documents such as:
Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R
Generic Letter 81-12, Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980)"
Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12
Information Notice 84-09, "Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire
Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)"
NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Program"
described in Manual Chapter 0514 and include the SRP [Standard Review Plan], branch
technical positions, regulatory guides, generic letters, and bulletins."
-2-
ENCLOSURE
In addition, in ANO-specific licensing basis documents, such as safety evaluation
reports and exemptions, the NRC staff described the same specific requirements for
ensuring one train of safe shutdown equipment is free of fire damage. In these
documents, the NRC restated the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section
III.G, and discussed the three methods for ensuring that one train of equipment and
cables for systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions
was free of fire damage, as required by Section III.G.2. The NRC further explained that
if these methods could not be met, then an alternative fire protection configuration must
be provided in accordance with Section III.G.3 of-Appendix R(alternative or dedicated
shutdown), of Appendix R. Specific requirements for meeting Section III.G.3 (alternative
l
or dedicated shutdown) are provided in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.L.
l
ne egua ons, ssatements of consideration,an
generic correspondence, aswell'as ANO-specific documentation, are in agreement
l
concerning the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown
conditions as required in Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. As these
documents show, the NRC has not in the past and does not currently consider manual
actions to be acceptable for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section
III.G.2, unless specifically reviewed and approved. The panel concludes that the
I
position to disallow the use of manual actions for meeting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix- R,
Section III.G.2 is not an imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the
Commission rules that ereis either new or different from a previously applicable staff
l
position. Therefore, this position is not a backfit specific to ANO. e Entergy's claim that
l
NRC inspection report statements constitute a basis for their backfit claim is addressed
I
in Sections III and IV of this enclosure.
11.
ANO's Position Regarding 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lII.G
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Entergy summarized their positions concerning
the use of manual actions as:
Ml.
The use of manual actions to operate necessary components .... outside the
I
identified fire area is permitted by IOCFR50 Appendix R, Section Mll.G. 1 and
does not violate 10 CFR.50,Section III.G.2;
'2.
Compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section ll.G.2 does not require
protective features on circuits that are not required to function and, therefore, are
not necessary systems required to achieve safe shutdown; conditions and,
{
regardless of fire damage cannot prevent the ability to achieve safe shutdown
conditions. '
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides the overall fire protection
objective to protect equipment so that in the event of a fire in any fire area, (a) one train
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ENCLOSURE
of systems necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (from either the control
room or emergency control stations) is free of fire damage; and (b) systems necessary
for reaching cold shutdown conditions (from either the control room or emergency
control stations) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Section IlI.G.1.a. can be met by
ensuring one train of safe shutdown systems is free from fire damage as specified in
Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R, or by using an alternative safe shutdown capability
specified in Section III.G.3. While Section IlI.G.1.a. contemplates the use of manual
actions, these are provided in the context of alternative or dedicated shutdown under
Section III.G.3.
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides three acceptable methods for
ensuring cables and equipment associated with one train of systems necessary for
achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. None of the
three methods in Section III.G.2 describes the use of manual actions to mitigate the
effects of a fire on safe shutdown equipment and cables. Rather, these methods have
the objective of preventing fire damage through the use of specific protection features.
Section Ill.G.2 also requires these same fire protection features for circuits whose
damage (by fire) could adversely affect the accomplishment of safe shutdown functions.
Contrary to Entergy's position (2) above, cables associated with systems necessary for
safe shutdown are required to be free of fire damage, whether the cables themselves
are considered "necessary" or not. In addition, certain circuits who in themselveWswhich
may not be required to function, but whose maloperation could adversely affect safe
shutdown, must also be free of fire damage.
If a licensee cannot meet the requirements of Seeoto 1 1..2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2 for certain fire areas, then an alternative or dedicated
shutdown capability is required as outlined in Section III.G.3. Under Section Ill.G.3,
manual actions may be taken. The goals and requirements associated with alternative
and dedicated shutdown capability under Section III.G.3 are specified in Section IlI.L of
Appendix R, and include a requirement that alternative shutdown capability be
implemented by procedures. Another option would be to request an exemption from
those portions of Section III.G.2 that cannot be met.
Conclusion: For the ANO plant, Entergy must meet the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Section Ill.G.1. In addition, at the ANO plant, Entergy must meet either
Section Ill.G.2 or Section III.G.3 for the protection of cables and equipment associated
with systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, or
request an exemption.Section III.G.2 provides three specific methods for preventing
fire damage to equipment and cables associated with systems necessary for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown, and to circuits whose maloperation could adversely
affect the licensee's ability to achieve hot shutdown. Section IllI.G.3 provides the option
of using alternative or dedicated shutdown capability for those fire areas in which the
licensee cannot meet the requirements of Section IllI.G.2. Therefore, the use of manual
actions for meeting the requirements of Section IllI.G.2 is not permitted, unless these
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ENCLOSURE
actions were specifically reviewed and approved by the NRC and documented in a
safety evaluation report.
Ill.
NRC Review and Approval of Manual Actions for Meeting the Requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G in 14 Fire Zones at ANO
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the use of manual actions to
achieve safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire has been a standard practice at
ANO since the inception of Appendix R. and ci
t
e_~-~- P
_
An
d
_
_
_
.. .
.
A surnmary-of-aan August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and ANG-Arkansas
Power and Light (documented by the NRC in a lettermeeting summary dated
September 3, 1982, which included a) and Arkansas P.Qwer and Light's response
toe :n IKlAr. rpnittpqf frnr -ne~ritirnnsl inf~rmntinfn I
RDIi
D
I.
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ANO's response to the RAI, dated October 5, 1982, provided additional
informatin concerng the 14 fire zones, in which.
I
!_
_o~~~~r safe.
1i'utdown under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2.
owever, upon review of a
the statements in context, we believe that the better view is that these statements
should be interpreted as constituting NRC's approval of the use of manual actions for
alternative shutdo
A
-A
_____
ur
ameeting on August 31, 1982, the NRC specifically
requested additional information concerning the use of manual actions in alternate
shutdown areas, which is documented in a meeting summary dated September 3, 1982.
The subject line of the meeting summary reads, 'Summary of Meeting with Arkansas
Power and Light Company (Ap&IAP&L) on August 31, 1982, Concerning the Alternate
Safe Shutdown Capability in the Event of a Fire at Arkansas Nuclear One Units Nos. 1 &
2 (ANO-1 & 2).N Clearly, the meeting was held and the summary (including the attached
RAI) was written in the context of alternative shutdown, which is governed by
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.3 and Section lll.L (specific requirements for
alternative er dedicatedmeeting Section llI.G.3 shutdown are provided in Section III.L).
The NRC subsequently issued an safety evaluation report (SER) dated May 13, 1983,
which provided the staff's review of the licensee's methodology for meeting Sections
III.G.3 and III.L. In this SER, the staff referenced the meeting of August 31, 1982, and
the licensee's response of October 5, 1 982-4etter. It is clear that in their SER of
May 13, 1983, the NRC reviewed manual actions credited in the 14 fire zones in the
I
I
I
I
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ENCLOSURE
context of Sections III.G.3 and lll.L, stating, "All other areas of the plant not required to
have alternate safe shutdown will comply with the requirements of Section Ill.G.2 of
Appendix R, unless an exemption request has been approved by the staff."-" The
licensee did not identify Fire Zones 98J and 99M in the list of fourteen fire zones
requiring manual action, and did not request an exemption from Section Ill.G.2.
Conclusion: The NRC reviewed the use of manual actions identified by the licensee in
14 fire zones for the purposes of alternative shutdown (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3). Manual actions for addressing fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99M were
not included in these 14. For all other areas the NRC expected the licensee to either
comply with Section III.G.2 or request an exemption. The licensee did not a request an
exemption from Section III.G.2 for the use of manual actions in Fire Zones 98J and
99M. Therefore, for Fire Zones 98J and 99M, the use of manual actions for achieving
and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was not reviewed and approved by the NRC.
IV.
NRC's Alleged Tacit Approval of the Licensee's Methodology for Complying with
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that in 1982, they submitted to the
NRC a description of their methodology for complying with Appendix R, which included a
statement that under certain conditions credit for manual operation of equipment was
taken. Entergy also stated that because this statement was not challenged in
subsequent NRC correspondence or safety evaluation reports, this silence constituted
tacit approval of the use of manual actions, thus, making it part of the ANO licensing
basis.
The
As discussed in NUREG 14093, simply not challenging a licensee's practice in
inspection reports would not be considered tacit approval. Furthermore, contrary
to Entergy's claim, the NRC was not silent regarding the use of manual actions.
In an August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light
Company, as documented by the NRC in a letter dated September 3, 1982, the
NRC requested additional information for fire zones that required some sort of
manual action or non-routine operation. Fire Zones 98J and 99M were not
identified by the licensee as requiring manual actions. By this licensee omission,
the NRC staff would have concluded that no manual actions would be credited
for mitigating fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99M.
In submitting the results of their Appendix R compliance review in a letter dated
July 1, 1982, the licensee stated, that in certain cases, credit for manual operation of
.I Section 3.3 of NUREG 1409, 'Backfitting Guidelines," states, "Cases where an
inspector provides tacit approval are relatively rare. Simply not challenging a licensee's practice
would not be considered tacit approval."
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ENCLOSURE
equipment was taken if controls (and power for valves) could be damaged by a fire.
Such credit was taken only if:
"a.
the component to be operated is not located in the affected fire zone,
although the cable may be damaged by fire;
Tb.
sufficient time is available to perform the required manual actions; and
"c.
personnel are available, beyond the fire brigade and minimum operations
shift crew limitations, to perform the manual actions."
Contrary to the above conditions, the licensee did not perform an
analysis that demonstrated sufficient time was available and sufficient trained personnel
were available to take all the actions required to mitigate all the failures, which could
occur as a result of fires in Fire Zones 98J and 99v__
_¶11 ~ ,~,- 212JT[11L.. discussed in Section III of this enclosure, manual actions
were reviewed and approved for use in alternative shutdown areas (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.3). Even if the NRC's approval of manual actions could be
construed as acceptable for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,.
Section III.G.2 (which, as discussed in Section III, there was no such approval , the
' licensee did not comply with their own criteria for the use of manualatos~
Conclusion: Even if, as Entergy claims, the NRC approved (tacitly approvedor
otherwise) the use of manual actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R (which it
did not), this approval would have been dependent on the licensee doing so under the
conditions described in their Appendix R compliance methodology. However, for Fire
Zones 98J and 99M, the licensee did not meet their own conditions set forth for the use
of manual actions.
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