ML033510574
| ML033510574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Gordon Peterson Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| 50-413/03-301, 50-414/03-301 50-413/03-301, 50-414/03-301 | |
| Download: ML033510574 (308) | |
See also: IR 05000413/2003301
Text
Draft Submittal
(Pink Paper)
CATAVVBA APRIL 2003 EXAM
50-413 & 50-41412003-301
MARCH 31 -APRIL 4 &
APRIL 30, 2003
DRAFT COMBINED RQ/SRQ WRITTEN EXAM
(PART 1 OF 3)
Bank Question: 999 Answer: A
1WS) Unit 2 is operating at 23% power. Given the following events and conditions:
120VAC pmel2ERPA fails
Which of the following statements is correct?
REFERENCES PROVIDED: AP-29 E d I 4
A. DIG 2A cannot be ruu in manual and it will run in auto due to an
emergency start signal.
B. D/G 2A cannot be run in manual and it wU1 not run in auto due to an
emergency start signal,
C. DIG 2A can be run in manual and it will not run in auto due to an
emergency start signal.
D. DIG 2A can be run in manual and it will run in auto due to an
emergency start signal.
__1______1_-_-___11-__---1----------------~~-----
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct:
D. Incorrect: D/G 2A will mn in auto due to an emergency start signal
Plausible: D/G 2A cannot be run in manual
C. Incorrect: D/G 2A cannot be run in manual and will run in auto due to
an emergency start signal
Plausible: DIG2A cannot be run in manual and will run in auto due to an
emergency start signa1
D. Incorrect: D/G 2A cannot be run in manual
Plausible: D/G 2A will run in auto due to an emergency start signal
Level: SRO&RO
KA: APE 057AA106(3.%3.5)
Level of Knawiedgc: Comprehension
Lesson Plan Objective: EPL Obj: IS
Source: New
Ques-999.doc
...........
. .....................
.............
..............
............ ~
Resources:
1. AP-29 Page 108-111 PROVIDED
DUK POWER CATAWBA OPRAT!ONS TRAENING
Objective
State the purpose of the Vital Instrumentationand Control System
Describe the oDeration of Kirk-Key interlocks
Describe the ooeration of Battesv Charaers
Describe the operation of Batteries
Describe the operation
.... ...
of Static Inverters
... ...- ... ... ...._ ....__
Describe the operation of Manual Bypass Switches
Describe the operation of Auctioneering Diode Assemblies
Describe the basic actions required of an NbQ for a loss of Vital or
Auxiliary Control Power per AP/l/N5580/29 (Loss of Vital or Auxiliary
Control Power)
Describe operation of the Vital I & C system when configured for normal
alignment
Describe operation of the Vital I & C system when configured for a battery
charger being removed from service
Describe operation of the Vital I & C system when configured for a battery
being removed from service
Describe operation of the Vital I & 6 system when configured for an
equalizing charge on a battery
Describe operation of the Vital I & C system when configured for an
Inverter being removed from service
Sketch channel A of the VitaC I & C system per training drawing CN-SYS-
EL-EPL-I 1
Evaluate the impact a failure of any Vital l & C component will have on
unit operation
Describe the Ground Detection controls and indications used at Catawba
Nuclear Station
Describe how il ground is indicated OR the ground detection devices used
at Catawba Nuclear Station -
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply the Limits and Precautions X
associated with OPl?/N6350/008(225 VDC/125 VAC Vitai Instrument
and Control Power Svstem
QP-CN-EL-EBL FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 25
Page 3 of 26
CONTROL POWER
APi2IAf5500I29
6. The following status lights are energized:
-e 2.9-16, A13 "NS Sys CPCS Trn A Inhibit"
- 2Sl-16, AI4 "VX Sys CPCS Trn A Inhibit".
7. CASystem:
- 26AP5090 (Am Feedwater flow 2A SIG) fails low
- 2CAP5100 (Aux Feedwater flow 28 SIG) fails low.
8. Diesel Generator 2A:
- 2FD-22 (DIG Eng Fuel Oil Bay Tnk 2A Fill) fails closed
- DIG 2A can not be run in manual. It will run in auto due to an emergency start signal but the
low-Low Lube Oil Pressure trip logic is reduced from 2I3 to 1/2
The following VB dampers fail open:
- 2DSF-D-2 (Diesel Bldg Return Air Barnper 282)
-m 2DSF-D-4 (Diesel Bldg return Air Damper 2A1).
e The following VB dampers fail closed:
- 25SF-D-1 (Diesel Bldg Outside Air Darnper 2A2)
- 2BSF-D-3 (Diesel Bidg Outside Air Damper 2Al).
9. EMF System:
The following are inoperable:
-a 2EMF-53A (2WL-8258 and 2WL867A will close when power is restored to ERP'A)
- Chart recorder 2MICR5380 (Cont Radiation, Unit Vent Radiation).
10. EHM System:
m Chart recorder 2MiCR5340(Ccnt Sump WIR bevel, H2 Analysis, Cont WIR Press) is
Bank Question: 998 Answer: D
1 Pts Unit 1 w a operating at 100% power.
Which one of the following malfunctions could occur and still have train A
of KC remain operable?
A. 1A2 KC pump has failed
B. 1A surge tank has been drain&
C. 1A KC heat exchanger is being cleaned
D. 1A ND heat exchanger KC side has a flow blockage
~
Disstracter Analysis: Tech Spec 3.7.7 bases states:
A CCW train is considered OPERABLE when:
a. Both pumps and associated surge tank are OPERABLE; and
b. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation
and controls required to pedom the safety related function are OPERABLE.
The isolation of CCW from other components or systems not required for
safety may render those components or systems inoperable but does not
affect the OPERABILITY of the CGW System
A. Incorrect Required to have BOTH KC pumps operable - each
pump has 50% capacity
Plausible: the 1B KC pump remains operable
3. Incorrect: Required to have the associated surge tank operable
Plausible: The D ~ D have
S sufficient NPSPIA with the surge tank
empty provideithe piping up to the tank is filled (per Tech-Spec
Bases 3.7.7
C. Incorrect: when cleaning the Hx,the HX is drained
Plausible: KG flow is routed through the 1B Hx to maintain KG
system flow while clearning
D. Correct: Although the 1A ND IiX would be inoperable, the i A KC
train remains operable.
Level: RO&SRO
K/A. SYS 008 G2.2.25 (233.7)
Lesson Plan Objective: KC Obj: 13
Source: New
Level of Knowledge: comprehension
References:
LOP-CN-PSS-KC pages 13,19
2. Tech Spec 3.7.7 bases
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING
-
P
Objective T
R
Q
State the purpose of the KC System.
Describe how the KC System is cooled.
Describe the normal flowpath of the KC System, including X
each header and the type of loads serviced by each.
Explain what happens in the KC System during: X
- Safety injection (Ss)
- Phase A Containment Isolation (St)
- Phase B Containment Isolation (Sp)
- Blackout
- bow bow KC Surge Tank bevel -
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply limits and X
precautions associated with OW4 (2)/A/6400/005
(Component Cooling Water System) -
State the typical values of the KC pump discharge X
pressure, KC Hx outlet temperature and KC pump flow.
State the basic actions required of an NbO for a loss of
Component Cooling Water and why.
Describe KC system makeup.
Draw a block diagram of the KC system per the KC System
Simplified Drawing.
Explain when the Chemistry group is to be notified X
concerning the KC system. -
Describe the purpose of the EMF'S associated with the KC X
System and what is indicated by a high level radiation
alarm.
List the instrumentation available in the control room for the
KC System.
When given a set of plant conditions and access to X
reference materials, determine the actions necessary to
comply with Tech SpedSbC's. -
Discuss the supplementary actions for the loss of KC AP. X
-
W-CN-PSS-KC H ) R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 42
Page 3 of 26
..............-.DUKE...POVm?
.
._ ....-........................ CATAWBA OPERATIONS
- TRAINING
-.-
b) NCDT and Excess Letdown Hxs
1) Flow controlled
2) Containment isolation for excess letdown is controlled from the
NV board.
H. KC Drain header and Drain Sump
2. Containment drain isolations will close on St.
a) Located outside containment downstream of drain header
containment penetration.
b) Allows drain header to be aligned during all modes of operation.
3. One 500 gal. steel lined covered sump per unit.
a) 2 pumps per sump - Aux. Bldg 522
b) Able to discharge to:
1) NR Chiller Surge Tank
2) Other Units Sump
3) KC Surge Tank
4) Mixing and Settling Tank
2.2 Operation
A. Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments (OBJ. #Z 3)
1. Refer to Technical Specification 3.7.7(Compment Cooling Water (CCW)
System) and Bases.
2. Refer to Selected Licensee Commitments 16.7-10 (Radiation Monitoring
For Plant Operations)
B. KC System Limits and Precautions and Special Lineups.
1. Review Limits and Precautions per OP/I/N6480/05 (OBJ. #5)
2. KC System Alignment for KC Heat Exchanger Cleaning (0-695-169)
a) Alignment is used to maintain the availability of all essential heat
loads associated with the KC Train having its heat exchanger
cleaned.
b) The KC Train containing the Heat Exchanger which is not being
cleaned supplies all Train A and B component loads.
OP-CN-PSS-KC FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 42
Page 13 of 26
DUKE POWER........ .... CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNlNG
__________
_.. - ____1__.
KC System Simplified Drawing
1
~
Reactor Building Non.Ess Hdr
23QA 2288
Aux Building NomEss Hdr
535
1A Surge i ' (i,
Y WI C Y
Tank
ur I I
-
Components Components
3A 18B
1A 28 I
OP-CN-PSS-KC FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY R N . 42
Page I 9 ob26
CCW System
B 3.7.7
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
assumed (Ref. 1). This 120°F limit is to prevent thermal degradation of
the large pump motors supplied with cooling water from the CCW
System.
The CCW System is designed to perform its function with a single failure
of any active component, assuming a loss of offsite power.
The CCW System also functions to cool the unit from RHR entry
conditions (Tmlde 35OoF),to MODE 5 (Tal,, e 200OF): during normal and
post accident operations. The time required to cool from 350°F to 280°F
Is a function of the number of CCW and RHR trains operating. One CCW
train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations with
Tmld< 2000F. This assumes a maximum service water temperature of
100F occurring simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the
system.
The CCW System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(Ref. 2).
bC6 The GCW trains are independent of each other to the degree that each
has separate controls and power supplies and the operation of one does
not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one CCW train is
required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the
safety analysis for the systems to which it supplies cooling water. To
ensure this requirement is met, two trains of CCW must be OPERABLE.
At least one CCW train will operate assuming the worst case single active
failure occurs coincident with a loss of offsite power.
A CCW train is considered OPERABLE when:
a. Both pumps and associated surge tank are OPERABLE; and
b. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation
and controls required to perform the safety related function are
The isolation of CCW from other components or systems not required for
safety may render those components or systems inoperable but does not
affect the OPERABILITY of the CCW System.
~~ ~~
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-2 Revision No. 0
Bank Question: 363.5 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is in mode 6 and refueling operations are currently in progress. Given
the following events and conditions:
- The Fuel Handling Manipulator &ne Operator (F'HhaCo) has indexed the
mast over the location where fuel assembly M-8 will be inserted.
All conditiondindicationson the fael handling manipulator crane are
satisfied for inserting the fuel assembly located at H-8, in accordance with
procedure.
Which one of the following statements describes the responsibility of the
"Operator at the Controls", associated with inserting the fuel assembly'?
A. Receives notification of assembly insertion from the Fuel Handling
SRO, and tracks core response to reactivity changes,
B. Relays information concerning core reactivity from the control
room to the Fuel Handling SRO prior to unlatching the assembly.
C. Grants permission to the FHMCO for inserting the fuel assembly
from the control room via the engineer communicathg with the
refueling crew.
D. Verifies proper llm plot results and gives permission to the Fuel
Handling SRO to unlatch the assembly.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct:
B. Incorrect: RE relays information to the FHSRQ
PlausibIe: The infomation is gathered in the CR
C, Incorrect: the MSRO authorizes inserting the assembly.
Plausible: if the candidate thinks the refueling is controlled from the CR
D. -
Incorrect: the FHSRO authorizes inserting the assembly monitor Urn
process periodically.
PlausihIe: this wouid bc the logical practice if the OATC was in charge.
Level: RO&SRO
KA. G 2.2.27 (2.4 1 3 . 5 )
Lesson Plan Objective: FNS SEQ 11
Source: Bank
Bus-363.1 .doc
Level of knowledge: memov
References:
1. OP-CN-FH-FHS pages 17
2. NSD 304 page 13
3. NSD 414 page 5
Ques-363.l.doc
DUKE PO WEf?
Objective
OP-CN-Fff-FHS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 20
Page 5 of 23
DUKE POWER CATAW6A OPERATIONS TRAINING
1) Sounds containment evacuation alarm
2) Containment evacuation alarm is blocked when both source
range high flux trips are blocked.
6) Symptom for entry to AW025 (Damaged Spent Fuel).
6. Limits and Precautions of Fuel Handling Bridges (Obj. #I 1)
a) Refer to latest copy of OP//1-2/N6550/006(Tfansferflng Fuel with the
Spent Fuel Manipulator Crane) and OPll-2/N6550M)07(Reactor
Buiiding Manipulator Crane Operation).
E. Mast Trave! Within Refueling Cavity (Obj. #7)
I. Bridge and Trolley positions are mutually interlocked to limit the fuel mast
to a path of travel that clears the guide stud in the core area, and travel is
limited to an area over the core.
a) To travel to the transfer system, fuel must be on centerline of the
transfer system.
b) Mast cannot be moved off the centerline until bridge reaches end of
travel.
c) Bridge and trolley can be moved over RCC change fixture area (Not
used).
d) Bridge and trolley tracks have index marks for pfoper positioning.
F. Selected License Commitments (Obj. #6)
I. Commitments for opefation and surveillance (Rx. Bldg. Cranes). (SLC
16.9.29)
2. Bases for SLC 16.9-19.
2.3 Fuel Handling Auxiliaries
A. The Catawba Nuclear Station is served with systems which suppoFt the
overall refueling operation. These Fuel Handling Auxiliaries provide for:
1. Handling of New Fuei from receipt to deposit in New Fuel elevator. Refer
to latest copy of AP/O/N5500133, (Damaged or Missing Tamper Seais on
Special Nuclear Material Shipments) (Obi. #a))
2. Transfer of New Fuel from the New Fuei Storage Vauit to the New Fuei
elevator.
3. Transfer of assemblies from the Reactor Building to the Spent Fuel Pool
and vice versa.
OP-CN-FH-FHS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 20
Page 17 of 23
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRlOR TO EACH USE
-
Nuclear Policy Manual Volume 2 NSD 304
2. Fuel handlers and Reactor Engineers must be aware of Technical Specification limits p l a d on storage
I locations in the SFFbuilding.
3. Fuel movementkontrol component movement shall be performed in accordance with approved, in-hand,
procedures. These procedures must provide controls to ensure the prevention of mispositioned Fuel Assemblies
or Control Components.
4. Procedural controls shall be in place to ensure that the required shutdown margin as defined by Technical
Specification is maintained.
Reactivity management during DofuelinglRefueling:
1. Fuel movement sequence shall be reviewed and approved by a Qualified Reactor Engineer.
2. l/m plots or count rate trending with specified maxinium thresholds shall he performed during core reload
3. Reactor Systems Engineering support shall be on site and available to the control roodrefueling booth during
core reload in order to provide technical assistance to the Licensed Operators. A Licensed Operator will track
I 4.
core response to reactivity changes.
Core reload shall be considered an InfrequentlyPerformed Test Evolution (IPTE). (see NSD 213)
5. A Qualified Reactor Engineer shall evaluate alternate fuel assembly moves in the core. The Refueling SRO
I shall approve all moves.
Reactivity management during Dry Cask Storage evolutions:
1. Verify Dry Cask Storage Qualifications Curve is correct.
1 2. A Qualified Reactor Engineer must approve all fuel moves.
304.6.6.2 Startup Operations
Scope: The following controls apply during reactor startupr: from the source range to criticality.
Special attention should be given to control of and the eKects of locked out or out of service computer points.
Verify cycle specific constarits are incorporated into applicable software and procedures for the pnrticular stage in
core life.
A Qualified Reactor Engineer shall be in the control room during the approach to criticality in order to assist
Licensed Operators in tracking of core response to reactivity changes and to provide technical assistance.
Estimated Critical Predictions and l/m plots shall be used to assist Licensed Operators in controlling the rate of
reactivity insertion. Count rate trending with specified maximum thresholds may be used in lieu of i/m plots
during an initial cycle dilution, prior to initiating an approach to criticality.
Estimated Critical Positions (ECPs) and Estimated Critical Borons (ECBs) shall be performed independently by
a Qualified Reactor Engineer and a Licensed Operator.
e Licensed Operators shall be cautioned to expect criticality at all times during reactivity additions.
Startups shall be treated as Infrequently Performed Test Evolutions (IPTE) and controlled as such. (see NSD
213)
Conduct of operations governing the approach to criticality shall include the following:
1. Pre-job briefing before the approach to criticality.
An emphasis on Licensed Operators responsibility for the core.
An emphasis on the need for conservative actions and strict compliance with approved procedures
30 JAN 2002 13
VERIFY NARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACII USE
3$!1H3V3 0.LXOMd AT3.LVIiI3EUMI 3J.Ea3h\ LSNIV3V A d 0 3 Q W H AdlX3A
s IOOZ A W EO
'V
G'Z'PCP
'V
8'Z'PLP
'V
L'Z'PCP
'2
'a
'V
S'Z'PLP
Bank Question: 399 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% with the pressurizer level controller in the 1-2
position. Given the following initial response:
Charging flow reduces to minimum
Backup heaters immediately energize
- Actual level begins to decrease
Which one of the following failures has occurred to cause this plant
response?
A. PZR level channel 1 detector reference leg has ruptured
B. PZR level channel I detector variable leg has ruptured
C. PZR level channel 2 detector reference leg has ruptured
D. PZR level channel 2 detector variable leg has ruptured
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct answer - a le& in the reference leg c a w s the pressurizer
channel to sense a high level condition - which causes the system
response as indicated. Actual pressurizer level decreases initially due
to charging flow decreasing whik letdown remains in service.
E. Incorrect: - variable leg rupture causes channel 1 to sense a low
PZR level - actual level will increase not decrease initially
Plausible: - if the candidate thinks that this will cause a high level
C. Incorrect: - will cause channel 2 to sense a high level - will not get
heaters deeriergizing - only get a high level alarm
Plausible: - if the candidate confuses the plant response for channel
2 - thinh that charmel 2 controls
D. Incorrect: - pressuri7~rlevel would increase not decrease
Plausible: - if the candidate confuses the direction of the pressurizer
level failure or doesn't recognize plant response - this is very similar
to a channel 1 high failure only the actual level increase instcad of
decreases
Level: RO&SRO
KA: APE 028 KI.01 (2.8*/3.1*)
Lesson Plan Objective: ILE Obj: 6
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
I. OP-CN-IC-ILE page 15,16
DUKf POWER .................................. CA TAWBA OPERA TlONS TRAINING .....
x .= ,.r___.... .....
OBJECTIVES
Objective
1 1
1 State the purpose of the Pressurizer Level Control (LE)System.
Describe the pressurizer level control program including values and
signal sources for program development.
1 I
3 Describe why a cold calibrated channel is required.
I I 4 Describe the response of ILE system to a deviation of pressurizer
level from program value.
I 5 I Discuss control room controls and indications associated with ILE.
6 Describe ail automatic functions, alarm and control, that occur when
--B pressurizer level deviates from program level, including setpoint
changes and level channel failures.
Describe protection signals, trips, interlocks and permissives
associated with ILE including setpoints.
Describe the actions which must be taken to restore pressurizer
heater operation following a pressurizer low level heater cutoff.
Explain ILE system operation during startup, shutdown and normal
operation.
I /10 Given appropriate plant conditions, apply the limits and precautions
associated with the IhE system.
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference
materials, determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech
SpecslSLCs.
Given a set of specific plant conditions and required procedures,
apply the rules of usage and outstanding PPRBs to identify the
correct Drocedure flow math and necessary actions.
TIME: 2.0 HOURS
OP-CN-PS-KE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONbY REV. 20
Page 3 of 24
-DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATlOtVS TRAiNlNG
d) High level greater than or equal to 70% of
Level Span
e) High level alert 1/3 92% of Level Span
B. Limits and Precautions -When any pressurizer water level channel is
removed from service the PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SELECT
switch should be set such that an alternate channel is used for control action.
2.6 System Operations
A. Unit Startup (QBJ. #9)
1. Before startup, the reactor coolant loops and pressurizer are filled
completely with water.
2. After venting is complete, the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized.
3. When pressurizer temperature exceeds saturation temperature for
existing pressure, a steam bubble is formed while pressure is maintained
at the desired value (approx. 50 psig).
4. Pressurizer level is reduced manually until the no-load PZR level is
reached.
5. Level control may be switched to manual to maintain water level during
heatup. Charging and letdown are controlled using additional controls
associated with the Chemical and Volume C o n t ~ dSystem. Refer to
descriptions of this system for further operating information.
B. Normal Operation (OBJ. #9)
1. During normal operation, pressurizer level is maintained automatically
with the pressurizer level control system controlling NV-294 to maintain
level at programmed level.
C. Unit Shutdown (OBJ. #9)
I. Pressurizer heaters are de-energized and spray flow is manually
controlled to cool the pressurizer.
2. Charging flow will be controlled to raise PZR level to approximately 85%
level. Cooldown of PZR is accomplished with ND spray.
B. Abnormal Operation (OBJ. #la)
1. Electrical Faults
a) Controlling Channel fails high
1) Charging flow reduced to minimum rapidly
2) Backup heaters come on immediately.
3) Level drops steadily until low level reached (assuming no
operator action). NV-1A closes (NV-2A remains open)
4) Letdown secures at less than 17% from Backup Channel
QP-CN-PSJLE K)R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY R W . 20
Page 15 0624
j_
D f f K EPOWER CATAWBA OPERATiQNS TRAINING -
5) Heaters off at less than 17% from Backup Channel
6) Level will begin to rise after UD secures until high level trip
setpoint is reached. (Assuming no operator action)
7) Operator Action - Switch level control select to operable channel.
b) Controlling Channel fails low
1) Letdown isolation immediately
2 ) Heaters off immediately. NV2A closes (NVIA remains open)
3) Full Charging flow established rapidly
4) High level trip when setpoint is reached. (Assuming no operator
action)
5) Operator Action - Switch level control select t~ operable channel
c) Backup Controlling Channel fails high
1) Noeffect
2) Operator action - Switch level control select to operable channel
d) Backup Controlling Channel fails low
I) Letdown Isolation immediately. NV-1A closes (NV-2A remains
open)
2) Heaters off immediately
3) Level increases slowiy
4) Charging flow will reduce to minimum
5) Level will begin to rise after UD secures until high level trip
setpoint is reached. (Assuming no operator action)
6) Operator Action Switch level control select to operable channel
~
e ) Any channel failed high if not selected
1) NoEffect
f) Any channel failed low if not selected
1) Noeffect
g) Tavg fail high
1) No effect at 100% power
2) Less than 200% power, level will rise steadily to 55% Pzr IvI
3) Operator action - Defeat defective Tavg channel
h) Tavg fail low
1) No effect (auctioneered Hi is used by the circuitry)
OP-CN-PS-!LE FOR TRAENING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 20
Page 16 cf24
Bank Question: 508. I Answer: D
1 Pts Unit 2 is responding to a main steam line break inside containment. Given
the following events and conditions:
containment pressure is 0.1 psig
The pressurizer is solid
ES-I . I (SqfeW Injection Termination) has been implemented
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the status of the
ECCS systems upon successful completion of ES-1. 1?
A. One NS pump running to provide containment pressure control
B. One ND pump running to provide adequate heat removal
C. One NI pump running to provide adequate inventory control
D. One NV pump running to provide a normal charging lineup
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: NS pumps are secured in ES-1.1, step 14
Plausible: If candidate does not know major actions of ES. . I
B. Incorrect: ND pumps are secured in ES-1 .I, step 1
Plausible: If candidate does not know maior actions of ES- . I
C. incorrect: NI pumps me secured in ES-lYl, step 11
Plausible: If candidate does not know major actions of ES-1.1
D. Correct:
Level: RO&SRO
WA: APE WE01 3 3 . 3 (3.8/4.0))
Lesson Plan Objective: EP2 Obj: 2 , 9
Source: Mod hTC Catawba 1999
Level of Knowledge: memory
References:
1.OP-CN-EP-EP2 page 9
2. ES-1.lpages 10-12
Ques-508. I.doc
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNlNG
-
bP OBJECTIVES
4 ose of EP/?/A/5000/ES-1.3(Transfer to Cold Leg
_ .
5
6
-
7
-
8
Explain the Bases of the Major Actions of EP/1/A(5000/ES-1.I(SI
Termination)
the Bases of the Major Actions of EP/I/A/5000/ES-1.2 (Post
LOCA Cooldown and Deoressurization)
the Bases of the Major Actions of EP/I/A/500O/ES-I.3
I
(Transfer to Cold Lea Recirculation)
I
I I
I I12 Explain the Bases of the Major Actions of EP/l/A/5000/ES-1.4
(Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation)
I I13 Explain the Bases of the Major Actions of EP/l/A/5000/ECAl .I
(Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)
I I14 Explain the Bases of the Major Actions of EP/I/A/5000/ECA-1.2
(LOCA Outside Containment)
OP-CMP-P2 FOR TRAlN4N6 PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03
Page 3 of 14
-
DUKE POWER - .~.-.....-........... CATAWBA OPERATIONS
________m ..... TRAINING
2. ES-1.I, (Si Termination) is entered from E-0, (Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection); El, (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant); or FR-H.1,
(Response to boss of Secondary Heat Sink), when the specified criteria
was satisfied. Following the termination of SI and stabilization of the
plant, ES-1.1 is exited to a plant recovery procedure based on the
availability of the NC pumps and whether a plant cooldown is required.
B. Major Action Summary
1. Sequentially Reduce SI Flow
a) The appropriate criteria for reducing SI flow should have been
satisfied prior to entry into ES-2 .I. The operator will reset the SI and
Containment Isolation Signals to allow him to manually operate the
safeguards components. One charging pump is stopped and NC
pressure is checked. If NC pressure decreases after the charging
pump is stopped then leak flow or NC system shrink is greater than
Si flow and transition is made to -I, (Loss of Reactor or Secondary
Coolant) for further action and diagnosis. Stable or increasing NC
pressure indicates that one charging pump flow is adequate and
normal charging is aligned. Pressurizer level is controlled with
charging flow. If Pressurizer level cannot be maintained, injection
flow is realigned and transition made to ES-42 (Post LOCA
Cooldown and Depressurization), If normal charging can maintain
Pressurizer bevel, then the operator checks NC pressure to
determine if he can stop the NI pumps. If NC pressure is stable or
increasing and greater than the shutoff head of the NI pumps, then
both pumps are stopped. If criteria for stopping the NI pumps cannot
be satisfied then transition is made to ES-1.2 for further action. If
both NI pumps can be stopped, then the operator will also stop the
ND pumps and continue in ES-I .Ito realign and control the plant.
2. Verify SI Flow Not Required
a) After the SI pumps are stopped, the operator will verify that SI flow is
no longer required by verifying NC subcooling and pressurizer level.
If NC subcooling is less than required, SI pumps are manually started
and a transition is made to E-I , (boss of Reactor or Secondasy
Coolant). If Pressurizer level is less than required, charging flow is
controlled to maintain level. If this is not possible SI pumps are
manually started and a transition is made to E-I.
3. Realign the Plant to Pre-SI Configuration
a) When the operator verifies that SI flow is not required, the plant is
realigned into a pre-SI configuration and pressurizer level, NC
pressure, and NC T-hots are stabilized.
4. Maintain the Want in a Stable Condition
OP-CM-EFEP2 H I R TRAININ& PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03
Page 9 of 14
SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION
EP/l/Af5000/ES-1.I
46. Control charging as follows:
- a. Control charging flow to maintain Pzr
level stable.
- b. Verify Pzr level - STABLE OR b. 1E Pzr level is decreasing, THEN:
INCREASING.
1) Open the following valves:
INI-9A (NV Pmp C/b lnj Isol)
- INI-1OB (NV Pmp C/b Inj Isol).
2) Close the following valves:
- INV-342A (Chrg Line Cont Isol)
- lNV-314B (Chrg bine Ccnt Isol)
- 3) -_ EP/l/N5000/ES-1.2 (Post
LOCA Cooldown And
Depressurization),
11
a. Verify the following conditions are a. Perform the following:
satisfied:
- 1) -any S/G is faulted, _ I_do not
- 0 NC pressure - STABLE OR continue until faulted S/G
INCREASING depressurization stops.
- NC pressure GREATER THAN
~
- 2) - no S/G is faulted -conditions
1620 PSIG. for stopping NI pumps cannot be
satisfied after faulted SIG
depressurization stops,
I EP/l/N5000/ES-1.2 (Post
LOCA Cooldown And
Depressurization).
- b. Stop NI pumps.
12.
SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION
EP/I/N5000/ES-l.I
13.
a. NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs a. Perform the following:
- GREATER THAN 0°F.
- 1) Manually start SI1 pumps and align
valves as necessary to restore NC
subcooling.
- 2) _ _ EP/l/N5000/E-1 (L Of OSS
Reactor Or Secondary COQhRt).
- b. -
PZf I ~ e GREATER
l THAN 11% b. Perform the following:
(20% ACC).
- 1) Control charging flow to restore Pzr
level to greater than 11%
(20% ACC).
2) I Pzr level cannot be maintained
greater than 11% (20% ACC),
- a) Manually start S/I pumps and
align valves as necessary to
restore Pzr level.
- b) _ _ EP/l/N5QQO/E-I(LOSS
Of Reactor Or Secondary
Coolant).
I 14.
- a. At least one NS pump - ON. a. Perform the following:
-1) an NS pump(s)
starts while in this arocedure..
perform Step 14.
- 2) --Step 15.
b. Verify the follovding valves - OPEN: b. Perform the following:
- IFW-27A (NB Pump I A Suct From - 1) -containment pressure is less
FWST) than 1 PSIG, I__. perform Steps
14.d through 14.g.
- e -iFW-55B (ND Pump 1B Suct From
WST). - 2) __ -Step 15.
- c. Containment pressure - LESS THAN c. Perform the following:
2.4 PSIG.
- 1) -containment pressure is less
than 2.4 WIG, -perform
Step 14.
- 2) --Step 15.
- d. Verify operating NS pump(§) HAVE - d. - NS pump(s) has previously been
REMAINED RUNNING SINCE INITIAL stopped, Step 15.
PHASE B SIGNAL.
- e. Reset NS.
- f. Stop NS pumps.
g. Close the following valves:
- 1NS-29A (NS Spray Hdr I A Cont
Isol)
- 1NS-32A (NS Spray Hdr 1A Cont
Isol)
- INS-158 (NS Spray Hdr 1B Cont
Isol)
- * 1NS-12B (NS Spray Hdr 1B Cant
Isol).
Bank Question: 508 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Which one of the following statements correctly describes the status of the
ECCS system upon successful completion of ES-I. 1 (Safety Injection
Termination) following a steam line break if the ECCS system worked as
designed?
A. one NI pump running
R. one ND pump running
C. one NV pump running
D. one XS pump running
Bistracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: NI pumps are secured in ES- 1.1, step I I
Plausible: If candidate does not know major actions of ES-1.1
E. Incorrect: ND putnps are secured in ES- 1.1, step 12
Plausible: Ifcandidate does not know major actions ofES-1.1
C. Correct answer
D. Incorrect: NS pumps are secured in E§-1.1, step 14
Plausible: if canindidate does not know major actions of E§-I .I
Bank Question: 507 Answer: B
I Pt(s) Unit 2 is responding to a LOCA into the Auxiliary Building in ECA-1.2
( L O U Outside ofCobrrtainmeni). Upon completion of BCA-1.2, NC system
pressure continues to decrease.
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the correct major
action to assure proper method of removing decay heat under these
conditions?
A. Transition back to E-1 (LQSSof Reactor or Secondary Coolant).
B. Transition to ECA-1.1 (LQSSof Emergency Coolant Recirculation).
C. Transition to ES-1.2 (Post LOCA cooldown and Depressrrrizfftion).
D. Transition to ES-1.3 (Transilion to ColdLeg Recirc).
Distracter Analysis: This question does not require the candidate to
memorize procedurc transitions. Instead, the candidate is expected to
logically assess conditions (LOCA into the AUX BLD that cannot be
isolated -pressure continues to decreax after completion of ECA-
1.2) and deduce that the containment sump inventory is still being
lost. The only corrcct procedure would be ECA-1 .I to address this
problem. All other procedure transitions do not work.
A. Incorrect: Not the correct procedural transition if the NC system
pressure continues to decrease (ie leak path not isolated).
Plausible: 'phis IS the correct procedure if the NC system pressure
was stable or increasing.
B. Correct: continuing loss of inventory means that there may be
insuficient water in containment for recirculation cooling
C. Incorrect: Transition to ES-1.2 not allowed, as the leak is not
isolated.
Plaudbie: The name of the procednre is appropriate for the situation.
D. Incorrect: Transition to ES-1.3 not in accordance with the major
action steps.
Plausible: Although many actions are the same, it is not the correct
procedure.
Lever: RO&SRO
KA: WEH EA2.1 (3.4/4.3)
Lesson Plan Objective: EP2 Obj: 6, 13
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1.OP-CN-EP-EP2page 12
2. ECA- 1.2 page 6
DUKE BOW%R CATAWBA OPERATIONS TaAiNlNG
LP OBJECTIVES
-
L
P
OP-CN-EP-EP2 FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03
Page 3 of 14
DUKE POWER- CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
A. Overview
1. Purpose: This procedure provides actions for transferring the safety
injection system from the cold leg recirculation made to the hot ieg
recirculation mode.
2. ES-1.4 is entered from E-I (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)
where the plant specific time for transferring to hot leg recirculation is
reached. In this case a break in the NC system has occurred which is
large enough to reduce the NC pressure to less than the shutoff head of
the ND pumps. After the transfer has been completed the operator
should return to E-I.
B. Major Action Summary
1. Align SI Flowpath for Hot Leg Recirculation
a) Hot Leg recirculation is implemented to terminate boiling in the core
and to prevent boron precipiFation in the core.
C. Use the Enhanced Background Document for detailed step description.
2.6 EPll/A/500O/ECA-l.I(Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)
A. Overview
I. Purpose: This procedure provides actions when emergency coolant
recirculation capability is lost. This is defined as the inability to inject from
the sump Fo the NC system using an ND pump.
2. ECA-1.I can be entered from E-I, (boss of Reactor or Secondary
Coolant), when cold leg recirculation cannot be verified to be available.
Entry is made from ES-1.3, (Transfer to Cold beg Recirculation), when at
least one flowpath from the sump cannot be established or maintained.
--__ 2 Also entry can be made from ECA-1.2, (LOCA Outside Containment)
when a LOCA outside containment cannot be isolated. If recirculation is
restored at any time, the operator should return to the procedure and step
in effect. If recirculation is not restored upon procedure completion the
plant staff is consulted.
B. Major Action Summary
1. Continue attempts to Restore Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
a) The operator is to try to restore the equipment needed for
recirculation in order to avoid performing any extreme recovery
actions. These actions will be continued throughout the procedure.
2. Increase/Conserve FWST Level
a) Makeup is added to the FWST and FWST outflow is minimized by
stopping any unnecessary containment spray pumps and decreasing
SI pump flowrate.
3. Depressurize SGs to Cooldown and Depressurize the NC System
W-CN-EP-EPZ FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03
Page 12 of 14
II CNS
EPll/AI5000/ECA-1.2
LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RFSPONSE NOT OBTAINED
I 2. (Continued)
c. Isolate Nl header to cold legs as
follows:
1) Verify following NI pump miniflow - 'I) Stop NI pumps.
valves - OPEN:
- 0 1Nl-215A (NI Pump 1A Miniflow
Isol)
- 0 1NI-I44A(NI Pump I B Miniflow
!sol)
- INI-147B (NI Pump Miniflow Hdr
To FWST Isol).
- 2) Place the "PWR DISCON FOR
1NI-I62A" in "ENABLE.
- 3) Close 1NI-262A (NI To C-Legs lnj
Hdr Isol).
- 4) Verify NC pressure - INCREASING. 4) Perform the following:
- a) Open 1NI-162A.
- b) Place the "PWR DISCON FOR
INI-162A" in "DISCON".
- c) 1E the N i pumps were stopped,
THEN start NI pumps.
3. Verify leak path is isolated as follows:
a. NC pressure - INCREASING. - a. W T Q EP/l/A/5000/ECA-l.I (Loss
Of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).
- b. Initiate actions as required to complete
leak isolation.
- C. m m P/l/A15000/-1 (LO S Of S
Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).
Bank Question: 501 Answee: B
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a terrorist attack in the control
room caused the operators to rapidly evacuate to the Auxiliary Shutdown
Panel. The operators were not able to perform AN17 (Loss of Control
Room) actions prior to evacuation at 0200.
The terrorists tripped the turbine but did not operate any other controls.
There are no other local operator actions taken. Given the following steam
generator narrow range levels:
9200 0292 0204 0206 0208
2ASIGNR 65% 37% 22% 15% 25%
2BS/GNR 64% 38% 23% 18% 26%
2CSlGNR 63% 39% 25% 16% 24%
2DSIGNR 65% 38% 26% 20% 27%
Which one o the following statements describes the comr :te list of
running feedwater pumps when the operators first arrive at the ASP at
0210 to take local control of the plant?
A. Both motor driven CA pumps
-7 B. Both motor driven CA pumps and the turbine driven CA
Pump
C. Both motor driven CA pumps and both CF pumps (at
minimum speed)
D. Both motor driven CA pumps, the turbine driven CA pump
and both CP pumps (at minimum speed)
_____________II___________l___l_________-~~~~-~-~-~------------------
Distracter Analysis: The 10-10 setpoint for SGWL is 17%. This causes:
a Reactor trip - on 1 of 4 SIGs in 2 of 4 channels
e MD CA pumps auto-start - on 1 of 4 S/Gs in 2 of 4 channels
TU CA pump auto-start - on 2 of 4 S/Gs in 2 of 4 channels
A. Incorrect: CF pumps will not trip -this is done by a local operator
action in AP-17, TD CA pump auto-starts.
Plausible: MB CA pumps will start when S/G levels C: 17% on
114 S/Gs
B. Incorrect: The CF pumps wili continue to nm until tripped by
local operator action in AP-17
Plausible: The MD and TD CA pumps auto start
C. Incorrect: The TD CA pump will auto start.
Plausible: The MD CA pumps auto start and the CF pumps remain
running
D. Correct answer:
Level: RO&SRO
KA: APE 068 AA1.12 (4.414.4)
Lesson Plan Objective: CP-RSS Obj: 4
Source: Bank
Level of Knowledge: Analysis
References:
I. OP-CN-CP-RSS page 9,16-21
2. OP-CN-IC-IFE page 23
3. OP-CN-CF-CA page 9
- DUKE ..
POWER
. .....-.,.
~
-. -........
CATAWBA OPERATIONS
...... TRAlNlNG
......_ _
.....-
Objective
State the following associated with the general design criteria for the
Auxiliary Shutdown Complex.
e Operational Modes required to Maintain and Achieve
Requirements for permanent and temporary instrumentation
Describe the Auxiliary Shutdown complex design criteria including the
definition of the Aux. SID complex.
List the system control panels that are considered part of the Auxiliary
Shutdown Complex.
State the general plant functions that can be controlled at the Aux S/D
panels and list the controls available to accomplish these functions.
Describe the sources of AC and DC power required to satisfy Auxiliary
Shutdown Complex design criteria.
State the capabilities lost and the alternatives available folCowing a plant
fire that affects B train components on the Auxiliaw Shutdown ComDlex.
List the two Control Room conditions that result in an evacuation of the
Control Room.
List the remote storage locations for each of the following enclosures of
AP/I/N5500/17 (boss of Control Room) and the general actions taken for
each:
Turbine Bldg Operator Actions
e Auxiliary Bldg Operator Actions
HVACActions
Describe all control manipulations performed from areas throughout the
plant during a control room evacuation event, per AP/1/8/5500/17
Describe what the operator must do upon arrival at the Auxiliary
S/D panels A, E3 and the CAPT panel
e List the automatic actions which occur when the Aux SID Panels
are taken to local
State the control signals and partial controi signals that are
blocked when the Aux S/B panels are taken to local
BP-CN-CP-RSS FQR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 3 of 21
DUKE POWER.
rmr*-?;F;r.--. . -mmrrm- CATA..WBA -
.-............ OPERATIONS TRAINING
D. Additional controls on Auxiliary Shutdown Panels that provide the capability to
go to Cold Shutdown. (Obj. #4)
1. Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Valves
2. Component Cooling Pumps and Valves
3. Nuclear Service Water Pumps
E. Additional controls of the Auxiliary Shutdown Complex (Obi. #4)
1. VCNC Local Panels - HVAC Control Panels l A and 'IB located behind
control room Elv. 594 Auxiliary Building.
a) Auxiliary Building Ventilation Controls (VA)
b) Control Room Ventilation Controls (VC) YC also in general area.
2. D/G panels A & B and associated ventilation system (Controls for DIG to
provide essential power).
3. VI local panels located in Service Building basement (Used to start and
control instrument air compressors for vital valves).
2.4 Controls and Indications of the Aux Shutdown Complex (Obi. #4)
A. ASP A & B Controls and Indications available
1. CA controls and indications.
2. Boric Acid control and indications.
3. NVcontrol
4. ND control
5. KC and RN control and indications.
6. Pzr indications.
7. CLA indication
8. Sequencer reset
9. Transfer switch
I O . SR indication
3. CAPT Panel Controls and indications available
1. Each SIG indications - (W/R bevel, SM press, CA flow)
2. Each SIG CA manual loader.
3. RN valves to CA pump suctions
4. S/G.PORVs
5. CAPT speed and startlstop control
QP-CN-CP-RW H I R TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 9 of 21
_.
DUKE POWER .... I _____-----
CATAWBA.....
OPERATIONS TRAINING ..-
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel A
Instrumentation And Controls Available For Hot Shutdown
INDICATORS:
Steam Generator A bevel
Steam Generator B Level
Steam Generator A Pressure
Steam Generator B Pressure
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator A
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator E3
Auxiliary Feedwater Condensate Storage Tank Level Low
Condenser Hatwell Level LQW
Upper Surge Tank bevel Low
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Train A boss of Normal Suction
Nuclear Service Water System Flow
Component Cooling Water System Flow
Charging Line Flow
Letdown Flow
Pressurizer Level
Pressurizer Pressure
Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature & Hot Leg Temperature
Seal Injection Flow
Volume Control Tank Level
Boric Acid Flow
Boric Acid Tank bevel
LOCA Sequencer Activated Status Light
B/O Sequencer Activated Status Light
Diesel Generator A Status bight
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Relay Status
SR Count Rate
Low Press Mode
OP-GKGP-WSS WIR TRAlNJffG PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 6
page 16 Qf 21
DUKE BO WEB CATAWBA OPERA TiONS TRAlNlNG
Cold Leg Accumulator Discharge Isolation Valves
CONTROLS:
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel A Transfer Switch
Auxiliary Feedwater Motor A StarVStop
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Normal Suction Valve CA11A
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A RN Suction Valve CAI 5A
Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve RN250A
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Discharge to Steam Generator A Isolation Valve CA62A
Normal Charging Flow Isolation Valve NV-39A
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Discharge to Steam Generator B Isolation Valve CA58A
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Auxiliary Feedwater to SG A Valve Position Selector
Station (CA60)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Auxiliary Feedwater to SG B Valve Position Selector
Station (CA56)
Nuclear Service Water Pump A
Component Cooling Water Pump A I
Component Cooling Water Pump A2
Boric Acid Transfer Pump A
Centrifugal Charging Pump A
Component Cooling System Valves - KCIA, KC3A, KCSOA, KC2308, KCC378, KC56A
Chemical & Volume Control System Valves - NV-1A, NV-2A, NV-Z3A, NV-378, NV-
1I A , NV-I86A, NV-1928, NV-238AA,NV-14&, NV-309, NV-294
PZR P Q W S- NC-33A, NC-34A
PZR Heaters
Sequencer Reset
Residual Heat Removal System Valves - ND-2A, ND-37A
Residual Heat Removal Pump A
OP-CN-CP-RSS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 17 of 21
DUKE PO WE@
P -
CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAlNlNG
m
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel B
Instrumentation And Controls Available For Hot Shutdown
INDICATORS:
Steam Generator C bevel
Steam Generator 5 bevel
Steam Generator C Pressure
Steam Generator D Pressure
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator C
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator 69
Auxiliary Feedwater Condensate Storage Tank Level Low
Condenser Hotwell Level Low
Upper Surge Tank Level bow
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Train B Loss of Normal Suction
Pressurizer Level
Pressurizer Pressure
Reactor Coolant Cold beg Temperature & Hot Leg Temperature
Nuclear Service Water System Flow
Component Cooling Water System Flow
Charging Line Flow
Seal Injection Flow
Volume Control Tank bevel
Boric Acid Flow
Boric Acid Tank Level
LOCA Sequencer Activated Status bight
B/O Sequencer Activated Status Light
Diesel Generator I3 Status bight
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Relay Status
SR Count Rate
Low Press Mode
Cold Leg Accumulator Discharge Isolation Valves
OP-CN-CP-RSS F8R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 18 of21
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATONS T M I N E "
CONTROLS:
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel B Transfer Switch
Auxiliary Feedwater Motor B StarVStop
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Normal Suction Valve CAW
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B RN Suction Valve CA18B
Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve RN310B
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Discharge to Steam Generator C Isolation Valve CA46B
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Discharge to Steam Generator B Isolation Valve CA42B
Auxiliary Charging Flow isolation valve NV-32B
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Auxiliary Feedwater to SG C Valve Position Selector
Station (CA44)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Auxiliary Feedwater to SG D Valve Position Selector
Station (CA4Q)
CA Sys. VLV Ctl Trn B Reset
Nuclear Service Water Pump B
Component Cooling Water Pump B7
Component Cooling Water Pump 82
Boric Acid Transfer Pump B
Centrifugal Charging Pump B
Component Cooling System Valves - KC2B, KC18B, KC53B, KC228B, KCC40B,
KC815
Chemical & Volume Control Systems Valves -NV122B, NV1235, NV1248,NVI 25B,
NV2365, NV309
PORV'S NC31B, NC32B, NC35B, NC36B
~
Pressurizer Heaters
Sequencer Reset
Residual Heat Removal System Valves - NC-1B, ND-36B
Residual Heat Removal Pump B
QP-CN-CP-RSS FQR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 6
Page I 9 of 21
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
AUXILIAKY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE CONTROL PANEL
INSTRUMENTATIONAND CONTROLS
AVAILABLE FOR HOT SHUTDOWN
Indicators:
Steam Generator A bevel
Steam Generator B Level
Steam Generator C Level
Steam Generator B bevel
Steam Generator A Pressure
Steam Generator B Pressure
Steam Generator C Pressure
Steam Generator B Pressure
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator A
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator B
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator C
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow to Steam Generator D
Steam Supply Press to CA Pump Turbine
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Speed
lndicatinq Liqhts:
Steam Supply Valve SA2 Open-Close
Steam Supply Valve SA5 Open-Close
Condenser Hotwell bevel
Upper Surge Tank bevel
Auxiliary Feedwater Condensate Storage Tank level
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps boss of Normal Suction
QP-CN-CP-RSS FQR TRAINENG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 20 wf 21
-
DUKE POWER - CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING
Controls:
Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Steam Brain Isolation TE33A
Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SG A Isolation Valve CA66B
Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven pump Discharge to SG 3 Isolation Valve CA54B
Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SG C Isolation Valve CA50A
Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SG D [solationValve CA38A
Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Normal Suction Valve CA7A
Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve CAI 16A
Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve CA85B
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine StaNStop
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction From H~twellIsolation Valve CA2
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction From Upper Surge Tank Isolation Valve CA4
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction From CA Condensate Storage Tank Isolation
Valve CA6
Steam Generator A Power Operated Relief Valve §VI9
Steam Generator E3 Power Operated Relief Valve SV13
Steam Generator C Power Qperated Relief Valve SV7
Steam Generator D Power Operated Relief Valve SV1
Steam Generators Power Operated Relief Valves Transfer Switch (Unit 1 Qniy)
Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Discharge Valves Auto-Start Alignment Reset
Switches
Train A Ctrl. Xfer SW
Train 4 Ctrl. Xfer SW
OP-CN-CP-RSS FOR TRAINlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 21 of 21
-DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNMG
3) A setting le.% than 0% sets B CFPT to assume more load than A.
2.16 CFPT Response to Reactor/CFPT Trip (Obj. #16)
A. Reactor Trip
1. Each CFPT that is in Auto will Runback to 50% (2975 RPM) and have each
Slave MIA Station selected to Manual. 50th Train A and Train B Reactor Trip
signals (P4A and P-45) are required to initiate this runback*.
2. If that CFPT was in Manual when the trip occurred it will still Runback to 2975
RPM.
3. The operator may operate the CFPT in the Decrease direction only. Speed may
be increased, but no higher than 2975 RPM.
4. In order to regain control of the CF pumps, one of two things must be done.
a) Close the Reactor Trip Breakers (to dear P4).
b) Select BYPASS on the Reactor Trip Bypass key operated switch.
5. When the breakers are closed, the Runback is armed. If the CFPT Speed is
very close to 2975 RPM at the time the Reactor Trip occurs, the Runback need
not be accomplished for obvious reasons but the M/A Station will still be
switched to Manual and operator control still lost.
5. CFPTTrip
1. When the CFPT trips, the following occur:
a) Slave is forced to Manual.
b) Speed Demand runs back to ZERO.
2. When the trip condition clears, the CFPT can be started only after the operator
ensures slave demand is at zero prior to raising speed.
3. If speed still cannot be increased after reducing the slave demand to zero,
transfer of CFPT speed control to the local panel may be required to reset
SGWLC (Refer to OP/1(2)/A16250/001, Enc. 4.3 - Feedwater Pump Startup).
2.17 Unit Differences Summary (Obj. #17)
A. Steam Generator Level Ramp Programs
B. Feedwater Pump Speed Control DP Programs
6. Unit 2 SGWLC Runback Circuit
D. Nozzle Swap Logic and Permissives
2.18 Technical Specifications (Obj. #18)
A. Technical Specification 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip System Instrumentation)
1. Steam Generator LO-LO bevel
P-4A and P4B are required to ensure on-line reactor trip breaker testing cannot potentially cause an imdvertant
CFPT Nnback to 50% speed.
QP-CN-CFIFE K I R TRAiNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 29
Page 23 of 29
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAiNiNG
b) Each of the suction reliefs has a lift setpoint of 150 psig and a capacity
of 30 gpm.
c) Discharge of each suction relief valve is to the associated pumps
sump.
2.2 Operation
A. Automatic Operation (Obj # 4)
1. Start Signals: Motor Driven Pumps l(2) A & B
a) Safety Injection: Train Related; Sequencer Activated (Load Group 8)
b) Blackout: Train Related; Sequencer Activated (Load Group 8)
c) Two of four S/G narrow range level channels in one of four S/G LO LO
LEVEL (2 of 4 L.S./l of 4 SIG) (Unit I:I 1%; Unit 2: 37%): starts both
CA Pumps.
d) Loss of Both Feed Pumps (2/3LOW FPT Control Oil Pressure (less
than 75 psi): stahs both CA Pumps.
e) AMSAC: Starts both CA Pumps.
1) Loss of CF feed path AMSAC: This system is functioning when
Turbine Impulse Pressure is greater than 40% Turbine Load and
remains active for TWO (2) minutes after Turbine Load decreases
to less than 40%.
(a) 34 CF Containment Isolation Valves closed (UNIT 1
ONLY)
(b) 3/4 Main Feed Regulating Valves less than 25% open with
associated Bypass less than 50% open. After 30 Seconds
of this condition AMSAC causes Both Trains of CA to Start.
2 ) boss of Both Feed Pumps.
2. Start Signals: Turbine Driven CA Pump # 1 & 2
a) Bladtout on either 4160 Essential Bus; Sequencer activated
1) On a concurrent B/O and SI, the TDCW will NOT start.
2) If an SI is received within 8.5 sec of a B/O, the TDCAP will NOT
start.
3) If an SI signal is received and clears but the SI is not reset and
then a 810 is received, the TDCAP will not Start.
4) All B/O initiated TDCAP starts WILL be delayed by 8.5 sec for the
Sequencer BIO logic to run.
5) If a B/O occurs and a subsequent SI occurs greater than 8.5 secs
after the BIO, the TDCAP will autostart on the B/O and wiil
continue to run at the time of the SI whether the on/off switch is
in the on or ow position until the 68 Sys is Reset.
OP-GN-CPCA FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 43
Page 9 of 26
Bank Question: 489.f Answer: A
1 Ptis) Unit 1 was operating at 100% power following a refueling shutdown. Unit 2
was shutdown in mode 6. It was discovered khat a spent fuel element from
the unit 1 refueling had been incorrectly stored in a filler location in the spent
fue1 pool. Thc element had exceeded the burnup (G\VD/MTU) requirements
to qualify for storage in a filler location.
Which one of the following statements describes the correct action(s)
required by Tech Specs to preserve spent fuel pool shutdown margin?
A. Immediately initiate action to move the non-complying fuel
assembly to an unrestricted storage location.
B. Immediately initiate actions to move the non-complying fuel
assembly to a restricted storage location and to shutdown Unit 1
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
C. Initiate action to move the non-complying fuel assembly to a
restricted storage location within one hour.
D. Initiate actions to move the uon-complying fuel assembly to an
unrestricted storage location and to shutdown Unit 1within 1
hour.
Distracter Analysis: Restricted locations in the spent h c i pool will store
spent fuel elements that have lower burnout. Elements that have
higher bumout must be stored in unrestricted areas.
A. Correct answer:
B. Incorrect: moving the spent he1 element to a restricted location
~
would violate Tech Spec 3.7.16. Tech Spec 3.0.3 does not apply - no
need to shutdown unit 1.
Plausible: If the candidate does not know the difference between
~
restricted and unrestricted locations and thinks that Tech Spec 3.0.3
applies to this condition.
C. Incorrect: - must initiate action immediately - not qualified for
storage in a restricted location.
Plausible: - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCQs for important Tech Specs are common - a
restricted area may imply more reactive elements should he stored
there.
D. Incorrect: - must initiate action immediately - Tech Spec 3.0.3 does
not apply.
Ques-489.l.doc
Plausible: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCQs for important Tech Specs are common
~
Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires initiating action to shutdown the unit within
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Level: RO&SRO
K A SYS 033 K2.01 (3.0i3.5)
Lesson Plan Objective: KF Qbj: 19,22
Source: Mod McGuire MRC 1999
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1.QP-CN-FH-KF page 13
Ques-489. Ldoc
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNlNG
Objective
systems, subsystems, and components which require remedial action to
be taken in less than one hour
OP-CN-FH-KF FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 27
Page 5 of 19
DUKE POWER CA JA WBA OPERA JlONS TRAlNING
Objective
State the purpose(s.)of the KF Svstern
Given a drawing of the KF System, designate the major components and
trace the system flowpaths for different modes of operation
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply the Limits and Precautions
associated with OW1/N6200/005. IxlxIx
Describe the function and operation of KF local controls Ixlxlx
State the type of power supplies to the KF Pumps IXIXIX
rates
operating procedures
Describe typical parameter values during normal operations I X I X I X
Describe system/operator action during abnormal conditions per
AP/I/N5558/26 (boss of refuel in^ Canal or Spent Fuel Pool bevel)
~
lxlxlx
-istthe trips and interlocks associated with the KF System
State the volume/level relationship of the spent fuel pool ... .
,I x
....
Describe draining the spent fuel pool to the FWST or RHT per the
saeratina orocedure
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference materials,
jeterrnine the actions necessary to comply with Technical Specifications
and Selected Licensee Commitments
OP-CN-FHXF FOR TAEMNe PURPOSES ONLY REV. 27
Page 4 of f9
2. Flow - 100 gprn
6. Cooling Loop
1. Flow - 2300 gpm
D. Purification Loop
I. Flow throttled to less than or equal to 265 gpm
E. KC Flow - 9000 gprn
2.3 Limits and Precautions (Qbj. #3)
A. Review current Limits and Precautions per QP/l/A/6200/005 (Spent Fuel
Cooling System)
2.4 Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments (Obj. # I 9 and 22)
A. 3.7.14 (Spent Fuel Pool Water Level) (Requires that remediai action be taken
"IMMEDIATELY")
B. 3.7.15 (Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration) (Requires that remedial action
be taken "IMMEDIATELY")
C. 3.9.16 (Spent Fuel Assembly Storage) (Requires that remedial action be taken
"IMMEDIATELY")
B. SLC 16.7-9 (Standby Shutdown System)
E. SLC 16.7-10 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations)
F. Sb6 16.9-21 (Refueling Operations-Storage Pool Water Level)
2.5 Pump Power Supplies (Obj. #5)
A. Fuel pool cooiing pump A Safety Related 4160V Essential Buss ETA
B. Fuel pool cooling pump B Safety Related 4160V Essential Buss ETE3
C. Fuel pool skimmer pump Non- Safety related Unit 6OOV Motor Control
Center MXK
5. Fuel Transfer Canal Air Driven Unwatering Pump (VI)
2.6 Setpoints
A. Alarms
1. Temperature
a) 145°F (KC) at the outlet of KF pump motor cooler.
b) 125°F high temp spent fuel pool.
2. Flow
a) 2680/2100 gpm KF HX highllow flow (KF)
b) 3150/500 gpm below setpoint of controller KF HX highllow flow (KC)
QP-CN-FH-KF FOR TRhlNlNo PURPOSES ONLY REV. 27
Page 13 of I 9
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage
3.7.16
3.9 PLANT SYSTEMS
3.7.16 Spent Fuel Assembiy Storage
LCO 3.7.16 The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each new or spent fuel
assembly stored in the spent fuel pool storage racks shall be within the
following configurations:
a. Unrestricted storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.16-1; or
b. Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.16-1, of fuel which
does not meet the criteria of Table 3.7.16-2.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.
ACTIONS
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
A. Requirements of the a,? ss__s_________NOTE_____________
LCO not met. LCO 3.0.3 is not
applicable.
initiate action to move the Immediately
noncomplying fuel
assembly to the correct
location.
I I
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with the
specified configurations.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.7.16-1 Amendment Nos. 173/165
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage
3.7.16
Table 3.7.16-1
Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus lnitial Enrichment for Unrestricted Storage
lnitiai Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup
[Weisht% U-235) m u )
4.05 (or less) 0
4.50 2.73
5.00 5.67
t
8 t
t
6t UNRESTRICTED /
4 T STORAGE
,...... .......
,,,.... .,.
,. - .
I , ... ,.......
......
2 t /-.-
_.-
,-
-A. RESTRICTED
STORAGE
0
1
+ -~&:.-
/_/
- + - -. - -~l~- - - - ~ J
4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.00
Initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight% U-2.
NOTES:
Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Tabie 3.7.16-1
may be qualified for Unrestricted storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved
methodology to assure that ,.k is less than or equal to 0.95. Likewise, previously unanalyzed
fuel up to a nominal 5.0 weight% U-235 may be qualified for Restricted storage by means of an
analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that ketiis less than or equal to 0.95.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.7.16-2 Amendment Nos. 173/165
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage
3.7.16
Table 3.7.16-2
Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus Initial Enrichment for Filler Assemblies
Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup
(Weiaht% U-235) (GWDIMTU)
1.90(or less) 0
2.00 16.83
2.50 26.05
3.00 35.11
3.50 43.4%
4.00 51.99
4.4% 6Q.00
UNACCEPTA5LE
For Use As Filler Assembly
60 ~*~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .. . . ....
,/_- -
50
ACCEPTABLE ..
,_./.
.-
For Use As Filler Assembly
40 _.-
_,/-
30 ,-A.
_-_...
_ ,
-
,_.,.
_,
./-
20 ,.- UNACCEPTABLE
r,.
-
For Use As Filler Assembly
10 /i
0
t
~r~~~~~~ ; /
i
i
~ ~ ~ . ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ +I ~- ~: . ~ ~ - -
1..50 2.00 2.50 3.QO 4.50 4.00 4.50
Initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight% U-2.
NOTES:
Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.26-2
may be qualified for use as a Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved
methodology to assure that is less than or equal to 0.95.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.7.16-3 Amendment Nos. 173/165
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage
3.7.16
RESTRICTED
Restricted Fuel: Fuel defined for Restricted Storage in Table 3.7.46-1, (Fuel defined for
Unrestricted Storage in Table 3.7.16-1, or non-fuel components, or an
empty location may be placed in restricted fuel locations as needed)
Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table
3.9.16-2, or an empty cell.
Boundary Condition: Any row bounded by an Unrestricted Storage Area shall contain a
combination of restricted fuel assemblies and filler locations arranged
such that no restricted fuel assemblies are adjacent to each other.
Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column 1 can not be adjacent to
an Unrestricted Storage Area, but row 4 or column 4 can be.
Figure 3.7.16-1
Required 3 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Storage
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.7.16-4 Amendment Nos. 173/165
Bank Question: 489 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% power follo~inga refueling shutdown.
If it is discovered that a spent fuel element was incorrectly stored in the
wrong region of the spent fuel pool, which one ofthe following statements
describes the correct action(s) required by Tech Specs?
A. Initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel assembly to the
correct location within one hour.
B. Initiate actions to move the noncomplying fuel assembly to the
correct location and to shutdown Unit 2 within 1hour.
C. Immediately initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel
assembly to the correct location.
D. Immediately initiate actions to move the noncomplying fuel
assembly to the correct location and to shutdown Unit 2 within 1
hour.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: - must initiate action immediatety
Plausible: - I hour LCOs for important Tech Specs are common and
the fuel assembiy has clearly decayed more tIm 16 days
B. Incorrect: - must initiate action immediately - Tech Spec 1.0.3does
not apply
Plausible: - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCQs for important Tech Specs are common and
the fuel assembly has clearly decayed more than 16 days; Tech Spec
3.0.3 requires initiating action to shutdown the unit w i t h 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
C. Correct answer:
D. Incorreck - Tech Spec 3.0.3 does not apply
Plausible: - If the candidate thinks that Tech Spec 3.0.3 applies
Bank Question: 482.1 Answer: D
1 Pt(s) During an outage, air-operated valves 2NV-122B & 123B (Loop C To Excess
Ltdn N1x'Isol) are being used to isolate valve 2NV 124B (Excess Ltdn Press Cont)
for maintenance.
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the requirements for
using 2NV-122/123 as an isolation boundary?
A. Tag shut the air supply to the valves and tag open the air regulator
petcocks. Tags should also be firmly fixed around the remote
operating switch on the main control board.
B. Tag shut the air supply to the valves and @g&&dtheak
_ -
regu1at-a- Tags should also be firmly fured around the
remote operating switch on the main control board.
Co Tag shut the air supply to the valves and tag closed the air
regulator petcocks. A switch Iabd should also be firmly fured
around the remote operating switch on the main control board.
D. Tag shut the air supply to the valves and tag open the air regulator
petcocks. A switch labels should also be firmly fmed around the
remote operating switch on the main control board.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: - switch labels are used on main control boar& for tagging
remote switches - not red tags.
PIausible: - the position of the components is correct -
B. Incorrect: - the air regulator petcocks must be tagged open not closed
Plausible: - if the candidate does not know the proper position for
tagging the regulator petcock
C. Incorrect: the air regulator petcock must be tagged open not closed -
~
tags are not hung on main control board switches
Plausible: if the candidate does not know the proper tagging for the air
operated valves
D. Correct answer - per NSD-500
Level: RO&SRO
KA: G 2.2.13 (3.6 / 3.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: NSO2 Obj: 5
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
I. OP-CN-ADM-NS82 page 9
2. NSDSOO page 5,1 I
3. OMP 2-33 page 14
---
DUKE POWER
=-..=_l__ii -... ...- _.- CATA WBA OPERATIONS...
_.....__..-.
%
_-
TRAINING
..._ ...
Objective
Given a specific component, develop a tagout boundary for repair of
that component using controlled references.
Isolate high energy before low energy
0 Tag open a vent or drain
- Double isolate high energy boundaries or check valve used as
isolations
Use Butterfly Isolation Reliability Guide
0 Access the equipment database
3escribe the responsibilities of the NLO for preparing, placing and
- learing tagouts.
3ven a copy of a REDTAGIConfigurationControl Tag, explain each
- ntry made.
%en a copy of a Tagout Record (R&R) Sheet, explain each entry
nade:
1 Initial entries
b Removal entries
I Restoration entries
ixplain how tags and tag stickers are properly placed on
amponents and controls.
Explain the process for voiding tags I R&R's.
- xplain the process for replacing lost or damaged tagsltag stubs.
ixplain the process for lifting tags for testing (TLFT).
OP-CN-ADM-NS02 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 06
Page 4 of i 5
=
-
5UKE POWER CA TAWBA OPRA TloNS TRAINING
C. Equipment Database (EDB) - An Olympus computer program, which can be
accessed individually or via use of the OPS REDTAG Program, which provides
access to the data in the Equipment Database.
D. Component Positions -The REDTAG program uses many different removal
positions when creating a tagout or adding tags. They are located on a Drop
Down Screen in the OPS REDTAG Program.
E. Additional Items from OMP 2-18:
1. Tag outs are used to document a component being in an "out of normal"
position and shall be used if the configuration will extend beyond the
current shift.
2. Tag outs are not used in place of a procedure change.
3. Numbered tags shall be used for isolation purposes.
4. N/A tags may be used for nsn-isolation purposes such as vents or drains
5. If available, the operating procedure will be used to remove equipment
from service.
6. Operating Experience Tagging Reference SHALL be used when making a
tag out.
3. Tags are made for specific work and cannot be reused once signed.
8. If the tags are for a contaminated area, the stubs maybe removed and left
in the WCC will removal is in progress.
F. Additional Items from NSB 500:
1. The R&R will give the correct seauence for components to be positioned
and tagged. Normally this will be from high to low energy components.
(0bj #5)
2. When possible a vent or drain shall be tagged open inside the tag
boundary to prevent repressurization of the system. (Obj #5)
3. Double isolation will be considered for the following (Obj #5):
a) High temp or pressure sources with suspected internal leakage
b) Any check valve approved for use as a tag boundary.
4. The following must be approved by the QSM and documented via NSD
500 and attached to the tag out.
a) use of any check valve as an isolation boundary
b) the use of any air operated valve which is not gagged or have air
isolated and vented
c) Not hanging a tag due to safety or radiological reasons (WGS must
approve in writing as well.)
OP-CN-ADM-NSO2 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 06
Page 9 of $5
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
-
Nuclear Policy Manual Volume 2 NSD 500
500.7.1.2 White Tags
1. White Tags are used for the following:
Configuration control of equipment for procedure and regulation adherence
Equipment protection
Situations in which a component is functional, but some precaution or information is necessary prior to
operation.
2. A White Tag shall not used:
If isolation of the component provides for personnel protection
e When more appropriate administrative methods are available.
Used in place of Temporary Modification tag.
3. White Tag($) will not be listed as pa? of the isolation boundary for a WO.
0 The Work Group will not be the Holder of any White Tags included in the Tagout that provides their
protection during work.
4. Examples of White Tags genersted by the Safety Tag Program are show in Appendix E -
OperationdChemistry RedlWhite Tag InstructionslExample Tags.
5. Examples of White Tags used by the Maintenance Department and Site Services Department are show in
-
Appendix G Maintenance RedlWhite Tags. The White Tag shown in Appendix G will oniy be hung O R
equipment that Maintenance or Site Services are the QCG for.
500.7.1.3 Use of Control Board stickers
B Tag stickers shall be used on control bards or control panels in the COR~XOIroom where use of a full sized tag
could obscure other switches. indications, or control functions.
2 Tag stickers may be used on control boards and control panels in the piant.
3 A tag sticker shall be considered the same as the tag which it represents. with same requirements
4 When more than one tag is required on a control switch, a single control sticker may be used.
500.9.1.4 Use of TrilRSmiSSioR Department Y d l o W Hold Tags
If Dispatcher requests Re-closer Devices to be tagged, use of Yellow Hold Tags prevents unwanted Re-closer
actuation. Yellow Hold Tags are controlled by Dispatcher and are defined in Electrical Transmission Department
Procedrares.
50.72 TAGOUT RESPONSlBlLlTlES
500.?.2.1 OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT
I Will determine the Operational Control Group for equipment and systems.
2 Superintendent of Operations BEST is:
2.1 Owner of NSD 500 and responsible for the tagout standard^
2.2 Will approve the Removal and Restoration Process for all site groups that perform Tagout.
REVISION I8 5
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
VERIFY HARD CQPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRlOR TO EACH USE
Nuclear Policy Manuat Volume 2
~ NSD 500
i 500.7.3.2 Tagout k?VdOQmetlt
1. The tagout deveiopment shall include the following:
1.1. The work scope is sufficiently defined in the WO Task.
1.2. Determination of tagout boundaries shall include a review of the Work Order for which the tagout is being
developed.
1.3. The identification of components to he tagged must be based on Controlled Plant Enginewing Documents,
whenever drawings exist that identifies all required Energy Isolation Devices.
1.4. If no Controlled Plant Engineering Documents exist for identifying required Energy Isolation Devices,
develop tagout as follows:
1.4. I. Operational Control Group Supervisorldesigneeshall determine acceptable Energy Isolation Devices
by referring to supplied drawings OR equipment or by performing a physical inspection.
1.4.2. The OCG will request that the appropriate §ME on the componentlsystem provide adequate
guidance in the WO Task for isolation.
1.5. Boundaries, vent, and drain paths, will be based upon purpose and nature of potential hazards for each
tagout request.
1.6. Each operating mechanism for a device shall be tagged to ensure all motive force is removed.
Example: A valve that is manually or electrically operated shall be tagged electrically and on
handwheel.
1.7. Air operated valves are not a preferred tagout boundary.
1.7. I . When air operated valves are wed as tagout boundaries, motive force shall be removed by
isolating and tagging air supply. Air shall be vented down stream of isolations.
1.7.2. If air operated valve can not be vented, a determination must be made that trapped motive force is
not adequate to move actuator.
1.7.3. An air operated valve can o d y be used if it can be assured that the valve will remain in the
required safe position.
1.7.4. In lieu of this determination a mechanical type gag may be installed to prevent changing valve
position.
1.7.5. An Operations Manager shall approve use of air valves if requirements of steps 1.7.1 thru 1.7.4 are
not met.
1.8. The tagout will define the correct sequence in which components are to be positioned and tagged.
1.9. In general, isolation sequence will be from high to iow energy compomnts.
1.10.Where possible. a vent or drain path within the boundary shall be tagged open to prevent system
re-pressurization.
1.11. Safety related equipment tagout process shall include consideration of the following:
- Technical Spgcification adherence for TS actions and Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO).
Selected License Commitments (SLCs).
Technical Specificationpost maintenance testing requirements
Appropriate level of Re-job and Post-job Brief.
2. The installation of a Red Tag m y be considered hazardous or impractical in certain cases.
For example: Very high radiation levels or the only feasible isolation valve is inaccessible.
An exception to placing a red tag can be made for these situations.
This exception to red tag placement must be approved for use by an Operations Manager.
REVISION 18 11
VERIFY WARD CQPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
Operations Management Procedure 2-33 Page 14 of 22
2. For pneumatic valves that fail into a certain position
without additional valve positioning capabilities
a. Ensure the desired position is the same as the
failed position.
b. Isolate the VI air supply to the positioner.
c. Bleed air from the valve. The regulator drain
valve may be used if the VI air supply is
isolated upstream of the regulator.
NOTE: 1. The following returns the valve to normal operation.
2. Most pneumatic valves are controlled from a remote location. On
a return to service, the controller should be verified 01positioned
for the desired position.
d. Close the valve used to bleed air from the air
operated vaive.
e. Open the VI isolation to the positioner.
f. Ensure air is available to the local controller, if
applicable.
3. For pneumatic valves that fail into a certain position
with handwheel positioned mechanical stops.
engage handwheel and place the mechanical stop at that position
before failing air. This reduces wear on the travel stop stem.
a. Isolate VI air supply.
b. Open the bypass valve if applicable.
e. Bleed air from the valve. The regulator drain
valve may be used if the VI air supply is
isolated upstream of the regulator.
d. If applicable, engage handwheel.
e. Position valve by use of handwheel.
NOTE: The following returns the valve to normal operation.
Bank Questdon: 460.2 Answer: D
1 Ptis) If a large fire was reported in a vital area inside the RCA, which one of the
following responses is correct by station procedures?
A. The Fire Brigade must suppress this fire without assistance
because the Bethel Volunteer Fire Department is not allowed to
access vital areas under the NRCs post-9/11 anti-terrorist
orders.
B. The Fire Brigade must suppress this 5re because Bethel
Volunteer Fire Department is not qualified to fight fire in a
radiologically controlled area.
C. The Fire Brigade is initially responsible for Bre suppression
activities at the scene. Upon arrival, the Bethel Volunteer Fire
Department will take over control of the stem
D. The Fire Brigade is primarily responsible for fire suppression
activities at the scene. The Bethel Volunteer Fire Department
will respond promptly to the scene and will function under the
Site Incident Commander.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: - Offside Fire Departments are allowed escorted access to
vital areas of the plant. Provisions are in place to allow the offsite
Fire Department to anive at the scene promptly.
Plausible: - they have restrictions regarding leaving the site. The
NKGs post-9/11 anti-terrorist orders place additional restrictions on
vital area access by non-permanent employees.
B. Incorrect: -0ffsite Fire Departments are trained to fight fires in
radiologically controlled area.. of the plant. Provisions are in place to
allow the offsite Fire Department to arrive at the scene promptly
PIausibLe: - If the candidate does not understand that offsite Fire
Departments are trained in radiological fires.
C. Incorrect: The Site Incident Conimander retaains responsibility for
the scene of the fire.
Plausible: The offsite Fire Departments are full-time professionals
and the candidate may think that the Fire Brigade Leader should turn
over the responsibilities to the offsite professionals.
D. Correct Incorrect: -The Fire Brigade is primarily responsible to
figlit fire inside the protected area.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: G 2.4.27 (3.0/3.5)
Lesson Pian Objective: SS-RE'Y SEQ 38
Source: Mod Ques-460.1 McGuire hXC 2002
Level of knowledge: inemomy
References:
1.NSD 112 page 1
DUKE POWER
_...- .....
.~~ -
.___. ,., _.- .... TAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
.CA
-. ..... _.._ _ _ ...
-
I L
Objective
S
0
-
Explain the 3 methods of actuating the Mulsifyre Deluge Systems X
-
State the purpose of the Turbine Bearing Deluge Systems
State what causes the Turbine Bearing Deluge Systems to alarm
State how the Turbine Bearing Deluge Systems is actuated
State how the Turbine Bearing Deluge Systems are pressurized
Describe how Deluge Systems for Carbon Filters are actuated
State the purpose of the DIG Low Pressure 60,(Cardox)
Svstems
State the capacity of the Cardox Systems
State the purpose of the Cardox Systems refrigeration unit
State the normal Cardox Systems pressure
State the Cardox Systems tank level requirements
Explain how the Cardox Systems are actuated, including:
Automatic electric, Manual electric, & Manual
State the iength of time delays for the Cardox Systems
State the purpose of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Pits High
Pressure CO, (CACO,) Systems
State the normal CA C02 Systems pressure
Explain how the CA CO, Systems are actuated, including:
Automatic electric, Manual electric, & Manual
State the length of time delays fer the CA 60, Systems
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply limits and precautions
associated with related station procedures.
State your duties, per Nuclear System Directive: 112, as a Fire
Brigade member
Define "Fire Impairment" and state Operations primary
responsibility concerning fire impairments
OP-CWSS-RN FOR TRAlNING PURPOSES QAKY REV. 75
Page 4 of 24
VERIFY EIAm COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
Nuclear Policy Manunl- Volume 2 NSD 112
112. FIRE BRIGADE ORGANIZATION, TRAlNlNG AND
RESPON SIB1LITES
112. I PURPOSE
The primary purpose of the Fire Brigade Organization is to minimize the consequences of postulated fires with or
without the assistance of offsite fire agencics by rapid fire suppression. The site Fire Brigade Organization is trained
to be self-sufficient and is expected to respond to a fire involving property inside the owner conteolled area. The
Fire Brigade may provide limited support during an onsite hazardous materials emergency, or a fm (including the
Switchyard) as resource^ allow. Offsite fire agencies are normally responsible for f r e suppression activities outside
of the protected area, but may bc used to assist with fme fighting activities inside the protected area; switchyard and
other buildings outside the protected area. When offsite fre agencies are used inside the protected area, they will
hnction under the direction of the Site Incident Commander.
112.2 REFERENCES
0 Duke Power Company, Catawba Nuclear Station, Response to Appendix A to BTB-ASCB 9.5.1
- lOCFRSO Appendix R
0 hTPA 27 Private Fire Brigades
W P A 600 IndusIrial Fire Brigades
hRC Regulatory Guide 1.120 Fire Protection Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants
NRC Standard Review Plan, BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Position C3
e Nuclear Mutual Limited PropcrQ Loss Prevention Standards, Section 111A
Fire Brigade Training 8r Qualifications Manual
e SLC 16.13-1 (Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee)
I PIPC-01-02617
112.3 SPECIFIC RESPQNSiBlUTlES
Site VP has overall authority and responsibility for all Hazards and Emergency Response Planning. The pianrning
effort is delegated to the Manager, Emergency Planning.
Operatiom ShiftManagerEmergency Coordinator in the Conaol Room has final responsibility and authority in
handling a fire emergency. The brigade leader will function under his cognizance and keep him informed of the
status of the emergency. The Operations Shift Manager on duty is responsible for ensuring that Fire Brigade
staffmg requirements are met. In the event that a deviation in staffiog levels o c ~ mthe, Operations Shift Manager
shall ensure a PIP is initiated to document the deviation
Emergency Planning Manager has the responsibility for the administrative aspects of the Fire Brigade.
The Program Administration under the direction of the EP Manager is responsible for the following.
Ensure that all offsite fire department training and drills are conducted.
- Provides technical and tactical advice to the Fire Brigade Leader in the attack and extinguishment of fires.
Maintains the shcture ofthe Fire Brigade's organization.
24 SEP 2001 1
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE KMMEDIATELY PRXOR TO EACH USE
Bank Question: 460. I Answer: B
1 Pt(s) If a fire was reported in the iunchroom of the Administrative Building, which
one of the following responses is correct by station procedures?
k Offsite fire departments are responsible for fire suppression
activities at the scene. The Fire Brigade must be held in reserve
for station flees inside the protected area.
B. Offsite fire departments are responsible for fire suppression
activities at the scene. The Fire Brigade may provide limited
support if resources allow.
C. The Fire Brigade is responsible for the initial response at the
scene. They are required to turn over control of the scene as
soon as an offsite fire department arrives and immediatdy return
to the protected area.
D. The Fire Brigade is responsible for fire suppression activities at
the scene. An offsite fire department may be called to provide
support if additional resources are required.
--___-- _s- - I - _ _-_--_
- - ----
k I uJ Distracter Analysis:
I /ULfl
v
A. Incorrect: -the Fire Brigade is allowed to leave the protected area.
-30
,&%)1> & B.
C.
Plausible: -they have restrictions regarding leaving the sitc.
Correctanswer
Incorrect: the Fire Brigade is not responsible for initial response
~
and they are not required to return to the protected area.
Plausible: - if the candidate thinks that they cannot remain outside
the protected area.
D. Incorrect: - The Fire Brigade is not primaily responsible to fight
fire outside the protected area.
Plausible: If the candidate does not understand fire brigade
responsihilities.
Level: RO Only
MA:G 2.4.27 (3.U3.5)
Lesson Plan Objective: SS-RFY SEQ 38
Source: Hank
Level of knowledge: memory
Ques-460.1.doc
References:
1.NSD112 page1
Ques-460.l.doc
Bank Question: 0162 Answer: B
1 R(s) Unit 2 is performing a plant startup when a problem occurs in the main
feedwater system.
The following events and conditions occur:
- 2A main feedwater pump is running
- 2B main feedwater p m p tnrbine is not reset
e Reactor power is 25%
e The 2A main feedwater pump trips
The operator manually trips thc plant
a All steam generator levels decrease to 20%
Assuming S Y S ~ M Soperate as designed, when did the turbine driven CA
pump receive an auto-start signal (if at all)?
A. When the 2A main feedwater pump tripped.
B. When narrow range (eve1 decreased below 36%.
C. When the reactor trip occurred.
D. The turbine driven CA pump did not receive an auto start signal.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: AMSAC is not in service
Plausible: The M S A C signal to start CA on loss of both hPPs is
not in service and only starts the motor driven pumps.
B. Correct: 36.8% is the unit 2 setpoint
C. Incorrect The TDCA pump started when SGWL reached 36.8%
Plausible: the SIG 10-10 levei setpoint is 10.7% for unit 1
D. Incorrect The TDCA pump starts at 46.8% SGWL.
Plausible: this would be true for unit 1.
Level: RO&SKO
K k SYS 059 K1.02 (3.413.4)
Lesson Plan Objective: CF Obj: 4
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: analysis
---...........................
References:
1. OP-CN-CF-CA page 10, 1 1
2.OP-CN-ADM-UDpages 12,13
Objective
Describe the Unit 1 CF flowpaths during the following normal plant
evolutions.
Unit Startup to point where flow is transferred to the Main CF
Nozzles.
e Power escalation to Rated Power.
Describe the Unit 2 CF flowpaths during the following Normal Plant
Evolutions.
e Unit Startup to point where Row is established to the Main CF
Nozzles.
"Split Flow" during power escalation to rated power.
indicated in the Control Room.
ADM-UD pages 12 and 13
1. At the top of these riser pipes is a metal fixture, which causes the
steam-water mixture to take a swirling path, throwing the
moisture to the outside into the pipe around the riser pipe. The
moisture in this pipe then joins the rest of the separated out
moisture above the top of the wrapper.
2. The steam which comes aut Qf the swirl vanes then enters the
second-stage chevron moisture separators where any moisture
left in the steam is taken out and then drains through pipes from
this separator down above the top of the wrapper where it
combines with the recirc flow from the swirl vanes.
3. All recirc flow above the wrapper flows down above the tube
sheet by passing through the downcomer region. The
downcomer region is the area between the wrapper and the SIG
shell. This recirc water area is where the S/G level is measured.
B. Main Feedwater Nonle
1. By procedure, the main nozzle will always be used above 15%
flow going up in power and down to 15% flow when decreasing
power.
2. Feedwater first enters the reverse flew limiter, which contains 4
venturi-shaped holes. This reverse flow limiter limits the rate of
reactivity addition on a feed line break.
3. To prevent excessive entering velocity on the tubes at the inlet
two things have been done. One, the inlet region tubes are
expanded to make them more rigid. Second, a flow orifice has
been installed upstream of the containment isolations to limit the
flow to the main nozzle to 87% of 100% flow with the 68 nozzle
unisolated. This is done to prevent excessive wear of the first
row of tube due to high velocity feedwater entering the S/G.
4. After entering the CF nozzle the feedwater contacts the counter
flow preheater section and flows up the Tc side of the tube
bundle.
C . Steam Generator Level Program
I. Unit #I Level Program
a) Unit 1 has Babcock & Wilcox Keplacement Steam
Generators. While this S/G design does not require S/G
level to be ramped, a ramp is still provided to allow additional
operational flexibility.
I) The ramp lower limit ensures that the main feed sing
gooseneck remains covered and that plenty of mass
margin exists to either S/G i o Lo Level reactor trip or
SIG Hi Hi Level (P14) CF Isolation. This allows low
power maneuverability.
2) The upper limit ensures that plenty of water exists in the
S/G to ensure S/G Lo Lo Level reactor trip does not
occur on a Loss of One Main Feedwater Pump (LOMFP)
and that water level remains below the primary
separators at all times.
b) Programmed level is determined by use of the Power Range
Excore Detector Median Selected power.
4 ) Programmed Level Setpoint: 39%-65% Narrow Range
level from 0-100% Excore power.
2) LEVEL DEVIATION ALARM: plus or equal to 5% of
current Program value
3) LOW LEVEL ALERT: 5% above the Program LO LO
Level Trip Setpoint
4) LO-LO LEVEL REACTOR TRIP: 1 1 % ( 2 4 Levels on 1/4
§/GIs)
5) HIGH-HIGH LEVEL (P-14); 83% (2/4 Levels an 1/4
SIG's) causes: Turbine Trip, Initiates CF Isolation and CF
pump turbine Trip.
c) The S/G Lo Lo Level Trip and P14 functions independently
from the SIG Level Control System. The Four level channels
contain the circuitry necessary to monitor the fixed High and
Low Level Trip setpoints.
2. Unit #2 Level Program (Qbj. # I )
a) Unit 2 SIG has Westinghause D5 S/Gs. While this design
does not require level to be ramped, level is programmed
from 62% at 0% power to 67% at 100% power to ensure
sufficient water mass is present in the S/G to avoid a S/G LO
Lo Levei reactor trip in the event of a LOMFP.
1) HI-HI LEVEL TURBINE TRIP: 77%
2) PRQGRAMMEB AT POWER LEVEL: 62% to 67%
3) LQ-LQ LEVEL REACTOR TRIP: 37%
b) The HI-HI LEVEL TURBINE TRIP and LO-LO LEVEL
REACTOR TRIP setpoints are still 2/4 Level Bistables an 114
S/G coincidence. The Annunciators for LEVEL DEVlATlON
-
+ 5% AND LO-bO LEVEL ALERT 5% above Reactor Trip
remain the same.
c) The Level Trip Program for Unit 2 S/G's have Four (4)
Channels of Trip instrumentation. The Four ievel channels
contain the circuitry necessary to monitor the fixed High and
Low Level Trip setpoints. The coincidence necessary to
generate the Alert Annunciators and Trips work the same as
Unit 1I
CF-CA pages 10 and 11
d) The most likely source of overpressure is leaking discharge
e) Each of the suction reliefs has a lift setpoint of 150 psig and a
capacity of 30 gpm.
f) Discharge of each suction relief valve is to the associated
pumps sump.
1.2 Operation
A. Automatic Operation (Obj # 4)
I. Start Signals: Motor Driven Pumps 1(2) A & B
a) Safety Injection: Train Related; Sequencer Activated (Load
Group 8)
b) Blackout: Train Related; Sequencer Activated (Load Group
8)
c) Two of four S/G narrow range level channels in one of four
SIG LO LO LEVEL (2 of 4 L.S./7 of 4 S/G) (Unit 1: 11%; Unit
2: 37%): starts both CA Pumps.
d) Loss of Both Feed Pumps (2/3 LOW FPT Control Oil
Pressure (less than 75 psi): starts both CA Pumps.
e) AMSAC: Starts both CA Pumps.
1) Loss of CF feed path AMSAC: This system is functioning
when Turbine Impulse Pressure is greater than 40%
Turbine Load and remains active for TWO (2) minutes
after Turbine Load decreases to less than 40%.
(a) 3/4 CF Containment Isolation Valves closed
(UNIT 1 ONLY)
(b) 3/4 Main Feed Regulating Valves less than 25%
open with associated Bypass less than 50%
open. After 30 Seconds of this condition AMSAC
causes Both Trains of CA to Start.
2) Loss of Both Feed Pumps.
2. Start Signals: Turbine Driven CA Pump # 1 & 2
a) Blackout on either 4160 Essential Bus; Sequencer activated
1) On a concurrent B/O and SI, the TDCAP will NOT start.
2) If an SI is received within 8.5 sec of a BIO, the TDCAP
will NOT start.
3) If an SI signal is received and clears but the SI is not
reset and then a 810 is received, the TDCAQ will not
start.
4) All ,310 initiated TDCAP starts WILL be delayed by 8.5
sec for the Sequencer B/O logic to run.
., ..
.
.
..
.
- ..
5) If a B/O occurs and a subsequent SI occurs greater than
8.5 secs after the B/O, the TBCAP will autostart on the
B/O and will continue to run at the time of the SI whether
the on/off switch is in the on or off position until the
CA Sys is Reset.
b) Two of four S/G narrow range level channels in two of four
S/G LO LO LEVEL.
c) The following are NOT CA AUTO STARTS but merely
cause the steam to be admitted to the Turbine, (CA SYS
VLV CTRL resets remain lit):
1) Loss of Power or Instrument Air to 1(2)SA 2 or 5 causes
these valves to fail open and admit Main Steam to the
Turbine driven CA Pump.
2) 2/4 SSF Wide Range S/G bevels less than 45% cause
SA-5 to fail open. THIS FEATURE CAN NOT BE
DEFEATED. (A loss of SSF power will initiate this same
failure).
3. Plant Response to the CA Auto Start.
a) BB flow control valves close.
b) BB Cont. Isolation and Bypasses Close; Train Related
c) NM Sample Cont. isolations Close; Train Related
d) CF Cont. Isolation Bypasses Close; either train
e) Individual Tempering Line Isolation Valves Close; either train
f) Flow Control Valves fail to FULL OPEN.
g) If it was a Turbine Driven Start; SA 2 & 5 fail open, Governor
positions to Max speed and TD Flow Control Valves fail to
FULL OPEN.
h) A Train CA Signals causes TB governor to position to
MAX speed and prevents manual closing of T&T Valve at
MC-10. B Train DOES NOT provide these features.
i) RN Valves low suction pressure alignment circuits are
enabled.
j) CS47(Normal Motweil MIU Control) fails &@&on either
train CA Auto start. This ensures the CA system is not
affected by any UST inventory loss to the hotwell. Control
board resets buttons for each train restores the valve to its
normal makeup duties.
Bank Question: 039 Answer: B
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 containment pressure is 4.0 psig. All equipment is operating as designed.
Safety injection has been RESET.
What are the minimum actions necessary for the operator to reopen lKC-425A
(Reactor Building Non-EssentiaI Supply Header Isolation)?
A. Press the OPEN pushbutton on MC-11.
B. Reset phase B train A, then press the OPEN pushbutton on
MC-11.
C. Wait until containment pressure is less than 3 psig, reset phase B
train A, then press the OPEN pushbutton on MC-11.
D. Reset phase B trains A and (together), then press the OPEN
pushbutton on MC-11.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: must reset phase B.
Plausible: may not realize valve has closed due to phase B.
B. Correct: valve bas closed due to phase B. KC-425 is a train A valve.
Phase B can be reset at any time, therefore, to open KC-425, reset phase
B train A, then open the valve.
C. Incorrect: Phase B can be reset at any time.
Plausible: candidate believes phase B cannot be reset until below the
setpoint.
D. Incorrect: Only train A must be reset.
PIausibIe: candidate believes the train A and train 3 reset buttons must
be depressed together in order to get phase B reset.
KA: SYS 103 K4.06 (3.U3.7)
Lesson Plan Objective: CNT-CNT SEQ 17
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
I. OP-CN-ECC-ISE pages 18-19
2.OP-CN-GNT-CnTT pages 19-20
Is IL
1 temperature.
7 I DESCRIBE the operation of Containment Ahnosahere Radiation 1 I
Monitors EMF3S(Particulate), 39 (Gas), and 40 ;Iodine)
including:
0 Operation of the sample pump and sample point selection
valves.
Automatic actions initiated by Trip 2 aiarnis
.. s e .to a Phase A._
P a c.k. a m o .n..-. Containnlcnt
.- isolation .
the responsc of EMF-S3A/B to a drsip:. break
I I per SD 4.1.2 (Access to Containment or Annulus and Areas Having- I I
I high Pressur; Steam Relief Devices)
1I I STATE the site administrative reauirements for when. and in what I X 1 X
I Operations.
16 1 DESCRIBE the operation of the Containnrent Isolation ESF I I
I systems for a Phase A Containment Isolation. I
17 I DESCRIBE the oaeration of the Containment Isolation BSF I
systems for n Phase
...-..B Containment . ..
. Isolation.
STATE the pwpose of the Coiitalr.inent Valve Injection Water
I (Nw) system.
ISE pages a8 and 19
(Sp) Phase B Isolation
Hi IIi Cont
Press ? 3 PSIG
NSNX
INIT
MANUAL Phase B
C. Phase B Isolation (Sp)
1. 2 signals can actuate an Sp
a) Manual: One pushbutton per train under Plexiglas cover on
MCI 1 (Phase 3, NS-VX Initiate, Cont Vent lsol Button)
b) Hi-Hi Containment Pressure: 2/4 Containment Pressure
Channels greater than or equal to 3.0 psig. An annunciator
(AD-13) signals Control Room on HI HI Containment
Pressure on any one channel.
1) The "Phase B, NS-VX h i t and Cont Vent !sol" Button,
when depressed, will initiate all three functions.
2. Reset (Phase B Reset Button)
a) Allows manual control of Sp valves.
b) One pushbutton for each train (NS board)
c ) Functional with any pressure in Containment.
3. Phase B Isolation indication: annunciator or? AD13.
4. Phase B Isolation, completes the isolation of non-essential
Containment penetrations including KC to the NCPs.
(Sh) Containment Ventilation Isolation
1 I
---+
Cont
Manual
St
Manual Sp
N S V X lnlt
Cont Vent Is01
J >
KSIVX
1nit
B. Containment Ventilation lsolation (SH)
1. 4 Signals can actuate an SH.
a) Manual Phase A (ST): Train A (B) ST wili actuate train A (E!)
SH.
b) Manual Phase B, NS-VX Initiate, Cont Vent Isol:Train A (B)
(Phase 5 , NS-VX Initiate, Cont Vent lsolf will actuate train A
(B) SH. This is a single pushbutton that actuates three
functions.
c) S, Signal: Train A (B) S, will actuate Train A (B3) SH.
d) EMF 38 L, 39 i, 40 TKlP 2: High Containment Particulate,
Gas, or Iodine will actuate BOTH Trains of SH.
2. SH will shutdown and will isolate VP and isolate VQ Containment
[solation valves.
3. Reset (Cont Vent [sol Reset)
a) One pushbutton per train (NS Board)
b) Functional with Ss present as long as EMF Signals are not
present.
4. Indication of the isolation is via the ESF Monitor lights.
CNT pages 19 and 20
a) Typical Electrical Penetration -Annulus View
Typical E-Pen Enclosure
Cover portal allows viewing SF6
pressure gauge. Hand-held pyrometer
used to measure penetration shell
temperature. Calculatiun perfwmed to
obtain temperature adjusted pressure
value
If pressure is low,remove cover
and connect SF6 supply to test
connection.
(Conductors net shown for ciarity)
/
I
2. Mechanical Penetrations
a) Where process piping penetrates containment, penetrations are
designed to accommodate some piping movement and expansion
while maintaining containment integrity.
b) Dual Ply Mechanical Bellows assemblies are subject to leak rate
testing.
c) Mechanical Bellows - Cold Penetration
SHROUD TESTPORT I
. . .. .~ . ...
CONTAINMENl
Typical Mechenical Bellows Assembly
B. Containment Isolation Systems (Obj. #13 and 14)
1. The Containment Isolation System closes penetrations not required for
engineered safety features operation on:
a) Phase A (St) containment isolation signal that is derived from the
safety injection signai.
b) Phase I3 (S,) containment isolation signal that is derived from the
high-high containment pressure signal.
2. Valves on VPNQ purge line isolation close on:
a) Phase A containment isolaiion signal.
b) High containment activity (Sh) signal.
3. Post-Accident Valve Submergence
a) A list of active valves in containment that are below maximum flood
elevation is presented in UFSAR Table 6-96.
b) Some valve operators were not qualified for submergence. These
valves close on Containment Isolation Phase A (St) signais. There
is sufficient time for them to close before being flooded.
c) To prevent possible repositioning after flooding, the vaives motor
controls circuits have been modified. One relay per train will be
energized by a St signal and mechanically latched in. Normally
closed contacts from this relay will be wired between the limit
switches and the open motor starter coils of vaives of the
corresponding train. These contacts will open on St and prevent
any spurious limit switch operation from repositioning the valves.
d) These relays have manual reset capabiiity in the control room.
4. Containment Isolation valves are identitied in UFSAR Table 6-77
(Containment Isolation Valve Data).
a) Lists ali Containment Isolation Vaives and indicates the
appropriate Tech. Spec. Condition for inoperable valves.
b) Most are automaticaiiy operated valves. Some are manual valves
that are nama%ylocked closed.
c) A few are manually operated and normally open. SA-I and 4 (S/G
to CAPT Maintenance 1~01)must be open for the CAPT to be
OPERABLE, but are also manual containment isolation valves.
The & i
to l&
close these valves ensures operability. These valves
remain open because operability of the CAPT is more safety
significant than the need for SA-? and S A 4 to be closed.
d) The SIG PORVs are dual function valves, required to perform a
containment isolation function and to be available for cooldown.
Refer to LCO 3.7.4 (Steam Generator Power Operated Relief
e) NW must be available to containment isolation valves (where
applicable) being used to isolate a penetration to comply with any
LCO 3.6.3 Required Action.
Bank Question: 060.1 Answer: B
1P W Unit 2 was operating at 100%power when an electrical Eire started inside the
auxiliary building cable room conidor. What type of fire suppression system
is installed in this area and what are the hazards to personnel if they enter this
room?
A. A manual deluge (Mulslfyre) System i s installed. An electrical
shock hazard exists due to the use of water to combat an
electrical fire.
B. An automatic sprinkler system is installed. An electrical shock
hazard exists due to the use of water to combat an electrical fire.
6. An automatic Halon system is installed. An asphyxiation hazard
exists due to the presence of Halon gas.
D. A manual Cardox system is installed. An asphyxiation hazard
exists due to the presence of carbon dioxide gas.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: An automatic sprinkler system is installed
Plausible: an electrical shock hazard exists
B. Correct Answer:
C. Incorrect: An automatic spkrrMer system is instal6ed
Plausible: Halon gas is generally used in areas in which electrical
fires are the predominant risk because it does not create a shock
h&
D. Incorrect: An automatic sprinkler system is instailed
Plausible: CARBOX is a common fire suppressant in the industry
Level: RO&SRO
KA. SYS 086K5.04 (2.913.S)
Lesson Plan Objective: SS-RFY Obj: 18
Source: Mod; Ques-060, McGuirc NRC 99
Level of knowledge: memory
Refercnces:
1. OP-GN-SS-RFY page 15
2. SLC 16-9.2
_ -
DUKE
-POWER
__._.- .-.- -.
-. -
..-.-
.-.-
...-
-
...-
-
-
. CATAWBA -_
_.OPERATDNS TRAINING
..__- ...=
OBJECTIVES
~
I L P
Objective S T
S R
0
-
Stale the purpose of the Fire Protection IRF & RY) Svstems I X X
-
kist the power source for the Main Fire (RY) pumps
Describe the basic RF & BY flow paths Jx
State the automatic start setpoint for the Main Fire (RY) pumps IX
State the location of Control Room RF & BY Controls I
List the 3 Headers that penetrate the Reactor Building wail and X
state which header isolations are normally closed
List the system that supplies the hose cabinets in the D/G rooms X
and state why this supply is used
State the automatic start setpoint for the Jockey (RF) pumps X
State the normal Pressurizer Tank level Ix
Explain how pressure is maintained on the RF & RY Systems Ix
State the normal RF & RY header pressure Ix
State the setDoint for the N, SUPR~Yvalve for the Pressurizes Tank 1X
actuated
Describe how local Water Driven Bell Alarms oaerate IX
OP-CN-SS-RFY FOR TRAlNlMG PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 5
Page 3 of 24
k. Automatic Water Spray (Mulsifyre Deluge) Systems
1. Purpose: (Qbj. #17,21)
a ) Mulsifyre systems are designed to deliver large quantities of water to
totally engulf equipment.
2. These systems are commoniy referred to as "Mulsifyre" systems and
normally consist of the following:
a) Isolation (Controi) varve
b) Mulsifyre clapper (deluge) valve
c) Heat actuated fire detectors (thermal detectors)
d) Alarm device (pressure switch)
OP-CN-SS-RFY FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 5
Page I 5 of 24
16.9
_ I -
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS FIRE PROTECTlON SYSTEMS
16.9-2 SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
COMMITMENT;
Sprinkler systems in Table 16.9-1 shall be OPERABLE:
APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment protected by the Sprinkler System is required to be
REMEDIAL ACTION:
a. With one or more of the above required Sprinkler Systems inoperable, within
'l hour, in accordance with the "Fire Watch Code" given in Table 16.9-4,
established a continuous fire watch or an houriy fire watch.
b. Verify backup fire suppression (fire extinguisher, nearby fire hose station) is
available, and if not, establish backup fire suppression equipment for the
affected area. This must be acmomphshed within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> given above.
TESTiNG REQUIREMENTS:
a. Each of the above required Sprinkier Systems shall be demonstrated
OPERABLE:
I. By verifying that each valve (manual or power-operated) in the flow
path, which is accessible during plant operations, is in the correct
position. The frequency of the verification shall be determined by the
performance based criteria stated in the Bases Section.
ii. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow
path through at least one complete cycle of full travel,
Exception: Valves that are cycled as part of the ASME Section XI,
Subsection IWV (Inservice Testing of Valves in Nuclear Power Plants)
program (RF38!3B, RF449E3, RF457B) are exempt from this
requirement.
iP. At least once pes 18 months by verifying that each valve (manual or
power-operated) in the flow path which is inaccessible during plant
operations is in its correct position and
Chapter 16.9-2 Page 1 of 5 01117/00
TESTING REQUIREMENTS: (cont'd)
iv. At least once per 18 months:
1) By performing a system functional test which includes an
inspector's test connection flow test and cycling each valve in
the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through
at least one complete cycle of full travel.
2) By a visual inspection of each Sprinkler System starting at the
system isolation valve to verify the system's integrity; and
3) By a visual inspection of each nozzle's spray area to verify the
spray pattern is not obstructed.
REFERENCES:
?) Catzwba FSAR, Section 9.5.1
2) Catawba SER, SectEon 9.5.2
3) Catawba SER, Supplement 2, Section 9.5.1
4) Catawba SEI?, Supplement 3, Section 9.5.1
5) Catawba Fire Projection Review, as revised
6) Catawba Fire Protection Commitment index
BASES:
The OPEMBILITY of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures fiat adequate fire
suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any
portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located. The Fire
Suppression System consists of the water system, sprinklers, CO, and fire hose
stations. The collective capability of the Fire Suppression Systems is adequate to
minimize potential damage to safety -related equipment and is a major element in
the facility Fire Protection Program.
The ability to demonstrate that the valves in the RFlRY flew path can be cycled is
critical to maintaining the system properly. The containment isolation valves
(RF389B and RF447B) and the annulus sprinkler system isolation valve (RF457B)
are required to be cycled or stroked at least once every quarter as part of the
Catawba IWV program. Therefore, credit can be taken for cycling these valves
under the IWV program, and they do not need to be cycled annually to meet the SLC
criteria.
The proper positioning of WWRY valves is critical to delivering fire suppression
water at the fire source as quickly as possible. The option of increasing or
decreasing the frequency of valve position verification allows the ability to
Chapter 16.9-2 Page 2 of 5 01/17\00
BASES (contd)
optimize plant operational resources. Should an adverse trend develop with RFlRY
valve positions, the frequency of verification shall be increased. Similarly if the
RFIRY valve position trends are positive, the frequency of verification couid be
decreased. Through programmed trending of RFiRY as found valve positions, the
R F R Y System will be maintained at predetermined reliability standards. The RFiRY
System Engineer is responsible for trending and determining verification frequencies
based on the following:
Initially the frequency will be monthly.
Annually review the results of the completed valve position verification procedures.
- If the results demonstrate that the vaives are found in the correct position at least
99% of the time, the frequency of conducting the valve position verification may
be decreased from - monthly to quarterly or - quarterly to semiannually or -
semiannually to annually - as applicable. The frequency shall not be extended
beyond annually (plus grace period).
If the results demonstrate that the valves are not found in the correct position at
(east 99% of the time, the frequency of conducting the valve position verification
shall be increased from - annually to semiannuaily or semiannuaily to quarterly
-
~
or quarterly to monthly as applicable. The valve position verification need not
~
be conducted more often that monthly.
In the event that portions of the Fire Suppression Systems are inoperable, alternate
backup fire-fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas
until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. When the inoperable fire-
fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a
longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if
the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.
This Selected Licensee Commitment is pala of the Catawba Fire Protection Program
and therefore subject to the provisions of Section 2.C. of the Catawba Facility
Operating Licenses.
Chapter 16.9-2 Page 3 of5 01117100
TABLE 16.9-1
SPRlNKLER SYSTEMS
Room No. EPuiDment Fire Watch Code
a. Elevation 522+0 Auxiliary Building
100,201,106 ND & NS Connecting
'I11,l f 2 Corridor
104 ND Pump I B
105 ND Pump ?A
109 ND Pump 28
110 ND Pump 2A
b. Elevation 543+0 _I Auxiliary Building
230 NV Pump l a
231 NV Pump 1B
240 NV Pump 2A
24 1 NV Pump 25
250 Unit 1 CA Pump Roem
260 Unit 2 CA Pump Room
C. Elevation 55490 - Auxiliary Buiiding
340 U2 Battery Room Corridor (DD-EE)
350 U1 Battery Room Corridor (DD-EE)
d. Eievation 560+0 - Auxiliary Building
300 KC Pumps I A I , 182,
300 KC Pumps f BZ ,152
e. Elevation 574+0 - Auxiliary Building
480 U2 Cable Room Corridor (DD-EEJ
490 U1 Cable Room Corridor (BD-EE)
f. Elevation 577+0 - Auxiliary Building
400 KC Pumps 2AII2A2,
400 KC Pumps 261,282
9. Reactor Buikiings
Chapter 16.9-2 Page 4 of 5 01116/99
TABLE 16.9-1
SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
Fire Watch Codes for Table 16.9-1 (Sprinkler Systems):
(I) Continuous.
(2) Hourly unless Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is inoperable. if SSS is
inoperable - continuous watch is required.
(3) HOUFIY unless opposite train component is inoperable, OR sprinkler system
for opposite train component is inoperable, OW Standby Shutdown System
(SSS) is inoperable. If opposite train component, or sprinkler for opposite
train component, or SSS is inoperable - continuous watch is required.
Chapter 16.93 Page 5 of 5 01116199
Bank Question: 60 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when an electrical fire started inside the
auxiliary buiiding cable spreading room. What type of fire suppression
system is instdied inside the cable spreading area and what are the hazards to
personnel if they enter this room?
A. A manual deluge (Mulsifyre) System is installed. An electrical
shock hazard exists due to the use of water to combat an
electrica1 fire.
B. An automatic sprinkler system is installed. An electrical shock
hazard exists due to the use ofwater to combat an electrical fire.
C. An automatic Kahn system is installed. An asphyxiation hazard
exists due to the presence of Halon gas.
D. A manual Cardox system is installed, An asphyxiation hazard
exists due to the presence of carbon dioxide gas.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct Answer:
B. Incorrect: A manual deluge Mulsifyre system is installed
Plausible: an electricai shock hazard exists
C. Incorrect: A manual deluge Mulsifyre systcm is inslalled
Plausible: Halon gas is generally used i8 areas in which electrical
fires are the predominant Rsk because it does not create a shock
hazard
D. Incorrect: A manual deluge Mulsifyre system is instalied
Plausible: Cardex gas is a personnel hazard - although all the
CARBOX systems have been replaced with W O N , the pull
switches stiil say CARDOX in some areas (like the diesel generators)
Bank Question: 260.2 Answer: D
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is responding to a loss of main feedwater event from 100% power.
Given the following events and conditions:
The reactor has tripped
m The 2 8 and 2B motor-driven CA pumps started in auto
e The turbine-driven CA pump (CAPT) starzed in auto
e Train A CA has been reset
e Train B CA has failed to reset
e The CA p m p s are aligned to the CACST
Which one of the following automatic system respomes will occur as storage
tank and CA pump suction pressures decrease?
A. 2A CA pump trips.
CAPT #2 pump trips.
2B CA pump shifts to the RN system.
B. 2A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system.
CAPT #2 suction shifts to the RN system.
2B CA pump trips.
C. 2A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system.
CAPT #2 pump trips.
2B CA pump trips.
D. 2A CA pump hips.
CAPT #2 suction shifts to the RN system.
2B CA pump suction shifts to the Rhsystem.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: because the CAFT pump swap to RN
Plausible: candidate believes A train controls CAPT pump
B. Incorrect: 2A CA pump trips and 2 5 CA pump shirts suction to RN
Plausible: if the candidate believes reset allows shift
C. Incorrect: Reverse of what actually happens
Plausible: if the candidate reverses the logic
D. Correct: because train B did not reset, it will shift when pressure
decreases below 6 psig.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 061 K6.02(2.6/2.7)
Lesson P i a Objective: CA Obj: 12
- -
Source: Mod McGuire NhiG 2002
&eve[of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1.OP-CN-CF-CApage 13, 14
--
Objective
~ ~~
Explain the purpose of the CA System.
bist all of the sources of water available to the CA pumps, and the
order of preference of each.
Explain the normal and recirculation flew paths associated with the
CA System.
List the automatic start signals (including setpoint) for the motor
driven and turbine driven CA pumps
Explain the trip and reset procedures for the CAPT TripRhrottle
valve.
~ ~ -~
Explain CAPT local operation.
Given appropriate plant conditions apply Limits and Precautions
associated with related station procedures.
Draw the CA system per the Simplified Row Diagram.
Describe the use of the Auto Start Defeat circuitry.
Describe the operation of CA System Valve Control reset circuitry.
Discuss how to regain control of CA pumps following CA auto start
coincident with sequencer actuation.
Explain CA pumD low suction pressure protection.
Given a set of plant conditions and access to reference materials,
determine the actions necessary to cornp!y with Tech SpeclSLC's.
State from memoty all Technical Specification actions for the
applicable systems, subsystems, and components which require
remedial action to be taken in less than one hour.
List the system designator and major component nomenclature.
Time: 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />
OP-CN-CPCA H I R TaQlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 43
Page 3 of 26
2) Moving of these valve travel stops will piace the CA system into an
Action Statement and require rebalance of the system.
3) Positions are placed in the throttle valve program as number
threads open, so anyone who wants to verify throttle position can
count threads without moving the valves.
b) The vaive positioners are calibrated so that 0-100% demand
comesponds to the actual (Full closed to Travel Stop) movement
range.
1) The open Limit Switches are adjusted to provide open indication
when the valve is at the travel stop.
2) The controilers on both units are 0% (Fuil Closed) to 100% (Full
Open).
C. Loss of Normal Suction Pressure Protection (Qbj t# 12)
1. Provides a method to supply alternate suction sources to the CA pumps in
the event that the Normal Sources, Condensate Grade Water, beccnne
inadequate. Annunciator alarms are provided for indications of Low
inventory in these tanks. A low level alarm exists on the UST at 50% to
allow the operator time to initiate make-up to preclude swapover to RN. If
this action can not be performed, the operator must isolate the UST and
break Condenser vacuum.
a) Each train of pressure witches share a common Impulse line. Should
that line fail and pressure decrease, all three (3) pressure switches will
sense a low pressure condition.
b) The LOSS of Normal Suction Pressure Actions are on a FIVE (5)
Second Delay for ALL three channels.
c) if both trains of "CA SYS VLV CTRL" are RESET following an
automatic start of the CA system and "CA PUMPS LOSS OF
NORMAL SUCT (AD-5 E-I or 2) is received, the CA pumps will trip
and if manually restarted will trip again in 5 seconds. To avoid this
dilemma the operator must manually swap CA suction to the RN
supply and then restart the CA pumps.
d) Ifany of the RN to CA valve's switches are selected to closed, the auto
swap to RN for the associated pump is disabled, and therefore, the
pump will be inoperable.
e) 'A' Train, E' !' Train and RC Low Suction Pressure Setpoints (10.5, 6,
and 9.3 psig respectively) are different due to pressure tap locations
(Elevations). They should all occur at same time on suction pressure
decrease.
2. "A" Train Loss of Normal Suction Protection
OP*CM-CF-CA FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 43
Page 13 of 26
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAiNlNe
a) Three (3) pressure switches monitor the suction pressure to " A MD
and TB pump. Should 2/3devices sense 10.5 PSIG decreasing, the
following occurs:
1 ) For "A" pump, id Auto Sari received CA NOT RESET
Pump IS Running then 1(2)CA15A and 1(2)RN25QAOPEN
2) For l(2) TD pump, ifAUTO START received ANB CA NOT
RESET then Z(2)CAI 16A and 1(2)RN25QAOPEN.
3) 1(2)AD-5 E1 :"CA PUMPS TWAIN A LOSS OF NORM SUCT'
alarms on decreasing pressure and 1(2)AD-5 F1: "VLV RN250 RN
WDR TO 24 PMP SUCT ISOL OPEN" alarms when RN250A is
intermediate or full opera.
3. "BTrain Loss of Normal Suction Protection
a) Three (3) pressure switches monitor the Suction Pressure to "5" MD
and TD pump. Should 2/3 devices sense 6.0 PSiG decreasing, the
following occurs:
1) For "13" pump, ifAuto Start received AJQ CA NOT RESET
Pump IS Kunning then 1(2)CA185 and 1(2)RN91OB OPEN
2) For l(2) TD pump, if AUTO START received AND CA NOT
RESET then 1(2)CA85B and 1(2)RN31QBOPEN.
3) 1(2)AD-5 E2:"CA PUMPS TRAIN B LOSS OF NORM SUCT"
alarms on decreasing pressure and F2: 'VLV RN310 RN HDR TO
CA PMP SUCT lSOb OPEN" alarms when RN310B is
intermediate or full open.
b) RC System Loss of Normal Suction Source
1) The RC piping buried within the Turbine Building provides a
separate, redundant Sabotage Proof source of Feed Water to the
SIG's. This Source is a part of the SSF Complex and can supply
the S/G's with enough feed to maintain the plant at Hot Standby
Conditions fer 3.5 days.
2) Three (3) pressure switches monitor suction pressure at the same
location as the RN pressure switches. But these Will supply ONLY
THE PB CA PUMP upon reaching setpoint.
3) At 9.3 PSIG decreasing (2/3 coincidence) 1(2)CA174 and
1(2)CA175 WlbL OPEN.
4) l(2)AD-5 64:"SSF CA XFR TO RC" indicates when SSF source
lined up to CA system.
5) RC swapover is independent of an auto start signal.
Of-CN-CFCA FOR TRAlNNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 43
Page 14 of 26
Bank Question: 260.1 Answer: D
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is responding to a loss of main feedwater event from 100% power.
Given the foilowing events and conditions:
The reactor has tripped
The 2A and 2B Motor-driven CA (MDCA) pumps started in auto
The Turbine-driven CA pump (TDCA) started in auto
0 CA suction pressure siowiy drops to 4 psig
Which one of the following automatic system responses (if any) will occur at
this time?
A. 2A CA pump sucgon remains aligned to the CA storage tanks
The TDCA pump suction shifts to the RN system
2B CA pump suction shifts to the RN system
B. 2A CA pump suction remains aligned to the CA storage tank
The TDCA pump suction remains aligned to the CA storage tank
2B CA pump suction remains aligned to the CA storage tank
C. 2A CA pump suction shifts to the Rh' system
The TDCA pump suction shifts to the RN system
2B CA pump suction shifts to the RN system
D. 2A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system
The TDCA pump suction remains aligned to the CA storage tank
2B CA pump suction remains aligned to the CA storage tank
Distracter Analysis: Unit 2 A train valves RN-69A and CA-I5A opens at 4.5
psig and B train valves including the TDCA A train supply opens at 3.5 psig.
A. Incorrect: 2A CA pump shifts suctions to the RN system and TDCA
and 2B CA pumps do not shift
Plausible: if the candidate reverscs the train relation of the unit
difference.
B. Incorrect: 2A CA pump shifts suctions to the KN system.
Plausible: if the candidate does not know the auto-swap setpoints.
This is the correct answer for Unit 1
C. Incorrect: 2.B CA and TDCA pumps do not shift suctions to the RN
system.
Plausible: ifthe candidate does not know the swap over setpoints
D. Correct Answer:
Level: RQ&SRO
Ques-260.1 .doc
KA: GEN (32.2.4 (2.813.0)
Lesson Plan Objective: CF-CA SEQ I0
Source: Mod; Ques-260, Catawba NRC I997
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
1. OP-MC-CF-CA pages 21,63
Bank Question: 263 Answer: A
1W S ) Unit I is shutdown in mode 6 with fuel movement in progress. Givcn the
following events and conditions:
The new fuel elcvator fails tQ operate in the up direction
Which one of the following statenients describes the cause of this problem?
A. 1EMF-15 (SPEATFUEL BLDG REFUEL BRIDGE) has failed
high.
B. 1EMP-20 (NEWFUEL STOR 1A) has failed high.
C. The bad in the new fuel elevator weighs 1100 Ibs.
D. The spent fuel bridge crane is NOT indexed over the new fuel
elevator.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct answer
B. Incorrect: does not have an interiock .With the new fuel elevator
Plausible: new h e %vault monitor sounds like it "fits" with new fuel
monitor if candidate does not know answer
C. Incorrect: If load exceeds 1200 Ibs., will prevent movement
Plausible: this is a valid interlock but the weight is insufFicient to
actuate it
D. Incorrect: there is no interlock to prevent moving the new fuel
elevator
Plausible: there is m interlock to prevent moving the spent fuel poo!
crane
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 034K6.02 (2.6J3.3)
Lesson Plan Objective: FI-I-FKS SEQ 8
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-CN-FH-FHS page 18
Explain the purpose and design features of the Fuel Handling System: X
1. Fuel transfer canal
2. Spent he1 pool
3. Caskarea
New Fuel Elevator
- Fuel Transfer Tube
- Fuel Transfer Car
Upendcr
Fuel Handling Tools
A. Components Description
1. New Fuel Elevator (Obj. #&)
a) Box shaped, with top open and able to hold one fuel
assembly.
b) Used to lower New Fuel assemblies into SFP. (Refer to
OQ/1-2/8/6550/006) (Transferring Fuel with the Spent Fuel
Manipulator Crane).
c) Control pendant on operating floor
1) Up/Down light
2) No-load light
(a) less than or equal to 330 ibs. tight
3) Overload light
(a) Normal greater than 1200 Ibs. (Can be
bypassed)
(1) Prevents raising elevator with assembly in
it unless key bypass switch is activated.
(Prevents removing a Spent Assembly
using this elevator).
(b) Overload greater than 2400 Ibs. (No Bypass on
this)
4) Up/Down pushbutton
d) Will not go up with high radiation alarm on EMF--Z5op loss of
power to EMF-15 (Spent Fuel Pool Building Refueling Bridge
Monitor).
e ) Will not go up with loss of power to SFP crane or crane over
the elevator.
2. Transfer
a) Fuel Transfer Tube (Obi. #8)
I ) Used for transferring fuel under water between
containment and spent fuel pool.
2) Blank flange closes transfer tube on containment side.
3) Valve is used on spent fuel side.
b) Transfer Car (Obj. #8)
1) Runs on raised tracks through the transfer tube.
Normal drive system is two continuous roller chains running along the length of the
tracks 0p1 the pit side. Ends of chains connected to a pusher a m .
Bank Question: 282.7 Answer: C
1 ?t(s) Which one of the following statements correctly describes the complete VI
system response to a loss of VI header pressure?
A. 96 psig - the standby air compressor auto starts and loads
-
80 psig VS-78 (VS supply to VI) opens
B. 96 psig the standby air compressor auto starts and loads
-
~
80 psig VS-78 (VS supply to VI) opens
76 psig VIS00 (VI supply to VS) closes
~
C. 96 psig the standby air compressor auto starts and loads
- the standby air compressor quick starts and Ioads
~
94 psig
80 psig - VI-500 (VIsupply to VS) closes
76 psig - VS-78 (VS supply to VI)opens
D. 96 psig - the diesel air compressor quick starts and loads
94 psig - the standby air compressor auto starts and loads
80 psig - VI-500 (VK supply to VS) closes
76 psig VS-78 (VS supply to VL) opens
~
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: Missing the quick start ofthe standby air compressor and
VS-78 opening
Plausible: partially correct - actions listed are correct
B. Incorrect: missing the quick start ofthe air compressor - valve
operation serpoitlts are reversed
Plausible: partially correct correct actions, wrong setpoints
~
C. Correct This is the correct sequence
B. Incorrect: the diesel air compressor does not auto-start - missing the
quick start sequence for the standby air compressor.
Plausible: partiarly correct.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 079 A4.01 (2.7/2.7)
Lesson Plan Objective: VI Ohj: 5,8,28,30
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
Ques-282.1 .dos
l.OI-CN-SS-VI page 19
Ques-282.1 .doc
DUKE POWER CATAWBA QPERATiQNS TRAiNiNG
Objective
State the system designator@)and nomenclature for major components
Explain the purpose of the Instrument Air system
Describe the basic flow paths through the Instrument Air system
Airflow
0 Recirculated Cooling water flow
Nuclear Service Water flow
Identify the normal Instrument Air system header pressure.
Identify the major components served by the Instrument Air system
and describe the effect on plant operations on a Boss of lnstrument Air
Describe the conditions which will cause an Instrument Air compressor to
tn'P
Explain how the Instrument Air system will respond to a compressor trip
Describe how to cross-connect the Instrument Air and Station Air
systems
- Explain why the CFOSS connection is made
Describe the flow path from VS to VI
Describe the Instrument Air compressor automatic actions and their
setpoints
Explain the purpose of the Instrument Air dryers
Describe the automatic actions, alarms, and their setpoints associated
with the Instrument Air Dryers
Identify the type of power supplles to each compressor (Vi, VS and VB)
Exglain the DurPose of the Station Air svstem
Describe the basic flow paths through the Station Air system
Airflow
e Recirculated Cooling Water flow
e Low Pressure Service Water Row
Identify the norma\ Station Air system header pressure
OB-CN-SS-VI H I R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY R N . 26
Page 4 of 36
DUKE POWER CATAWBA O P M TIONS TRAINING
2. Loss of VI to Primary PORVs
Pressure regulating valves supply primary FORV's (1NC344, and 328)
a) Nitrogen pressure supplied from Cold Leg Accumulators A and 5.
b ] The probabilistic risk assessment states the need to have two motive
forces for Pzr PORV's in case NCS feed and bieed is needed?so the
N2 was added. If no N2 and a major accident occurs in conjunction
with a loss of VI to containment then there may be no means to
COntr51 the heat buildup in the reactor and consequently core
damage
3. Loss of VI (Obj. #5,8,28, 30)
a) Automatic actions
-
1) 96 psig Low Pressure Alarm - Standby Compressor starts and
loads
2) 94 psig - Standby Compressor "Quick-Starts" and loads
(a) NOTE: The "Quick-Start" feature refers to a timer that is
set in the CEM computer program. This timer allows the
standby compressor time to start and reach normal
operating temperatures prior to loading. Phis also aliows
for small fluctuations in system pressure without loading
the standby compressor.
(b) Upon receipt of the "Low Pressure Emergency" alarm at
94 psig, this time is halved by the CEM computer to allow
the standby compressor to load faster.
3) 80 psig - VI 670 'VI Dryer Auto Bypass' opens
4) 80 psig - VI500 'VIsupply to VS' closes.
5) 76 psig - VS78 VS supply to VI' opens - VS provides instrument
air via oil removal filters.
b) AQ/O/A/5500/22 'Loss of Instrument Air'
1) Reference a current copy of this AP
2) Major actions
Ensure proper compressor operations
Locate and isolate leaks
Maintain stable plant conditions
- Monitor piant equipment for status changes.
OB-GN-SS-M FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 28
Page f 9 of 36
Bank Question: 300.1 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit l was responding to a steamhe break inside containment on the IC S/G
per E-2 (Faulted Steam Generutor Isohtion). All equipment has operated a
designed.
Which one ofthe following action statements correctly describes the
expected method for isolating steam to the CAPT from the faulted SKI?
A. Manually close the CAPT trip and throttle valve (EA-145).
B. Manually close the IC MSN and MSIV bypass valve.
6. Manually close the maintenance isolation valve (1SA-4) in the
doghouse.
D. Manually close the stop-check valve (1SA-6) in the mechanical
penetration room.
Distracter Anaiysis:
The key to this question is for the candidate to realize that the manual
isolation valve would be preferred to the stop check valve.
A. Incorrect: Will isolate §team from EB and le S/G
Plausible: partially correct - will isolate wrong S/G
B. Incorrect:
Plausible: if candidate doesnt realize the tap for the CAPT is
u p s t r m of the M S N
C. Correct: the manual isolation is the preferred choice in E-2
Plausible:
D. Incorrect:
Plausible: the stop check is closed if the isolation valve cannot be
closed.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: APE 040 AK2.01(2.6D.5)
Lesson Plan Objective: CA Obj: 11
Source: Bank
Levei of knowledge: memory
References:
1. EP-E2 page 12
Ques-NO. 1.doc
2. E-2 Background Document pagc 9
Ques-300.1 .doc
P
DUKE POWER CA f AWBA OPERATIQNS TRAINING
P
I'
S
Objective
S
Time: 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />
OP-CN-CFCA M R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 43
Pag@3 of 26
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAININ0
A. Overview
1. Purpose: This procedure provides actions for transferring the safety
injection system from the cold leg recirculation made to the hot leg
recirculation mode.
2. ES-1.4 is entered from E-4 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)
where the plant specific time for transferring to hot leg recirculation is
reached. In this case a break in the NC system has occurred which is
large enough to reduce the NC pressure to less than the shutoff head of
the NB pumps. After the transfer has been completed the operator
should return to E-I..
B. Major Action Summary
1. Akgn SI Flowpath for Hot Leg Recirculation
a) Hot Leg recirculation is implemented to terminate boiling in the core
and to prevent boron precipitation in the core.
6. Use the "Enhanced Background Document" for detaikd step description.
2.6 EP/I/N5000/ECA-l .I (boss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)
A. Overview
I. Purpose: This procedure provides actions when emergency coolant
recirculation capability is lost. This is defined as the inability to inject from
the sump lo the NC system using an NB pump.
2. ECA-1.1 can be entered from -I, (Loss of Reactor or Secondary
Coolant), when cold leg recirculation cannot be verified to be available.
Entry is made from ES.1.3, (Transfer to Cold beg Re&rculation), when at
least one flowpath from the sump cannot be established or maintained.
Also entry can be made from ECA-I 2,(LOCA Outside Containment)
when a LOCA outside containment cannot be isolated. If recirculation is
restored at any time, the operator should return to the procedure and step
in effect. If recirculation is not restored upon procedure completion the
piant staff is consulted.
B. Major Action Summary
1. Continue attempts to Restore Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
a) The operator is to try to restore the equipment needed for
recirculation in order to avoid performing any extreme recovery
actions. These actions will be continued throughout the procedure.
2. IncreasdConserve FWST Level
a) Makeup is added to the FWST and FWST sufflow is minimized by
stopping any unnecessary containment spray pumps and decreasing
SI pump Rowrate.
3. Depressurize SGs to Cooldown and Depressurize the NC System
OP-CN-EP-EP2 KIR TRAfNING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 03
Page f 2 of f 4
_STEP _ 7: I Iso'iate a l l f a u i t e d S / G ( s ) as f o l l o w s :
PURPOSE :
To i s o l a t e a l ' l feedwater t o and steam f l o w from the f a u l t e d S/(i(S)
To prevent t h e operator frog i s o l a t i n g steam t o t h e CAPT i f i t i s t h e o n l y 2
source of feed f l o w t o t h e steam generators. 26
APPLICABLE ERG BASIS:
I s o l a t i o n o f t h e reedwater t o t h e faulted S / G maximizes the cwldousn
c a p a b i l i t y of the nonfaulted loops f o l l o w i n g a feedline break and minimizes
t h e NC System cooldown and mass and energy release follolying a steamline
break. I s o l a t i o n c f steam paths from t h e faulted SiG a l s o r i n i i n i z e s t h e NC
Systein cooldown and mass and energy release t o containment. Ir: a d d i t i o n .
i s o l a t i o n o f these steam paths could i s o l a t e t h e break.
I f t h e CAPT i s t h e o n l y operable source o f feed flow t o t h e steam generators
(1 . e . , CA Pump 1A and 1B ana other operable pumps are incapable. o f p r o v i d i n g
feed f l o w t o t h e S G s ) . then i s o l a t i o n o f t h i s steam supply l i n e may degrade
system conditions and r e s u l t i n a t r a n s t j o n t o F R - H . l . Therefore. t h i s t
i s o l a t i o l ? must not be performed. 26
PLANT SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
Corrective actions o f P I P 90-0008 were implemented. The new guidance. shou?d
steam t o CAPT r e q u i r e i s o l a t i o n . i s t o proceed f i r s t t o the Maintenance
i s o l a t i o n s i n t h e doghouse. t o be consistent with Tech Specs and SAR. A
contingent a c t i o n i s provided t o d i r e c t t h e operator t o t h e p r e v i o u s l y used
stopcheck valves located i n t h e mechanical penetration room.
KNOWLEEUABILITY:
Page 7 o f 14 Revision E
_-
Bank Question:324 Answer: D
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a design basis LOCA into
containment occurred. Given the following conditions:
2E1wI'-53A/B (Containment T W A / B (HIRange)) are both inoperablc
Which one of the following indications would most accurately determine the
dose rates inside containment for the offsite dose assessment calculations?
A. 2EMF-.38,39,40 (ContainmentPAR/GAS/TOD) indications
B. 2EMF-5 (LIQWWCONTAREA) indications
C. 2EMF-54(") (Unit Vent Gamma @&HI Range)) indicatbns
B. Portable instruments readings taken on the containment wall
and appropriately scaled for shielding factors
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: 2EMF-38,39,40 are isolated by a phase A signal
Plausible: They accurately measwe radiation levels under normal
circumstances
B. Incorrect This would only measure activity inside the NC system
piping
Plausible: This monitor is used to measure NC system activity
during norma! operations
C. Incorrect: the unit vent path would be isolated during an accident
Plausible: If not isolated, this could be a good measurement ofthe
activity in containment
D. Correct: In the event both Containment High Range Radiation
Monitors become inoperable during an accident, alternate
measurement of containmcnt radiation may be performed per
EPp/O/B/1009/006 (Ahnative Method for Detemining Dose Rate
Within the Reactor Building).
hvel: RQ&SRO
KA: SYS 073 A1.01 (3.20.5)
Lesson Plan Objective: CNT Qbj: 9
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-GN-CNT-CNT page 13
DUKE POWER CA TAWBA OPERA770" TRAIhVNG
Objective
- Operation of the sample pump and sample point
0
selection vaives.
Automatic actions initiated by Trip 2 aiarms
/ / / I
EXPLAIN the operation of the personnel airlock doors for
normal entry and exit. I I I I
OP-CN-CNT-CNT FQR TRAlNl" PORPQSES ONLY REV. 40
Page 4 of 27
_-
2) Evaluation of Core Damage
(a) Operations SROs and Reactor Group will use RP/O/A15000/015
(Core Damage Assessment) to determine the extent of
clad/fuel failure.
(b) EMF53A and EMF53B may be used to calculate percent
cladlfuel damage or to directly estimate fuel failure.
(c) Information is provided to the Emergency Dose Assessor to
select the correct dose computer mode!.
3) Alternate Radiation Monitoring
(a) In the event both Containment High Range Radiation Monitors
become inoperable during an accident, alternate measurement
of containment radiation may be performed per
HP/O/B/1009/006 (Alternative Method for Determining Dose
Rate Within the Reactor Building).
(b) This procedure directs RP technicians to select a high range
survey meter and obtaln a contact dose rate at center of
outside aidock door to the upper personnel airlock hatch.
(c) A calculation is performed to yield an estimated containment
radiation level for use with emergency offsite dose assessment
calculations.
4) EMF53A and EMF53B are required by TS 3.3.3 (Post Acddent
Monitoring Instrumentation)
B. Equipment Hatch (Penetration No. C400)
I . The Equipment Hatch Penetration and Cover are components of the steel
Containment Wall.
2. Normally, the Equipment Hatch Cover is latched to t4e penetration sleeve..
When required for containment closure, the Equipment Hatch Cover is required
to be held in piace without gaps.
3. When access into Containment is required, the Equipment Hatch Cover is
designed to be lifted out of the way by a hoist hung from the Containment wall.
Maintenance Group is responsible for performing this evotution. The hatch must
be sapable of being replaced without AC power available (Le. a backup portable
generator to power the hoist) shouid it be required. The time required to do this
is documented at the beginning of each outage. lf containment closure is
required, and exceptions are allowed, this time must be less than a calculated
stay time to allow removal of the equipment hatch (the equipment hatch being
removed would be considered a closure exception.)
4. The Equipment Hatch containment vessel seal is a double O-ring design subject
to Type B Leak Rate Testing following final installation after an outage. (Refer to
PP/l/A14260/001H (Equipment Hatch Leak Rate Test))
OP-CN-CNT-CNT FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 40
Page 13 of 27
Rank Question: 33f.I Answer: B
1Pt(4 A technician is performing a calibration procedure, which requires a series of
approximately 10 sequential steps to be conducted while standing in a
contaminated area. Hehhe is in direct communications with an operator, the
communicator, who holds the procedure and reads each step sequentially.
If the performer does not have the procedure in hand as hdshe performs the
steps, what are the requirements ofNSD 704 (TechnicalProcedure Use and
Adherence) regarding the sign off for each step?
A. Only the performer can sign off the steps upon completion of the
task after leaving the contaminated area.
B. The communicator signs off each step as the step is completed
using hisher own initials and the initials of the performer.
C. The communicator signs off each step as the step is completed
using h i h e r own initials along with the time.
D. The communicator signs off each step as the step is completed
using the performer's initials along with the time.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: Both initials must be entexed on each step.
Plausible: this is a logical albeit incorrect choice.
B. Correct:
C. Incorrect Bath initials must be entered on each step.
Plausible: this is a logical aibeit incorrect choice.
D. Incorrect: Both ini~alsmust be entered on each step.
Plausible: this is a logical albeit incorrect choice.
Level: RO&SRO
KA:ADM Ci 2.1.20(4.3 14.2)
Lesson Plan Objective: ADM-OP SEQ 13
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-CN-ADM-OP page 8
2. NSD 704 pages 4,7
-
L
P
I I h v intent of Drocedures.
1 Describe the General ~ h i l o s o ~ and
xlx X
-
I 1
7 Define the term Qualified Individual.
~
X
1 8 1 Explain when IV is required. X
1 9 1 Describe the resDonsibiIRies for use of Drocedures.
"working copy", control copy (outside Control Room), and
"control GODV". -
I 1'lI List the actions to take arior to the use of a orocedure. X
Describe when a procedure is required to be in the possession of the X
1
13 Explain when sign off/initials are required in a procedure.
I 14 1 Describe the action taken for incomplete and completed procedures.
I I
$ 5 ~escribethe requirements necessary to depart from a procedure.
I 16 I Describe the astion necessaw to resolve a given discrepancy.
I 17 1 Describe how procedures are verified correct.
l l
18 Describe how control copy (outside the Control Room) procedures are
maintained current. -
1 1
19 Describe the use and purwxe of the "Revised Data Book" X
X
-
X X
from the constrained lancluaae list.
OP-CN-ADM-OB H I R TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 18
Page 4 of f 2
D. Information Used/Taken into Account
1. Tech Manuals
2. Manufacturer's Instruction Manuals
3. General technicai information
4. Vendor technical bulletins
5. FSAR
6. Techspecs
7. Relevant Operating Experiences (e.g. reportable occurrence).
8. Safety Precautions
3. Good Engineering/OperationalPractices
2.2 Operations Management Procedure 1-4 (Use of Procedures) and NSD 704
outlines the specific requirements for using operations department procedures.
2.3 Use BMP 1-4, and NSD 704 cover with the student the following sections:
A. Responsibiiities (Obj. #9)
1 . Operations Shift Manager or Unit Supelvisor
2. All pemnnei who use procedures
B. Qudifications (Obj. #7,29)
6. Control of Approved Procedures (Obj. #IO, 28)
1. Contro! Copy Procedures
a) Control copies in the Control Room
b) Control copies in locations other than Control Room
2. Working Copy Procedures
D. U s e of Approved Procedures (Obj. #14, 15)
1. General Statements of Philosophy (Obj. # I )
2. Levels of Use (Obj. #12)
3. Use of Procedures (Obj. # 1,
I17)
4. Departure From Approved Procedures (Obj. #15)
5. Procedure Sign-off (Ob]. g13.23)
6. Procedure Conflicts (OP, PTs)
7. Independent Verification (IV) (Obj. #8)
8. Constrained Language (Obj. #21)
9. Component Operations
I O . In Progress Procedures
OP-CM-hDM-OP FOR TRAlMING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 18
Page 8 of 12
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE 1MMEI)IATELY PRiOR TO EACH USE
NSD 704 Nuclear Policy Manual - Volume 2
an unexpected situation can make nuttcrs worse. Only when there is an immediate personnel
hazard OF risk of equipment damage should attempts be made to change the state ofthe system
prior to involving supervision or the Control Room SUO.
1) Involving supervision or the Control Room SRO before taking any other actions to return system
to normal or safe. condition.
Note: Procedure probletns do not relieve the performer of the responsibiliw for maintaining
safe plant operation, while conducting the activity.
704.6 PROCEDURE US (REFER TO APPENDIX B, 704.)
I. Procedures shall only be used for tlie intent and purpose for which they were written.
2. Procedures shall be adhered to during the course ofactivities
3. A Working Copy or a Control Copy of a procedure shall be used in the conduct ofthe specified activities.
4. Prior to use, Working Copies shall he vmified by comparison with the Control Copy of the procedure. This
comparison shall be repeated every 14 calendar days while work is in progress. If work is stopped and later
resumed more than 14 calendar days from last verification. comparison with the Control Copy shall be
performed prior to restarting work.
5. At least one person performing the task describtd by the procedure shall be qualified to the procedureltask, or
the task shall be directly supervised. Documartation of directly supervised tasks shall be included in the
procedure or in the work order.
6. Procedure steps should normally be initialedhigned by the qualified (OF directly supervised) person
performing the step. When this is not practical, a separate qualified (or directly supervised) person may sign
as the performer based on pasitive verification of correct step performance. The person signing as performer
is accountable for correct step performance.
7. If the person signing a procedure step is not the performer. both doer and documenter initials (or names) shall
be entered at each applicable step or group of steps.
8. Persons performire a procedure which contains sign-otfsteps should place their name and initials at the
beginning of the procedure or on the first page of the procedure on whish their initials appear.
9. Transfer of sign-offs or data from contaminated procedures to a clean copy shall be step-by-step. Photocopy.
facsimile, electronic message recorder. or direct communication to another individual are acceptable methods
to accomplish this.
10. When transferring completed steps from an existing procedure to a new procedure:
A. Transfer original initials of the person performing the procedure step
8. The individual transferring the initials then signs or initials all applicable pages indicating that the
initials have been transferred.
iI , Direct supervision of a task includes. as a minimum, a pre-job briefing, a post-job review of results, and any
job observations the supervisor deems necessary to ensure proper compliance and the desired results are
obtained.
12. All procedures shall be considered as Continuous Use procedures unless othetwise designated within the
procedure. Procedures should be classified in accordance with Appendix A. 704.
13. Continuous Use or Reference Use procedures shall be in the possession ofthe perfonnerfs) at the job site.
14, For Continuous tlse procedures. each step shall he read, understood. and perfomled as written. If sign-off is
required. each step shall be signed off as the action is completed (step-by-step adherence).
4 28 MAR 2001
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
-
Nuclear Policy Manual Volume 2 NSD 704
3. If place keeping aides (hones, blanks, etc.) are not provided, the user may still check off steps as they are
completed.
4. When the action or condition called for by a step is found to already exist, t::? step may be signed off as
completed. Any unexpected actions or conditions shall be evaluated.
5. Procedure steps should normally be initialedlsigned by the qualified (or directly supervised) person
performing the step. When it is not practical for the person performing the step to sign the step. two other
methods may be. used.
A. When n separate qualified (or directly supervised) person has positive verification of correct step
performance. that individual may sign off as the performer.
The person signing off as performer is accountable for Correct step performance
- Positive verification is direct visual observation of a step with an obvious and easy way to
determine outcome.
B. When another person signing a procedure step is not the performer AND does not have positive
verification. both the performer's initials and the documenter's initials (or names) shall be entered at
each applicable step or group of steps.
The performer is accountable for correct step performance
The documenter is accountable for correct step sequencing, proper place keeping, and COTT&C~
documentation.
6. Initials may be transferred from an in-progress or completed Working Copy to another Working Copy.
A. Circumstances which might require the transfemng of initials are:
- Transferring from a contaminated copy to a clean copy.
Consolidating signatures from several working copies to a singte Working Copy.
- Transferring from an in-progress procedure to a new revision of the procedure.
3. Transfers of sign-offs OK data is to be done step-by-step.
C. Acceptable methods to accomplish transferring of initials are:
0 F%otocopy
Facsimile
- Direct communications to another individual
D. Transfer initials from an in-progress Working Copy to another Working Copy as follows:
Transfer initials of the person performing the procedure step
'e The person transfemng the initials shall sign or initiai all steps indicating the initials have been
transferred.
For wholesale transfer of initials. the person transfemng the initids may sign their initial on
each page, with an explanation.
7. Repeating a series of steps:
flexibility should be written into the procedure when steps may need to be repeated.
If steps have signoff blanks. sign off during the first or last pass through the block of steps.
- Check boxes can be checked once during the last pass or once during each pass, whichever is best
for the user to maintain place keeping.
REVISION 10 7
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAlNST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
Bank Question: 353.3 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) A male worker is repairing a valve in a contaminated =ea, which has the
following radiological chmacteristics:
The workers present exposure is 1943 =in for the year
- General area dose rate = 30 mredhr
Airborne contamination concentration = 10.0 DAC
The job will take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ifthe worker wears a full-face respirator. It will
only take 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if the worker does NOT wear the respirator.
If the Ipp Manager grants all applicable dose extensions, which one of the
following choices for completing thisjob would maintain the workers
exposure witbin the station administrative requirements?
A. The worker should NOT wear the respirator because the
calculated TEDE dose received will be less than ifhe -ears one.
B. The worker should NOT wear the respirator because the dose
received without wearing B respirator will not exceed site annual
personnel dose limits.
C. The worker shouId wear the respirator because the calculakd
TEDE dose received will be less than if he does not wear one.
D. The worker should wear the respirator othenvise fie could exceed
DAC h i t s .
Distracter Analysk.
Radiation exposure comparison:
Without respirator
DDE = 30 me& x I hr = 30 m e m
From airborne contamination:
CEDE = 10 DAC 1 hr x 2.5 mrcm/E)AC-hr = 25
TEDE = 30 9 25 = 55 mrem fromjob
Total exposure for year = 1943 f 55 = 1998 mrem
With respirator
DDE = 30 mre&x 2 br = 60 mrem
CEDE = 0
TEDE = 60 tnrem
Total exposure for year = 1943 f 60 = 2003 mrem
(With respirator) (Without respirator)
TEDE = 60 men1 > 55 mrem = do not use a respirator
A. Correct answer
B. Incorrect the dose will exceed the 2000 mrem limit based on
calculation.
Plausible: If the candidate miscalculates the dose.
C. Incorrect: The calculated exposure will be greater if you wear the
respirator.
Plausible: If the candidate incorrectly computes the exposure - this
was the correct answer on a previous exam
D. Incorrect: DAC limits are not direct ALARA controls.
Plausible: If the candidate does not understand the concept of
derived airborne concentrations.
Level: RO&SRO
G 2.3.2 (2.5 12.9)
Lesson Plan Objective: HIP Obj: 2,4
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
I. OP-CN-MD-EF pages 14-15
-
DUKE POWER
E_i___ CAPAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING
Objective
Define the following terms:
Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE)
Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE)
Total Effective Dose Equivalent (PEDE)
Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)
Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE)
List the 1OCFR20 and Duke Power Administrative
External and hternal Dose Limits for the following:
BEBE
Individual Organ or Tissue
kens of the Eye
Skin or any Extremity
Declared Pregnant Woman
Mlnors
Public
Planned Special Exposures /PSE)
State the type of exposure each of the following terms
relates to:
Annual Limit on Intake (ALI)
Derived Air Concentration (DAC)
List the mathematical relationship between DAC-hours
and Abl, and between ALI and TEDE.
Describe how internal dose can occur.
BP-CN-RAD-#B FQR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 6
Page 3 ob 35
-
Objective I:jr L
P
R
O
-
X
Radiation Control Area (RCA)
Radiation Control Zones (RCZ)
Radiation Areas
High Radiation Area ( H W )
Extra High Radiation Area (EHRA)
Very High Radiation Area ( V H M )
Airborne Radioactivity Area
Radioactive Materials Area
Contaminated Area
Hot Spots
bow Exposure Waiting Area (LEWA)
-
X
state the correct action to take when an Electronic
Uarming Dosimeter (EAD) alarms.
- orrectly interpret the information on the Daily Dose
! I X
-
X
teport and (S) RWP's.
OP-CN-RAD-HP FOR TRAINING PVRPQSES ONLY REV. I 6
Page 4 of 35
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
2.4 Emergency Exposure (Obj. #18)
A. Personnel chosen for emergency exposure will be selected based on the
following I
I. Personnel must be Duke Power Emergency Response Organization
Member or Off-site Agency Emergency Worker.
2. Should be a voluflteer, but ifexpected to receive greater than 25 rem the
person must be a volunteer.
3. Personnel shall be advised of the risks, including the effects of different
levels of dosage, both short and long term effects.
4. Should be non pregnant adult.
5. All factors equal the older workers should be considered first.
B. Exposure Limits
1. To protect valuable property a person may receive up to 10 rem T E E ,
30 rem to the Lens of the eye, and 100 rem to the skin and extremities.
2. To save a life or protect a large population a person may receive 25 rem
T E E , 75 rem to the Lens of the eye, and 250 rem to the skin and
extremities.
3. To save a life or protect a large population on volunteer basis only, a
person may receive greater than 25 rem TEDE, greater than 75 rem to
the Lens of the eye, and greater than 250 rem to the skin and extremities.
2.5 Internal Exposure
A. Annual Limit on Intake (AM) (Obj. #3)
The amount of airbarne radioactive material necessary to receive a
CEDE of 5 rem effective dose equivalent or 50 rem to any organ. Each
individual is limited to one ALi per year.
B. Derived Air Concentration (DAC) (Obj. #3)
The concentration of radioactive material in air that would result in an
intake of one ALI if breathed for 2,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (40hourdweek, 58
weekdyear).
2000 DAC-hours = 1 ALI = 5 rem internal exposure (CEDE) Obj. ##4)
1 DAC hr = 2.5 mrem
C. Relating BAC, CEDE, ALI, and TEDE
TEDE is equal to the external dose plus the internal dose (CEDE). Since
5 rem is equivalent to 1 ALI, which is ako equivalent to 2,000 DAC hours,
1 DAC hour is equal to 2.5 mrem of external dose for most radionuclides
(5,000 msemB,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> = 2.5 mrem per DAC hour). For
nonstochasticaiiy limited radionuclides, the hazard is somewhat less than
that of 2.5mrem external dose.
QB-Cbs-RAD-HP K I R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 96
Page t 4 of 35
At 25% of BAC or greater, area is posted with sign Airborne
RadioactivityArea. Personnel entering the area are assigned DAC-hrs
based on time in the area.
Example of a Simplified TEDEIALARA Evaluation
Review the foliowing problems:
Art individual is assigned the task of repairing a door in a radiological
area. The area has a dose rate of 24 mredhr and also has some
airborne radioactivity. From experience with this doer, the individua!
knows it will take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 20 minutes to make the repair with a
respirator or 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> without a respirator. If the job is done without a
respirator, the individual will receive 2 DAC hours internal exposure.
If the individual wears a respirator what will the total dose be?
Answer: The total dose will be 56 m e n .
(24 mrem/hr)(2.33 hrs) = 56 mrem
If the individual does not wear a respirator, what will the total exposure
be?
Answer: The total dose will be 53 mrem.
(24 mrem/hr)(2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) + (2 DAC hours)(2.5 mrem/DAC hour) = 53 mrem
Which individual received less dose?
Answer: The individuai not wearing the respirator.
B. Methods of internal Deposition (Obj. #5)
1. Radioactive Material enters the body through:
a) Inhalation breathing.
~
b) Ingestion -eating, drinking, or chewing.
c) Absorption - absorbing it through the skin.
d) Onjection/Open wounds - through an open wound, sore, or pUnctUre
wound. Notify RP if you have open cuts or sores BEK)RE entering
radidegically controlled areas.
3. Wadiobgical Areas(0bj. #6)
3.2 Plant Condition Changes
O P - C N - wD-HP FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page f 5 of 35
Bank Question: 592.1 Answer: C
I Pt(s) Unit 1 is in mode 3. NC pressure is 1940 psig. CA auto start defeat
"Defeated" lights are lit
The following sequence of events occw on unit 1 while in mode 3:
1. CF isolation and the running CFPT trips on S/G Hi-Hi level
2. The S/G Hi-Hi level clears
3. CF isolation is reset
4. T-avc increases and NC pressure increases to 1960 psig
Which of the following correctly explains when, if at all, the CA pumps
should have automatically started'?
A. Following the CF isolation reset.
B. When the S/G Hi-Hi level cleared.
C. When pressure increased above P-11.
D. The CA pumps have remained off for these events.
~~~~~~~~~~~
Distracter Analysis:
Tests the candidates' knowledge ofthe low suction pressure protection
circuitsy when the CA has been reset.
A. Incorrect: defeated by CA auto start defeat
Plausible: coukd result in a CA pump start
B. Incorrect: defeated by CA auto start defeat
Plausible: normally tnic
6. Correct answer The auto start defeat will Auto RESET when above
P-1 1 and can be manually RESET at any time.
D. Incorrect: auto resets
Plausible: candidate does not recall the signal auto resets above P-11
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 061 A2.05 (3.1*/3.4*)
Lesson Plan Objective: CA Obj: 9
Source: Mod Ques-592 McGuire NRC 2000
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
1. OP-CN-CF-CA pages 10 and 11
DUKE POWER
-2. ...... 55%
CATAWBA-~OPERATiONS
.-..... -
TRAlNiNG
the automatic start signals (induding setpoint) for the motor
and turbine driven CA 5um5s
Discuss how to regain control of CA pumps following CA auto start
coincident with sesuencer actuation. I 1
14 State from memory all Technical Specification actions for the
applicable systems, subsystems, and components which require
remedial action to be taken in less than one hour.
15 List the system designator and major component nomenclature. 1x1
Time: 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />
OP-CN-CFCA K I R TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY R N . 43
Page 3 of 26
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
6 ) Two of four SIG narrow range level channels in two of four SIG LO LO
LEVEL.
C) The following are NOT "CA AUTO STARTS" but merely cause the
steam to be admitted to the Turbine, ("CA SYS VLV CTRL" resets
remain lit):
1) Loss of Power or Instrument Air to 1(2)SA 2 or 5 causes these
valves to fail open and admit Main Steam to the Turbine driven CA
Pump.
2) 2I4 SSF Wide Range S/G bevek less than 45% cause SA-5 to fail
open. THIS FEATURE CAN NOT BE DEFEATED. (A loss of
SSF power will initiate this same failure).
3. Plant Kesponse to the CA Auto Start.
a) BB Row control valves close.
b) BB Cont. lsolation and Bypasses Close; Train Related
c) NM Sample Cont. Isolations Close; Train Related
d) CF Cont. lsolation Bypasses Close; either train
e) Individual Tempering bine isolation Valves Close; either train
f) Flow Control Valves fail to "FULL OPEN".
g) If it was a Turbine Driven Start; SA 2 & 5 fail open, Governor positions
to Max speed and TD Flow Control Valves fail to "FULL OPEN".
h) "A" Train CA Signals causes TD governor to position to MAX" speed
and prevents manual closing of T&T Valve at MC-I0. "B" Train DOES
NOT provide these features.
i) RN Valves low suction pressure alignment circuits are enabled.
j) CS47(N~rmalHotwell MIU Control) fails closed on either train CA
Auto start. This ensures the CA system is not affected by any LIST
inventory loss to the hotwell. Control board resets buttons for each
train restores the valve to its normal makeup duties.
4. AUTO-START-DEFEAT: (M/D PUMPS ONLY Obj # 9) Each train of CA
contains a defeat button that allows the operators to prevent certain start
signals for normal unit shutdown.
a) Defeated Start Signals: (NOTE: These are the 3 MID CA auto-starts
that are NOT sequencer actuated.)
1) 114 SIG 214 LO LO LEVEL
2) Loss of Both Feed Pumps
3) AMSAC (already defeated if less than 40% for greater than 2 min.)
QP-CN-CFCA FOR 7RAiNlNG PURPQES ONLY R N . 43
Page 10 of 26
-
I
DUKE PQWER................
.......-..... CATAWBA OPERA TlONS TRAINING
b) To operate this circuit, you must be in the PI1 state: 2/3 Pressurizer
Pressures less than 1955 PSIG.
c) This feature will Auto RESET when above P-4 1 and can be manually
RESET at any time.
5. CA SYSTEM VALVE CONTROL RESETS (Obj #tIO)
a) Any CA Auto Start automatically starts and positions the CA system to
supply feed to the S/G's. During this period, the operator can neither
affect CA valve control nor shutdown the pumps. In order to regain
control of CA, the operator must RESET each Train of CA. These
switches are labeled "CA SYS VLV CTRL". These "RESETS" must be
held depressed for greater than 2 seconds to ensure reset.
b) If the motor driven CA pumps were in "Auto-Start Defeat" when an
auto-start signal is generated,
1) The pumps will start if the "auto-start defeat" should clear (either
manually or automatically if above P-I 1).
2) The operator can know an Auto-Start signal is present prior to
going above P-I 1 by observing CA valves RESET light "lit" for
both trains. If an auto-start signal is present, then the RESET
lights will be dark.
3) If CA starts due to Ss or Blackout, the motor driven pumps are still
controlled by the Sequencer until the sequencer is reset. (Obj #t
11)
c) "A" Train RESET gives operator control to the following
I) CA PUMP "A" (If Sequencer is Reset)
2) I' (2)CA 60 & 56; .§/GA and B Flow Control Valves
3) I(2)CA 48 & 36; TD Flow Control Valves for C & D S/Gs.
4) "A" Train Air Solenoids energize for 1(2)SA 2 & 5
5) Allows closing T&T valve at MC-10
6) Allows Train Related BB, NM and CF valve control
d) "B" Train RESET gives operator control of the following
? ) CA PUMP "B" (If Sequencer Reset)
2) 1(2)CA 44 & 40; S/G C and D Flow Control Valves
3) l(2)CA 64 & 52; TD Flow Control Valves for A & B WGs.
4) "B" Train Air Solenoids energize for I(2)SA 2 & 5
5) Allows Train Related BB, NM and CF valve control.
OP-CN-CF-CA FOR TRAiNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 43
Page f f of 26
Bank Question: 592 Answer: 6
1 PYS) Unit 1 was cooling down in Mode 4 when the IAI KC pump kips. Given
the following conditions:
Both trains of KC were initially in operation
- lA2 KC pump was secured due to high KC flow
Both trains of ND were aligned for RHR shutdown cooling
NCS temperature was 205 O F
If train A KC pumps cannot be restarted, which one of the following list of
actions is the complete b t of actions that must be taken to prevent damage
to equipment?
A. Stop ND pump 1A
B. Stop h7) pump 1A
Isolate ND flow through the 1A ND heat exchanger
Ce Cross-connect KC flow to the 1A ND heat exchanger
Cross-connect KC flow through the 1A ND Pump mechanical
seal heat exchanger
D. Stop ND pump 1A
Isolate KC flow through the letdown heat exchanger
~~~~~
Distracter Analysis: Upon a loss of KC to an operating ND train, M/21
requires two actions (per Foldout page):
- Stop the associated hJ pump
m Isolate flow to the associated ND 1%
A. Incorrect: Must also stop flow to the ND HX per AN21
Plausible: action to stop the IA ND pump is correct. There is a
sepamte operating precaution to maintain flow through the ND HX >
2000 gpm to prevent water hammer -but it does not apply to this
case.
B. Correct answer
C. Incorrect: cannot cross-connect B train KC flow to the A train ND
HX under these conditions - APRI specifies that flow must be
stopped to the ND w(.
Plausible: There is a precaution to ensure that KC flow is
maintained to ND mechanical seal HX for all operating ND pumps
D. Incorrect: no need to secure flow the letdown HX
Plausible: this would be required if KC was lost when the plant was
at power and NCS temp was higher to prevent flashing in the letdown
line.
Bank Question: 594.3 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 45% power when a loss of condenser vacuum
occurred. Given the following events and conditions:
- The s t e m dump system was in a noma! alignment
a All autoniatic protective actions occur as designed
a Condenser vacuum slowly decreases to 16 inches
The operators implement M I 2 3 (Loss ofcondenser Vucuumj.
Which one of the following statements correctly describes how T, is
controlled after the transient is over and the plant has stabilized?
REFERENCES PROVIDED - &tFiV%&&
A. Controlled on the condenser steam dumps around 553 OF
B. Controlled on the atmospheric steam dumps around 557 O F
C. Controlled on the condenser steam dumps around 561 O F
D. Controlled on the PORVs around 561 O F
Distracter Analysis: the turbine will trip at approximately 22 inches of
vacuum, C-9, condenser available, is goJ lost because vacuum does
not drop below 15 inches and the condenser steam dumps will
control Tave. The reactor does trip because power is below P8.
Rods drive in automatic.
The operators would enter AP-2 (Turbine Trip) and stabilize Rx
power at 6-10%. The plant would stabilize on the load rejection
controller at Tref o f 577'F +3"F (deadband) + 1°F (6-10%) = 561'P
A. Incorrect:Tave will stabilize at -561°F on the condenser steam
dumps.
Plausible: ifthe candidate thinks that the plant will stabilize on the P-
12 setpoint when the dunlps activate in load reject mode. This occurs
under certain instrument failures that cause Tref to fail low.
B. Incorrect:Tave will stabilize at -561°F on the condenser steam
dumps.
Plausible: If the candidate does not recognize that C-9 is not lost.
This was the answer in a prior version of this question.
C. Correct: Tave will stabilize at -56IOF on the condenser steam
dumps.
D. Incorrect: Tave will stabilize at -561°F on the condenser steam
dUmPS.
Plausible: if the plant stabilizes on the PORVs - if the candidate
thinks that both the condenser and atmospheric steam dumps do not
actuate, ahen Tave would be controlled on the S/G PORVs
(1 125#+14.7 converts to -561 O F ) . This occurs under certain
instrument failures where Tref failed high.
Level: RB&SRO
KA: G 2.4.2 (3.9 14.1)
Lesson PIan Objective: STM-IDE SEQ 7
Source: Mod Ques-594, Gatawba NRC 1999
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
I. BP-CN-STM-IDE pages 7-10,21,24,25
2. OP-CN-STMSM page 8
3. S t m Tabla PROVIDED
~
..-.
DUKE PQWR ...........--., - - -m
- . . .v
CATAWBA..OPERA
.......
...
-
TIQNS 7HAINING
N
Objective
(I
-
- 1 Describe the purpose of the IBE System.
2 List the banks of steam dumps and the number of valves in each bank.
-
-3 Describe the capacity of the Steam Dump System.
4 Describe the eontrollers in the Steam Dump System.
m Describe the inputs to each controller
m Discuss the plant conditions required to "enable" the
- controller
5 Discuss the conditions required to "arm" each bank of dump valves.
m Discuss the plant conditions that would cause Steam Dump
- "actuation"
6 State the number of steam dumps that can be isolated with the unit at
- 4 00% power.
7 Discuss the purpose and state the setpoint of each of the following:
e P-12 Lo-Lo TaVg Interlock
m C-7A
- c-7E3
m c-9
Describe the controls associated with the ID System.
Describe the system response to a failure of each input to IDE.
Describe haw to transfer modes of operation of the IDE System.
Discuss how a cooldown Is accomplished using the ID System.
OP-CN-STIW-!DE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21
Page 3 of 29
-_. DUKE
...-
POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-
--,
a-_
..-
..- =
--.. _....-
___... --...----
4. Condenser steam dumps are provided with inlet and outlet manual isolation
valves.
5. Atmospheric steam dumps can be isolated from CR by electrically operated
isolation valves.
G. Steam Pressure Controller (Obj. # 4 )
1. Used during S/Uand S/D less than 15% power. Can be used if Load
Rejection or Plant Trip Controllers are not properly operating.
2. Enabled by "STEAM DUMP SELECT switch on Control Board being
selected to "STM PRESS".
3. This controller compares steam header pressure to a setgoint put in by the
operator on the "SBM PRESS CTWL" Man/Auto Station on MC2.
4. Sends a signal to modulate condenser dumps if the arming signals are
satisfied and no blocks exist.
a) Arming signals (Obj. # 5)
1) Press Mode Selected
2 ) C-9
(a) 2/2 condenser vacuum greater than 15" Hg on condensers
A&B.
(b) 1/4 RC pump bkrs closed.
b) Blocking signal
1) P-12TRNA
2) P-12TRN B.
H. Load Rejection Controller (Obj. # 4)
1. Used during a load rejection to prevent a large Tavg increase on a loss of
load.
2. Enabled by Steam Dump Select switch being in "Tavg" and no Keactor trip
(P-4 Train B).
3. Compares auctioneered high Tavg tof ,T and sends a signal to modulate
all banks as necessary. A leadllag circuit conditions the auctioneered Hi
Tavg signal. This circuit initially boosts the magnitude of any change in
auctioneered Hi Tavg by a factor of 2. This is to make the steam dumps
respond in an anticipatory manner and to prevent overshoot.
4. A 3OF dead band exists on the controller to allow rod control to actuate to
decrease Tavg.
5. Sends signal to modulate dumps open one bank at a time.
a) Bank one open fully, then Bank 2 starts opening, etc.
OP-CN-STM-DE FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21
Page 7 of 29
-DUKE
-POWER ...-.- ....... ---_ ......CA TAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
____.- ____
... - = = = = = L P
6. Arming Signais (Obj. # 5)
a) "TaVg"mode selected
b) C-7A or C-7B actuated.
1) C-7A arms condenser dumps.
2) C-7B arms atmospheric dumps.
c) W Reactor Trip (P-4 Train A) - atmospheric dumps.
d) C-9 - Condenser Dumps
7. Load Rejection Signals
a) Load detected by turbine impulse pressure channel II.
2 ) Different channel than reactor control uses for Tref calculation.
b) Load signal goes thru lsol amp to derivative circuit.
c) Derivative circuit generates output signal proportional to rate of change
of impulse pressure.
1) Qutput zero fer nonchanging pressure signal.
d) Load Reduction Bistables
1) C7A Loss of Load Interlock (Obj. # 7)
(a) 10% Step load decrease or a ramped load decrease over a
given period of time.
(b) Energizes latching relay.
(c) Activates 6-7A loss of load interlock status light
(1) LOSS OF LOAD INTLK COND DMP VLVS.
(d) With C-9 activated, will arm banks 1, 2, 3.
(1) Energizes arming solenoid valves.
(2) C-9 not activated will block arming signals (Banks 4 ,
2,3)
(e) C-78 Reset-take "STM DUMP SELECT SWITCH" to
"RESET"
2) C7B boss of Load Onterlock (Obj. # 7)
(a) 30% step load decrease or a ramped load decrease over a
period of time.
OP-CN-STM-IDE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY R N . 21
Page 8 of 29
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPRATlONS TRAINING
(b) Energizes latching relay
(c) Activates C-7B interlock status light
(1) LOSS OF LOAD INTLK ATMQS BUMP
(d) Arms Banks 4 and 5 with:
(1) (Train A P-4) Reactor Trip
~
(2) STM DUMP SEL. SWITCH IN "Tavg"
(3) (Train A P-4) Reactor Trip arming signal for
Bank 4 and 5.
(e) C-7B Reset ~ Take STM DUMP SELECT SW. to RESET
I. Plant Trip Controller (Obj. # 4)
1. Used to reduce Tavg to Tno-Load following a Reactor trip.
2. Enabled by select switch in "Tavg" with a Reactor Trip (P-4 Train B).
3. Compares Tavg to T n o - ~ o aand ~ modulates Banks 1,2 and 3 (Condenser
Dumps). A leadliag circuit conditions the auctioneered Hi Tavg signal. This
circuit initially boosts the magnitude of any change in auctioneered Hi Tavg
by a factor of 2. This is to make the steam dumps respond in an
anticipatory manner and to prevent overshoot.
4. Arming Signals (Qbj. # 5)
a) Reactor Trip (P-4 Train A)
b) C-9
5. Trip signal is similar to Load Rejection.
6. Output limited to 49% steam dump demand, which is not enough of a
control signal to open the atmospheric steam clumps.
J. P-12 Lo-Lo Tavs Interlock (Qbj. # 7)
1. Blocks dump actuation to prevent excessive cooidwn below minimum
temperature for criticality.
2. Set at 553'F on 214 NC loops.
3. Solenoid valves that shut off control air for each steam dump valve.
4. Steam Dump 1NTL.K Byp TRN (A) B
a) Either Switch in OFF
1) Steam dumps blocked
b) Both switches in ON
1) Normal plant operation
2) Steam dump actuation permitted.
QP-CN-STM-/DE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21
Page 9 of 29
1.~
DUKE.._
POWER ...-. ..- ..... - CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
2-L. ..s.L____
c) ?!&&,I switches to BYP INTLK momentarily. (Spring return to "ON")
1) Bypasses P-12 block signal for Bank Idump valves.
2) Allows Bank 1 to be used for plant cooldown below P-1%setpoint.
3) Activates Status light STM DUMP INTLK TRAIN A (B) BYPASSED.
4) If P-t2 clears (3/4 NC loops greater than 553") bypass
~
automatically reset.
d) Both switches to OFF/RESET
1) Resets bypass signal
2) Blocks All steam dumps
K. Status Lights (SI-5) (Qbj. # 8)
4. ATMOSCOND STM DUMP MODULATION Lit when any arming signal is
~
present.
2. ABMQS/COND STM DUMP TRIP OPEN Lit when Steam dump demand is
~
greater than 16.2% and Tave Mode is selected on the STM BUMP SELECT
Switch.
4. PROCEDURES
4.1 Normal Startup (Qbj. # 10)
A. Select STM PRESS control mode
B. Set steam header pressure controller for no-load operating pressure (I 090 psig
at 557'~).
C. Steam dump is used as an artificial load until sufficient steam is available to roll
the turbine at 10% power.
4.2 Normal Operation
A. When the load increases to approx. 15% and all dump vaive close, select, ,T
control mode.
5. Steam dump valves will remain closed during normal operation.
C. Steam Dump !solation (Ref. Site Directive 3.8.8 Scheduling Philosophy for
Priority Work) (Obj. #6)
The maximum number of steam dumps and S/GPORV's which can be isolated
at 100% power is 2. The two can be made up of any atmospheric dump, one
condenser dump, or one S/G POW. However, the 2 should never be 2
atmospheric, 2 condenser or 2 S/G PQRV's. This is Lo prevent lifting steam line
safety valves in the event of a full and instantaneous load rejection.
4.3 Loss of Load
A. If a 10% step load reduction occurs, steam wilt be dumped to the condenser
automatically.
QP-CN-SlWIDE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21
Page f 0 of 29
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING ........ -
T-AVE M O D E @ 1 5 % LOAD
AUCT HI
T-A V G
T-NO LOAD T-REF PRESS
REJECTION PRESSURE
CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER
T-AVG MOD T-AVG MODE
NO P-4 TRN B
STM DUMP
DEMAND STPT= 8.43 =
QP-CN-SWIACILPE FOR TRAINhVG PURPOSES QNLY REV. 21
Page 24 of 29
DUKE POWER ............... ..,., .-.- CATAWBA OPERATlONS 7RAINING
--
2. S/G PORV's can be controlled from:
a) Control Room (Panel MC-2)
I)"AUTO" - PORV's open at 1125 psig increasing
PORV's close at 1092 psig decreasing
2) "MANUAL" - SIG PORV is opened or closed by the operator
using a "0" to "IO" position pot, with "0" being closed and "10"
being fully open
(a) Prior to selecting "MANUAL", the pot should be set on "0"
to prevent inadvertent P O W opening.
3) In "AUTB", only VI (Instrument Air) is available to operate the
SIG PORV.
4) In "MANUAL", solenoid valves align such that either VI or N2 can
supply the PORV. The source with the higher pressure will
supply control air and positioning air.
(a) Two (2) breakers are located behind panel MC-6 in the
Control Room. These breakers should remain energized
('ON') at all times. They provide the capability to take the
POKV to "MANUAL" Control. When these breakers are
de-energized indication of "AUTO" or "MANUAL" control
is lost and the control for the PORV fails to the "AUTO"
position.
b) CAPT Panel in "LOCAL" Control
I) Two (2) breakers are provided in the CAPT panel room to
transfer control for the SIG PQRV's from Control Room Control
to C A W LOCAL CONTROL.
2) Breakers are located in the CAPT Room.
3) Breakers are normally 'OFF' and should only be turned 'ON'
when Control transfer is desired.
4) Prior to transfer, the "Manual Loaders associated with each
PORV should be verified 'closed' to prevent inadvertent P O W
opening.
5) When breakers have been selected to 'ON', all control functions
are taken away from the Control Room and the operator controls
PORV position using local "Manual Loaders" for each POW.
6) When operating the PORV's from the CAPT panel, VI is the &
source available for positioning the PORVs. If VI is lost while at
the CAPT panet in "LOCAL" control, the SIG PORV cannot be
opened.
OP-CN-STM-SM FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 8 of 18
Bank Question: 594.2 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating ower when a Ioss ofcondenser vacuum
occurred. Given the events and conditions:
Condenser vacuum decreases to 19 inches
- The steam dump system w a in a normai aligmnent
All automatic protective actions occur as designed
The operators implement APl23, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
What should be the value of T-ave aRer the transient is over and the plant has
stabilized?
A. 553T
a
B. 557"P
561OP
D. 566OF
Distracter Analysis: the turbine will trip at approximately 20 inches of
vacuum, C-9, condenser available, is lost below 20 inches.
f
A. Incorrect: will stabilize at 559 O F .
Plausible: if the candidate thinks that the C-7 load reject controllers
will activate the dumps, the lack of C-9 lets only the atmospheric
dumps operate in steam pressure mode until shut by P-12 at 553 OF.
This is the right answer if the candidate does not know that the
reactor is tripped for loss of vacuum at any power.
B. Incorrect: Tave will stabilize at 559 O F
Plausible: If the candidate misunderstands that the Tavg/pPant trip
mode is blocked by 6-9. This was the answer in a prior version.
C. Correct: plant will stabilize on the SlG POKVs -the atmospheric
dumps do not function.
D. Incorrect: will stabilize at 559 OF.
Plausible: if the plant stabilizes on the steam generator code safeties
- if the candidate thinks that both the condenser dumps 'and the
atmospheric dumps do not actuate, and forgets about the S/G PORVs.
Level: RO&SRO
KA. APE 051AK3.0I (2.8 / 3.1)
Lesson Plan Objective: STM-DE SEQ 5/6
Source: Mod; Ques-594.1, Catawbrp Audit 2001
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-MC-STM-IH)E pages 21-3 1
Bank Question: 594.f Answer: B
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating a a o w e r when a loss of condenser vacuum
occmed. Given the following events and conditions:
0 Condenser vacuum decreases to 16 inches
- The steam dump system was in a normal alignment
All automatic protective actions occur as designed
- No operator action
What shouuld be the vaIue of T-ave after the transient is over and the plant has
stabilized?
A. 553'F
551'F
C. 561OF
D. 564OF
Dfstracter Analysis: the turbine will trip at approximately 22 inches of
vacuum, C-9, condenser available, is lost below 15 inches.
A. Incorrect: Tave d l stabilize at 557 "F
Plausible: If the misunderstands the P-12 interlock
B. Correct: will stabiIize at 557 "F
P-4 QCCWS and enables the plant trip controller to return NC
temperaure to no-load T a m
C. Incorrect: will stabilize at 554 O F .
Plausible: if the candidate thinks that the plant will stabilize on the
atmospheric steam d m p s - the condewer dumps do not function
D. Incorrect: will stabilize at 557 O F
Plausible: if the plant stabilizes on the steam generator code safeties
- if the candidate thinks that both the condenser dumps and the
atmospheric dumps do not actuate.
Level: RO&SRQ
KA: APE 051AK3.01 (2.8 / 3.1)
Lesson Plan Objective: IC-IDE SEQ 5,7
Source: Md,Ques-594, McGuire Exam 2000
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-IC-IDE pages 5-1 1
Bank Question: 594 Answer: C
~~
1 Pt(s)
Q
Unit 1 was operating looo power when a loss of condenser vacuum
occurred. Given the follo g events and conditions:
Condenser vacuum dropped to 10 inches
The steam dump system was in a nomai alignment
- All automatic protective actions occurred as designed
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the opemtion of
the condenser dump valves?
A. Condenser steam dump valves do not open because the C-7.4
arming signal is blocked.
B. Condenser steam dump valves do not open because the load
rejection controller is active.
Condenser steam dump valves isolate when condenser pressure
@ drops below 20 inches of vacuum.
D. Condenser steam dump valves isolate when the P-12 block
solenoid valves close.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: C-7A wilt arm on a 10% step change in load
Plausible: If the C-7A interlock did not pick up and iirm the
condenser dump valve, they would not open
B. Incorrect: The piant trip controller is active when P-4 occurs and the
steam dump select switch is in T-me position.
Plausible: The load rejection controller is active when P-4 does not
OCCW.
C. Correct answer
D. Incorrect: The condenser dump valves would close on loss of c-9.
The P-12 Mock solenoids do not actuate unless T-ave is below 554
OF.
Plausible: The P-12 block solenoids act to protect the NCS against
an uncontrolled cooldown
Bank Question: 600 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is at 4% power, conducting a plant starcup. Given the following
events and conditions:
A control bank A rod drops
0 NCS temperature decreases to 550°F
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the required
actions (if any)?
A. No technical specification action is required, however, the plant
must be shutdown to mode 3 to recover the rod.
B. Within 30 minutes, adjust power range NEs to increase reactor
power so that reactor power and thermal power best estimate are
equal.
C. Within 30 minutes be in mode 2 with Ynless than 1.0.
D. Immediately trip the reactor and enter E 4 (Reactor Trip or
Safety Injection).
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: Tech Spec 3.4.2 is applicable in mode 2 when critical.
Plausible: The change from mode 2 to mode Ioccurs when power
exceeds 556. If the candidate thinks that ITS 3.4.2 only applies in
mode 1, this would be a plausible mistake.
B. Incorrect: Thermal power would indicate lower, not higher than
reactor power due to increased thermalization of the neutrons. While
NI adjustment is a problem, this action docs not comply with tech
spec 3.4.2.
Plausible: This was a recent event (July 1, 1998) at hlcGuire - but
the temperature remained under 55 1 O F for only 4 minutes. The
concern expressed in the ~essonslearned report was for the NI power
to thermal power mismatch.
C. Correct answer
D. Incorrect: An immediate reactor hip is NOT required. AP/14
requires a controlled shutdown to mode 3 - but with temp only 1 O F
below minimum required for criticality, the best choice is C.
Shutting down to mode 3 is not a distracter.
Plausible: Seems like an appropriate response to finding yourself
below the minimum temperature for criticality - an overly
conservative response.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: G2.1.11 (3.0/3.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: NC SEQ 10
source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-PS-NC page 33
2. Tech Spec 3.4.2 page 1
.-.
DUK
-............-
..- ...
POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
.=.....-...-...-.......-...-.............- -.....-
Objective
Examine NC system operations.
- Explain NC System leak testing
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply limits and precautions associated
with related station procedures.
Explain controlling NC level in a drained condition.
List the svmetoms for entw into AP/I/A/5500/10 (Reactor Coolant Leak)
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference materials,
determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech Specs/SLC's.
State the svstem desianator and nomenclature for maior components.
Describe "Critical Valves" as specified in OW1 (2)/A/6160/001 (Controlling
Procedure For Unit Startup). Include in discussion which valves are
designated as critical valves, how they may be identified locally, and
actions taken to ensure these valves are closed prior to commencing
normal power operations.
Describe the EMF'S associated with NC and be able to describe the
automatic actions that occur when they reach the Trip 2 setpoint.
TIME: 2.0 HOURS
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY R W . 33
Page 5 of 37
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-=-._=
.-.-~- ..,,.....
= -_
-_
.. _..- - .. P
2) A Iminute transport time delay (via extra length of pipe) allows
for decay of N-16.
3) No automatic actions associated with this EMF.
4) Symptom for entry to AP/I 8 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).
2.3 Technical Specifications (Obj. #Iff)
A. Refer to the latest revision of the following Technical Specifications:
4. T.S. 2.0 Safety Limits
2. T.S. 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits
3. T.S. 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for criticality
4. T.S. 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (Pn) Limits
5. T.S. 3.4.4 RCS Loops - Mode Iand 2
6. T.S. 3.4.5 RCS Loops - Mode 3
7. T.S. 3.4.6 RCS LOOPS - Mode 4
8. T.S. 3.4.7 RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled
9. T.S. 3.4.8 RCS Loops - Mode 5 , Loops not Filled
10. T.S. 3.4.9 Pressurizer
II.T.S. 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves
12. T.S. 3.4.1 1 Pressurizer BBRVs
13. T.S. 3.4.12 LTOP System
14. T.S. 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage
15. T.S. 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage
16. T.S. 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
17. T.S. 3.4.76 RCS Specific Activity
B. Refer to the latest revision of the following Selected Licensee Commitments
I. SLC 16.5-1 Mid-Loop Operation with Irradiated Fuel in the Core.
2. SLC 16.5-2 Safety Valves - Shutdown
3. SLC 16.5-3 Chemistry
4. SLC 16.54 Pressurizer
5. SLC 16.5-5 Structural Integrity
6. SLC 16.5-6 Reactor Coolant System Vents
7. SLC 16.5-7 S/G Pressure/Ternperature Limitation
2.4 Power Supplies
A. Pressurizer Heaters (Obj. #3)
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 33 of 37
RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality
3.4.2
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality
LCO 3.4.2 Each RCS loop average temperature (Tavg)shall be ~ 5 5 1 ° F .
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,
MODE 2 with ,k 1.O.
ACTIONS
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
ioops not within limit.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.2.1 Verify RCS ,T, in each loop 2 551°F. --------NOTE-------
Only required if
,T, - T,, deviation
alarm not reset
and any RCS loop
Taq e 562 "F
Catawba Units 1 and 2 4.4.2-1 Amendment Nos. 1731165
Bank Question: 602.1 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is responding to a LQCA. The crew has entered ES-1.2. Post LQCA
Cooldown and Depressurization.
Given the following events and conditions:
e Pressurizer level is steady
e Only one train of ECCS is injecting
- Lwp A temperatures are representative of all 4 loops
- MSIVs and steam dumps are open
Which one of the following sets of plant parameters is indicative of fully
established natural circulation as outlined in Enclosure 3, NaWal Circulation
Monitoring Parameters?
References Provided:
-
0200 - 0205 -0210 - 0215
A. Steam Header Pressure (psig) 742 715 676 645
NC System Pressure (psig) 968 964 960 958
LOOPA T-hot (OF) 544 536 535 521
LOOPA T-cold (OF) 512 510 502 497
B. Steam Header Pressure (psig) 142 709 676 645
NC System Pressure (psig) 968 972 975 981
LOOPA T-hot (OF) 547 552 555 563
LOOPA T - d d (OF) 548 544 540 536
C. Steam Header Pressure (psig) 142 747 I50 762
NC System Pressure (psig) 968 964 960 958
LOOP A T-hot (OF) 544 536 535 527
Loop A T-cold (OF) 512 514 515 517
D. Steam Header Pressure (psig) 742 737 140 732
NC System Pressure (psig) 938 942 945 941
LOOP A T-hot (OF) 539 542 545 545
Loop A T-cold (OF) 513 510 510 506
~~~~
Distrlacter Analysis: Thc following conditions support natural circulation:
SIG pressure stable of decreasing
T-hot stable or decreasing
T-cold stable or decreasing
NC subcooling 9 0 NC pressure may trend up or down.
~
Ques-602.1.doc
A. Correct: This shows indication of natural circulation flow occuning
- decreasing S!G pressure, T-cold at S/G saturation conditions and
decreasing, T-hot decreasing.
B. Incorrect: T-hot is increasing while steam pressure is decreasing
Plausible: Stcam pressure and T-cold are both decreasing
C. Incorrect: Steam pressure is increasing and T-cold is tracking along
with this trend. Temperature difference is decreasing indicating that
heat removal rate is decreasing. This is a classic case of gas binding
Plausible: T-hot is decreasing.
D. Incorrect: No subcooling.
Plausible: T-cold is decreasing
Level: RO&SRO
KA: EPE 011 EA2.09 (4.3i4.5)
Lesson Plan Objective: HT Obj: 15
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: analysis
1. EP/l/N5000/ES-1.2 enclosure 3
2. stem tables
3 . OP-CN-THF-HT page 8-10
--
..
DUKE .......
.....-
BOWER ......
...... .1
CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
__
... Y I I I ..........
.......... -
r Define Heat Transfer.
Objective
State the three ways heat is transferred in a nuclear power piant.
Define Conduction heat transfer.
Explain the variables that effect the rate of conduction.
List the formulas used for conduction.
Give an example of where conduction heat transfer occurs in the power
plant.
Given a set of parameters, be able to work conduction problems.
Define Convection heat transfer.
Explain the variables that effect the rate of convection.
List the formulas used for convection.
Give an example of convection heat transfer in the power plant.
Given a set of Darameters. be able to work convection problems.
Define Natural Circulation.
List the characteristics of a power plant that are required for natural
circulation.
Describe the parameters used to determine if natural Circulation exists.
Explain what plant conditions the operator maintains to enhance natural
circulation.
Describe what plant conditions can impede natural circulation.
Define Radiation heat transfer.
Explain the variables that effect the rate of radiation heat transfer
Give an example of radiation heal transfer in the power plant.
Define Departure From Nucleate Boiling.
~~~
Explain how DNB occurs in a nuclear reactor.
Describe the undesirable effects of DNB.
List the parameters that effect DNB.
OP-Cff-THFHT Fora TRAlNihlG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 06
Page 3 of 15
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
B. (Obj. # I O ) The formulas used for connective heat transfer are:
1. Q = MC Delta T and,
2. Q = M Delta h
C. Uses
1. Q = M C Delta T
a) Used for heat transfer in medium with phase changes end
boundary is crossed.
Example:
1) NC Delta T across the aX core
2) NC Delta T across the S/G
2. Q = M Delta h
a) Used for heat transfer where there @ a phase change, but
boundary is crossed. (Obj. #?I)
Example:
1) Feedwater to steam in the S/G
2) Steam to condensate in the condenser
8. Example Problem (Obj. #12)
1. A reactor is producing 341'I Mw with a core Tavg 591OF. If core Tc is
561, what is NC flow rate?
2.4 Natural Circulation
A. Mechanism (Obj. #13)
1. Natural Circulation occurs due to density difference between fluids or two
points in the same fluid system. As a fluid is heated up its density
decreases. Fluids of higher temperature, lower density have a natural
tendency to rise to a higher elevation. Conversely, fluids with lower
temperature, higher density have a tendency to fall to a lower elevation.
a) Example
-_--_-__-__-___ Levels equal-.,-----------
A B
OP-CN-THFHT FOR TRAINfNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 06
Page 8 of f 5
Tank 'A' water has a higher density than tank 'B'because of the lower
temp. Static pressure felt on either side of the valve will be due to the
difference in density between the tanks since there is no height
difference.
If the valve is opened flow will occur from tank 'A to Tank '3' until
levels change sufficiently to cause the Delta P = 0.
b) In the above example we could place a heater in tank 'B' and a heat
exchanger in tank 'A' to remove heat and we would still only get flow
until the levels changed to make Delta P = 0. To have continuous
flew between the tanks, a complete path from tank ' B to tank 'A' and
a completely fiiled loop is needed. With the heat source (heater), heat
sink (heat exchanger), and return flow path, we can establish a small
natural circulation RQW.
COOLING
FLOW HEATER
(SOURCE)
(SINK)
2. The amount of flow we can get from the above system can be aided
further by elevating the heat sink (tank 'A') above the source (tank 'R).
The difference in height will cause a greater Delta P across the valve,
increasing flow.
HEIGHT
B. Plant Application (Obj. #14)
1~ In the NC system we have all the desian characteristics for natural
circulation. They are:
a) Heat source - the core
b) Heat sink - the S/G
OP-CN-THFHT K ) R TRcllNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 06
Page 9 of i 5
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINlNG
c] A complete flow path NC piping
~
d) Differencein height with sink above source - 96 is higher than core.
1 ) The centerline of the core (source) to the centerline of SIG (sink).
(a) The sink is considered to be the centerline of the heat xfer
area.
(b) In a QTSG this can be varied significantly by varying the
SIC3 water level. In a U-tube SIG, however, the centerline
will stay constant as long as water level is kept in the NR,
which is above the tubes.
C. Verification of Natural Circulation (Qbj. #15)
1. In the NC system, when we lose forced convection cooling, natural
circulation will be established "naturally" if ali of our systems respond
correctly.
2. When the NCPs trip, the Reactor will trip or will be tripped. The decay
heat in the core will have to be removed and will be the heat source. We
will still be drawing steam either thru the auxiliaries or steam dumps or
both. The SIG leveis will be maintained either by CF or CA. Heat added
in the core will cause the NC fluid to rise to the S/G where heat is
removed. The cooler water will then fall to the core to be reheated.
3. An operator must be able to verify that this occurs by looking at his plant
instrumentation.
Indicators of natural circulation are: (Per Emergency Procedures)
a) NC Subcooling: 0°F
b) Th steady or decreasing
c) Core exit thermocouple: stable or decreasing
d) SI6 pressure constant (or decreasing with Yh).
e) NC T-cold (Wide Range): near saturation temperature for SIG
pressures.
4. If any of the above indications are outside the expected indication, natural
circulation may not exist and there may be a blockage in the NC system.
5. Adequate time must be allowed to verify actions (steam dumping) have
been effective. NC Loop Transit time wiil be increased to approximately 2
to 6 minutes. It may also take 15 to 30 minutes before Natural Circulation
flow is fully established. This will be seen as a 'sluggish' NC system
response to changes in steam demand.
D. Detriments to Natural Circulation (Qbj. #le)
? ~ Loss of heat sink
a) Loss of SIG feed
OP-CN-THFHT FOR TRAIMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 06
Page I U of 15
POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION
EP/1/N5000/ES-1.2
Enclosure 3 - Page 1 of 1
Natural Circulation Monitoring Parameters
I. The f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s s u p p o r t or i n d i c a t e n a t u r a l c i r c u l a t i o n f l o w :
o N C suhcoo:ing - GREATER T H A N O°F
o S / G p r e s s u r e s - S T A B L E OK D E C R E A S I N G
0 NC T - H o t s - S T A B L E OR D E C R E A S I N G
o C o r e e x i t T l C s - S T A B L E OK D E C R E A S I N G
0 NC ? - C o l d s - A 7 S A T U R A T I O N TEMPERA.rlJRE F O R S / G PRESSURE
( W I T H I N T H E L I M I T S i l F T I i E GRAPH E E L O W ) .
SIG PRESSURE (PSIG:
iZOil
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
400
zoo
100
0
ZOO 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
NC T-COLD TEMPERATURE ( * F )
2. 1+ Natural C i r c u l a t i o n flow i s n o t established. i n c r e a s e dumping steam t o
e s t a b l is ti N a t u r a 1 C ir c u l a t ion f 1 ow
Bank Question: 605.1 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 trips from 100% power due to an electrical fault.
5 minutes later, 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) alarms in trip 2.
Which one of the following indications will provide the best indication (most
sensitive and timely) to c o n h that a SiG tube leak has just occurred?
A. Observing lEMF-26,27,28 and 29 (Steamline I A - I D )
B. Comparing SIG feed flow to steam flow mismatch
C. Observing lEMF-M(L) (SIC sample (lo range))
D. Observing lEMF41,72,73,94 (WGA-D leakage)
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct answer: normally, EMF-71-74 are the most sensitive
monitors. But these monitors detect N16y radiation that has a high
energy (7 MeV) y that only is generated when the reactor is operating
at power (requires a neutron flux).
B. Incorrect: Not a sensitive method of comparison - requires large
61pm leak rates before this is noticeable.
Plausible: This method will show gross SGTRs
C. Incorrect: S/G sample line will isolate at EMF-33 trip 2 -the sample
line can only be lined up to i SiG at a time. If the leak is not in that
S/G, there will be no indication of anything after isolation. Prior to
isolation, it may show an increasing trend due to a general build up of
activity in the fcedwater.
Plausible: This would be a good answer if the automatic isolation
did not occur
D. Incorrect: most sensitive method as it detects NI6y radiation
Plausible: This was the correct answer for the 1997 NRC exam -
when the premise of the question had the reactor was operating at
100% power. In this question, the reactor has tripped and neutron
flux has decreased - causing the NI6y to decay off(T% is 7 seconds)
so that by the time that the steam Iine monitors see the contents of the
S/G, the NI6y has decayed away.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 039 A2.03 (3.N3.7)
Lesson Plan Objective: SM Obj: 28
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-STM-SM page 12,13
=. DUKE
=
POWER _..._ CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING
~____.--
-
I P
T
SM System Objective I S
R
Q
-
Discuss S/G overfill including:
0 The conditions that couid result in SI6 overfill X
0
0 The potential consequences of S/G overfill
Automatic actions that could preclude overfill
I -
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference materials,
determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech Specs/SLCs
Discuss the symptoms and subsequent actions of AP/l/N5500/28
the SM (Main Steam):
0 Unit 1 Steam Line EMF26,27,28,29
Unit2 Steam Line EMF10, 11, 12, 13
0 Unit 7 Steam kine N l 6 Monitors 1EMF71, 72, 73, 74
0 Unit 2 Steam Line N16 Monitors 2EMF71. 72. 73,74
Time: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
.. -DUKE
- POWER ~
1 .-.... CA....
TAWBA- OPERATIONS......
TRAiNiNG
- -- ...-.,
b) For a gradual loss of VI, the valve will not close until pressure goes
-
below about 35 40 psig. We should be able to take credit for the
MSlVs down to and even below 40 psig.
c) When performing operator actions per Loss of VI (AP/Q22),the AQ
cautions the operator to depress the "ciose" pushbutton on the
MSIV's, if they have failed closed. This prevents them from opening
inadvertently when Vi is restored.
3. Manually controlled from MC-2 with a momentaw PB.
a) indication of open/closd and 90% position on MC-2.
4. Auto close on main steam isolation and must be reset lo open.
5. Auto close when ASP is placed in "LOCAL"; will automatically reopen
when the ASP is transferred back to the control room, unless "CLOSE"
pushbutton is depressed.
6. Located in the doghouse.
F. Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves
1. Provide bypass for MSIV's for warming SM lines.
2. Manually controlled from MC-2 with air loader.
3. Auto close on "Main Steam Isolation" and must be reset to open.
4. Auto close when ASP is placed in local; will automatically return to
selected position when ASP controi is transferred back to the CIR.
5. Located in doghouse.
G. Radiation Monitors (Obj#28)
1. 1EMF26,27,28,29 and 2EMF11, 12, 13, 14 (Steam Line Radiation
Monitors)
a) Area monitors located upstream of the MSIV's in the doghouses.
b) Monitors potential S/G relief paths to atmosphere.
c) No automatic functions.
d) Symptom for entry to AP/l/N5580/10 (Reactor Coolant Leak)
2. EMF-71, 72, 73, 74 (N-16 Steam Line Monitors)
a) These EMPs provide accurate real-time monitoring of the Main
Steam lines at the point just before they reach the equalization
header. The detectors monitor energy levels associated with N-76
gammas present in the NC (Reactor Coolant System). The
presence ofthe N-16 isotope in the SM headers is indication that
a primary to secondary leak exists.
QP-CN-STM-SM FQR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REK 34
Page f4cf18
DUKE~. POWR
......................-. .......-....-..._ I-... .... OPERAT1ONS 7RAINING -
CATAWBA
b) The N-16 isotope emits such energetic gammas that it is probable
that during a S/G tube rupture that the count rate on the adjacent
monitor (5&C or A&B) will also increase, though not as much as
for the actual leaking generator.
c) The readings on the N-16 monitors are calculated based on a
complex mathernatic calculation. Because of the way the
calculation is done internaily (programming) and the way they are
set up, these EMFs became increasingly inaccurate at power
levels below 40% and may spuriously alarm.
d) No control functions are associated with these EMF'S.
e) Symptom for entry to APII/N5500/10 (Reactor Coolant Leak).
f) SbC 16.7-28 (Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation for Plant
Operations)
H. Equalization Header
'I. Located in Turbine Building 594 level.
2. Most of the auxiliary loads tap off here.
3. Supplies main turbine stop valves.
4. Ensures equal pressures on all S/G's.
I. Loads (Qbj. # 13)
1. Main turbine stop valves
a) Provide steam shut off for normal and emergency conditions.
b) Below seat chambers interconnected.
c) Pressure equalized around valves by #2 stop valve internal bypass.
2. CAPT steam supply
a) Comes off upstream of S/G's '3' and 'C' MSIV's.
b) Supplied thru air valves SM,5.
3. Steam seals
a) Seals turbine shaft.
b) SM supply used during operation.
4. CSAE
a) Maintain vacuum on main condenses
b) SM reduced to 150 psig for use in CSAE
c) SM supply used during operation
5. Auxiliary Steam
a) Qne supply to aux steam
OP-CN-STM-SM FOR TRAINAG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 13 of 18
Bank Question; 731 Answer: A
04 hl5L.H # e x
1 Pt(s) Federal Regulations require the emergency core cooling system to be
designed to maintain peak cladding temperature below 2200 OF.
Which one ofthe following statements correctly describes the basis for this
design criterion?
A. To prevent acceleration of the zircall~y-waterreaction.
B. To prevent exceeding the zircallcy clad melting point.
C. TQprevent exceeding the fuel melting point.
D. To prevent the onset cf full f ~ m boiling and DNB. 3 f z .-7
(/ Ir a flj c,
- I - --
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct: The zirconium-water reaction is described by the following
chemical equation: Zr + 2H,O -->210, + 2H, + HEAT. The rate of
this reaction is highly dependent upon clad tempcraturc, such that
above approximately 1800y the reaction becomes significant. It
becomes accelerated at 2200°F and auto-catalytic (self-sustaining) at
4800F.
B. Incorrect: Zircalloy will melt at approximately 33l6'F.
Plausible: its approximately 900 degrees below the melting point.
C. incorrect: fuel melt i s a much higher temperature, 5100°F.
PIausible: a logical answer if the candidate doesn't know the answer
D. Incorrect: these are event specific mechanisms rather analysis
criteria.
Plausible: If the catididate confuses heat transfer mechanisms with
ECCS criteria.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 006 K3.02 (4.314.4)
Lesson Plan Objective: 'FA-AM SEQ 10
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-CN-IC-ISE page 5
2.OP-cEd-TA-AM pages 7-9
3. IOCFR50.46
QuesJ3l.doc
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
OBJECTIVES
-
L
Objective I: P
S
Describe available heat sinks and the mechanics of core cooling. I
State alternate methods of core cooling for specific plant conditions. 1
List the sources of gas/steam during accident conditions. I
Describe situations that may result in gas accumulation in the NCS. 1
Explain how gas accumulation in the NCS could block reflux
cooling. lx
Describe how the use of NC pumps minimizes the effect of gas
accumulation.
State the symptoms and effects of gas/steam binding.
ExDIain how boron Drecbitation affects core coolina.
--a
Describe alternate success paths when normal components or
systems are not available for core cooling
Describe the instrumentation that is required to be qualified for
operation in a hostile environment. (Adverse Containment
Conditions)
Explain the possible failure modes of Post Accident Monitor (PAM)
instrumentation
Describe alternate means of determining critical parameter values
assumino failure of the rximarv means
Discuss the plant computer capabilities for data acquisition for
recoanizina core darnaae I
Describe the use of radiation monitors to detect a degraded core
condition I
Discuss the administrative procedures used to address the
unexaected conditions for which no emeraencv mocedures exist I
Explain why all incore Thermocouples are not expected to read the
same followine an accident
OP-CN-TA-AM FOR TRAMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. f6
Page 3 of 39
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
1. introduction
1.1 Overview
A. Safeguards are used to control the plant during all operating conditions
designed into their operating features.
B. Included in the design are safeguards to:
1. Control anticipated abnormal transients
2. Sense accident situations and to initiate operation of equipment to
control the plant during the accident. This presentation will focus on
these safeguards which are called the Engineered Safety Features
Actuation System.
1.2 System Purpose: (Obj #I)
The purpose of the Engineered Safeguard Actuation System is to initiate action to
protect the core and Reactor Coolant System components, and ensure
containment integrity in the event of an accident.
1.3 ECCS Acceptance Criteria
A. Emergency Core Cooling Systems shall be designed such that its calculated
cooling performance following postulated loss of coolant accidents conforms
to the criteria of 1OCFW 50.46
1. Peak Cladding Temperature: The calculated maximum fuel element
cladding temperature shall not exceed 2200°F.
2. Maximum cladding oxidation: The calculated total oxidation of the
cladding shail no where exceed 0.17 times the total cladding thickness
before oxidation.
3. Maximum Hydrogen Generation: The calculated total amount of
hydrogen generated from the chemical reaction of the cladding with
water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that
would be generated if all of the metals in the cladding cylinders
surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum
volume, were to react.
4. Coolable Geometry: Calculated changes in core geomet9 shall be such
that the core remains amenable to cooling.
5. Long Term Cooling: After any calculated successful initial operation of
the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an
acceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended
period of time required by the long lived radioactivity remaining in the
core.
Z .4 Objectives
OP-CM-ECCS-ISE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 37
Page 5 of 26
DUKE-.POWER
.- .....
CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING . ...
___-.
5 BARRIERS ANNULUS
VENTILATION
'INTERED PRESSURE
FUEL
BOUNDARY
PELLET
1
c3
ZR #
CLAD
NC FLOW I
CONTAINWNT REACTOR
VESSEL BUILDING
The boundaries are the permanent structures which surround the core/fuel.
E. Acceptance criteria for ECCS per IOCFR 50.46
1. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature shall not
exceed 22oooF.
2. The calculated total oxidation ofthe cladding shall nowhere exceed .67
times the total cladding thickness before oxidation.
3. The calculated total amount of l-i2 generated shall not exceed .01 times
the amount that would be generated if all the cladding were to react.
4. Calculated changes in core geometry shall be such that the core remains
amenable to cooling.
5. The mlculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptable
low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of
time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.
2. PRESENTATION
2.1 Core Cooling Maintenance
A. Fuel Temperature Limits (Obj. #lo)
1. With inadequate flow for core cooling, core temperatures will rise. Once
steam is contacting the clad the heat transfer coefficient diminishes
greatly which requires a much higher clad temperature and therefore
centerline fuel temperature will increase.
OP-CN-TA-AM FOR TRAlNING PURPOSES ONbY REV. 16
Page 7 of 39
DUKE PO WR CATAWBA OPERATMlNS TRAINMG
SUMMARY QF CLAD AND FUEL TEMPERATURES
I l.l...__.l---...-
n Z ~ R C - l W . l E HSELF SUSTAINING 7 . a .. . .. .......-. .
Ma)
AVERAGE CbAO TEMP 590-LE4
500
I
2. During normal operation of a PWR core, the reactor coolant temperature
reaches a maximum of about 620aF,and the maximum averaqe fuel
centerline temperature around 3250°F. These values are well below any
level where significant material damage occurs. The normal average fuel
temperature is about 2300°F.
3. On core uncovery the heat transfer out of the fuel rods is dominated by
the drastic lowering of the heat transfer coefficient at the outer cladding
surface which destroys the capability of the fuel element to dissipate the
decay heat of the core at a rate fast enough to avdd temperatures high
enough to damage the fuel element materials. As the temperature
excursion continues to clad temperatures above $831OF, additional heat
can be generated within the system by metal (primarily zirconiumlsteam
exothermic chemical) reactions.
At elevated temperature during a LBCA that involves core uncovering,
zirconium may react with steam to form zirconium oxide and hydrogen by
the following chemical reaction
Zr + 2H20 -+ZrO2 f 2H2 f Heat
a) Although zircaloy oxidizes much more rapidly than stainless steel at
temperatures below about 1000°C (183I0F),the rate of stainless
steel oxidation per unit weight at about 1250°C (2281OF) is equal lo
that of zirconium.
BP-CN-TA-AM FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 76
Page 8 of 39
DUKE POWER
....-....--.........
CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
.......,.._,..,..n,-__l_______________ -
b) As the zirconium oxide layer on the cladding grows, the oxygen
generated at the zirconium oxide surface must diffuse through an
increasingly resistant diffusion barrier to get to the base metal. In this
way, the zirconium oxide layer itself a u l d serve to shield the
unoxidized metal from further oxidation.
4. The melting point of uranium dioxide is approximately 51OO0F, for
zirconium oxide 489I0F, and for ZirGalOy 3316°F. The melting point of
zircaloy is also variable as a function of the amount of oxygen dissolved
in the metal. (Increasing from 3316°F for 0% dissolved oxygen to 3586°F
for about 20 % dissolved oxygen.) The equilibrium ternary system
uranium-zirconium-oxygen,however, has combinations of these
elements that form a liquid phase at temperatures as low as 2731O F .
This is known as the uraniurnlmirconium eutectic.
a) No liquid phase exists at 10QO0C(1831°F). At 2000°C (3630°F),
eutectic liquid can form given an equilibrium contact condition
between uranium dioxide and any zircaloy metal, irrespective of the
level of dissolved oxygen in the metal. No liquid can form, however,
between U02 and oxidized zircaloy or ZQ.
b) The cladding is likely to burst due to internal pressure effects before it
reaches eutectic formation temperature (51500"C, 2731OF). This
would allow steam into the fuellcladding gap, oxidizing the interior
cladding surface and thus effectively shielding the UO2 from the
Zircaloy metal and preventing eutectic liquid formation.
Poor contact between the fue! pellet and inside cladding surface
would inhibit eutectic formation below the melting point ofthe
cladding. Once the cladding becomes melted, the potential for
eutectic formation would increase.
A fast temperature ramp would increase the probability for eutectic
formation by raising the temperature faster than oxygen can diffuse
into the zircaloy.
El. Methods of Core Cooling
1. Normal operation (Obj. #1,2, & 11)
a) Forced convection cooling is provided by the NC pumps with the heat
sink provided by the steam generators. (preferred method of cooling)
1) The main feedwater pumps normally provide water to the SlG's
above ,700 psig. Below this pressure, the condensate booster
pumps provide the deed requirements.
2) The CA pumps will auto start to provide feed if the CF pumps are
unavailable or trip.
OP-CN-?&AM FOR TRAlNl" PURPOSES ONLY REV. 16
Page 9 of 39
Bank Question: 736.f Answer: D
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is in the process of conducting a plant start~ip.
Power mnge channels indicate thc foilowing:
- PRN4I=8%
PRN42=8%
- PRN43=10%
- PRN44=8%
Which ofthe following conditions would result in an autetnatic reactor trip?
B. One turbine impulse pressure channel fails high.
C. NCS controlling pressurizer level channel fails Low.
D. NCS controlling pressurizer pressure channel fails high.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: all loop flow trips are automatically blocked below P-7
Plausible: if the candidate does not recall that the NCP trip is
blocked by P-7
3, Incorrect: P-7 would be enabled, but this does not cause a trip
Plausible: if the candidate is confused over the effect of turbine
impulse on main generator trip
C. Incorrect: Pressurizer High Level, Pressurizer Low Pressure,
blocked by P-7
Plausible: an old horse is that if Pzr level fails low, eventually the
reactor will trip on high Pzr level.
D. Correct: As pressure decreases to 1845 psig, SI is actuated. The SI
signal generates a Reactor Trip Signal
Level: RO&SRO
KA: S Y S 010 K3.03 (4.0/4.2)
Lesson Plan Objective: ISE Obj: 4
Source: Mod Catawba NRC 2000
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-ECCS-ISE page 14
DUKE POWER CA TAWBA OPERA)TONS TRAlNlNG
Objective
materials, determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech Specs
OP-CN-ECCS-ISE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 37
Page 3 of 26
DUKE POWER
P -- CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNjNG
-
D. The Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinet is a single bay cabinet containing relays
and electronic components. This cabinet was added due to changes and
modifications (not enough room in the output bay).
1. The purpose of the Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinet is to provide input for
various process and protection interlocks.
2. Contains extra relays for actuation of interlocks for Process Control and
SSPS. (Le. VCT LO LEVEL interlock swap to FWST, P-12 interlock,
orifice isolation auto close at 17% pressurizer level.)
2.4 ESF Signals (OBJ #4 & 5)
Safety Injection
P4 Cout Hi press Pzr lo press
-r
Sequencer Sump Swap
vsiver
A. Safety injection (Ss)
1. Three signals actuate S.,
a) Manual
1) One button for Train A and One button for Train B under
Plexiglas on MC11.
2) Each button ONLY ACTUATES its respective train. (See
drawing abQve)
OP-CN-ECCS-ISE FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 37
Page 14 of 26
Bank Questbra: 736 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is in the process of conducting a plant startup. Given the following
events and conditions:
Power range channels indicate the following:
- PRN41=8%
PRN42=8%
PRN43=10%
- PRN44=8%
Which of the following conditions would result in an Automatic Reactor
Tlipp?
B. Pressurizer level increases to 94%.
e. RCS pressure decreases to 1840 psig.
D. One turbine impulse pressure channel fails high.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: all Ioop flow trips are automatically blocked below P-7
Plausible: if the candidate does not recall that the NCP trip is
blocked by P-7
B. Incorrect: Pressurizer High Level, Pressurizer Low Pressure,
blocked by P-7
Plausible:
C. Correct: As pressure decreases to 1845 psig, SI is actuated. Thc SI
signal generates a Reactor Trip Signal
D. Incorrect P-4 would be enabled, but this does not cause a trip
Plausible: if the candidate is confused over the effect of turbine
impulse on main generator trip
Levei: RO&SRO
KA: SYS OlOK1.02(3.9/4.1)
Lesson Plan Objective: ISE SEQ 4
Source: New
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1 OP-CN-ECCS-BE page 14
~
Bank Quesfion: 757 Answer: B
1W S ) Units 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with a normal service water line-up
and RN pump 2A running. Given the following conditions and indications:
RN pumps lA, 1B and 2B start.
1 and 2 RN-48B (RhSUPPLYX-OVER ISQL) CIOSC
1 and 2 RN-47A (WSUPPLYX-OVER ZSOL) remain open
- RN suction and discharge valves Swap to the SNSWP.
Which one of the following conditions correctly describes the cause ofthis
condition?
A. The Lake Wylie dam failed.
B. X N pump intake pit A screens are clogged.
C. RN pump intake pit level indicator (RXZNTAKEPITLVL AY
failed low.
D. There was a spurious containment phase By actuation on Unit 1.
- -
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: low lake level would cause a low level in both RN pump pits A
and B, which would close valvesl/2W-47A
Plausible: Partially correct - all other actuations would occur
B. Correct
C. Incorreet: requires 2 of 3 level inshuments to fail to get the actions.
Plausible: if the candidate does not know the coincidence logic.
D. Incorrect: would not cause RN suction valves to swap to the SNSWP -
woufd cause llRN-47A to close and would not cause 2RN-48B to close
Plausible: partially correct - would cause all other conditions
Level: RO&SRO
KA: APE 062 AA1.02 ( 3 2 3 . 3 )
Lesson Plan Objective: PSS-RVObj: 12
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-PSS-RNpages 14, 15,32-33
2. AP-29 End 14 page I IO
- DUKE POWER -. ....................... -.CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
Objective
Explain the action which takes place on:
ABlackout
An Emergency Low Pit Level
A Safety Injection signal
- An Sp signal
- ASP~OIOC~I
Describe the reason for isolating the Auxiliary Building non-
essential header supply valve on a blackout signal.
Draw a block diagram of the RN System per the ISS REQUIRED
training drawing.
Explain the purpose of the W system and basic operation of the
system.
Purpose
Normal Alignment
Flow Path
Control switch alignments & parameters required for auto swap.
Parameters required for W operable status.
Explain the purpose of the VZ system and basic operation of the
system.
Purpose
Normal Alignment
Describe how temperature is controlled.
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply limits and precautions
associated with related station procedures.
OP-CN-PSS-RN KJR TWINING PURPOSES ONLY R W ~40
Page 4 of 50
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS
...
.... -=.....-..... -- TRAINING ..
c) Flow
1) RN Strainer Outlet Flow
(a) This instrumentation provides flow indication in the
Control Room and on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.
It also provides high and low flow alarms and a signal to the RN
minimum flow selector. High flow 24,000 gpm, Low flow 8,600
gpm.
2 ) RN Pump Cooling Flow
Locai indication is provided for the following process flows:
(a) RN Pump Motor Cooler Outlet Flow
(b) RN Pump Motor Upper Bearing Oil Cooler Outlet Flow
d) bevel
1) Lake Wylie Water Level provides Control Room indication of the
level of Lake Wylie. No alarms are provided.
2 ) Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Level provides Control
Room indication of the level of the SNSWP. An annunciator and
computer alarm is initiated at low level (572 ft) and an
annunciator alarm is initiated at low-low level (571.5 ft). bevel
marks visible from shore are painted on the SNSWP
instrumentation pier.
3) RN Pumphouse Screen Relative Level Differential provides
Control Room indication of the relative differential levels across
the RN Pumphouse screens. An alarm is provided on high (15"
water column) differential level to alert personnel of partially
blocked screen.
4) RN Pump Intake Pit A and Pit B Levels
There are three (3) level instruments per pumphouse, one Unit 1
designated is powered from Unit 1, one Unit 2 designated is
powered from Unit 2, and one Shared is powered from Unit
1.Alarms are provided on low (559) and emergency low (557.5)
levels. In addition, the following actions are automatically
initiated upon two out of three emergency low level in either RN
Pumphouse pit: (Obj. #la)
(a) Pit A Pit B Emergency Low Level will start RN Pumps
la, 1B, 2,428.
(b) Pit A Emergency bow Level will close:
(1) 1 and 2 RN48B
(c) Pit B Emergency Low Level will close:
(1 ) 'l and 2 RN47A
OP-CN-PSS-RN FOR TRAENING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 40
Page 14 of 50
- DUKE BOWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNING
-
(6) Pit A Q3 Pit B Emergency Low Level will swap to the
SNSWP
(I) Open valves IRN3A, IRN4B, fRN58B, 2RN63A 1
8 2 RNW6AA,1 & 2 RN848B.
(2) Close valves IRNIA, 1RN2B, IRNtjA, 1RN6B,
ZRN53B, IRNMA, 1RN57A, fKN843B, 1 8 2
RN847A, I& 2RN8498.
(3) There is a 2 minute time delay before the valves
can be swapped back to their normal position.
4. FIN Pumphouse Miscellaneous
a) Fire hose racks in the RN Pumphouse are supplied from the general
use headers.
1) The general use header is normally isolated by locked ciosed
manual isolations below the ground level (Le. must be accessed
by ladder); therefore the pumphouse is provided with a tire
hydrant, outside, near the pumphouse.
b) Temperatures inside the KN Pumphouse will be maintained by the
VZ System, so freeze protection is not necessary.
c) VZ System (RN pumphouse ventilation System) (Obj. #6)
1) Purpose (Obj. #I 6)
(a) The purpose of the VZ system is to provide normal and
emergency Ventilation of the Nuclear Service Water Pump
compartments during all operating conditions.
2 ) General Description
(a) The VZ System consists of two, 100% capacity safety
related, fans for each pump compartment. One fan in
each compartment is designated Unit 1 and the other Unit
2. Fans l A and 2 8 will service RN pumps I A and 2 8
while fans IB and 28 will serve RN pumps IB and 2B.
(b) In addition to the above safety Ban, one non-safety fan is
provided to ventilate the pumphouse area below the
operating level when local maintenance is performed.
(c) The VZ fans are powered from the motor control centers
in the RN pumphouse.
(d) Local thermostaticaBly controlled heaters (non-safety
related) are provided to maintain ambient temperatures
during winter months in the pump compartments.
OP-CN-PSS-RN FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 40
Page 15 of 50
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
(a) OPEN: 2RN287A (KC 2A Hx Inlet Isol)
e) 2ASP B to LOCAL
1) CLOSE: 2RN849B ( D E 2B Hx Ret To Lake)
2) OPEN: 2RN69B (2B RN Header Supply Isol), 8488 (BIG 2B Hx
Rtn To SNSWP), 2RN351 (KC 28 Hx Outlet Throttle)
3) If a unit 2 "B"train KC pump is running then
(a) OPEN: 2RN347B (KC 2B Hx Inlet Isol)
E. Action on emergency low pit level (dogged intake or loss of lake Wylie due to
a seismic event) (Obj. #la)
a. Pit A m Pit B actuates Pit A AND Pit B Emeraencv bow Level
2. Pit A m Pit B Emergency Low bevel starts all 4 RN Pumps
a) Pumpstart
1) opens its discharge valve
2) opens its motor cooler inlet
3. Pit A 08 Pit B Emergency Low Level swap RN suction and discharge to
SNSWP
a) CLOSE: 1RNIA (RN P/H Pit A Ssol From Lake), 2B (RN P/H Pit A
lsol From Lake), 5A (RN P/H Pit 3 lsol From Lake), 6B (RN PIH Pit B
lsol From Lake), 57A (Station RN Disch To RL System), 843B
(Station RN Disch To RL System).
b) OPEN: 1RN3A (RN P/# Pit A lsol From SNSWP), 4B (RN P/H Pit B
is01 From SNSWP), 63A (RN Header A Return To SNSWP), 58B
(RN Header B Return To SNSWP).
4. Swap diesel discharge to SNSWP
a) CLOSE: 1RN847A, 1RN849B, 2WN847A,2RN8498
b) OPEN: 1RN846A, 1RN848B, 2RN846At 2RN848B
5. Pit A Pit B Emergency tow Level split N B train discharges
a) CLOSE: IRN53B (B Train Disch Crossover Isol), 1RN54A (A Train
Disch Crossover Isol)
6. Pit A Emergency Low Level closes supply header crossover valves.
a) CLOSE 1 and 2 RN48B (RN Supply X-Over Isol)
7. Pit B Emergency Low Level closes supply header crossover valves.
a) CLOSE Iand 2 RN47A (RN Supply X-Over Isol)
OP-GN-PSS-RN FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 40
Page 32 of 50
DUKE. PO MER......
--.. ? ....... CATAWBA .OPERATIONS
......
....... . --_-
7Rb\lNING
8. There is a two minute time delay before the operator may realign the
suction valves to the lake. This allows system restoration to normal if the
signal was erroneous. Two minutes is sufficient time for all components
to respond and allows the operator to verify the error prior to attempting
to return to the norma! lineup.
F. Actions on Safety Injection 3," (Obj. #12)
1. ANY unit S, will:
a) Start all RN pumps
I) Pumpstart
(a) opens its discharge
(b) opens its motor cooler inlet
b) Close lube injection strainer crossover valves
1) CLOSE: ZRN36A AND IRN37B
2. LOCA unit specific action on S,:
a) Full KC Hx Row on LOCA unit
1) Throttle valve fully opens
(a) Unit 1 S, open: 1RN291 (KC Hx 1A Outlet Throttle), 351
(KC Hx 1B Outlet Throttle)
(b) Unit 2 S, open: 2RN291 (KC Hx 2 8 Outiet Throttle), 351
(KC Hx 28 Outlet Throttle)
b) Isolate LQCA unit Aux Bldg vent header
I) Unit 1 S, CLOSE: 1RN839A (Unit 1 AB Fuel Hdkg Rad Area
~
Sup Hdr), 841B (Unit 1 AB Fuel Hdlg Rad Area Ret tidr)
2) Unit 2 S, - CLOSE: 2RN839A (Unit 2 AB Fuel Hdlg Rad Area
Sup Hdr), 841B (Unit 2 AB Fuel Hdlg Rad Area Ret Hdr)
3. If control has been switched to the ASP'S, h e only equipment
automatically positioned on an S, (which will occur during NC cooldown)
will be the lube injection strainer crossover valves (I RN36A, 37B), and
the Aux Bldg vent header (1 and 2 RN839A, 8418)
G. Actions on containment high-high pressure "S," (Obj. #12)
1. Assure discharge flow path
a) Any S,-OPEN 1RN63A (RN Header A Return To SNSWP), 588
(RN Header B Return To SNSWP)
2. Split LQCA unit essential header supplies
-
a) Unit 1 S, Close IRN47A (RN Supply X-Over isol), 48B (RN Supply
X-Over Isol)
OP-CN-PSS-RN FOR TRAINlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 40
Page 33 of 50
LOSS OF VITAL OR AUX CONTROL POWER
AP/2/Al5500/29
17. NV System:
- The foilowing valves fail closed if selected to "AUTO":
- 2NV-IEIA (B/A Blender Otlt To VCT)
- e 2NV-186A (BIA Blender Otit To VCT Otlt)
- e 2NV-2424 (RMWST To BIA Blender Ctrl)
- 2NV-238A (BIA To Bkndr Ctrl VLv).
- BAT Pumps 2A and 28 will not operate if in "AUTO"
- Reactor Makeup Pumps 2A and 28 will not operate
e Train A SMM Boron Dilution Interlock will be disabled with switch in "Enable"
- "2NV-37A Vlv Position" receiver gauge fails lo.
48. RN System:
- RN Pit A Emergency Low bevel swap to SNSWP logic is reduced from 2/3 to 1/2
- 2RNP74QQ(RN Intake PIP Level A) fails low.
19. SM System:
2SMP5210 (Turb Imp Press)
-* Chart Recorder 2SMcR5080 (SG 2A Stm Press, S/G 2A Lvl (%), S/G 28 Press) is
deenergized.
2Q. SV System:
- 2SV-13 (SIG 2B PORV Manual Ctrl) fails closed if in manual. Unaffected if in AUTO
- 0 2SV-19 (SIG 2A PQRV Manual Ctrl) fails closed if in manual. Unaffected if in AUTO.
21. VASystem:
- Tornado isolation Train A will not stop Aux Bldg Filter Exh Fan 2A.
Bank Question: 769.I Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is recovering from a loss of secondary coolant accident. Safety
injection initiated properly. A total loss of feedwater has caused the
operators to implement FR-H. 1, (Loss of Secondaty Heat Sink). Given the
following plant conditions:
NCS Pressure 2335psig
NCS Temperature 565°F
S/G 1A, lB, 1C Pressure 118Opsig
S/G lA, lB, 1C Level (WR) 12%
S/G 1D Pressure lOOpsig
S/G ID Level (WR) 35%
VI system pressure lOpsig
Containment pressure 3.4psig
Which one of the following actions is initially required to assure the
maintenance of adequate core cooling?
A. Depressurize S/G lA, lB, and 1C to allow feeding the S/G using
the condensate system.
B. Reset the CAPT and align it to feed S/Gs lA, 1B and 1C.
C. Open 1NC32B (PZR PORVJ and 1NC34A (?ZR PORVJ using
nitrogen pressure.
D. Reset safety injection and containment phase A isolation
signals to re-establish instrument air pressure to open 1NC32B
and 1NC34A.
-
Distracter Analysis: The FR-II.1 values for dry S/G level is < 12% (ACC <
21%). Because containment pressure is 3.4 psig, ACC VdUeS are in
effect.
A. Incorrect: Cant feed dry S/Gs
Plausible: ifthe candidate does not recognize dry S/G criteria met,
this is one FR-Z. 1 recovery method.
B. Incorrect: Cant feed dry S/Gs
Plausible: if the candidate does not recognize dry S/G criteria met,
this is one FR-Z. 1 recovery method.
C. Correct:
D. Incorrect: Must reset S, to reopen VI valves.
Plausible: if the candidate thinks that VI is a phase A isolated
system.
Que$-769.I.doc
Level: RO&SRO
KA: WE05 G2.1.32 (3.4i3.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: FRH Obj: 2
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
I. OP-CN-EF-FRH page 6
2. FR-H. 1 background document step 17, page 18
DUKE POWER CATAWi3.4 OPERATlONS TRAINING
OBJECTIVES
I
Objective S
S
State the purpose of Function Restoration procedures
-
EP/1/Af5000/FR-H Series Heat Sink
State the Bases for all NOTES and CAUTIONS in Function
Restoration procedures EP/I/N500O/FR-H Series - Heal Sink
Explain the Bases for the Major Actions of Function Restoration
procedures: EWI/Af5000/FR-H Series - Heat Sink
Explain the Bases for all steps in each of Function Restoration
procedures EP/l/N500O/FR-H Series Heat Sink
~
Given a set of specific plant conditions and required procedures,
I
apply the rules of usage and outstanding PPRBs to identify the
correct procedure flowpath and necessary actions
OP-CM-EP-FRH FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 01
Page 3 of I O
-. -POWER
.DUKE ........~. ............
............--,-_ CATAWBA
.......-
........-.
OPERATIONS
.....
..... -
TRAiNiNG
D. Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities
I. This event assumes that a reactor trip has occurred and the SG PORVs
and steam dump systems fail to respond, and SG safeties lift to limit the
2. Operation on the safeties does not allow operator control of $6 pressure,
and the steam release path of the safeties is unisolable.
E. Steam Generator Low Level
1. A SG low level condition is expected following a reactor trip from power;
however, with the actuation of auxiliary feedwater SG level should be
gradually restored under normal conditions.
2. If SG $eve1is not restored, then the cause could be due to an auxiliary
feedwater system problem or the SG may be faulted.
2.2 Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EP/FR-#I.I)
A. Cover the purpose of FR-H.l as stated on the cover of the H.1 procedure.
(OBJ. # I )
B. Red Path
1. NR Level in all S1G less than 11% (29% ACC) and
2. Total feedwater flow to intact S/Gs less than 450 gpm.
C. Major action step summary JQBJ. #3)
1. AttemDt Restoration of Feed Flow to Steam Generators: The operator
attempts to restore or establish auxiliary feedwater flow, main feedwater
flow, and condensate flow while checking symptoms for a loss of
secondary heat sink. Auxiliary feedwater flow restoration is attempted
first and, if unsuccessful, NC pumps are tripped to extend the available
time to establish feed flew from the main feedwater and condensate
systems.
2. Initiation of NC Bleed and Feed Heat Removal: If symptoms for loss of
secondary heat sink are reached, NCS bleed and feed heat removal is
initiated through SI actuation (feed path) and opening the Pzr PORVs
(bleed path). Bleed and feed heat removal is maintained until the
secondary heat sink is reestablished and verified.
3. Restore and Verifv Secondatv Heat Sink: After NCS bleed and feed heal
removal is established, the operator continues attempts to restore narrow
range level in at least one SG. M e r level is established, the
effectiveness of the secondary heat sink is verified by decreasing NC
temperatures.
OP-CN-EP-FRH H I R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. Of
Page 6 of 10
-
STEP - 1 7 : YeriTy bleed and feed should bo i n - t i a t e d as fo'llows:
?IJRPOSC :
To check i f t h e secondary heat sink c o n d i t i o m require i n i t i a t i a n o f bleed and
feed.
APPLICABLE ERG BASIS:
The operator should continue attempts t o e s t a b i i s h f l o w t o t h e steam
generators u n t i l 3 S / G WR l e v e l s are l e s s than 12% (21% ACC: i s exceeded which
i n d i c a t e s t h e need f o r i n i t i a t i o n of bleed and feed. I f t h e operator gets t o
Step 17. i n i t i a l attempts t o e s t a b l i s h CA f l o w . ma:n feedwater f l o w o r
condensate f l o w have been unsuccessful. Step 17 checks 3 S / G WR l e v e i s
greater than 12% (21% ACG) t o determine i f the secondary heat s i n k i s s t i i . 1
e f f e c t i v e . I f i t i s not e f f e c t i v e . the cperator coctinues t o Step 18 t o
e s t a b l i s h NC System bleed and feed heat removal. I f t h e seccndary heat
removal i s s t i l l e f f e c t i v e . t h e operator returns t o Step 1 t o contlnue
attempts t o r e s t o r e feed f l o w t o the S / G s . I f a t any t i m e t h e bleed and feed
c r i t w ; o n i s exceeded. bleed and feed should be immediately i n i t i a t e d .
PLANT SPECIFIC INFORYATION:
KNOln'LEDGUAB I L ITY :
Two a d d i t i o n a l purposes are served by t h i s step. I F feed a n d b l e e d
has alrezdy k e n s u c c e s f u l l y i n i t i a t e d . t h e crew i s t r a n s i t i o n e d t o
t h e appropriate procedure sections t c contihue attempts t o r e s t o r e
secondary c o o l i n g . I f feed and bleed has been previously attempted
and f a i l e d , then t k e step assumes more than e i g h t minutes have passed
since event i n i t i a t i o n . and f u r t h e r atteapts t o i n i t i a t e bleed and
feed are b y p a e d .
Page 18 o f 70 Revision 02/06/2092
Bank Question: 793.1 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with all rods out.
An operator notices that one core exit thermocouple for quadrant I1 on the
plasma display indicates >1300°F.
Which of the following correctly describes a reason for this thermocouple to
be much higher than the other thermocouples?
A. The thermocouple measuring junction has shorted.
B. The thermocouple measuring junction has an open circuit.
C, The thermocouple reference junction temperature has increased.
D. The thermocouple reference junction temperature has decreased.
Distracter Analysis: The voltage across a thermocouplejunction increases
as the temperame of that junction increases. A shorted measuring
junction will cause the temperature to fail high.
A. Correct: a shorted thennocouple causes the rcmoval of the
difference in EMF, the TC will read high.
E, Incorrect: an open measuring junction causes the temperature
indication to fail LOW not high.
Plausible: if candidate believes that like an RTD and open causes a
high reading
C. Incorrect: the temperature measured is based on the difference on
voltage between the reference junction (at 165 O F ) and the TIC. If the
reference junction is heated above 1G5 "F, then the voltage difference
will decrease and the temperature signal will decrease.
Plausible: if the candidate reverses the effects
D. Incorrect: the temperature measured is based on the difference on
voltage between the reference junction (at 165 O F ) and the TIC. If the
reference junction is cooled below 165 O F , then thc voltage difference
will increase and the temperature signal will increase. However, the
increase of 2600 O F is not possible because thc reference junction
temperature cannot be cooled enough.
Plausible: the effect of a decrease in reference junction temperature
will be to make the measured temperature increase.
Level: RO&SRQ
KA: SYS 014 K6.01(2.7I3.0)
Lesson Plan Objective: IC; Obj: 2
Source: Mod Catawba NRC 2000
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-SS-IG page 10
2. OP-CN-PS-CCM page 15
DUKE
..-_.._.-POWER .........
......_......_ CATAWBA OPERATlONS
.
TRAlNlNG
.&_ e
LPRO TRAINING OBJECTIVES
1. Describe the difference between setpoint and control point.
-B- 2. Describe how the thermocouple fails (high or low) with an open circuit,
with a short circuit.
3. Describe how the RTD fails (high or IQW)with an open circuit, with a short
circuit.
4. State how elastic deformation pressure instruments operate.
5. State the principle of operation of flow detectors.
6. Using the Pressurizer as an example, state indication failures (high or low)
for:
6.1 Break in the reference leg.
6.2 High containment temperature.
6.3 Break in the impulse leg.
6.4 Rupture of the diaphragm.
6.5 An open equalization line.
7. List the ESF signals and their setpoints.
8. Recognize the logic gate symbols and correctly interpret a iogic diagram.
OP-CN-SS-IC; FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 05
Page 3 of 22
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
I
3. Temp. Instrumentation and Control
1. The simplest temp. detector used is the thermocouple.
a) Used for a wide range of temperature detection where-
accuracy is not rewired.
b) Consists of a pair of dissimilar metal wires.
1) Jined at the ends forming 2 Junctions, Measuring and
Reference.
2) Heating the Measuring Junction produces a voltage greater than
the voltage across the Reference Junction.
3) You can read the difference between the 2 voltages on a
Voltmeter.
6) Thermocouple failures: (LPRQ/LPSQ #2/PTRQ #I )
1) Open - fails low
2) Short fails high
~
2. Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTD's)
a) Operate OR the principie that the resistance of certain metals
changes as the temp. changes - (temp. increases => resistance
increases)
b) RTD's act as electrical Transducers, converting temp. changes to
velagesignals by measuring resistance.
c) The metals most suitable for RTD's are platinum, copper and nickel.
1) Platinum is the best and most often used.
2) The metal wire is formed and shaped around an insulating
material.
d) RTD's are hiahly accurate, give fast response and are small in size.
e) They can be used in a well (wide range in NCS). A well is a piping
penetration with an insert to contain the RTB (slower response)
9 They can be used in a manifold type arrangement (narrow range in
NCS). A manifold arrangement is a bypass with the RTD inserted
directly into the fluid (Faster response)
g) RBB Instrument Failures (LPRQ/LPSQ #3/PTRQ #2)
1 If the RTD opens it will fail high because of no current flow,
therefore infinite resistance (Most common). This would give a
failed high temp. indication.
2) If the RTD shorts it will fail low because of zero resisance. This
would give failed iow temp. indication.
h) Bridge Circuit
OP-CN-SS-I6 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV.05
Page 10 of 22
DUKE PO WR CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAlNING
6. Thermocouple Core Map Bisplav Pase - An outline of the core with a
train-oriented view of the incore T/C layout. The values are located on
the map as they appear in the core.
TIC CORE MAP I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I1 13 14 15
I I
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2 0 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 5
7. Thermocouple Quadrant DisDlav Pase - Divided into four (4) sections,
one for each quadrant. The appropriate thesrnocouples are shown by
their location and the temp is displayed in degrees F.
QP-CN-PS-CCM FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. ?I
Page f 5 of 20
Bank Questdon: 793 Answer: W
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with all rods out.
An operator notices that one core exit thermocouple for quadrant I1 on the
plasma display indicates 2200°F.
Which of the following correctly describes a reason for this thermocouple to
be much higher than the other thermocouples?
A. The thermocouple reference junction temperature has increased.
B. The thermocouple reference junction temperature has decreased.
C. The thermocouple measuring junction has an open ckeuit.
D. The thermocouple measuring junction has shorted.
-____
Distraeter Analysis: The voltage across a thermocouple junction increases
as the temperature of that junction increases. A shorted measuring
junction will cause the temperature to fail high.
A. Incorrect: the temperature measured is based on the difference on
voltage between the reference junction (at 165 O F ) and the TIC. If the
referencejunction is heated above 165 O F , then the voltage difference
will decrease and the temperature s i p d will decrease.
Plausible: if the candidate reverses the effects
B. Incorrect: the temperature measured is based on the difference on
voltage between the reference junction (at 165 O F ) and the T/C. If the
reference junction is cooled below 165 O F , then the voltage difference
will increase and the temperature signal will increase. However, the
increase of 1600 O F is not possible because the reference junction
temperature cannot be cooled enough.
Plausible: the effect of a decrease in reference junction tempmtWC
will be to make the measured temperature increase.
C. Incorrect: an open measuring junction causes the temperature
indication to fail LOW not high.
Plausible: if candidate believes that like an RTD and open causes a
high reading
D. Correct: a shorted thermocouple causes the removal of the
difference in EMF, the TC will read high.
Level: RQ&SRQ
KA: 017 A2.01 (3.U3.5)
Lesson Pian Objective: IG SEQ 2
Source: New
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-SS-IG page 10
2. OP-CN-TA-AM page 26
3. OP-CN-PS-CCM page 15
Bank Question: 796 Answer: G
I Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. Given the following events and
conditions:
0 l-AEh&FfiO, (PRTKI TEMP)
e 1 AD-6 F/11 ( P R T H I P R E S a m - - _ 0 ~ -.
e Lower confahment temperature = 124 O F '2
0 The NC system is at normal operating temperature
e Letdown is in service
Which one of the following statements correctly describes a condition that
could cause these alams?
A. The PRT has heated up due to ambient containment
temperature.
B. 1 ND-3 or 1ND-38,(NO SUCTIONRELIEF VALVES) have lifted.
C. 1 NV-15B (LETDN CONTISOL) has spuriously closed.
D. The reactor vessel inner O-ring has leaked.
--
Distraeter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: Containment temperature is less than PRT temperature.
Plausible: Heat up from containment ambient conditions can cause
this to occur if containment temperature is high enough.
B. Incorrect: the ND system is too low in temperature and isolated Erom
the NC system, to cause this to occur even if the ND suction relief
were to lift.
Plausible: the ND suction relief line goes to the PRT.
C. Correct: if 1NV-ISB closes. the letdown relief valve 1NV-14will
lift and relieve to the PRT.
D. Incorrect: the reactor vessel inner O-ring leaks to the NCDT.
Plausible: if the candidate thinks that this leaks to the PRT
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 007 G2.4.4 (4.W4.3)
Lesson Plan Objective: NC Obj: 3
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
I. OP-CN-PS-NC pages 12*21-22,25-26,31
2. OP-CN-PS-NV pages 11-13
3. QP/liB/6100/010G FilO, Fill
Ques-796.doc
..._ DUKE
. POWER.. .
.
.a --CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING __.-
..
Objective
I
I Explain the purpose of the NC system.
PRT, NV, NI,and ND.
- Explain how normal system parameters are maintained in the NC System.
Describe the purpose and operation of the Pzr.
identify the purpose of the Pzr relief valves and safety valves.
- Identify the power supply to the Pzr heaters.
Identify the various internal components on a drawing of the reactor vessel.
m Explain the purpose of the internal components.
Explain the methods of support (radial and axial) of reactor vessel internals.
Identify the vessel head penetrations and their purpose.
Identify the vessel bottom penetrations and their purpose.
or cause of the flow.
0 Explain the appropriate pressure drop across the core.
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAINfNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 4 of 37
DUKE POWER CA TAWBA OPEHATiONS TRAINING
......- c_____ . ....
f) Primary Boundaries
1) leading edge of thimble is sealed.
2) Thimbles are sealed to conduits with mechanical seals at the
seal table.
E. Susveillance specimen Baskets
1. Six core locations.
2. Attached to the four neutron shield pads at the core axial centerline.
F. 0-Ring Leak Detection
1. Two Leakoff Line Connections with isolation valve in each line
a) One between the O-rings (Inner) with isolation valve normally open.
b) One after both O-rings (Outer) with isolation valve normally closed.
1) Inner and outer leakoff isolation valves are manual valves on
Unit 1 and remotely operated valves (from control room) on Unit
2.
c) Pie into common line to NCDT
1) Common line contains RTD and isolation valve operated from
control room
2. If inner o-ring fails, leakage will flow through inner leakoff Bine past RTD
into NCBT. The RTD wlll initiate annunciator in control room to alert
operators of o-ring failure.
6. Flow Path (Obj. #7)
1. Core barrel separates inlet and outlet core water.
a) Flow comes into the vessel.
b) Flows down the annulus formed by reactor vessel and core barrel.
c) Flows up thru core.
d) flows out thru the TH outlet nozzle.
2. Core Bypass Flow (7.5% of total flow) (Obj. #7)
a) Flow up thru columns undesirable.
b) Head cooling flow (4%) maintains flow down thru columns.
3. Upper Internal Flowpaths
a) Head cooling bypass flow (4%)
1) Head Cooling Nozzles.
2) Nozzles penetrate upper support structure flange and core
barrel.
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAiNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 12 of 39
DUKE POWER...............................
...............................................
.............
CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
18. Code Safeties
a) Provide NC Integrity protection (Obj. #3)
b) 3 totally enclosed pop type valves (NC-1,2, 3)
c) Relieve at 2485 psig (Obj. #3)
d) RTB to indicate valve leakage
I ) 1 per valve
2) Temperature indicated on MCB
3) Alarm in control room on high temperature
e) Acoustic Monitoring System to indirectly detect safety valve position
1) 2 accelerometers on each safety valve discharge Bine detect
acoustical vibrations mused by steam flowing through the valve
discharge piping.
(a) Both sensors are wired but only one is selected for
processing with the other utilized as a spare
2) Signal from accelerometer is converted to a voltage which is
processed in a cabinet located in the 560 Electrical Penetration
Room to provide an output that represents relative valve position
and initiate signals to control room.
(a) Output is displayed on local panel as 10 LEDs
corresponding to relative valve position.
(b) Preset alarm setpoint causes annunciator on MC14 and
illuminates a Group 2 monitor light panel status light.
(c) A Flow/No Flow light on MCIO will also indicate Flow
when the alarm setpoint is reached.
19. Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) (Obj. #3)
a) Designed to condense and cool Pzr discharge steam equal to 100%
of the volume above the full-power pressurizer water level setpoint.
Not designed for continuous discharge.
b j Normally -75% level with 3-5 psig N2 over pressure.
c) Steam discharges to tank through sparger and drained to NCDT.
d) Can be cooled by
1) Spray from RMWST; cool from 200°F to 110°F in one hour.
2) NCDTHX
e) Rupture disc: Relieves at 100 psig
1) Relief capacity equal to the combined capacity of the three-
pressurizer safety valves.
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TaAiNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 21 Of 37
DUKE BOWER P
CATAWBA OPERRPloNS TRAINING -
2) The PRT design pressure (and the rupture disc settings) is twice
the calculated pressure resulting from the maximum safety valve
discharge described above.
f) Vent sight glass has been upgraded to 2500 psia and 388°F.
g) Inputs:
I ) PzrPORV's
2) Pzr Safety Valves
3) Reactor Vessel Head Vent
4) ND Suction Relief Valves
5 ) NV Letdown Relief Valves
6) NV NCP Seal Return Relief
7) PzrVent
B. Instrumentation and Control
1. Temperature
a) Narrow range Th and Tc
1) indication for all four loops
2) 530T - 630°F range for Tc
3) 530°F - 650°F range for Th
4) indication on computer
b) Narrow Range RTD's
I)Provide AT and Tavg signals
NOTE: AT = Th - TC
Tavg=Th+Tc
2
(a) Reactor Control System
(c) MCB indication (each loop)
(d) Recorder inputs for readout display (AT, OPAT, OTAT)
(e) MCB deviation alarm on excessive single loop variation
from other loops on AT and Pavg.
2) Reactor trip on 2/4 AT signals exceeding OP or OTAT setpoints.
3) Rod stop/turbine runbacks on 2/4 AT signals exceeding
OPDTAT rod stop setpoints. Turbine runback to continue until
the AT rod stop signal disappears.
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 22 of 37
&_.
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERA TIONS TMlNING
2) Temperature indicated on MCB (50-35OOF)
3) High alarm indicates at 130°F tank cooling is required.
1) NCRD5898
2) Temperature indicated on MCB
3) High alarm on MCB at 140°F
4) High alarm indicated Q-ring seal leakoff.
2. Pressure
a) Pzr Pressure (four (4) transmitters)
1) Covered in detail in Pressurizer Pressure Control Lesson Plan.
b) Reactor Loop Pressure (WR)
1) NCPT 5120 (Loop B) (0-3000 psig)
(a) Interlocked with N52A and ND37A
385 psig OPEN permissive
(b) Supplies indication on MCB indicator and recorder.
(c) WR pressure indication in used during startup and
shutdown in conjunction with manual control Pzr heaters
and sprays for accurate pressure indication.
2) NCPT 5441(L00p C)
(a) Provides WR indications on MCB
(b) Interlocked with NDIB and ND36B
385 psig OPEN permissive (Obj. #3)
3) NCPT 5142 (Loop C Low Range Press. Indication 0-805 psig
c) Low Range NC Pressure on C/R SMCR5080,5810
1) 0-6OOpsig
2) At 550 pisg decreasing, C/R will set to Hi speed to aid monitoring
LTPQP ops.
d) Pressurizer Relief Tank Pressure
1) NCPT 5130 (0-150 psig)
2) Pressure indicator on MCB
3) Hi alarm at 8 psig
QP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page250f37
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNlNG
3. bevel
a) Pressurizer bevel
4 ) (Four (4) channels indicated on MCB)
(a) Three (3) hot calibrated provides signals
(2) NVSystem
(3) Pzr heater cutout circuit
(4) Input to LEVEL PROGRAM/ACTUAb level
summer
(5) Input to OAC for channel indication and input to
computed value for "Actual Level"
(i) "Actual Level"' is hot calibrated average
corrected for deviation frorn 653°F
pressurizer temperature
(b) One (1) cold calibrated used during startup, shutdown and
refueling for indication.
2) Three (3) channels provide remote indication
(a) Hot Shutdown Panels A and B - one channel each
(b) Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) - one channel
b) Pressurizer Relief Tank
1) NCLT5130
2) Level indication on MCB (0-100%)
3) High/Low level alarm on MCB at 89%/67%
4. Flow
a) Loop Flow Measurement
1) Measured by three detectors
2) Tap at piping elbow between S/G and NC pump suction.
Delta P proportional to velocity squared
3) Provides low flow signal for reactor trip 2/3 coincidence.
4) Provides Control Board Indication (0-100%)
b) Bypass Panel (1.47) Automatic Inputs. Any motor-operated
containment isolation in the NC System.
OP-CN-PS-NC FOR TRAlNfNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 26 of 37
- DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINlNG -
FWST through NB33 to Hot Legs via N1183B
Makeup tlowpath status will be displayed on a control room
whiteboard.
Required makeup flow rates are specified in AP/l(2)/A/5500/19 'Loss
of NU.
Makeup Rowpath status will be displayed on a control room
whiteboard.
e) AP/1(2)/A/55OO/19 'boss of Residual Heat Removal' This procedure
~
addresses remedial action for a loss of NB including containment
closure, makeup flow, and restoration of ND. This procedure is
discussed further in the Ne) lesson.
4. NC System Leak Testing
-
Limits and Precautions reference PT/1(2)iA/4150/001A
5. Pressurizer Relief Tank Qperation Limits and Precautions - reference
OP/1(2)/A/6150/004
6. NC System Leakage Calculation - reference PT/1/A/4150/001D (Qbj. #!3)
Basic Procedure:
a) Ensure unit temperature and pressure are stable
b) Isolate any NC unmeasured inputbutput sources
c) Run KCSLEAK program on the QAC. This program performs NC
system mass calculations in various locations in the NC and NV
systems. Receives input from:
All loops T-HOT, T-COLD, and T-AVE. Uses only those loops
with an NC pump running to calculate average values for each.
e Pressurizer Average Level
e PRT average level
- VCT average level
NCDT average level
Pressurizer Surge line temperature
e Pressurizer Water temperature
e NC system pressure
e Variws valve positions that would indicate unmeasured mass
being addedhemoved from the NCS.
The program must be allowed io run long enough to ensure a
high confidence in the result but in all cases will run for 30
minutes or more.
OP-CN-BS-NC FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33
Page 31 O f 37
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNl
3) Loss of air.
c) Cannot open unless NVIOA, Z 1A and 238 are closed.
d) Cannot close if either NVIOA, 1!A or 43A is open, except on PZR
low level when both valves will auto close.
I
FROM ND
2. Regenerative Heat Exchanger
a ) Recovers heat loss from UB flow by reheating charging flow.
b) Nominal Hx outlet temp - 38ooF.
c) Limit and Precaution limits charging flow through heat exchanger to
180 gpm.
d) UD flow on shell side; charging flow on tube side.
e) First temperature reduction for demineralizer protection
9 Letdown Temperature
1) Indicates temperature exiting the regenerative heat exchanger.
2) Indication and high alarm on MCB.
3. Orifice Isolation Stop Valves NV1IA, IOA, 138 (OBJ. #22 & 23)
a) Air operated globe valves, fail closed, operated from MCB or Aux
S.D. panel (NV-1? A& NV-138 only from ASP-A).
b) Cannot be opened unless UD ISQL valves are open
c) Auto close signals
OP-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REK 34
Pa@ 11 Qf 63
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINlNG
1) Low PZR level (17%).
2) Containment Isolation (ST).
3) Closure of NVlA or NV2A (cannot open NVIOA, 1I A or 33A
URI~SS NV1 and 2 are open).
4) Both centrifugal charging pumps tripped.
4. UB Orifices (2) lsolation Valves NV-11 & 13
-
a) Reduce coolant press 1900 psig at design flow rate.
b) One 75 gpm orifice. This is the normal flowpath for letdown on Unit 2
(NV-13 Block Valve).
c) One 45 gprn orifice (NV-17 Block Valve). Used to obtain greater UB
flow in conjunction with 75 gprn orifice or reduce letdown flow as
required by procedures.
d) Max LJD flow of 120 gpm at normal operating pressure.
5. UD Manual Flow Control Valve (NV849) (NV10 Block Valve)
a) Used to warm up downstream piping on Unit 2. On Unit 1 this is the
normal letdown flowpath and is set at 75 gpm per the NV operating
procedure.
b) Flow rate of 5 to 1I O gpm (when NCS pressure is less than or equal
to 385 psig).
c) Controlled from MCB via manual loader.
d) The power source for the control circuit of this valve (NV 849) is now
a non-safety related, non-interruptible power source (1KXPB).
During a LOOP event, control of this valve is still available as long as
the battery source for 1KXPB and VI are available.
e) The response of NV-849 to the controller shows that the flow
response is not linear throughout the scale and is as follow:
I)NV-849 does not respond until -35% demand on the controller.
2) QAC indicates the valve is full closed at 26% demand.
3) Demand is off scale high when flow is 110 gpm.
4) NV-849 travel stops are set for 110 gpm.
5) NV-849 flow rate is very sensitive in the 95-2 10+ YOdemand
range.
6) NV-849 controk for a very steady flow rate once set.
6. If Letdown flow is to be increased to greater than normal flow (greater
than 80 gpm) a new Dose Equivalent Iodine limit is instated per AP118.
High Activity in Keactor Coolant.
O9-m-Ps.w FOR TfWNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 12 of 63
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAlNlNG -
7. Letdown Line Relief Valve (1 NVU)
a) Overpressure protection for low press. piping and tube side of U D
heat exchanger.
b) Relief setpoint 600 psig.
c) Kelieves to Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT).
d) Capacity -max flow rate through all orifices.
8. MV155 UD Containment !solation Valve
a) Operated from MC5.
b) AUTO-CLOSE on St signal.
C) AUTO-OPENS on ASP " B to local.
9. ND Letdown Control Valve (NV135) (OBJ. #5)
a) Opera when ND system is in KHK Mode and NCS deanup desired.
b) Control and indication on 6/5.
c) Fails closed on loss of instrument air. (OBJ. #23)
1Q. Letdown heat exchanger
I
LETDOWN
a) Single shell-multi pass.
QP-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAININ0 PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 73 of 63
OP/~/H/6100/OIOG
PANEL: 1AD-6 Page 89 of 92
PKT HI TEMP F/lO
SETPOINT: 130°F
ORIGIN: 1NCRD5350
PROBABLE 1. PZR PORV lifting or leaking.
CAUSE: 2. PZR safety lifting or leaking.
THE RESPONSES FOR THIS ALAKM ARE LISTED IN
AP/I/A/SS00/11 (PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES)
OP!l!B!6 100/01OG
PANEL: 1AD-6 Page 90 of 92
PRT HI PRESS
SETPOINT: > 8 psig
ORIGIN: lNCPT5130
PROBABLE 1. Pressurizer relief or safety valve discharging into tank.
CAUSE: 2. N2 overpressure.
AUTOMATIC 1WG-225 (Unit 1 PRT to WG Comp Isol) closes.
ACTIONS:
NOTE: PRT rupture disk relieves at a "NOMINAL" pressure of 100 psig.
Computer point CIA0885 (PRT Press) alarms at 6 psig.
IMMEDIATE Monitor PRT temperature, pressure, and level on main control board
ACTIONS: and PORV downstream and safety downstream temperatures to determine
cause of alarm.
SUPPLEMENTARY 1. Ensure source of pressure is identified and action taken.
ACTIONS: 2. Since the normal depressurization flow path to WG has isolated.
perform the following per OPi l/A/6150/004 (Pressurizer Relief Tank):
2. I Reduce level until the auto close signal to I WG-225 clears.
2.2 Perform pressure reduction.
2.3 Re-establish normal PRT level.
3. Refer to TS 3.4. I3 , for operational Reactor Coolant leakage criteria.
REFERENCES: 1. CNEE-0173-03.03
2. Westinghouse Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints
CNM-1201.00-39
3. NC System Description - PRT rupture disc relief pressure
Bank Question: 828 Answer: B
1 Pi($ Unit lwas operating at 7% power when an electrical problem causes the loss
of 1TlB. Given the following events and conditions in chronological
sequence:
Voltage on short buses ITB and 1TD drops to 75%
Frequency on short buses 1T5 and 1TD decreases to 55 hertz.
"hc ITB-to-1TD fast bus transfer faiis to occur
e All equipment operates as designed.
e No operator action
What is the current status of the unit?
A. The reactor does not trip, B and D NCPs trip.
B. The reactor does not trip, all NCPs trip.
C. The reactor trips, B and D NCPs trip.
D. The reactor trips, all NCPs trip.
Distracter Analysk
A. Incorrect: all NCPs are tripped
Plausible: partially correct - power is below P-7, candidate may not
know UF will trip dl NCPs.
B. Correct: UF (56 hertz) will trip all NCP breakers, because power is
less than P-7, the reactor will not trip.
C. Incorrect: the reactor does not trip if below P7 - all NCPs are
tripped
Plausible: partiaily concct - B& D NCPs do trip candidate may
~
think UF trips only B and D NCPs and because it is always in effect,
may trip the reactor.
D. Incorrect: the reactor does not trip if below P7
Plausible: candidate may think UF trips all " 2 s and because it is
always in effect, may trip the reactor.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS M2 K4.03 (2.U3.1)
Lesson Plan Objective: NCP Obj: 8 EP Obj: 12
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
KefeEnces:
I OP-CN-PS-NCP page 20,2 1,22,23
~
2. OP-CN-EL-EP page 29,30
DUK POWER CATAWBA OPERAT1ONS TRAINING
-
Objective
State the purpose of the NC pumps.
Explain the design, operation, and function of major NC pump and motor
components.
Vibration Monitors
--
0 Flywheel
Anti-reverse Rotation Device
Motor Thrust and Guide Bearings
0 Pump Impeller
Pump turning Vane-Diffuser
Pump Diffuser Adapter
Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger
Pump Radial Bearing
Explain the operation of the NC pump seals including injection flow paths,
flow rates. discharge flow paths, and pressure drops.
Explain which coaling water supplies cool the NCP components.
Explain the operation and purpose of the oil lift system.
Explain the sources of water, lineups and flowpaths needed to till the NCP
stand pipe.
Identify the power supplies to the NC pumps.
ExDlain the function and ormation of the NCP PumD Monitor Svstem.
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply limits and precautions associates
with related station procedures.
Outline the procedures fer startingktopping NC pumps.
Explain the use of redundant breakers between the 9KV switchgear ani
the NC pumps.
- Explain the interlocks associated with the pump breakers and the oil lifl
system.
QP-CN-PS-NCP FOR TRAlN/AG PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 4
Page 3 of 27
.--.=.,- POWER
....DUKE CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-A...=..-
-
L
P
Explain the purpose of ihe Electrical Distribution System.
.. ....... -............ ........ ...............
List from where the switchyard PCB's wn be operated.
Describe how to remove and return a switchyard PCB fram/to
service.
Describe how to operate switchyard disconnects, also list what
protective equipment is required to operate a switchyard or
transformer disconnect.
Describe how to operate a main transformer ground disconnect.
Describe how to operate the Generator PCB's and MOD'S; also
list from where they are operated.
Describe how to operate the generator neutral ground
disconnect.
Explain the purpose of the Isolated Phase Bus System (IPB).
Describe the procedure for grounding the PB.
Describe the 6.9 KV power system.
List the loads Dowered from 6.9 KV toad centers.
Describe how a transfer of power on the 6.9 KV load center can
be accomDlished.
Describe how to oDerate a 600 V breaker.
ExpEain how to shift 600 V unit and shared load enters to the
alternate source.
Explain how to shift 600 \I unit and shared and blackout MGCs
to the alternate source.
Describe the term "Hot Bus" Transfer and how it apples to Unit,
Shared and Blackout MCC's.
Describe the term "Dead Bus" Transfer and how it applies to
Unit, Shared and Blackout MCC's.
Describe the 4460 V power essential system.
ExDlain how the 4160 V load center is assured a Dower source.
OP-CN-EL-EP FOR TRAlNlNG PURPQSES ONLY REV.33
Page 3 of91
6. 6.9KV incorning and tie breakers are controlled from control room - MC-
I1
a) 3 position transfer switch (See one below typical of eight)
1) Auto - allows auto swap
-
2) Man "A and Pie allows operating the "A incoming breaker and
the t i breaker.
3) Man "B" and Tie - allows operating the "B" incoming breaker and
the tie breaker.
1 MODE SELECT 1
b) Open - Close Pushbutton operates the breaker (See below)
7. To supply a 6900V load center completely from one auxiliary transformer,
the tie breaker can be closed and one incoming breaker opened.
8. Transfer can occur automatically or manually. (OBJ. #la)
a) Auto Transfer
1) Mode select switch in "Auto"
2) Auto transfer initiated by a Zone Lockout or 75% UV on the
incoming line (No fault on affected bus)
3) If in synch - fast transfer with loss of load. This will only occur
with the Main Generator on line.
OP-CN-EibP KIR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV.33
Page 29 of 91
4) If NOT in sync then the transfer is delayed to allow voltage to
decay to a point that syncronization is not a concern. (slow
transfer). Loss of load will occur.
5) A new switch was added that controls this transfer. With the Main
Generator off line , this switch is placed in the defeat position and
then only slow transfers will occur. This switch controls the tie
breaker.
6) The defeat removes the sync check relays (25s) from the circuit
and provides for only a slow transfer. See 4 above for
description.
7) The AUTOMATIC FAST TRANSFER ENABLE, DEFEAT switch
is located in the 6.9KV load center rooms on the control panels
with the under voltage transfer relays.
b) Manual Transfer (Example: Transfer ITA to 1P2B)
1) Select "Man A and T I - these are the breakers to be operated.
2) Close the Tie breaker, the "A" feeder will open.
3) The transfer switch should always be selected to the position for
the breakers to be operated.
OP-CN-EL-EP MIR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV.33
Page 30 of 91
-............
DUKE.- POWER
_-. .L
.'
CATA
.__..--===-
WBA OPERATlONS TRAIN"
2. NC Pump Monitor System ( O W#8)
a) Purpose: To initiate a reactor protective action whenever a
significant loss of reactor coolant flow is imminent due to a
sustained reduction in voltage or frequency on the power cables to
the NC pump motors.
b) Monitor System Description
1) Solid State
(a) ONE Undervoltage and ONE Undefrequency detector
monitors each NCP power suppiy.
(b) If the voltage or frequency drops below an acceptabie
pre-set level for a pre-set time, the associated monitor
channel provides a trip signai to SSPS.
2 ) Status lights
(a) Indicates channel trip
(b) Located on NCP monitor panel
(c) Recorded by event recorder
3) SSPS
(a) Activates annunciator alarm in Control Room
(b) Control Woom status lights in Control Room
(c) Utilizes 2/4 logic scheme to evaluate the signal
c) Reactor Trip greater than P-7
1) Undervoltage on 214 NCPs trips the Reactor if power level
greater than or equal to 10% (P-7). UV detectors are located
between the Safety Breaker and the NCP motor.
2) Underfrequency on 2/4 NCPs trips the Reactor if power Bevel
greater than 10% (P-7). IBF detectors are located between the
6.9 KV Supply Breaker and the Safety Breaker.
NOTE: The P-7 interlock is used in the circuit as the NC pumps are not required during
reactor operation below 10%.
3) Underfrequency aiso trips all four (4) NC pump motor safety
breakers - &t dependent on P-7, alwavs enabled.
OPCKPS-NCP FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV.14
Page20of 27
DUKE POWER CATAWBA QPERATKINS TRAINING
4) Component Location
(1) Contains all components of system.
(2) Located in control room.
(b) Contents (channel)
(I) Voltage module
(2) Frequency Module
(3) Test Switch
(4) Asst. Aux. Relays
(5) Status bights
(c) Votlage/frequency Monitor Modules
(1) Major components of system.
(2) Variable sensing circuits.
(3) Adjustable trip.
(4) Adjustable timer.
5) Trip Setpoint Ranges
(a) Voltage - 5082 VAC (77% of RCP motor nominal
operating voltage.)
(b) Frequency - 56 hertz
d) Monitor operation
1) Trips adjustable trip components
(a) Triggers adjustable timing ckt.
(b) After pre-set timer, contacts open to de-energize aux.
relay.
(c) Aux. relay contacts
(1) De-energize status light on monitor panel
(2) Activate event recorder
(3) Sends channel voltage + trip signal to SSPS
e) Test Feature
1) Individual channel test
(a) installed
(b) Key-operated
(c) 3-position
OP-CN-PS-NCP FOR TRAINING PURPQSES QNLY REV.14
Page 21 of 27
(d) Spring-return-to-center
2) Energizes test delay
(a) VMT (Volt)
(b) FMT (Freq)
3) Relay contacts provide test signal
(a) Curnputer
(b) Annunciator
NOTE: Contacts also interrupt input ckt. to volt/freq monitor. The 2/4 channel logic
scheme in the SSPS allows one channel to be tested during reactor operation without
reactor/NC motor bkr. trip.
3. Trips and Interlocks
4. NCQ Interlocks (OBJ # I O )
a) The 6.9 KV Supply Breaker (located in the 6.9 KV switch gear)
trips are:
1) ground fault
2) overcurrent
3) averfrequency
4) phase balance
5) motor differential
This breaker has !jQ UV or UF trips.
b) The Safety Breaker (located in the Aux Bldg) trips are:
1) gruund fault
2) overcurrent
3) associated 6.9 KV Supply Breaker trip
4) underfrequency on two NCP Power supplies
c) If Supply (Non-safety) breaker fur an individual pump opens, the
safety breaker fer that pump opens
d) Oil lift pressure must be greater than 500 psi (2/3switch logic) to
close safety breaker.
e) 3/4 supply breakers closed to dose a Safety breakers (to clear UF
trip of all Safety Breakers)
2. QiB Lift Trips
a) Flasher wired to starter if overload condition.
BP-CN-PS-MCP FOR TRAIMKVG PURPOSES ONLY REV.14
Page 22 ob 27
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
3. Oil Lift interlocks
a) Only one oil lift pump can operate at any give time per NCP.
b) Prevents NC motor start until oil lift press is greater than 500 psi.
C. Instrumentation
1. Indication
a) NC Pump Supply AMP Meter (1 for each safety breaker)
b) NCP A Sea! Outlet Temp * (50-250° F)
c) NCP A Seal Water Flow* (0-20 GPM)
d) NCF A No. Z Seal Delta P * (0-400 PSID)
NCP A Radial Bearing Temp*
e) *Same for B, C, and D Pumps
f] NC PMP MON PNL (7RCPM)
1) Bus Voltage Normal (Light)
2) Control Power Available (Light)
3) Bus Frequency Normal (Light)
4) Voltage Monitor Test (Light)
5) Frequency f&nitor Test (Light)
g) NCP Vibration on Shaft and Frame
2. Chart Recorders
a) NCP A and B Hi-Leak-Off Flow (C and I3 on another recorder)
b) NCP A and B Lo-Leak-OFF Flow (C and B on another recorder)
3. Computer Inputs
a) Analog (applicable to all four pumps)
1) NC Pump A MTR LWR THR BRG TEMP
2) NC Pump A MTR UPR THW BRG TEMP
4) NC Pump A MTR STATQR WINDING TEMP.
5) NC Pump A MTR AMPS
6 ) NC Pump A MOTOR UPR BRG TEMP.
7) NC Pump A VIBRATION CHANNELS.
b) Digital
1) NC Pump Oil Fill Otsd Cont !sol.
Bank Question: 829 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 1was operating at 100%power when the crew detects indications ofa
loss of NC inventory. Given the following events and conditions:
- AI1 systems are In automatic
Indicated letdown flow is 62 gpm
1NV-13A (LTDN ORIF 1.4 OTLT CQNTISOL) is open
Letdown pressure is 350 psig
§ed return - 3.5 gpm per NCP
- Indicated charging flow - 90 gpm
Indicated seal injection flow - 35 gpm
VCT level is decreasing
Pressurizer pressure and level are constant
Containment humidity is increasing
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the Iocation of the
leak?
A. Letdown line, between the letdown orifice and the containment
Isolation valve.
B. Charging line between 1iW-309(Sed Waterhjection F ~ Q wand )
1NV-294 (NVPumps A&B Disdi Flow CTRL).
C Charging Une inside containment.
B. One of the RCS loops.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct: if the leak is on the ietdom line, VCT level will drop,
charging and letdown will be matched and pressurizer level will
remain constant.
B. Incorrect:
PIausible: operator misses that these valves are outside containment.
C. Incorrect: charging leak would be indicated by increased charging.
Plausible: candidate misinterprets indications.
D. Incorrect: Charging flow would have to increase.
PIaosible: candidate assumes its a small leak and misinterprets the
indications.
Level: RQ&SRO
KA: SYS 004 A l . l l (3.913.0)
Lesson Plan Objective: none
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
1. OP-CN-FS-NV page 20-25
2. K/A EPE 009 EA2.02 (3.5133)
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-. ..... . -,.........._ -..-................=/
i) Failure of NV5761 variable leg
1) Isolation Sf this variable leg downstream of the bellows would
cause the control board VCT level indication to fail low and one
of the OAC indications of VCP level would fail as is.
2) A leak in this variable leg downstream of the bellows would give
erroneously lower than actual indication determined by the size
ofthe leak, affecting the control board indication and one of the
two VCT level indication on the OAC.
3) Discrepancy between this channel and NV5760 should cause
the operator to check the trend of the two and then determine he
has a failure on NV5761.
4) When the channel fails to less than 23%, a VCT low level alarm
will occur, alerting the operator of a problem.
5) If the channel fails to less than 35%, auto makeup will start
requiring the operator to take action to stop the auto makeup,
and check the QAC for indication of level on channel 2.
j) Failure of NV5760 reference leg
1) A leak in this reference leg or a failure of the DIP instrument will
cause the local indication and one of the two OAC indications of
VCT level to indicate higher than actual level.
2) if level fails to greater than 83.5% (UNIT 1) or 78 % (UNIT 2), a
VCT high level alarm will occur alerting the operator to a problem
which the operator should be able to detect by looking at trends
and his other channel.
3) If level fails to greater than 9?.4%(UNIT 1) or 85.3% (UNIT 2),
NV172A will fully divert to the RHT, requiring the operator to
select VCT on the control switch. This failure also affects the
auto swap to the FWST on bo-Lo VCT level. The operator would
be required to manually swap.
k) Failure of NVLT5762 reference leg
1) A leak in this reference leg or a failure of the B/P instrument will
cause the control board indication and one of the two OAC
indications of VCT level to indicate higher than actual level.
2) If level fails to greater than 83.5% (UNIT 1) or 78% (UNIT a), a
VCT high leve! alarm will occur alerting the operator to a problem
which the operator should be able to detect by looking at trends
and his other channel.
OP-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY R N . 34
Page 20 of 63
-
DUKE 86WER - CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING -
3) If the above VCT level transmitter fails high or as is, VCT auto
makeup will not occur causing VCT level to decrease over time.
(a) Operator monitoring of VCT level will notice no change in
VCT level if failed as is, or wiil be alerted by the VCT Hi
Lvl alarm iffailed high.
(b) NVbT5760 indicates on the OAC, and will show actual
VCT level in this situation.
(c) The operator will be required to perform manual makeup
to insure VCT level is maintained.
(d) If NVLT5761 has failed high, the operator will have to
select manual on the MAN/AUTO station for NV172A, and
position the controller to 100% to direct all letdown flow to
the VCT or select the VCT position on the control switch
for NVI 72A.
I) A leak in the common reference tap will not affect indication unless
the leak is big enough. If the common tap ruptures then all 4 VCT
level indications will fail high momentarily, but then as the VCT
depressurizes quickly, the level wilt return to indicating accurately.
1) PIP Q-M98-0747pointed out that a leak dowstream of the
common root valve could cause a deviation between indicated
and actual level of significant amount that is well within the
manufacturer's rated capacity of the hydrogen gas makeup valve
to the VCT.
(a) This makes a single failure of the common reference tap
capable of indicating level on all 4 channels higher than
actual.
(b) Ne modifications to the CNS VCT level instrumentation
were deemed necessary. (PIP C98-965)
m) VCT Outlet Temperature
1) Measures VCT discharge temperature.
2) Indication and high alarm on MCB.
n) VCT Pressure
1) Indicates VCT pressure.
2) Auto-closes WG3 in Waste Gas System on low pressure.
3) Indication and high-low alarms on MCB.
OP-CN-PS-NV H I R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 21 of 63
...... DUKE POWER
._.... ..,. .
.... - CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAiNiNG ..
19. VCT Gas Space Control
a) H2 blanket
1) 25 to 50 psig bl2 overpressure on VCT - as pressure in the VCT
increases more hydrogen is put into solution. Pressure changes
occur due to Bevel changes as well as hydrogen control valve
adjustments. Operation with VCT pressure greater than normal
(35 psig) for extended periods will cause hydrogen concentration
in the NCS to increase to greater than Tech Spec allowable
values.
2) Two functions (OBJ. #14)
(a) Maintains H2 in Rx coolant 25-50 cdkg H2.
(b) Sufficient back press for seal return flow.
3) NV224 H2 supply valve
(a) Self regulating, normally open.
(b) Maintains 15 to 55 psig over pressure in VCT
b) VCT to Waste Gas Purge
1) Purges H2 and fission gases to waste gas system.
2) Limits radioactive gas leakage to buildings from leakage of Rx
coolant.
3) WG3- Auto closes on low VCT pressure.
c) Degassing
I) NV466 VCT Vent to Waste Gas Header
_.
(a) Controlled from MCB.
(b) Used when degassing the VCT.
2) NV467 VCT Vent to WG System
~
(a) Self regulating valve.
(b) Used during degassing to maintain 15 psig in the VCT
d) N2 Purge
1) Used to purge gases (H2 and fission gases) prior to opening
2) NV226 N2 Supply ~ C VCT
~ I
(a) Self regulating normally closed.
OP-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 22 of 63
5UK POWER -
CATAWBA OPERATIONS T R A N N G
(b) Used during purging operation of VCT to purge gases (H
2 and fission gases) prior to opening reactor coolant
system.
20. Potential gas sources into the Charging pump suction (OBJ. #30)
a ) Nitrogen supply Z NV226
1) Not normally used. Chemistry will align when needed during a
shutdown.
b) Hydrogen supply NV224
1) Aligned to supply hydrogen to the VCT during normal operation.
Set to maintain 30 psig in the VCT.
2) Isolated when entering mode 5 during a shutdown, and then
realigned when mode 4 is entered during startup.
c) Nitrogen from WG (WG163)
I) Supplies nitrogen to the VCT during shutdown when Mode 3 is
entered from B Shutdown Decay Tank. Set to maintain 20 psig.
2) isolated during a startup when Mode 4 is entered. Isolated by
three valves in series.
d) Gas desorption
1) As water flows from the VCT to the charging pumps suction
some of the gas in solution is stripped out and accumulates in
the high points of the suction header.
(a) This header is vented monthly per Tech Spec surveillance
3.5.2.3, which requires venting of ECCS pump casings
and discharge lines. CNS has ako inciuded venting the
suction header as well resulting in small quantities of gas
being removed from the suction header, but preventing a
large amount from accumulating over time and eventually
causing trouble in the charging pumps.
(b) Prior to implementing this venting requirement several NV
pump damage incidents occurred at CNS. One occurred
7/88, and resulted in NV Pump 2A impeller cracking from
various causes including entrainment of hydrogen gas.
Another occurred in 11/89 and also involved entrainment
of hydrogen gas musing damage to NV Pump 1E3 rotor.
2) The charging pumps miniflow line returns to the seal return line
through two mini flow orifices which tend to strip some gases out
of solution. These gases return with the rest of the flow into the
auxiliary nozzle into the VCT putting the gas back into the VCT
gas space.
OP-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 23 of 63
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAIMNG
e) Makeup system isolations
1) During a shutdown to account for NC system shrinkage,
considerable makeup will be necessary. NV186A, makeup
isolation to the VCT outlet will be opened to supply makeup, and
must be reclosed when not in use.
2) If the normal IetdQwn flowpath becomes unavailable and excess
letdown is placed in service, the line coming into the top of the
VCT will fill with gas and if the valves providing makeup are open
or leaking, gas could flow from the VCT to the charging pump
Suction.
3. Charging (OBJ. #6)
REGENEMWE
lllS
I. NV188A, 289B - VCT Outlet Isolation
a) Operated from MCB.
b) AUTQ-CLOSE (084.W2 & 23)
I)Low-Low level in VCT (212 and associated FWST suction valve is
not Closed; NV252A for NV188A and fdV253B for NV189B).
2) Ss signal associated FWST suction valve not Closed.
~
3) Alarm on BDMS - associated FWST suction valve not Jose&.
c) AUTO-OPEN on ASP to local (Train related). (OBJ. #24)
Of-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAlNiNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 24 Qf 63
DUK POWER CATAWBA OPERATlQNS TRAINING
2. NV252A, 253B Supply from FWST
~
a) Operated from MCB.
b) AUTO-OPEN (OBJ. #22)
1) Low-Low level in VCT (2/2).
2) Ss signal.
3) Alarm on BDMS.
3. Positive Displacemeflt Pump (PDP) abandoned in place
4. Centrifugal Charging Pumps (2) (OBJ. #6)
a) Provides normal means of charging.
b) Suctions
1) VCT
2) FWST
3) ND System during recirculation (Hot or CoM) Phase of an
accident.
c) Backup cooling water supply from the YQ system for 1A and 2A NV
pumps.
d) Discharge
1) Miniflow recirc valves NV203 and 202
(a) Open to protect CCP's during low Chg flow conditions.
@E 60 gPm/PumP
(c) Closed by operator when NC pressure less than 1580
following a LQCA and NV SI flow is indicated.
(d) Auto OPEN on ASPS to local. (QBJ. #24)
2) NV 294 flow control valve
(a) Manual or auto control
(1) Auto controlled by PZR level error and feedback
from total charging flow.
(2) Manual control by operator.
OP-CKPS-NV FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 25 of 63
Bank Question: 834 Answer: B
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a design basis LOCA occurred.
Radiation monitoring teams at the site boundary report that projected Iodine
131 dose is 25 rem.
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the cause of this
problem on the VE filter trains?
A. The HEPA fdters are saturated
B. The charcoal fdters are saturated
C. The prefdter/demisters are saturated
D. The VE fdter unit preheaters are energized
~~~~ ~~~~~
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: HEPA filters do not remove radioactive Iodine
Plausible: HEPA filter remove small particulates
B. Correct:
C. Incorrect: Prefilter/demister do not remove Iodine.
Plausible: If the candidate does not know the prefilter function.
D. Incorrect: Heaters are supposed to be energized.
Plausible: If the candidate does not know the heater function.
Level: RO&SRO
K A SYS 027K5.01 (3.U3.4)
Lessen Plan Objective: CNT-VE SEQ 2/3
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-CN-CNT-VE pages 5-6
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-
I
Objective
Describe the purpose of the VE system
Describe why it is necessary to maintain a vacuum in the annulus
followina a LQCA
Explain how the release of fission products from containment is limited
Describe how fires can start in the VE carbon filter
Describe how a fire in the carbon filter is extinguished
l 6 Given appropriate plant conditions, apply Limits and Precautions
associated with related station procedures
Describe the Standby alignment for VE per OQ/1/Ai6450/002
Describe the conditions necessary to auto start the VE fans
Describe how the VE System operates to maintain a vacuum in the
annuIu s
Explain how to secure VE following an auto start Der OP/1/8/6450/002
I
I
Describe how lo manually start and stop the VE Bans per
OPl1/Ai6450/002
ExDlain the Annulus Ventilation ODerabilitv Test PT/l/Ai4450/003A
Discuss the relationship between VE and VY systems
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference materials,
determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech SpecdSLCs
Trace the VE System flow path given a drawing of the VE System
..... ..........................
..................
TIME: 1.O Hour
5P-CN-CNT-E F5R TRAlNlNC PURPOSES ONLY REV. I5
Page 3 of l f
- - _e_
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING
1 INTRODUCTION
~
1.1 Overview
A. This lesson will describe the operation of the Annulus Ventilation System (VE)
including a description of each major component.
1.2 Format
A. The system will be discussed in the following order:
1. Objectives
2. Basic Description and Operation
3. Techspecs
4. Summary
1.3 Student Learning Objectives
A. Cover Objectives
2. PRESENTATION
2.1 Purpose (Ob]. #I)
A. Produce and maintain a negative pressure in the annulus during kBCA
conditions.
B. Reduce the concentration of radioactivity in the air within and discharged from
the annulus through recirculation and filtration of annulus air.
C. Provide long term fission product removal within the annulus through filtration.
2.2 Basic Description
A. The VE System consists of two redundant trains per Unit, each train having:
4. Full capacity fan
2. Filter Train.
3. Dampers and associated duct work
4. Controls
B. The VE System will produce a 4.5 water vacuum in the annulus within 60
seconds following an S,sgnal. Maintaining a negative pressure in the
annulus allows leakage from the primary containment to enter the annulus for
collection and filtration prior to release to the Unit Vent. This filtration reduces
potential ofisile and onsite dose. (Obj. #2)
C. The VE fans take suction high in the annulus, and the VE fans discharge Sow
in the annulus. This provides for good mixing and filtration of the annulus air.
D. Fission product release is prevented by two methods: (Obj. #3)
DUKE POWER .......-.
........ CATAWBA OPERATIONS...... -..-TRAINING
_
1. Containment isolation valves Mock potential leak paths from containment
2. Limiting containment pressure and temperature following an accident to
prevent exceeding design parameters of the containment structure.
2.3 Components
A. Fans (2 per Unit)
1. Auto started by the train related B/G sequencer following the S, signal,
2. On/Off controls so fans can be operated manuaily from the control room
for performance testing
3. Each fan is 100% capacity at approximately 9000 cfm
4. Powered from EMXI, EMXB
B. Filter train (2 per Unit)
1. Prefilter/Bemister Prefilter removes larger particles entrained in the air
~
and the demister removes at least 99% of entrained moisture.
2. Heater
a) Reduces relative humidity of air too less than or equal to 70%.
b) Energized when the fan is started with proper differential pressure
across the filter unit.
3. HEPA filter (2 per filter train)
a) One before carbon filter - removes finer particles from the air
b) One after carbon filter - used to remove carbon filter bed particles
4. Carbon filter
a) Removes radioiodines from the annulus air
b) Fire detection alarms indicate increasing temperatures in the carbon
bed
c) Fire Alarm Procedure (Obj. #5)
1) Ensure that affected train is secured; place fan select switch in
OFF
2) Manually close the sprinkler drain valve
3) Manually open the sprinkler deluge valve
d] Fires can be started by (Obj. M )
1) Decay of fission products in the filter bed
2) Heavy local deposition of radioiodines which generate decay
heat.
C. Miniflow dampers I34 and D9 (1 per filter
QP-CN-CNT-VE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 5
Page 6of 17
Bank Que5stion: 843.1 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is operating at 75% power and Unit 2 is at 100?/0power. Given the
following events and conditions:
Switchyard breakers PCR 20 and 21 open.
Which one of the following statements correctly describes the efTect on units
1 and2?
A. Unit 1wilI remain at 75% power and unit 2 will runback to
approximately 56%.
B. Unit 1 will runback to approximately 34% and unit 2 will remain
at IOO%@
C. Unit I will Punback to approximately 56% and unit 2 will remain
at 100%.
D. Both units 1and 2 will runback to approximately 56%.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct: Unit 2 is affected, unit 1 is not.
B. Incorrect: Unit 1 will not runback
Plausible: answer transposed - If candidate believes unit I affected
and will mback for 3 minutes at i5%/minute.
C. Incorrect: Unit 1 will not runback
Plausible: previous correct answer on earlier test.
D. Incorrect: Unit 1 will not runback
Plausible: patially correct - if candidate believes both units
affected.
Level: RO&SRO
K A SYS 062 A4.01 (3.3/3.1)
Lesson Plan Objective: EP Obj: 39
Source: Mod Catawba Audit Exam ZOO0
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. QP-CN-EP-EP pages 1 1 and 12
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS PB(\INiNG
Objective
-
0
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference x
materials, determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech
Specs/SbCs.
-
Describe the requirements for reporting relay or breaker X
operation to the dispatcher, and explain how to fill out and route a
Describe the initiating signals fer a Main Turbine Runback X
associated with Main Power System.
-
State from memory the Immediate Actions of AQII.2/5500/03 X
(Load Rejection)
77
. .. .....
..I..:.:
State the system designator and nomenclature for major
comDonents
TIME: 3.0 HOURS
OP-CN-EL-EP FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV.33
Page 5 of 91
- - DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERAPIONS TRAlNlN6
b) until less than 56%
15% min for a
maximum of 3 min
12. If PCB 14 (23) is closed and PCB 17 (20) is closed with their associated
bay ties open PCB's 13 and 15 (22 and 24) and PCB's 16 and 18 (19 and
21)and unit at 108% power a Main Turbine Runback will be initiated.
(OBJ. MO).
a) 15% per minute for a max of 3 min.
b) Unit 1 less than 56%
e) Potential in this configuration to overload the remaining tie line to
Allison Creek and Roddey.
15% min for a
maximum of 3 min
56%
Loss of Switchyard
Runback
El. Motor Operated Disconnects
1. A set of disconnects is located between the Main transformers and the
switchyard to allow isolating the unit feeders.
2. These disconnects are motor operated and can be controlled from:
a) Control Room
b) Relay House
c) Local
OP-CN-EL-EP FQR T'RAINING PURPOSES ONLY RN.33
Page 1f of 91
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
3. The MOB'Sare interlocked such that:
a) An MOD will not operate if either of its associated PCB's are closed.
b) Cannot close the MOB'S if the busline ground disconnects are closed
(and vice versa). There is a mechanical and electrical interlock to
prevent this.
C. Ground Disconnects (OBJ. #%)
I. Each unit tie line is provided with a set of ground disconnects to ground
the line when the unit is separated from the grid.
2. Interlocked with the MODSso both can't be closed at the same time.
3. Refer to OP/O/N6350/010 (Operation of Station Disconnects and
Breakers) for operation guidance.
1. Two 230KV/22KV stepupktepdown transformers, each 50% capacity
connect the onsite and offsite power systems.
2. The transformers are oil cooled
a) Oil is pumped thru the transformer and then cooled by oil/air heat
exchangers.
b) Fans are provided for forced cooling.
c) The pumps and fans power comes from Z (2)LXC, 1(2)LXD and are
divided into banks.
61) LXC (LXD) is the normal supply for one bank and emergency supply
for another bank.
e) Shifting main transformer auxiliaries (OW1(2)/N6350/005,
Enclosures 4.21 and 4.22)
1) Allows power to be supplied to all of the cooling groups on each
main transformer from either LXC or LXB.
2) If done in a timely manner (within 12 minutes), may prevent a
turbine runback on a loss of one supply.
OP-Cdv-EL%$ K l R TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV.33
Page a2 of 91
Bank Qoesfion: 857.2 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is operating at 100% power. Pressurizer level is on program, and
normal charging is in service and letdown flow is through a 75 gpm orifice.
Given the following events and conditions:
2NV-3 14E (CHARGINGLINE CONT OUTSIDE ZSOL) ~purio~sly closes
duc a relay failure
Flashing in the letdown line reduces letdown flow to 5 gpm
Without operator action, approximately how long before a pressurizer level
deviation alarm actuates?
Assume I35 g d l ~ n =s I %pressurizer level
A. A low-level deviation alarm will occur in less than one hour.
B. A low-level deviation alarm tvill occur in greater than one hour.
C. A high-level deviation alarm will occur in less than one hour.
D. A high-level deviation alarm will Occur in greater than one hour.
Distracter Analysis:
Charging flow is reduced to the minimum value - goes to 32 gprn t~ the NCP
seals. 12 gpm seal flow goes to the VCT.
PZR level starts on program (55%) and must change by 5% to actuate a
deviation alarm. 5% x 135 gallons is 665 gallons.
The reduction in charging flow into the NCS causes charging flow to reduce
to minimum (32 gpm) as the PZW fills up. NCP Seal flow continues (12
gpni). Letdown flow drops to 5 gpm because of high regen HX outlet
temperature (flashing at the orifices). Net charging flow drops to 1-15 gpm
(32- 12 - 5)
665 gaIlondl5 gpm = 44.3 minutes.
A. Incorrect: level will increase not decrease
Plausible: If candidate miscalculates and believes level will decrease
because NC is supplying sed injection.
B. Incorrect: level will increase not decrease
Plausible: If the candidate believes only the 5 &pm letdown is causing
level to decrease.
C. Correct: Alarm should occur in 44 - 45 minutes
D. Incorrect: Alarm should occur in 44 - 45 minutes
Plausible: Ifthe candidate miscalculates or does not know the
deviation is 5%, or neglects the 12 gpm ioss due to the seal leakoff.
Level: RO&SRO
KA:APD 022 AA2.04 (2.Y3.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: NV Obj: 2,3,4
Source: Mod Ques-857.1 McGuire NRC 2002
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
1. QP-CN-PS-NV pages 12
2. OP-CN-PS-ILE page 19
=.- DUKE POWER CATAWRA OPERATIONS TRAINING
....
~
-.....,- .....
...->.--. -__ --
OBJECTIVES
I
Objective S
S
State the purpose of the Chemical and Volume Control (NV)
system.
~
State the purpose of the makeup portion of the Reactor Makeup
(NB) system. Ix
Discuss the importance of maintaining a flow balance in the NV
system and state nominal flow values.
Describe the operation and flowpath of NV normal !&down
Ix
purification including functions of the different ion exchangers and
filters.
Describe the operation and flowpath of NV letdown from ND. \ X
Describe the operation and flowpath of normal charging. lx
Describe the operation and flowpath of NV seal iniection. lx
Describe the operation and flowpath of NV excess letdown. Ix
Describe the operation and flowath of NV auxiliarv sorav. I
Given a copy of the system flow diagram or a one iine symbolic
diagram, label the major components and show the Blow path
through the maior components.
State the function of the cover gases used on the VCT including
minimum pressure requirements and how pressure is maintained. I
Discuss how fission gases are removed from the VCT. I
List the control features of VCT level, including channel, setpoint
and coincidence.
OP-CN-PS-NV FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REK 34
Page 3 Of 63
D U E POWER CATAWBA OPEFWTIONS TRAINING
1) Low PZR level (17%).
2) Containment Isolation (ST).
3) Closure of NVIA or NV2A (cannot open NVIOA, 3 1A or 33A
unless NVI and 2 are open).
4) Both centrifugal charging pumps tripped.
4. UD Orifices (2) lsoiation Valves NV-11 & 13
-
a) Reduce coolant press 1900 psig at design flow rate.
b) One 75 gprn orifice. This is the normal flowpath for letdown OR Unit 2
(NV-I 3 Block Valve).
6) One 45 gpm orifice (NV-11 Block Valve). Used to obtain greater UD
flow in conjunction with 75 gpm orifice or reduce letdown flow as
required by procedures.
d) Max UD flew of I20 gpm at normal operating pressure.
5. UD Manual Flow Control Valve (NV849) (NV10 Block Valve)
a) Used to warm up downstream piping on Unit 2. On Unit 1 this is the
normal letdown flowpath and is set at 75 gpm per the NV operating
procedure.
b) Flow rate of 5 to 110 gprn (when NCS pressure is less than or equal
to 385 psig).
c) Controlled from MCB via manual loader.
d) The power source for the control circuit ef this valve (NV 849) is now
a non-safety related, non-interruptible power source (I KXPB).
During a LOOP event, control of this valve is still available as long as
the battery source for IKXPB and VI are available.
e) The response of NV-849 to the controller shows that the flow
response is not linear throughout the scale and is as foliows:
1) NV-849 does not respond until -35% demand on the controller.
2) OAC indicates the valve is full closed at 26% demand.
3) Demand is off scale high when flow is 110 gpm.
4) NV-849 travel stops are set fer 110 gpm.
5) NV-849 flow rate is very sensitive in the 95-1'to+ % demand
range.
6 ) NV-849 controls for a very steady flow rate once set.
6. If Letdown flow is to be increased to greater than normal flow (greater
than 80 gpm) a new Dose Equivalent Iodine limit is instated per AP/18,
High Activity in Reactor Coolant.
09-CN-PS-NV H I R TRQlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 34
Page 12 of 63
DUKE POWER -
.--
CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
I- ..... ~
PZR LEVEL PROGRA
AND SETPOINTS (U2)
REACTOR TRIP (>P-7)
92%
HIGH LEVEL ALARM
70%
55% 95% HIGH LEVEL DEVIATION
.-- - - - - -----
PZR ALARM, BACKUP
HEATERS ON - ---------
LEVEL -5% LOW LEVEL
DEVIATION ALARM
_ - _ - - - /
_____- , /
LOW LEVEL ALARM
17%
LETDOWN ISOLATES & HEATERS OFF
1 I
0
557.0 587.0'
AUCT Hi T- avg
OP-CWPS-ILE FQR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REK 20
Page 19 of 24
1 Pt(s) Unit I is operating at 65% power with pressurizer level on program, and
normal charging and letdown flow through a 95 gpm orifice. Given the
following events and conditions:
- 1NV-245B (CHARGINGLIME CONTOUTSZDE ZSOL) SpuEiOuSly closes
Flashing in the letdown line reduces letdown flow to 5 gpm
0 The operators take no actions
How long before the pressurizer high level alarm actuates?
REFERENCES P R O I : Unit 1 Databook Curve 738
A. Less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
B. 2 to 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />
C. Greater than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />
D. Greater than 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />
Distracter Analysis:
Charging flow is reduced to the minimum value - goes to 32 gpm to the NCP
seals. 12 gpm seal flow goes to the VCT.
PZR level starts at 44.5% (6.5* (55%-25%) +25% = 44.5%).
PZR level increases to the high level alarm at 70%.
The reduction in charging flow into the NCS causes charging flow to reduce
to minimum (32 gpm) as the PZR fills lap. NCP Seal flow continues (12
gpm). Letdown flow drops to 5 gpm because of high regen HX outlet
temperature (flashing at the orifices). Net charging flow drops to +I5 gpm
(32- 12 - 59
Per tank curve: 70%=9800 gal, 44.5%-6500 gal, 17%=2800 gai.
3300gal(9800-6500) / (15gpm) = 220 minutes = 3.67 hours7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br />
A. Incorrect: There are more than 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Plausible: If candidate neglects to subtract seal flow and letdown flow
3300 gal / 32 gpm = 103 minutes = 1.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> - or misreads tank
curves / miscalculates pressurizer level
B. Incorrect: There are more than 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Plausible: If the candidate includes the loss of letdown but neglects
seal return flow: 3300 gaV(32-5) gpm = 122 min = 2.03 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. -or
misreads tank curves / miscalculates pressurizer level
C. Incorrect: There are more than 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Plausible: Assuming loss of letdown, if the candidate does not include
seal retum flow: 33OOgal/ (32 - 12) gpm = 165 min = 2.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> - or
misreads tank curves / miscalculates pressurizer ievel
D. Correct answer: 3.67 hours7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br />
Level: RO&SRO
KA: APE 022AA2.04(2.9!3.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: PS-NV SEQ 6
Source: New
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
1. OP-MC-PS-Wpages 17,39
2. OP-MC-PS-LE page 35
3. Unit I Databook Curve 7.38 - PROVIDED
Bank Question: 865.2 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 is at full power when the following events occur:
- Reactor power is approximately 98%
NCS T, is increasing
@ Main turbine load is 1150 W e
- Feedwater flow continues to operate as designed
- The RO is manually inserting rods
Which one ofthe following statements correctiy describes the EQP basis in
FR-S. 1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS) for immediately
tripping the turbine?
A. Prevent an uncontrolled cooldown and positive reactivity
addition.
B. Maintain or extend steam generator inventory.
C. Prevent turbine overspeed when the main generator trips.
D. Minimize the peak pressure transient for the event.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct: The basis in the EOPs is to prevent an uncontroiled
cooldown and causing a positive reactivity addition
B. Incorrect: if the main feedwater pumps continue to operate, the S/G
inventory will not be a problem
Plausible: This is the EQP basis for an ATWS with a loss of
C. Incorrect: The basis in the BOPS is to prevent an uncontrolled
cooldown and causing a positive reactivity addition
Plausible: concern or the operation of the turbine
D. Incorrect: The basis in the EOPs is to prevent an uncontrolled
cooldown and causing a positive reactivity addition. The peak
pressure will actually be greater if the turbine is tripped early in the
Plausible: mininiizing the peak pressure is always a good thing for
an accident.
Level: RQ&SRO
KA: EPE 029 EK1.02 (2.6/2.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: FRS Obj: 5
Source: Mod McGuire NRC 2002
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-CN-EP-FRS pages 5-7
2. FR-S.1 page 2
3. FR-S.1 Background Step 2 page 2
DUKE
...
POWER ...CATA
............
A-
%-- -
WBA OPERAT1ONS TRAINING
OBJECTIVES
Objective
1
1 State the purpose of Function Restoration procedures:
EP/l/N5000/FR-S Series - Subcriticality
1
2 State the Immediate Actions of EP/1/8/5000/FR-S.I (Response to
Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS).
I
3 Explain the difference between an ATWS event and a failure of the
Reactor Protection System to initiate a Reactor Trip
1
4 State the Bases for all NOTES and CAUTIONS in Function
Restoration procedures EP/l/N5000/FR-S Series - Subcriticality
1
5 Explain the Bases for the Major Actions of Function Restoration
procedures EP/l/N50QO/FR-SSeries - Subcriticality
I
6 Explain the Bases for all steps in Function Restoration procedures
EP/?/N5000/FR-SSeries - Subcriticality
OP-CN-EP-FRS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00
Page 3 of 8
-- DUKE POWER
...
-. ........
........ -
n>
.
..
..
.
CA TAWBA OPERATIONS ..-.
TRAINING
.......
1. INTRODUCTION
1.I Objectives
1.2 inputs to Subcriticality CSF tree
A. Source Range Startup Rate
B. Intermediate Range Startup Rate
C. Power Range Indication
B. Keactor Protection System (Reactor trip required)
E. Control Rod on bottom indication
F. Reactor trip breaker position
2. FR-S Series - Subcriticality CSF
2.1 Overview of plant conditions covered by FW-S series
A. ATWS - Anticipated Transients without Scram.
1. ATWS is any mechanical or electrical failure that keeps the control rods
from dropping into the core during anticipated transients (Condition II
events) which require a reactor trip.
Loss of LsadRurbine Trip
Loss of Normal Feedwater
Loss of Bffsite Power
Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal
- Accidental NC Depressurization
Partial Loss of Forced NC Flow
2. The common characteristic of ATWS events is a power generation-power
removal mismatch leading to temperature excursions of the NC system.
The increased NC system temperatures could lead to a severe reduction
in the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) and lead to fuel
damage.
3. The loss of load ATWS and loss of normal feedwater ATWS have the
greatest potential for creating a NC system over pressure condition which
could lead to a loss of NC system integrity. Fuel damage combined with
a loss of NC integrity could lead to a radioactive release into containment
and/or the environment.
4. instrumentation failures that generate a reactor trip signal and the reactor
does not trip, and a plant transient is not initiated due to the failure, are
not considered ATWS events.( OBM3)
OP-CN-EP-FRS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00
Page 5 of 8
-~.__.__-.__DUKE
_ POWER - a,%.-___
CA TAWEA OPERATIONS TRAINING._
~
.z.. __I) ._
B. boss of Subcriticality
1. The normal expectation for core flux after a reactor trip is to promptly drop
out of the power range and level off in the source range.
2. Core heat production after several minutes should be limited to that from
radioactive decay of fission products, rather than from the fission process
itself.
3. Several scenarios could occur that could lead to positive reactivity
insertion and subsequent neutron flux increase:
Control rods drop but do not fully insert
Inadvertent dilution of the NC system
Excessive cooldown from secondary depressurization or excessive
feedwater addition
2.2 Nuclear Power GenerationdATWS (EP/FR-S.I 1
A. Cover the purpose of FR-S.1 as stated on the cover of the S.1 procedure.
(O5J.#l)
B. RED Path.
1. Rx Trip required and
2. PW>5%
C. ORANGE Path.
1. Rx trip required and
2. PR<5%and
3. I/RSUR>O
D. Immediate Actions (QBJ.#2)
E. Major action step summay (QBJ.#5)
1. Verifv Automatic Actions or Perform Manual Actions to Reduce Core
Power: A Bull reactor trip is the preferred way to shut down the reactor. If
automatic functions have still not been effective, any manual trips from
the control room are to be actuated. If these are still not effective, the
rods should be inserted using the Rod Control System.
2. Emeraencv Borate: Several methods of emergency borating are
available in the control room. This action is taken prior to initiating more
time-consuming local actions to trip the reactor and/or turbine.
3. Check for Possible Sources of Positive Reactivitv and Eliminate Them:
Possible sources of positive reactivity are checked and eliminated at this
time. Actions include isolation of ali dilution paths and
icientification/isolation of faulted SG(s) causing an uncontrolled NC
system cooldown. These actions address the return-to-power condition
and will probably not be required for an ATWS.
OP-CN-EP-FRS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00
Page 6 of 8
DUKE..-..
POWER _ __ - - .~-__ CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAlNlNG
... > I - .-
4. Verifv Subcriticaiitv: This final action checks on the effectiveness of
previous steps in mitigating the transient prior to departing the guideline.
Departure is not allowed until subcriticality is verified.
F. Use the "Enhanced Background Document"', maintained by the Catawba
Procedures Group, for a detailed discussion of the bases of steps, notes and
cautions and immediate actions. (OBJ.#2,4 and 6)
2.3 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown (EWFR-S.2)
A. Cover the purpose of FR-S.2 as stated on the cover of the S.2 procedure
(OBJ.#I )
B. Yel!ow Path
1. IR SUR less negative than -.2dpm or
2. SR SUR positive
C. Major action step summary (OBJ.#5)
1. Check if Loss of Core Shutdown is from Core Reactivitv or
Instrumentation Problems: A check is made of the behavior of the IIR
flux traces and the source range channels startup rate. If the l/R flux is
decreasing, source range detectors are energized either automatically or
manually when the flux is less than the P-6 setpoint. If the intermediate
range channels are undercompensated, source range detectors are
manually energized. Undercompensation is recognized by a flux trace
leveling off above the P-6 setpoint, and preventing automatic source
range re-energination. Any reactivity probiem is addressed by boration.
2. Borate NCS as Necessarv: If the intermediate range flux is not
decreasing and the intermediate range channels are not
undercompensated, the NCS is borated until the flux is kss than the P-6
setpoint. If the source range channels indicate a positive startup rate,
then the NCS is borated until the source range startup rate is negative or
zero.
3. Check for Subcriticalitv: This action checks for the desired indications of
an adequately shutdown core, Le., source range channels indicating zero
or negative startup rate. If this is not the case, boration intended only to
ensure subcriticality is performed. However, a CAUTION following this
action informs the operator that boration should continue to obtain
adequate shutdown margin.
B. Use the "Enhanced Background Document", maintained by the Catawba
Procedures Group, for a detailed discussion of the bases of steps, notes,
cautions and immediate actions. (OBJ.#2,4 and 6)
OP-CN-EP-FRS FOR TRAINl" PURPOSES ONLY REV. 00
Page 7 of 8
C. Operator Actions
0 Veri% Reactor Trip: Perform the following:
-* All rod bottom lights - LIT - a. Manually trip the reactor.
- * All reactor trip and bypass breakers - - b. E reactor will not trip, THEN manually
OPEN insert rods.
- 0 IIR amps - DECREASING
0 Verify Turbine Trip: Perform the following:
- a All turbine stop valves - CLOSED - a. Manually trip the turbine.
OW b. E turbine will not trip, THEN:
Both of the following: - 1) Depress the "MANUAL" pushbutton
on the turbine control panel.
-
- All MSlVs - CLOSED
- 2) Rapidly unload turbine by
- All MSlV bypass valves - CLOSED. simultaneously depressing the
"CONTROL VALVE LOWER and
"FAST RATE" Gushbuttons
3) turbine will not runback, r"
close:
- * All MSlVs
- All MSlV bypass valves.
3. Verify CA pumps are sunning as follows:
- a. Motor driven CA pumps - ON. - a. Manually start motor driven CA
pump(9.
- b. 3 S16 NIB levels - GREATER THAN I b. Ensure CA Pump #I RUNNING.
11%.
4. Initiate emergency boration of NC
System as follows:
- a. Ensure at least one NV pump ON ~
'C"EP
.- .: -. 2 : ' V e r i f y 'Turbir:e Trip:
PUR?OSb::
To en.cure t h a t . t h e t l l r b i n e i s t r i p p e d
A?PLICA3I,E ERG BAS;S:
The t ~ r b i n i :i s t r i p p e d t o p r e v e n t ar: u c c o n t r o l . l e d coc1dow:i 3f t h e SC: :iysr.en
due t o s t e a m flsw that t h c t u r b j n e would rer:c?;~re. :or hn ATwS evcnt where! a
-
10s:; of normal ieedwat.er !>as occrirred, a n a l yses 1~ai.e showr. t h a t a t . u i - h i ~ et T i p
i:; nc:cess;lry iwit.:iin 3 0 secoi:dsj t.0 i r . a i n t a i n S i G i n v e n t o r y .
I f t.:ie t c r b i n e w i l l n o t t r i p , a :c:rhi.ne r u n b a c k (manual d e c r e a s e i n load: a t
maxinun rate will a L s c r e d u c n s t e a m f l o w i n a d t ? i a y c d mancei-. l f t h e T c r h j n c
s t o p v a l v e s c a n n o t be c l o s e d by e i t h e r t r i p or r u n b a c k , t h e M S I V s shou1.d be
r:lc,sed.
. t t i r h j . n e t r i p i s r e r p i r r d f o r an AMS cvent where a loss
A oF r.ain feeciwater
h a s ccc;iireci. For o t h e r ATWS e v e n t s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f wher, ;I turhi.nr!
t . r i p i s t.he i n i t i a t i n g e v e n t , man:ia1 t r i p p i n q of t h e t:.ii-kir.e may y i e l d a
somewhat. h i g h e r s y s t e m p r e s s u r e , d e p e n d i n n i)n t h c i i n i : : i a t i n q e v e n t and t.imt? in
core 1 L t e , t h a n what would o t h e r w i s e be expcct.ed. H Q W O V e r , t h i s a c t i c n has
iniiied i<>be. iwcessary d u e zo t.he analytical result.:; o b t a i n e d . S i n c e
t h e s e a r c rna:iy i n i t . i a t i n g ATWS event::; and scme t h a t : r e q c i r e inur.ediat:r
m i t i q a t i : i g act,ior.s, d i a q r : o s i s of t h e i n i ! : i a t l r i q e v e n t would not. b e i e a s i i ) l e
and s e p a : - a t c guidance i c r - d i i f e r e n t . ATWS eVe1lt.s would complicate t r a i n i r i q and
c o u l d delay t i m e l y performanco o f n e c e s s a r y Liperatcr a z t . i o n s .
PIAST $ F E C I F~! C I NFORMA.'TL.L> :
KIX>WLEDGF,!RR 1 L I':.x. :
-
Bank Question: 906.1 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) A station emergency battery is supplying DC bus loads without a battely
charger on line.
If the equipment load on the DC bus does not change, whish one of the
following battery discharge curves describes the battery capacity as a
function of the battery discharge rate?
birsll <'rYCfel I*- aIYuw
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct: As battery voltage drops, dischwge current will increase to
maintain power to the same load
B. Incorrect: Battery capacity decreases as discharge rate increases
Ptausible: If the candidate does not apply E=R and P-IE correctly
C. Incorrect: Battery voltage decreases slowly initiatally
Plausible: If the candidate does not apply E=IR and P=IE correctly
D. Incorrect: Battery capacity decreases as discharge rate increases
Plausible: If the candidate does not apply E=IR and P-IE correctly
Level: RO&SRO
KA:SYS 063 A1.O1 (233.3)
Lesson Plan Objective: EPL Obj: 4,21
Source: Mod Ques-906 McGuire NRC 2002
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-EP-EPL page 7,8
Ques-906.1 .doc
DUKE POWER CATAWBA Q P E M TIQNS TRAINING
Objective
1 I
1 State the purpose of the Vital Instrumentation and Control System I X
I 2 I Describe the operation of Kirk-Key Interlocks I X
I 7 I Describe the oDeration of Auctioneering Diode Assemblies lx
8 Describe the basic actions required of an NLO for a loss of Vital or X
Auxiliary Control POWWper AP/I/N5500/29 (Loss of Vital or Auxiliary
Control Power)
h d % i c r i b e omration of the Vital I & C system when configured I
for a batte9 X
I being removed from service
.
m e the imDact a failure of any Vital I & C component will have on IX
unit operation
Describe the Ground Detection controls and indications used at Catawba X
Nuclear Station
I and Control Power System
OB-CN-U-EPL FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 25
Page 3 of 26
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-
N
Objective L
0
.,
Using the Annunciator Alarm Response Procedure for IAD-"I1, correctly ...
describe the annunciator alarms associated with the Vital I & C system
-
Given a set of specific plant conditions and access to reference material,
determine the actions necessary to wmply with Tech Specs/§LC's. -
. .
Summarize BC battery operation under loaded conditions X
e State where to obtain accurate indication of a battery's condition
- State actions to be taken to minimize the drain on a battery
- Describe the operational characteristics when subjected to heavy
loads for lQnQ Derbds Of time -
State from memory all Technical Specification actions for the applicable ...
systems, subsystems and components which require remedial action to
be taken in less than T hour. . .
-
OP-CN-EL-EPL FOR TRAINiN6 PURPOSES ONLY REV. 25
Page 4 of 26
DUKE POWER CA TAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
3. Each battery is also capable of supplying the anticipated momentary
loads during this two-hour period.
4. DC battery operation under loaded conditions (Obj. # 21) (SER 3-99, PIP
c-00-1223)
a) When batteries consisting of more than one cell are discharged for an
extended period of time, the potential exists for individual ceils to drop
below the voltage of the battery bank. Under loaded conditions the
most accurate indication of a battery's condition (voltage) is taken at
each individual cell and not at the distribution center or any meter
which measures voltage across the entire bank of batteries.
b j When a batte9 is under a heavily loaded condition for a long period
of time a phenomena known as cell reversal may occur-. Cell reversal
is a condition where an individual battery cell reverses polarity. The
positive lead becomes the negative lead and the negative lead
becomes the positive lead. When this happens, the cell becomes a
load on the battery and causes the battery's voltage to decrease
rapidly. This phenomena occurs at approximately 80435% of normal
battery voltage. Once a cell has undergone cell reversal, it cannot be
recovered.
c) bow battery voltage can cause damage to the remaining cells in a
battery bank and damage the equipment being supplied from the
battery.
d) To prevent cell reversai and damage to equipment being supplied by
a battery we have to minimize the drain on the battery. Actions taken
to minimize the drain on a battery include removing non-vital loads
from the BC bus, placing AC portions of these systems on alternate
power sources, and consulting station management for
recommended loads to remove from a DC bus.
e) Anytime battery voltage drops below 105 VDC, the battery is
removed from the bus.
5. Plant Response due to 125VDC Battery Failure (Obj. #15)
During normal operation there should be no effect on the Plant since
the Battery Charger will be supplying the 125VDC Distribution
Center.
Receive Annunciator l(2) A D 1 1; H(f-4) 125 VDC ESS PWR
Channel (A-8) trouble for the applicable Battery.
If the Vital Battery is the only source of power then the channel will
become completely de-energized which will be indicated by some of
the following:
1) Multiple Control Room Alarms/Annunciators
2) One row of lights on the Status Indicator Panels will be lit.
OP-CN-EL-EPL FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 25
Page 7 of 26
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS T13AINlNG
3) All instruments which receive power will fail to the bottom of their
indicated scale.
4) Loads affected:
(a) Channel B & Channel C will have little effect on plant
operations since virtually no loads come off of these.
(b) See Section F2 for Loads affected by a Channel A Battery
Failure.
(c) See Section F3 for Loads affected by a Channel D Battery
Failure.
6. Kirk-Key Interlocks (Obj. #2)
1. inputs to A 6 Power Panel EMS are interlocked such that only one
breaker can be closed at a time. This prevents tying two trains of Vital
Power together thereby, preventing a single faiiure from rendering two or
more channels of Vital Instrumentation and Control Power inoperable.
2. EDS output breakers are interlocked to prevent closing more than one
breaker at a time.
3. Any combination of breaker alignment which results in OR& train supplying
the other train through the standby charger results in a control room
annunciator which serves to warn the operator of this condition.
4. The feeder breakers to AC Power Panei EMS on 1E M U and 1EMXJ are
interlocked such that only one breaker may be closed at a time.
D. 425 VDC Distribution Centers
I. Four per unit, designates as follows:
a) EDA - Channel A
b) EDB Channel B
c) EBC -Channel C
d) EDD - Channel D
2. Each Distribution Center receives power from the associated channel
battery charger (normal) or battery (emergency).
3. Each Distribution Center supplies the associated channel static inverter
and one 125 VDC panel boards.
a) EDA supplies auctioneering diode assembly ADA, which feeds 125
VBC Panelboard EDE.
b) EDD supplies auctioneering diode assembly EADB, which feeds 125
VDC Panelboard EDF.
4. A 125VDC Distribution Center Failure will cause the Piant to respond like
a Battery Failure when the Battery is the only source of power to the
Distribution Center.
QP-CN-EL-EPL FOR TRAINING PURPQSS ONLY REV. 25
Page 8 of 26
Bank Question: 906 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) A station emergency battery is supplying DC bus loads without a battery
charger online. If the load on the DC bus does not change, which one of the
following statements correctydcscribes a vital battery's discharge rate
(amps) as the battery is expended?
A. The discharge rate will be fairly constant u n a the design battery
capacity (amp-hours) is exhausted and then will rapidly decrease.
B. The discharge rate will decrease steadily until the design battery
capacity is exhausted.
C. The discharge rate will increase steadily until the design battery
capacity is exhausted.
D. The discharge rate RIM inittally decrease until approximately
50% design capacity had been expended and then increase until
the battery has been exhausted.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: The discharge rate increases.
PIausible: Tkis is a typical response for many design systems - If the
candidate does not recall that V= IXR.
B. Incorrect The discharge rate increases.
Plaaasibie: If the candidate reverses the effect of decreasing voltage
on discharge rate.
C. Correct:
D. Incorrect: The discharge rate increases.
Plausible: Ifthe candidate does not understand battery theory.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: EPE 055 EKI.01 (3.313.7)
Lesson Plan Objective: EL-EPL SEQ 12/20
Source: New
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
I . BP-MC-EP-EPL pages 65-67
Bank Question: 9OOa.f Answer: D
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is responding to a S/G tube rupture in E-3 (Steam Generator Tube
Rupture). Given the following events and conditions:
The target temperature has been determined.
e P-1 1 has been reached and the operators have blocked main steam
isolation signal.
- Operators are preparing to open the steam dumps to cooldown to the
target tenipmture.
What is the applicable limit for the operator opening the steam dumps?
A. The steam dumps should be opened to limit the main steam
header depressurization rate to < 100 psig/sec.
B. Steam dumps should be opened to limit the cooldow7nrate to less
than 100 degreeshour to prevent exceeding Tech Spec limits.
C. Steam dumps should be opened to limit the cooldown rate to less
than 25 degreesihour to prevent pressurized thermal shock
concerns.
D. All steam dumps should be fully opened to depressurize the S/Gs
as quickly as possitaie.
P___
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: E-3 requires depressurizing at the maximum rate wide
avoiding a main steam isolation signal at 100 psiglsec when above P-
11.
Plausible: if the operator does not recognize tbat blocking P-1 1
prevents the main steam isolation signal actuation
B. Incorrect: E-3 requires depressurizing at the maximum rate while
avoiding a main stem isoiation signal at 100 psig/sec
Plausible: While TS limits apply, the dumps will be isolated long
before that limit is approached. This is the TS cooldown limit.
C. Incorrect: E-3 rcquircs depressurizing at the maximum rate while
avoiding a main stem isolation sigma1 at 100 psig/scc
Plausible: PTS and limiting cooldown are reasonablc concerns for
other events.
D. Correct: E-3 requires depressurizing at the maximum rate while
avoiding a main steam isolation signal at 100 psig/sec - but P11 has
been blocked so this is not a problem.
Level: RO&SRB
KA: EPE 038 A1.05 (4.1/4.3j
Lesson Plan Objective: EP4 Qbj: 19
Source: Mod McGuire NRC 2002
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. QP-CN-EP-EP4 page 8
2. E-3 page 20
3. E-3 Background Document step 19 pages 23-28
DUKE POWER
=......._-__ -<.- - A_
CATAWBA ......OPERATIONS TRAINING
--.
Objective
Desired)
Explain the Bases, including any identified knowledges/abilities, for
all of the steps, notes, and cautions in EP/I/N5000/E-3 (Steam
Generator Tube Rudure)
Explain the Bases, including any identified knowledges/abilities, for
all of the steps, notes, and cautions in EP/I/A/5000/ECA-3.2 (SGTR
With Loss of Reactor Coolant-Saturated Recovery Desired)
Given a set of specific plant conditions and all required procedures,
use the rules of usage and outstanding PPRBs to identify the
7. INTRQDUCTION
1.1 Objectives
- DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
-
3.1 is made if either condition is not satisfied. NC System
depressurization to ruptured SIG pressure is accomplished using either
PZR sprays or PZR PQRVs. Depressurization will be terminated prior to
stoppage of the P-S leak and recovery of PZR level, if PZR level
indicates abnormally high (head void formation loss of PZZR press
~
control) or loss of subcooling (steam formation in the active NC System
region).
4. Terminate SI! to Stop Primary to Secondary Leakage with the successful
stoppage of P-%leakage there is no need for S/l flow to maintain NC
inventory. S/i pumps are stopped and normal inventory control is
established. NC pressure and charging flow are controlled to prevent
leakage through ruptured S/G tubes.
5. Prepare for Cooldown to Cold Shutdown. With all safety concerns
addressed the operators will align the plant systems for a cooldown from
near hot shutdown conditions to a cold shutdown condition. Transition
will be made to a post-SGTR cooldown method procedure (33.1, 3.2,
3.3). Subsequent cooldown will be accomplished by backfilling, S/G
blowdown or steam dumps.
C. Use the "Enhanced Background Documeni" for Enclosure Explanation, basis
for NQTES/CAUTIONS and All Steps.
2.2 EP//1(2)/N5000/ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill) (Qbj. # I ,2,3,4,5)
A. Overview
1. Purpose: To provide guidance for attaining cold shutdown conditions
while controlling primary pressure at secondary press (no P-S leakage)
end cooling the ruptured S/G by repeatedly transferring the heated
secondary water through the rupture to the primary and refilling the S/G
with feedwater.
2. ES-3.1 is entered from E-3 based on the availability of intact SlGs for
cooidown and other piant systems to support normal cooldown functions.
3. E§-3.1 is exited to E-3, if a rupture of another S/Goccurs. Exit to ECA
9.1 is made, if NC subcooling is lost or steam release capability from all
non-ruptured S/G(s)is lost. ES-3.1 is a terminal procedure that places
the plant in a cold shutdown condition with further actions being
determined by station management.
B. Major Action Summary
1. Prepare for cooldown to cold shutdown. Normal NC System inventosy
and pressure control is established or verified. CLAs are isolated to
prevent injection that cwld re-establish P-S leakage and would delay NC
depressurization. Shutdown margin is controlled to ensure adequacy
during backfil! operation that wiil dilute the NC System.
2. Cooldown and Depressurize NC System for RHR Operations.
OP-CN-EP-EP4 FQR TRAIMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 04
Page 8 of 16
19. (Continued)
f. Bump steam to condenser from intact f. Perform the following:
SI6(s) at maximum rate while
attempting to avoid a Main Steam - I)Dump steam from all intact SIG(s)
Isolation. with SIG PORV(s) at maximum rate
while attempting to avoid a Main
Steam Isolation.
- 2) E any intact SIG PBRV cannot be
opened from the control room,
THEN dispatch operator@)to dump
steam at maximum rate from intact
S/G(s) P O W . REFER TO
Enclosure 3 (Local Operation of
SIG PORVs).
3) IF operator@)were dispatched to
SIG PORV(sj, THEN:
- a) Obtain sound powered phone
from storage box on rear wall of
control room.
- b) Connect sound powered phone
to jack on 1MC-11.
- c) Monitor sound powered phone
for communication from the
Doghouse(s).
4) E no intact SIG is available for NC
System cooldown, =contact
station management to determine
which of the following to perform:
-* Use faulted S/G
QR
- --
GO TO EQ/I/N5QQO/ECA-3.1
(SGTR With boss Of Reactor
Coolant - Subcooled Recovery
Desired).
- 5) =Tostep 19.g
STEP 19 N O I F ~ LAft,er the l o a steamline pressure main steam i s o l a t i o n s i g n a l
i s blocked Main Steam 1so;ation w i l l occur i f t h e high steam
p r e s s w e r a t e setpo.int. i s exceeded
PURPOSF :
Tc a l e r t t h e operatar t o the p o t e n t i a l f o r inadvertent
steamline i s o l a t i o n during t h e subsequent steam generator
depressur; z a t ion.
APPLICABLE ERG BASIS:
An automatic p r o t e c t i o n feature i s provided t o close t h e main
steamline i s o l a t i o n valves &en t h e steam pressure r a t e
s i g m l i s exceeded. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g step. t h e operator i s
i n s t r u c t e d t o dlrmp steam from t h e i n t a c t steam generators
which may resu:t i n exceedicg t h e raLe s e t p o i n t . Therefore.
t h i s note i s intended t o a l e r t t h e operator o f t h i s
possi b i 1it y .
The r a p i d cooldown should be continued using t h e atmospheric
stearn duinps i f MSIV closure occurs.
PLANT SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
KNOWLEOGEiAB I L IT Y :
Page 23 of 73 Revision 18
~ STFI' Ut!XRIf'!IOFi TABLE !OK E P l I i A i 5 0 0 0 : t - 3
C
_.. mpcrator Actions
STEP 19 I n i t i a t e VC System cooldown as f o l l o w s ,
PURPOSE :
To e s t a b l i s h s u f f i c i e v t subcooling i n t h e NC System so that. t h e primary system
w i l l remain subcooled a f t e r pressure i s decreased t o stop primary-to-secondary
1eakage.
Discmsion o f Substep a , :
e To i d e n t i f y a secondary side break i n t h e ruptured steam generator and
t r a n s f e r t h e operator t o th.e appropriate contingency procedure.
To minlmize possible pressurized thermal shock o f t h e reactor vessel due
t o r a p i d cooldown below 350°F i n subseqdent steps.
APPLICABLE ERG BASIS:
The p r i n c i p a l goal o f t h e E-3 procedwe i s t o stop primary-to-secondary
leakage and t o e s t a b l i s h and maintain s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n s o f adeqirate
cooliint inventory. These i n d i c a t i o n s include a pressurizer l e v e l i n d i c a t i o n
t o t r e n d coolant inventory and HC System subco3l'ing t o ensure t h a t t h e
indicated pressurizer l e v e l i s r e l i a b l e . This step i s designed t o e s t a b l i s h
s u f f i c i e n t subcooling i n t h e MC System so t h a t t h e primary system w l l l remain
subcooled a f t e r KC System pressure i s decreased iI: subsequent steps t o stop
p r i mary-to-secondary 1eakage,
Since. i n order t o stop t h i s leakage. t h e NC System pressure mirst be decreased
t o a value equal t o t h e ruptured steam generator pressure. t h e temperature a t
which t h i s cooldown i s terminated is dependent upon t h e ruptured steam
generator pressure. A t a b l e i s provided f o r various ruptured steam gecerator
pressures showing t h e f l u i d temperature corresponding t o 20°F subcoo1;ng a t
each o f these pressures, i n c l u d i n g allowances f o r subcooling u n c e r t a i n t i e s
w i t h normal o r adverse containment conditions. The cooldown i s based on t h e
core e x i t T i c s since these a l s o provide t h e i c p u t f o r S / I termination and
r e i n l t i a t i o n . The 20°F subcooling i s provided as operating margin t o
accommodate f l u c t u a t i o n s i n NC: S y s t m temperature. perturbations i n ruptured
steam generator pressure, i n t e r p o l a t i o n between 1i s t e d ruptured steam
generator pressures, and overshoot d u r i r g NC System depressurization.
As previously demonstrated. t h e pressure o f t h e i n t a c t steam generators must
be nair%aioed less than t h e pressure o f t h e ruptured steam generators i n order
to maictain kC System subcooling. S'ifice f l o w from t h e rupt.ured steam
generator shou!d be i s o l a t e d . t h i s pressure d i f f e r e n t i a l is established by
dumping steam only from t h e i n t a c t steam generators. Steam dump t o t h e
condenser ;s preferred t o minimize r a d i o l o g i c a l releases and conserve
feedwater supply. However, t h e PORVs on t h e i n t a c t steam generators provide
ar: a l t e r n a t i v e steam release path. I f no i n t a c t steam generator i s a v a i l a b l e .
NC System temperature should be c o n t r o l l e d by a d j u s t i n g feed f l o w t o a f a u l t e d
steam generator o r by releasing steam from a ruptured steam generator. This
l a t t e r inethod w i l l r e s u l t i n continued primary-to-secondary leakage and i s
best handled i n ECA-3.1 (SGTR With Loss O f Reactor Coolant - Subcooled
Recovery desi red).
It i s not intended f o r t h e operator t o r e e v a l u a t e t h e reqilired core e x i t
temperature or p r e c l s e l y i n t e r p o l a t e between values l i s t e d i n t h e t a b l e .
Continued On Next Page.
Page 24 of 73 Revision 18
_ ~~
STEP ~ _ _ _ l A ~ i E , , . F O t itP/l/A/S00lIlE -3
Ut5CRIPT13N
C. 3verat.p- Actioc.5-
Co!i:.inued From Previous ,?age
For s m a l l tube f a i l u r e s . Pzr pressure may reaain above t h e P-11 permissive.
Althotigh pressure w i i i decrease as t h e NC System i s cooled. i t may s t i l l
remain greater than t h e P-11 permissive. I n t h a t case t h e operator can reduce
Dzr pressure using Pzr spray o r a FrJRV. so t h a t t h e S/I signal can be blocked.
When t h e required core e x i t t.emperature ?s reached. t h e ir,t.act steam generator
pressure ( o r feed flow t o a f a u l t e d steam generator) should be c o c t r o l l e d t o
maintain that temperature.
Cooldown of t h e NC System should be completed before continuing i n t h e
procedure.
Natural c i r c u l a t i o n f l o w i n t h e ruptured loops may stagnate during t h i s
cooldown. The h o t l e g temperature i n t h a t loop may remain s i g n i f i c a n t l y
greater thar. t h e i n t a c t loops. I n a d d i t i o n . s a f e t y i n j e c t i o n f l o w i n t o t h e
c o l d l e g may cause t h e c o l d leg f l u i d temperature t o decrease r a p i d l y i n t h a t
same loop. Steps t o depressurize t h e NC System and terminate S/I shotild be
performed as q u i c k l y as possible a f t e r t h e cooldown has been conpleted t o
minimize possible pressurized-thermal shock o f t h e reactor vessel.
NC System cooldown should proceed as q u i c k l y as possible and should n o t be
l i m i t e d by t h e 100"Flhr Technical S p e c i f i c a t i o n l i m i t . E F t e g r i t y l i m i t s
should n o t be exceeded since t h e f i n a l temperature w i l l remain above 356°F
Considerations when s e l e c t i n g a f a u l t e d o r ruptured S / G f o r NC System cooldodn:
In t h e u n l i k e l y event t h a t no i n t a c t steam generator i s a v a i l a b l e . one must
s e l e c t e i t h e r a f a u l t e d steam generator. i . e . . one w i t h a secondary side
break. o r a ruptured stean; gererator f o r c o o l i ~ gt h e NC S y s t m t o NO System
operating c o n d i t i o n s . This Cecjsion should be based upon consideration o f
t h e concerns created by each method and an evaluation o f t h e parameters that
e f f e c t them. A secondary side break leads t o uncontrolled steaming o f t h e
a f f e c t e d steam generator and possible avercooling o f t h e NC System.
Continued feed fled t o t h i s steam generator w i l l increase t h e amount o f
steam discharged and can increase the uncontrolled coo!dowri o f t h e WC
System. The p o t e n t i a l consequences o f continuing t o feed a f a u l t e d steam
generator depend on t h e s i z e and l o c a t i o n o f t h e secondary s i d e break. For
breaks i n s i d e containment. feed f l o w t o t h e a f f e c t e d s t e m generator w i l l
r e s u l t i n a d d i t i o n a l discharge t o containment and p o t e n t i a l l y higher
containment pressures and temperatures. This miy adversely a f f e c t t h e
r e l i a b i l i t y and accuracy o f instrumentation i n s i d e containment. Therefore.
i f containment pressure i s adverse, a f a u l t e d steam generator should not be
used f o r NC System cmldown. Although contairiment conditions w'i11 n o t be
a f f e c t e d i f t h e break i s located outside containment. t h e area surrounding
t h e break w i l l be uninhabitable u n t i l a f t e r steam f l o w subsides. Since
continued feed f l o w w i l l prevent access t o t h i s area. personnel requirements
i n t h e v i c i n i t y should be considered before feeding a f a u l t e d steam
germator.
As p r e v i o u s l y mentioced. a steam break may also r e s u l t i n an overcooling
event. The c o l d l e g teaperatvre response depends on t h e s i z e o f t h e break
and t h e inventory i n t h e a f f e c t e d steam generator. For l a r g e r breaks.
continued feed flow can reduce t h e c o l d l e g temperature and may cause a
chal;enge t o r e a c t o r vessel i n t e g r l t y . Consequently. feed f l o w should n o t
be i n i t i a t e d t o a f a u l t e d steam generator i f any c o l d l e g temperature may
v i o l a t e t h e I n t e g r i t y Status Tree ORANGE or RED path p r i o r i t y l i m i t s .
Continued On Next Page.
Page 25 o f 73 Revision 18
_
Sli_
p L l~
X R I F T I 3 N TARLF. FO3 iPIIiAi5000iE-3
~
C . Ofifrator Actions
Continued f rom Previous Page
0 Thermal stresses on t h e steam generator tubes should also be considered
before feeding a f a u l t e d steam generator. Ift h e steam generator i: d r y ,
c o l d feed f l o w may stress t h e h o t tubes causing tube f a i l u r e s . f u r t h e r
dissussion on feeding a h o t , d r y steam generator i s provided i n t h e
background document f o r FR-H.5 (Response To Steam Generator Low Leve' 1.
As an a l t e r n a t i v e coo:down method. one couid steam a ruptured steam
generator. I n add'ition t o increasicg radiological reieases. t h i s w i l l
r e s u l t i n continued primary-to-secondary leakage. I f t h e tube f a i l w e i s
l a r g e , t h e r e a c t o r coolant makeup supply could be depleted before Rt1R system
cooling can be established. This Ray a l s o r e s u l t i n a steam generator
o v e r f i l l c o n d i t l o n . Hence. before steaming a ruptured steaK generator. one
must consider p o t e n t t a l r a d i o l o g i c a l consequences. i w i u d i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
the condenser, r e a c t o r coolant a c t i v i t y . and meteoroiogical c o n d i t i o n s . and
also t h e r a t e o f accumulation o f water i n t h e ruptured steam generator and
reactor coolant makeup supply.
I f more than olie steam generator i s ruptured. t h e lowest ruptured S I G pressure
should be used t o determine t h e required core e x i t temperature. If cooldown
t o a t a r g e t core e x i t temperature i s already i n progress when a subsequent.
SGTR i s diagnosed. t h e operator should stop t h e c o o l d w n (as d i r e c t e d by
enclosure 1) u n t i l t h e subsequent ruptured S / G i s i s o l a t e d since continuing
the cooldown would lower t h e pressure i n t h e newest ruptured S I G and would
r e s u l t i n unnecessary releases p r i o r t o i t s i s o l a t i o n from t h e i n t a c t S / G s .
The t a r q e t core e x i t t e m e r a t u r e should be re-examined t o determine i f t h e
temperature should be reduced based on t h e subsequent ruptured S / G pressure
(DW-92-070).
Continued On Next Page.
Page 26 o f 73 Revision 18
- p i p DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR iF/l:A/50iiO/E-3
.C. Ocerator Actions
Ccntinuecl f-rom Previous Page
Discussion o f Substep a . (320 P S I G j : 218
SJbsequent steps d i r e c t the operator t o dtimp steam from the i n t a c t steam 2
generators t o cacl t h e NC System as r a p i d l y as possible i n crder t o t
e s t a b l i s h adequate subcooling margin. The temperature a t which t h i s t
cooldown i s terminated depends on t h e pressure i n t h e ruptirred stean 2
generators. I f t h i s pressure i s less than t h e s a t u r a t i o n presstire >
-
corresponding t o 350°F plus 20°F and inaccuracies. t h i s cooldown could 2
r e s u l t i n an ORANGE p r t o r i t y on t h e I n t e g r i t y Status Tree. To avoid th.;s t
condition t h e operator i s transferred t o ECA-3.1 (SGTR k i t h Loss O f Reactor >
-
Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired). which l i m i t s t h e cooldown r a t e t o t
less than 100"Fihr. 218
A ruptured steam generator pressure l e s s than t h e s a t u r a t i o n pressure t
corresponding t o 350°F plus 20°F and inaccuracies i s also a possible 2
i n d i c a t i o n o f a steam break associated w i t h t h e affected steam generator. 2
For such an event. t h e ECA-3.1 procedure i s more approprjate since 2
primary-to-secondary leakage cannot be terminated u n t i l c o l d shutdown. 218
A pressure based on 350°F was chosen t o prevent unnecessary t r a n s i t i o n s :rom 2
E-3 a t hjgher pressures when i t i s s t i l l desirable t o continue w i t h E-3 and t
t o minimize possjble pressurized thermal shock o f t h e reactor vessel. Since t
there i s no check on t h e r e a c t i v i t y condition, t h e r e i s no g u x a n t e e that t
r e t u r n t o c r i t i c a l i t y w i l l not occur during NC System cooldown. 218
e Under t h e u n l i k e l y case t h a t r e c r i t i c a l i t y occurs. t h e NC System cooldown 2
would r e s u l t i n a challecge t o t h e C r i t i c a l Safety Functions. i . e . . a t
c r i t i c z l i t y conditton on t h e S u b c r i t i c a l i t y Status Tree. The operator w i i ? 2
be d i r e c t e d t o t h e procedure FR-S.! (Response To Nuclear Power 2
Generation/ATWS). o r t h e procedure FR-S.2 (Response To Loss Of Core 2
Shutdownj. t o i n i t i a t e emerGency boration o f the NC System and obtain 2
adequate shutdowr: margin. A f t e r t h e adequate shutdown margin i s assured. 2
t h e operator w i l l be d i r e c t e d t o go back t o E-3 procedure t o c o n t i w e t,he t
recovery actions. 218
PLANT SPECIFIC INFORMTION:
Operating crews have asked i f they could base t h e i r t a r g e t temperature on t h e
S / G PORV s e t p o i n t i f pressure i s befng maintained by t h e S / G PORV. The PPRB
response states t h a t ii?order t o avoid adding complexity t o t h i s procedure.
the crew should use t h e pressure t h a t i s observed a t t h e time t.he step i s
read. Even though using t h e l o v e r pressure and r e s u l t i r g ?ower t a r g e t
tnyperature r e s u l t s i n i: longer cooldown and sdbsequent hjgher ruptured S / S
leve'l. t h e Pzr PORVs can be used i f S / G o v e r f i l l becones a concern. Also.
using t h e lower t a r g e t t m p e r a t u r e r e s u l t s i n a more conservat.ive subcooling
margin a f t e r depressurization (PPRB EP/liA/5000/1E. 4/16/93),
Continued On Next Page.
Page 27 o f 73 Revision 18
Bank Question: 907 Answer: Q
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is implementing FR-C. 1 (Response to Inadequate Core Cooling).
Given the following events and conditions:
P-1 1 has been blocked.
Operators are preparing to open the steam dumps to deprcssurize intact
steam generators to 110 psig.
What guidance should be given to the operator opening the s t e m dumps?
A. The steam dumps should be fully opened to depressurize the
S/Gs as quickly as possible.
8. A cooldown rate of less than 100 degreedhour should be
established to prevent exceeding Tech Spec limits.
C. A cooldown rate of less than 25 degreedhour should be
established to prevent pressurized thermal shock concerns.
D. The steam dumps should be very slowly opened (<2 psig I sec) to
prevent MSIV closure.
I - -
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: The steam dumps should be opened slov.4y.
Plausible: If the candidate confuses the FR-C guidance with tube
rupture guidance.
B. Incorrect: While TS h i t s apply, the dumps will be isolated long
beforc that limit is approached.
Plausible: This is the TS cooldown limit.
C. Incorrect: PTS is not the immcdiate concern with CETs >1200
degrees.
Plausible: PTS and limiting cooldoRn are reasonable conccrns for
other events.
D. Correct: note in C. 1 informs the operator that a depressurization ratc
of less than 2 psighecond will maintain the MSIVs open.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: EPE 074 EK2.06 (3.5/3.6)
Lesson Plan Objective: EP-FRC SEQ 4
Source: New
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. OP-MC-EP-FRC page 37
2. EP/l/A/5000/FR-C.1 page 9
Bank Question: 977.1 Answer: B
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a loss ofoffsite power caused a
reactor trip. The crew has verified natural circulation in ES-0.I (Reactor
Trlp Raponse). Ten minutes later, the operator notes that the themiocouple
input to both plasma displays is malfunctioning.
Which one of the following correctly describes a valid indication that natural
circulation is continuing?
A. S/G saturation temperatures are decreasing and REACTOR VESSEL
UR LEVELindication is greater than 100 %.
3. S/G pressures are decreasing and T,, is at S/G saturation
temperature.
C. $/epressures are decreasing and REACTOR VESSELD P indication
is greater than 100%.
D. $/Epressure is at saturation pressure for TCold and REACTOR
V E S S E L D P indication is greater than 100 %.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: There is no indication of coupling between primary and
secondary.
Plausible: These are important indications during natural circulation.
B. Correct:
C. Incorrect: RVLIS is unavailable during natural circulation.
Plausible: S/Gpressure decreases during natural circulation and
RVLIS is one of the other plasma display indications.
D. Incorrect: RVLIS is unavailable during natural circulation.
Plausible: S/G pressure will remain close to saturation for Tcold
during natural circulation and RVLIS is one of the other plasma
display indications.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: AE'E056AK1.04(3.1*/3.2*)
Lesson Plan Objective: HT Obj: 15
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: memoy
Ques-9ll.l.doc
References:
1. ES-Q.1 page 12
2. ES-0.1 Enciosure 2 page 21
-
DUKE POWER CATAWEA OPERATIONS TRA/N/NG
-- - -
I N L P
Objective s L P T
S 0 R
~
Define Heat Transfer
~~ ~
--I-
State the three ways heat is transferred in a nuclear power plant.
Define Conduction heat transfer.
Explain the variables that effect the rate of conduction.
List the formulas used for conduction.
Give an example of where conduction heat transfer occurs in the power
plant.
Given a set of Darameters. be able to work conduction problems.
Define Convection heat transfer.
Explain the variables that effect the rate of convection.
List the formulas used for convection.
Give an example of convection heat transfer in the power plant.
Given a set of parameters, be able to work convection problems.
Define Natural Circulation.
~
List the characteristics of a power plant that are required for natural
circulation.
Describe the parameters used to determine if natural circulation exists.
Explain what plant conditions the operator maintains to enhance natura!
circulation.
Describe what plant conditions can impede natural circulation.
Define Radiation heat transfer.
Explain the variables that effect the rate of radiation heat transfer.
Give an example of radiation heat transfer in the power plant.
Define Departure From Nudate Boiling.
Explain how DNB occurs in a nuclear reactor.
Describe the undesirable effects of DNB.
List the parameters that effect DNB.
QP-CN-THF-HT FQR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES QNLY REV. 06
Page 3 of 15
A C T I O N l E X P E C T E D RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 13. Verify at least one NC pump ON. - Perform the following:
NOTE Preference should be
given to running NC Pump
1B and then NC Pump 18
to provide Pmr spray
capability.
- a. Start one NC pump. REFER TO
OPll/A/6150/002A (Reactor Coolar
Pump Operation).
- b. Verify Natural Circulation until an NC
pump can be started. REFER TO
Enclosure 3 (Natural Circulation
Monitoring Parameters).
14. Determine status of Nlls as follows:
- a. Verif IlR channels - LESS THAN a. Perform the following:
8
I O - ? AMPS.
- 1) WHEN IIR channels are less than
SA ~
THEN IIP
perform Steps S,
14.b and 14.c.
- 2) GO IQStep 15.
- b. Verify S/R channels - ENERGIZED. - b. Place SIR select switches in "RESET".
- c. Transfer one channel of the "NIS
RECOBDEB" to SIR instrumentation.
Ir I I II
REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE
Enclosure 3 Page 1 of 1
Natural Circulation Monitoring Parameters
1. The f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s s u p p o r t o r i n d i c a t e n a t u r a l c i r c u l a t i o n f l o w :
0 NC s u b c o o l i n g - GREATER THAN O°F
o C / G p r e c s c i r e s - 2TABL.E OR DECREASING
0 NC T - t i o t s - STABLE O R D E C R E A S I N G
n C o r e e x i t 1 / C s - STAELL O R D E C R E A S I N G
n NC T - C o l d s - A 1 S A T U R A l I O N TEMPERATURE FOR S / G FRESSURE
(WITHIN 1 H E LIMITS 01 THE GRAPH BELO!4:.
S i G PRESSURE ( P S I G )
200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
4CO
300
20G
100
200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
NC T-COLD TEMPERATURE ( O F )
2. -
IF Natural Circulation flow i s not established. i n c r e a s e dumping steam t o
e s t a b l i s h Natural C i r c u l a t i o n flow.
Rank Question: 957.I ARSW@f: D
1 Pt(s) Unit 1 is opemting at full power. Given the foliowing containment
ventilation lineup:
e 3 Lower Containment Ventilation Units (LCWs)
e 1 Pipe Tunnel Booster Fan (PTBF)
3 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Vent Fans
e 1 Incore Instrument Room Air Handling Units (HIRAHLJs)
3 Upper Containment Ventilation Units (UCWs)
Both Containment Auxiliary Charcoal Filter Units (CACFUs) are
shutdown
A loss of offsite power occurs on Unit 1. Both diesel generators start and
energize ETA and ETB. Sequencing is complete. No operator action ha?
been taken regarding the electric plant.
What is the expected Containment Ventilation lineup?
A. None of the previously running equipment will he running,.
B. All equipment running prior to the loss of offsite power will be
running.
C. AU equipment running prior to the loss of offsite power running,
except the CACFUs, which remain shutdown.
D. All the LCVU, PTBF, CRDM vent, UCVU fans, and both
I I W U s , will be running. The CACFUs will remain shutdown.
I -
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: Each train starts their respective fans, even those not
running previously, except for the CACFUs.
Plausible: may believe no equipment starts until the sequencers are
reset.
B. Incorrect: Each train starts their respective fans, even those not
running previously, except for the CACFUs.
Plausible: partially correct - true except for the CACFUs
C. Incorrect: Each train starts their respective fans, even those not
running previously, except for the CACFUs.
Plausible: partially comect - negiects the start of the other
equipment.
D. Correct: Each train sta& their respective fans, even those not
running previously, except for the CACFUs.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 022 A3.01 (4.114.3)
Ques-957.l.dos
Lesson Plan Objective: W Obj: I2
Source: Bank
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-W pages 12 and 13
Ques-957.l.doc
_...
DUKE .n
POWER ......
....-... . CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
P
Objective
foliowing operating modes:
- Normal Cooling
Lower Containment Additional Cooling
Upper Containment Additional Cooling
I
12 Describe the automatic actions that occur in the W System on a Blackout
Load Sequencer actuation.
13 Describe the effects on the Containment Chilled Water (W)system and
' configured
associated piping when the Containment Ventilation (W)System is not
properly during periods of low containment heat load.
-
14
-
15
conditions, determine compliance with the LCB and apply any Required
Actions or Surveillance Requirements.
OP-CN-CNT-W FOR TRAINING PURPOSES QNLY REV. 18
Page 4 of 58
DUKE PO WEB CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
4. The CACFUs contain paper HEPA filters and prefilters. These are
installed upon unit entry into Mode 5 and removed prior to entry into
Mode 4. This eliminates the possibility of filter material coming loose in
lower containment during an accident and clogging the ND pump suction
screens.
5. CACFUs are controlled by individual ON/O!T E30 pushbuttons on the
Main Control Board.
2.7 -
System Alignments (Modes 1 4) (Obj # 4I)
A. Normal Cooling Alignment
1. 3 LCVUs in LOW speed and NORM.
2. 1 PTBF in LOW speed.
3. 3 CRDM vent fans ON.
4. 1 BlRAHU in NORM.
5. 1 or 2 UCVUs in NORM and associated RaFs in AUTO.
B. If Lower Containment additional cooling is required:
1. First, start the fourth LCVU in LOW speed and NORM
2. If additional cooling is required, place two LCVUs in HIGH speed and
place the PTBF in HIGH speed.
3. A third LCVU can be placed in HIGH speed if necessary.
C. If Upper Containment additional cooling is required, start additional UCVUs in
NORM.
2.8 System Response to a Blackout Load Sequencer actuation (Ob] #12)
A. A blackout, as far as containment ventilation is concerned, can be defined as
a loss of normal power to either 4160v Essential Bus ETA or ETB with
subsequent Blackout Load Sequencer actuation. Containment ventilation
system components are designed to respond to a train related blackout (e.g.
A and C LCVUs will respond only to a blackout on ETA).
5. All W System components except the CACFUs are powered from Blackout
MCCs.
C. W System Component Response
a. LCVUs start in LOW speed. 16 LCVUs were in HIGH speed they will start
in LOW speed to protect the Diesel Generator.
2. FTBFs start in LOW speed.
3. CRDM vent fans start.
4. llRAHUs start
5. UCVUs start
OP-CN-CNT-W FOR TRAlNiNG PURPOSES ONLY R N . 18
Page 12 of 18
DUKE POWER -. ................-. CATAWBA OPERATiONS TRAiNiNG
D. All W units operate as indicated regard[ess of switch position.
E. All W units will return to their pre-blackout status when the load sequencer is
reset.
F. If the loss of power to ETA and/or ETB was caused by a ioss of offsite or unit
power, The W system may automatically align RN to the W cooling coils.
W will automatically swap to RN on a loss of power to 600v Unit Motor
Control Centers MXE or MXI
2.9 Limits and Precautions (Obj #14) - Provide students with Limits and Precautions
from OP/1/A/6450/001 (Containment Ventilation (W)Systems).
2.10 Technical Specifications (Obj #14)
A. Provide the students with copies of latest revisions of the LCO and Bases far
T.S. 3.6.5 (Air Temperature).
B. Note that Containment Air Temperature is determined by calculating the
average of the temperature indications at the inlet of the operating ventilation
units (separately for lower and upper compartments)
3. SUMMARY
3.1 System Operation Alignment
A. Normal
1. 3CRDM Fans
2. 1 Incore Instrument Room Cooling Unit
3. 3 bower Containment Cooling Units/Fans
4. 1 Pipe Tunnel Booster Fan
5. lor 2 Upper Containment Cooling Units and Return Air Fans
B. Blackout (Train related).
1. Lower Containment Fans start in LOW speed.
2. Pipe Tunnel Booster Fans Start in LOW speed
3. CRDM Fans Start
4. Incore Instrument Fans Start
5. Upper Containment Fans Start
6. Cooling water Auto Swaps from W to RN unless W is in local then a
manual swap to KN is required.
3.2 Review Objectives
OP-CN-CNT-W FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 8
Page 13 of 18
Bank Question: 963 Answer: C
1P W Which one of the following statenicnts correctly describes how a severe axial
flux imbalance that is outside of the normal limits (as defined in the ROD
Book section 3.9 (OACMunualinput Data)) could affect automatic and
manual rod withdrawal at 100% power?
A. AFD inputs to OTDT cause the QTDT setpoint to increase,
which could actuate a C3 rod stop to prevent automatic rod
withdrawal. Operator would manually insert rods to restore
AFD within the target band and clear the rod stop.
B. AFD inputs to OPDT cause the OPDT setpoint to decrease,
which could actuate a C3 rod stop to prevent automatic or
manual rod withdrawal. Operator would manually insert rods to
restore AFD within the target band and clear the rod stop.
C. AFD inputs to OPDT and QTDT cause both setpoints to
decrease, which could actuate a C3 or C4 rod stop to prevent
automatic or manual rod withdrawal. A turbine runback would
automatically reduce NC temperature below the QPDT or
OTDT setpoints to clear the rod stop.
D. AFD inputs to OPDT and OTDT cause both setpoints to
increase, which would actuate a C3 or C4 rod stop to prevent
automatic rod withdrawal. Manual rod withdrawal would still
operate and a turbine runback would not occur. Operators
would manually insert or withdraw rods to restore AFD within
the target band and clear the rod stop.
Distracter Analysis: AFD being outside the penalty box causes OTDT and
OPDT setpoints to decrease which will cause the C3 and C4 rod
stops to actuate at 100% power
A. Incorrect: An automatic turbine runback will reduce delta-t below
6 3 setpoint.
Plausible: answer is partially correct - auto rod wiiithdrawai will be
inhibited
3. Incorrect: OPDT causes a C4 rod stop - not C3. An automatic
turbine runback will reduce delta-t below C4 setpoint.
Plausible: conhses with OTDT -answer is partially correct
6. Correct:
D. Incorrect: Manual rod withdrawal is inhibited and an automatic
turbine runback will reduce delta-t below C3 or C4 setpoint.
Plausible: answer is partially correct - moving rods to restore AFD
directly counters the AFD problem.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 001 A3.03 (3.6/3.8)
Lesson Plan Objective: IPX SEQ 9
Source: New
Level of knowledge: comprehension
References:
I. OP-CN-IC-IPX page 14, 15
2. Tech Spec 3.3.1 gages 18-20
-..= DUKE
_
.-_
..
PO WE/? 7-
7 ..
CA TAWBA OPERATIONS .
a.
TRAINING-
I L L P
Objective S P P T
S R S R
State the purpose of the Reactor Protection System (IPX) System. I X
List the reactor trips. lx
Describe the function of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS).
... ..... ..... .. .... ....
Describe the operation of the following breakers and associated
... .....Ix1x X X
interlocks:
Reactor trip breakers
0 Reactor trip bypass breakers
- Safety Limit
Limiting Safety System Setting
TIME: 2.0 HOURS
OP-CN-IGIPX FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 25
Page 3 of 35
DUKE POWER - -CATAWBA QPf?ATlONS TRAINING
6) OT Delta T Rod Stop (C-3)
(a) Delta P = Delta T setpoint -3%
(b) Blocks automatic and manual rod withdrawal
(e) QT Delta T Turbine Runback (C-3).Turbine runback @
10% pes minute until Delta T is below the setpoint.
b) Over power Delta T (OP Delta T)
1) Protects against excessive fuel centesline temperature, (KW/ft)
2) Provides a backup to the Power Range High Flux- High Setpoint
Trip.
3) Delta T setpoint varies as a function of Tave, the Rate of Change
of Tave and AFD.
(a) Tayedecreases setpoint as Tave rises above full load,T ,
to correct for changes in coolant density and specific heat
capacity with changes in coolant temperature,
(b) The rate of change of Tave decreases the setpoint if Tave
is increasing.
(c) AFD decreases setpoint if AFD is outside the range given
in ROD Book Section 3.9.
(d) OP Delta T is calculated for each loop.
(e) At full power steady state conditions, OPAT setpoint
should be the value of K4 in the CObR times 100%.
4) If the Delta T in 2/4 loops is greater than the OP Delta B setpoint,
the reactor will trip.
5) Turbine Runback & Rod Stop (C-4)
(a) Delta T = Delta T sp -1%
(b) Blocks automatic and manual rod withdrawal.
(c) Turbine Runback @ 10% per minute until Delta B is below
the setpoint.
4. Pressurizer Trips
a) Low Pressurizer Pressure WX Trip
1) Protects NC System against Departure from Nucleate Boiling
(DNB).
2) 214 Pressurizer pressure channels less than or equal to 1945
psig.
3) Trip Signal auto unblocked greater than P-7, and automatically
blocked less than 8-7.
QP-CN-;1PX FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY R W . 25
Page 14 of 35
DUKE POWER -..-...........................-........ CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING .......
P __m_
.......
b) Hi Pressurizer Water Level Rx Trip
1) Prevents release of water through the reliefs and collapsing of
the Pzr steam bubble.
2) 2/3 level indication greater than or equal to 92% level.
3) Trip signal auto unblocked greater than P -7 and automatically
blocked less than P-7.
c) Hi Pressurizer Pressure
i)Prevents overstressing pressure vessel and piping. (NCS
integrity)
2) Z 4 pressure sensors greeter than or equal to 2385 psig.
5. Reactor Coolant Flow Trips
a) Lo NC flow trip
4) Protects against DNB
2) a 3 channel less than or equal to 91% full flow in 1/4 loops when
greater than P-8.
3) 2/3 channel less than or equal to 91% of full flow in 2/4 loops
when greater than P-7.
b) Undervoltage NC Pump Busses
1) 2/4 NCP busses less than or equal to 5082 volts.
2) Trip signal auto unblocked greater than P-7 and automatically
blocked less than P-7.
c) Under frequency on NC Pump Busses
1) 214 NCP busses less than or equal to 56.4 Hz.
2) Trip signal auto unblocked greater than P-7 and automatically
blocked less than P-7.
3) NCPs are tripped regardless of the state of P-7
B. Heat Sink Protection
1. Steam Generator Trips (Obj. #2)
a) Low-Low Water Level Reactor Trip
1) 2/4 channel on 1/4 S/G less than or equal to 10.7% (Unit I),
36.8% (Unit 2)
2) Low low level in 1/4 S/G starts motor driven aux feed pumps.
3) Low-low level in 2/4 S/G auto start turbine aux feed pump.
4) Protects against sudden loss of heat sink.
OP-CWIGIPX FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 25
Page 15 of 35
RTS Instrumentation
3.3.1
Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
Note 1: Overtemperature AT
The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not excee the following IOMINAL
TRIP SETPOINT by more than 4.3% (Unit 1) and 4.5% (Unit 2) of RTP.
A T (' " ')
(1 + r, s
+ ( &1 < [ ATo K, - K,
' I - T' + K3 ( P - P') - fi (A/)
Where: AT is the measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, "F.
ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, O F .
s is the Laplace transform operator, sec.'.
T is the measured RCS average temperature, O F .
T' is the nominal Tavsat RTP (allowed by Safety Analysis), 5 585.1"F(Unit I)
< 590.8"F (Unit 2).
F i s the measured pressurizer pressure, psig
P' is the nominal RCS operating pressure, = 2235 psig
Ki = Overtemperature AT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, as presented in
the COLR,
K2 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient, as
presented in the COLR,
K3 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip depressurization setpoint penalty
coefficient, as presented in the COLR,
z,, T~ = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for AT, as presented in
the CBkR,
r3
= Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the
COLR,
T~~z, = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for Tevg,as presented in
the COLR,
z0
= Time constant utilized in the measured ,T. lag compensator, as presented
in the COLI?, and
f,(Al) = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of
the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on
measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
(i) for qt - q, between the "positive" and "negative" f,(AI) breakpoints as
presented in the COLR; fl(Al) = 0, where q, and qb are percent
RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the
core respectively, and q, + q, is total THERMAL POWER in percent
of RATED THERMAL POWER;
(ii) for each percent AI that the magnitude of q, - qb is more negative
than the f,(Al) "negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT
Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f,(Al) "negative"
slope presented in the COLR; and
(continued)
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 8 Amendment Nos. 'i95/188
RTS Instrumentation
3.3.1
Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
(iii) for each percent Ai that the magnitude of q, qbis more positive
~
than the f,(Al) "positive" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT
Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f,(Al) "positive"
slope presented in the COLR.
Note 2: Overpower AT
The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following NOMINAL TRIP
SETPOINT by more than 2.6% (Unit I)and 3.1% (Unit 2) of RTP.
Where: AT is the measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTBs, "F.
ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, "F.
s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-'.
T is the measured RCS average temperature, O F .
T"is the nominal Tavg at RTP (calibration temperature for AT instrumentation),
e 585.1"F (Unit 1) 5 590.8"F (Unit 2).
-
& = Overpower AT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT as presented in the
COLR,
Ks = O.O2/"F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average
temperature,
I T' and I$ = 0 for T 5 T',
z,, 't2 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for AT, as presented in
the COLR,
T3 = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the
COLR,
76
= Time constant utilized in the measured Tsvg lag compensator, as presented
in the COLR,
T7 = Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Taw,as presented in the
COLR, and
f,(AI) = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of
the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on
measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
(i) for q, - q, between the "positive" and "negative" f,(Al) breakpoints as
presented in the COLR; f,(Al) = 0, where q, and q, are percent
RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the
core respectively, and q, + q, is total THERMAL POWER in percent
of RATED THERMAL POWER;
(continued)
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-19 Amendment Nos. 195/188
RTS Instrumentation
3.3.1
Table 3.4.1-1 (page 7 of 7)
Reactor Trip System instrumentation
(ii) for each percent AI that the magnitude of q, - q, is more negative
than the f,(Al) "negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT
Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f,(Al) "negative"
slope presented in the COLR; and
(iii) for each percent AI th8t the magnitude of qt - q, is more positive
than the f,(Al) "positive" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT
Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f,(Al) "positive"
slope presented in the COLR.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-20 Amendment Nos. 173/165
Bank Question: 964 Answer: D
1 Pt(s) Unit I is operating at 100% power. Given the following events and
conditions:
Train A equipment is in service.
0 E T A is deencrgized due to a bus fault and power cannot he restored
All plant safety equipment operatcs automatically as d e s i p d .
- No operator action has been taken.
What would be the immediate impact (if any) of the loss of E T A on the
NCP pump bearings?
A. AU NCPs would continue to be cooled.
B. A and D NCPs would lose cooling.
C. B and C NCPs would lose cooling.
D. AU N C h Would b e COokg.
_
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: all NCPs are affected -.the bus fault precludes
reenergizing iETA and prevents restarting A train KC pumps from
the DIG.
Plausible: candidate believes the B train KC pumps would auto-
Start.
B. Incorrect: all NCPs are affected - the bus fault precludes
reenergizing E T A and prevents restarting A train KC pumps from
the DIG.
Plausible: One header supplies A and D NCPs
C. Incorrect: all NCPs are affected -the bus fault precludes
reenergizing 1ETA and prevents restarting A train KC pumps from
the DIG.
Plausible: one header supplies B and C NCPs
D. Correct all NCPs are affected.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: SYS 003 K2.02 (2.5*!2.6*)
Lesson Plan Objective: KC Obj: 4
Source: New
Ques-964.doc
Level of knowledge: memory
References:
1. BP-CN-PSS-KC page 4
DUKE BOWER CATAAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING_p=
Objective
State the D U T B O S of ~ the KC Svstem.
Describe how the KC System is cooled.
Describe the normal Rowpath of the KC System, including
each header and the type of loads serviced by each.
Explain what happens in the KC System during:
- Safety Injection (Ss)
- Phase A Containment Isolation (St)
- Phase B Containment Isolation (Sp)
- Blackout
- Low Low KC Surge Tank Level
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply limits and
precautions associated with OW1(2)/A/6400/005
(Component Cooling Water System)
State the typical values of the KC pump discharge
pressure, KC Hx outlet !empernture -
.............. ............._
arid .KC pump flow. ...
State the basic actions required of an NbO for a loss of
Component Cooling Water and why.
Describe KC system makeup.
Draw a block diagram of the KC system per the KC System
Simplified Drawing.
Explain when the Chemistry. .group is to be notified
concerning the KC system.
Describe the purpose of the EMFSassociated with the KC
System and what is indicated by a high level radiation
alarm.
List the instrumentation available in the control room for the
KC Svstem.
When given a set of plant conditions and access to
reference materials, determine the actions necessary to
corn~lywith Tech SpedSLCs.
Discuss the sumlementarv actions for the loss of KC AP.
BP-CN-PSS-KC FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 42
Page 3 of 26
- DUKE PO WR CATAVYBA OPERATIONS TRAINlNG -
d) Precautions for chemicals used in the KC system:
(a) Sodium nitrite is a suspected carcinogen, so avoidllimit
exposure.
(b) Wash off any KC water thoroughly. It may cause an
irritation to the skin and it will burn the eyes.
4 1. bevel Indication in CR. (OBJ. #4 and #12)
a) bow level in Surge tank (computer point) 37.3%
b) Low low level
(a) 34% ( V I instrument per tank causes valve closure. A
separate instrument is used for indication and alarms.)
(b) Closes the train related Auxiliary and Reactor Building
non-essential header isolation valves.
(c) Ensures at least one train will provide adequate NPSH if a
leak develops with the trains cross-connected.
B. MC Pumps (Obj. #18)
1. Two per train one pump normally running.
2. Power Supply - l(2) ETNB
3. Normal Parameters (OBJ. #6, 'l2)
a) Pressure
1) Normally approximately 100 psig.
2 ) Indication available in Control Room and at each pump.
b) Flow (OBJ. # 6, #12)
1) CR indication
2) Aux. §ID Panel indication
3) Flow will depend on the components in service
(a) -
NB Hx 5000 gpm
(b) KF Hx as required (1000-3000 gpm)
(c) other components normally in service supply 3500 gpm
4. Runout Flow (OBJ. #IT,)
a) Annunciators
1) 5700 gpm increasing with either KC Pump running (Train A(B)
single pump runout)
2 ) 10,800 gpm increasing with 2 KC Pumps running (Train A(B) two
pump runout)
OB-CN-PSS-KC FOR TRAMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 42
Page 7 of 26
Bank Question: 965 Answer: B
1 Pt(s) Unit 2 was operating at 100% when a large-break LOCA occurred inside
containment at 0200. Given the following events and conditions:
e 020 1 - containment pressure = 1.O psig
m 0205 - Containment pressure = 3.0 p i g
m 0210 - containment pressure = 0.5 psig
e 02 15 - containment pressure = 0.1 psig
m a t should be the status of the Containment Air Return dampers and fans at
time m?
A. Dampers open; fans running.
B. Dampers open; the fans never started.
C. Dampers opened but have closed, fans started but have stopped.
D. Dampers opened but have closed; the fans never started.
Distracter Analysis: from the VX lesson plan:
Dampers are automatically opened ifthe following conditions are met: (Obj.
M, 5 )
10 seconds have elapsed from receipt of Sp signal.
e Greater tliai or equal to 0.4 psig signal from Containment Pressure
Control System (CPCS).
- Less than or equal to 0.5 psid across the damper.
- Load Group #1 from D/G sequencer has permission to start
AiF return fans (AFW)automatically start if the following conditions are met:
(Obj. #4,5)
9 minutes have elapsed from receipt of Sp (phase B) signal.
Greater than or equal to 0.4psig 8ignd fronm CPCS.
e Load Group #11 from B/G sequencer has permission to start.
A. Incorrect: fans are not running until 0210 - because 9 minutes have
not elapsed since reaching Sp setpoint (3.0 psig).
Plausible: Candidate believes the ARF starts 9 minutes after phase
A (St) signal
B. Correct dampers open 10 seconds after the Sp signal. Fans start
nine minutes later if CPCS present. CPCS is not present until 0215.
C. Incorrect: dampers remain open; fans start nine minutes after the Sp
signal and would shutdown, however, they never started.
Plausible: candidate does not know time deiay - fans stop on CPCS
interlock at 0.3 psig.
D. Incorrect: dampers remain open
Plawible: candidate believes the dampers close - partially correct.
Level: RO&SRQ
MA:SYS a25 ~4.02 (2.7*/2.5*)
Lesson Plan Objective: VX Obj: 4 , 5
Source: New
Level of knowledge: analysis
References:
I . OP-CN-CNT-VX pages 7 and 8
..-. DUKE......... POWER.. .. .. CA TAWEA OP&W TIONS TRAINING
__=n
Objective
State the purpose of each of the following Containment Hydrogen Control
Systems:
Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer System
Hydrogen Recombiners
- Hydrogen Ignition System
e Hydrogen Purge System
- Containment Hydrogen Monitors
Describe the sources of hydrogen in containment during a LOCA and the
limit on hydrogen concentration in containment.
Describe the various flow paths during operation of these systems.
Describe the automatic and manual operations performed to control the
hydrogen concentration in containment.
Describe the conditions necessary for automatic operation of the
Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer System.
Given appropriate plant conditions, apply Limits and Precautions
associated with related station procedures.
Given a set of plant conditions and access to reference materials,
determine the actions necessary to comply with Tech SpecdSLCs.
e 3.3.3 Hydrogen Monitors
0 3.6.7 Hydrogen Recombiners
3.6.8 Hydrogen Skimmer System
o 3.6.9 Hydrogen Ignition System
e 3.6.1 1 Air Return Svstem
OP-CN-CNT-VX FOR TRAlNlNG PtIWOSES ONLY REV. 17
Page 3 of f f
DUKE PO WE!? . CATAWBA OPERATIONS
..............
.......- ........ ..., s,s,,,s L.-TRAINING
,......-__..- ...
c) 40,000 CFM capacity
3. Back draft dampers, normally closed, act as check valves to prevent ice
condenser bypass. Prevent backnow from lower to upper CNT through
the Air Return Fans. (Obj. #3)
4. Electrically operated dampers are located on discharge of fans. Delta P
interlock is to prevent overloading the damper motor.
5. Inadvertent operation of the Containment Air Return Fan System may
result in excessive depressurization of the containment atmosphere. The
Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) prevents the occurrence
of such an event. Each CPCS loop transmits a start permissive on
containment pressure in excess of the permissive setpoint. The CPCS
loop wiH initiate termination signals when pressure falls below the
termination setpoint. A single CPCS transmitter provides an open
permissive to the Containment Air Return Fan Isolation Damper. This
same transmitter along with a redundant CPCS transmitter provides the
staNenable or the stop signal to the Containment Air Return Fans. Two
redundant interlocks prevent a single failure from resulting in a failure of
the Containment Air Return Fan to stop.
6. Dampers are automatically opened if the following conditions are met:
(Obj. #4,5)
a) 10 seconds have elapsed from receipt of Sp signal.
b) Greater than or equal to 8.4 psig signal from Containment Pressure
Control System (CPCS).
c) Less than or equal to 0.5 psid across the damper.
d) Load Group #from I B/G sequencer has permission to start.
7. CPCS and less than or equal to .5 psid permissive is no longer an input
once the damper is OPEN.
8. ARF automatically start if the following conditions are met: (Obj. #4,5)
a) 9 minutes have elapsed from receipt of Sp signal.
b) Greater than or equal to 0.4 psig signal from CPCS.
c) Load Group #I 1 from D/Gsequencer has permission to start.
9. If containment pressure reaches less than or equal to 0.3 psig, the ARF
will stop, to prevent inadvertent Containment depressurization, but the
dampers will not close. (Obj. #4,5)
I O . Carbon Steel angle dams has been installed around the VX Fans to
prevent flooding and subsequent inoperability during Containment Spray
actuation.
11. To manualiy start the ARF, requires CPCS signal and "ON" selected.
Manual starts of fan will bypass the time delay. (Obj. M)
OP-GN-GbJT-W FOR TRAIMNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 67
Page7offl
12. To manually open the damper requires the following: (Obj. #4)
a) Sp or ARF Manually " O N
b) CPCS signal
c) "OPEN" selected
d) Time delay is bypassed
43. CPCS function is performed by "POWER LOCKOUT" MCG's. Each
contactor has an associated breaker in series. The breaker serves no
useful function but had to be bought as a package to obtain a safety
related seismic qualified contactor. if this "POWER LOCKOUT" breaker
is opened, control room indication is unaffected.
B. Hydrogen Skimmer System
1. Safety related system.
2. Two fans (4260-CFM capacity) located in upper containment.
3. Fans take suction from the following dead-ended spaces in lower
containment. (Obj. #3)
a) All 4 S1G compartments
b) Pressurizer compartment
c) Reactor compartment
d) A11 4 cold leg accumulators
e) North and South fan rooms
f) lncore instrumentation room
4. Fans discharge in upper containment in the vicinity of hydrogen
recombhers. (Obj. #3)
5. Electrically operated isolation valves located in each fan suction line.
6. Isolation valves VX-1A and VX-2B will automatically open 9 minutes after
the receipt of Sp signal. (Obj. #4, 5)
7. Hydrogen skimmer fans will automatically start if the following conditions
are met: (Obj. #4,5)
a) 9 minutes have elapsed from receipt of Sp signal.
b) Load Group #11 from the D/G sequencer has permission to start.
c) The suction isolation valves are open.
8. To manually start the fan just requires manually " O N on the key switch.
This will bypass any time delays. (Obj. M)
9. Po manually OPEN the isolation valve requires (Obj. #4)
a) Sp or VX fan manually on
QP-CN-CNT-VX KPR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. f 7
Page 8 of f f
Bank Question: 966 Answer: A
1 Pt(s) During a reactor start-up, the following conditions are noted:
0 The reactor is at normal operating pressure and temperature.
0 Four NCPs are running.
NCS temperature is being controlled using the steam dumps.
The reactor power is 5%.
Which of the following describes the change in actual plant parameters if the
controlling steam header pressure transmitter fails high?
A. Steam dump demand increases. Steam header pressure
decreases, and NCS temperature decreases.
B. Steam dump demand decreases. Steam header pressure
increases, and NCS temperature increases.
C. Steam dump demand increases, Steam header pressure
increases, and NCS temperature decreases.
D. Steam dump demand decreases. Steam header pressure
decreases, and NCS temperature decreases.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Correct:
B. Incorrect: Steam dump demand increases.
Plausible: Parameter changes are consistent with error in steani
dump change.
C. Incorrect: Steam pressure change is not consistent with increased
demand.
Plausible: reflects indicated rather than actual pressure.
D. Incorrect: Steam dump demand does not go down.
Plausible: psychometrically bakanced.
Level: RO&SKO
KA: SYS 041K3.02 (3313.9)
Lesson Plan Objective: STM-IDE SEQ 9
Source: New
Levei of knowledge: comprehension
References:
1. OP-CN-STM-IDE page 13
DUKE POWER CATAWBA OPERATIONS TRAINING
Objective
Describe the purpose of the IDE System.
List the banks of steam dumps and the number of valves in each bank.
Describe the capacity of the Steam Bump System.
Describe the controllers in the Steam Dump System.
0 Describe the inputs to each controller
0 Discuss the plant conditions required to "enable" the
controller
Discuss the conditions required to "arm" each bank of dump valves.
0 Discuss the plant conditions that would cause Steam Bump
"actuation"
State the number of steam dumps that can be isolated with the unit at
a 00% Dower.
Discuss the purpose and state the setpoint of each of the following:
e P-12 Lo-Lo TaVg Interlock
0 C-78
w C-7B
0 c-9
Describe the controls associated with the ID System.
Describe the system response to a failure of each input to ID.
Describe how to transfer modes of operation of the IDE System.
Discuss how a cooldown is accomplished using the D E System.
OB-CN-SPM-KJE FOR TRAIN\NG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21
Page 3 of 29
A. Fails High -would affect Load Rejection Controller
1. The Load Rejection Contmller would not generate an output since Tref
would in most cases, always be higher than Auctioneered Hi Tavg.
2. This situation would require manual operation of the steam dump system to
reduce Tavgunless TaVgincreased above the failed Trefvalue by more than
3 degrees.
3. Fails Low - would affect Load Rejection Controller
4. Generates a TaVg- Tref mismatch causing an output signal to be generated
from the Load Rejection Controller when indicated Tavg exceeds T~~~by 30
I=.
2. Steam Dump Valves wilt not open until C-78 or C-75 arming signals are
generated by a subsequent failure or actual load rejectionheduction.
5.5 Turbine impulse Pressure Channel II
A. Affects C-7A and C9-5IOSSof load interlock arming signals
1. A high failure would prevent the C-78 and C-75 loss of load interlocks from
actuating.
2. If Channel 1 I impulse pressure fails low, loss of load interlocks 6-7A and C-
7B wit1 actuate to arm the steam dumps.
5.6 Reactor Trip Breaker Failures
A. Breaker "A"fails to open OR a reactor trip
1. The Plant Trip controller is enabled due to $4Train B.
2. P-4 Train A arming signal to the condenser dumps is not available.
3. Condenser dumps could still be armed if C7A or C7B are actuated on the
4. Atmospheric dumps will be armed if C7B is actuated on the reactor trip, but
the Plant Trip controller output is limited to 49% demand. This demand is
insufficient to open the atmospheric dumps.
B. Breaker "B" fails to open on a reactor trip
1. Plant Trip controller is not enabled due to no P-4 Train B.
2. Load Rejection controller is enabled due to no P-4 Train 5. Demand based
on Auct H. Tavg - Tref signal is sent to the steam dumps.
3. Condenser dumps are armed due to P-4 Train A and will open.
4. Atmospheric dumps are not armed because of $4Train A is present.
6. POWER SUPPLY
W-cN-STM-iDE FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES ONLY REV. 21
Page 13 of 29
Bank Question: 967 Answer: C
1 Pt(s) Which one of the following pmcticcs is required of control room personnel in
order to assure accurate; concise verbal communications when communicating
with non-licensed operators (hZOs)?
A. NLQs shall use sound-ponered phone systems as the priority
communications method.
B. KLOs shall use a two-way radio for communications from the cable
spreading room, since there is no telephone readily available.
C. NLOs shall repeat-back instructions for actions directed by the
control room.
ChP %.
D. %LOs shdl. report the completion of ordered actions upon their
return to the kitchen, if there is no telephone readily available.
Distracter Analysis:
A. Incorrect: The telephone is the priority communication method.
Plausible: Sound powercd phones are often used when a direct and
constant communication link is required.
B. Incorrect: Two-way radios are not allowed in the cable spreading area.
Plausible: Two-way rddios are used for fire brigade and when telephones
are not available.
C. Correct:
D. Incorrect: Reporting completion of actions is required imnediatery from
the nearest phone.
Plausible: OMP 2.2 1 requires immediate reporting of actions completed
to the control room.
Level: RO&SRO
KA: G 2$17 (333.6)
Lesson Plan Objective: ADM-NSOI Obj: 14
Source: New
Level of knowledge: mcmory
References:
1. O W 2-16 page 6
2. NSD 509 pages 2 and 7
...
DUKE.....-. .
POWER
. . .
..
a. .. -
CATAWBA OPERATIONS
.....~. . TRAINING ..
- -
L P
Objective P T
R R
0
1 i I Bescribe each step of the S.T.A.R. Self Checking process X
I 2 1 State the purpose for performing Independent Verification X
1 3 I Describe the qualifications of the Verifier X
I I 4 Describe the process of Separate Verification and state when it is
used.
X
I 5 I 5escribe the process of Double verification and state when it is used. X
Describe the process of Independent Verification of locked X
cormonents.
I 1
7 State the conditions that may allow IV to be waived. X
on required when a component is found out of the
state when it is used.
I 1 10 Assess when a Verbal Pre-Job Briefing should be conducted per CNS
S.D. 3.0.21.
1
I
1 11 Explain what items must always be addressed in Verbal $re-Job
Briefing per CNS S.B. 3.0.21.
Evaluate the need for a Written Pre-Job Briefing in accordance with
S.D. 3.0.21 (SRQ Only).
15 Illustrate the application of: X
- Useof Names
Repeat Back (Three Way Communications)
Providing specific Information, for the Operations Communications
I Standards as stated in NSD 509 and QMP 2-21
OP-CN-ADM-NSOI FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 07
Page 3 of f 4
1. Only authorized IAE personnel shall adjust the sound level of
annunciators in the Control Room.
6. Communications
6.1. To ensure effectivc communications. the follow~ingshall be strictly
adhered to by ail Operations personnel.
Non-Iicensed Operators shall be instructed, with the
assignment of each Control Room initiated task, to report their
actions back to the Controi Room immediately upon
completion.
6.2. Telephones are the primary source of communications in the Control
Room. All operators shall ensure the following standard practices are
implemented.
A. When answering the telephone, Control Room personnel shall
answer: "Unit fkJ Control Room, m.
k3. When giving instructions to other employees, Control Room
personnel shall have the person -he instructions back to
ensure thev understand.
C. When incoming calls request action of Control Room
personnel, the Control Rooni pcrsoimel shall repeat the
instructions back to the person requesting the action. This will
ensure both persons understand the request.
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR T O EACH USE
NSD 509 Nuclear Policy Manual -Volume 2
5092.2.3 Performance Criteria
I. Control Room Access: Access to the control room shall be strictly controlled during normal and emergency
conditions. The control room and control room area boundaries shall be clearly defined in Operations
administrative procedures. All personnel who are not normally assigned to the control room, but have a specific
need for access, shall request authorization to enter. Exceptions shall be specifically addressed. For exaniple.
the on duty Operations shitl personnel are not required to request authori7~tiontu enter the control ronm due to
the nature oftheir responsib es. Responsibility for controlling access to the control room in normal and
emergency conditions shall be clearly defined in Operations administrative procedures.
2. Control Room Appearance: High housekeeping standards and cleaning routines shall be implemented and
strictly followed. Responsibilities and routines for the Control Room and Conhol Room area housekeeping
shall be specifically defined.
3. Control Room and Control Room Area Material Condition: Material condition standards shall be
implemented and strictly followed. Control boards. cabinets, chairs, desks, ceilings. floors. walls, lighting, etc.
shall be routinely inspected, repaired, repainted or replaced to maintain a like-new appearance. Tape shall not
be used on control boards, cabinets or desks. Responsibilily for the Conhol Ruom and Control Room area
material conditions shall be clearly defined.
4. Control Room Personnel Dress Code: Control Room licensed personnel shall have standard dress to aid in
proper identification and to present B neat and professional appearance. Reactor Operators shall be distinguished
from Senior Reactor Operators. Licensed operators normally assigned on shiR shall wear the standard dress
when on the simulator or standing license duties.
6. Control Room Environment: The Control Room environment shall be quiet and conducive to a professional
approach to the job. Unnccessar\i distractions that could cause operator attention to be diverted shall be
eliminated.
7. Control Room Communication Practices: The standard communication practices described in Appendix A
of this directive shall be implemented and shktly followed.
Communications is one of the most important functions related to Control Room operations. Directions are
given and taken via several means of communication.
Control Room personnel shall verify their communications are clear. precise and acknowledged. Care should be
taken to ensure all parties are speaking the same technical language. Instructions provided from the Control
Room or requests received by the Control Room personnel shall be repeated using thrw way communication to
ensure accuracy and understanding. Instructions that are unusual or complex shall be written down to eliminate
confusion.
Radio communications shall strictly adhere to the Federal Communications Conimission regulations as
addressed in the Duke Power Company Radio Operators Manual.
8. Control Hoom Sarveillance: Operators shall be alert and attentive to control board indications and alarms.
Control board indic.ations shall be monitored frequently to detect problem situations early. Operator response to
alarms shall be timely and actions shall be taken to address and correct the alarm causes. The number of work
activities affecting control board indications that are performed concurrently shall be limited so that the
operator's ability to detect and respond to abnormal conditions will not be compromised.
9. Control Room Annunriatom and Instrumentation:
Defective Control Room Annunciators and Instrumentation shall be identified and repaired promptly. If an
annunciator is determined to be defective, the Control Operator shall ensure that alternate monitoring means are
available to monitor parmeters of importance.
IO. Control Room E.quipment: Cahinets, chairs. desks. tables, etc. shall be professional i n appearance and limited
to what is authorized by designated Operations Supervision. Workstations shall be arranged in the Control
Room and Control Room area to prevent unnecessary distraction of Control Rocm Personnel.
2 29 JAN 2002
VERIFY NARD C-PY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDaATELY PRIOR T O EACH USE
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
Nuclear Policy Manual - Volnme 2 NSD 509
APPENDIX A.569. NUCLEAR SITE COMMUNICATION STANDARDS
Three Way Communication 8: Use of the Phonetic Alphabet
0 These communication standards describe acceptable practices to be used at the three sites
m They apply to ALL site pemonnel whenever:
I. An individual is directed to take an action aReecting installed plant equipment and!or
2. Information is given to an individual about limits, precautions or plant status.
Communication Standards: Phonetic Alphabet:
Three W q Communication (repeatbacks): A ALPHA ~
.This twl is our primary defense against niiscommunicatinn. n - BRAVO
-Repeathacks and acknowledgments shall he used whether talking face-to-tidce
C -CHARLIE
or using radiositelephnnes.
D - DELTA
-hctionilnFormatinn is clearly direc.fed hy using the receiver's name.
-Requested action w,ill nnt take place until repeathacks and ncknowledgments
E - ECHO
are complete. for example. I:- FOXTROT
Sender-"Fred. open valve IHP-26." G - GOLF
Receiver- "Open valve IHP-26." H - HOTEL.
Sender- "Thxt'r cor~ect."
I -INDIA
Sender (calling work control tiom next to an operating feedpump). 'lnck. alignment conrplcte on Main
Fccdwatcr Pump I - Alpha" 1 - JI![.IETl
Recciver- "Alignment complete an Main Feedwater Pump I - Alpha" K - K11,O
Sendci- "That's correct. L. - LIMA
llse of the Phonetic Alphabet:
M - MIKE
Phonetics shall always he iised fur train and channel designations For example.
N - hOVEMBER
I A Steam Generator would hc"1 Alpha Steam (ienuacnr"
<:CW pump IC would he "CCW I'amp I Charlie.'.
I) - OSCAK
iCF-116B would he"ICF-126Rravn"
P PAPA
~
Chit. main and tihdnn-1 designation shall always he used. For example. Q - QCEHEC
For valve ICF-1268ra~in~:'ICF-lZh Rrava"!s correct. R - ROMEO
S a y n g 'CF-I20 Bravo S SIERRA
nr"IC'F-126.
I - 'rANGO
or"ICF-126E" is not meet:'
[ I -UNIFORM
Phonetics ni noun names should hc wed Yor system OF component designators ullere the sender or receiver
feels there is a rcasnnahle chance ofmiswmrnanication such as. sound alike systems. high nnise areas. V -VICTOR
radioitelephone cammirnicafinn where reception is poor. etc. Fn: enaniplc:
W - WHISKEY
At MNSICNS: NV system m y he referred tn as N-Victor.
41 ONS. "High Pressure Extraction'. coald he used instead o i H P E to prevent m f i i s i o n with HPC high
X - X-RAY
Pressure ln.iection" system Y -YANKEE
The standard phanctic alphabet listed on this attachment shall he used.
Z ZlJLI!
~~
29 JAN 2002
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WER SITE lMMEDlATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
- DUKE POWER A-
,-
. .
CATAWBA OPERATlONS TRAINING
.....-, -_-. ... ...
2) Ask any questions at any time
3) Stop at any point if a question OCCUFS
4) Ensure quality all else
e) For certain activities, the turnover process or a pre-shift briefing
can take the piaee of a pre-job brief.
d) Some activities may be performed without a Pre-Job Brief, as
specified by the group manager or his designee.
3. Canned Pre-Job Briefs -This is a ready made Briefing Form
specifically designed for a task known to require a written Pse-Job
Brief. It can be edited by user to fit current conditions. It SHALL be
used if a canned brief exists.
2.5 Operations Communications Standards, and Practices (Obj. 14, 15, 16, 17)
A. Review the communications standards and expectations as presented in
NSD 509.
1. Use of Names - use students to demonstrate this application
2. Use of Repeat Backs - have students demonstrate
3. Use of Specific Information - have students demonstrate
4. Use of Names/werk areas when using phoneslradios
5. Use of Phonetics (Obj. #ti)
a) Demonstrate cases of likely confusion when the phonetic alphabet
shall be used.
b) Review the three cases in which the phonetic alphabet must be
used.
1) NV, NC & ND Systems
2) When Referring to a valve number and train
3) When referring to a loop or train
c) Misuse of phonetics
B. Review the Rules of Conduct as presented in OMP 2-21 Section 6.0 and
the key considerations when Reporting Abnormal conditions as explained
in Section7.I la. (Qbj. #14)
C. Review proper use of Two-way Radios using latest copy of OMP 2-21,
Section 7. (Obj. #le)
QP-CN-ABM-NSQl FOR TRAlNlNG PURPOSES QMLY REV. 07
Page 13 of 14
DUKE BOWER CATAWBA OPERATk3NS TRAINlNG
2.5 Control Room Conduct
A. Using S.D. 3.1.10 (Control Room Access and Control) and OMP2-16 (Control
Room Conduct), review the procedures that govern Control Room access.
(Obj. #23)
1. The CRSRO is responsible for controlling access to the Control Room
horseshoe area.
2. During emergencies the OSM or designee is responsible for controlling
access to the Control Room horseshm area.
3. Review the list of personnel who may access the Control Room without
permission.
4. Control Room access is restricted during designated turnover times.
B. Using OMP 2-16 (Control Room Conduct), review control room conduct and
professionalism expectations (Obj. #24). Specifically:
1. The CRSRO is responsible for providing the leadership necessary to
enhance the professionalism of Control Room personnel.
2. Access to the Red Zone (the carpeted area in front of the main control
boards) is controlled by the Nuclear Control Operators (NCBs).
3. All Control Room personnel shall behave in a courteous: tactful, and
businesslike manner. Distractions are to be minimized. Review
telephone protocol.
4. Only personnel authorized by the OSM may eat in the Control Room.
5. Only Licensed Operators or HLC License Candidates performing ETQS
tasks may manipulate the reactor controls.
6. If the Control Room Operators request NLOs to perform actions in the
station, the NhQs shall be instructed to report back to the Control Room
when actions are completed.
7. Annunciator Response:
a) Control Operators shall ensure other Control Room personnel are
notified when an alarm is received.
b) Procedures for replacement of burned out annunciator lamps.
C. Using NSD 509, ( Site standards in Support of Operational Focus ), review
the expectations for Control Room personnel response to Control Room
alarms with respect to (Obj. #22);
1. Unexpected alarms,
2. Individual expected alarms
3. Multiple expected a!arms.
4. Nuisance alarms.
OFCN-ADM-NSO5 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY Reds
Page $Q of 12